1 


GIFT    OF 
Ji#E  K.ffATHER 


THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 

The 
Annexation  of  Texas 

Octavo      ix  +  U96  pages 
By  mail,  postpaid,  $3.00 

This  is  the  only  work  attempting  to 
deal  thoroughly  with  an  affair  that 
was  intrinsically  far  more  important 
than  had  previously  been  supposed, 
and  was  also  of  no  little  significance 
on  account  of  its  relation  to  the  war 
with  Mexico. 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


THE 

WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


BY 


JUSTIN   H.   SMITH 

u 
FORMERLY   PROFESSOR    OF    MODERN    HISTORY 

AT   DARTMOUTH    COLLEGE 
AUTHOR   OF    "THE   ANNEXATION   OF    TEXAS,"    "OUR 
STRUGGLE     FOR     THE     FOURTEENTH     COL- 
ONY,"  "ARNOLD'S   MARCH   FROM 
CAMBRIDGE   TO   QUE- 
BEC,"  ETC. 


VOLUME    I 


Ne&j  gotfc 

THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

1919 

All  rights  reserved 


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Copyright,  1919, 
By  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  printed.    Published  December,  1919. 


Norwood  Press 

J.  S.  Cushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


HENRY   CABOT  LODGE,  LL.D. 

SENATOR    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES 

HISTORIAN 

PRESIDENT    OF    THE    MASSACHUSETTS    HISTORICAL    SOCIETY 

WHO    GAVE    THE    AUTHOR    INVALUABLE    ASSISTANCE 

IN  THE  COLLECTION  OF  MATERIAL  RELATING 

TO    THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO 

THIS    WORK 

IS    VERY    RESPECTFULLY    IN8CRIBEI) 


PREFACE 

As  every  one  understands,  our  conflict  with  Mexico  has 
been  almost  entirely  eclipsed  by  the  greater  wars  following  it. 
But  in  the  field  of  thought  mere  size  does  not  count  for  much ; 
and  while  the  number  of  troops  and  the  lists  of  casualties  give 
the  present  subject  little  Comparative  importance,  it  has  ample 
grounds  for  claiming  attention.  \As  a  territorial  stake  New 
Mexico,  Arizona  and  California  were  of  immense  value.)  Na- 
tional honor  ^as  involved,  and  not  a  few  of  the  Mexicans 
thought  their  national  existence  imperilled.  Some  of  the 
diplomatic  questions  were  of  the  utmost  difficulty  and  interest. 
The  clash  of  North  and  South,  American  and  Mexican,  pro- 
duced extraordinary  lights  and  shades,  and  in  both  countries 
the  politics  that  lay  behind  the  military  operations  made  a 
dramatic  and  conlinual  by-play]  The  military  conduct  of 
the  governments  —  especially  our  own  —  and  the  behavior 
of  our  troops  on  foreign  soil  afforded  instruction  worthy  to  be 
pondered.  While  vast  concentrations  of  forces  and  com- 
plicated tactical  operations  on  a  great  scale  were  out  of  the 
question,  the  handling  of  even  small  armies  at  a  long  distance 
from  home  and  in  a  region  that  was  not  only  foreign  but  strange, 
created  problems  of  a  peculiar  interest  and  afforded  lessons 
of  a  peculiar  value,  such  as  no  earlier  or  later  war  of  ours  has 
provided;  and  the  examples  of  courage,  honor  and  heroism 
exhibited  in  a  conflict  not  only  against  man  but  against  nature 
merited  correct  appreciation  and  lasting  remembrance.1  * 

The  warrant  for  offering  another  work  on  the  subject  rests 
primarily  on  the  extent  and  results  of  the  author's  investiga- 
tions.   His  intention  was  to  obtain  substantially  all  the  valuable 

*The  notes  to  which  this  and  the  other  "superior  figures"  invite 
attention  will  be  found  immediately  after  the  text  of  the  volume.  In  the 
notes  only  brief  titles  of  books  are  given,  but  these  may  be  supplemented 
by  reference  to  the  list  of  printed  sources  given  in  the  appendix  of  the 
second  volume.  Citations  (in  the  notes)  preceded  by  a  number  in  black 
type  refer  to  the  list  of  MS.  sources  standing  at  the  end  of  the  notes. 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 

information  regarding  it  that  is  in  existence,  and  no  effort  was 
spared  to  reach  his  end.  The  appendix  of  volume  II  gives  a 
detailed  account  of  the  sources.  By  special  authorization 
from  the  Presidents  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico  it  was 
possible  to  examine  every  pertinent  document  belonging  to 
the  two  governments.  The  search  extended  to  the  archives 
of  Great  Britain,  France,  Spain,  Cuba,  Colombia  and  Peru, 
those  of  the  American  and  Mexican  states,  and  those  of  Mexi- 
can cities.  The  principal  libraries  here,  in  Mexico  and  in 
Europe,  the  collections  of  our  historical  societies,  and  papers 
belonging  to  many  individuals  in  this  country  and  elsewhere 
were  sifted.  It  may  safely  be  estimated  that  the  author 
examined  personally  more  than  100,000  manuscripts  bearing 
upon  the  subject,  more  than  1200  books  and  pamphlets,  and 
also  more  than  200  periodicals,  the  most  important  of  which 
were  studied,  issue  by  issue,  for  the  entire  period.*  Almost 
exclusively  the  book  is  based  upon  first-hand  sources,  printed 
matter  having  been  found  of  little  use  except  for  the  original 
material  it  contains  or  for  data  regarding  biography,  geography, 
customs,  industries  and  other  ancillary  subjects.2 

The  author  also  talked  or  corresponded  with  as  many  of  the 
veterans  as  he  could  reach,  and  he  spent  more  than  a  year,  all 
told,  in  Mexico,  where  he  not  only  studied  the  chief  battle- 
fields but  endeavored,  through  conversations  with  Mexicans 
of  all  grades  and  by  the  aid  of  foreigners  long  resident  in  the 
country,  to  become  well  acquainted  with  the  character  and 
psychology  of  the  people.  As  the  war  was  fought  almost  ex- 
clusively among  them,  and  its  inception,  course  and  results 
depended  in  large  part  upon  these  factors,  the  author  attaches 
not  a  little  importance  to  his  opportunities  for  such  personal 
investigations  and  to  his  Mexican  data  in  general.2 

Probably  more  than  nine  tenths  of  the  material  used  in  the 

/preparation  of  this  work  is  in  fact  new.     No  previous  writer 

\  J  on  the  subject  had  been  through  the  diplomatic  and  military 

\arciuves  of  either  belligerent  nation,  for  example.     Virtually 

a  still  larger  percentage  is  new,  for  the  published  documents 

needed  to  be  compared  with  the  originals.     In  the  printed 

American  reports  relating  to  the  battles  of  September  8  and  13, 

*  These  figures  cover  also  the  author's  "Annexation  of  Texas,"  which 
is  virtually  an  introduction  to  the  present  work. 


PREFACE    .  ix 

1847,  for  instance,  over  fifty  departures  from  the  manuscripts, 
that  seemed  worth  noting,  were  found.  Nor  did  the  additional 
documents  prove  by  any  means  to  supply  mere  details.  A 
great  number  of  unprinted  statements  from  subordinate 
officers,  who  were  nearer  to  the  facts  than  their  superiors  could 
be,  were  discovered.  The  major  official  reports  needed  both 
to  be  supplemented  and  to  be  corrected.  Such  reports  were  in 
most  instances  colored  more  or  less,  and  in  some  radically  dis- 
torted, for  personal  reasons  or  from  a  justifiable  desire  to  pro- 
duce an  effect  on  the  subordinates  concerned,  the  army  in 
general,  the  writer's  government,  the  enemy,  and  the  public 
at  home  and  abroad ;  while,  as  General  Scott  stated  in  orders, 
unintentional  omissions  and  mistakes  were  "common."  Tay- 
lor's account  of  the  battle  of  May  9,  1846,  for  example,  failed 
completely  to  explain  his  victory.  It  has  been  only  by  ob- 
taining and  comparing  a  large  number  of  statements  that 
approximate  verity  has  been  reached.  The  same  has  been 
true  of  the  diplomatic  and  political  aspects  of  the  subject.  The 
reports  of  the  British,  French  and  Spanish  ministers  residing 
at  Mexico,  to  cite  one  illustration,  proved  indispensable.  In 
reality,  therefore,  aside  from  its  broader  outlines  the  field 
presented  ample  opportunities  for  study;  and  while  no  doubt 
so  extended  an  investigation  included  many  facts  of  slight 
value,  La  Rochefoucauld  was  right  when  he  said,  "To  know 
things  perfectly,  one  should  know  them  in  detail."  3 

As  a  particular  consequence  of  this  full  inquiry,  an  episode  I 
that  has  been  regarded  both  in  the  United  States  and  abroad! 
as  discreditable  to  us,  appears  now  to  wear  quite  a  different ' 
complexion.  Such  a  result,  it  may  be  presumed,  will  gratify 
patriotic  Americans,  but  the  author  must  candidly  admit 
that  he  began  with  no  purpose  or  even  thought  of  reaching  it. 
His  view  of  the  war  at  the  outset  of  his  special  inquiries  coin- 
cided substantially  with  that  prevailing  in  New  England,  and 
the  subject  was  taken  up  simply  because  he  felt  convinced  that 
it  had  not  been  studied  thoroughly.  This  conviction,  indeed, 
has  seemed  to  be  gaining  ground  rapidly  for  some  time,  and 
hence  it  is  believed  that  new  opinions,  resting  upon  facts,  will 
be  acceptable  now  in  place  of  opinions  resting  largely  upon 
traditional  prejudices  and  misinformation. 

Some  might  suggest  that  only  a  military  man  could  properly 


x  PREFACE 

write  this  work.  But,  in  the  first  place,  the  author  did  not 
wish  to  prepare  a  technical  military  account  of  the  war.  His 
aim  was  to  offer  a  correct  and  complete  view  of  it  suitable  for 
all  interested  in  American  history,  and  it  will  be  found  that 
politics,  diplomacy  and  other  phases  of  the  subject  required 
as  full  investigation  as  did  its  military  aspects. 

Secondly,  the  author  took  pains  to  qualify  himself  for  his 
task.  The  real  difficulty  of  the  commanding  general  consists 
in  applying  the  principles  of  war  under  complicated,  obscure 
and  changeful  conditions,  and  in  overcoming  " friction' '  of 
many  sorts.  The  intellectual  side  of  the  art  is  readily  enough 
understood.  "In  war  everything  is  very  simple/'  wrote 
Clause witz,  the  fountainhead  of  the  modern  system.  "The 
theory  of  the  great  speculative  combinations  of  war  is  simple 
enough  in  itself,"  said  Jomini;  "it  only  requires  intelligence 
and  attentive  reflection. "  "Strategy  is  the  application  of 
common  sense  to  the  conduct  of  war,"  declared  Von  Moltke. 
Arnold  in  his  Lectures  on  Modern  History  said :  "  An  un- 
professional person  may,  without  blame,  speak  or  write  on 
military  subjects,  and  may  judge  of  them  sufficiently;"  and 
the  eminent  military  authority,  G.  F.  R.  Henderson,  endorsed 
this  view.  "The  theory  of  war  is  simple,"  wrote  another 
expert,  "and  there  is  no  reason  why  any  man  who  chooses  to 
take  the  trouble  to  read  and  reflect  carefully  on  one  or  two  of 
the  acknowledged  best  books  thereon,  should  not  attain  to  a 
fair  knowledge  thereof."  As  may  be  seen  from  the  list  of 
printed  sources,  the  present  author  —  beginning  with  the 
volumes  recommended  by  a  board  of  officers  to  the  graduates 
of  the  United  States  Military  Academy  —  did  much  more  than 
is  here  proposed. 

Finally,  during  the  entire  time  occupied  in  writing  this  work 
he  fortunately  enjoyed  the  advantage  of  corresponding  and 
occasionally  conferring  with  Brigadier  General  Oliver  L. 
Spaulding,  Jr.,  of  the  United  States  Field  Artillery,  formerly 
instructor  at  the  Army  Service  Schools,  Fort  Leavenworth,  and 
more  recently  Assistant  Commandant  of  the  School  of  Fire, 
Fort  Sill,  who  had  distinguished  himself  not  only  in  the 
service  but  as  a  writer  on  professional  subjects.  General 
Spaulding  has  kindly  discussed  with  the  author  such  military 
questions  as  have  arisen,  and  has  read  critically  all  the  battle 


PREFACE  xi 

chapters.     No  responsibility  should,  however,  be  attached  to 
him,  if  a  mistake  is  detected.4 

A  word  must  be  added  with  reference  to  the  notes.  These 
have  been  placed  at  the  ends  of  the  volumes  because  the  author 
believes  the  best  plan  will  be  to  read  the  text  of  each  chapter 
before  looking  at  the  notes  that  bear  upon  it,  and  also  in  part 
because  he  did  not  wish  any  one  to  feel  that  he  was  parading 
his  discussions  and  citations.  The  notes  contain  supplemen-l 
tary  material  designed  to  make  the  work  a  critical  as  well  as 
a  narrative  history,  and  contain  also  specific  references  to  the! 
sources  on  which  the  text  is  based.  These  references  involved 
a  most  annoying  problem.  When  one's  citations  are  limited 
in  number  and  proceed  in  single  file,  as  it  were,  they  can  be 
handled  easily.  But  in  the  present  instance  Qg  ™ any  as  1800 
documents  were  useaTor  a  chapter,  not  a  few  of  which  were 
ciled/more  thari^  onre ;  and  earn  sentence  of  the  text  —  to 
speak  broadly  —  resulted  from  comparing  a  number  of  sources. 
Under  tfiese^conditions  the  usual  method  would  have  produced 
a  repellent  mass  of  references,  perhaps  greater  in  extent  than 
the  text  itself,  which  would  have  been  very  expensive  to  print 
and  from  their  multiplicity  would  have  been  extremely  in- 
convenient. Where  that  method  appeared  feasible  it  was 
adopted,  but  as  a  rule  the  references  have  been  grouped  by 
paragraphs  or  topics.  In  many  cases,  however,  pains  have 
been  taken  to  indicate  in  the  text  itself  the  basis  of  important 
statements,  and  further  hints  will  be  found  in  the  notes.  The 
reader  can  thus  always  ascertain  in  general  the  basis  of  the 
text,  and  will  find  specific  references  wherever  the  author  has 
thought  it  likely  they  would  be  desired.  The  special  student 
will  wish  to  look  up  all  the  citations  bearing  on  any  topic  that 
interests  him.  No  doubt  the  plan  is  somewhat  unsatisfactory, 
but  after  studying  the  subject  for  a  dozen  years  the  author 
feels  sure  that  any  other  would  have  been  more  so.5 

To  thank  all  who  kindly  assisted  the  author  to  obtain  ma- 
terial is  practically  impossible ;  but  a  number  of  names  appear 
in  the  list  of  MS.  sources,  and  others  must  be  mentioned  here. 
Without  the  cordial  support  of  Presidents  Theodore  Roosevelt 
and  Porfirio  Diaz,  Secretary  of  State  Elihu  Root,  Minister  of 
Relations  Ignacio  Mariscal,  and  Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge 
this  historv  could  not  have  been  written;    and   the  author 


xii  PREFACE 

acknowledges  with  no  less  pleasure  his  special  obligations  to 
Whitelaw  Reid,  American  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain,  Joseph 
E.  Willard,  Ambassador  to  Spain;  Henri  Vignaux,  First 
Secretary  of  our  embassy  at  Paris ;  J.  J.  Limantour,  Minister 
of  Hacienda,  Mexico ;  Major  General  J.  Franklin  Bell,  Chief  of 
Staff;  Major  General  F.  C.  Ainsworth,  Adj.  Gen. ;  Admiral 
Alfred  T.  Mahan;  Admiral  French  E.  Chadwick;  Brigadier 
General  J.  E.  Kuhn,  Head  of  the  War  College,  Washington; 
Dr.  J.  Franklin  Jameson,  Director  of  the  Department  of  His- 
torical Research,  Carnegie  Institution;  Dr.  Gaillard  Hunt, 
Chief  of  the  Division  of  MSS.,  Library  of  Congress;  Dr.  St. 
George  L.  Sioussat,  Brown  University;  Dr.  Eugene  C.  Barker, 
University  of  Texas ;  Dr.  Herbert  E.  Bolton,  Professor  Fred- 
erick J.  Teggart  and  Dr.  H.  I.  Priestley  of  the  University  of 
California ;  Dr.  R.  W.  Kelsey  of  Haverford  College ;  Dr.  J.  W. 
Jordan,  Pennsylvania  Historical  Society;  Dr.  Worthington  C. 
Ford,  Editor  for  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society;  Dr. 
Solon  J.  Buck  of  the  Minnesota  Historical  Society;  R.  D.  W. 
Connor,  Secretary  of  the  Historical  Commission  of  North  Caro- 
lina ;  Dr.  R.  P.  Brooks  of  the  University  of  Georgia ;  Dr.  Dunbar 
Rowland,  Director  of  the  Archives  and  Historical  Department 
of  Mississippi ;  T.  M.  Owen,  Director  of  the  Historical  Depart- 
ment of  Alabama ;  Dr.  George  M.  Philips,  State  Normal  School, 
West  Chester,  Pa. ;  Waldo  G.  Leland,  Secretary  of  the  American 
Historical  Association;  W.  B.  Douglas  and  Miss  Stella  M. 
Drumm,  Librarian,  of  the  Missouri  Historical  Society;  Dr. 
Clarence  E.  Alvord  of  the  University  of  Illinois  and  Mrs.  Alvord 
(formerly  Miss  Idress  Head,  Librarian  of  the  Missouri  Historical 
Society) ;  Ignacio  Molina,  Head  of  the  Cartography  Section, 
Department  of  Fomento,  Mexico;  Charles  W.  Stewart,  Li- 
brarian of  the  Navy  Department;  James  W.  Cheney,  long 
the  Librarian  of  the  War  Department;  Major  Gustave  R. 
Lukesh,  Director,  and  Henry  E.  Haferkorn,  Librarian  of  the 
United  States  Engineer  School,  Washington  Barracks;  D.  C. 
Brown,  Librarian  of  the  Indiana  State  Library;  Victor  H. 
Paltsits,  Department  of  MSS.,  New  York  Public  Library; 
W.  L.  Ostrander  of  the  library  at  West  Point;  Lieutenant 
James  R.  Jacobs,  28th  United  States  Infantry;  Dr.  Katherine 
J.  Gallagher;  Dr.  Martha  L.  Edwards.  To  the  widow  of 
Admiral  Charles  S.  Sperry  and  their  son,  Professor  Charles  S. 


PREFACE  xiii 

Sperry,  the  author  is  particularly  indebted  for  an  opportunity 
to  examine  important  papers  left  by  William  L.  Marcy.  Valu- 
able suggestions  were  most  kindly  given  by  Dr.  William  A. 
Dunning  of  Columbia  University  and  Dr.  Davis  R.  Dewey  of 
the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology,  who  read  portions 
of  the  text,  by  Francis  W.  Halsey,  Esq.,  of  New  York,  who 
read  nearly  all  of  it,  and  by  Dr.  Edward  Channing  of  Harvard 
University,  who  was  so  good  as  to  look  over  more  or  less  closely 
all  of  the  proofs.  To  the  helpers  not  mentioned  by  name  the 
author  begs  leave  to  offer  thanks  no  less  sincere. 

Finally,  the  author  desires  to  mention  the  enterprise  and 
public  spirit  shown  by  the  publishers  in  bringing  out  so  ex- 
pensive a  work  at  this  time  of  uncertainty. 

The  Century  Club,  New  York, 
September,  1919. 


CONTENTS   OF  VOLUME   I 


Maps  and  Plans  in  Volume  I 
Conspectus  of  Events  .     .    . 
Pronunciation  of  Spanish     . 


CHAPTER 
I. 
II. 
III. 

IV. 


Mexico  and  the  Mexicans  . 

The  Political  Education  of  Mexico 

The   Relations   between  the   United   States 

Mexico,  1825-1843. 
The  Relations  between  the  United  States 

Mexico,  1843-1846 

The  Mexican  Attitude  on  the  Eve  of  War 

The  American  Attitude  on  the  Eve  of  War 

The  Preliminaries  of  the  Conflict  . 

Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  Guerrero 

The  United  States  Meets  the  Crisis 

The  Chosen  Leaders  Advance 

Taylor  Sets  out  for  Saltillo 

Monterey 

Saltillo,  Parras,  and  Tampico 

Santa  Fe 

Chihuahua     .... 

The  California  Question  Y\ 

The  Conquest  of  California 

The  Genesis  of  Two  Campaigns 

Santa  Anna  Prepares  to  Strike 

BUENA   Vl*TA 


Notes  on  Volume  I        .        .    j,  . 
Appendix  (Manuscript  Sources)  . 


AND 


AND 


PAGE 

xvii 
xix 
xxi 

1 
29 

m 

it 

138X 
156 
- 181  ~ 
204^ 
225 
239 

284 
298_ 
315-^ 

347 
370 
384 

402 
565 


MAPS   AND   PLANS   IN   VOLUME   ONE 

As  equally  good  sources  disagree  sometimes,  a  few  inconsistencies  are  un- 
avoidable. Numerous  errors  have  been  corrected.  An  asterisk  indicates  an 
unpublished  original.     Statements,  cited  in  the  notes,  have  also  been  used. 

PAGE 

1.  Mexico  in  1919.     Based  upon  standard  maps      .         .         .         .    xxii 

2.  Profile  of  the  Route  between  Vera  Cruz  and  Mexico   ...         2 

Drawn  by  Lieut.  Hardcastle  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1 ;  30  Cong.,  1  sess.). 

3.  Matamoros  and  Fort  Brown t     159 

Sketch  map  based  on  a  *map  drawn  by  Luis  Berlandier,  Arista's 
chief  engineer  (War  Dept.,  Mexico) ;  Meade,  Letters,  i,  73  ;  McCall, 
Letters,  444;  New  Orleans  Picayune,  June  28,  1846;  *sketch  by 
Mansfield,  Taylor's  chief  engineer  (War  Dept.,  Washington)  ;  and 
an  anonymous  plan  (Mass.  Hist.  Society). 

4.  Fort  Brown  to  Brazos  Island 162 

Sketch  map  based  principally  upon  the  map  in  Apuntes  para  la 
Historia  de  la  Guerra  entre  Mexico  y  los  Estados-Unidos  and  a 
map  by  Eaton  of  Third  Infantry  (Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  209;  29  Cong., 
1  sess.). 

5.  Battle  of  Palo  Alto K;j 

Sketch  map  drawn  by  a  U.  S.  army  officer.  Based  on  Eaton's 
plan  (Ho.  Ex.  Doc,  209 ;  29  Cong.,  1  sess.)  ;  a  *sketch  by  Ber- 
landier (War  Dept.,  Mexico)  ;  Apuntes ;  Mexico  a  traves  de 
los  Siglos,  iv,  562 ;  El  Republicano  (Berlandier)  ;  a  map  in  Cam- 
pafia  contra  los  Norte-Americanos ;  a  map  by  Lieut.  Dobbins  in 
Life  of  General  Taylor ;  and  Journal  of  Milit.  Service  Institution, 
xli,  96. 

6.  Battle  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma  {i.e.  Resaca  de  Guerrero)       .         .     170 

Sketch  map  based  on  Apuntes ;  New  Orleans  Picayune,  June 
25,  1846,  from  official  drawings ;  a  plan  by  Dobbins  in  Life 
of  General  Taylor ;  a  map  in  Campafia  contra,  etc. ;  a  plan  by 
Berlandier  in  El  Republicano;  a  plan  by  Eaton  (Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  209; 
29  Cong.,  1  sess.) ;  French,  Two  Wars,  52;  and  Journal  of  Milit. 
Service  Instit.,  xli,  100. 

7.  From  Matamoros  to  Monterey   . 210 

Based  on  an  official  Mexican  map  prepared  by  the  Fomento  Dept. 
and  on  Gen.  Arista's  map. 

8.  Battles  of  Monterey  :  General  Map 232 

Based  on  *three  plans  drawn  by  Lieut.  Gardner  from  surveys  of 
Lieut.  Scarritt  (War  Dept.,  Washington)  ;  Picayune  Extra,  Nov.  19, 
1846  (Lieut.  Benjamin)  ;  a  *drawing  by  Adjutant  Heiman  (Tennessee 
Hist.  Society)  ;  a  map  in  Apuntes ;  and  a  plan  by  Balbontin  (In- 
vasion Americana). 

xvii 


xviii  MAPS  AND  PLANS  IN  VOLUME  ONE 

PAGE 

9.    Battles  of  Monterey .  Central  Operations  .         .         .         .  240 

Based  on  the  same  sources  as  No.  8  supra. 

10.  General  Wool's  March 271 

Based  on  reconnaissances  of  Capt.  Hughes,  Lieut.  Sitgreaves,  and 
Lieut.  Franklin  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  32;    31  Cong.,  1  sess.). 

11.  Tampico  and  Its  Environs 276 

Based  on  a  sketch  by  Lee  and  Gilmer  (War  Dept.,  Washington)  ; 
and  a  Fomento  Dept.  Map  (see  No.  7  supra). 

12.  General  Kearny's  March  to  Santa  Fe  .         .  .         ,  F  287 

From  a  sketch  drawn  by  A.  Wislizenus  (Sen.  Misc.  Doc.  26 ; 
30  Cong.,  1  sess.). 

13.  El  Paso  to  Rosales,  Mexico 305 

From  a  U.  S.  War  College  map,  Washington. 

14.  Battle  of  Sacramento 307 

Based  on  a  map  in  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1 ;  30  Cong.,  1  sess. ;  and  a  plan 
in  Mexico  a  traves  de  los  Siglos,  iv,  644. 

15.  California  in  1846 316 

Based  on  a  map  in  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1 ;  30  Cong.,  1  sess. 

16.  Northern  California 317 

From  a  sketch  by  Lieut.  Derby  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  18;  31  Cong., 
1  sess.)  and  recent  maps. 

17.  Fight  at  San  Pascual 341 

From  a  plan  in  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1 ;  30  Cong.,  1  sess. 

18.  Fight  near  Los  Angeles 344 

From  a  plan  in  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1 ;  30  Cong.,  1  sess. 

19.  General  Patterson's  March 360 

From  a  map  in  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  13 ;    31  Cong.,  2  sess. 

20.  From  Mexico  City  to  Agua  Nueva      .         .         .         ,        .         .381 

From  a  Fomento  Dept.  map. 

21.  From  Monterey  to  La  Encarnacion 382 

Based  on  a  map  in  Rapida  Ojeada  sobre  la  Campana,  etc.;-  and 
a  *sketch  by  Lee  and  Gilmer  (War  Dept.,  Washington). 

22.  Battle  of  Buena  Vista         . 387 

Based  on  a  map  drawn  by  Capt.  Linnard  from  the  surveys  of 
Capt.  Linnard  and  Lieuts.  Pope  and  Franklin  (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  1 ; 
30  Cong.,  1  sess.) ;  *two  plans  by  the  same  officers  (War  Dept.,  Wash- 
ington) ;  a  *map  based  on  a  sketch  by  Dr.  Vanderlinden,  chief 
Mexican  surgeon  (War  Dept.,  Mexico) ;  a  map  by  Balbontin  (In- 
vasion Americana) ;  a  *map  drawn  by  Stanislaus  Lasselle  (Indiana 
State  Library)  ;  a  plan  by  Lieut.  Green  (Scribner,  Campaign  in 
Mexico) ;  *Croquis  para  la  intelligencia  de  la  Batalla  de  la  Angos- 
tura (War  Dept.,  Washington). 


■' 


CONSPECTUS   OF   EVENTS 

1845 

March.       The  United  States  determines  to  annex  Texas ;  W.  S.  Parrott 
sent  to  conciliate  Mexico. 
Texas  consents ;  Taylor  proceeds  to  Corpus  Christi. 
Larkin  appointed  a  confidential  agent  in  California. 
Slidell  ordered  to  Mexico. 
Slidell  rejected  by  Herrera. 

1846 

Taylor  ordered  to  the  Rio  Grande. 

Taylor  marches  from  Corpus  Christi. 

Slidell  finally  rejected  by  Paredes. 

Taylor  reaches  the  Rio  Grande. 

Thornton  attacked. 

Battle  of  Palo  Alto.- 

Battle  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma. 

The  war  bill  becomes  a  law. 

Kearny's  march  to  Santa  Fe  begins^ 

Monterey,  California,  occupied.   J 

Camargo  occupied. 

Paredes  overthrown. 

First  attack  on  Alvarado. 

Los  Angeles,  California,  occupied. 

Santa  Anna  lands  at  Vera  Cruz. 

Kearny  takes  Santa  Fe. 

Taylor  advances  from  Camargo. 

Santa  Anna  enters  Mexico  City. 

Operations  at  Monterey,  Mex. 

Insurrection  in  California  precipitated,   i 

Wool's  advance  from  San  Antonio  begins. 

Kearny  leaves  Santa  Fe  for  California. 

Santa  Anna  arrives  at  San  Luis  Potosf. 


July. 

Oct. 

17. 

Nov. 

10. 

Dec. 

20. 

Jan. 

13. 

Mar. 

8. 

21. 

28. 

Apr. 

25. 

May 

8. 

9. 

13. 

June 

5. 

July 

7. 

14. 

Aug. 

4. 

7. 

13. 

16. 

18. 

19. 

Sept. 

14. 

20-24. 

22-23. 

23. 

25. 

Oct. 

8. 

XX  CONSPECTUS  OF  EVENTS 

Second  attack  on  Alvarado. 

San  Juan  Bautista  captured  by  Perry. 

Tampico  evacuated  by  Parrodi. 

Wool  occupies  Monclova. 

Tampico  captured  by  Conner. 

Saltillo  occupied  by  Taylor. 

Scott  appointed  to  command  the  Vera  Cruz  expedition. 

Wool  occupies  Parras. 

Kearny's  fight  at  San  Pascual. 

Doniphan's  skirmish  at  El  Brazito. 

Scott  reaches  Brazos  Id. 

Victoria  occupied. 

1847 

Scott  orders  troops  from  Taylor. 
Fight  at  the  San  Gabriel,  Calif. 
Fight  near  Los  Angeles,  Calif. 
Mexican  law  regarding  Church  property. 
Santa  Anna's  march  against  Taylor  begins. 
Taylor  places  himself  at  Agua  Nueva. 
Scott  reaches  Tampico. 
Battle  of  Buena  Vista. 
Insurrection  at  Mexico  begins. 
Battle  of  Sacramento. 
Scott  lands  near  Vera  Cruz. 
Vera  Cruz  occupied. 
Operations  in  Lower  California  opened. 
Scott's  advance  from  Vera  Cruz  begins. 
Battle  of  Cerro  Gordo ;  Tuxpan  captured  by  Perry. 
Jalapa  occupied. 
Worth  enters  Puebla. 

Trist  opens  negotiations  through  the  British  legation. 
San  Juan  Bautista  again  taken. 
The  advance  from  Puebla  begins. 
Battles  of  Contreras  and  Churubusco. 
ept.  7.    Armistice. 
Battle  of  Molino  del  Rey. 

Battle  of  Chapultepec;  the  "siege"  of  Puebln  begins. 
Mexico  City  occupied. 
Pefia  y  Pena  assumes  the  Presidency. 
Fight  at  Huamantla. 
Trist  reopens  negotiations. 
Mazatlan  occupied  by  Shubrick. 


Oct. 

15. 

24. 

28. 

29. 

Nov 

.  15. 

16. 

18. 

Dec. 

5. 

6. 

25. 

27. 

29. 

Jan. 

3. 

8. 

9. 

11. 

28. 

Feb. 

5. 

19. 

22-23. 

27. 

28. 

Mar. 

9. 

29. 

30. 

Apr. 

8. 

18. 

19. 

May  15. 

June 

6. 

16. 

Aug. 

7. 

20. 

Aug. 

24-! 

Sept. 

8. 

13. 

14. 

22. 

Oct, 

9. 

20. 

Nov. 

11. 

CONSPECTUS  OF  EVENTS  xxi 


1848 


Feb.     2.    Treaty  of  peace  signed. 
Mar.  4-5.  Armistice  ratified. 

10.    Treaty  accepted  by  U.  S.  Senate. 
May  19,  24.    Treaty  accepted  by  Mexican  Congress. 

30.    Ratifications  of  the  treaty  exchanged. 
June  12.    Mexico  City  evacuated. 
July     4.    Treaty  proclaimed  by  President  Polk. 


THE   PRONUNCIATION   OF   SPANISH 

The  niceties  of  the  matter  would  be  out  of  place  here,  but  a  few  general 
rules  may  prove  helpful. 

A  as  in  English  "ah";  e,  at  the  end  of  a  syllable,  like  a  in  "fame," 
otherwise  like  e  in  "let" ;  i  like  i  in  "machine" ;  o,  at  the  end  of  a  syllable, 
like  o  in  "go,"  otherwise  somewhat  like  o  in  "lot";  u  like  u  in  "rude" 
(but,  unless  marked  with  two  dots,  silent  between  g  or  q  and  e  or  i) ;  y  like 
ee  in  "feet." 

C  like  k  (but,  before  e  and  i,  like  *th  in  "thin");  ch  as  in  "child"; 
g  as  in  "go"  (but,  before  e  and  i,  like  a  harsh  h) ;  h  silent ; ,;  like  a  harsh  h ; 
11  like  f  Hi  in  "million" ;  h  like  ni  in  "onion" ;  qu  like  k ;  r  is  sounded  with 
a  vibration  (trill)  of  the  tip  of  the  tongue  (rr  a  longer  and  more  for- 
cible sound  of  the  same  kind) ;  s  as  in  "sun";  x  like  x  in  "box"  (but,  in 
"Mexico"  and  a  few  other  names,  like  Spanish,;)  j  z  like  *  th  in  "thin." 

Words  bearing  no  mark  of  accentuation  are  stressed  on  the  last  syllable 
if  they  end  in  any  consonant  except  n  or  s,  but  on  the  syllable  next  to  the 
last  if  they  end  in  n,  s  or  a  vowel. 

*  In  Mexico,  however,  usually  like  s  in  "  sun."     f  In  Mexico  usually 
like  y. 


XX11 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


MEXICO  AND  THE  MEXICANS 

1800-1845 

Mexico,  an  immense  cornucopia,  hangs  upon  the  Tropic  of 
Cancer  and  opens  toward  the  north  pole.  The  distance  across 
its  mouth  is  about  the  same  as  that  between  Boston  and  Omaha, 
and  the  line  of  its  western  coast  would  probably  reach  from  New 
York  to  Salt  Lake  City.  Nearly  twenty  states  like  Ohio  could 
be  laid  down  within  its  limits,  and  in  1845  it  included  also  New 
Mexico,  Arizona,  Utah,  Nevada,  California  and  portions  of 
Colorado  and  Wyoming.1 

On  its  eastern  side  the  ground  rises  almost  imperceptibly 
from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  for  a  distance  varying  from  ten  to  one 
hundred  miles,  and  ascends  then  into  hills  that  soon  become  lofty 
ranges,  while  on  the  western  coast  series  of  cordilleras  tower 
close  to  the  ocean.  Between  the  two  mountain  systems  lies 
a  plateau  varying  in  height  from  4000  to  8000  feet,  so  level  — We 
are  told — that  one  could  drive,  except  where  deep  gullies  make 
trouble,  from  the  capital  of  Montezuma  to  Santa  Fe,  New 
Mexico.  The  country  is  thus  divided  into  three  climatic  zones, 
in  one  or  another  of  which,  it  has  been  said,  every  plant  may 
be  found  that  grows  between  the  pole  and  the  equator.1* 

Except  near  the  United  States  the  coast  lands  are  tropical 
or  semi-tropical ;  and  the  products  of  the  soil,  which  in  many 
quarters  is  extraordinarily  deep  and  rich,  are  those  which 
naturally  result  from  extreme  humidity  and  heat.  Next  comes 
an  intermediate  zone  varying  in  general  height  from  about 

*  It  will  be  seen  that  occasionally  the  same  "superior  figure"  is  attached 
to  several  paragraphs,  and  that  sometimes  these  reference  numbers    are 
not  in  consecutive  order.     The  reasons  will  be  discovered  when  the  reader 
consults  the  notes,  which  follow  the  text  of  each  volume. 
vol.  i — "b  1 


>*\  I  i  <J  ft  ;*•/:: THE/y'Al  WITH  MEXICO 

2000  to  about  4000  feet,  where  the  rainfall,  though  less  abun- 
dant than  on  the  coast,  is  ample,  and  the  climate  far  more 
salubrious  than  below.  Here,  in  view  of  superb  mountains 
and  even  of  perpetual  snows,  one  finds  a  sort  of  eternal  spring 
and  a  certain  blending  of  the  tropical  and  the  temperate 
zones.  Wheat  and  sugar  sometimes  grow  on  the  same  planta- 
tion, and  both  of  them  luxuriantly;  while  strawberries  and 
coffee  are  not  far  apart.1 

The  central  plateau  lacks  moisture  and  at  present  lacks  .trees. 
The  greater  part  of  it  is  indeed  a  semi-desert,  though  a  garden 


PROFILE  OF  THE  ROUTE 
BETWEEN  MEXICO  AND  VERA  CRUZ 


wherever  water  can  be  supplied.  During  the  wet  season  — 
June  to  October  —  it  is  covered  with  wild  growths,  but  the 
rains  merely  dig  huge  gullies  or  barrancas,  and  almost  as 
soon  as  they  are  over,  most  of  the  vegetation  begins  to  wither 
away.  The  climate  of  the  plateau  is  quite  equable,  never 
hot  and  never  cold.  Wheat,  Indian  corn  and  maguey  —  the 
plant  from  which  pulque,  the  drink  of  the  common  people, 
is  made  —  are  the  most  important  products;  and  at  the 
north  great  herds  of  cattle  roam.  In  the  mountains,  finally, 
numberless  mines  yield  large  quantities  of  silver,  some  gold, 
and  a  considerable  amount  of  copper  and  lead.1 

The  principal  cities  on  the  eastern  coast  are  Vera  Cruz*  the 
chief  seaport,  and  Tampico,  not  far  south  of  the  Rio  Grande 
River.  In  the  temperate  zone  between  Vera  Cruz  and  Mexico 
lie  Jalapa  and  Orizaba,  and  behind  Tampico  lies  Monterey.  On 
the  central  plateau  one  finds  the  capital  reposing  at  an  elevation 
of  about  eight  thousand  feet  and,  about  seventy  miles  toward 
the  southeast,  Puebla ;    while  on  the  other  side  of  the  capital 


THE  PEOPLE  3 

are  the  smaller  towns  of  Queretaro  and  San  Luis  Potosi  toward 
the  north,  and  Zacatecas  and  Chihuahua  toward  the  north- 
west. In  the  middle  zone  of  the  Pacific  slope  rises  the  large 
city  of  Guadalajara,  capital  of  Jalisco  state;  and  along  the 
coast  below  may  be  found  a  number  of  seaports,  the  most 
important  of  which  are  Guaymas,  far  to  the  north,  Mazatlan 
opposite  the  point  of  Lower  California,  San  Bias  a  little  farther 
down,  and  Acapulco  in  the  south.1 

Exactly  how  large  the  population  of  Mexico  was  in  1845  one 
cannot  be  sure,  and  it*  included  quite  a  number  of  racial  mix- 
tures ;  but  for  the  present  inquiry  we  may  suppose  it  consisted 
of  1,000,000  whites,  4,000,000  Indians,  and  2,000,000  of  mixed 
white  and  Indian  blood.2  The  Spaniards  from  Europe,  called 
Gachupines  in  Mexico,  were  of  two  principal  classes  during 
her  colonial  days.  Many  had  been  favorites  of  the  Spanish 
court,  or  the  proteges  of  such  favorites,  and  had  exiled  them- 
selves to  occupy  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time  high  and  lucrative 
posts;  but  by  far  the  greater  number  were  men  who  had  left 
home  in  their  youth  —  poor,  but  robust,  energetic  and  shrewd 
—  to  work  their  way  up.  With  little  difficulty  such  immi- 
grants found  places  in  mercantile  establishments  or  on  the 
large  estates.  Merciless  in  pursuit  of  gain  yet  kind  to  their 
families,  faithful  to  every  agreement,  and  honest  when  they 
could  afford  to  be,  they  were  intrinsically  the  strongest  ele- 
ment of  the  population,  and  almost  always  they  became  wealthy.3 

Their  sons,  poorly  educated,  lacking  the  spur  of  poverty,  and 
finding  themselves  in  a  situation  where  idleness  and  self-in-    -— ^_ 
dulgence  were  their  logical  habits,  commonly  took  "  Siempre--jt{u2 
alegre"  (Ever  light-hearted)  for  their  motto,  and  spent  their  Ac^f 
energy  in  debauchery  and  gambling.     To  this  result  their  own 
fathers,  while  disgusted  with  it,  usually  contributed.     Spanish 
pride  revolted  at  the  ladder  of  subordination  by  which  these 
very  men  had  climbed.     They  felt  ambitious  to  make  gentle- 
men of  their  sons,  and  some  easy  position  in  the  army,  church 
or  civil  service  —  or,  in  default  of  it,  idleness  —  was  the  career 
towards  which  they  pointed;   and  naturally  the  heirs  to  their 
wealth,  whose  ignoble  propensities  had  prevented  them  from 
acquiring  efficiency  or  sense  of  responsibility,  made  haste,  on 
getting  hold  of  the  paternal  wealth,  to  squander  it.     If  the 
pure  whites,  with  some  exceptions  of  course,  fell  into  this 


\ 


4  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

condition,  nothing  better  could  fairly  be  expected  of  those 
who  were  partly  Indian;  and  before  the  revolution  it  was 
almost  universally  felt  in  Spain  and  among  the  influential  class 
of  colonials  themselves,  that  nothing  of  much  value  could  be 
expected  of  Creoles,  as  the  whites  born  in  Mexico  and  the  half- 
breeds  were  generally  called.  The  achievement  of  indepen- 
dence naturally  tended  to  increase  their  self-respect,  broaden 
their  views  and  stimulate  their  ambition;  but  the  less  than 
twenty-five  years  that  elapsed  between  1821  and  1846,  when 
the  war  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States  began,  were 
not  enough  to  transform  principles,  reverse  traditions  and 
uproot  habits.3  ^___ T__ ^ 

The  pure-blooded  Indians  —  of  whom  there  were  many 
tribes,  little  affiliated  if  at  all  —  had  changed  for  the  worse 
considerably  since  the  arrival  of  the  whites.  In  their  struggles 
against  conquest  and  oppression  the  most  intelligent,  spirited 
and  energetic  had  succumbed,  and  the  rest,  deprived  of  strength, 
happiness,  consolation  and  even  hope,  and  aware  that  they 
existed  merely  to  fill  the  purses  or  sate  the  passions  of  their 
masters,  had  rapidly  degenerated.  Their  natural  apathy, 
reticence  and  intensity  were  at  the  same  time  deepened.  While 
apparently  stupid  and  indifferent,  they  were  capable  of  volcanic 
outbursts.  Though  fanatically  Christian  in  appearance,  they 
seem  to  have  practiced  often  a  vague  nature  worship  under  the 
names  and  forms  of  Catholicism.  Indeed  they  were  themselves 
almost  a  part  of  the  soil,  bound  in  soul  to  the  spot  where  they 
were  born ;  and,  although  their  women  could  put  on  silk  slippers 
to  honor  a  church  festival  and  every  hut  could  boast  a  crucifix 
or  a  holy  image,  they  lived  and  cften  slept  beside  their  domestic 
animals  with  a  brutish  disregard  for  dirt.3 

Legally  they  had  the  rights  of  freemen  and  were  even  the 
wards  of  the  government,  and  a  very  few  acquired  education 
and  property ;  but  as  a  rule  they  had  to  live  by  themselves  in 
little  villages  under  the  headship  of  lazy,  ignorant  caciques  and 
the  more  effective  domination  of  the  priests.  As  the  state 
levied  a  small  tax  upon  them  and  the  Church  several  heavy 
ones,  their  scanty  earnings  melted  fast,  and  if  any  surplus  ac- 
cumulated they  made  a  fiesta  in  honor  of  their  patron  saint, 
and  spent  it  in  masses,  fireworks,  drink,  gluttony  and  gam- 
bling.    When  sickness  or  accident  came  they  had  to  borrow  of 


THE  CLASSES  5 

the  landowner  to  whose  estate  they  were  attached ;  and  then, 
as  they  could  not  leave  his  employ  until  the  debt  had  been 
discharged,  they  not  only  became  serfs,  but  in  many  cases 
bequeathed  their  miserable  condition  to  their  children.  Silent 
and  sad,  apparently  frail  but  capable  of  great  exertion,  trotting 
barefooted  to  and  from  their  huts  with  their  coarse  black  hair 
flowing  loosely  or  gathered  in  two  straight  braids,  watching 
everything  with  eyes  that  seemed  fixed  on  the  ground,  loving 
flowers  much  but  a  dagger  more,  fond  of  melody  but  preferring 
songs  that  were  melancholy  and  wild,  always  tricky,  obstinate, 
indolent,  peevish  and  careless  yet  affectionate  and  hospitable, 
often  extracting  a  dry  humor  from  life  as  their  donkeys  got 
nourishment  from  the  thistles,  they  went  their  wretched 
ways  as  patient  and  inscrutable  as  the  sepoy  or  the  cat  —  in- 
fants with  devils  inside.3 

At  the  head  of  the  social  world  stood  a  titled  aristocracy 
maintained  by  the  custom  of  primogeniture.  But  as  the  nobles 
were  few  in  number,  and  for  a  long  time  had  possessed  no 
feudal  authority,  their  influence  at  the  period  we  are  study- 
ing depended  mainly  upon  their  wealth.  Next  these  came 
aristocrats  of  other  kinds.  Some  claimed  the  honor  of  tracing 
their  pedigree  to  the  conquerors,  and  with  it  enjoyed  great 
possessions;  and  others  had  the  riches  without  the  descent. 
The  two  most  approved  sources  of  wealth  were  the  ownership 
of  immense  estates  and  the  ownership  of  productive  mines. 
On  a  lower  level  stood  certain  of  the  rich  merchants,  and  lower 
still,  if  they  were  lucky  enough  to  gain  social  recognition,  a  few 
of  those  who  acquired  property  by  dealing  in  the  malodorous 
government  contracts.  To  these  must  be  added  in  general 
the  high  dignitaries  of  the  church,  the  foreign  ministers,  the 
principal  generals  and  statesmen  and  the  most  notable  doctors 
and  lawyers.     Such  was  the  upper  class.4 

A  sort  of  middle  class  included  the  lesser  professional  men, 
prelates,  military  officers  and  civil  officials,  journalists,  a  few 
teachers,  business  men  of  importance  and  some  fairly  well-to- 
do  citizens  without  occupations.  Of  small  farms  and  small 
mines  there  were  practically  none,  and  the  inferior  clergy  sig- 
nified little.  The  smaller  importing  and  wholesale  mer- 
chants came  to  be  almost  entirely  British,  French  and  German 
soon  after  independence  was  achieved,  and  the  retailers  were 


6  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

mostly  too  low  in  the  scale  to  rank  anywhere.  The  case  of 
those  engaged  in  the  industries  was  even  more  peculiar.  Work- 
ing at  a  trade  seemed  menial  to  the  Spaniard,  especially  since 
the  idea  of  labor  was  associated  with  the  despised  Indians, 
and  most  of  the  half-breeds  and  Indians  lacked  the  necessary 
intelligence.  Skilled  workers  at  the  trades  were  therefore  few, 
and  these  few  mostly  high-priced  foreigners.  Articles  of 
luxury  could  be  had  but  not  comforts;  pastries  and  ices  but 
not  good  bread;  saddles  covered  with  gold  and  embroidery, 
but  not  serviceable  wagons;  and  the  highly  important  factor 
of  intelligent,  self-respecting  handicraftsmen  was  thus  well-nigh 
missing.4 

The  laboring  class  consisted  almost  entirely  of  half-breeds 
and  Indians.  In  public  affairs  they  were  not  considered,  and 
their  own  degraded  state  made  them  despise  their  tasks.  Fi- 
nally, the  dregs  of  the  population,  especially  in  the  large  cities, 
formed  a  vicious,  brutal  and  semi-savage  populace.  At  the 
capital  there  were  said  to  be  nearly  20,000  of  the  leperos,  as 
they  were  called,  working  a  little  now  and  then,  but  mainly  oc- 
cupied in  watching  the  religious  processions,  begging,  thieving, 
drinking  and  gambling.  In  all,  Humboldt  estimated  at 
200,000  or  300,000  the  number  of  these  creatures,  whose  law 
was  lawlessness  and  whose  heaven  would  have  been  a  hell.4 

The  only  church  legally  tolerated  was  that  of  Rome;  and 
this,  as  the  unchallenged  authority  in  the  school  and  the 
pulpit,  the  keeper  of  confessional  secrets  and  family  skeletons, 
and  the  sole  dispenser  of  organized  charity,  long  wielded  a 
tremendous  power.  The  clerical  fuero,  which  exempted  all 
ecclesiastics  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  courts,  reinforced 
it,  and  the  wealth  and  financial  connections  of  the  Church  did 
the  same.  In  certain  respects,  however,  the  strength  of  the 
organization  began  to  diminish  early  in  the  nineteenth  century ; 
and  in  particular  the  Inquisition  was  abolished  in  Mexico,  as 
it  was  in  Spain.  Soon  after  the  colony  became  independent, 
a  disposition  to  bar  ecclesiastics  from  legislative  bodies,  to 
philosophize  on  religious  matters  and  to  view  Protestants 
with  some  toleration  manifested  itself.  Ten  years  more, 
and  the  urgent  need  of  public  schools  led  to  certain  steps,  as 
we  shall  see,  toward  secular  education.  Political  commotions, 
the  exactions  of  powerful  civil  authorities  under  the  name  of 


THE  CHURCH  7 

loans,  and  various  other  circumstances  cut  into  the  wealth  of 
the  Church;  and  the  practical  impossibility  of  selling  the 
numberless  estates  upon  which  it  had  mortgages  or  finding 
good  reinvestments  in  the  case  of  sales,  compelled  it,  as  the 
country  became  less  and  less  prosperous,  to  put  up  with  delays 
and  losses  of  interest.5 

Moreover  the  Church  was  to  no  slight  extent  a  house  divided 
against  itself.  Under  Spanish  rule  and  substantially  down  to 
1848,  all  the  high  dignities  fell  to  Gachupines,  who  naturally 
faced  toward  Spain,  whereas  the  parish  priests  were  mainly 
Creoles  with  Mexican  sympathies;  and  while  the  bishops  and 
other  managers  had  the  incomes  of  princes,  nearly  all  of  the 
monks  and  ordinary  priests  lived  in  poverty.  There  was, 
therefore,  but  little  in  common  between  the  two  ranks  except 
the  bare  fact  of  being  churchmen,  which  was  largely  cancelled 
on  the  one  side  by  contempt  and  on  the  other  side  by  envy; 
and  the  common  priests,  having  generally  sided  against  Spain 
during  the  revolution  and  always  been  closely  in  touch  with 
the  people,  exercised,  in  spite  of  their  pecuniary  exactions,  an 
influence  that  largely  balanced  the  authority  of  their  heads. 
Finally,  the  ignorance  of  most  ecclesiastics  and  the  immorality 
of  nearly  all  greatly  diminished  their  moral  force.  A  large 
number,  even  among  the  higher  clergy,  were  unable  to  read 
the  mass ;  and  the  monks,  who  in  the  early  days  of  the  colony 
had  rendered  good  service  as  missionaries,  were  now  recruited 
—  wrote  an  American  minister  —  from  "  the  very  dregs  of  the 
people/'  and  constituted  a  public  scandal.5 

Still,  the  Church  wielded  immense  power  as  late  as  1845, 
and  this  was  reinforced  by  the  type  of  religion  that  it  offered. 
High  and  low  alike,  the  Mexicans,  with  some  exceptions,  lived 
in  the  senses,  differing  mainly  in  the  refinement  of  the  gratifica- 
tions they  sought;  and  the  priests  offered  them  a  sensuous 
worship.  Sometimes,  almost  crazed  by  superstitious  fears, 
men  would  put  out  the  lights  in  some  church,  strip  themselves 
naked,  and  ply  the  scourge  till  every  blow  fell  with  a  splash. 
It  was  pleasanter,  however,  and  usually  edifying  >  enough,  to 
kneel  at  the  mass,  gaze  upon  the  extraordinary  display  of  gold 
and  silver,  gorgeous  vestments,  costly  images  and  elaborately 
carved  and  gilded  woodwork,  follow  the  smoke  of  the  incense 
rolling  upward  from  golden  censers,  listen  to  sonorous  incan- 


8  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

tations  called  prayers,  and  confess  to  some  fat  priest  well 
qualified  to  sympathize  with  every  earthy  desire.  A  man  who 
played  this  game  according  to  the  rule  was  good  and  safe. 
A  brigand  counting  the  chances  of  a  fray  could  touch  his  scapu- 
laries  with  pious  confidence,  and  the  intending  murderer  solicit 
a  benediction  on  his  knife.  Enlightened  Catholics  as  well  as 
enlightened  non-Catholics  deplored  the  state  of  religion  in 
Mexico.5 

Next  after  the  Church  came  the  "army,"  which  meant  a 
social  order,  a  body  of  professional  military  men  —  that  is  to 
say,  officers  —  exempted  by  their  fuero  from  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  civil  law  and  almost  exclusively  devoted  to  the  traditions, 
principles  and  interests  of  their  particular  group.  As  the 
Church  held  the  invisible  power,  the  army  held  the  visible; 
and  whenever  the  bells  ceased  to  ring,  the  roll  of  the  drum  could 
be  heard.  Every  President  and  almost  every  other  high 
official  down  to  the  close  of  our  Mexican  wac  was  a  soldier, 
and  sympathized  with  his  class;  and  as  almost  every  family 
of  any  importance  included  members  of  the  organization,  its 
peculiar  interests  had  a  strong  social  backing.  By  force  of 
numbers,  too,  this  body  was  influential,  for  at  one  time,  when 
the  army  contained  scarcely  20,000  soldiers'  It  had  24,000 
officers;  and  so  powerful  became  the  group  that  in  1845, 
when  the  real  net  revenue  of  the  government  did  not 
exceed  $12,000,000,  its  appropriation  was  more  than 
S21,000,000.5 

Under  Spanish  rule,  although  the  army  enjoyed  great  privi- 
leges, it  had  been  kept  in  strict  subordination,  and  usefully 
employed  on  the  frontiers;  but  independence  changed  the 
situation.  Apparently  the  revolution  was  effected  by  the 
military  men,  and  they  not  merely  claimed  but  commonly 
received  the  full  credit.  Not  only  did  a  large  number  of  unfit 
persons,  who  pretended  to  have  commanded  men  during  the 
struggle,  win  commissions,  but  wholesale  promotions  were 
made  in  order  to  gain  the  favor  of  the  officers ;  and  in  these 
ways  the  organization  was  both  demoralized  and  strengthened. 
Over  and  over  again  military  men  learned  to  forswear  their 
allegiance,  and  at  one  time  the  government  actually  set  before 
the  army,  as  a  standard  of  merit,  success  in  inducing  soldiers 
of  the  opposite  party  to  change  sides.5 


THE  ARMY  9 

In  the  course  of  political  commotions,  to  be  reviewed  in  the 
next  chapter,  the  armed  forces  were  more  and  more  stationed 
at  the  cities,  where  they  lost  discipline  and  became  the  agents 
of  political  schemers;  and  naturally,  when  the  government 
admitted  their  right  to  take  part  as  organized  bodies  in 
political  affairs,  the  barracks  came  to  supersede  the  legislative 
halls,  bullets  took  the  place  of  arguments,  and  the  military 
men,  becoming  the  arbiters  on  disputed  points,  regarded  them- 
selves as  supreme.  Moreover,  every  administration  felt  it 
must  have  the  support  of  this  organization,  and,  not  being 
able  to  dominate  it,  had  to  be  dominated  'by  it.  Political 
trickery  could  therefore  bring  the  officer  far  greater  rewards 
than  professional  merit,  and  success  in  a  revolt  not  only  wiped 
away  all  stains  of  insubordination,  cowardice  and  embezzle- 
ment, but  ensured  promotion.  A  second  lieutenant  who 
figured  in  six  affairs  of  that  sort  became  almost  necessarily 
a  general,  and  frequently  civilians  who  rendered  base  but 
valuable  services  on  such  occasions  were  given  high  army  rank. 
No  doubt  some  risk  was  involved,  but  it  was  really  the  nation 
as  a  whole  that  paid  the  penalties;  and  anyhow  one  could  be 
bold  for  a  day  far  more  easily  than  be  courageous,  patient, 
studious,  honest  and  loyal  for  a  lifetime.  All  true  military 
standards  were  thus  turned  bottom-side  up,  and  some  of  the 
worst  crimes  a  soldier  can  perpetrate  became  in  Mexico  the 
brightest  of  distinctions.5 

(Of  course  the  discovery  that  rank  and  pay  did  not  depend 
upoh  deserving  them  set  every  corrupt  officer  at  work  to  get 
advanced,  while  it  drove  from  the  service,  or  at  least  dis- 
couraged, the  few  men  of  talents  and  honor ;  and  as  all  subor- 
dination ceased,  a  general  not  only  preferred  officers  willing 
to  further  his  dishonorable  interests,  but  actually  dreaded  to 
have  strong  and  able  men  serve  in  his  command^)  In  1823  the 
Mexican  minister  of  war  reported  to  Congress,  "Almost  the 
whole  army  must  be  replaced,  for  it  has  contracted  vices  that 
will  not  be  removed  radically  in  any  other  way/'  and  four 
years  later  a  militia  system  was  theoretically  established  with 
a  view  to  that  end ;  but  the  old  organization  continued  to 
flourish,  and  in  April,  184G,  the  British  minister  said,  "The 
Officers  .  .  .  are,  as  a  Corps,  the  worst  perhaps  to  be  found 
in  any  part  of  the  world.     They  are  totally  ignorant  of  their 


10  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

duty,  .  .  .  and  their  personal  courage,  I  fear,  is  of  a  very 
negative  character."  5 

In  1838,  a  German  visitor  stated  there  were  a  hundred  and 
sixty  generals  for  an  army  of  thirty  thousand,  and  this  was 
perhaps  a  fair  estimate  of  the  usual  proportion ;  but  out  of 
all  these,  every  one  of  whom  could  issue  a  glowing  proclama- 
tion, probably  not  a  single  "Excellency"  could  properly  handle 
a  small  division,  while  few  out  of  thousands  of  colonels  could 
lead  a  regiment  on  the  field,  and  some  were  not  qualified  to  com- 
mand a  patrol.  A  battle  was  almost  always  a  mob  fight  ending  in 
a  cavalry  charge ;  and  Waddy  Thompson,  an  American  minister 
to  Mexico,  said  he  did  not  believe  a  manoeuvre  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy  was  ever  attempted.  Naturally  the  general  adminis- 
tration of  military  affairs  became  a  chaos;  and,  worst  of  all, 
a  self-respecting  general  thought  it  almost  a  disgrace  to  obey 
an  order  —  even  an  order  from  the  President.5 

The  privates  and  non-commissioned  officers,  on  the  other 
hand,  mainly  Indians  with  a  sprinkling  of  half-breeds,  were 
not  bad  material.  The  Indians  in  particular  could  be  described 
as  naturally  among  the  best  soldiers  in  the  world,  for  they  were 
alm6st  incredibly  frugal,  docile  and  enduring,  able  to  make 
astonishing  marches,  and  quite  ready  —  from  animal  courage, 
racial  apathy  or  indifference  about  their  miserable  lives  —  to 
die  on  the  field.  But  usually  they  were  seized  by  force,  herded 
up  in  barracks  as  prisoners,  liberally  cudgelled  but  scantily 
fed,  and  after  a  time  driven  off  to  the  capital,  chained,  in  a 
double  file,  with  distracted  women  beside  them  wailing  to 
every  saint.  When  drilled  enough  to  march  fairly  well  through 
the  street  in  column,  clothed  in  a  serge  uniform  or  a  coarse 
linen  suit,  and  equipped  with  an  old  English  musket  and  some 
bad  powder,  they  were  called  soldiers,  and  were  exhorted  to 
earn  immortal  glory;  but  naturally  they  got  away  if  they 
could,  and  frequently  on  a  long  expedition  half  a  corps  de- 
serted.5 

Such  men  were  by  no  means  "thinking  bayonets,"  and  as 
a  rule  they  shot  very  badly,  often  firing  with  their  guns  at  the 
hip  in  order  to  avoid  the  heavy  recoil.  Not  only  did  they  lack 
the  inspiration  of  good  officers,  but  in  pressing  times  it  was 
customary  to  empty  the  prisons,  and  place  their  inmates  in 
the  ranks  to  inculcate  vice.     The  government  furnished  their 


/^' 


THE  CIVIL  OFFICIALS  11 

wages,  upon  which  as  a  rule  they  had  to  live  from  day  to 
day,  even  more  irregularly  than  it  paid  the  officers,  and  the 
latter  frequently  embezzled  the  money ;  so  that  it  became  a 
common  practice  to   sell  one's  arms  and    accoutrements,   if 
possible,  for  what  they  would  bring.     Finally,  the  duty  always"* 
enjoined  upon  the  troops  was  "blind  obedience,"  not  the  use  I     ^** 
of  what  little  intelligence  they  possessed;    and  their  bravery,  ]      v 
like  that  of  such  officers  as  had  any,  was  mainly  of  the  im-  / 
pulsive,    passionate    and    therefore    transient    sort,    whereas  / '. 
Anglo-Saxon  courage  is  cool,  calculating,  resolute  and  com- J 
paratively  inexhaustible.5  f 

The  special  pride  of  all  military  men  was  the  cavalry;  but 
the  horses  were  small,  and  the  riders  badly  trained  and  led. 
"The  regular  Mexican  cavalry  is  worth  nothing,"  wrote  the 
British  minister  early  in  1846 ;  and  as  the  mounts  were  quite 
commonly  hired  merely  for  the  parades,  just  as  the  rolls  of  the 
whole  army  were  stuffed  with  fictitious  names  on  which  the 
officers  drew  pay,  it  was  never  certain  how  much  of  the  nominal 
force  could  be  set  in  motion.  As  for  the  artillery,  Waddy 
Thompson  remarked  that  in  a  battle  of  1841  between  the 
foremost  generals  of  the  country,  not  one  ball  in  a  thousand 
reached  the  enemy.  On  the  other  hand  there  were  excellent 
military  bands,  and  one  of  them  dispensed  lively  selections 
every  afternoon  in  front  of  the  palace  at  Mexico.5 

Third  in  the  official  order  of  precedence  and  in  the  actual 
control  of  affairs  came  the  government  officials,  and  these, 
like  the  army  and  the  clergy,  formed  a  special  group  with  a 
similar  fuero,  a  similar  self-interest  and  a  similar  disregard 
for  the  general  good.  Once  appointed  to  an  office  one  had  a 
vested  right  therein,  and  could  not  legally  be  removed  without 
a  prosecution.  To  eliminate  a  person  in  that  manner  was 
extremely  difficult;  and  when  the  government,  in  a  few  no- 
torious instances,  tried  ejectment,  the  newspapers  of  the 
opposition  hastened  to  raise  an  outcry  against  it  for  attacking 
property  rights,  and  the  culprits  were  soon  reinstated.5 

Offering  such  permanence  of  tenure,  a  "  genteel  "  status, 
idleness  even  beyond  the  verge  of  ennui,  a  perfect  exemption 
from  the  burden  of  initiative,  and  occasional  opportunities  for 
illegitimate  profits,  government  offices  appealed  strongly  to 
the  Mexicans,  and  a  greed  for  them  —  dignified  with  the  name 


12  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

of  aspirantism  when  it  aimed  at  the  higher  positions  —  was 
a  recognized  malady  of  the  nation.  To  get  places,  all  the 
tricks  and  schemes  employed  in  the  army  and,  if  possible,  still 
more  degrading  intrigues  were  put  in  play ;  and  offices  had  to 
be  created  by  the  wholesale  to  satisfy  an  appetite  that  grew 
by  what  it  fed  upon.  The  clerks  became  so  numerous  that 
work  room  —  or  rather  desk  room  —  could  not  be  provided 
for  all  of  them.  Only  a  favored  portion  had  actual  employ- 
ment and  received  full  pay  —  if  they  received  any  —  while 
the  rest  were  laid  off  on  barely  enough  to  support  life.  Some 
were  competent  and  willing  to  be  faithful ;  but  when  they  saw 
ignorance,  laziness,  disloyalty  and  fraud  given  the  precedence, 
they  naturally  asked,  Why  do  right?  Idleness  is  the  mother 
of  vice ;  and  so  there  was  a  very  large  body  of  depraved  and 
discontented  fellows,  wriggling  incessantly  for  preferment, 
fawning,  backbiting,  grabbing  at  any  scheme  that  would 
advance  their  interests,  intensely  jealous  of  one  another,  but 
ready  to  make  common  cause  against  any  purification  of  the 
civil  service.5 

How  justice  was  administered  in  Mexico  one  is  now  able  to 
surmise.  The  laws,  not  codified  for  centuries,  were  a  chaos. 
Owing  to  numberless  intricacies  and  inconsistencies,  the 
simplest  case  could  be  made  almost  eternal,  especially  as  all 
proceedings  were  slow  and  tedious.  A*  litigant  prepared  to 
spend  money  seldom  needed  to  lose  a  suit.  Some  cases  lasted 
three  generations.  The  methods  of  administering  justice, 
reported  the  British  representative  in  1835,  "afford  every 
facility"  for  "artifices  and  manoeuvres. "  6 

Another  difficulty  was  that  the  courts  lacked  prestige. 
During  the  revolution  the  magistrates,  practically  all  cf  them 
Gachupines,  committed  so  many  acts  of  injustice  in  behalf  of 
the  government,  that  people  forgot  the  proper  connection 
between  crime  and  retribution.  Punishment  seemed  like 
a  disease  that  any  one  might  get.  In  1833  the  minister  of  this 
department  complained  that  for  five  years  Congress  had  almost 
ignored  the  administration  of  justice;  and  in  1845,  the  head 
of  the  same  department  said  that  for  a  long  time  the  govern- 
ment had  systematically  reduced  the  dignity  and  influence  of 
the  judges  and  magistrates.  Their  pay  was  not  only  diminished 
but  often  withheld;    and  the  official  journal  once  remarked, 


EDUCATION  13 

that  the  authorities  had  more  important  business  in  hand  than 
paying  legal  functionaries.6 

This  was  obviously  wrong,  but  in  a  sense  the  judges  merited 
such  treatment,  for  they  seem  to  have  lacked  even  the  most 
necessary  qualifications.  To  make  the  situation  still  worse, 
the  executive  authorities  had  a  way  of  stepping  in  and  pervert- 
ing justice  arbitrarily.  Even  the  Mexicans  were  accustomed  to 
say,  "A  bad  compromise  is  better  than  a  good  case  at  law"; 
but  it  was  naturally  aliens  who  suffered  most.  "The  great 
and  positive  evil  which  His  Majesty's  subjects,  in  common 
with  other  Foreigners,  have  to  complain  of  in  this  country  is 
the  corrupt  and  perverse  administration  of  justice,"  reported 
the  minister  of  England  in  1834.6 

Criminal  law  was  executed  no  better  than  civil.  The  police 
of  the  city  are  a  complete  nullity,  stated  the  American  repre- 
sentative in  1845.  A  fault,  a  vice  and  a  crime  were  treated 
alike;  and  the  prisons,  always  crowded  with  wrongdoers  of 
every  class,  became  schools  in  depravity,  from  which  nearly  all, 
however  bad,  escaped  in  the  end  to  prey  upon  society.  Well- 
known  robbers  not  only  went  about  in  safety,  but  were  treated 
with  kindly  attentions  even  by  their  late  victims,  for  all  under- 
stood that  if  denounced  and  punished,  they  would  sooner  or 
later  go  free,  and  have  their  revenge.6 
(Adverting  formally  before  Congress  in  1841  to  the  "notori- 
ously defective"  administration  of  justice,  the  Mexican  Presi- 
dent said,  "  the  root  of  the  evil  lies  in  the  deplorable  corruption 
which  pervades  all  classes  of  society  and  in  the  absence  of  any 
corrective  arising  from  public  opinion."  In  large  measure  this 
condition  of  things  was  chargeable  to  the  low  state  of  religion, 
but  in  part  it  could  be  attributed  to  the  want  of  education. ) 
Spain  had  required  people  to  think  as  little  as  possible,  keep 
still  and  obey  orders ;  and  for  such  a  role  enlightenment  seemed 
unnecessary  and  even  dangerous.  To  read  and  write  a  little 
and  keep  accounts  fairly  well  was  about  enough  secular  knowl- 
edge for  anybody,  and  the  catechism  of  Father  Ripalda,  which 
enjoined  the  duty  of  blind  obedience  to  the  King  and  the  Pope, 
completed  the  circle  of  useful  erudition.  In  the  small  towns, 
as  there  were  few  elementary  schools,  even  these  attainments 
could  not  easily  be  gained ;  and  as  for  the  Indians  they  were 
merely  taught  —  with  a  whip  at  the  church  door,  if  necessary 


14  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

—  to  fear  God,  the  priest  and  the  magistrate.  Religion  gave 
no  help ;  and  the  ceremonies  of  worship  benumbed  the  intellect 
as  much  as  they  fascinated  the  senses.6 

When  independence  arrived,  however,  there  sprang  up  not  a 
little  enthusiasm  for  the  education  of  the  people,  and  the  states 
moved  quite  generally  in  that  direction.  But  there  were 
scarcely  any  good  teachers,  few  schoolhouses  and  only  the 
most  inadequate  books  and  appliances;  money  could  not  be 
found ;  and  the  prelates,  now  chiefly  absorbed  in  their  political 
avocations,  not  only  failed  to  promote  the  cause,  but  stood  in 
the  way  of  every  step  toward  secular  schools.  A  few  of  the 
leaders  —  notably  Santa  Anna  —  professed  great  zeal,  but 
this  was  all  for  effect,  and  they  took  for  very  different  uses 
whatever  funds  could  be  extorted  from  the  nation.  In  1843 
a  general  scheme  of  public  instruction  was  decreed,  but  no 
means  were  provided  to  carry  it  into  effect.  The  budget  for 
1846  assigned  $29,613  to  this  field,  of  which  $8000  was  intended 
for  elementary  schools,  while  for  the  army  and  navy  it  required 
nearly  twenty-two  millions.  In  short,  though  of  course  a 
limited  number  of  boys  and  a  few  girls  acquired  the  rudiments 

—  and  occasionally  more  —  in  one  way  or  another,  no  system 
of  popular  education  existed.6 

Higher  instruction  was  in  some  respects  more  flourishing. 
Before  the  revolution  the  School  of  Mines,  occupying  a  noble 
and  costly  edifice,  gave  distinction  to  the  country ;  the  univer^ 
sity  was  respectable ;  an  Academy  of  Fine  Arts  did  good  work ; 
and  botany  received  much  attention.  But  at  the  university 
mediaeval  Latin,  scholastic  and  polemic  theology,  Aristotle 
and  arid  comments  on  his  writings  were  the  staples,  and  even 
these  innocent  subjects  had  to  be  investigated  under  the  awful 
eye  of  the  Inquisition.  Speculation  on  matters  of  no  practical 
significance  formed  the  substance  of  the  work,  and  the  young 
men  learned  that  worst  of  lessons  —  to  discourse  volubly  and 
plausibly  on  matters  of  which  they  knew  nothing.  This  course 
of  discipline,  emphasizing  the  natural  bent  of  the  Creoles, 
turned  out  a  set  of  conceited  rhetoricians,  ignorant  of  history 
and  the  real  world,  but  eager  to  distinguish  themselves  by  some 
brilliant  experiment.  When  the  yoke  of  Spain  had  been  cast 
off,  all  these  institutions  declined  greatly,  and  the  university 
became  so  unimportant  that  in  1843  it  was  virtually  destroyed ; 


THE  INDUSTRIES  15 

but  the  view  that  speculation  was  better  than  inquiry,  theory 
better  than  knowledge,  and  talk  better  than  anything  —  a 
view  that  suited  Mexican  lightness,  indolence  and  vanity  so 
well,  and  had  so  long  been  taught  by  precept  and  example  — 
still  throve  despite  a  few  objectors.  Of  foreign  countries,  in 
particular,  very  little  was  commonly  known.  While  elementary 
education,  then,  was  nothing,  higher  education  was  perhaps 
worse  than  nothing.6 

Nor  could  the  printed  page  do  much  to  supply  the  lack. 
Only  a  few  had  the  taste  for  reading  books  or  opportunities  to 
gratify  the  taste,  if  they  possessed  it.  Great  numbers  of  catchy 
pamphlets  on  the  topics  of  the  day  flew  about  the  streets; 
newspapers  had  a  great  vogue ;  and  there  were  poor  echoes  of 
European  speeches,  articles  and  books ;  but  most  of  the  printed 
material  was  shockingly  partisan,  irresponsible  and  misleading. 
"Unfortunately  for  us,"  observed  the  minister  of  the  interior 
in  1838,  "the  abuse  of  the  liberty  of  the  press  among  us  is  so 
great,  general  and  constant,  that  it  has  only  served  our  citizens 
as  the  light  of  the  meteor  to  one  travelling  in  a  dark  night, 
misguiding  him  and  precipitating  him  into  an  abyss  of  evils."  6 
(^Only  some  300,000  out  of  3,000,000  white  and  mixed  people 
were  actual  ^producers  —  three  times  as  many  being  clericals, 
military  men,  civil  officials,  lawyers,  doctors  and  idlers,  and  the 
rest  old  men,  women  and  children^)  The  most  brilliant  of  their 
industries  was  mining,  the  annual  output  of  which  was  about 
$18,000,000  in  1790,  fell  during  the  revolution  to  $5,000,000,  and 
by  1845  rose  again  —  despite  the  unwise  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment—  to  about  the  earlier  level.  During  the  period  of 
depression  most  of  the  old  proprietors  and  many  of  their 
properties  were  ruined;  but  English  companies  took  up  the 
work,  and  although  for  some  time  their  liberal  expenditures 
went  largely  to  waste,  they  gradually  learned  the  business, 
and  their  example  encouraged  some  Germans  to  enter  the 
field.  How  greatly  the  nation  profited  from  the  mines  was  not 
entirely  clear.  About  as  much  silver  went  abroad  each  year 
as  they  produced,  paying  interest  on  loans  that  should  not 
have  been  made,  and  buying  goods  for  which  substitutes  could 
usually  have  been  manufactured  at  home.  But  the  govern- 
ment laid  valuable  taxes  on  the  extraction  and  export  of  the 
precious  metals,  and  there  was  also  a  profit  in  the  compulsory 


16  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

minting  of  them  —  though,  as  all  the  inventiveness  of  the 
nation  expended  itself  in  politics,  the  processes  at  the  mints 
were  about  as  tedious  and  costly  in  1845  as  while  Cortez  ruled 
the  country.7 

Little  more  can  be  said  for  the  cultivation  of  the  soil.  When 
Mexico  separated  from  Spain,  the  vine  and  the  olive,  flax  and 
certain  other  plants  formerly  prohibited  were  acquired,  and 
coffee  soon  became  important ;  but  on  the  other  hand  agricul- 
ture had  met  with  disaster  after  disaster  in  the  course  of  the 
revolution.  "Up  to  the  present,"  said  a  ministerial  report  in 
December,  1843,  "agriculture  among  us  has  not  departed 
from  the  routine  established  at  the  time  of  the  conquest."  A 
cart-wheel  consisted  still  of  boards  nailed  together  crosswise, 
cut  into  a  circular  shape  and  bored  at  the  centre;  a  pointed 
stick,  shod  sometimes  with  iron,  was  still  the  plough ;  a  short 
pole  with  a  spike  driven  through  one  end  served  as  the  hoe; 
the  corn,  instead  of  going  to  a  mill,  was  ground  on  a  smooth 
stone  with  a  hand  roller ;  and"  no  adequate  means  existed  of 
transporting  such  products  as  were  raised  to  such  markets  as 
could  be  found.  Most  of  the  "roads"  made  so  much  trouble 
even  for  donkeys  and  pack-mules  that  it  was  seriously  proposed 
to  introduce  camels;  and  the  most  important  road  of  all,  the 
National  Highway  from  the  capital  to  Jalapa  and  Vera  Cruz, 
was  allowed  to  become  almost  impassable  in  spots.  Besides 
poor  methods,  bad  roads,  brigands,  revolutions  and  a  great 
number  of  holidays,  there  were  customhouses  everywhere 
and  a  system  of  almost  numberless  formalities,  the  accidental 
neglect  of  which  miafrt  involve,  if  nothing  worse,  the  confisca- 
tion of  one's  goods,  vjn  short,  how  could  agriculture  prosper, 
said  a  memorial  on  the  subject,  when  he  that  sowed  was  not 
permitted  to  gather,  and  he  that  gathered  could  reach  no 
market  ? 7  ~. 

However,  more  could  be  produced  than  used  .J  The  prime 
requisite  was  population.  So  much  appeared  te*-oe  clear ;  and 
for  that  reason,  as  well  as  to  obtain  the  profits  of  the  industries 
and  prevent  money  from  going  abroad,  great  efforts  were  made 
by  independent  Mexico  to  develop  manufacturing,  which  had 
been  prohibited  —  though  not  with  entire  success  —  by  Spain. 
The  year  1830  was  a  time  of  golden  hopes  in  this  regard.  At 
the  instance  of  Lucas  Alaman  a  grand  industrial  scheme  went 


COMMERCE  17 

i 

into  effect,  and  a  bank  was  founded  to  promote  it  by  lending 
public  money  to  intending  manufacturers.  Cotton  fields  were 
to  whiten  the  plains ;  merino  sheep  and  Kashmir  goats  to  cover 
the  hillsides ;  mulberry  trees  to  support  colonies  of  silk-worms ; 
imported  bees  to  produce  the  tons  of  wax  needed  for  candles; 
and  ubiquitous  factories  to  work  up  the  raw  materials.  A  few 
men  honestly  tried  to  establish  plants,  but  the  industry  chiefly 
promoted  by  the  law  and  the  bank  was  that  of  prying  funds 
from  the  national  treasury;  and  when  this  income  failed,  as  it 
did  in  a  few  years,  many  half-built  mills  came  to  a  stop,  and 
much  half-installed  machinery  began  to  rust.  Alaman  himself, 
partner  in  a  cotton  factory,  became  bankrupt  in  1841,  and  the 
bubble  soon  burst.7 

The  manufacturers  formed,  however,  a  strong  political  clique, 
and  in  their  interest  a  system  not  only  of  protection,  but  of 
absolutely  prohibiting  the  importation  of  numerous  articles, 
was  adopted  by  law.  This  had  the  effect  of  making  the  people 
pay  dearly  for  many  of  their  purchases.  The  farmers,  who 
wished  raw  materials  kept  out,  had  influence  too,  and  were 
always  blocking  the  scheme  of  the  manufacturers  to  let  raw 
materials  in;  and,  as  the  cost  of  producing  and  transporting 
made  native  goods  dear,  smuggled  merchandise  undersold 
Mexican  articles  even  after  paying  for  the  necessary  bribery 
and  other  expenses.  In  a  word,  although  certain  coarse  and 
bulky  things  continued  to  be  made  in  the  country,  the  endeavor 
to  build  up  an  industrial  population,  support  agriculture,  and 
thus  doubly  strengthen  the  nation  was  very  superficially 
planned  and  very  unsuccessfully  carried  out.  Nearly  all  the 
better  manufactures,  a  large  part  of  the  food,  most  of  the 
clothing,  and  substantially  all  the  luxuries  came  from  abroad.7 

The  business  of  importing  continued  to  be  mainly  in  Spanish 
hands  for  some  years  after  Mexico  became  independent,  but 
for  reasons  that  will  appear  in  the  next  chapter  the  Spaniard 
had  to  retire  about  1830.  The  British  then  obtained  the  lion's 
share ;  and  as  they  were  Protestants  they  could  not,  even  when 
they  so  desired,  identify  themselves  with  the  nation,  and  take 
a  responsible  share  in  public  affairs.  Commerce  was  not,  in 
fact,  a  source  of  strength.  A  few  raw  products  were  exported, 
but  essentially  commerce  consisted,  as  was  natural,  in  merely 
receiving  goods  from  foreigners  and  letting  the  foreigners  have 
vol.  i  —  c 


X 


c 


18  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

money  in  return.  Moreover  the  volume  of  commerce  dwindled 
notably,  like  that  of  all  other  business.  As  for  retail  trade, 
when  the  Spaniards  had  to  retire,  it  fell  mainly  into  Mexican 
hands ;  but  it  was  conducted  in  a  small  way,  the  profits  were 
narrow,  and  the  failures  were  many.7 

Even  more  significant  for  us,  however,  than  such  details  were 
the  life  and  character  of  the  people,  and  it  may  be  helpful  to 
call  back  the  year  1845  and  visit  Mexico  for  a  couple  of  days. 
First  we  will  stroll  along  a  country  road  in  a  fairly  typical 
region.  The  general  aspect  is  one  of  semi-wildness,  but  soon 
the  tops  of  well-bleached  ruins  amid  the  soft  green  indicate 
decrepitude  instead,  suggesting  as  the  national  character  decay 
preceding  maturity.  A  long  mule  team  approaches  in  a  waving 
line,  and  on  a  finely  equipped  horse  at  the  head  of  it  we  observe 
a  swarthy  man  in  green  broadcloth  trousers  open  on  the  outside 
from  the  knee  down,  with  bright  silver  buttons  in  a  double  row 
from  hip  to  ankle,  and  loose  linen  drawers  visible  where  the 
trousers  open.  A  closely  fitting  jacket,  adorned  with  many 
such  buttons  and  much  braid,  is  turned  back  at  the  chin  enough 
to  reveal  an  embroidered  shirt;  and  the  costume  reaches  a 
climax  in  a  huge  sombrero  with  a  wide,  rounding  brim  and  high 
sugar-loaf  crown,  adorned  with  tassels  and  a  wide  band  of  silver 
braid.  This  gentleman,  the  arriero,  is  the  railroad  king  of 
Mexico,  for  he  and  others  of  his  class  transport  the  freight  and 
express.  Trust  him  with  anything  you  please,  and  it  will 
surely  be  delivered ;  but  should  he  be  unlucky  at  cards  and  out 
f  work,  he  might  rob  you  the  next  day.8 

A  group  of  Indians  meet  us,  little  more  human  in  appearance 
than  the  donkeys  they  drive ;  and  we  observe  how  easily  they 
carry  loads  on  their  backs,  and  how  quickly  and  lightly  they 
march.  Yonder  we  see  their  huts  —  pigpens,  Americans  would 
suppose;  and  a  little  apart  from  these  we  notice  a  stone  or 
adobe  house.  Certainly  there  is  nothing  grand  about  this 
dwelling,  for  it  contains  only  a  single  room,  and  that  half  full 
of  implements,  horse  furniture,  charcoal,  provisions  and  what 
not;  but  it  affords  a  home  for  six  or  eight  persons  of  the  two 
sexes.  Presently  the  master,  though  not  the  owner,  of  the 
establishment  rides  up,  prodding  his  active  but  light  and  stubby 
horse  with  blunt  steel  spurs  almost  as  large  as  the  palm  of  one's 
hand,  to  make  a  dash  for  our  benefit.     Swinging  his  wife  from 


LIFE  IN  THE  COUNTRY  19 

the  saddle-bow  the  rancher v  alights,  and  we  find  him  to  be  a 
short,  wiry,  muscular  person,  with  a  bronzed  and  rather  satur- 
nine countenance  but  friendly  and  respectful  manners.  He 
wears  tough  leggings,  leather  trousers,  a  small  rectangular 
shawl  (serape)  that  falls  over  his  back  and  breast,  allowing  his 
head  to  protrude  through  a  hole  in  the  middle,  and  a  wide 
sombrero,  while  at  the  saddle-bow  hang  the  inevitable  lasso 
and  a  bag  of  corn  and  jerked  beef,  one  meal  a  day  from  which 
is  all  he  requires.  Apparently  he  does  not  feel  quite  at  home 
on  the  ground,  and  that  is  natural,  for  he  spends  about  half  of 
his  waking  hours  in  the  saddle.  Herdsman,  farmer  or  brigand, 
according  to  circumstances,  he  is  also  cavalryman  at  need; 
and  a  corps  of  such  fellows,  if  properly  trained  and  led,  would 
make  the  best  light  horse  in  the  world,  perhaps.  His  chief 
interests  in  life,  however,  are  gambling  and  cock-fighting,  and 
he  is  quite  capable  of  losing  all  his  worldly  goods,  his  wife  and 
even  his  pony  at  the  national  game  of  monte,  and  then  of  light- 
ing a  cigarette  and  sauntering  off  without  a  sign  of  regret.8 

Now  we  approach  what  may  be  called  a  village,  but  one 
extremely  different  from  a  village  in  the  United  States.  The  ** 
great  things  are  a  handsome  grove  and  in  the  midst  of  it  one 
old  church  of  gray  stone,  full  of  saints  and  relics  and  ancient 
plate,  with  a  ragged,  stupid  Indian  crouching  on  the  floor._ 
Near  by  are  two  or  three  ranchero  cottages  with  a  group  of 
Indian  huts  in  the  distance,  and  yonder  stands  a  large,  rambling 
edifice  of  stone  with  a  mighty  door  and  heavily  barred  windows. 
From  the  ends  of  the  building  run  high  walls  inclosing  several 
acres,  and  within  the  protected  space  may  be  seen  a  number  of 
substantial  dwellings  and  what  appear  to  be  storehouses  and 
stables,  while  far  away  over  hill  and  plain  spreads  the  hacienda, 
an  estate  as  large  as  a  county.  Finally,  on  a  gentle  slope  not 
far  distant  we  observe  a  monastery  with  a  rich  garden  behind 
it,  and  a  fat,  contented  prior  riding  sleepily  up  to  its  arched 
gateway  through  a  dozen  or  two  of  kneeling  aborigines.8 

Toward  evening  we  reach  the  state  capital,  and  as  we  cross 
a  bridge  on  the  outskirts,  we  see  a  crowd  of  people  bathing. 
Both  sexes  are  splashing  and  swimming,  all  as  happy  as  ducks 
and  all  entirely  nude.  Even  the  presence  of  strangers  does 
not  embarrass  the  young  women,  some  of  whom  are  decidedly 
good-looking;    and  they  even  try  to  draw  our  attention  by 


20  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

extra  displays  of  skill.  Looking  for  an  inn  we  discover  two 
lines  of  low,  rickety  buildings  alternating  with  heaps  of  rubbish, 
fodder  and  harness.  After  some  efforts  a  waiter  is  found  and 
we  obtain  a  room,  with  a  mule  already  slumbering  in  one 
corner  of  it  and  all  sorts  of  household  litter  thrown  about. 
A  wretched  cot  with  a  rope  bottom,  a  dirty  table  and  an  abun- 
dance of  saints  portrayed  in  Mexican  dress  help  to  make  the 
place  homelike.  The  waiter  is  amiable,  and  ejects  the  mule 
with  a  great  show  of  indignation ;  but  when  we  ask  for  water  and 
a  towel  his  good  nature  fails.  "Oh,  what  a  man,"  he  cries, 
flinging  up  his  hands ;  "  What  a  lunatic,  Ave  Maria  Purisima ; 
Ha !  Ha !  Ha !  He  wants  water,  he  wants  a  towel ;  what  the 
devil  — !  Good-by."  The  dining-room  is  a  hot,  steamy  cell, 
fitted  up  with  charcoal  furnaces ;  and  for  viands  we  are  offered 
plenty  of  hard  beef,  chile  (pepper)  and  tortillas  (flapjacks  of  a 
sort),  besides  a  number  of  dishes  that  only  a  native  could  either 
describe  or  eat.  Chile  and  tortillas  appear,  however,  to  be  the 
essentials;  and  the  latter,  partly  rolled  up,  serve  also  as 
spoons.8 

After  dinner  we  look  about  the  town.  All  is  monotonous 
and  sombre.  The  houses,  mostly  of  one  story,  form  a  con- 
tinuous wall  along  the  street  —  or  along  the  sidewalk,  if  there 
be  one  —  and  their  projecting,  heavily  barred  windows,  in  front 
of  which  the  young  fellows  have  to  do  their  courting,  suggest 
prisons  more  than  homes.  Now  we  come  to  the  massive, 
crumbling,  gloomy  church,  and  wcnder  where  the  priest  keeps 
the  family  which  everybody  knows  he  has.  Here  is  the  govern- 
ment house,  and  we  stop  to  picture  the  wily  politicians,  who  — 
with  noble  exceptions  —  obtain  the  offices  of  local  grandeur, 
and  the  little  horde  of  clerks,  many  of  them  rendered  pre- 
maturely decrepit  by  their  vices,  that  fawn  but  cannot  be 
made  to  work  at  the  nod  of  authority.  In  vain  we  look  for 
a  book-store,  though  somewhere  that  name  doubtless  appears 
on  a  sign;  but  we  do  find  the  office  of  the  comandante  gen- 
eral, an  officer  who  represents  the  central  power,  has  charge 
of  the  military,  and  often  is  mining  and  counter-mining  in  a 
sharp  struggle  with  the  governor.  How  intolerably  dull  it 
must  be  to  live  here !  Business  of  a  large  sort  there  is  none. 
The  little  newspapers  are  scarcely  more  than  echoes  from 
partisan  sheets  at  Mexico.     Religion  is  a  subject  that  one 


LIFE  AT  MEXICO  21 

must  let  alone,  and  education  a  subject  that  it  is  useless  to 
discuss.  Of  science,  history,  art,  nothing  is  known.  The 
small  men  in  power  brook  no  criticism  except  from  enemies. 
Affairs  in  other  states,  even  a  famine  or  a  flood,  excite  little 
interest.  Not  much  is  left  except  petty  intriguing  and  the 
gratification  of  coarse  appetites.  A  revolution  is  about  the 
only  possible  escape  from  this  more  deadly  ennui.8 

Our  second  day  shall  be  given  to  the  metropolis.  The 
suburbs  of  Mexico  are  mostly  ragged  and  unclean,  but 
some  broad  avenues  lined  with  fine  trees  run  through  them, 
and  entering  the  city  by  one  of  these  we  make  our  way  to  the 
great  central  plaza.  On  the  eastern  side  of  this  extends  the 
palace,  a  very  long  two-storied  building  of  little  distinction, 
and  on  the  northern  side  towers  the  huge  cathedral,  quite  in 
the  grand,  heavy,  Spanish  style,  seamed  with  earthquake 
scars  and  pockmarked  by  revolutionary  bullets.  It  is  a  Sun- 
day morning  and  still  rather  early,  but  the  plaza  is  alive.  The 
usual  nightly  crop  of  dead  and  wounded  is  being  carried  to  the 
morgue  or  the  hospital.  Sick  men,  cripples  and  stalwart 
beggars  are  beginning  to  pose  for  alms.  Prisoners  in  chains 
are  pretending  to  put  the  streets  in  order ;  but  their  guards, 
with  that  mixture  of  good  nature  and  indolence  that  char- 
acterizes the  Mexican  unless  his  passions  are  excited,  let  them 
do  about  as  they  please,  and  they  take  their  cue  for  street- 
cleaning  from  the  Book  of  Revelation :  They  that  be  filthy, 
let  them  be  filthy  still.8 

Indians  in  various  tribal  costumes,  mostly  picturesque  and 
all  dirty,  patter  through  the  square  with  loads  of  provisions  or 
babies.  As  no  stoves  or  fireplaces  exist,  the  charcoal  man's 
loud  "Carbosiu!"  {Carbon,  senor  /)  resounds  through  the 
streets.  So  does  the  plaintive  cry  of  the  water-carrier,  bending 
under  his  great  earthen  jar,  for  the  houses  are  all  supplied 
from  a  few  public  fountains,  the  termini  of  aqueducts.  "  Or- 
chata,  lemon,  pineapple,  tamarind !"  calls  out  a  shrill  voice; 
"What  will  you  take,  my  darling?  This  way  for  refreshment :" 
and  we  see  a  good-looking  girl  in  a  short  skirt  expanded  wide 
with  hoops,  her  arms  bare  and  her  bodice  cut  low  enough  for  a 
ball,  selling  " temperance' '  drinks.  Here  is  a  dingy  cell 
stuffed  with  chin-basins,  razors,  dental  implements,  boxes  of 
pomade,  a  guitar,  a  fighting-cock  tethered  in  a  corner,  and 


22  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

sundry  pictures  of  saints,  parrots  and  battles ;  and  there  a  cigar 
shop  with  a  slender,  black-eyed  girl  behind  the  counter,  bold 
enough  and  handsome  enough,  even  without  the  red  rose  in 
her  hair,  to  tempt  St.  Anthony.  Observe  the  evangelista,  or 
public  letter-writer,  with  two  quills  and  an  inkstand  ready 
on  his  little  desk  under  a  canopy  of  straw  matting ;  and  observe, 
too,  that  lepero  with  his  back  against  a  donkey's  pannier,  rob- 
bing the  pannier  while  he  pretends  to  be  buying  a  knife.8 

Priests  in  long  shovel  hats;  lousy  soldiers  in  ragged,  ill- 
fitting  uniforms;  gaudy  officers  chatting  and  smoking;  jug- 
glers with  snakes  and  balls;  cynical  dandies  retailing  love 
affairs;  half-naked  leperos  in  the  corners  sleeping  off  their 
pulque;  lottery  venders  with  long  strings  of  tickets;  sellers 
of  flowers,  toys,  candy,  glass,  wax- work,  mock  jewellery,  cheap 
cutlery,  and  a  thousand  other  things;  closed  carriages  taking 
ladies  to  church ;  more  beggars  and  still  more  —  these  and 
many  other  sights  keep  us  too  busy  for  reflection;  but  we 
cannot  help  noticing  that  seven  out  of  ten  persons  are  social 
drones  or  parasites,  and  that  vice  of  one  sort  or  another  dims 
the  face  and  weakens  the  step  of  almost  every  one.  Suddenly 
a  light  bell  tinkles,  and  the  crowd  is  instantly  grave  and  still. 
"God  is  coming,"  they  whisper,  or  in  other  words  the  viatic 
is  going  to  a  sick  man.  A  coach  drawn  by  two  mules  and 
followed  by  a  dozen  slovenly  friars  holding  lighted  candles 
and  chanting,  comes  slowly  down  a  street.  All  uncover  and 
kneel,  and  we  must  do  likewise  or  very  likely  get  a  pum- 
melling.8 

This  reminds  us  of  duty;  and,  electing  the  cathedral  in 
preference  to  sixty  other  churches,  we  enter.  Before  us  is 
a  great  throng,  chiefly  women  and  leperos,  of  most  devout 
worshippers.  The  finest  ladies  in  the  city  are  here,  dressed 
all  in  black,  with  no  ornaments  except  a  silk  mantilla,  edged 
with  lace,  and  a  high  tortoise-shell  comb;  and  they  kneel 
humbly  beside  the  drudge  or  the  beggar.  The  church  itself  — 
designed  in  the  Spanish  style,  which  places  the  choir  in  the 
middle  of  the  nave  and  a  balustraded  walk  between  that  and 
the  great  altar  —  with  a  cloud  of  incense  filling  the  air  and 
many  hundreds  of  candles  gleaming  murkily  from  the  shrines, 
is  most  mysterious  and  impressive.  The  gorgeousness  of  the 
sacred  ornaments  amazes  us.     Literally  tons  of  silver  are  in 


LIFE  AT  MEXICO  23 

sight;  gold,  precious  stones  and  gems  abound;  and  mag- 
nificent vestments  try  to  hide  the  vulgar  priests.  But  the 
splendor  is  oppressive,  and  the  stench  of  the  leperos  intolerable ; 
let  us  return  to  the  light  of  day.8 

All  the  streets  are  laid  out  at  right  angles,  and  most  of  the 
houses  that  line  them  are  in  two  stories,  of  which  the  lower 
one  is  reserved  for  horses,  carriages,  servants,  cows  and  storage ; 
and  the  walls,  built  of  rough  stone,  are  very  thick.  The  out- 
side is  usually  frescoed  in  white,  orange,  blue,  red  or  pale  green, 
and  often  adorned  with  pious  verses  or  biblical  texts.  Entering 
the  big  double  gateway,  we  find  ourselves  in  a  courtyard,  upon 
which  doors  and  grated  windows  open;  and  we  observe  that 
a  covered  balcony  of  wrought  iron  or  possibly  bronze,  reached 
by  a  central  stairway  and  giving  access  to  the  rooms  of  the 
second  story,  is  built  round  it.  In  many  courtyards  there  are 
flowers  and  a  fountain,  and  sometimes  there  are  trees.  Oc- 
casionally we  find  what  looks  like  a  grandee's  residence,  for 
Mexico  was  called  in  the  Spanish  time  a  city  of  palaces,  and 
some  of  these  residences,  built  of  superior  stone,  equipped  with 
gilded  balconies  and  stairs,  adorned  with  artistic  sculptures, 
and  perhaps  decorated  with  Dutch  tiles  in  blue  and  white, 
have  survived  in  a  fair  condition  the  ruin  of  fortunes  and  the 
disappearance  of  titles;  but  at  their  best  they  were  always 
imperfect,  reminding  one  of  the  golden  image  with  clay  feet, 
and  now  most  of  them  are  dilapidated.8 

Here  is  a  gambling  place,  well  filled ;  but  it  is  only  the  usual 
monte,  and  if  we  care  to  watch  a  game,  there  will  be  something 
like  a  thousand  more  opportunities.  Already,  people  are 
making  for  the  bull-fight ;  but  the  upper  classes  mostly  ignore 
that  sport,  and  we  may  well  follow  their  example.  On  the 
other  hand  let  us  drop  in  at  the  cock-pit.  "Hail,  immaculate 
Mary,  the  cocks  are  coming !"  the  herald  is  proclaiming.  On 
the  benches  one  may  see  the  most  delicate  and  fashionable 
young  ladies  of  the  city  as  well  as  the  sharpest  gamblers,  and 
everything  is  quiet  and  orderly.  But  a  glance  is  enough ;  and 
now  as  the  "quality"  will  soon  have  dined,  we  will  stroll  on 
past  the  stately  trees  of  the  Alameda  to  the  New  Promenade, 
and  be  ready  for  them.8 

Here,  every  afternoon  at  about  five  o'clock,  and  especially 
on  Sunday,  may  be  seen  the  Mexican  elite.     About  a  thousand 


24  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

carriages  are  in  line  to-day,  many  of  them  heavy,  grand  affairs 
from  Europe,  but  some  very  antiquated  and  shabby,  for  the 
lady,  however  poor,  must  have  a  carriage  of  some  sort.  Here 
one  sees  the  fair  sex  at  their  best.  Clad  in  the  most  sump- 
tuous and  brilliant  costumes  they  can  possibly  obtain  and  well 
covered  with  diamonds  —  for  everybody  above  the  rank  of  a 
lepero  has  diamonds  —  they  sit  up  straight  and  handsome,  and 
many  of  them  look  almost  regal.  More  horses  than  mules  are 
to  be  seen,  and  many  of  them  have  been  imported.  Guided 
by  postilions  instead  of  drivers,  the  carriages  roll  sedately  along 
with  an  exchange  of  mutual  salutes  but  not  a  word  of  con- 
versation, and  after  a  turn  or  two  draw  up  and  stop  side  by 
side,  so  that  the  ladies  may  review  some  four  or  five  thousand 
cavaliers,  who  now  ride  past.8 

Each  gallant,  without  appearing  to  notice  the  carriage  of  his 
choice,  pays  court  to  an  adored  occupant  of  it  by  a  special  show 
of  grace  and  horsemanship  as  he  goes  by.  Small  fortunes  in 
silver  and  gold  are  lavished  on  the  equipment  of  the  steed,  and 
the  cavalier  is  resplendent  in  his  tightly  fitting  trousers,  short 
jacket,  huge  sombrero,  gilded  spurs,  silver  buttons,  silk  braid 
and  gold  lace.  For  us  the  impression  is  impaired  considerably 
by  his  manner  of  riding,  for  he  leans  forward,  puts  barely  his 
toes  into  the  stirrup,  and  carries  his  heels  far  back;  but  he 
can  ride  very  showily  after  all,  curvetting  and  prancing,  and 
the  Mexicans  are  fully  satisfied  that  no  other  horsemen  in  the 
world  are  their  equals.8 

The  promenade  over,  all  go  to  the  play  —  not  that  anybody 
of  fashion  cares  for  it,  but  because  that  is  the  style,  and  few 
have  any  other  way  to  pass  the  time.  Let  us  have  a  look 
ourselves  at  the  principal  theatre,  which  travellers  have  pro- 
nounced —  after  one  at  Naples  —  the  finest  edifice  of  the 
kind.  It  accommodates  more  than  eight  thousand  persons, 
and  the  rent  of  the  best  boxes  is  about  $3000  a  year.  But 
almost  every  man  and  many  of  the  women  appear  to  be  smok- 
ing; one  can  hardly  see  the  actors;  the  noise  of  conversation 
is  distracting ;  and  as  we  are  not  adepts  in  the  play  of  glances 
and  fans  which  keep  so  many  ladies  in  the  boxes  and  so  many 
gallants  in  the  pit  fully  occupied,  we  shall  find  it  pleasanter 
at  the  British  legation  ball.  Allons !  Why,  what  a  clangor 
the  church  bells  are  making !     To  be  sure  that  opens  the  gates 


LIFE  AT  MEXICO  25 

of  purgatory  for  a  while  and  gives  the  inmates  a  respite,  but 
it  certainly  bears  rather  hard  on  the  living.8 

While  by  nature  the  most  sociable  of  people,  the  Mexicans 
are  the  least  so  in  practice,  wrote  an  American  minister  at  that 
capital.  This  is  partly  because  many  of  social  rank  now  lack 
the  means  to  entertain,  and  partly  because  society  is  cut  up 
by  intrigues,  jealousies  and  bitter  memories;  but  at  a  foreign 
legation  one  has  no  expenses,  and  all  meet  on  neutral  ground. 
As  we  enter,  everything  seems  fine  and  even  brilliant.  Dia- 
monds are  in  profusion  again,  and  the  lustre  of  the  great  pearls 
matches  them.  But  in  Mexico  it  is  never  wise  to  look  closely, 
for  gross  imperfections  are  sure  to  be  discovered ;  and  here,  as 
we  soon  observe,  the  gowns  are  not  really  in  style,  and  the 
musicians  are  only  unshaven,  half-blind,  tatterdemalion 
scrapers.8 

However,  the  people  are  what  we  care  for,  and  they  are 
certainly  most  interesting.  Again  we  see  the  dignified  ladies; 
they  move  now,  and  with  a  decided  though  rather  ponderous 
grace.  Conversation  is  not  their  forte,  for  they  seldom  read 
and  never  think;  but  all  have  beautiful  eyes,  teeth  and  hair; 
all  have  small  hands  and  feet;  and  all  are  amiable,  sincerely 
kind  and  by  no  means  wanting  in  tact.  The  older  ones  appear 
stout  and  rather  phlegmatic,  it  is  true,  but  those  of  an  earlier 
age  are  often  fascinating.  Look  for  instance  at  the  girl  under 
the  chandelier,  plainly  all  sentiment  and  senses,  not  really  tall 
but  slender  enough  to  appear  so,  with  a  profile  of  carved  ivory, 
pale  cheeks  just  warmed  with  crimson,  large,  dark,  languorous 
eyes,  and  a  voluptuous  figure  disguised  with  no  stays ;  and  all 
this  poised  seemingly  on  the  toe  of  a  dainty  satin  slipper. 
What  matters  it  if  she  and  the  rest  of  the  ladies  passed  their 
day  in  gazing  idly  out  of  windows,  smoking,  nibbling  sweet- 
meats and  chattering  trifles,  and  did  not  put  on  their  stockings 
or  do  up  their  hair  until  dinner-time  ?  8 

But  for  us  the  men  are  more  important.  That  short  in- 
dividual in  spectacles,  who  looks  erudite  and  speaks  in  a  low 
tone  with  a  gravity  and  reserve  that  emphasize  his  remarks, 
is  Alaman,  the  most  distinguished  of  the  conservatives.  The 
thin-featured,  sharp-nosed  person,  so  elegant  and  cynical,  is 
Tornel,  posing  now  in  his  favorite  attitude  as  the  patron  of 
learning.     Smooth-faced  Bocanegra,  an  honorable  if  not  very 


26  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

able  statesman,  is  talking  yonder  to  the  British  minister  with 
the  easy  courtliness  of  a  genuine  hidalgo.  Handsome  and 
brave  Almonte  —  "a  good  boy,"  as  Santa  Anna  calls  him  —  is 
laying  siege  to  the  belle  under  the  chandelier ;  and  Pena  y  Pefia, 
seemingly  rather  dry  and  uninspired,  is  debating  somewhat 
laboriously  with  a  brother  judge.8 

Let  us  join  a  group.  How  strong,  genial,  easy,  ready  and 
gay,  yet  dignified  and  reposeful,  they  all  are!  Few  indeed  of 
our  own  countrymen  could  be  so  charming.  Some  one  ap- 
proaches, and  they  grasp  him  warmly  by  the  hand,  throwing 
the  left  arm  at  the  same  time  round  his  shoulder  and  softly 
patting  his  back.  "Friend,"  "Comrade,"  are  frequent  salu- 
tations. We  are  presented  to  the  group,  and  find  ourselves 
at  once  among  devoted  intimates.  "My  house  is  yours," 
exclaims  one  with  a  look  that  carries  conviction.  "  Remember, 
I  exist  only  to  serve  you,"  says  another.  "Only  command 
me  and  all  that  are  mine,"  exclaims  a  third.8 

Mexico,  however,  reported  a  British  minister,  "  judged  merely 
by  outward  Appearances,  is  a  perfectly  different  thing  from 
Mexico  seen  in  the  Interior."  One  might  be  presented  with 
a  dozen  houses  and  all  their  contents,  yet  go  to  bed  on  the 
sidewalk  hungry.  These  friends  and  comrades  are  daily 
intriguing  and  conspiring  against  one  another.  Talk  with 
an  eloquent  declaimer,  and  you  will  find  his  beautiful  ideas 
vague  and  impracticable.  Discuss  them  with  him,  and  you 
will  either  excite  wrath  by  demolishing  his  opinions  or  earn 
contempt  —  since  he  suspects  in  his  heart  that  he  is  an  igno- 
ramus—  by  letting  him  vanquish  you.  Notice  how  lightly 
they  speak  of  religion.  That  is  considered  good  form.  The 
Church  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  institution  for  the  women. 
But  at  bottom  almost  every  one  is  mortally  afraid  of  the 
hereafter,  as  a  child  is  afraid  of  the  dark,  and  when  seriously 
ill  is  ready  to  grovel  before  a  priest.  The  apparent  robust- 
ness of  these  men,  largely  due  to  their  indolence,  is  too  often 
undermined  by  Cyprian  accidents,  which  are  confessed  with- 
out hesitation.  Hardly  one  of  the  husbands  is  loyal  to  his 
vows,  while  the  other  sex  care  only  to  elude  numberless  watch- 
ful eyes,  and  observe  a  strict  regard  for  appearances;  and  in 
the  lower  walks  a  mother  will  quite  readily  sell  her  daughter's 
good   name.     However,    courtesy   is   delightful   whatever   lies 


LIFE  AT  MEXICO  27 

behind  it,  and  if  a  person  will  try  to  eat  a  picture  of  grapes, 
he  should  blame  himself  for  his  disappointment.  Tempera- 
ment, environment  and  education  make  sangfroid  and  intel- 
lectual mastery  impossible  here;  and  in  a  world  where" 
passionate  men  and  women  grow  up  in  traditions  of  idleness 
and  self-indulgence  they  can  hardly  be  expected,  especially 
with  the  bad  example  of  their  priests  before  them,  to  be  dis- 
tinguished for  self-restraint.8  - 

Meanwhile,  are  the  common  people  at  home  knitting?  Let 
us  walk  back  to  the  cathedral.  The  full  moon  is  out.  Almost 
above  us  rise  the  powerful  towers  against  the  clear  firmament, 
and  on  our  left  is  the  palace,  filling  one  whole  side  of  the  square 
with  its  numberless  balconies  and  windows,  while  in  front 
spreads  the  great  plaza,  glittering  with  innumerable  lights 
against  the  shadowy  arcades  that  fill  the  opposite  side.  The 
sky  is  a  soft,  pale  blue ;  and  the  stars,  fading  rear  the  brilliant 
moon,  appear  like  dust  raised  by  her  chariot  wheels.  Under 
the  trees  on  our  right  a  huge  serpent,  the  scales  of  which  are 
human  beings,  turns,  winds,  bends,  parts  and  rejoins  in  a 
circular  promenade.8 

Some  occupy  themselves  with  prosaic  thoughts,  —  business, 
politics  or  social  events  —  and  a  few  talk  of  science  and  poetry. 
Yonder  goes  a  millionaire,  a  real  king  of  gold,  at  sight  of  whom 
all  hats  come  off,  while  all  eyes  court  his  glance ;  but  another, 
who  passes  with  a  triumphant  step  and  bold  gestures,  appears 
to  the  crowd  a  greater  man,  for  he  is  the  king  of  the  sword,  the 
king  of  the  bull-ring,  the  matador.  But  most,  perhaps,  are 
talking  and  thinking  of  love  and  of  pleasure.  Furtive  but 
meaning  glances  are  often  exchanged;  occasionally  hand 
presses  hand  under  the  folds  of  the  cloak;  at  times  a  few 
mysterious  words  pass  quickly;  now  and  then  one  sees  a 
pretty  woman  on  the  arm  of  her  bold  lover,  showing  herself 
proudly  to  the  world,  while  the  husband  follows  on  behind  as 
best  he  can;  and  here  and  there  a  scowling,  discarded  friend 
looks  out  from  behind  a  post  with  a  knife  clutched  behind  him. 

Would  you  like  to  see  a  little  more  ?  Then  visit  the  Barrio 
Santa  Anna,  and  watch  men  with  bloodshot  eyes  and  women 
in  red  petticoats  and  loose,  open  chemisettes  dancing  a  wild 
fandango,  or  plunge  into  a  lepero's  dive  and  watch  the  pariahs 
gambling  sedately  with  a  bloody  knife  on  the  table  before 


28  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

them,  while  down  in  one  corner  a  crouching  woman  moans 
and  mutters  over  a  prostrate  figure. /But  how  lightly  all  is 
done,  even  the  tragedies,  compared  with  northern  depth  and 
seriousness.     In  a  sense  we  feel  we  are  observing  children.8^ 

Of  course  in  so  brief  a  space  the  subject  of  this  chapter  could 
not  be  thoroughly  treated,  but  our  inquiry  seems  to  make 
certain  facts  plain.  (Littiejn  the^material^mental  and  moral 
spheres  was  really  sound  in  the  Mexico  of  1845.  Her  popu- 
lation was  insufficient,  and  was  badly  welded  together,  so  far 
*as  it  had  been  welded  at  all ;  and  while  the  lower  orders  of  the 
people  lay  deep  in  ignorance,  laziness  and  vice,  the  upper 
class,  if  we  ignore  exceptions,  were  soft,  superficial,  indolent  and 
lax)  urbane,  plausible  and  eloquent,  apathetic  but  passionate, 
amiable  and  kind  though  cruel  when  excited,  generous  but  un- 
trustworthy, wasteful  but  athirst  for  gain,  suspicious  and  subtle 
but  not  sagacious,  personally  inclined  to  be  pompous  and 
nationally  afflicted  with  a  provincial  vanity,  greatly  enamoured 
of  the  formalities  of  life,  greatly  wanting  in  the  cool,  steady 
resolution  for  which  occasional  obstinacy  is  a  poor  substitute, 
and  still  more  wanting  in  that  simple,  straightforward,  sober 
and  solid  common  sense  which  is  the  true  foundation  of  personal 
%and  national  strength,  (in  particular,  the  Mexican  was  in- 
tensely personal.  This  made  him  and  his  politics  very  inter- 
esting yet  was  really  unfortunate,  for  in  such  men  principles 
and  institutions  could  have  but_feeble  roots.  Finally,  as  one 
result  of  this  awareness  of  self,  every  man  of  any  strength  had 
the  instincts  of  a  dictator.  Authority  he  instinctively  re- 
sented; but  on  the  other  hand,  when  some  one  appeared  to 
be  dominant,  a  consciousness  of  this  inner  recalcitrancy  and 
a  fear  of  its  being  detected,  combining  with  a  hope  of  favors, 
produced  adulation  and  apparent  slavishness. 

Evidently,  then,  Mexico  was  not  intrinsically  a  strong 
country.  Evidently  her  people  had  few  qualifications  for 
self-government.  Evidently,  too,  they  were  unlikely  to  handle 
in  the  best  manner  a  grave  and  complicated  question  requiring 
all  possible  sanity  of  judgment  and  perfect  self-control ;  and, 
in  particular,  misunderstandings  between  them  and  a  nation 
like  the  United  States  were  not  only  sure  to  arise  but  sure  to 
prove  troublesome) 


X 


II 

THE  POLITICAL  EDUCATION  OF  MEXICO 

1800-1845 

It  was  of  course  the  political  side  of  Mexican  civilization  that 
had  the  most  direct  bearing  on  our  relations  with  that  country, 
and  this  can  best  be  explained  by  approaching  it  historically. 
At  the  same  time  we  shall  be  aided  in  studying,  not  only  some 
of  the  principal  figures  in  the  war  and  their  mutual  attitudes, 
but  some  of  its  most  important  and  mysterious  events. 

The  colonial  regime  of  Spain  was  intended  and  carefully 
planned  to  ensure  the  safety,  prosperity  and  contentment  of 
her  distant  subjects,  but  for  certain  reasons  it  worked  badly. 
Like  all  nations  of  that  period,  she  believed  that  her  colonies 
existed  for  the  good  of  the  mother-country,  and  aimed  first 
of  all  to  control  and  exploit  them.  She  had  to  depend  upon 
very  human  agents  that  were  practically  beyond  her  reach. 
While  theoretically  all  Mexicans,  except  the  aborigines,,  en- 
joyed an  equality  before  the  law,  the  government  felt  that 
emigrants  from  the  Peninsula  were  especially  worthy  of  con- 
fidence; and  at  the  same  time  not  a  few  of  these  men  had 
friends  industriously  scheming  for  them  at  court.  The  con- 
sequences were,  first,  the  establishment  of  a  powerful  Gachupine 
oligarchy,  largely  dependent  on  the  royal  will,  the  lowest 
member  of  which,  even  if  penniless,  felt  superior  to  every 
Creole,  and,  secondly,  the  enthronement  of  privilege,  often 
gained  by  ignoble  means,  in  government,  army,  church  and 
business.  The  Creoles  —  overawed  by  the  almost  divine 
prestige  of  the  king,  trembling  before  his  power,  and  convinced 
that  only  his  troops  could  protect  them  against  the  Indians  — 
submitted;  but  they  hated  their  insolent  oppressors,  and  the 
Indians  hated  both  groups.  On  the  principle  of  "Divide 
and  conquer"  the  government  fomented  these  dissensions ;  and, 

29 


30  .    THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

supported  by  the  intolerance  of  the  Church,  it  did  its  utmost 
to  bar  out  foreigners  and  foreign  ideas  in  order  to  ensure  an 
unreasoning  subordination.1 

What  Mexico  owed  to  Spain,  therefore,  aside  from  the 
remembrance  and  fruits  of  an  efficiency  that  she  could  not 
hope  to  ^equal,  was  a  settled  tradition  of  arbitrary  rule  based 
on  force,  of  authority  selfishly  and  often  corruptly  used,  of  the 
government  as  possessing  the  sole  initiative,  of  social  disunion 
resulting  from  privilege  and  monopoly,  of  personal  successes 
frequently  due  to  intrigue  or  purchased  favor,  of  political 
indifference  except  among  the  controlling  or  aspiring  cliques,  of 
apathy  concerning  all  high  interests,  of  ignorance,  inertness, 
fanaticism,  hard  oppression,  blind  obedience,  passionate  feuds 
and  gross  pleasures.1 

Little  by  little  new  ideas  reached  a  few  of  the  more  intel- 
ligent, however.  The  American  Declaration  of  Independence 
became  known,  and  also  the  fact  that  Spain,  by  supporting 
England's  relbellious  colonies,  had  cooperated  with  heretics 
long  pictured  as  infidels  and  fiends.  Echoes  from  Diderot's 
encyclopaedia  and  reports  of  the  French  revolution  crept  in; 
and  the  natural  desire  both  to  share  on  equal  terms  in  the  offices 
and  in  business,  and  to  escape  from  the  extra  cost  of  living  due 
to  the  monopolies,  quickened  thought.  When  war  with  England 
led  to  the  raising  of  Mexican  troops,  a  new  sense  of  power  be- 
gan to  be  felt;  when  the  Spanish  monarchy  crumbled  before 
Napoleon  in  1808,  the  illusion  of  the  king's  divinity  and  in- 
vincibility faded ;  when  the  royal  family  exhorted  the  Mexicans 
to  accept  the  heir  of  the  French  revolution  as  their  master, 
loyalty  quivered  to  its  base ;  and  when  the  people  of  Spain  took 
up  arms  to  defend  their  betrayed  nationality,  the  principle  of 
popular  sovereignty  loomed  up  as  greater  than  royal  pre- 
rogatives. Finally  the  mass  of  the  people,  though  too  apathetic 
to  realize  the  full  meaning  of  these  facts,  were  roused  by  a 
thunder-clap  at  home.2 

Struggling  with  the  crisis  precipitated  by  events  in  the 
Peninsula,  the  viceroy  —  partly  to  gain  support  for  himself, 
it  is  probable,  and  partly  to  gain  support  for  the  monarchy  — 
showed  a  disposition  to  give  the  Creoles  a  voice  in  the  govern- 
ment, upon  which  the  leaders  of  the  oligarchy  were  so  amazingly 
foolish  as  to  depose  him  by  force,  and  usurp  his  authority. 


THE  REVOLUTION  AGAINST  SPAIN  31 

This  conduct  proved  that  much  of  their  boasted  loyalty  and 
supposed  ability  had  been  shams,  that  what  they  really 
meant  was  to  enjoy  the  wealth  and  power,  that  the  cause  of 
the  Creoles  was  not  one  of  subjects  against  their  king,  but  one 
of  subjects  against  subjects,  and  that  only  force  could  settle 
the  issue.  Dreams  of  independence  immediately  crystallized 
into  schemes  of  insurrection.2 

Foremost  among  the  conspirators  was  Hidalgo,  commonly 
described  by  the  Mexicans  as  a  Washington,  but  in  reality  a 
kindly,  public-spirited,  mockingly  irreligious  and  frankly 
immoral  priest.  His  plans  were  discovered;  and  so  on  the 
sixteenth  of  September,  1810,  in  the  desperate  hope  of  saving 
himself  and  his  associates,  he  called  upon  the  Indians,  rabid 
with  fanaticism  and  hatred  of  their  oppressors,  to  rise  against 
the  Spanish,  who,  he  declared,  had  now  allied  themselves  with 
infidel  Frenchmen  against  their  holy  religion.  What  followed 
was  like  the  bursting  of  reservoirs  filled  with  blood  and  fire. 
Scarcely  a  trace  of  statesmanship  was  exhibited  by  the  leaders ; 
most  of  their  disciples  acted  like  fiends  let  loose;  and  their 
enemies  did  little  better.  Soon  many  common  priests,  many 
Creole  military  men,  and  not  a  few  other  persons  who  felt  sore 
under  the  heel  of  wealth  and  power  and  were  ambitious  to  rise, 
embraced  the  cause,  and  so  many  of  the  rest  sympathized  with 
Hidalgo's  demand  for  independence,  that  probably  by  good 
management  he  could  have  succeeded ;  but  against  a  campaign 
like  his  the  substantial  elements  of  society  found  it  necessary 
to  combine,  and  when  the  heads  of  the  insurrection  were 
betrayed,  captured  and  shot  in  1811,  little  of  it  remained 
except  horrible  memories  and  lessons  in  conspiracy,  treachery, 
hate,  folly,  wholesale  destruction  and  wholesale  murder.2 

In  a  new  form,  however,  the  cause  of  independence  lived  on. 
Instead  of  wild  hordes  crying,  "Death  to  the  Gachupines ! " 
there  were  now  for  the  most  part  stealthy  but  merciless  bands 
of  guerillas,  and  the  government  soldiers  followed  close  behind 
them  in  daring  and  ruthlessness.  On  the  coast  near  Vera  Cruz 
an  officer  named  Antonio  Lopez  dp  flan  fa.  Anna,  won  a  captaincy 
about  this  time  by  hunting  down  insurgents,  and  on  the  plateau 
a  handsome,  dashing  man  with  brown  hair  and  reddish  side- 
whiskers  named  Agustin  de  Iturbide,  who  had  negotiated  with 
Hidalgo  about  accepting  the    lieutenant    generalship  of  the 


32  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

revolutionary  army,  distinguished  himself  on  the  royal  side  for 
greed  and  bloodthirstiness.  In  1814  he  wrote  to  the  viceroy 
one  Good  Friday,  "In  honor  of  the  day,  I  have  just  ordered 
three  hundred  excommunicated  wretches  to  be  shot,"  and  the 
women  among  his  prisoners  fared  no  better  than  the  men.  Qn_ 
the  other  side  Nicolas  Bravo,  whose  father  had  been  taken  and 
executed,  won  a  noble  distinction  by  releasing  about  three 
hundred  captives  despite  orders  to  kill  them;  Guadalupe 
Victoria,  as  he  named  himself,  earned  renown  by  living  in 
caves  like  a  wild  beast  rather  than  give  up;  and  Vicente 
Guerrero,  operating  at  the  south  in  unexplored  mountains, 
exhibited  great  resourcefulness,  remarkable  knowledge  of  men 
and  extraordinary  courage.  The  principal  hero  of  this  period, 
however,  was  Morelos,  an  Indian  priest,  who  showed  himself 
a  consummate  partisan  leader.2 

So  successful  were  these  and  the  many  other  chiefs  in  terror- 
ism, robbery,  slaughter  and  sack,  and  so  deep  a  sentiment  in 
favor  of  independence  now  existed,  that  with  a  little  sagacity 
in  counsel  and  a  little  concert  in  action  the  cause  might  have 
triumphed ;  but  ambitions,  jealousies,  insubordination,  dis- 
loyalty and  political  incompetence  ruined  everything,  and  by 
the  end  of  1819,  although  Guerrero  still  made  head  a  little,  the 
second  phase  also  of  the  revolution  was  substantially  at  an  end, 
leaving  behind  it  hot  embers  of  turmoil,  fighting,  treachery 
and  massacre,  and  countless  examples  of  making  pillage  a  live- 
lihood, selfishly  disregarding  the  common  cause,  and  grossly 
blundering  in  political  management.  Thought  and  feeling 
in  Mexico  had,  however,  been  so  educated  by  reflection,  ex- 
perience, discussion  and  foreign  comments  during  the  past 
nine  or  ten  years,  that  a  longer  acceptance  of  the  old  regime 
could  not  be  expected.  Absolutism,  though  triumphant,  was 
doomed.2 

Clhe  fatal  blow  came  from  its  champions.  In  1820  a  revo- 
lution in  Spain  revived  the  liberal  constitution  that  had  been 
adopted  eight  years  before  and  then  had  been  abolished  by 
Ferdinand  VII;  and  Apodaca,  now  ^viceroy  of  Mexico,  felt 
compelled  to  proclainTthe  new  law^)  The  troops  and  the 
people  began  to  dread  another  civil  *war ;  and  the  oligarchy, 
especially  the  Church  dignitaries,  concluding  at  once  that  only 
separation  from  the  mother-country  could  save  their  privileges, 


ITURBIDE  33 

looked  about  for  an  instrument.  One  was  easily  found.  Itur- 
bide's  greed  had  finally  driven  him  from  his  post,  his  fortune 
had  been  wasted  in  self-indulgence,  and  he  was  now  desperate. 
Long  since,  his  active  mind  had  seen  that  if  the  Creole  troops 
could  be  seduced,  they  —  supported  by  the  revolutionary 
sentiment  of  the  people  —  could  overmatch  about  half  their 
number  of  Spanish  regiments;  and  he  agreed  readily  to  be- 
come the  champion  of  autocracy  in  order  to  betray  it.  Cleverly 
deceiving  the  government,  he  obtained  a  command  through  the 
aid  of  his  backers,  and,  in  order  to  clear  the  field,  attacked 
Guerrero.  To  dispose  of  that  wary  foe  proved,  however,  no 
easy  task;  so  he  negotiated  privately  with  a  public  enemy, 
described  himself  as  "destitute  of  ambition  and  self-interest/' 
and  finally  inveigled  the  insurgent  leader  into  joining  the 
conspiracy.  Victoria  followed  that  example.  Santa  Anna, 
though  recently  made  a  lieutenant  colonel  by  the  viceroy,  came 
over  with  his  men.  Other  leaders  did  the  same ;  and/on 
February  24,  1821,  Iturbide  felt  strong  enough  to  announce 
a  programme,  the~famous  Plan  of  Iguala.2 

This  declared  for  independence,  a  limited  monarchy  under  a 
Bourbon  king,  the  Roman  Catholic  church  as  the  sole  form  of 
religion,  the  old  fueros,  the  right  of  office-holders  to  retain  their 
posts,  the  fraternal  union  and  political  equality  of  Gachupines, 
Creoles  and  Indians,  and  the  appointment  of  a  committee 
(junta)  to  govern  Mexico  provisionally.  No  scheme  could 
have  seemed  more  inviting,  and  none  could  have  been  more 
delusive,  for  it  ignored  insurmountable  difficulties  and  promised 
incompatible  advantages.  In  all  probability  Iturbide  knew 
this ;  but  prelates,  troops,  officials  and  people  took  the  shining 
bait;  O'Donoju,  the  new  Spanish  general,  deciding  it  would 
be  useless  to  fight,  made  a  treaty  with  the  revolutionary  chief ; 
and  on  September  27,  1821,  Iturbide  carried  the  tricolor  through 
the  gate  of  the  capital,  stopped  his  gallant  black  charger  at  the 
convent  of  San  Francisco,  and  received  the  golden  keys  of  the 
city.  Obedience,  the  sole  basis  of  Mexican  society,  had  been 
swept  away;  treachery  and  perjury  had  triumphed;  and  yet 
the  unthinking  multitude  hurrahed.2 

The  generalising,  violating  the  principle  of  popular  sov- 
ereignty, now  appointed  the  junta  himself,  excluding  all  the 
old  revolutionists ;    that  body  in  turn  elected  him  and  four  as- 

VOL.   i  —  D 


34  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

sociates  to  exercise  the  executive  power  as  regents ;  and  a  Con 
stituent  Congress  was  prematurely  summoned  to  draw  up  an 
organic  law.  The  situation  soon  proved  to  be  extremely  diffi- 
cult. Resentments  needed  to  be  healed,  jealousies  appeased, 
commerce  and  the  industries  put  in  motion,  and  the  whole  edifice 
of  society  and  politics  rebuilt  on  new  foundations  out  of  in- 
congruous elements.  Peculiarly  urgent  was  the  demand  for 
money  —  the  more  so  as  some  of  the  taxes  were  abolished  in 
order  to  sweeten  the  revolution,  while  the  expenses  grew.  On 
entering  Mexico  Iturbide  had  proclaimed,  "You  see  me  in  the 
most  opulent  of  capitals;"  and  every  one  expected  the  new 
government  —  an  independent,  Mexican,  popular  govern- 
ment—  to  bear  an  open  purse.  In  October,  1821,  some  four- 
teen thousand  claims  were  presented  to  it.3 
("tturbide,  whatever  his  aims  and  whatever  his  faults,  was  the 
sole  Mexican  of  recognized  preeminence,  the  sole  possible 
rallying  point ;  and  patriotism  called  upon  all  to  support  his 
prestige  and  patiently  correct  his  errors  until  society  could 
take  shape.  Nothing  of  the  sort  occurred,  however.)  The 
army  idolized  him;  the  civil  officials  counted  on  him;  the 
prelates  feared  him  less  than  they  did  his  enemies;  and  the 
masses,  ignorant  of  what  went  on  below  the  surface,  revered 
him  as  the  Father  of  Independence;  but  the  cheated  abso- 
lutists, disappointed  borbonistas,  cajoled  insurgents,  distanced 
comrades,  eclipsed  leaders  and  unsuccessful  claimants,  the 
patriots,  indignant  that  a  cruel  royalist  should  be  the  heir  of 
the  revolution,  the  republicans,  few  in  number  but  increasingly 
influential,  the  friends  of  those  he  had  massacred  or  plundered, 
and  behind  all  the  Scottish  Rite  Freemasons,  who  were 
liberals  yet  partisans  of  Spain  —  all  these  hated  and  dogged 
him.  Honors  and  emoluments  were  heaped  upon  him  to  excite 
envy  and  odium;  his  weaknesses  were  baited;  his  strength 
was  provoked;  his  administrative  blundering  was  stimulated 
instead  of  corrected.  When  financial  necessities  compelled 
him  to  decree  a  forced  loan,  paper  money  and  other  arbitrary 
measures,  many  began  to  denounce  him  as  a  tyrant.  Plausibly 
enough  he  was  accused  of  disloyalty  to  his  pledges  and  of  aiming 
to  be  king.  Finally  his  enemies,  making  the  most  of  certain 
indiscretions  that  he  committed,  undertook  to  remove  him 
from  the  command   of  the  army.     Whatever  had   been  his 


ITURBIDE  35 

purpose,  he  now  found  it  necessary  to  strike;  and  a  mutiny 
of  the  troops  —  endorsed  later  by  the  Congress  under  military 
and  mob  pressure  —  declared  him  emperor.3 

Expenses  then  increased  still  more.  Jealousies  and  enmities 
were  embittered.  Public  sentiment  veered  sharply.  Time, 
strength  and  funds  were  swallowed  up  in  pomps  that  created 
no  more  illusion  than  a  college  student  in  a  toga.)  Encompassed 
with  flatterers,  foes  and  traitors,  financially  and  politically 
incompetent  himself  and  guided  by  incompetent  advisers,  well 
enough  aware  that  after  deceiving  everybody  he  could  expect 
no  one  to  be  true,  Iturbide  lost  his  head,  sometimes  wavered 
and  sometimes  tyrannized.  Finally  he  thought  it  necessary 
to  deprive  Santa  Anna  of  an  authority  that  had  no  doubt  been 
abused;  and  this  interesting  young  man,  who  had  recently 
proclaimed  that  he  welcomed  Iturbide's  elevation  with  a  posi- 
tively uncontrollable  exuberance  of  joy,  "pronounced"  for  a 
republic,  knowing  scarcely  anything  about  that  system,  but 
knowing  a  great  deal  about  the  Emperor's  unpopularity. 
This  precipitated  a  revolution ;  and  the  movement,  soon  taken 
up  by  Victoria,  Guerrero  and  Bravo,  spread  rapidly.  Itur- 
bide's most  intimate  and  trusted  general  was  despatched 
against  the  insurgents,  but  betrayed  him.  The  army  went 
over.  The  people,  who  revered  the  Liberator  but  not  the 
Emperor,  concurred.  With  bad  faith  and  gratuitous  outrages 
his  enemies  crowded  savagely  upon  him.  Early  in  1823  he 
abdicated ;  and  in  May,  forsaken  by  every  one  of  the  many  he 
had  benefited,  the  discredited  hero  sailed  for  Europe,  leaving 
behind  him  examples  and  suggestions  of  the  most  demoralizing 
kind.3 

The  junta,  meanwhile,  had  disgusted  the  nation  with  its 
frivolities,  political  and  fiscal  incompetence  and  usurpation  of 
powers,  and  there  was  a  feeling  of  relief  when  it  dissolved  in 
February,  1822,  the  next  day  after  Congress  met.  Congress, 
however,  did  no  better  and  fared  even  worse,  for  it  earned 
much  contempt  by  sanctioning  under  pressure  the  elevation  of 
Iturbide;  and  then  Iturbide  made  Congress,  and  made  all 
popular  government,  quite  ridiculous  in  the  eyes  of  the  people 
and  the  army  by  forcibly  sending  the  members  home.  When 
at  his  wit's  end,  he  recalled  it  as  if  inviting  the  coup  de  grace, 
and  soon  it  not  only  earned  more  contempt  by  pronouncing 


36  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

his  elevation  illegal  and  punishing  every  mark  of  condolence  for 
the  faUen  chief,  but  undertook  to  outrank  omnipotence  by  pre- 
tending that  no  empire  had  existed.  Soon,  too,  all  the  selfish 
ambitions  that  had  combined  against  Iturbide  in  this  body 
showed  themselves  so  clearly  as  to  add  further  discredit;  and 
worse  yet  the  Congress,  though  chosen  merely  to  frame  a 
constitution  under  the  Plan  of  Iguala,  held  on  after  the  refusal 
of  Spain  to  cooperate  had  put  an  end  to  that  scheme.3 

The  republicans,  who  were  gaining  ground  because  evidently 
no  other  Mexican  could  stand  where  Iturbide  had  fallen,  and 
the  Iturbidistas,  who  desired  to  create  anarchy  in  order  to 
force  the  recall  of  their  hero,  clamored  for  new  elections.  Five 
provinces  demanded  them  formally;  and  at  length,  despised 
by  every  one,  Congress,  the  firstfruit  of  popular  government, 
fell  to  the  ground.  Almost  every  institution  that  should  have 
enjoyed  respect  was  now  discredited  —  even  the  Church,  for 
it  had  crowned  the  emperor  and  shed  its  benedictions  liberally 
on  Congress..  The  army,  however,  stood,  for  it  had  shown  its 
power  both  to  elevate  and  to  overthrow.3 

The  next  Congress,  which  met  November  7,  1823,  had  a  more 
democratic  basis;  but  the  members  were  personally  inferior, 
intrigue  and  self-seeking  again  prevailed,  and  the  young  orators 
—  convinced  that  winning  applause  from  the  galleries  was  the 
true  object  of  speaking  —  launched  forth  on  all  occasions  with 
that  fatal  fluency  which  their  intoxicating  idiom  encouraged. 
After  centuries  of  enforced  silence,  men  to  whom  liberty  could 
only  mean  license  were  called  upon  to  decide  the  gravest 
questions  of  statesmanship.  Naturally  they  were  eager  to 
build  before  laying  foundations;  and  naturally,  too,  where 
nine  tenths  of  the  people  could  not  read,  it  seemed  like  genuine 
statesmanship  to  flourish  the  novel  vocabulary  of  independence.3 

Frivolous,  fickle,  now  torpid  and  now  running  amuck, 
Congress  found  itself  compelled  eventually  to  frame  a  constitu- 
tion. Under  Spanish  rule  the  provinces,  each  governed  by  an 
intendant,  had  known  little  and  cared  less  about  one  another ; 
and  now,  stimulated  by  the  centrifugal  tendency  of  the  Iberian 
character  and  the  dread  of  a  tyrant,  inflamed  by  transcendental 
doctrines  of  liberty,  disgusted  with  the  proceedings  of  the 
national  authorities,  and  captivated  by  the  thought  of  offices 
for  all,  they  began  to  claim  sovereignty;    and  something  had 


VICTORIA'S  ADMINISTRATION  37 

to  be  done  at  once.  A  republic,  though  alien  to  all  the  habits 
and  feelings  of  the  nation,  seemed  evidently  necessary,  because 
no  possible  monarch  existed,  and  because  no  other  system 
could  make  it  the  interest  of  a  sufficient  number  of  persons 
to  maintain  the  government;  but  this  did  not  end  the  dif- 
ficulties. The  centralized  type  of  republic  was  ardently 
desired  by  the  oligarchy  as  likely  to  prove  controllable,  and  by 
all  the  monarchists  as  a  sloping  path  toward  their  goal;  but 
the  friends  of  Iturbide  and  the  enemies  of  privilege  —  strongest 
at  a  distance  from  the  capital  —  fought  against  it,  and  at 
length,  as  the  federal  system,  about  which  only  the  vaguest 
notions  were  entertained,  promised  more  offices  and  seemed 
more  likely  to  hold  the  country  together,  it  was  decided  upon.3 

To  meet  the  crisis  one  individual,  taking  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States  as  a  basis,4  drafted  the  required  instrument 
in  three  days;  and  so  an  untrained  and  uneducated  nation 
found  itself  provided  with  a  complicated  mixture  of  democracy 
and  privilege,  liberty  and  intolerance,  progress  and  reaction, 
which  paralyzed  itself  by  combining  such  antagonistic  elements, 
omitted  the  safeguard  of  a  supreme  court  like  ours,  and  showed 
its  own  inadequacy  by  providing  that  in  emergencies  the 
President  might  be  given  "extraordinary  powers,"  or  in  other 
words  become  a  dictator.  In  short,  the  government  Was 
organized  as  a  permanent  revolution.  There  was  much 
enthusiasm,  however,  over  this  triumph  of  nationality,  anc(\)n 
New;  Year's  day,  1825,  the  first  constitutional  Congress  assem- 
bled.^ The  treasury  was  now  full  of  borrowed  English  gold; 
and  — -  as  every  one  hoped  the  new  system  might  be  developed 
in  the  direction  he  preferred  —  all  agreed  that  an  era  of  peace, 
joy  and  prosperity  had  at  length  arrived.3 

Victoria  was  elected  President,  His  frank,  ruddy,  bronzed 
face,  peering  out  of  gray  whiskers  and  curly  gray  hair,  looked 
happy  and  encouraging,  but  soon  the  mass  of  the  nation  felt 
once  more  cheated;  for  although  Bravo  had  been  the  can- 
didate of  the  oligarchy,  Victoria  —  yielding  to  the  pressure 
of  that  element  —  gave  it  a  preponderance  in  the  administra- 
tion. A  multitude  of  people  were  exasperated  to  find  the  old 
privileged  classes  again  in  control,  and  the  execution  of  Itur- 
bide under  an  illegal  law  —  for  he  had  returned  to  Mexico  — 
infuriated  his  partisans.    Worse  yet,  the  oligarchy  denied  the 


38  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

practicability  of  the  federal  system  for  so  unwieldy  a  country, 
where  the  states  felt  so  independent,  where  so  many  men 
aspired  to  hold  office  and  where  so  few  were  qualified,  and 
plotted  to  set  up  the  centralized  regime,  with  monarchy  — 
preferably  under  a  Spanish  prince  —  as  the  ultimate  aim  of 
many;  and  Victoria,  a  polite,  weak,  indolent,  easily-flattered 
man  of  small  abilities,  little  education  and  immense  vanity, 
who  idolized  his  country  but  felt  she  would  always  need  him 
as  chief-priest,  fell  in  with  this  plan,  because  without  a  change 
of  the  constitution  he  could  not  be  President  a  second  time.5 

Disgusted  and  alarmed,  the  Federalists,  who  included  the 
Iturbidistas,  began  therefore  to  scheme  gropingly  for  a  new 
revolution,  a  new  war  of  independence ;  but  at  length,  realizing 
that  under  the  constitution  a  majority  could  rule,  they  estab- 
lished Masonic  lodges  of  the  York  Rite,  and  with  great  skill, 
activity  and  perseverance  organized  their  forces.  Before  long 
their  power  showed  itself  at  the  voting-urns,  and  the  President, 
recognizing  the  logic  of  events  and  perceiving  he  could  never 
supplant  Bravo  in  the  favor  of  the  aristocracy,  changed  the 
complexion  of  the  government.  This  in  turn  angered  the 
faction  displaced,  and  most  unwisely  —  being  physically  much 
the  weaker  side  —  it  massed  its  power  in  December,  1827,  and 
revolted  under  a  certain  Montano.  Bravo,  though  Vice- 
President,  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  insurgents;  but 
the  government  forces  under  Guerrero,  attacking  him  during 
a  truce,  quickly  ertded  the  revolt.5 

Peace,  however,  did  not  return.  The  newspapers  unearthed 
or  invented  so  many  unsavory  tales  about  the  leading  citizens 
that,  besides  proving  those  men  unworthy  of  confidence,  they 
excited  lasting  resentments.  The  Federalists  —  particularly 
the  Iturbidistas  —  harshly  avenged  their  past  sufferings,  for 
the  Mexican  idea  of  justice  meant  a  chance  to  persecute  the 
oppressor;  and  every  thinking  mind  saw  with  dismay  that 
whereas  previous  insurrections  had  occurred  in  a  natural 
revolutionary  period,  the  government  legally  established  by 
the  nation  had  now  been  defied  by  a  great  party  led  by  the 
Vice-President  himself.  This  was  the  letting  out  of  waters, 
and  to  palliate  it  as  chargeable  to  circumstances  would  be  to 
excuse  all  political  crimes.5 

Meanwhile  another  storm  had  been  gathering.     The  Spanish 


VICTORIA'S  ADMINISTRATION  39 

element,  which  not  only  was  superior  but  felt  so,  had  given 
much  offence ;  and,  quite  aside  from  grudges,  many  thought 
it  unsafe  to  have  so  large  a  number  of  Gachupines  in  the 
country  —  many  of  them  active  and  able,  not  a  few  of  them 
soldiers,  and  some  occupying  high  civil  and  military  positions 
—  at  a  time  when  Spain  was  preparing  to  reassert  her  author- 
ity over  Mexico.  Others  argued  that  should  the  Spaniards 
go,  their  places  in  business  and  the  public  service  would  be 
available  for  Mexicans.  Still  others  considered  this  a  good 
way  to  enfeeble  the  oligarchy,  so  as  to  curtail  its  privileges. 
Many  demagogues  perceived  that  here  lay  a  splendid  oppor- 
tunity to  acquire  a  following;  and  the  Spaniards,  for  their 
part,  long  accustomed  to  despise  and  lord  it  over  the  Mexicans, 
often  ^exasperated  the  public  by  offensive  and  imprudent 
conduct  The  natural  consequences  followed.  Many  in- 
surrections, benevolently  treated  by  the  government,  de- 
manded the  expulsion  of  the  Gachupines;  some  of  the  states 
passed  laws  in  that  sense;  and  finally,  in  1827  and  1828, 
Congress  did  the  same.  A  very  large  number  of  Gachupines 
actually  departed  and  carried  away  their  money.  This  drew 
out  the  strongest  fibres  of  public  life,  the  army,  finance,  trade 
and  the  industries;  while  the  injustice  and  impolicy  of  these 
decrees  and  the  bloody  vengeance  taken  upon  a  few  silly 
Spanish  conspirators  embittered  feeling  in  Mexico,  and  greatly 
injured  Mexican  credit  in  Europe,  where  few  except  the  Span- 
ish merchants  enjoyed  any  financial  standing.5 

By  the  time  Victoria's  administration  drew  near  its  end, 
Mexico  had  marked  out  her  downward  route.  The  parties 
faced  each  other  as  implacable  foes.  Each  perpetrated  as 
much  electoral  fraud  and  violence  as  it  could;  each  kept  up 
a  savage  press;  and  each  worked  in  the  dark  through  secret 
societies.  Owing  to  extravagance,  peculation,  bad  manage- 
ment, the  backwardness  of  the  states  in  paying  their  quotas, 
and  the  failure  of  an  English  banking  house,  the  treasury  was 
empty  in  spite  of  lavish  borrowing.  "Liberty"  had  become 
a  by-word,  for  Victoria  had  wielded  the  extraordinary  powers 
for  a  year  and  a  half,  punishments  had  gone  beyond  the  laws, 
and  the  government  had  been  given  authority,  not  only  to 
expel  foreigners  at  will,  but  even  to  banish  citizens  from  their 
states.     Corruption    was    general    and    profound,    commerce 


40  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

feeble,  credit  extinct,  justice  perverted,  reported  the  French 
agent;  and,  as  his  British  colleague  added,  the  "Name  of 
Patriotism"  was  used  as  a  "Cloak  to  cover  the  greatest  Ex- 
cesses." 5 

And  now  came  something  worse.  Well  aware  they  could  not 
elect  one  of  their  own  number  President  against  the  popular 
candidate,  Guerrero,  the  Centralists  looked  about  for  an 
acceptable  Federalist.  Gomez  Pedraza,  Victoria's  minister 
of  war,  though  narrow,  harsh  and  passionate,  was  a  strict  and 
honest  man,  a  laborious  official  and  a  thoughtful,  effective 
orator.  He  had  fought  on  the  Spanish  side  in  the  revolution, 
and  naturally  favored  a  conservative,  aristocratic  regime. 
He,  therefore,  was  secretly  adopted  in  place  of  Bravo,  now  in 
exile.  All  those  who  detested  unseemly  party  strife  preferred 
him,  and  as  the  moderate  wing  of  the  Federalists  also  took 
that  side,  quite  unaware  that  Centralism  lurked  in  the  shadow, 
Guerrero's  noisy  and  overconfident  supporters  found  them- 
selves beaten.  This  result  and  the  open  exultation,  threats 
and  hostilities  of  their  old  enemies,  who  still  controlled  the 
senate  and  the  supreme  court,  enraged  them,  for  they  per- 
ceived they  had  been  duped  once  more,  and  they  hotly  charged 
—  no  doubt  with  some  reason  —  that  money  and  Pedraza's 
power  as  head  of  the  war  department  had  frustrated  the  will 
of  the  people ;  while  it  disgusted  Victoria  to  be  superseded  by 
a  man  he  had  looked  down  upon  as  merely  a  useful  clerk.6 

Another  individual  also  took  offence.  After  setting  the  ball 
in  motion  against  Iturbide,  Santa  Anna  had  been  eclipsed  by 
larger  figures,  and  to  shine  again  he  took  up  arms  as  Protector 
of  the  People;  but  this  enterprise  collapsed  at  once,  and  he 
issued  a  very  humble  proclamation,  closing  with  the  words, 
"Permit  me,  permit  me  to  dig  myself  an  obscure  grave  that 
my  ashes  and  my  memory  may  disappear."  A  fairly  com- 
fortable grave  was,  however,  dug  for  him  by  removing  His 
Penitence  to  Yucatan  as  military  commandant,  and  he  pro- 
ceeded at  once  to  gild  its  interior  by  permitting  illicit  commerce 
with  Cuba.  Returning  after  a  while  to  the  proper  field  of 
ambition,  he  was  more  than  suspected  of  complicity  in  two 
insurrections;  but  in  each  case  he  read  the  omens  in  season 
to  extricate  himself,  and  virtuously  offered  his  sword 'to  the 
government.     Now,    however,    he   took   a   bold    stand.     Not 


SANTA  ANNA  41 

only  were  he  and  the  successful  candidate  personal  enemies, 
but  he  felt  that  little  would  be  left  of  himself  after  four  years 
of  Pedraza's  rule;  and  he  knew  that  Guerrero,  in  addition  to 
being  favored  by  the  army,  really  had  a  majority  of  the  people 
on  his  side.  Accordingly  he  unfurled  his  flag  in  September, 
1828,  for  Guerrero,  popular  rights  and  a  total  expulsion  of  the 
Gachupines.  In  this  contest  he  showed  amazing  quickness, 
audacity  and  resourcefulness,  keeping  up  his  motley  troops 
principally  by  brigandage;  but  very  soon  his  cause  appeared 
to  be  doomed.6 

.  At  this  point  Lorenzo  de  Zavala,  one  of  those  human  meteors 
that  rarely  illuminate  Anglo-Saxon  skies,  came  forward.  His 
political  relations  were  extremely  intense;  and  now,  believing 
the  Centralists  intended  to  place  him  before  a  firing-squad, 
he  organized  at  Mexico,  in  the  hope  of  saving  himself  and 
Santa  Anna,  the  woeful  insurrection  of  the  Acordada,  which 
fixed  the  example  of  party  revolution.  Victoria  had  an  under- 
standing with  him,  though  after  betraying  the  government 
and  letting  the  handful  of  rioters  get  a  safe  start,  he  lost  his 
nerve  and  betrayed  them  also ;  and  in  the  end,  at  the  cost  of 
some  bloodshed  and  extensive  robberies,  the  insurrection 
triumphed;  "the  vile  and  unnatural  Pedraza" —  as  his  foes 
called  him  —  fled  to  the  United  States,  and  Congress,  after 
having  declared  Pedraza  elected,  pronounced  Guerrero  Presi- 
dent on  the  express  ground  that  revolts  had  occurred  in 
his  favor.  In  reality  this  was  a  revolution  of  numbers  and 
popular  ideas  against  privilege  and  oligarchy,  and  before  long 
the  country  accepted  the  situation.6 

Santa  Anna  was  now  a  popular  hero,  the  saviour  of  the 
nation ;  and  he  proceeded  to  confirm  his  title.  In  1829  came 
the  long  expected  blow  from  Spain,  and  having  calmly  assumed 
the  military  authority  at  Vera  Cruz,  he  advanced  to  meet  it. 
Near  Tampico  the  invading  army,  stricken  with  fever,  desired 
to  lay  down  its  arms;  but  Santa  Anna,  eager  for  laurels, 
attacked  it.  Spanish  valor  accepted  the  challenge ;  the 
Mexicans  were  repulsed;  and  their  ambitious  leader  left  the 
field  before  the  battle  ended.  The  invaders  were  then  permitted 
to  surrender,  and  soon  a  new  cry  was  echoing  through  the 
streets  of  Mexico,  "Viva  Santa  Anna,  the  Victor  of  Tampico!" 
Clothing  himself  with  modesty  and  grace  he  now  posed  as  a 


42  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

sort  of  benevolent  divinity.  Rather  tall,  thin,  apparently 
feeble  but  capable  of  great  exertions  on  occasion,  with  a  head 
that  bulged  at  the  top,  a  swarthy  complexion,  brilliant  and 
restless  eyes,  a  very  clear-cut  voice  and  a  voluble  tongue,  he 
moved  about  his  estate  at  Manga  de  Clavo  and  the  near-by 
city  of  Vera  Cruz  in  an  easy,  affable  way,  accumulating  popu- 
larity. "Can  read  somewhat,"  reported  our  consul  in  that  city ; 
but  his  thoughts  were  above  literature.  "Were  I  made  God," 
it  was  said  that  he  once  remarked,  "I  should  wish  to  be  some- 
thing more." 6 

Meantime,  April  1,  1829,  Guerrero  assumed  the  Presidency. 
In  his  green  jacket  edged  with  fur,  red  waistcoat  bound  with 
a  blue  sash,  brown  mantle  and  heavy  sabre,  with  his  thick  hair 
bristling  toward  all  points  of  the  compass,  he  was  a  picturesque 
figure,  and  as  candidate  had  answered  very  well.  For  the  role 
of  chief  magistrate,  however,  the  British  minister  justly  de- 
scribed him  as  "totally  unfit."  Being  mostly  of  Indian  and 
partly  —  it  was  stated  —  of  negro  blood,  he  instinctively 
distrusted  the  whites,  while  the  latter  utterly  despised  the 
class  to  which  he  belonged.  Though  his  intuitive  judgment  was 
quick  and  within  the  range  of  his  experience  remarkably  correct, 
he  knew  nothing  whatever  of  letters  and  politics,  necessarily 
depended  upon  the  self-seeking  flatterers  of  his  party,  and 

(veered  about  like  the  wind.  In  military  emergencies  he  could 
burst  his  bonds  like  a  Samson,  but  the  things  he  really  cared 
for  were  a  wench,  a  bottle,  a  game  of  monte  and  a  nap  under 
some  spreading  tree.  Without  ideas,  knowledge,  experience 
or  high  character,  he  faced  a  terrible  inheritance :  the  laws 
ignored,  the  authorities  despised,  the  administration  dis- 
organized, the  treasury  worse  than  empty,  the  country  in 
distress  and  turmoil.6 

Professions  of  loyalty  to  the  "sacred"  constitution  and  the 
laws  could  not  blot  out  the  fact  that  his  authority  was  based 
upon  a  riot ;  and  others  would  not  feel  satisfied  merely  because 
he  was  content.  The  extraordinary  powers  of  the  Executive, 
granted  in  view  of  the  Spanish  invasion,  were  used  oppressively. 
A  multitude  of  persons  clamored  for  money  and  he  could  give 
them  none ;  a  multitude  clamored  for  reforms,  and  he  scarcely 
knew  what  they  were  talking  about.  As  far  as  possible  the 
rest  of  the  Gachupines  were  driven  out,  but  this  merely  added 


A  NEW  REVOLUTION  43 

to  the  confusion.  President  and  nation  simply  drifted,  and 
the  rocks  were  near.  Before  long  the  general  government  was 
practically  ignored  except  at  the  capital,  and  the  heads  of  the 
secret  societies  wielded  the  real  power.  Guerrero  even  allowed 
the  oligarchy,  his  deadliest  foe,  to  alienate  him  from  the  com- 
mon people,  the  source  of  his  strength.  He  became  almost  as 
isolated  as  Mahomet's  coffin ;  and  then  —  as  soon  as  ambition 
could  disguise  itself  with  a  programme  —  he  fell.6 

Mainly  owing  to  the  good-will  of  Guerrero,  the  Vice-President 
was  General  Anastasio  Bustamante,  a  heavy,  dull,  rather 
kindly  and  fairly  honest  aristocrat,  though  nominally  a  moder- 
ate Federalist.  When  appointed  by  Guerrero  to  command 
the  army  of  reserve  at  Jalapa,  the  principal  military  force  in 
the  country,  he  exclaimed  on  taking  leave  of  the  President, 
"Never  will  I  unsheathe  my  sword  against  General  Guerrero, " 
but  within  a  year , (December,  1829)  he  did  it;  and,  though 
a  beneficiary  of  the  Acordada  riot,  he  revolted  against  the 
government  in  the  name  of  the  constitution.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  his  rebellion  was  merely  another  effort  of  the  privileged 
classes,  a  revised  edition  of  Montano's,  and  the  army  received 
its  pay  from  the  money  chests  of  the  oligarchs.  Little  op- 
position was  encountered,  for  Guerrero  had  let  Delilah  shear 
him,  the  Acordada  episode  and  much  other  misconduct  had 
completely  discredited  the  radical  Federalists,  and  the  Federal- 
ists in  general  —  who  had  raised  Bustamante  from  a  political 
prison  to  the  second  place  in  the  nation  —  could  not  believe, 
after  his  fresh  protestations  of  loyalty  to  the  constitution,  that 
he  would  betray  them.  The  President,  finding  nobody  to 
lean  upon,  fled  to  his  old  haunts  in  the  south,  was  treacherously4 
captured  and  was  shot ;  and  meanwhile,  on  the  first  of  January, 
1830,  Bustamante  took  up  the  reins.  Greed,  corruption, 
imprudence,  evil  passions  and  lawlessness  had  ruined  the 
cause  of  democracy,  and  Victoria's  experiment  of  letting  aris- 
tocrats administer  a  professedly  popular  system  had  to  be 
tried  again.6 ' 

Bustamante  opened  Congress  with  a  bit  of  the  fashionable 
hypocrisy,  asserting  that  a  "sacred  Constitution"  had  placed 
him  in  power;  but  he  showed  that  what  interested  him  was 
"the  wishes  of  the  army,"  and  the  army  reciprocated  this 
affection.     Alaman,  who  had  been  Victoria's  chief  adviser  at 


44  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

first,  now  became  the  real  head  of  the  government.  More 
than  any  other  man  in  Mexico  he  could  claim  to  be  called  a 
statesman,  for  he  knew  some  history,  had  observed  politics  in 
Europe,  and  in  a  superficial  yet  impressive  way  could  reason; 
but  he  was  a  statesman  of  the  Metternich  school,  wily  and 
insincere,  wholly  unable  to  sympathize  with  democracy,  and 
profoundly  in  love  with  force.  Whatever  did  not  suit  the 
government  he  demolished  without  regard  to  law;  whoever 
opposed  it  was  crushed.  In  administration  the  government 
did  well,  but  —  attempting  to  represent  democracy  and 
privilege,  progress  and  reaction,  the  past  and  the  future,  a 
self-governing  state  and  an  all-controlling  church  at  one  and 
the  same  time  —  it  undertook  to  perform  an  impossible  task 
by  impossible  means.  Consequently  it  satisfied  neither  of  the 
parties  and  offended  both.  King  Stork  proved  worse  than 
King  Log.7 

Santa  Anna,  incensed  because  Guerrero  would  not  appoint 
him  minister  of  war,  had  at  first  coquetted  with  Bustamante's 
movement;  but  soon,  overshadowed  at  Jalapa  by  the  Vice- 
President  and  by  Bravo,  whom  Guerrero  had  pardoned,  he 
retired  to  his  estate.  On  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  he 
took  up  arms  for  Guerrero;  but  when  his  chief  gave  up,  he 
followed  that  example,  and  patiently  awaited,  crouching,  the 
time  to  spring.  Now  he  saw  the  tide  of  passion  rising,  and 
saw  also  the  best  citizens  agreeing  that  Mier  y  Teran,*  an  able 
and  honorable  man,  should  be  the  next  chief  magistrate. 
Accordingly,  to  prevent  an  election  if  nothing  more,  he  "  pro- 
nounced "  in  the  name  of  Federalism  at  the  beginning  of  1832, 
and  called  for  a  change  of  Cabinet,  though  four  years  earlier 
he  had  battled  for  the  principle  that  nobody  should  interfere 
with  a  President's  choice  of  ministers;  and  then  he  required 
that  Bustamante  should  give  up  his  place  to  Pedraza  as  the 
rightful  head  of  the  state,  though  Santa  Anna  himself  had 
been  the  cause  of  Pedraza's  exclusion  on  the  ground  of  illegal 
election.     Supported  by  the  Vera  Cruz  customhouse  and  de- 

*  A  Mexican  sometimes  chose  to  bear  the  family  name  of  his  mother  as 
well  as  that  of  his  father.  The  former  was  connected  to  the  latter  with 
the  word  "and"  (y).  Paredes  y  Arrillaga,  Pefia  y  Pefia,  Mora  y  Villamil 
are  instances.  In  referring  to  such  persons,  however,  it  was  customary 
to  use  only  the  first  of  the  names.  Thus  one  finds  much  more  often 
"Paredes"  than  "Paredes  y  Arrillaga." 


SANTA  ANNA  PRESIDENT  45 

fended  by  the  pestilence  of  the  coast,  he  occupied  a  most 
advantageous  position ;  and  consistency  did  not  signify.7 

Near  the  close  of  the  year  the  two  chiefs,  brought  together 
by  Pedraza,  adjusted  the  affairs  of  the  nation  —  that  is  to  say, 
the  offices  —  as  private  business,  and  the  troops  on  both  sides 
were  liberally  rewarded.  Congress  protested,  but  was  utterly 
powerless.  Bustamante  soon  found  it  wise  to  give  up  the 
Presidency;  and  as  the  elections  were  not  general  enough,  at 
the  proper  time,  to  create  a  Congress,  constitutional  govern- 
ment vanished.  However,  though  Pedraza  had  resigned  and 
even  left  the  country,  which  no  President  could  legally  do, 
Santa  Anna  and  Bustamante  now  hoisted  him  into  power  to 
complete  the  term  interrupted  by  Guerrero,  while  the  "best 
citizens"  fell  out  over  offices  and  personal  issues,  and  so  dis- 
sipated the  brightest  prospect  seen  as  yet  in  Mexican  public 
life.7 

Under  these  circumstances,  of  course,  the  dominant  general, 
Santa  Anna,  was  elected  President.  For  Vice-President  the 
choice  fell  upon  Valentin  Gomez  Farias,  leader  of  the  radical 
Federalists.  In  many  ways  Farias  deserved  warm  admiration. 
He  was  active,  indefatigable,  fearless,  thoroughly  honest,  and 
willing  —  perhaps  a  little  more  than  willing  —  to  serve  the 
public  in  the  humblest  or  the  highest  office.  He  loved  Mexico 
ardently,  and  he  believed  in  the  supremacy  of  law  and  the  civil 
authority.  Unfortunately,  however,  his  education  was  in- 
adequate for  the  work  he  undertook  to  do;  and  he  lacked 
prudence,  patience  and  common  sense.  In  short,  he  may  be 
characterized  as  a  fanatical  democrat  and  political  idealist.7 

Santa  Anna  now  had  the  army  at  his  back,  but  he  desired  to 
have  also  the  privileged  classes  there,  and  they  had  been 
exasperated  by  his  overthrowing  Bustamante.  He  there- 
fore decided  to  let  them  see  they  needed  him;  and,  retiring 
early  in  1833  to  his  estate  —  which  in  fact  he  enjoyed  much 
more  than  bearing  the  burdens  of  administration  —  he  left 
the  Vice-President  in  power.  Farias  then  undertook  to  trans- 
form Mexico,  by  merely  saying  "  Open  Sesame!  "  to  the  Fed- 
eralist majority  in  Congress,  into  a  modern,  liberal,  orderly  and 
prosperous  nation ;  and  reform  projects  made  their  appearance 
at  once.  The  privileges  of  the  army  were  boldly  attacked  and 
still  more  those  of  the  Church,  which  aimed  to  be  in  the  social 


46  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

order  enough  to  dominate  it,  yet  enough  outside  to  escape  from 
all  obligations.  Farias  proposed,  therefore,  without  having  a 
well-digested  plan,  to  reassert  the  supreme  authority  formerly 
exercised  by  the  king,  abolish  the  clerical  fuero  and  the  com- 
pulsory tithes,  provide  for  popular,  lay  education,  and  bring 
into  productive  circulation  the  immense  wealth  controlled  by 
the  Church;  and  Congress,  fully  aware  that  reforms  were 
necessary,  dazzled  by  the  boldness  and  novelty  of  his 
programme,  and  misled  by  the  Mexican  faith  in  theories  and 
formulae,  supported  him.7 

Naturally  such  projects  and  their  foreseen  consequences 
roused  the  clericals  and  all  in  that  camp  to  fury,  and  the  pro- 
prietors of  great  estates  also  grew  alarmed.  The  President 
felt  his  time  had  come,  and  in  May,  therefore,  he  resumed  his 
functions.  The  progress  of  reform  promptly  halted,  and  soon 
it  was  announced  that  Santa  Anna,  ingeniously  made  a  prisoner 
by  his  own  troops,  had  been  proclaimed  dictator.  Un- 
doubtedly he  expected  the  mutiny  that  now  broke  out  at  the 
capital  to  overthrow  the  government;  but  Farias,  again  in 
power  during  the  President's  absence,  quelled  the  revolt,  and 
Santa  Anna  found  it  necessary  to  "escape"  and  resume  his 
office.7 

Pretending  still  with  consummate  address  to  favor  both 
parties  —  though  really  a  Centralist  now- — he  made  both  of 
them  court  and  fear  him,  and  proved  his  power  by  breaking 
down  and  then  restoring  the  army.  Of  course,  however,  these 
manoeuvres  excited  suspicion.  The  privileged  classes,  though 
anxious  for  his  support,  hesitated  to  pledge  him  theirs,  and  so 
he  returned  on  a  six  months'  leave  of  absence  to  his  figurative 
plow,  leaving  Tornel,  whom  an  American  minister  described 
as  "a  very  bad  man,"  to  scheme  in  his  interest.  The  now 
embittered  and  excited  forces  of  reform  were  thus  unleashed, 
and  before  long  the  Church  and  the  rich  proprietors  offered 
the  Cincinnatus  of  Manga  de  Clavo  absolute  power  on  con- 
dition that  he  should  protect  them.  In  April,  1834,  therefore, 
two  months  before  his  leave  was  to  expire,  he  took  possession 
of  the  supreme  power  again,  and  was  hailed  by  the  clergy  as 
a  new  Messiah.  Supported  soon  by  the  revolutionary  "  plan" 
of  Cuernavaca,  he  made  himself  in  effect  a  dictator.  The 
cause    of    reform    was    harshly    checked    and    turned    back. 


A  CHANGE  OF  REGIME  47 

Congress  found  the  door  of  its  hall  barred;  and  Farias, 
covered  with  abuse,  was  driven  from  the  country.7 

Secretly  encouraging  reactionary  insurrections  and  instigat- 
ing demands  ior  a  centralized  regime,  though  still  professing 
publicly  the  other  creed,  Santa  Anna  ordered  the  people  to 
surrender  their  weapons,  and  crushed  with  a  ruthless  hand 
the  state  of  Zacatecas,  which  dared  to  oppose  his  will. 
"Worthy  son  of  the  father  of  lies,"  "unrivalled  chameleon," 
"shameless  hypocrite,"  "atheist  and  blasphemer,"  shrieked 
his  opponents.  "With  the  tranquility  of  a  tiger,  which,  sated 
with  the  flesh  of  its  prey,  reposes  on  what  it  does  not  wish  to 
devour,  Santa  Anna  reports  his  victory,"  cried  El  Crepusculo. 
But  resentment  counted  for  nothing;  Mexico  was  prostrate. 
Late  in  1835,  therefore,  a  packed  Congress  of  self-seeking 
politicians  decided  upon  centralization,  and  it  was  understood 
that  Santa  Anna  would  be  chosen  President  for  ten  years,  with 
a  longer  term  and  a  higher  title  in  prospect.  But  now  the  scene 
was  tragically  shifted.  In  March,  1836,  the  Texans  declared 
their  independence.  The  Napoleon  of  the  West  fell  into  their 
hands  at  San  Jacinto,  where  they  defeated  his  army ;  and,  as 
an  inkling  got  abroad  of  the  unpatriotic  agreements  made  with 
his  captors  while  in  fear  of  revenge  for  his  cruelties,  he  thought 
it  wise  to  announce,  on  returning  to  Mexico  in  1837,  a  definitive 
retirement  from  public  life.7 

According  to  the  organic  law,  any  proposed  constitutional 
change  had  to  remain  under  consideration  for  two  years ;  but 
the  Congress  of  1835,  not  minding  a  trifle  like  this,  drew  up 
as  fast  as  possible  what  it  named  the  Seven  Laws  —  called 
by  others  the  Seven  Plagues.  By  December,  1836,  despite 
the  resistance  and  threats  of  the  Federalists,  the  new  regime 
was  fully  organized,  and  Bustamante  soon  held  the  reins  again. 
The  Church  and  the  wealthy  were  now  satisfied.  The  army 
also  felt  pleased,  for  the  Federalists  denounced  its  privileges, 
the  cost  of  the  many  state  offices  created  by  them  reduced  the 
amount  of  money  it  could  get,  and  an  aristocratic  government 
seemed  likely  to  need  it  constantly  and  pay  it  with  some 
regularity;  and  so  the  prospect  was,  especially  with  Santa 
Anna  eliminated,  that  the  new  regime  would  be  stable.7 

But  among  the  aristocrats  it  had  become  unfashionable  by 
this  time  to  meddle  with  politics.    The  groups  that  made  up 


48  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

the  dominant  party,  though  united  against  the  democrats, 
had  little  else  in  common.  Each  group  desired  to  enjoy 
privileges  and  shun  burdens;  each  aimed  to  exploit  the  na- 
tion ;  and  there  was  not  enough  to  satisfy  all.  The  expulsion 
of  the  Spaniards  had  weakened  the  numbers,  ability,  energy 
and  wealth  of  the  party;  and  now,  as  after  every  revolution, 
it  proved  so  impossible  to  fulfill  the  promises  made  to  win 
support,  that  soon  disappointed  friends  were  allying  them- 
selves with  open  enemies.8 

A  new  difficulty,  too,  arose,  for  under  a  centralized  system 
the  government  had  to  assume  financial  responsibilities  pre- 
viously borne  by  the  states.  A  strong  treasury  was  therefore 
essential ;  yet  the  rich,  and  in  particular  the  clergy,  would  not 
pay  enough  to  carry  on  the  government  they  had  established. 
Consequently  funds  had  to  be  borrowed,  Church  property  being 
the  only  available  security ;  and  the  clergy,  instead  of  meeting 
the  terms  of  the  money-lenders,  busily  hid  or  exported  their 
wealth.  Every  dollar  that  could  be  raised  had  to  be  given 
the  army  as  the  price  of  its  allegiance,  and  for  six  months  not 
one  civil  employe,  from  the  President  down,  received  a  salary. 
In  October,  1837,  the  ministry  resigned  in  a  body,  and  would 
not  return  to  their  desks,  for  nobody  cared  to  support  so  heavy 
a  load  when  there  was  no  chance  to  steal  or  even  to  get  paid.8 

Early  in  November  the  British  representative,  although  the 
legation  had  all  along  sympathized  with  the  aristocratic  party, 
reported  that  Centralism  had  completely  failed;  and  it  was 
notorious  that  Bustamante  himself  desired  a  restoration  of 
Federalism  as  the  only  possible  expedient.  Seeing  their  enemies 
divided,  the  liberals  took  heart,  and  petitions  for  a  change  of 
system  were  soon  pouring  in  from  the  departments,  which  had 
now  taken  the  places  of  the  states.  Dissatisfaction  spread. 
Pronunciamientos  began,  and  only  the  popularity  of  Busta- 
mante, who  had  mellowed  with  age  and  foreign  travel  during 
his  period  of  eclipse,  maintained  the  government.  Yet  Federal- 
ism could  not  act,  for  at  this  juncture  the  French  minister  was 
pressing  claims,  and  the  two  wings  of  the  party —  the  moderates 
led  by  Pedraza  and  the  radicals  led  by  Farias  —  disagreed 
passionately  on  this  foreign  issue.  A  complete  state  of  anarchy 
prevails,  reported  our  consul  at  Mexico  in  December,  1838.8 

Santa  Anna  all  this  time  was  quietly  at  work,  though  he  had 


FALL  OF  BUSTAMANTE  49 

called  heaven  to  witness  that  he  would  be  loyal  to  the  existing 
regime;  and,  as  often  happened,  chance  came  to  his  aid.  A 
French  fleet  faptured  the  fortress  of  Ulua,  off  Vera  Cruz,  at 
this  time,  and  a  party  of  marines  landed  at  the  town,  destroyed 
some  war  material,  and  then  marched  back  to  reembark. 
Santa  Anna  commanded  there,  and,  being  wounded  in  attack- 
ing these  troops,  had  to  undergo  amputation  at  the  knee.  This 
was  his  opportunity,  and  he  at  once  issued  a  most  eloquent 
address.  Already  he  had  outdone  opera  bouffe,  and  now  he 
outdid  himself.  "Probably  this  will  be  the  last  victory  I  shall 
give  my  country,"  he  said;  "I  die  happy  that  Divine  Provi- 
dence has  permitted  me  to  devote  to  her  every  drop  of  my 
blood.  .  .  .  May  all  my  fellow-citizens,  forgetting  my 
political  errors,  concede  to  me  the  one  title  that  I  would  leave 
my  children,  that  of  a  Good  Mexican."  There  had  been  no 
victory,  for  the  French  drove  him  out  of  Vera  Cruz  before  he 
could  dictate  the  address,  and  he  did  not  dream  of  dying ;  but 
the  Mexicans  are  tender-hearted,  and  the  episode — particularly 
in  contrast  with  the  inaction  of  the  government,  which  could 
not  afford  an  efficient  regular  army  and  dared  not  arm  the 
people  —  gave  him  a  fresh  hold  on  the  nation,  even  though  all 
capable  of  thinking  felt  by  this  time  profoundly  skeptical 
about  him.8 

Accordingly  he  became  the  power  behind  the  tottering  throne 
in  December,  1838,  and  when  Bustamante  took  the  field  early 
the  next  year  to  put  down  an  insurgent  named  Mejia,  the 
Centralist  leaders  had  Santa  Anna  made  temporary  President 
as  a  bulwark  against  Federalism.  The  quality  of  his  penitence 
quickly  showed  itself.  His  power  was  audaciously  used  to 
cripple  Bustamante,  suppress  liberty,  gain  partisans  and 
benefit  himself  and  his  friends.  In  a  word,  he  achieved  the 
most  lawless  and  shameless  administration  yet  witnessed,  and 
though  universally  feared,  was  now  execrated  by  almost  all 
except  his  personal  followers.  In  July,  1839,  the  President 
resumed  his  functions,  but  matters  only  went  on  from  worse 
to  worst  —  corruption  rampant  in  the  administration,  public 
spirit  dead.  In  July,  1840,  rioters  actually  made  him  their 
prisoner  for  a  time.  False  advisers,  particularly  Tornel,  drew 
him  farther  and  farther  into  Santa  Anna's  net.  Corpulent 
and  aging  rapidly,  he  fell  into  a  sort  of  mental  stupor;    and 

VOL.   i  —  E 


50  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

in  August,  1841,  the  British  minister  reported  that  the  govern- 
ment, if  left  to  itself,  would  soon  expire  of  inanition.  As  for 
the  nation,  it  was  not  merely  in  anarchy  but  in  chaos.  Even 
the  conservatives  admitted  that  the  Seven  Laws  would  not  do.8 

This  very  month  rang  the  bell  for  the  next  scene.  General 
Mariano  Paredes,  another  important  figure  in  the  history  of 
our  war  with  Mexico,  was  a  brave  but  rather  besotted  officer, 
more  honest  but  less  clever  than  his  leading  contemporaries. 
On  a  mere  pretext,  though  he  owed  much  to  Bustamante,  he 
revolted ;  more  or  less  in  collusion  with  him  Santa  Anna  pro- 
nounced as  mediator;  and  General  Valencia,  correctly  de- 
scribed by  an  American  consul  as  "  destitute  of  every  principle 
of  honor  or  honesty,"  treacherously  getting  hold  of  what  was 
called  the  citadel  at  Mexico,  rebelled  on  his  own  account : 
check  from  two  knights  and  a  castle,  as  Sefiora  Calderon 
wittily  described  the  situation.  Weary,  disgusted,  in^ 
different,  cynical,  men  heard  unmoved  the  "Quien  vive?" 
and  "Centinela  alerte!"  of  the  insurgents  at  the  capital,  and 
between  two  puffs  of  their  cigarettes  gossiped  about  the  revolu- 
tion as  if  it  had  occurred  in  Europe.  It  was  only  a  game  of 
chess,  and  the  public  were  spectators.  They  understood  now 
that  nearly  all  the  pompous  phrases  of  the  politicians  had 
meant,  as  Lara's  Revista  Politico,  of  1840  put  it,  "Move,  and 
let  me  have  your  place."  8 

In  this  confusion  Santa  Anna,  whom  the  conservatives  had 
now  decided  to  support  instead  of  the  inefficient  Bustamante, 
came  rapidly  to  the  front.  His  triumph  was  soon  foreseen, 
and  the  nation  acquiesced.  Most  people  knew  he  was  a  villain, 
but  felt  that  at  any  rate  he  possessed  energy.  Probably  he  could 
keep  order,  they  said,  and  perhaps,  if  entirely  trusted,  would 
act  well.  If  not,  one  big  rascal  could  not  be  so  bad  as  many 
little  ones;  and  at  the  very  least  any  change  must  be  an  im- 
provement. In  reality  this  bold,  cunning,  hungry,  sharp 
adventurer,  who  knew  what  he  wanted  and  got  it,  dazzled  the 
average  Mexicans.  They  saw  in  him  a  fulfilment  of  them- 
selves, and  in  letting  him  rule  they  had  the  feeling  of  success 
without  the  trouble.8 

For  a  while  Bustamante,  whose  government  practically 
faded  out  in  September,  1841,  resisted  with  dignity  though  with 
no  chance  of  survival ;   but  at  length,  in  a  fit  of  desperation,  he 


SANTA  ANNA  VIRTUALLY  DICTATOR  51 

cut  the  ground  of  legality  from  under  his  own  feet  by  pro- 
nouncing for  Federalism,  and  on  October  7,  Santa  Anna, 
driving  rapidly  through  Mexico  behind  four  white  horses 
belonging  to  a  stockbroker,  with  a  retinue  of  splendid  coaches 
and  an  immense  escort  of  cavalry,  took  up  his  quarters  at  the 
palace  in  Tacubaya,  a  few  miles  beyond.  Yet  not  a  single 
viva  greeted  his  magnificent  entry  or  his  address  to  Congress. 
Memory  paralyzed  admiration.  In  despair,  not  love,  Mexico 
consented  to  be  his.8 

By  the  new  arrangement,  called  the  Bases  of  Tacubaya,  a 
new  Congress  was  to  draw  a  new  constitution.  Meantime 
some  one,  the  choice  of  a  junta  appointed  by  the  successful 
chief,  was  to  have  the  powers  "  necessary  for  the  organization 
of  all  branches  of  the  public  service,"  and  naturally  Santa 
Anna  himself  received  the  votes  of  his  junta.  This  arrange- 
ment was  regarded  by  the  nation  as  a  mere  parenthesis,  but 
the  General  held  a  different  idea.  On  October  10,  the  gloomy 
old  cathedral  was  as  bright  as  gold,  silver,  gems  and  hundreds 
of  candles  could  make  it.  Troops  entered  the  sacred  pre- 
cincts, and  formed  to  the  music  of  drums  and  cornets.  The 
archbishop  proceeded  to  the  main  entrance  in  cope  and  mitre, 
holding  in  his  hands  a  crucifix  equally  beautiful  and  precious, 
and  there  he  waited  for  about  three  quarters  of  an  hour,  when 
a  military  officer,  who  had  not  even  deigned  to  put  on  full 
dress,  marched  in  and  seated  himself  on  a  splendid  throne. 
A  large  suite  of  generals  followed,  but  none  of  them  ventured 
to  sit,  though  the  Te  Deum  lasted  an  hour ;  and  finally  the  man 
on  the  throne  rose  and  took  this  oath :  I  swear  to  God  —  to 
do  as  I  please ;  for  such  was  the  meaning  of  the  Bases.  Har- 
dened by  seeing  his  superior  astuteness,  audacity  and  energy 
balked  so  many  times  by  circumstances  and  a  lack  of  con- 
fidence in  his  honor,  Santa  Anna  proposed,  now  that  he  once 
more  had  the  power,  to  grip  it  with  a  hand  of  steel.9 

As  dictator  he  indulged  himself  by  running  through  the 
entire  diapason  from  childishness  to  omnipotence,  announcing 
impossibilities  and  attempting  absurdities.  The  freedom  of 
the  press  and  the  freedom  of  speech  were  violated.  The  tariff 
was  juggled  with  for  selfish  pecuniary  reasons.  He  ordered 
the  university  to  give  one  of  his  friends  a  degree  and  a  chair 
—  that  is  to  say,  learning  and  a  profession.     He  closed  a  bank 


52  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

without  allowing  it  the  time  to  liquidate.  He  put  up  a  cheap 
building  of  rubble  work  that  was  merely  an  eyesore  —  though 
Tornel  compared  it  to  the  Simplon  road  of  Napoleon  —  and 
the  city  government  had  to  fall  down  and  worship  it.  His 
amputated  foot  was  dug  up  and  reinterred  with  extraordinary 
pomp.  On  the  top  of  a  monument  was  erected  a  gilded  statue 
of  him  pointing  toward  Texas,  though  some  said  it  was  pointing 
at  the  mint.  The  Church,  now  governed  by  the  soft  Arch- 
bishop Posada,  drowsy  with  satisfaction  and  carelessly  fatten- 
ing on  sweetmeats  presented  to  him  by  adoring  nuns,  was  forced 
to  make  "loans" ;  and  payments  on  public  debts, for  which  reve- 
nues had  been  solemnly  pledged,  were  suspended.9 

Nothing,  one  might  almost  say,  was  too  great  or  too  small 
for  Santa  Anna,  if  it  looked  auriferous.  No  coach  wheel  could 
turn  without  first  paying  a  tax.  Anybody  with  a  promising 
scheme  to  get  national  funds  could  find  a  partner  at  the  palace. 
Brokers  and  contractors  took  the  places  of  politicians ;  wealthy 
merchants,  able  to  loan  great  sums  at  great  percentages,  took 
the  places  of  statesmen.  Corruption  was  rampant  everywhere, 
of  course.  "An  arbitrary  system,  indeed,  must  always  be 
a  corrupt  one,"  as  Burke  said;  "there  never  was  a  man  who 
thought  he  had  no  law  but  his  own  will,  who  did  not  soon  find 
that  he  had  no  end  but  his  own  profit."  These  words  describe 
Santa  Anna's  course.  And  when  his  chest  was  full  enough 
and  his  army  big  enough,  putting  a  substitute  in  his  place  and 
shaking  off  the  cares  of  state,  he  went  down  to  enjoy  his  gam- 
bling and  cockfighting  and  plan  his  next  political  move  at  Manga 
de  Clavo,  secure  from  observation  and  protected  by  troops. 
Hints  of  a  formal  dictatorship  began  to  be  heard.9 

To  keep  up  appearances,  however,  he  summoned  the  pro- 
posed Congress.  A  majority  of  the  members  were  Federalists, 
but  he  promptly  informed  it  that  Federalism  would  not  do, 
and  when  they  insisted  on  their  notion,  Tornel,  the  minister 
of  war,  who  was  glad  to  be  his  lackey  and  wear  the  livery  of 
the  house,  barred  Congress  out  of  its  hall.  Presently,  without 
a  sign  of  protest  from  any  one,  it  was  dissolved  by  decree; 
and  then  eighty  persons,  chosen  by  the  administration,  drew 
up  a  new  constitution  called  the  Organic  Bases.  Valencia 
was  president  of  this  junta;  and  both  he  and  Paredes  began 
to   plot   against  the  dictator.     Santa  Anna  forced   them   to 


DOWNFALL  OF  SANTA  ANNA  53 

swallow  their  ambitions  for  the  time  being,  however,  and  by 
dint  of  military  interference  - —  though  his  enemies  were  be- 
stirring themselves  and  he  was  now  increasingly  ur  popular  —  he 
became  President  in  January,  1844,  under  the  new  constitution. 
This  appeared  like  a  concession  to  legality,  but  no  doubt  it 
was  intended  as  a  recoil  for  another  spring.  His  dream  of 
empire  still  went  on,  it  was  fully  believed.9 

Although  the  minister  of  justice  described  this  period  as 
"an  epoch  of  glory"  and  an  "era  of  absolute  felicity,"  the  new 
Congress  manifested  a  disposition  to  antagonize  the  President ; 
but  an  almost  supernatural  dread  of  him  paralyzed  even  his 
enemies,  and  he  readily  bowled  them  over.  Then  (ne  was 
given  a  special  sum  of  four  millions  for  war  with  Texas;  and 
after  that  sum  was  promptly  absorbed,  he  demanded  not  only 
ten  millions  more  but  "extraordinary  powers"  to  lay  taxes. 
This  meant  that  he  wanted  to  have  every  man's  property  at- 
his  disposal,  and  it  was  generally  believed  that  with  a  foreign 
war  as  excuse  he  would  soon  try  to  make  himself  autocrat. 
Congress  resisted,  and  before  long  was  suspended.9 

But  now  the  people  took  fire.  They  had  trusted  Santa  Anna 
completely,  and  their  confidence  had  been  as  completely 
abused  .J)  It  was  felt  that  he  had  shown  a  deliberate  intention 
to  ignore  the  public  interest  and  feed  upon  the  nation  —  dis- 
regarding all  personal  rights,  threatening  all  fortunes  and 
contradicting  all  principles.  Paredes,  who  had  never  forgiven 
Santa  Anna  for  running  him  off  the  track  in  1841,  pronounced. 
In  November,  1844,  war  began.  The  President  attempted 
both  to  cajole  and  to  terrorize  his  enemies,  and  moved  against 
the  insurgents  with  a  powerful  army ;  but  on  December  6  the 
troops  at  the  capital  revolted,  and  the  nation  concurred.  In  the 
departments  he  was  particularly  hated,  for  he  had  impover- 
ished them  with  taxes  and  spent  the  money  elsewhere;  but 
Mexico  itself  blazed.  "Death  to  the  lame  man!"  shouted  the 
populace,  dragging  his  foot  round  the  streets.  Dazed  and 
overwhelmed,  Santa  Anna,  after  moving  about  irresolutely 
with  his  dwindling  army,  left  it  with  a  small  escort  early  in 
January,  1845,  and  then  took  to  his  heels  with  only  four  serv- 
ants. Before  long  some  peasants  captured  him,  and  later  in 
the  year  he  was  banished.9 

At  first  sight  this  collapse  amazes  us.     It  seems  impossible 


54  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

that  Santa  Anna,  whose  particular  talent  lay  in  discovering 
the  direction  of  political  currents,  should  have  lost  so  suddenly 
his  tremendous  power.  But  the  explanation  is  readily  found. 
Without  a  doubt  he  was  the  foremost  Mexican  of  his  time. 
Seen  at  the  head  of  a  ragged,  undisciplined  mob  called  a  regi- 
ment, inspiring  them  with  eye,  gesture  and  words,  and  leading 
them  on  with  almost  electrical  energy;  seen  at  a  banquet, 
where  he  could  show  himself  —  despite  the  six  colonels  erect 
and  stiff  behind  his  chair  —  merely  a  prince  of  good  fellows, 
dignified  but  cordial,  courtly  but  unrestrained,  brilliant  yet 
apparently  simple;  seen  at  the  council  board,  seizing  upon  a 
shrewd  idea  expressed  by  one  of  his  associates  and  developing, 
illustrating  and  applying  it  in  a  way  that  made  its  real  author 
marvel  at  his  chief's  wisdom;  seen  in  one  of  his  outbursts  of 
Jacksonian  rage,  as  when  he  threatened  at  a  diplomatic  re- 
ception to  run  the  boundary  line  between  Mexico  and  the 
United  States  at  the  cannon's  mouth ;  seen  at  the  opera  house, 
in  a  crimson  and  gold  box  with  a  retinue  of  crimson  and  gold 
officers,  dressed  in  the  plainest  of  costumes  himself,  and  wearing 
on  his  countenance  an  interesting  expression  of  gentle  melan- 
choly and  resignation,  as  if  he  were  sacrificing  himself  for  the 
nation  and  shrank  from  the  gaze  of  an  adoring  public  —  seen 
in  these  and  other  phases  he  appeared  remarkable,  and  even, 
as  combining  them,  extraordinary.9 

But  in  reality  he  was  a  charlatan.  Though  head  of  an  army, 
he  knew  nothing  of  military  science ;  though  head  of  a  nation, 
he  knew  nothing  of  statesmanship.  By  right  of  superiority 
and  by  right  of  conquest  Mexico  seemed  to  be  his ;  and,  with 
what  Burke  described  as  "  the  generous  rapacity  of  the  princely 
eagle,"  he  proposed  to  take  the  chief  share  of  wealth,  power, 
honor  and  pleasure,  leaving  to  others  the  remnants  of  these 
as  a  compensation  for  doing  the  work.  It  was  a  cardinal 
principle  with  him  that  the  masses  could  be  ignored;  and  in 
1844,  having  reduced  the  Church  to  subservience  and  formed 
a  combination  with  the  military  and  the  financial  men,  based 
on  a  community  of  interest  in  exploiting  the  national  revenues, 
he  deemed  himself  invulnerable,  the  more  so  because  the 
coterie  of  base  flatterers  that  he  loved  to  have  about  him  re- 
flected this  conviction.  Of  a  true  national  uprising  he  had  no 
conception ;    and   when    this    came,   finding    himself    in  the 


HERRERA  BECOMES  PRESIDENT  55 

presence  of  a  power  that  amazed  and  overawed  him,  seeing 
his  axioms  disproved  and  his  pillars  going  down,  he  lost  heart, 
and  plunged  from  the  zenith  to  the  nadir  of  his  essentially 
emotional  nature.9 

Santa  Anna's  legal  successor  was  General  J.  J.  Herrera, 
president  of  the  council  of  state,  a  fair,  pacific,  reasonable  and 
honest  man;  and  the  new  ministry  commanded  respect.  For 
a  time  the  halcyon  days  of  1825  returned.  This  was  the  first 
great  popular  movement  since  Mexico  had  become  independent. 
All  had  united  in  it,  and  therefore  all  were  in  harmony ;  every 
one  had  assisted,  and  therefore  every  one  felt  an  agreeable 
expectation  of  reward.  Factions  laid  down  their  arms.  For 
a  few  weeks  all  remembered  they  were  Mexicans.  But  the 
situation  was  extremely  difficult.  Santa  Anna's  constitution, 
which  commanded  no  respect  because  neither  authorized  by 
the  people  nor  endorsed  by  good  results,  was  still  in  force. 
All  who  believed  in  his  system,  including  twenty  thousand 
half-pay  —  or  rather  no-pay  —  officers,  dissipated,  hungry  and 
reckless,  began  at  once  to  plot  for  his  return  or  for  some  one 
of  the  same  kind  to  succeed  him.  Herrera's  aim  to  introduce 
reforms,  both  civil  and  military,  gave  great  offence.  Paredes, 
representing  the  Church  and  the  aristocracy,  stood  at  the  head 
of  the  main  army,  and  soon  showed  a  disposition  to  hold  aloof. 
Indeed  every  prominent  man  had  a  busily  scheming  clique.10 

The  correct  course  for  the  new  President  would  have  been 
to  declare  for  the  constitution  of  1824,  and  throw  himself  upon 
the  Federalists ;  but,  fearing  that  such  a  step  would  excite 
a  revolution,  he  adopted  the  timid  and  hopeless  policy  of  trying 
to  balance  one  party  against  another.  Owing  to  fear  of  the 
army,  though  he  knew  he  could  not  rely  upon  it,  he  dared  not 
organize  militia;  and  before  long  a  body  of  troops  were  al- 
lowed to  revolt  with  impunity.  Soon,  therefore,  the  govern- 
ment had  no  prestige  and  no  substantial  backing.  Every  sort 
of  a  complaint  was  made  against  it.  The  financial  troubles 
became  acute.  Confusion  and  uncertainty  reigned,  and  the 
President  was  physically  incapable  of  a  hard  day's  work.10 

In  March  a  conspiracy  that  indicated  an  ominous  combina- 
tion of  Federalists  and  Santannistas  came  to  light.  (In  May, 
under  strenuous  pressure  from  England  and  France,  the 
government  shrinkingly  agreed  to  recognize  Texas  if  she  would 


56  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

bind  herself  not  to  join  the  United  States ;}  and  this  wise  though 
tardy  move  brought  an  avalanche  of  abuse  upon  it.  In  June 
the  Federalists  rose,  but  the  affair  was  badly  managed  and 
failed.  Tornel,  the  arch-plotter,  a  general  who  never  had  a 
command,  was  sent  to  the  northern  army ;  and  other  turbulent 
men  were  imprisoned.  But  still  the  government  merely 
drifted  —  blind,  irresolute,  vacillating,  moribund ;  and  the 
general  public  looked  on  with  complete  indifference.  .Going 
to  sleep  red  and  waking  up  green  —  for  revolutions  usually 
began  at  night  —  was  no  longer  a  novelty.10 

In  August  the  ministers  resigned ;  "  the  chief  offices  of  state 
were  begging  in  the  streets,"  wrote  the  correspondent  of  the 
London  Times;  and  the  men  who  finally  took  them,  while 
personally  well  enough,  had  little  strength  and  less  prestige. 
By  September  the  government  stood  in  hourly  fear  of  a  revo- 
lution; but  so  little  booty  could  be  seen,  that  although  the 
plots  thickened,  they  were  lazily  developed,  and  amounted  to 
nothing.  Paredes,  the  Santannistas  and  the  Federalists 
became  constantly  more  threatening,  however,  and  the  ad- 
ministration more  and  more  afraid  to  take  any  step  whatever, 
good  or  bad.  Nobody  could  guess  what  it  would  do  to-day 
from  what  it  did  yesterday.  The  anarchy  of  weakness  con- 
stituted the  government.  A  triumvirate  of  Paredes,  Tornel 
and  Valencia  was  much  talked  of.  Many  prayed  for  some 
respectable  despot,  many  for  a  foreign  prince ;  and  some  of  the 
more  thoughtful  suggested  cautiously  an  American  protectorate. 
"Sterile,  deplorably  sterile"  has  been  the  movement  against 
Santa  Anna,  exclaimed  the  friendly  Sigh  XIX  in  October, 
describing  it  as  "a  moment  of  happy  illusion."  By  this  time 
the  administration  was  powerless  even  at  the  capital;  and  on 
November  30  FA  Amigo  del  Pueblo,  an  opposition  sheet,  an- 
nounced, "There  is  no  government  in  Mexico."  This,  how- 
ever, was  premature.  Before  the  denouement  of  this  tragi-farce 
the  United  States  was  to  enter  upon  the  scene ;  and  as  this  new 
phase  of  the  drama  requires  to  be  prepared  for,  we  must  here 
leave  Herrera,  for  a  brief  space,  in  the  midst  of  his  difficulties.10 

Sterile  indeed  and  most  deplorable  was  the  whole  series  of 
events  that  we  have  noW  followed.  One  is  glad  to  pass  on; 
but  let  it  be  noted  first  that  while  circumstances  promoted, 
they  did   not  produce   it.     The  Mexicans   knew   better,   far 


DEPLORABLE  STATE  OF  MEXICO  57 

better,  than  they  acted.  In  1824  the  Constituent  Congress 
pointed  out  distinctly  in  a  solemn  address  to  the  nation,  that 
without  virtue  liberal  institutions  would  fail,  revolution  would 
follow  revolution,  anarchy  would  ensue )  and  as  time  went  on 
editors  and  orators  frequently  tracedihe  causes  of  Mexico's 
downfall  in  vivid  and  truthful  sentences.  The  trouble  y&fiT 
that  a  great  majority  of  those  who  might  have  advanced  her 
welfare  preferred  ease  to  effort,  guile  to  wisdom,  self-indulgence 
to  self-control,  private  advantage  to  the  public  weal,  partisan 
victory  to  national  success ;  and  naturally,  in  such  a  state  of 
things,  the  few  honorable,  public-spirited  citizens  could  seldom 
command  a  sufficient  following  to  accomplish  anything  Our 
leading  public  men,  said  a  contemporary,  having  been  for  one 
reason  or  another  contemptible,  have  learned  to  despise  and 
distrust  one  another,  and  the  public,  sick  to  death  of  their 
manoeuvres,  have  learned  to  despise  and  distrust  them  all; 
yet  such  persons  —  demagogues  and  soldiers  —  were  still 
permitted  to  lead.  Paper  constitutions  and  paper  laws, 
naturally  of  little  validity  in  the  eyes  of  such  a  wilful,  passionate 
race,  had  been  rendered  by  experience  contemptible. 

For  the  consequences,  if  there  be  such  a  principle  as  national 
responsibility,  the  people  as  a  body  were  responsible;  and  so 
they  were  for  the  results  of  this  deplorable  schooling  as  it 
affected  the  relations  between  their  country  and  ours.  The 
inheritance  from  Spain  had  been  unfortunate,  but  there  had 
been  time  enough  to  recover  from  it ;  and  instead  of  improving, 
the  Mexicans  had  even  degenerated.11 


-J 


Ill 

THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED    STATES 
AND  MEXICO 

1825-1843 

In  turning  from  the  domestic  to  the  foreign  affairs  of  Mexico 
we  must  beware  of  carrying  prejudice  with  us.  Our  minds 
must  be  open  to  all  the  facts,  and  see  them  exactly  as  they  were. 
But  it  is  right  and  even  necessary,  for  our  guidance  in  interpret- 
ing these  facts,  to  presume  that  aliens,  traditionally  disliked 
by  the  Mexicans,1  were  treated  no  more  kindly,  fairly  and 
honestly  than  fellow-citizens;  and  the  evidence  is  conclusive 
that  even  the  highest  authorities  were  generally  unbusinesslike, 
often  unjust  or  tricky,  and  on  too  many  occasions  positively 
dishonorable  in  their  dealings  with  foreigners.2 

Our  first  minister  to  Mexico,  received  there  on  June  1,  1825, 

k-v      was  Joel  R.  Poinsett.     Apparently  a  better  man  for  the  office 

*    could  not  have  been  chosen  or  even  created;    and  the  warm 

interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  cause  of  Spanish-American 

independence,  our  prompt  recognition  of  Mexico,  and  the  fact 

that  her  political  institutions  had  been  modeled  upon  ours, 

were  additional  auguries  for  the  success  of  his  mission.     But 

v\duty  required  him  to  stand  for  a  Protestant  power  in  a  country 

intensely  Roman  Catholic,  to  represent  democracy  where  the 

dominant  element  consisted  of  aristocrats  hoping  more  or  less 

generally  for  a  Bourbon  king,  to  support  Monroe's  doctrine 

|of  America  for  the  Americans  against  the  strength  of  Europe 

land  the  European  affiliations  of  Mexico,  to  vindicate  the  equal 

position  of  the  United  States  where  Great  Britain  had  estab- 

l  fished  a  virtual  protectorate,  to  insist  upon  full  commercial 

privileges  when  the  Spanish-American  states  favored  mutual 

concessions,  and  to  antagonize  other  influences  possessing  no 

little  strength.3  \ 

58 


FRICTION  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  COUNTRIES        59 

,  His  only  feasible  course  was  to  affiliate  with  men  of  the  popu- 
lar, democratic,  Federalist  party.  Largely  through  his  advice 
they  abandoned  their  plan  of  rebelling,  placed  their  confidence 
in  organization  and  the  ballot,  and  so  gained  the  ascendency. 
They  soon  fell  into  excesses  of  their  own,  however,  which  they 
were  glad  to  charge  against  a  Protestant  and  foreigner ;  all  the 
other  elements  antagonized  by  him  joined  in  the  accusations; 
envy  of  the  recognized  prosperity  of  the  United  States  assisted ; 
and  in  the  end  he  came  to  be  almost  universally  denounced  by 
the  Mexicans  as  the  diabolical  agent  of  a  jealous,  hypocritical, 
designing  government/' 

Of  course,  the  Poinsett  affair  planted  a  root  of  bitterness  in 
the  United  States.  Our  national  authorities  could  but  protest 
against  the  attacks  upon  our  minister  that  were  made  by  state 
legislatures  in  contempt  of  all  diplomatic  usage,  against  the 
neglect  of  the  Mexican  Executive  to  shield  him,  and  against 
the  general  attitude  of  distrust  and  ill-will  exhibited  by  that 
country.  Indeed,  our  government  fully  believed  that  baseless 
popular  clamor  had  been  permitted  to  exert  "a  sinister  in- 
fluence" against  the  Americans  in  its  councils,  and  pointedly 
informed  Guerrero  that  unless  "a  marked  change"  in  the 
temper  of  his  administration  should  " speedily"  occur,  a  col- 
lision might  result;  and  of  course  the  people  of  the  United 
States  could  not  fail  to  notice  the  abusive  and  even  ferocious 
treatment  accorded  to  our  representative,  against  whom  no 
charges  were  made  by  the  Mexican  government,  and  to  resent 
still  more  keenly  the  insults  that  were  lavished  upon  the 
character  and  purposes  of  the  American  nation.  The  fact 
that  Poinsett  continued  to  be  an  important  factor  in  our  public 
life,  even  becoming  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  at  a  later  day, 
tended  to  emphasize  these  feelings,  both  official  and  popular.4 

Besides  all  this,  official  work  of  his  added  to  the  irritation  in 
both  countries.  As  one  of  his  principal  duties,  he  was  instructed 
to  make  a  treaty  reaffirming  the  boundary  agreed  upon  with 
Spain  in  1819,  or,  if  he  could,  buy  a  portion  at  least  of  Texas. 
The  proposal  that  our  neighbor  should  sell  us  territory  has  been 
called  by  partisan  writers  in  the  United  States,  insulting,  but 
as  we  have  made  purchases  from  Spain,  France,  Russia  and 
Mexico  herself,  this  accusation  is  evidently  unwarranted. 
On  the  other  hand  the  suggestion  was  reasonable.     We  for  our 


/ 


60  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

part  desired  the  land,  aside  from  its  intrinsic  value,  as  a  needed 
protection  to  New  Orleans  and  the  Mississippi;  and  Mexico 
not  only  appeared  to  misprize  it,  but  could  have  strengthened 
herself  somewhat  by  letting  it  go.  Later  it  became  a  fashion 
with  her  public  men  to  declaim  about  its  preciousness  and 
beauty ;  but  as  late  as  1836,  according  to  Santa  Anna  himself, 
many  officials  did  not  know  where  Texas  was  or  what  nation 
claimed  it.  Mexico  had  ten  times  the  area  she  could  people, 
and  what  she  needed  in  that  quarter  was  the  means  of  shielding 
her  northern  settlements  from  the  Indians.  Moreover,  under 
contracts  already  made,  Texas  was  filling  up  with  men  who, 
as  President  Victoria  saw  in  1825,  were  not  at  all  likely  to 
assimilate  with  the  Mexicans;  and  since  it  was  recognized 
that  a  mistake  had  been  made  in  admitting  such  colonists,  it 
might  well  have  seemed  the  part  of  wisdom  to  cut  off  the 
infected  section  before  it  should  set  an  example  of  dissatis- 
faction, and  perhaps  cause  trouble  also  with  the  United  States.5 

Poinsett,  accordingly,  taking  the  matter  up  in  July,  1825, 
stated  frankly  that  the  treaty  of  1819  was  recognized  by  his 
country  as  binding,  but  expressed  a  desire  to  lay  it  aside,  and 
fix  upon  a  more  satisfactory  line.  This  pleased  Victoria  and 
Alain  an,  for  they  imagined  they  could  push  the  boundary 
eastward  almost  to  the  Mississippi,  but  in  spite  of  Poinsett's 
urgency  and  his  dropping  the  plan  to  extend  our  territory, 
a  long  delay  followed.  At  last,  however,  on  January  12,  1828,  a 
treaty  of  limits  reaffirming  the  agreement  with  Spain  was  duly 
signed.  In  the  course  of  April  it  reached  Washington  and  was 
ratified.  On  the  last  day  of  the  month  our  secretary  of  state 
notified  the  Mexican  representative  that  he  was  ready  to 
exchange  ratifications,  and  reminded  him  that  under  the 
terms  of  the  instrument  this  would  have  to  be  done  by  May 
12;  but  Obregon  was  not  prepared  to  act,  and  for  that  reason 
the  treaty  failed.6 

Yet  the  Mexicans  not  only  held  that  the  United  States  caused 
the  miscarriage  in  order  to  prosecute  designs  upon  Texas,  but 
charged  officially  as  well  as  on  the  street,  with  neither  evidence 
nor  plausibility  in  favor  of  the  accusation,  that  our  minister 
stole  the  paper  —  entrusted  to  him  on  May  10  for  transmission 
—  which  would  have  authorized  Obregon  to  exchange  the 
ratifications.     So  we  had  in  1830  this  extraordinary  picture: 


/ 


FRICTION  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  COUNTRIES         61 


on  the  one  hand,  the  United  States  earnestly  desiring  the, 
prosperity  and  friendship  of  Mexico,  and  pursuing  a  just  andi        \> 
sympathetic  policy  towards  her;    and,  on  the  other,  Mexico!     y/^ 
accusing  us  of  hostile  intentions  and  the  basest  arts.     From\ 
that  day  on,  everything  we  did  was  viewed  with  a  jaundiced]  ^ 


The  treaty  of  limits  was,  however,  revived  by  fresh  ne- 
gotiations, and  in  April,  1832,  went  into  effect.  By  its  terms 
a  joint  commission  to  run  the  line  had  to  be  appointed  within 
a  year  from  this  date,  and  presently  Mexico  received  notice, 
both  at  her  own  capital  and  at  ours,  that  an  American  com- 
missioner had  been  named ;  but  she  paid  no  attention  to  the 
matter,  and  the  year  expired.  Our  minister  was  then  directed 
to  negotiate  a  new  agreement,  labored  for  more  than  twelve 
months,  and  finally,  by  addressing  strong  language  personally 
to  the  acting  President,  carried  the  point.  Yet  the  United 
States  was  officially  denounced  for  endeavoring  —  and  by 
wretched  artifices  —  to  delay  the  fixing  of  the  boundary.7 

Meanwhile  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  proposed  by 
Poinsett  at  about  the  same  time  as  the  treaty  of  limits,  had 
been  pursuing  a  checkered  career,  though  a  similar  agreement 
between  Mexico  and  England  went  rapidly  through.;  At  one 
stage  of  the  proceedings  the  Mexican  plenipotentiaries  kept 
our  minister  entirely  in  the  dark  about  an  important  concession 
made  to  Great  Britain,  falsely  assuring  him  that  equally 
favorable  terms  were  offered  to  this  country.  Indeed,  Victoria 
showed  a  strong  disposition  to  block  the  business  altogether. 
July  10,  1826,  however,  the  negotiators  reached  an  agreement, 
but  it  did  not  prove  satisfactory  to  the  American  Senate.  A 
second  treaty  signed  in  February,  1828,  did  not  please  the 
Congress  of  Mexico,  and  was  properly  rejected.  At  a  later 
date  negotiations  were  again  resumed ;  but  in  1831  that  body 
held  the  matter  in  abeyance  for  more  than  nine  months.  At 
last,  one  day  before  the  session  was  to  close,  our  minister  gave 
notice  that  unless  the  treaty  were  concluded,  he  would  leave 
the  country.  The  government  at  Washington  also  exerted 
some  pressure  by  insisting  that  the  two  matters  should  fare 
alike,  and  postponing  the  re-ratification  of  the  treaty  of  limits ; 
and  consequently  both  treaties  became  law  at  the  same  time, 
April  5,  1832.     Yet  for  nearly  a  year  the  commercial  treaty 


v 


62  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

was  not  promulgated  by  Mexico;  and  hence,  though  her 
citizens  residing  in  the  United  States  could  have  the  benefit 
of  it,  Americans  in  Mexico  could  not,  for  the  local  authorities 
with  whom  it  was  necessary  to  deal  declared  they  had  no 
knowledge  of  such  an  agreement.8 

Toward  the  close  of  1829  Guerrero,  as  a  desperate  throw  for 
popularity,  asked  for  the  recall  of  Poinsett,  merely  saying  that 
public  opinion  demanded  it ;  and  then  for  about  six  years  the 
United  States  had  as  its  representative  a  friend  of  Jackson's 
named  Anthony  Butler,  whose  only  qualifications  for  the  post 
were  an  acquaintance  with  Texas  and  a  strong  desire  to  see 
the  United  States  obtain  it.  In  brief,  he  was  a  national  dis- 
grace. Besides  having  been  through  bankruptcy  more  than 
once,  if  we  may  believe  the  Mexican  minister  at  Washington, 
and  having  a  financial  interest  in  the  acquisition  of  this  Mexican 
territory,  he  was  personally  a  bully  and  swashbuckler,  ignorant 
at  first  of  the  Spanish  language  and  even  the  forms  of  diplo- 
macy, shamefully  careless  about  legation  affairs,  wholly  un- 
principled as  to  methods,  and,  by  the  testimony  of  two  American 
consuls,  openly  scandalous  in  his  conduct.  One  virtue,  to  be 
sure,  according  to  his  own  account  he  possessed :  he  never 
drank  spirits;  but  one  learns  of  this  with  regret,  for  an  over- 
dose of  alcohol  would  sometimes  be  a  welcome  excuse  for  him.9 

His  particular  business  was  to  obtain  as  much  of  Texas  as 
possible,  an  enterprise  that  lay  close  to  Jackson's  heart;  and 
he  began  by  visiting  the  province  —  about  whose  loyalty  and 
relations  with  the  United  States  much  concern  was  already  felt 
at  Mexico  —  when  on  the  way  to  his  post.  This  promise  of 
indiscretion  in  office  was  admirably  fulfilled.  Maintaining  a 
hold  on  our  President  by  positive  assurances  of  success,  he 
loafed,  schemed,  made  overtures,  threatened,  was  ignored, 
rebuffed,  snubbed  and  cajoled,  fancied  he  could  outplay  or 
buy  the  astute  and  hostile  Alaman,  tried  to  do  "underworking" 
with  Pedraza,  plotted  bribery  with  one  Hernandez,  the  con- 
fessor of  Santa  Anna's  sister,  grossly  violated  his  conciliatory 
instructions  by  engaging  in  a  truculent  personal  affair  with 
Tornel,  and  was  finally,  after  ceasing  to  represent  us,  ordered 
out  of  the  country.  In  short  he  succeeded  only  in  proving 
that  we  had  for  minister  a  cantankerous,  incompetent  rascal, 
in  making  it  appear  that  our  government  was  eager  to  obtain 


THE  TEXAN  REVOLUTION  63 

Mexican  territory,  and  in  suggesting  —  though  explicitly  and 
repeatedly  ordered  to  eschew  all  equivocal  methods  —  that  we 
felt  no  scruples  as  to  means.  On  the  ground  of  Butler's  con- 
nection with  disaffected  Texas,  Mexico  politely  asked  for  his 
recall  near  the  close  of  1835,.  and  in  December  Powhatan  Ellis, 
born  a  Virginian  but  now  a  federal  judge  in  Mississippi,  was 
appointed  charge  d'affaires.10 

A  few  months  later  Texas  broke  away  from  the  mother- 
country,  and  her  former  lords  felt  sure  that  from  beginning  to 
end,  in  the  colonization,  rebellion  and  successful  defence  of 
that  region,  the  hand  of  the  American  government  could  plainly 
enough  be  seen.  Their  state  of  feeling  seemed  to  Butler  "a 
perfect  tempest  of  passion,"  and  Ellis  believed  that  the  Cabinet 
of  Mexico  discussed  seriously  the  question  of  an  open  rupture 
with  the  United  States.  The  Mexican  view,  however,  although 
supported  by  a  section  of  the  American  public,  was  radically 
incorrect.  Essentially  the  migration  of  our  citizens  across  the 
Sabine  formed"lTpart  of  the  great  movement  that  peopled  the 
Mississippi  valley.  The  causes  of  the  Texan  rebellion  were 
provided  by  Mexico  herself.  That  step  actually  crossed  the 
wish  and  aims  of  our  administration,  which  desired  to  buy 
the  province  —  not  see  it  become  an  independent  country. 
From  the  very  first,  our  national  authorities  proclaimed  and  en- 
deavored to  enforce  neutrality;  and  they  gave  the  Texans  no 
assistance  in  their  struggle  for  independence.  The  British 
minister  at  Mexico  expressed  the  opinion  to  Santa  Anna  that 
our  government  had  done  all  that  could  be  expected,  and  all 
that  lay  in  its  power ;  and  Santa  Anna  did  not  venture  to  deny 
this.  Individual  Americans  and  sometimes  Americans  in 
groups  did,  it  is  true,  contribute  materially  to  aid  the  cause  of 
Texas;  but  in  most  cases  their  action  was  entirely  lawful, 
while  in  the  others  it  could  not  be  prevented.  Moreover, 
these  few  trespasses  against  the  law  of  neutrality  were  in 
substance  only  just  retribution  fp£  the  tyranny,  misgovern- 
ment  and  atrocities  of  Mexico.  In  reality,  therefore,  our 
skirts  were  as  clear  as  reasonably  could  have  been  expected.11 

One  phase  of  the  case,  however,  which  excited  special  in- 
dignation at  Mexico,  requires  notice.  Two  streams  from  the 
north  send  their  waters  into  Sabine  Lake,  and  it  was  held  by 
some  that  either  of  these  could  be  regarded  as  the  Sabine 


\ 


64  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

River  and,  therefore,  as  marking  the  boundary.  In  October, 
1833,  Butler  urged  that  we  insist  upon  the  western  stream, 
commonly  called  the  Neches,  and  occupy  in  force  the  valuable 
intermediate  region,  which  included  Nacogdoches ;  and  for  a 
time  Jackson  felt  inclined  to  do  so.  Near  the  close  of  1835 
Mexico  was  officially  warned  against  encroaching  upon  our 
territory  while  fighting  the  Texans,  and  suspected  that  Secre- 
tary of  State  Forsyth  took  this  action  with  a  view  to  the  Nacog- 
doches district.  She  therefore  became  alarmed,  and  early 
in  1836  a  special  minister  hastily  set  out  for  Washington  to 
investigate  the  matter.  This  minister  was  Manuel  E.  de 
Gorostiza,}a  witty,  agreeable  man  of  the  world,  Mexican  by 
birth,  Spanish  by  education,  the  author  of  some  clever  dramas, 
but  not  professionally  a  topographer,  a  lawyer  or  even  a  dip- 
lomat.12 

fThen  a  delicate  matter  became  suddenly  menacing.  On 
both  sides  of  the  Sabine  there  were  Indians,  who  loved  war, 
whisky  and  plunder  as  much  as  they  hated  work  and  the 
whites.  A  paper  boundary,  particularly  one  in  dispute, 
meant  nothing  to  them.)  Once  roused,  they  were  practically 
sure,  as  Gorostiza  admitted,  to  rob  and  murder  wherever  they 
could;  and  not  only  the  fighting  in  Texas  but  at  least  ore 
Mexican  emissary  enkindled  their  passions.  United  States 
Indians  crossed  the  line  and  perpetrated  outrages.  Homes 
were  abandoned.  People  fled  panic-stricken  from  the  vicinity 
of  Nacogdoches;  citizens  of  the  town  implored  American 
protection  against  our  own  Indians;  and  evidence  of  an 
incipient  conflagration  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  General 
E.  P.  Gaines,  who  commanded  our  troops  on  the  border.12 
I  Now  the  treaty  of  amity  required  each  country  to  prevent 
its  Indians  from  ravaging  the  other;  but,  as  Mexico  did  n6t 
wish  us  at  this  time  to  keep  our  savages  from  harassing  the 
Texans,  and  did  not  request  us  to  act  for  her  in  fulfilling  her 
pledge,  which  she  could  not  fulfil  herself,  possibly  the  treaty, 
though  often  cited  by  the  United  States,  had  technically  no 
direct  bearing.  But  the  American  government  argued  rightly 
that  substance  was  more  important  than  form  j  that  the  intent 
of  the  treaty  was  to  require  both  countries  to  prevent  "by  all 
the  means  in  their  power"  an  Indian  war  on  the  frontier ;  that 
it  was  the  paramount  duty  of  the  .Executive  to  protect  our 


BOUNDARY  DIFFICULTIES  65 

people,  who,  as  Gorostiza  virtually  admitted,  were  liable  to 
be  endangered  by  the  threatened  conflagration ;  that^as  it  was 
known  to  be  physically  impossible  for  Mexico  to  comply  with 
the  treaty,  she  could  not  complain  of  us  for  doing  what  she  had 
agreed  ought  to  be  done,  and  had  undertaken  to  do ;  that, 
should  it  be  necessary  to  cross  what  had  been  commonly 
assumed  to  be  the  boundary  in  order  to  perform  our  duty  — 
particularly  in  order  to  prevent  our  own  Indians  from  per- 
petrating outrages  on  the  other  side  —  common  sense  and  the 
spirit  of  the  .treaty  warranted  our  doing  it;  and  that,  on 
account  of  the  distance  to  the  Sabine,  it  was  necessary  to  give 
the  general  commanding  there  a  certain  credence  and  a  certain 
discretion.)  Our  government  could  have  reasoned  also,  and 
very  likely  it  did,  that  the  strong  desire  of  the  Texans,  de  facto 
successors  to  the  Mexicans  in  that  region,  that  we  should  fulfil 
the  obligation  which  the  treaty  created,  was  an  additional 
ground  for  so  doing.12 

/Accordingly  Gaines,  while  ordered  with  strong  emphasis  to 
maintain  a  rigid  neutrality,  was  authorized  to  advance  as  far 
as  Nacogdoches  --  an  excellent  point  from  which  to  defend  the 
American  frontier  and  prevent  our  Indians  from  operating 
beyond  it  —  should  such  a  step  seem  positively  necessary ; 
and  then,  as  measures  of  precaution,  Forsyth  not  only  ex- 
plained our  views  and  intentions  personally  to  Gorostiza, 
but  made  in  writing  what  that  minister  himself  described  as 
a  "frank  and  noble"  statement,  saying  that  the  occupation 
of  the  intermediate  region,  should  it  occur,  would  be  temporary 
and  for  the  sole  purpose  indicated,  and  would  have  no  signifi- 
cance in  regard  to  the  boundary  question.12 

Apparently  satisfied  by  the  directness  and  candor  of  this 
policy,  Gorostiza  at  first  admitted  the  right  of  the  United 
States  to  enter  Texas  in  order  to  punish  actual  or  prevent 
intended  outrages,  and  thus  conceded  that  the  frontier  could 
be  crossed  without  offence.)  But  apparently,  when  he  had 
taken  leave  of  the  secretary  of  state,  his  distrust  returned, 
and  his  Mexican  subtlety  imagined  all  sorts  of  ugly  possibilities. 
It  disturbed  him  that  Forsyth  did  not  formally  commit  himself, 
in  advance  of  a  survey,  against  the  Neches  claim.  It  alarmed 
him  to  find  that  the  state  department  could  not  give  him 
early  and  exact  information  as  to  Gaines's  movements  in  a 
vol.  i — F 


66  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

remote,  unsettled  region.  He  felt  angry  that  Lewis  Cass,  who 
was  secretary  of  war  but  of  course  had  no  control  over  our 
foreign  relations,  looked  upon  Nacogdoches  as  American 
territory.  Various  other  things  also  appeared  to  him  sus- 
picious, when  really  his  lack  of  judgment  was  the  chief  or  only 
reason.  Most  important  of  all,  no  doubt,  he  thought  of  public 
opinion  in  Mexico,  which  was  entirely  unacquainted  with 
American  directness  as  exemplified  by  Forsyth,  intensely 
suspicious  of  us,  and  intensely  hostile.12 

(He  retracted,  therefore,  as  much  as  possible  of  his  con- 
currence, opened  a  war  of  notes  upon  our  state  department, 
and  near  the  end  of  the  year  1836,  on  learning  from  the  secre- 
tary that  in  spite  of  his  objections  American  troops  had  gone 
to  Nacogdoches,  demanded  his  passports,  and  left  our  shores 
in  wrath  A  His  conduct  in  so  doing  was  officially  endorsed  by 
his  government,  and  anti-American  feeling  in  that  country 
became  deeper  and  hotter  than  before.  Nothing  could  be 
seen  there  except  that  "sacred"  soil  claimed  and  long  occupied 
by  Mexico,  though  now  out  of  her  control,  had  been  profaned 
by  Gaines's  troops,  and  thus,  as  all  Mexicans  argued,  the  way 
opened  for  limitless  aggressions.  /To  make  the  case  even 
worse,  it  was  erroneously  believed  That  Houston's  victory  at 
San  Jacinto  had  really  been  gained  by  troops  then  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  and  it  was  said  that  we  were  preparing  to 
attack  Mexico  very  soon  by  sea  and  by  land.12 

i  Our  recognition  of  Texas,  which  occurred  early  in  1837,  was 
entirely  in  line  with  our  previous  action  in  similar  cases,  was 
less  prompt  than  our  recognition  of  Mexico  herself  had  been, 
and  seemed  not  only  warranted  but  required  by  the  circum- 
stances. )  That  republic  had  a  government  in  operation  which 
appeared  to  be  competent,  and  was  thought  likely  to  endure.  t 
Santa  Anna,  the  President  of  Mexico,  admitted  that  she  could 

.  not  hope  to  gain  control  of  the  revolted  province,  even  should 
its  troops  be  vanquished  in  the  field,  and  expressed  a  desire 
that  we  should  open  the  way  to  a  settlement  of  the  controversy 
by  granting  recognition.  After  1836,  as  the  Mexican  minister  of 
war  stated  eight  years  later,  there  was  no  serious  talk  of  attempt- 
ing to  subdue  Texas.  At  the  date  of  recognition,  since  war  be- 
tween us  and  Mexico  seemed  almost  inevitable,  there  appeare/1 
to  be  no  great  need  of  considering  her  susceptibilities;    and  it 


DIPLOMATIC  CLASHES  67 

was  feared  that  England  entertained  certain  designs,  unfavorable 
to  us,  regarding  Texas,)  which  could  be  defeated  or  at  least 
hindered  by  taking  this  action.  As  Mexico  was  totally  unable 
to  protect  American  vessels  in  the  port  of  Galveston,  we  had  to 
establish  relations  with  the  power  that  could  do  so,  or  else  con- 
duct an  important  part  of  our  trade  under  hazardous  conditions ; 
and  no  commercial  nation  willingly  accepts  the  second  alter- 
native in  such  a  case./'  Finally,  the  leading  powers  of  Europe 
endorsed  our  course  by  doing  the  same  thing  before  any  ma- 
terial change  in  the  situation  occurred.13 

Mexico,  however,  would  see  none  of  these  facts.  Our 
earliest  moves  toward-  recognition  were  looked  upon  by  her, 
said  the  British  minister,  "as  the  consummation  of  a  design 
long  since  entertained"  to  rob  her  of  that  valuable  territory, 
and  excited,  as  he  remarked,  a  "bitter  animosity"  that  no 
explanation  could  even  mitigate;  and  our  formal  action  be- 
came one  more  standing  ground  of  complaint  and  wrath  against 
the  government  and  people  of  the  LTnited  States.13 

In  1842  Mexican  feeling  was  intensified.  At  this  time  Santa 
Anna  thought  it  advisable  to-  rekindle  the  Texan  war,  now 
virtually  dormant  for  six  years.  Very  likely  he  did  not  wish 
to  let  the  case  go  by  default;  naturally  his  recollections  of 
Texan  hospitality  moved  him  to  reciprocate ;  and  in  all  proba- 
bility he  believed  that  any  prospect  of  fighting  Texas  or  the 
United  States  in  the  name  of  national  honor  would  help  to 
make  his  autocratic  military  rule  more  acceptable.  Accord- 
ingly, several  annoying  though  ineffective  raids  beyond  the 
Rio  Grande  occurred,  and  a  serious  invasion  was  threatened. 
Upon  this,  many  Texan  sympathizers  in  the  Unites  States  and 
many  who  thought  they  saw  England  supporting  the  Mexican 
operations,  held  meetings,  contributed  funds,  and  even  migrated 
to  Texas  with  guns  on  their  shoulders,  all  of  which  they  could 
legally  do.14 

In  pursuance  of  Santa  Anna's  policy  —  probably  also  to 
gratify  the  strong  and  universal  sentiment  of  his  fellow-citizens, 
aid  the  anti-Texas  and  anti-administration  party  in  the  United 
States,  neutralize  perhaps  the  good  understanding  between 
the  United  States  and  England  resulting  from  the  settlement 
of  our  northeastern  boundary,  and  possibly  gain  the  sympathy 
not  only  of  Great  Britain,  but  of  her  friend  Louis  Philippe  — 


68  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

Bocanegra,  the  minister  of  relations,  now  declared  war  upon 
us  in  the  field  of  diplomacy.  May  12,  1842,  he  addressed 
Daniel  Webster,  then  secretary  of  state,  directly,  protesting 
against  the  aid  given  Texas  by  our  citizens],  and  asking  whether 
the  United  States  could  injure  Mexico~any  more,  if  openly  at 
war  against  her.  "Certainly  not,"  he  said,  in  reply  to  his  own 
question.  Then  he  issued  a  circular  to  the  diplomatic  corps 
at  Mexico,  in  which  he  charged  our  government  with  tolerating 
aggressions  made  upon  Mexican  territory  by  "subaltern  and 
local  authorities,"  and  announced  that  while  his  country  did 
not  wish  to  fight  the  United  States,  she  would  certainly  do  all 
that  was  "imperatively  required  for  her  honor  and  dignity." 
Still  not  satisfied,  he  wrote  again  to  Webster,  though  an  an- 
swer to  the  first  letter  was  not  yet  due,  accusing  the  American 
Cabinet  itself  of  "conduct  openly  at  variance  with  the  most 
sacred  principles  of  the  law  of  nations  and  the  solemn  com- 
pacts of  amity  existing  between  the  two  countries,"  and 
threatening  that  a  continuance  of  this  policy  would  be  regarded 
as^ta  positive  act  of  hostility." 14 

(In  reply  to  Bocanegra's  first  despatch,  Webster  said  that  the 
American  government  utterly  denied  and  repelled  the  charges 
made  against  it,  and  then  with  characteristic  power  he  dis- 
cussed and  refuted  them.  We  shall  still  maintain  neutrality, 
he  concluded,  "but  the  continuance  of  amity  with  Mexico 
cannot  be  purchased  at  any  higher  rate."  To  Bocanegra's 
second  letter  his  reply  was  no  less  positive  but  a  great  deal 
briefer.  The  President,  he  wrote,  considers  the  language  and 
tone  of  that  communication  "highly  offensive,"  and  orders 
"that  no  other  answer  be  given  to  it  than  the  declaration  that 
the  conduct  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  in  regard 
to  the  war  between  Mexico  and  Texas,  having  been  always 
hitherto  governed  by  a  strict  and  impartial  regard  to  its  neutral 
obligations,  will  not  be  changed  or  altered  in  any  respect  or 
in  any  degree."  H 

'This  compelled  Mexico,  as  the  British  minister  observed,  to 
accept  the  rebuke  invited  by  her  imprudent  language  or  begin 
hostilities.  The  former  course  was  chosen ;  and  Bocanegra 
humbly  replied  that,  relying  upon  Webster's  "frank  declara- 
tion" of  neutrality,  he  would  not  dwell  further  upon  the  subject. 
Even  before  Webster  was  heard  from,  our  minister  described 


DIPLOMATIC  CLASHES  69 

the  state  of  feeling  at  Mexico  as  "most  bitter";  and  such  a 
correspondence,  disagreeable  enough  to  Mexican  pride,  tended 
naturally  to  bring  the  two  countries  nearer  to  the  tented  field. 
Richtofen,  the  Prussian  envoy  at  Mexico,  said  that  Bocane- 
gra's  note  led  to  a  distinctly  hostile  state  of  things.  At  one 
time  the  President  of  the  United  States  did  not  see  how  war 
could  be  avoided;  and  the  Mexican  press  did  about  all  it 
could  to  create  a  fighting  temper.14 

/  An  opera  bouffe  sequel  followed.  Commodore  T.  A.  C.  Jones, 
l^rng  at  Callao  with  our  Pacific  squadron,  received  some  of 
Bocanegra's  effusions  from  the  American  consul  at  Mazatlan, 
who  added  that  war  seemed  "highly  probable."  Jones  could 
not  believe  that  a  responsible  minister  would  write  so  fiercely 
unless  prepared  for  a  conflict,  and  he  felt  sure  the  United 
States  would  not  flinch.  Anxious  to  provide  a  port  of  refuge 
for  American  vessels,  alarmed  lest  England  should  now  obtain 
California  under  some  arrangement  with  Mexico,  as  she  was 
thought  ready  to  do,  an^  satisfied  that  hostilities  would  actually 
break  out  before  he  coulcTfeach  that  coast,  he  sailed  promptly 
and  arrived  at  Monterey  on  October  19.  Being  a  rather  self- 
sufficient  and  hasty  person,  he  investigated  the  matter  there 
in  but  a  superficial  manner,  and  the  next  day  politely  occupied 
the  town.  He  now  found  that  war  had  not  begun ;  and  upon 
this,  after  hauling  down  his  flag  and  saluting  that  of  Mexico, 
he  sailed  away,  while  General  Micheltorena,  the  governor, 
thundered  graiidiloquent  language  at  him  from  a  safe  distance. 
Naturally  the  authorities  at  Mexico  flared  up  at  this  episode; 
but  they  soon  found  that  no  charge  could  be  made  against  our 
government,  and,  realizing  presently  with  our  minister's  aid 
that  the  longest  finger  pointed  toward  Bocanegra  and  the 
loudest  laugh  was  at  Micheltorena,  they  willingly  allowed 
the  matter  to  fade  away.  It  therefore  sharpened  Mexican 
hostility  far  less  than  might  have  been  expected,  yet  no  doubt 
considerably.15 

Meanwhile  fresh  trouble  arose.  The  continuance  of  nominal 
war"  between  Mexico  and  Texas  and  the  constant  danger  of 
raids  interfered  seriously  with  our  commercial  interests. 
Near  the  end  of  June,  1842,  therefore,  the  American  secretary 
of  state,  hoping  to  influence  the  government  of  Mexico,  ob- 
served to  our  minister  that  the  war  was  "not  only  useless,  but 


70  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

hopeless,  without  attainable  object,  injurious  to  both  parties 
and  likely  to  be,  in  its  continuance,  annoying  and  vexatious 
to  other  commercial  nations";  and  this  line  of  policy  was 
followed  up  in  January,  1843.  Indeed,  Webster  gave  notice 
that  a  formal  protest  would  very  likely  be  made,  unless  the 
state  of  war  should  be  ended  or  respectable  forces  take  the 
field.14 

Naturally  these  remonstrances,  however  proper,  gave  much 
offence;  and  the  translation  of  John  Quincy  Adams's  bril- 
liant speech  at  Braintree,  Massachusetts,  which  made  an 
eloquent  but  mistaken  attack  upon  the  American  adminis- 
tration, gave  the  newspapers  of  Mexico  a  fresh  opportunity 
and  fresh  reason  to  ventilate  their  suspicions  of  us.  A  merciless 
warfare  upon  Texas  was  now  announced;  and  Santa  Anna 
decreed  in  June,  1843,  that  all  foreigners  taken  in  arms  on 
Texan  soil  should  be  executed.  In  reply  to  this,  our  secretary 
of  state  declared  that  American  citizens  could  not  be  prevented 
from  serving  abroad,  as  Frenchmen  and  Germans  had  served 
in  our  own  revolutionary  armies;  and  that,  if  captured  in 
Texas,  they  must  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war.  "On  this 
point/'  he  insisted,  "there  can  be  no  concession  or  com- 
promise." 14 

Here^ur__point  of  view  muot-be-shifteil.  So  far  we  have 
mainly  been  concerned  with  complaints  on  the  part  of  Mexico, 
and  it  will  be  admitted  that  in  those  affairs  the  United  States 
did  not  materially  injure  her  in  any  unlawful  way,  and  ex- 
hibited no  malicious  intentions.  We  must  now  take  up 
certain  American  grievances;  and  first  in  order  may  be  men- 
tioned the  summary  execution  of  twenty-two  of  our  citizens 
in  1835.  Under  the  revolutionist  Mejia  they  had  left  the 
United  States  for  Texas,  but  they  were  conducted  to  Tampico 
and  there  were  captured.  The  minister  of  relations  asserted 
that  they  were  duly  tried,  and  simply  experienced  the  rigor  of 
the  law ;  but  our  minister  ascertained  that  no  trial  took  place. 
In  spite  of  international  law  and  treaty  stipulations  the  govern- 
ment ordered  them  shot,  and  shot  they  were  —  officially 
murdered.  At  the  edge  of  the  grave  eighteen  of  them  signed 
a  denial,  their  "dying  words,"  that  any  intention  to  invade 
Mexico  had  existed  in  their  minds.16 

Next  may  come  the  systematic  endeavor  of  Mexico,  even 


AMERICAN  GRIEVANCES  71 

after  signing  the  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  to  hinder  our 
people  from  crossing  the  boundary,  and  in  particular  to  keep 
them  out  of  Texas.  Article  III  of  the  treaty  said :  "The 
cfEizens  of  Ihe  two  countries  shall  have  liberty  to  enter  into  the 
same,  and  to  remain  and  reside  in  any  part  of  said  territories, 
respectively. 'y  All  Mexicans  were  offered  the  full  benefit  of 
this  agreement  in  the  United  States;  but  a  Mexican  law, 
revived  by  decree  on  April  4,  1837,  with  evident  reference  to 
our  people,  read  thus  :  "  Foreigners  are  prohibited  from  settling 
in  those  States  and  territories  of  the  Confederacy  which  border 
on  the  territories  of  their  own  nations."  This  was  done  on 
the  ground  that  political  mischief  was  liable  to  result  from 
their  presence.  Now  some  allowance  is  to  be  made  for  this 
view.  But  in  reality  all  international  relations  involve  danger, 
and  the  country  that  fears  it  should  use  precautions.  American 
sailors  make  trouble  in  French  ports,  but  France  does  not 
refuse  them  admission  —  she  appoints  policemen.  The  danger 
from  Americans  in  Texas  was  doubtless  greater,  but  so  were 
the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  their  coming.  Had  Mexico 
governed  that  region  well,  their  presence  would  have  benefited 
her  immensely;  and  to  make  a  treaty  sanctioning  foreign 
intercourse,  and  then  endeavor  to  keep  the  main  avenue  of 
that  intercourse  barred,  in  order  to  avoid  the  legitimate  results 
of  her  own  misgovernment,  was  an  international  system  de- 
cidedly more  novel  than  friendly,  more  ingenious  than  straight- 
forward.17 

In  April,  1840,  under  a  verbal  order  from  the  governor  of 
upper  California,  a  considerable  number  of  peaceable  Americans 
and  other  foreigners,  residing  at  scattered  points,  were  sud- 
denly arrested  in  a  brutal  and  even  bloody  manner  on  the 
pretext  of  a  conspiracy,  and  their  property  was  confiscated. 
Even  the  possession  of  legal  passports  did  not  protect  them. 
After  suffering  inhuman  treatment,  they  were  sent  in  irons  to 
Mexico.  There  only  the  charity  of  strangers  preserved  their 
lives;  and  at  length,  after  marching  under  blows  and  with 
bleeding  feet  as  far  as  Tepic,  they  were  thrust  into  prisons. 
No  doubt  they  were  rough  in  character  and  behavior,  and  the 
presence  of  such  bold,  vigorous  foreigners  in  a  weakly  governed 
region  obviously  involved  some  dangers ;  but  they  had  rights. 
No  evidence  justifying  the  treatment  they  received  was  brought 


72  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

forward,  and  the  government  at  Mexico,  even  while  ordering 
them  expelled  from  the  country  without  compensation,  ad- 
mitted the  illegality  of  their  arrest.  Finally,  as  the  British 
minister  demanded,  they  were  permitted  to  go  home ;  but 
Mexico  failed  to  bear  the  expense  of  their  journey,  as  she  had 
promised  to  do,  and  paid  but  a  slight,  if  any,  indemnity.  Such 
conduct  when  she  had  millions  for  the  army,  the  civil  wars  and 
the  pockets  of  officials,  was  inexcusable.  Justly  enough  this 
affair  excited  the  deep  indignation  of  our  government  and 
people.18 

In  June,  1841,  a  Texan  expedition  set  out  for  Santa  Fe, 
hoping  to  bring  about  the  incorporation  of  New  Mexico  in  the 
new  republic,  but  not  planning  under  any  circumstances  to 
make  war ;  and  a  considerable  number  of  Americans  —  among 
A  them  Kendall,  editor  of  the  New  Orleans  Picayune  —  joined 
o*  \  the  caravan  with  commercial  or  other  peaceable  aims.  After 
a  while  the  entire  body  were  made  prisoners  by  the  Mexican 
governor.  Kendall's  passport,  when  duly  exhibited  under  a 
flag  of  truce,  was  taken  from  him;  and,  although  the  utmost 
penalty  incurred  under  Mexican  law  by  the  non-combatant 
Americans  was  expulsion,  they  were  driven  with  instances  of 
extreme  brutality  to  Mexico,  and  compelled  to  work  in  chains 
on  public  roads.  For  one  reason  or  another  a  few  of  our  citizens 
gained  their  freedom  from  time  to  time;  but  it  was  not  until 
well  on  in  1842  —  and  then  as  an  act  of  condescension  instead 
of  justice  —  that  Santa  Anna  released  the  main  body  of  them. 
Of  course  this  country  felt  highly  incensed  again;  and  the 
Executive,  while  disclaiming  all  desire  to  screen  Americans 
from  any  deserved  punishment,  ordered  our  minister  to  protest 
against  the  treatment  of  the  prisoners,  declaring  that  Mexico 
would  be  required  to  observe  the  rules  prescribed  by  modern 
public  law.  On  the  other  side  of  the  Rio  Grande  still  more 
passion  was  aroused,  but  in  the  opposite  sense.19 

Beginning  in  a  humble  way,  a  caravan  trade  between  St. 
Louis,  Santa  Fe  and  Chihuahua  grew  to  large  proportions,- 
and  eventually  interested  even  the  New  York  and  Philadelphia 
merchants;  but  this  commerce,  though  sanctioned  by  treaty, 
was  looked  upon  by  Mexico  with  disfavor  from  the  very  first. 
Excessive  taxes  were  imposed  at  the  frontier  and  at  Chihuahua ; 
and  finally,  in  August,  1843,  Santa  Anna  arbitrarily  locked  the 


AMERICAN  GRIEVANCES  73 

door.  Possibly  there  was  a  baseless  notion  that  political 
designs  upon  New  Mexico  were  entertained  in  the  United 
States ;  competition  with  native  traders  may  have  been  feared ; 
and  it  was  charged  that  smuggling  occurred.  But  compe- 
tition and  smuggling  are  unavoidable  features  of  international 
commerce;  and  if  they  afforded  an  adequate  reason  for  dis- 
regarding a  formal  agreement,  international  trade  arrangements 
would  not  be  worth  making.  Our  citizens  and  government 
objected  therefore  vigorously  and  with  justice  to  Santa  Anna's 
course.20 

One  week  after  this  decree  went  forth,  another  prohibited 
the  importation  of  certain  specified  articles  at  any  point,  and 
ordered  the  forfeiture  of  such  merchandise,  already  in  the  hands 
of  dealers,  if  not  sold  within  the  ensuing  twelve  months. ...  The 
list  of.  articles,  printed  solidly  in  small  type,  filled  nearly  an 
octavo  page,  and  apparently  was  intended  to  include  almost 
everything  embraced  in  our  trade  with  Mexico.  Peculiarly 
harsh  seemed  the  forfeiture  provision.  Not  only  was  it  ex 
post  facto,  but  our  traders  by  paying  the  duty  had  become 
entitled  to  the  privilege  of  selling  their  goods ;  and  the  American 
secretary  of  state  could  do  no  less  than  protest  against  the  law, 
as  "a  manifest  violation  of  the  liberty  of  trade  secured  by  the 
treaty."  Yet  something  still  more  serious  followed  it,  for 
aliens  were  soon  prohibited  from  doing  retail  business  at  all. 
An  attempt  was  made  to  defend  this  order  on  the  ground  that 
Americans  residing  in  the  country  were  subject  to  its  laws, 
usages  and  statutes ;  but  our  government  replied  that  a  treaty 
must  be  regarded  as  the  supreme  law,  and  that  if  one  solemn 
agreement  with  Mexico  could  thus  be  made  a  nullity,  all  the 
other  privileges  accorded  us  could  one  by  one  be  abrogated.21 

These  commercial  grievances,  however,  were  trifles  compared 
with   another   of  the   same   halcyon  period.     In  July,    1843,    \/ 
Tornel,  the  minister  of  war,  instructed  the  governors  of  Cali-         y 
fornia   and   three   other    northern    departments   to   expel   all      w 
citizens  of  the  United  States  residing  therein,  and  permit  no 
more  of  them  to  enter.     Extraordinary  precautions  were  taken 
to  keep  this  measure  secret,  and  Waddy  Thompson,  our  repre- 
sentative at  Mexico,  first  learned  of  it  on  December  23.     Four 
times  he  inquired  in  vain  whether  such  an  order  had  been 
issued ;     but   when   he    demanded    his   passports,    Bocanegra  . 


74  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

attempted  to  justify  Tornel's  instructions,  arguing  that  every 
government  is  authorized  to  protect  itself  against  seditious 
aliens.  This  was  an  evasion,  for  the  order  had  reference  to 
all  Americans,  however  law-abiding.  The  outcome  was  that 
now,  after  the  order  had  been  in  force  almost  six  months  and 
after  it  had  been  executed  in  at  least  one  department,  direc- 
tions were  given  to  make  it  include  all  foreigners,  and  apply 
only  to  the  seditious.  Thompson,  strongly  disposed  to  please 
the  Mexicans,  accepted  this  as  satisfactory;  but  his  country 
did  not,  for  the  governors  had  authority  still  to  decide  what 
Americans  were  dangerous,  and  expel  these  without  a  trial. 
Besides,  even  the  modified  order  required  them  to  prevent  our 
citizens  from  entering  their  jurisdictions,  and  thus  plainly 
violated  the  treaty.22 

All  of  the  grievances  thus  far  mentioned  bore  directly  upon 
he  general  government  of  Mexico,  but  there  were  also  many 
fothers,  primarily  chargeable  to  minor  authorities,  in  which 
our  national  rights  were  seriously  attacked;23  and  next  we 
reach  the  question  of  "American  claims"  —  that  is  to  say, 
private  injuries  for  which  damages  were  asked.  At  once  the 
idea  occurs  to  us  that  perhaps  our  citizens  brought  their  troubles 
upon  themselves  by  peculiarly  obnoxious  conduct.  This  does 
not  appear  likely  to  have  been  the  rule,  however,  for  the 
British,  although  the  Mexicans  felt  anxious  to  have  their  good- 
will and  assistance,  complained  loudly  and  long,  and  their 
government  protested  in  the  most  emphatic  and  sweeping 
style.  Indeed,  said  Ashburnham,  the  charge  of  England : 
"There  is  scarcely  one  foreign  power  with  whom  they  have 
had  any  relation,  which  has  not  had  more  or  less  cause  to 
complain  of  the  iniquity  and  persecution  to  which  its  subjects 
here  have  been  exposed;"  and  France,  though  her  claims  were 
much  smaller  than  ours,  took  up  arms  on  this  account.  Bear- 
ing in  mind,  then,  how  peculiarly  inimical  were  the  people  and 
authorities  of  Mexico  toward  us,  one  can  readily  imagine  what 
sort  of  treatment  citizens  of  ours  had  to  endure.24 
'In  the  next  place  one  desires  to  be  sure  whether  our  actual 
claims  were  real  or,  as  some  American  and  Mexican  writers 
have  asserted,  were  simply  "trumped-up."  That  a  few  of 
the  less  important  ones  had  no  basis  is  apparently  true,  but  it 
must  be  remembered  that  our  government  was  bound  to  con- 


THE  AMERICAN  CLAIMS  75 

sider  any  case  resting  on  prima  facie  support,  and  ask  for  an 
investigation.  It  could  not,  like  the  Mexican  authorities,,  j^»  v 
examine  the  records  necessary  for  the  detection  of  all  mistakes  0 
and  frauds.  Moreover,  the  existence  of  unfounded  claims, 
if  such  there  were,  does  not  matter  to  us,  for  the  real  question 
is  merely  whether  substantial  sums  were  justly  demanded. 
On  that  point  one  immediately  reflects,  not  only  that  our 
national  authorities  were  scarcely  capable  of  conspiring  with 
skippers  and  traders  to  pick  the  pocket  of  Mexico,  but  that, 
had  they  been  silly  enough  to  present  a  list  of  imaginary  claims, 
her  quick-witted  if  not  profound  officials  would  have  delighted 
to  analyze  and  expose  the  frauds.  Coming  then  to  the  ques- 
tion, one  can  answer  it  positively  in  the  affirmative.  Both 
national  and  international  tribunals  decided  that  we  had  well- 
founded  and  substantial  claims.25 

It  has  been  urged,  however,  that  our  demands  required  very 
difficult  and  extensive  investigations,  which  in  the  midst  of  her 
embarrassments  Mexico  could  not  reasonably  be  expected  to 
enter  upon ;  but  many,  if  not  most,  of  the  claims  were  in  fact 
simple.26  It  has  been  insisted  that  as  aggrieved  Mexicans  in 
the  United  States  appealed  to  our  courts,  the  proper  policy 
for  aggrieved  Americans  was  to  appeal  to  the  courts  of  Mexico ; 27 
but  the  assumed  analogy  did  not  exist.  The  Mexican  tribunals, 
in  addition  to  being  notoriously  bad  from  every  point  of  view, 
were  sometimes  deliberately  used  to  perpetrate  iniquities,  and 
could  not  always  enforce  their  fair  decisions.28 

American  writers  have  also  argued  that  it  was  contemptible 
for  a  strong  and  rich  nation  like  ours  to  demand  money  from 
a  poor  neighbor ;  but  the  extent  of  our  national  resources  had 
no  bearing  on  the  rights  of  individual  citizens,  crippled  or 
impoverished  by  Mexican  injustice.  This,  howevej^isJby--fto 
meansall  that  should  be  said.  The  wisdom  and  the  equity 
of  the  civilized  world  are  embodied  in  its  laws,  and  those  laws 
agree  that  one's  debts  are  to  be  paid.  Spendthrifts  are  not 
exempted  from  the  effects  of  this  rule,  and  the  poverty  of  the 
Mexican  treasury  was  due  not  only  to  carelessness  but  also  to 
crime.  Moreover Jif  an  amiable,  " siemyre-aleqre"  young  man  *-^ 
borrows  without  repaying,  wastes  his  substance  in  riotous  living, 
and  perpetrates  outrages  on  the  passers-by,  it  is  the  duty  of 
some  creditor  to  bring  him  before  the  courts,  and  convince  him 


. 


76  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

in  a  practical  manner  that,  as  a  member  of  civilized  society,  he 
is  accountable  for  his  acts.  The  same  principle  holds  of 
international  relations.  "All  political  communities  are  re- 
sponsible to  other  political  communities  for  jtheir  conduct," 
wrote  Canning  to  the  Spanish  government^  Webster  enun- 
ciated the  same  rule ;  and  it  was  not  only  the  right  but  the  duty 
of  the  United  States  —  as  a  fellow  nation,  a  sister  republic  and 
a  next  neighbor — to  bring  Mexico  to  her  senses  by  teaching  her 
what  membership  in  the  family  of  nations  involved  j!  Had  this 
been  done  at  the  beginning  of  her  wild  career,  she  might  have 
put  her  house  in  order  before  bad  practices  became  habitual.29 

Again,  we  shall  presently  find  good  reasons  to  believe,  that 
had  Mexico  fairly  examined  our  claims  and  frankly  stated  her 
financial  difficulties,  a  lenient  arrangement  regarding  what 
were  after  all  moderate  sums  for  a  nation  to  pay  could  readily 
have  been  made.  Further  still,  if  Mexico  was  too  poor  to 
discharge  her  debts  promptly,  it  was  incumbent  upon  her, 
besides  recognizing  them,  to  show  a  certain  appreciation  of  the 
indulgence  accorded  her ;  but  instead  of  so  doing  she  continued 
to  harass  American  citizens,  and  showed,  as  we  shall  find,  a 
distinct  lack  of  good-will  and  even  of  straightforwardness  in 
hex  dealings  with  us. 

Finally,  it  has  been  repeated  over  and  over  again  by  American 
and  Mexican  writers  that  our  claims  were  urged  aggressively. 
But  the  history  of  the  matter  does  not  read  in  that  way.  Our 
demands  for  redress  began  early  in  Poinsett's  day.  In  October, 
1829,  Butler  was  directed  to  lay  them  before  the  Mexican 
government,  but  at  the  same  time  to  avoid  "anything  like 
menace  or  defiance."  Morning  after  morning  his  table  was 
covered  with  fresh  American  remonstrances  against  official 
conduct,  he  reported,  and  for  years  his  efforts  met  only  with 
rebuffs;  yet  his  instructions  were  still  to  maintain  amicable 
relations,  and  our  government  set  him  the  example.30 

In  June,  1836,  Ellis  reported  that  "daily"  acts  of  "injustice 
and  oppression"  continued  to  be  perpetrated,  while  every 
application  for  redress  was  treated  with  "cold  neglect";  yet 
the  next  month  he  was  merely  instructed  to  "make  a  fresh 
appeal"  to  the  "sense  of  honor  and  justice"  of  the  Mexican 
government,  asking  that  our  grievances  "should  be  promptly 
and  properly  examined"  and  "suitable"  redress  be  afforded. 


OUR  CLAIMS  CONSIDERATELY  URGED  77 

In  order,  however,  to  check  what  the  British  minister  called 
"their  usual  system  of  evasion,"  a  satisfactory  reply  of  some 
kind  within  three  weeks  was  to  be  required,  and  should  it  not 
be  made  without  "unnecessary"  delay,  Ellis,  after  giving  a 
fortnight's  notice,  was  to  withdraw.  In  October  Monasterio, 
after  delaying  for  weeks  to  answer  Ellis,  admitted  that  his 
predecessors  had  neglected  this  business,  and  promised  he 
would  give  his  first  attention  to  our  claims,  many  of  which,  as 
we  know,  were  very  simple,  very  old  and  very  familiar  to  the 
foreign  office;  but  his  reply,  the  following  month,  was  mere 
evasion.  Why,  asked  Ellis,  have  not  the  claims  presented 
during  the  past  ten  years  been  either  accepted  or  rejected? 
But  the  mystery  was  not  explained,  and  at  the  end  of  December, 
1836  —  after  waiting,  not  three  weeks,  but  three  months  —  he 
withdrew.  Meanwhile  Gorostiza  distributed  among  the  diplo- 
mats at  Washington  a  pamphlet  in  which  he  accused  our 
government  of  grossly  dishonorable  conduct  in  regard  to  Texas ; 
and  the  unqualified  approval  of  his  superiors  turned  this  im- 
propriety into  a  grave  international  issue.0'1 

President  Jackson  had  originally  felt  most  sympathetic 
toward  Mexico ;  and  although  Butler  and  Ellis  agreed  that 
indulgence  was  a  mistaken  policy,  and  her  official  journal 
described  all  Americans  as  villains  and  all  our  claims  as  the 
pretexts  of  smugglers,  yet  in  a  Message  of  December,  1836, 
Jackson  recommended  courtesy  and  great  forbearance.  The 
evasions  practised  upon  Ellis,  however,  and  still  mere  the  ap- 
proval of  Gorostiza's  insulting  pamphlet,  sharpened  his  feelings, 
and  early  in  February,  1837,  he  laid  the  subject  of  our  claims 
anew  before  Congress,  as  it  was  his  right  and  his  duty  to  do, 
proposed  to  make  the  next  demand  for  settlement  from  the 
deck  of  a  warship,  and  asked  for  authority  to  undertake  re- 
prisals in  case  that  step  also  should  prove  ineffectual. )  In  the 
official  view  of  Mexico,  Gaines's  advance  and  Gorostiza's  with- 
drawal from  Washington  amounted  to  a  formal  rupture,  even 
though  Castillo,  her  ordinary  representative,  lingered  in  the 
United  States  until  March ;  and  in  our  own  official  opinion 
the  endorsement  of  Gorostiza's  conduct,  the  refusal  to  examine 
our  claims,  and  the  return  of  Ellis  could  signify  hardly  less. 
Under  such  circumstances  Jackson's  February  Message  was 
perfectly  normal  and  proper.32 


78  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

Congress  took  substantially  the  same  view  as  the  Executive ; 
but  there  was  some  fear  of  Mexican  privateers,  a  good  deal  of 
pity  for  a  sister  republic  supposed  to  be  the  victim  of  circum- 
stances, a  little  unwillingness  to  increase  Jackson's  power,  a 
pronounced  wish  to  comply  exactly  with  the  treaty  of  amity, 
which  required  formal  notice  in  advance  of  hostilities,  and 
considerable  hope  that  Santa  Anna,  who  had  now  been  restored 
alive  to  his  country  through  the  magnanimity  of  the  Texans 
and  the  Americans,  would  reciprocate  by  endeavoring  to  adjust 
our  claims.  Another  consideration,  however,  was  probably 
still  more  potent.  The  administration  party  felt  that  should 
war  be  declared,  the  opposition  wpuld  say  its  real  object  was 
the  acquisition  of  Texas;  and  so  Jackson's  well-known  desire 
to  obtain  that  region  prevented  in  large  measure,  instead  of 
causing,  an  outbreak  of  hostilities.  It  was  decided,  therefore, 
to  make  the  final  demand  for  redress  in  a  peaceful  manner, ) and 
to  show  full  respect  for  what  the  House  of  Representatives 
described  as  our  "ancient,  though  now  estranged,  friend."  33 
<,  In  March,  1837,  Van  Buren  became  President,  and  found  it 
necessary  to  take  some  action.  The  documents  bearing  on 
our  claims  were  critically  examined;  fifty-seven  cases,  appar- 
ently free  from  doubt,  were  made  out  and  proved;  and  in 
July,  Robert  Greenhow,  interpreter  of  the  state  department, 
presented  them  at  Mexico  with  a  final  demand  for  redress, 
adding  that  we  had  no  desire  to  cause  embarrassment  by  press- 
ing for  payment.  On  one  point,  however,  he  insisted : 
Gorostiza's  conduct  must  be  disavowed^  The  minister  of 
relations  admitted  in  reply  that  certairi~~of  the  cases  did  not 
require  long  examination,  which  was  indeed  true ;  but  he  said 
the  President,  while  "most  anxious"  not  to  cause  delay, 
wished  that  "each"  of  them  should  be  examined  "in  its  turn" 
and  that  "nothing  should  be  left  undone"  which  could  pro- 
mote "the  most  speedy  and  equitable"  settlement.34 
/  In  November  Martinez,  a  new  minister  to  the  United  States, 
whom  we  received  kindly  even  though  Gorostiza's  action  had 
not  been  disavowed,  presented  the  answer  of  his  government. 
Instead  of  the  document  officially  transmitted  by  Greenhow, 
an  obsolete,  incomplete  and  necessarily  inaccurate  list  of  our 
claims,  obtained  nobody  knows  how,  had  been  used;  only* 
four  of  our  fifty-seven  living  cases  had  even  been  considered; 


ARBITRATION  AGREED  UPON  79 

and  not  one  of  these  had  been  disposed  of.  Accordingly,  when 
our  Congress  assembled  in  December,  1837,  the  Executive  laid 
the  whole  subject  before  it  anew,  analyzed  Mexico's  evasive 
reply  —  so  different  from  what  had  been  solemnly  promised  — 
announced  that  fresh  outrages  of  a  serious  and  exasperating 
sort  had  been  committed,  and  plainly  intimated  that  no  hope 
of  a  peaceful  settlement  could  be  entertained.;  Evidently  the 
patience  of  the  United  States  had  nearly  come  to  an  end ;  but 
before  Congress  was  ready  to  act,  Martinez  proposed  a  scheme 
of  arbitration,  which  —  though  formally  decided  upon  by 
Mexico  in  May,  1837  —  it  had  apparently  been  her  deliberate 
purpose  to  hold  in  reserve  until  all  other  dilatory  tactics  should 
have  been  exhausted.35 

Naturally  our  government  hesitated  to  adopt  a  plan  which, 
as  the  British  representative  at  Mexico  wrote  when  he  heard  of 
it,  was  precisely  the  one  to  "gratify  the  favourite  object"  of 
our  debtors  —  "  the  gaining  of  time  and  postponement  of  the 
day  of  reckoning ";  but  in  April,  1838,  quite  unlike  France 
and  much  to  the  surprise  of  Mexico,  we  accepted  arbitration, 
and  it  then  appeared  that  Martinez  had  no  powers  to  act  in 
the  matter.  For  months,  indeed,  although  our  consul  at 
Mexico  was  assuring  that  government  of  our  fair  and  friendly 
disposition,  he  did  not  receive  them.36 

(in  September,  1838,  however,  a  convention  was  signed. 
Martinez  stated  that  it  would  not  haveTcHbe  ratified  by  the-" 
Congress  of  his  country,  but  her  President  ruled  otherwise, 
and  then  with  an  extremely  poor  excuse  did  not  submit  it. 
So  the  time  limit  arrived;  and,  to  the  intense  disgust  of  our 
people  and  administration,  the  agreement  lapsed. ,.  The  poor 
excuse  was  accepted  by  our  government,  however,  and  in  April, 
1839,  after  two  years  had  thus  been  frittered  away,  anotJ3£E- 
convention  was  made,  providing  that  each  country  should 
name  two  commissioners,  and  the  king  of  Prussia  select  a 
fifth  person  to  be  an  umpire ;  and  as  Mexico  disavowed  Goro- 
stiza's  conduct  in  circulating  the^-offensive  pamphlet,  our 
patience  appeared  to  be  rewarded.37 

In  the  opinion  of  Pakenham,  British  minister  at  Mexico,  the 
arbitration  arrangement  was  "a  very  fortunate  circumstance" 
for  the  debtor  nation,  and  one  that  she  ought  to  observe  scru- 
pulously; but  the  minister  of  relations,  without  even  a  poor 


80  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

excuse,  failed  to  consider  seriously  the  appointment  of  com- 
missioners until  a  few  days  before  the  treaty  required  them 
to  be  in  Washington,  and  consequently  the  agreement  expired. 
Mexico,  however,  could  not  well  take  advantage  of  this  fact ;  the 
United  States  waived  it;  and  on  August  25,  1840,  nearly  two 
and  a  half  years  after  we  had  accepted  arbitration,  the  joint 
commission  was  organized.  ,  The  representatives  of  Mexico 
were  Senores  Castillo  and  Leon,  one  of  whom,  being  unfamiliar 
;  with  business,  fell  under  the  control  of  his  colleague,  while  the 
other  was  described  by  Pakenham  as  conspicuously  dishonest. 
*In  eighteen  months  from  that  date,  according  to  the  treaty, 
the  labors  of  this  body  were  to  end.  To  kill  time  was,  therefore, 
to  kill  claims  —  or  at  any  rate  bury  them.38 

When  the  subject  of  the  commission  was  discussed  in  1838, 
Forsyth  took  the  ground  that  it  would  be  a  judicial  body, 
guided  solely  by  the  evidence  before  it ;  and  this  principle  was 
apparently  accepted  as  fundamental.  Webster,  now  the 
secretary  of  state,  pointed  out  that  it  was  essentially  and 
necessarily  such  a  tribunal.  The  Mexican  commissioners, 
however,  had  been  ordered  to  act,  not  freely  according  to  the 
evidence,  but  according  to  the  instructions  of  their  govern- 
ment ;  and  moreover  they  promptly  refused  to  let  the  claimants 
present  themselves  either  in  person,  by  attorney  or  in  writing. 
Some  four  months  were  spent  in  discussing  objections  raised 
by  them,  and  finally,  in  order  to  get  something  done,  the 
American  representatives  found  it  necessary  to  give  way. 
Yet  the  sailing  was  not  smooth  even  then.  Castillo  and  Leon 
|  resorted  not  only  to  dilatory  tactics  and  unfair  methods,  but 
I  even  to  express  falsehood ;  and  their  government  violated  in 
I  a  signal  manner  one  of  the  most  fundamental  stipulations  of 
the  treaty.  In  short,  if  we  jnay  believe  the  apparently  fair 
statement  of  the  American  commissioners,  the  Mexicans 
caused  delays  that  prevented  the  adjustment  of  claims  amount- 
ing to  more  than  five  millions,  and  pursued  a  course  in  general 
that  excited  great  indignation  throughout  this  country.  Mean- 
while, as  our  philo-Mexican  minister,  Thompson,  reported, 
"The  rights  of  American  Citizens  of  every  grade  and  character" 
were  still  subjected  to  "constant  outrage."  S9 
(.  In  spite  of  everything,  however,  some  two  millions  —  in 
1841    a    substantial    amount  —  were    awarded,    and    at    once 


MEXICAN  EVASIONS  81 


V 


Mexico  set  at  work  to  devise  a  scheme  for  evading  the  obliga- 
tion. Urgent  advice  from  the  British  minister  discouraged 
this  plan,  however;  and  finally  a  new  convention  was  made 
in  January,  1843,  expressly  for  the  convenience  of  our  debtor, 
by  which  the  amount  with  interest  was  to  be  paid  within  five 
years^  counted  from  the  following  April,  in  equal  quarterly 
instalments  of  cash.  "Such  indulgent  terms,"  was  Paken- 
ham's  description  of  the  arrangement.  Both  governments 
ratified  it;  and  so  after  these  many  years  of  patience  and 
effort  on  the  one  side,  evasion  and  sometimes  dishonesty  on 
the  other,  compensation  for  a  portion  of  our  grievances  began 
to  be  received.  But  —  after  all/ Mexico  paid  only  three,  in- 
stalments.    At  that  point  she  broke  her  word,  and  stopped.40) 

For  her  course  in  this  matter  there  seem  to  be  only  two 
conceivable  excuses;  hex^inbarxassed  condition  and  Jier  ir- 
ritation over  the  Texas  affair.  With  reference  to  these  it 
must  be  said  that  her  condition  was  itself  inexcusable,  and  at 
the^utmost  did  not  incapacitate  her  for  doing  all  that  we 
demanded;  while  her  irritation  was  essentially  unfounded, 
and,  even  had  it  been  reasonable,  would  not  have  justified  her 
making  promises  and  agreements  only  to  break  them,  or  resort- 
ing in  other  ways  to  dishonorable  methods.41 


VOL. 


IV 

THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AND  MEXICO 


i. 


1843-1846 


In  1843  our  decisive  difficulty  with  Mexico  began  to  take 
shape.  I  The  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States  was  on 
legal,  moral  and  political  grounds  entirely  legitimate.  That 
republic  had  defied  the  arms  of  the  mother-country  for  nine 
years.  It  was  recognized  as  an  independent  nation  by  the 
leading  commercial  powers  of  the  world ;  and  no  well-informed 
person,  even  in.JVIexico,  dreamed  that  it  would  return  to  its 
former  connection)  To  be  sure,  her  pretensions  were  asserted 
in  1845  as  loudly  as  ever;  but  she  made  them  ridiculous  by 
declaring  that  never,  under  any  circumstances,  would  the 
independence  of  her  rebellious  daughter  be  conceded.  Be- 
sides, Mexico  had  practically  acquiesced  in  the  recognition  of 
Texas  by  our  own  and  other  governments ;  and,  in  view  of  this 
fact,  as  good  a  lawyer  and  statesman  as  Daniel  Webster,  though 
opposed  to  incorporating  that  country  in  the  Union,  h§ld  that 
our  doing  it  gave  Mexico  no  ground  of  complaint.1 
(  Annexation  was  therefore  permissible,  and  grave  national 
interests  of  the  United  States  appeared  to  demand  the  step. 
All  northern  Mexico,  including  California,  seemed  liable  to 
secede,  for  the  people  of  that  whole  region  felt  profoundly 
dissatisfied  with  the  administration  of  their  national  affairs, 
and  realized  the  urgent  need  of  a  strong  and  orderly  government ; 
there  was  reason  to  believe  that  Sam  Houston,  the  President 
of  Texas,  thought  of  organizing  under  European  auspices  a 
southwestern  empire,  absorbing  Oregon,  and  thus  offsetting  the 
United  States;)  as  A.  J.  Donelson,  our  minister  in  Texas  at 
that  period, -^fote  in  1848,  "He  was  not  mistaken.  This  he 
could  have  done" ;  and  in  that  event  we  should  have  had  a  bold, 

82 


TEXAS  ANNEXED  JUSTLY  83 

ambitious  rival  in  the  rear.  The  anti-slavery  agitation  in  the 
United  States  led  many  6£  our  southern  citizens  to  long  for 
separation  and  a  union  with  slaveholding  Texas.  The  pos- 
sibilities of  Texan  cotton  production,  stimulated  by  the  English, 
who  were  eager  to  be  independent  of  the  American  fields, 
were  keenly  dreaded.  The  logic  of  the  situation  seemed  likely 
to  render  Texas  not  only  a  commercial  and  industrial  com- 
petitor and  a  rancorous  political  enemy,  but  a  source  of  danger- 
ous complications  with  Mexico,  England  and  France.  Finally, 
the  British,  who  possessed  a  powerful  influence  in  her  councils 
and  in  those  of  Mexico,  were  deliberately  endeavoring  to  shape 
matters  in  such  a  way  as  to  do  very  serious  harm,  it  was  be- 
lieved, to  the  interests  of  the  United  States./  Under  such 
conditions  no  one  could  reasonably  complain  because  we 
undertook,  employing  as  means  only  argument  and  persuasion, 
to  acquire  that  important  and  valuable  territory,  and  ward 
off  these  apparently  imminent  dangers.  Albert  Gallatin,  who 
opposed  our  taking  the  step,  wrote  later  that  it  was  "both 
expedient  and  natural,  indeed  ultimately  unavoidable."  1 
\  No  doubt  it  was  quite  natural  that  Mexico  should  take  offence. 
To  see  a  handful  of  poor  farmers,  nearly  all  of  them  foreigners 
by  birth,  rebel  against  their  national  government,  appropriate 
a  large  portion  of  the  nation's  territory,  rout  its  army,  capture 
its  President,  establish  a  working  political  system,  and  gain 
recognition  abroad,  had  been  fearfully  trying.  To  believe,  not 
only  on  the  authority  of  every  Mexican  leader  but  on  that  of 
many  Europeans  and  some  eminent  Americans,  that  all  this 
loss  and  chagrin  were  largely,  if  not  wholly,  due  to  the  machina- 
tions of  a  neighbor,  allied  to  Mexico  by  a  treaty  of  amity  and 
constantly  professing  friendship,  was  harder  yet.  And  now 
to  find  those  Texans,  recently  so  eager  to  escape  from  all  out- 
side control,  preparing  as  if  by  a  preconcerted  understanding 
to  join  that  seemingly  perfidious  and  aggressive  nation,  carrying 
their  invaluable  territories  with  them,  and  bringing  its  frontier 
to  the  very  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande  —  this  was  certainly 
enough  to  make  any  citizen,  ignorant  of  the  natural  steps  by 
which  it  had  really  come  about  and  quite  unable  to  understand 
American  ways,  boil  with  rage.  But  the  United  States  had 
labored  to  explain  the  affair  to  Mexico,  and  was  not  responsible 
for  her  blindness. 


84  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

I  For  a  number  of  reasons  Mexico  had  anticipated  the  final 
outcome  of  the  Texan  difficulties,  and  on  August  23,  1843, 
Bocanegra,  her  secretary  of  relations,  addressed  our  minister 
on  the  subject^  The  conduct  of  the  United  States  regarding 
that  province, -ne  wrote,  has  "appeared  to  afford  grounds  for 
doubting  the  sincerity  and  frankness"  of  the  American  author- 
ities, and  therefore,  while  hoping  that  the  republic  founded  by 
Washington  may  be  saved  "from  stain  and  dishonor,"  we 
announce  hereby,  "  that  the  Mexican  Government  will  consider 
equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  Mexican  Republic 
the  passage  of  an  act  [by  the  American  Congress]  for  the  in- 
corporation of  Texas  with  the  territory  of  the  United  States ;  \ 
the  certainty  of  the  fact  being  sufficient  for  the  immediate" 
proclamation  of  war."  Such  a  note  was  of  course  decidedly 
offensive  to  the  honor  of  this  nation.  Even  Thompson  felt 
compelled  to  be  indignant.2 

The  following  November  Almonte,  who  then  represented 
Mexico  at  Washington,  informed  our  secretary  of  state  that 
should  Congress  and  the  Executive  decide  upon  annexation, 
he  should  consider  his  mission  at  an  end.  "My  country," 
he  stated,  "is  resolved  to  declare  war  as  soon  as  it  receives 
information  of  such  an  act."  In  reply,  Upshur  asserted  rather 
sharply  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  regard  Texas  as  an 
independent  nation;  but  early  in  1844  he  talked  the  matter 
over  with  Almonte  in  a  very  frank  and  amicable  way,  and  the 
Mexican  minister  concurred  substantially  in  the  annexation 
policy  of  our  government.  The  next  spring,  however,  he  for- 
mally repeated  the  protests  of  August  and  November,  1843.3 

Probably  to  gain  time  and  if  possible  lead  us  on  to  acknowl- 
edge in  some  way  the  claim  of  Mexico,  Almonte  encouraged 
Calhoun,  who  had  succeeded  Upshur  as  the  secretary  of  state, 
»  to  believe  that  his  government,  looking  upon  Texas  as  lost, 
would  accept  a  pecuniary  consideration  in  order  to  minimize 
the  misfortune;  and/  about  the  middle  of  April,  1844,  a 
"bearer  of  despatches"  named  Thompson  left  Washington 
with  certain  instructions  from  the  secretary  of  state  to  B.  E. 
Green,  our  charge  at  Mexico.  These  directed  him  to  inform 
the  Mexican  government  that,  while  intending  no  disrespect 
and  feeling  an  "anxious  desire"  to  maintain  friendly  relations, 
the  United  States  had  been  compelled  by  a  regard  for  our  own 


THE  UNITED  STATES  CONCILIATORY  85 

security  to  negotiate  a  treaty  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  with- 
out reaching  a  previous  understanding  with  it,  but  had  borne 
its  attitude  in  mind,  and  was  now  ready  to  adjust  all  diffi- 
culties —  particularly  that  of  the  boundary,  which  had  pur- 
posely been  left  an  open  question  —  "  on  the  most  liberal  and 
satisfactory  terms,  j 4 

Thompson  landea  at  Vera  Cruz  on  May  14,  and  proceeded  at 
once  to  call  on  President  Santa  Anna,  then  at  one  of  his  estates 
near  the  coast.  He  next  went  on  to  the  capital,  and  in  company 
with  Green  had  a  conference  with  the  acting  President,  who 
was,  of  course,  entirely  under  Santa  Anna's  control.  No  good 
results  followed,  however,  and  Calhoun's  overture  for  an 
amicable  adjustment  of  the  Texan  difficulty,  which  Green 
presented  officially  in  a  note,  was  rejected  by  the  Cabinet. 
The  United  States,  Bocanegra  pretended  in  his  reply,  though 
it  had  injured  and  outraged  Mexico  by  taking  steps  toward 
annexation,  had  now  recognized  her  claim  to  the  territory; 
and  he  not  only  refused  to  make  any  concession,  but  formally 
repeated  the  declaration  of  August  23.  He  then  placed  the 
Texas  affair  before  the  diplomatic  corps  at  Mexico ;  an  unsuc- 
cessful attempt  was  made  to  obtain  from  Bankhead,  the 
British  minister,  some  hint  of  aid  against  the  United  States; 
Almonte  received  orders  to  persist  in  his  protests;  the  news- 
papers, taking  their  cue  from  a  journal  under  the  President's 
direct  control,  broke  out  into  what  Bankhead  characterized 
as  "the  most  violent  strain  of  invective  against  the  proposed 
annexation  ";  and  Santa  Anna  himself,  assuming  the  reins  of 
government,  called  for  30,000  men  and  a  large  sum  of  money.5 
fit  is  thus  clear  that  while  our  government  positively  and 
rightfully  denied  the  claims  of  Mexico  to  any  legal  ownership 
of  Texas,  it  showed  —  even  to  the  extent  of  imprudence  —  a 
kindly  regard  for  her  feelings  and  a  willingness  to  make  her, 
under  cover  of  adjusting  the  boundary,  a  substantial  present^ 
and  it  is  equally  clear  that  our  overture,  instead  of  being  re- 
ceived in  a  friendly  or  even  a  candid  manner,  was  twisted  and 
misrepresented,  and  was  used  by  Santa  Anna  not  only  to  advance 
his  personal  interests,  but  even  to  feed  the  prevalent  hostility 
against  the  United  States  and  increase  the  danger  of  war.f  Of 
course  Mexico  had  a  perfect  right  to  repulse  our  advances, 
but  her  method  of  procedure  in  the  case  was  unjustifiable. 


86  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Meanwhile,  from  a  variety  of  causes,  among  which  the 
merits  of  the  question  had  but  a  small  place,  the  treaty  of 
annexation  failed  in  our  Senate,  and  the  Texans,  who  had  given 
offence  to  England,  France  and  especially  Mexico  by  accepting 
the  overture  of  our  Executive,  found  themselves  not  only 
slighted  by  the  United  States  but  ferociously  menaced  by  Santa 
Anna,]  and  seemed  likely,  in  their  resentment  and  peril,  to 
swing  quite  beyond  our  reach  —  presumably  under  the  shield 
of  England.  To  counteract  this  tendency  somewhat  and  in 
a  measure  safeguard  Texas  against  the  dangers  we  had  brought 
upon  her,  Calhoun  sent  a  bold  and  even  audacious  despatch 
to  the  American  representative  at  Mexico.  The  United  States, 
he  said,  is  responsible  for  the  annexation  treaty,  andsiipon  us, 
not  upon  Texas,  the  wrath  of  Mexico  should  be  visited}  more- 
over the  matter  of  acquiring  that  territory,  which  it  has  long 
been  our  policy  to  do,  is  pending  still,  and  for  that  reason,  as 
well  as  on  the  score  of  humanity,  we  could  not  allow  the  ques- 
tion to  be  decided  by  fierce  Mexican  threats  of  brutal  hostilities ; 
Texas  is  to  be  treated  as  an  independent  power;  but  should 
annexation  be  consummated,  the  United  States  will  be  ready 
to  settle  most  liberally  all  resulting  difficulties.6 

In  October,  1844,  our  minister  gave  the  substance  of  this 
despatch  to  the  Mexican  government ;  and  /soon  the  talented, 
energetic  and  audacious  Rejon,  the  succes'sw  of  Bocanegra, 
sent  him  in  reply  a  long  but  not  wearisome  review  of  the  Texas 
affair,  that  was  absolutely  a  masterpiece  in  its  class.  Truths, 
managed  so  as  to  give  a  wrong  impression,  clever  half-truths 
and  flat  falsehoods  were  skilfully  combined,  and  at  last  the 
United  States  appeared  to  stand  in  the  dock  as  a  confessed 
perjurer  and  thief  awaiting  sentenced  As  for  Calhoun's  inter- 
vening now  between  Mexico  and  a  handful  of  rebels,  pro- 
tested Rejon,  that  could  not  be  tolerated,  unless  every  nation 
that  so  chose  might  fill  neighboring  territory  with  its  people, 
incite  them  to  revolt,  aid  them  to  resist,  and  finally  offer  them 
annexation.  Our  minister,  Shannon,  who  had  been  a  useful 
Democratic  stump-speaker  in  Ohio,  blustered,  blundered, 
threatened  and  undertook  to  argue,  but  only  drew  from  Rejon 
a  still  more  insulting  letter,  and  still  more  embittered  the  feel- 
ing-in  both  countries.7 

At  the  beginning  of  March,  1845,  our  President  signed  the 


MEXICO  PREPARES  FOR  WAR  87 

joint  resolution  of  Congress  which  provided  for  the  annexation 
of  Texas.  Almonte,  the  Mexican  minister,  at  once  protested^) 
giving  notice  that  his  country  would  maintain  the  claim  to 
her  ancient  province  "at  all  times,  by  every  means  ...  in 
her  power";  and/although  James  Buchanan,  who  now  became 
secretary  of  state  under  Polk,  replied  in  a  conciliatory  manner, 
Almonte  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  and  left  our  shores. 
At  Mexico  the  news  produced  a  tremendous  commotion, 
heightened  by  the  report  from  California  that  a  revolution, 
decided  by  the  American  settlers,  had  occurred  in  that  depart- 
ment.] War  at  once  and  war  to  the  knife!  cried  the  press  in 
concert ;  while  the  administration,  in  a  note  moderated  by  the 
British  and  French  ministers  yet  sufficiently  positive,  severed 
official  relations  with  Shannon,  and  insisted  upon  this  policy 
even  after  receiving  a  conciliatory  reply  from  him.  By  the 
action  of  Mexico  there  was,  therefore,  a  complete  rupture  Q 
between  the  two  countries.8 

(When  it  was  learned,  about  the  middle  of  July,  that  our 
terms  of  annexation  had  been  accepted  by  Texas,  passion 
burst  forth  again  J  The  leash  of  Mexican  eloquence  and  fury 
broke.  " August  Houses !  President  of  the  Republic!"  cried 
El  Amigo  del  Pueblo,  "  The  hour  of  danger  for  the  country  has 
sounded  and  she  has  a  right  to  look  to  you  for  salvation.  Union 
and  war!"  Not  merely  Texas  but  all  Mexico,  the  people  were 
told,  had  been  marked  as  its  prey  by  American  greed.  In 
order  to  save  itself  before  the  public  the  administration,  though 
at  heart  averse  to  hostilities,  proposed  to  Congress  a  declaration 
of  war.  Money  was  asked  from  the  Chambers,  and  full  quotas 
of  troops  were  summoned  from  the  departments ;  and  by  the 
end  of  the  month,  as  the  agent  of  our  government  duly  re- 
ported, the  course  of  things  pointed  strongly  toward  hostilities. 
The  archives  of  Vera  Cruz  were  carried  to  the  interior;  new 
guns  were  mounted  in  the  fortress  there;  steps  were  taken  to 
raise  a  loan  of  fifteen  millions ;  munitions  and  provisions  were 
said  to  be  going  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Matamoros;  and 
much  was  heard  about  the  movements  of  troops.  At  the  end 
of  July  the  ministers  of  Mexico  at  London  and  Paris  were 
notified  that  an  appeal  to  arms  would  be  made.  August  8  the 
Mexican  consulate  at  New  Orleans  closed ;  and  a  few  days 
later  our  consul  at  Havana  reported  that  his  Mexican  col- 


88  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

league  had  received  an  official  notification  of  the  existence  of 
war.9 

To  be  sure,  no  public  declaration  to  that  effect  appeared,  but 
jthere  were  good  reasons  for  considering  this  fact  unimportant. 
/With  Spanish-American  subtlety  the  Mexicans  discovered  that 
^:he  tlireat "of  August  ^,~"1 843,  repeated  later,  had  rendered 
such  an  announcement  unnecessary,  and  that  it  would  be 
shrewder  to  hold  that  by  annexing  Texas  we  had  declared  war 
upon  them,  since  they  would  then  be  free  to  attack  or  defer 
attacking  us,  as  might  seem  expedient./  Besides,  it  was  argued, 
Texas  was  merely  a  rebellious  province,  and  hence  Mexico 
could  make  war  there  at  will,  without  giving  us  an  excuse  for 
opening  hostilities  against  her  seaboard,  and  without  enabling 
us  to  seize  territory  by  the  right  of  belligerency.  Consequently, 
as  large  forces  had  been  ordered  to  the  north,  a  move  across 
the  Rio  Grande  at  any  hour  seemed  more  than  possible;  and 
the  official  journal  urged,  that  it  should  be  effected  at  the 
earliest  practicable  moment,  in  order  to  prevent  the  United 
States  from  occupying  the  territory,  and  making  ready  there 
for  .hostilities.10 

/The  American  government,  on  the  other  hand,  undertook  to 
restore  friendly  relations.  The  official  assurances  of  good-will 
given  Almonte  were  supplemented  by  private  representations 
conveyed  to  him  through  a  mutual  friend  by  a  member  of  our 
Cabinet ;  and  Polk  took  also  a  step  of  much  greater  importance. 
Before  the  end  of  March  W.  S.  Parrott  was  appointed  a  con- 
fidential agent  of  our  state  department,  and  ordered  to  reach 
Mexico,  which  had  long  been  his  place  of  residence,  by  the 
quickest  route.  Try  to  convince  the  Mexican  government, 
ran  his  instructions,  that  it  is  truly  for  the  interest  .of  that 
country,  "to  restore  friendly  relations  between  the  two  re- 
publics. "  If  it  is  found  willing,  you  may  reveal  your  official 
character,  and  say  that  the  United  States  will  send  a  "Minister" 
on  learning  that  he  will  be  kindly  received.  (The  annexation 
of  Texas  cannot  be  undone ;  but  "  you  are  at  liberty  to  state 
your  confident  belief  that  in  regard  to  all  unsettled  questions, 
we  are  prepared  to  meet  Mexico  in  a  most  liberal  and  friendly 
spirit."  n 

Thus  commissioned,  Parrott  sought  his  post  without  delay 
renewed  his  acquaintance  with  members  of  the  Mexican  Con- 


OUR  EFFORTS  TO  RESTORE  INTERCOURSE         89 

gress,  invited  them  frequently  to  lunch  or  dinner,  and  talked, 
no  doubt  in  the  spirit  of  his  instructions,  with  all  such  in- 
fluential persons  as  he  could  reach.  In  particular,  as  he  re- 
ported, he  was  "very  precise  in  stating,  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  could  never  recognize  in  Mexico  the  right 
to  claim  an  indemnity  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the 
American  Union;  but  that,  in  a  treaty  of  limits,  for  the  sake 
of  peace  and  good  neighborhood,  the  United  States  would,  no 
doubt,  be  disposed,  as  had  been  officially  stated,  to  meet 
Mexico,  in  a  negotiation,  upon  the  most  friendly  and  liberal 
terms."     No  explanation  could  have  been  clearer.12 

There  were  good  reasons  for  anticipating  a  favorable  result 
from  this  overture.  President  Herrera,  connected  by  mar- 
riage with  a  leading  American  merchant  at  the  capital,  was  an 
honest,  reasonable  and  patriotic  citizen;  and,  knowing  that 
hostilities  with  the  United  States  would  at  best  involve  many 
costly  sacrifices,  and  would  very  likely  throw  California  into 
our  hands,  he  desired  to  escape  by  some  method  from  his 
public  action  in  favor  of  war.  .  It  was  altogether  possible,  too, 
that  a  reverse  on  the  field  might  upset  his  administration  and 
injure  his  friends;  and,  since  the  movement  that  had  placed 
him  in  power  had  cost  money,  his  backers,  in  order  to  be  repaid, 
felt  anxious  to  curtail  instead  of  increasing  the  military  ex- 
penses. Moreover  there  was  trouble  with  both  England  and 
France  at  this  time;  the  more  intelligent  part  of  the  nation, 
cooling  a  little,  were  beginning  to  perceive  the  advantages  of 
a  peaceful  settlement  with  us ;  a  chance  could  be  seen  that  in 
the  end  such  a  policy,  reducing  the  cost  of  government,  would 
become  popular ;  and  finally  it  was  realized  that  unless  money 
to  pay  the  troops  were  obtained  from  the  United  States,  their 
fickle  allegiance  probably  could  not  be  retained.  Accordingly 
on  August  29,  1845,  Parrott  reported  that  in  his  opinion  an 
envoy  from  this  country  would  be  heartily  welcomed ;  almost 
at  the  same  time  Black,  our  consul  at  Mexico,  and  Dimond, 
our  consul  at  Vera  Cruz,  expressed  the  same  view ;  and  private 
advices  tended  to  confirm  these  opinions.13 
|  Our  own  reasons  for  wishing  to  have  diplomatic  intercourse 
restored  were  almost  equal  in  strength  to  Herrera's.  Aside 
from  the  political  and  commercial  interests  that  had  always 
led  us  to  seek  the  friendship  of  Mexico,  we  desired  to  collect 


X 


90  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

the  unpaid  instalments  of  our  awards,  prosecute  our  claims, 

guard  our  citizens  residing  in  that  country,  adjust  the  Texan 

/difficulty,   counteract  prejudicial  movements  on  the  part  of 

.^European  states,  and  cultivate  the  good-will  of  the  Central 

land  South  American  peoples,  Who  were  sure  to  be  influenced 

by  the  sentiments  of  their  kindred   next  us.     In  particular, 

j  only  two  or  three  months  later  Guizot's  idea  of  establishing 

j  a  balance  of  power  in  this  hemisphere  was  exciting  alarm  in 

|  Congress;    and  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  our  Executive, 

|  already  aware  of  it,  desired  the  support  of  Mexico  in  opposing 

a  design  so  un-American.     Besides,  Polk  felt  sure  that  European 

governments  had  an  eye  upon  California,  and  a  minister  was 

needed  at  the  Mexican  capital  to  prevent,  if  possible,    any 

bargaining  on  the  subject.14 

Even  more  important,  there  were  signs  that  a  monarchy 
headed  by  a  European  prince  might  be  set  up  in  Mexico, 
involving  dangerous  interference  in  our  commercial  and  political 
relations  with  that  country,  sure  to  increase  the  gravity  of  a 
military  contest,  should  one  arise,  and  seriously  attacking  the 
"Monroe  Doctrine."  As  early  as  1838  our  consul  at  Mexico 
reported  that  Alaman  and  the  conservatives  were  laboring  to 
establish  a  monarchy.  In  1840  Estrada,  one  of  the  ablest  and 
best  of  their  statesmen,  was  denounced  for  openly  advocating 
the  change.  Paredes,  now  at  the  head  of  the  army,  had  favored 
it  for  years,  and  in  1841  had  initiated  a  movement  in  that 
direction.  In  January,  1845,  two  agents  of  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment were  said  to  be  laboring  in  Mexico  for  the  same 
cause,  and  the  Memorial  Historico  announced  that  Spain, 
France  and  England  had  formed  an  alliance  to  set  up  a  new 
government  there.  At  about  the  same  time  the  Picayune 
stated  that  official  documents  relating  to  the  monarchical 
scheme  had  been  received  at  New  Orleans ;  and  early  in  March 
our  diplomatic  representative  at  London  sounded  a  strong 
note  of  warning.15 

/To  reinforce  all  these  considerations,  England  and  France 
felt  deeply  offended  at  our  absorption  of  Texas;  Polk,  who 
believed  "that  no  compromise  [in  the  Oregon  affair]  to  which 
Great  Britain  would  accede,  could  pass  the  Senate,"  now 
regarded  a  peaceful  adjustment  of  that  controversy  as  im- 
possible;') and  Mexico,  though  as  a  rule  profoundly  influenced 


SLIDELL  DESPATCHED  AS  MINISTER  91 

by  the  policy  of  England,  might  any  day  take  offence  at  some 
British  move,  and  wish  to  approach  the  United  States.  For 
these  reasons  it  was  of  great  importance  to  have  a  diplomatic 
agent  near  her  government  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any 
promising  turn;  and,  finally,  one  can  easily  imagine  that  in 
Polk's,  opinion  the  reception  of  a  United  States  minister  would 
of  itself,  aside  from  what  he  might  do,  render  it  more  difficult 
for  Mexico  to  maintain  her  unfriendly  attitude.16 

/Accordingly  the  letters  of  Parrott,  Black  and  Dimond  were 
promptly  taken  up  by  the  American  Cabinet,  and  after  a 
thorough  discussion  of  the  subject  it  was  unanimously  agreed, 
although  the  rupture  had  been  caused  by  Mexico,  to  reopen 
diplomatic  relations  with  her;  to  keep  this  intention  pro- 
foundly secret,  lest  European  ministers  at  Washington  should 
thwart  our  aims;  to  despatch  as  minister  John  Slidell  of 
Louisiana,  an  agreeable  man,  able  lawyer  and  excellent  Spanish 
scholar  —  just  the  sort  of  person  most  likely  to  gain  the  ear 
of  Mexico  —  and  to  pay  as  much  as  forty  millions,  if  necessary, 
for  a  satisfactory  boundary.  The  next  day,  however,  Polk 
learned  that  Mexico  had  been  taking  warlike  steps  as  late  as 
August  21.  It  was  therefore  concluded,  in  order  to  make  sure 
that  our  envoy  would  not  be  rejected,  to  wait  a  little  for  news) 
and  meantime  instruct  Black  to  ascertain  "officially"  whether 
a  "Minister"  would  be  received.  No  further  action  on  the  part 
of  the-  Mexican  government  appeared  necessary  to  restore 
friendly  intercourse,  for  previously,  after  the  withdrawal  of 
a  legation,  the  broken  thread  had  been  mended  by  sending 
a  new  representative.  Nothing  less  than  such  action  would 
have  answered  our  purpose,  for  only  a  diplomatic  agent  of  the 
usual  kind,  residing  near  that  government,  could  have  handled 
the  existing  problems.  In  consequence  exactly  this,  without 
qualification  or  ambiguity,  was  proposed.17 

Just  at  this  point  a  new  factor  appeared.  The  British,  ) 
Heading  a  great  amount  of  Mexican  bonds,  enjoying  a  very 
profitable  trade  in  that  quarter,  and  not  at  all  anxious  to  see 
us  extend  our  teritory  by  conquest,  did  not  wish  Mexico  to 
challenge  the  United  Statesj)and  early  in  October  Bankhead 
expressed  a  desire  to  confer  with  Pena  y  Pena,  her  secretary 
of  relations,  concerning  the  situation.  This  offer  was  cor- 
dially accepted ;   and,  at  an  interview  between  these  gentlemen 


92  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

and  the  President,  Herrera  said  that  the  "subjects"  which  an 
American  envoy  might  bring  up  would  be  discussed  "with 
every  disposition  to  terminate  them  amicably.")  Moreover, 
after  frequent  conversations  and  a  second  formal  interview, 
Pena  thanked  Bankhead  most  gratefully  in  writing  for  offering 
to  use  his  influence  with  Pakenham,  now  the  British  minister 
at  Washington,  "for  the  purpose  of  amicably  arranging  the 
differences  [las  &ijerencias\"  existing  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  and  intimated  plainly  that  Herrera  would 
listen  to  any  "proposals"  coming  from  the  American  govern- 
ment.18 

To  suppose  that  such  men,  discussing  a  matter  of  so  much 
gravity,  would  not  in  the  course  of  numerous  conversations 
take  up  its  most  obvious  and  most  important  aspects  would  be 
absurd.  These  must  have  been  considered,  and  Bankhead 
reported  that  not  only  the  annexation  of  Texas  but  "the  other 
points  of  difference,  such  as  Limits  and  Indemnity,"  were  to 
come  up,  and  in  particular  he  understood  that  whatever  sum 
the  United  States  might  agree  to  pay  would  be  "  much  reduced 
by  claims  arising  out  of  ike  Convention  [of  1839]  .  .  .  and  by 
others  since  created."  (Such  was  Polk's  view.  The  questions 
of  boundary  compensation  and  claims  compensation,  he  said, 
"naturally  and  inseparably  blended";  and  the  former  existed 
only  as  a  consequence  of  annexation,  j  To  suppose  after  the 
United  States  and  Mexico  had  so  long  and  beautifully  illus- 
trated the  scene  on  Keats's  Greek  vase  —  we  forever  pursuing 
and  she  forever  eluding  us  —  that  we  should  hand  over  to  her 
a  large  sum  without  first  ascertaining  and  subtracting  the  just 
value  of  our  claims,  would  have  been  ridiculous.  Moreover 
our  claims  counted  prominently  among  the  "differences" 
existing  between  the  two  governments,  and  without  a  definite 
adjustment  of  them  a  complete  settlement  and  restoration 
of  harmony,  such  as  this  plan  aimed  expressly  to  accomplish, 
was  impossible.19 

At  this  point,  however,  Bankhead 's  agency  ended,  for  another 
superseded  it.  On  October  13,  after  having  gone  over  the  mat- 
ter informally  with  Pena,  Consul  Black  at  the  minister's  request 
wrote  a  confidential  letter  to  him,  in  which  he  quoted  the 
following  language  from  his  instructions :  Ascertain  from  the 
Mexican  government  whether  it  will  receive  "an  envoy  from 


SLIDELL'S  MISSION  UNDERSTOOD  BY  MEXICO      93 

the  United  States,  intrusted  with  full  power  to  adjust  all  the 
questions  in  dispute  between  the  two  governments";  if  so, 
he  will  be  "immediately"  despatched.  The  secretary  of 
relations  now,  if  he  had  not  already  done  so,  laid  this  matter 
before  the  President,  and  on  the  fifteenth  he  replied  thus : 
My  government  is  "disposed  to  receive  the  representative 
[comisionado]  of  the  United  States  who  may  come  to  this 
capital  with  full  powers  from  his  government  to  settle  the 
present  dispute  [contienda]  in  a  peaceful,  reasonable  and  honor- 
able manner" ;  but,  in  order  to  eliminate  every  sign  of  coercion, 
the  American  fleet  must  retire  from  Vera  Cruz.  This  proposal 
was  sanctioned  by  the  Mexican  Congress  in  a  secret  session.20 

Now  the  American  proposition  contemplated  "all  the  ques- 
tions in  dispute,"  while  Pena  said  in  reply,  "the  present  dis- 
pute." But  this  was  apparently  an  immaterial  variation  in 
phraseology,  such  as  is  customary  with  men  of  independent 
minds.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  an  axiom  that  a  whole  includes 
all  of  its  parts,  and  the  American  claims  were,  as  we  have  just 
observed,  an  essential  feature  of  the  dispute  between  the  two 
countries.  In  the  second  place  we  know  that  Bankhead  so 
understood  the  matter.  In  the  third  place  this  mere  difference 
in  phraseology  certainly  did  not  indicate  with  any  clearness 
a  rejection  of  the  American  proposal  and  the  substitution  of 
an  essentially  different  one,  and,  if  so  intended,  it  involved  an 
ambiguity  for  which  Mexico  was  bound  to  pay  the  penalty. 
Fourthly,  Black's  note  was  the  sequel  to  a  confidential  interview 
with  Pena  held  expressly  for  a  free  comparison  of  ideas.  Now 
the  consul  must  have  understood  the  unvarying  refusal  of  the 
United  States  to  recognize  any  Mexican  claim  to  Texas,  and 
therefore  he  could  see  that  no  envoy  would  be  appointed  by 
us  to  treat  directly  and  exclusively  regarding  the  annexation 
of  that  republic.  His  instructions,  moreover,  were  perfectly 
distinct;  and  his  understanding  of  these  matters  would  have 
been  corrected,  had  correction  been  required,  by  Parrott, 
with  whom  he  was  ordered  to  confer.  If,  then,  it  had  appeared 
in  his  preliminary  conversation  with  Pena  that  Mexico  insisted 
upon  rejecting  the  American  overture  and  substituting  an 
essentially  different  and  essentially  unacceptable  proposition, 
he  would  have  stopped  at  that  point,  and  reported  in  substance 
that  Polk's  offer  was  declined.     There  would  have  been  no 


94  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

occasion  to  address  the  note  of  October  13  to  Pefia.     In  other 

words  the  American  offer  was  understood,  and  it  was  fairly 

and  squarely  met.  ^Herrera's  government  desired  earnestly, 

I  as  Pena  showed  Bankhead,  to  bring  about  such  a  complete 

t  settlement  as _  Polk  had  in  mind,  and  to  that  end  it  accepted 

\  our  overture.21  } 

But  there  is  another  point  worthy  of  notice.  The  word 
comisionado  used  by  Pena  —  the  past  participle,  employed 
here  as  a  noun,  of  the  verb  "to  commission"  —  has  usually 
been  translated  "commissioner,"  and  hence  it  has  often  been 
urged  by  American  writers,  that  he  did  not  agree  to  receive 
a  minister.  But  by  good  fortune  we  have  a  definition  of  that 
word  from  a  Mexican  secretary  of  relations.  "  A  comisionado, " 
wrote  Bocanegra,  "is  a  person  charged  by  any  community, 
or  private  citizen  to  conduct  any  business, "  and  this  definition 
obviously  included  ministers.  On  comparing  the  documents 
we  find  minister,  envoy,  plenipotentiary  and  comisionado  used 
as  equivalents;  and  Pena  called  Slidell  a  comisionado  after 
learning  that  he  came  as  a  resident  minister.  Besides,  the 
title  signified  nothing  substantial,  for  the  parties  agreed  that 
our  agent  should  have  full  powers  to  discuss  the  whole  business 
in  hand,  and  so  it  follows  again  that,  for  the  purpose  of  settling 
all  the  points  of  difference  existing  between  the  two  nations, 
Mexico  agreed  to  receive  an  American  minister.  November 
6  Polk  heard  as  much  through  Commodore  Conner,  then  off 
Vera  Cruz;  and  three  days  later  Parrott  arrived  with  Pena's 
autograph  note,  which  was  similarly  understood  at  the  White 
House.22 

/For  good  reasons  the  President  felt  that  no  time  could  be 
wasted.  It  was  a  critical  juncture.  The  controversy  with 
England  over  the  possession  of  Oregon  had  reached  an  acute 
stage}  and  our  minister  at  London  expressed  the  opinion  that 
she  Was  trying  to  make  use  of  Mexico  in  connection  with  it. 
Our  relations  with  Mexico  had  dragged  long  enough.  If  it 
is  intended  to  do  anything,  a  New  York  merchant  had  written 
some  time  since  to  the  secretary  of  the  navy,  "no  time  should 
be  lost  in  sending  a  person  to  Mexico,  as  you  can  scarcely 
conceive  the  feverish  excitement  in  our  mercantile  community," 
due  to  the  dread  of  privateers.  (fa[errera's  pacific  administration 
was  tottering;   and  our  consul  at  Vera  Cruz  warned  the  state 


*> 


SLIDELL'S  INSTRUCTIONS  95 

department  to  act  promptly,  since  it  might  go  down  at  any 
time.  Paredes,  the  monarchist,  was  known  to  be  plotting  a 
revolution;  and  the  London  Times,  then  a  journal  of  great 
importance,  had  pronounced  emphatically  for  a  Spanish  throne 
in  Mexico  as  a  bulwark  against  the  United  States,  and  had  said 
that  it  believed  no  European  power  would  object.  We  had 
promised  through  Black  that  a  minister  would  be  despatched 
"immediately,"  if  he  would  be  received;  and  Pena  not  only 
had  made  no  objection  to  this,  but  had  shown  impatience  for 
his  arrival.  In  anticipation  of  satisfactory  news  from  our 
consul,  Slidell  had  been  ordered  to  Pensacola,  and  instructions 
for  him  drafted.  By  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening  Qf  November 
10  these  were  ready ;  Polk  signed  his  commission  h  and  Lieu- 
tenant Lanier  of  the  navy  set  out  at  once  for  Pensacola  with 
the  documents.23 

f  "To  counteract  the  influence  of  foreign  Powers,  exerted 
against  the  United  States  in  Mexico,  and  to  restore  those 
ancient  relations  of  peace  and  good  will  which  formerly  existed 
between  the  Governments  and  the  citizens  of  the  sister  Repub- 
lics, will  be  the  principal  objects  of  your  mission, "  read  Slidell's 
instructions;  take  up  the  subject  of  our  claims  "in  a  prudent 
and  friendly  spirit,"  and  arrange  through  an  adjustment  of 
the  Texas  boundary  to  cast  upon  the  United  States  the  burden 
of  paying  them;  "exert  all  your  energies"  to  prevent  the 
cession  of  California  to  England  or  France  if  it  be  contemplated, 
and,  if  you  can  do  so  without  endangering  the  restoration  of 
amicable  relations  with  Mexico  and  the  adjustment  of  the 
Texas  boundary,  endeavor  to  purchase  at  least  the  northern 
part  of  California,  including  San  Francisco  Bay,  but  at  all 
events  conciliate  the  good-will  of  the  Mexicans,  even  should 
their  vanity  and  resentment  prove  trying.  Fully  in  sympathy 
with  Buchanan's  instructions,  the  minister  proceded  to  Vera 
Cruz  as  quickly  as  possible  on  a  vessel  of  war,  landed  there  by 
November  30,  and,  noting  that  his  way  had  already  been  paved 
by  the  retirement  of  our  fleet,  set  out  at  once  for  the  capital.24 

Unfortunately,  though  as  prompt  as  possible,  Polk  had  not 
been  prompt  enough.  Herrera's  administration,  as  we  have 
learned,  had  now  sunk  to  the  lowestooint  in  courage,  efficiency, 
prestige  and  sense  of  responsibility,  j  Every  morning  it  looked 
for  a  revolution,  and  every  nighk^or  a  mutiny.     Its  one  idea 


96  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

was  to  hold  on  until  the  assembling  of  Congress  on  the  first  of 
January,  in  the  hope  that  something  favorable  might  then 
occur ;  and  it  found  this  last  resource  threatened  by  its  reason- 
able and  pacific  policy  in  regard  to  the  United  States.  Earlier 
in  the  year  it  had  been  denounced  for  agreeing  to  recognize 
Texas  on  the  condition  of  her  abandoning  all  thoughts  of  joining 
the  American  Union,  and  now  it  was  menaced  for  listening 
to  Black  and  Buchanan.  A  call  for  war  in  the  name  of  honor, 
territory  and  independence  appeared  to  be  a  serviceable  ori- 
flamme  for  its  political  enemies/  Fierce,  unsparing  cries  of 
treason,  ignominy  and  national  ruin  therefore  assailed  Herrera; 
and  under  these  onslaughts  the  weak,  timid,  irresolute  adminis- 
tration lost  heart.25 
/"  On  December  3  Pena  saw  Black  at  the  palace  and  exclaimed, 
'We  hear  an  envoy  has  arrived  from  the  United  States ;  who 
can  he  be,  and  what  has  he  come  for  ?  The  consul  replied  that 
he  supposed  he  must  be  the  envoy  that  Mexico  had  agreed  to 
receive.  This  ought  not  to  be,  answered  Pena  hastily;  no 
envoy  was  expected  before  January;  we  are  not  prepared  to 
receive  him;  the  government  desires  he  should  not  come  to 
the  capital  or  even  disembark;  "you  know  the  opposition  are 
calling  us  traitors,  for  entering  into  this  arrangement  with 
you;"  his  coming  now  might  produce  a  fatal  revolution. 
This  interview  showed  that  before  anything  was  known  regard- 
ing Slidell's  quality,  credentials  or  instructions,  and  purely  on 
account  of  domestic -politics,  the  government  was  anxious 
to  break  its  agreement.  So  Pena  admitted  later,  for  he  privately 
sent  word  to  Slidell  that  under  the  circumstances  it  feared  to 
compromise  itself,  and  would  have  acted  otherwise  had  it  been 
free.  So  the  matter  was  understood  by  Bankhead ;  and  so  it 
has  been  understood  by  fair-minded  Mexican  historians.  It 
only  remained  to  contrive  a  method  of  evasion.26 

The  method  adopted  was  to  ask  the  council  of  state  —  a 
quite  unnecessary  proceeding  —  whether  it  would  be  proper 
to  receive  Slidell.  In  so  doing  Pena  expressed  a  decided 
opinion  in  the  negative,  advancing,  besides  arguments  of  no 
moment,  the  more  serious  objection  that  receiving  a  resident 
minister  would  imply  the  existence  of  friendly^  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  and  would  thus  condone  the  annexa- 
tion of  Texas.     Even  this  argument,  however,  possessed  no  real 


SLIDELL  REJECTED  97 

value,  for,  as  Pefia  recognized,  Slidell  was  explicitly  com- 
missioned to  "  restore "  friendly  relations,  which  indicated 
that  such  relations  could  not  exist  until  after  he  should  be 
received  and  after  he  should  act;  and,  besides,  Mexico  could 
have  received  him  with  a  declaration  of  reserve,  safeguarding 
all  her  claims.  Moreover  this  was  evidently  a  point,  if  of 
any  importance,  which  the  secretary  should  have  considered 
before  making  the  agreement.27 

To  avoid  this  last  difficulty,  he  alleged  in  his  desperation 
that  Black  had  proposed,  and  he  accepted,  the  plan  of  sending 
merely  an  envoy  ad  hoc,  a  special  envoy  commissioned  to  settle 
with  Mexico  for  the  annexation  of  Texas.  His  assertion, 
however,  is  disproved  by  the  circumstances  and  correspondence 
leading  to  Slidell's  appointment;  and  a  simple  argument 
reinforces  the  facts.  For  the  United  States  to  offer  amends 
for  annexation  woulcNiave  been  to  deny  its  repeated  protesta- 
tions that  annexation  was  perfectly  proper;  would  have  been 
to  brand  upon  its  own  forehead  the  heinous  charges  drawn  in 
vitriol  by  Rejon.  Pena  could  see  that  no  country  possessing 
the  eyesight  of  a  mole  and  the  courage  of  a  mouse  would  so 
degrade  itself.  He  knew,  October  11,  that  on  such  a  demand 
the  negotiations  would  end  before  beginning;  would  end  at 
once  in  his  study  with  Black's  bidding  him  a  respectful  good- 
night; and  since  Herrera  desired  the  negotiations,  he  could 
not  make  such  a  proposition.28 

Moreover  the  council  of  state,  which  was  a  permanent  body 
of  notables,  brushed  aside  this  contention  of  Pena's,  and  fell 
back  "on  the  very  nature  of  the  affair  and  on  the  state  of  our 
relations  (en  la  natureleza  misma  del  negocio  y  en  el  estado  de 
nuestras  relaciones) ."  Assuming  plainly  that  the  United 
States  desired  to  avoid  war  and  restore  friendly  diplomatic 
and  commercial  intercourse,  it  declared  that  we  had  set  a 
trap  [lazo]  for  Mexico,  and  undertaken  to  introduce  a  regular 
minister  under  false  pretences,  as  it  were,  in  order  to  compel 
her  to  be  amicable  against  her  will.  In  furtherance  of  this 
design  the  promise  of  the  Mexican  administration  cannot  be 
urged,  it  protested,  for  the  intention  must  have  been  merely 
to  let  the  Texas  affair  be  settled,  as  a  preliminary  to  the  restora- 
tion of  cordial  relations,  and  it  would  be  an  "unexampled 
humiliation"  were  Mexico  to  receive  a  regular  American 
vol.  i — H 


v 


98  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

minister  before  bein#-.satisfied  for  the  outrage  and  injury 
inflicted  upon  her.  (  In  other  words,  Mexico  had  promised 
to  receive  Slidell,  buVit  did  not  comport  with  her  interest  and 
her  dignity  to  fulfil  the  agreement.  This  decision  ensured  his 
rejection.  December  20  he  was  officially  notified  of  it,  and  in 
reply  he  wrote  what  seemed  to  him  a  spiritless  note,  explaining 
to  Buchanan  that  under  his  instructions  he  did  not  wish  to 
make  war  inevitable  by  closing  the  door  finally  to  negotiations. 
This  done,  he  withdre^  as  soon  as  an  escort  could  be  obtained 
to  the  city  of  Jalapa,  situated  not  far  from  the  coast  on  the 
Vera  Cruz  road,  to  await  instructions.29 

Daniel  Webster,  a  lawyer  of  no  mean  abilities,  formerly  our 
secretary  of  state,  and  at  the  time  when  he  spoke  a  resolute 
opponent  of  Polk,  said,  after  mature  consideration  of  the  matter, 
that  Mexico  was  "highly  unjustifiable"  in  thus  refusing  to 
hear  our  minister ;  and  the  demand  upon  this  nation  to  repudi- 
ate its  protestations  of  honesty,  and  become  the  football  of 
Mexican  party  politics,  did  seem  a  bit  unreasonable.  As  for 
Polk,  it  was  hard  indeed  to  be  charged  with  ruining  by  his 
awkward  statesmanship  the  pacific  administration  of  Herrera, 
when  in  fact  the  inherent  weakness  of  that  administration 
ruined  his  own  hopes,  and  to  be  denounced  in  the  United 
States  for  trying  to  force  war  upon  Mexico,  when  the  Mexicans 
denounced  him  for  trying  to  force  peace  upon  them.30 

But  Herrera's  amiable  inefficiency  was  near -its  doom.  The 
aristocratic  elements  —  Church,  army  and  monarchists  —  drew 
together,  and  this  action  forced  the  Santannistas  and  the 
Federalists  to  overlook  their  own  differences.  Paredes,  natural 
leader  of  the  former  combination,  hated  and  feared  the  latter, 
for  Santa  Anna  had  worsted  him  in  more  than  one  clash, 
and  the  Federalists  aimed  not  only  to  reform  the  Church 
and  support  republican  institutions,  but  also  to  destroy  the 
military  order  by  establishing  an  effective  militia  system. 
Professing  allegiance  to  the  administration  and  extorting 
from  its  hopes  and  fears  of  him  all  the  money  that  could  be 
obtained,  he  disobeyed  the  orders  to  divide  his  army  or  march 
to  the  Texas  frontier;  and  about  the  middle  of  December, 
seeing  that  the  Federalists  were  likely  to  control  the  new 
Congress,  he  revolted.  The  relations  of  Mexico  to  the  United 
States  afforded  a  battle-cry  helpful  to  the  army  and  hurtful 


HERRERA  OVERTHROWN  BY  PAREDES      99 

to  Herrera's  administration;  and  hence  the  President  was 
accused  of  "seeking  to  avoid  a  necessary  and  glorious  war" 
and  of  stooping  to  negotiate  "  the  ingnominious  loss  of  national 
integrity"  with  an  American  envoy.31 

Herrera  fulminated  against  the  traitorous  general  who  was 
attacking  his  own  country.  Both  houses  of  Congress  ful- 
minated. The  city  of  Mexico  and  every  department  fulmi- 
nated. But  all  this  was  merely  eloquence.  The  officer 
despatched  to  require  the  immediate  surrender  of  Paredes 
accepted  a  seat  in  his  carriage.  Most  of  the  commanders 
appointed  to  defend  the  capital  took  their  stations  under 
pledges  to  the  enemy.  December  29,  when  Paredes  arrived 
within  about  a  dozen  miles  of  Mexico,  the  garrison  of  the 
citadel,  instigated  by  their  chief  officer,  General  Valencia, 
rose ;  nearly  all  the  rest  of  the  forces  at  the  capital  soon  fol- 
lowed that  example;  and  Herrera,  giving  up  the  Presidency 
without  firing  a  gun,  left  the  palace  with  the  entire  body  of 
his  loyal  officers  and  officials,  his  mild  face  and  his  respectable 
side-whiskers  —  in  one  hired  cab.31 

The  only  danger  of  the  revolutionary  cause  had  been  from 
treachery.  Tornel  and  many  of  the  officers  were  at  work  for 
Santa  Anna,  and  Valencia,  whom  nobody  would  trust,  was  at 
work  for  himself.  Paredes,  resembling  the  one-eyed  man 
among  the  blind,  had  a  certain  reputation  for  honesty;  and 
these  plotters,  misled  by  his  reiterated  declarations  that  he 
would  accept  no  office  in  the  new  government,  thought  him 
simple  enough  to  be  used  and  then  thrown  over.  Valencia 
in  particular,  who  was  president  of  the  council  of  state  and 
therefore  legally  the  successor  of  Herrera,  felt  already  trium- 
phant, put  on  regal  style,  and  helped  himself  liberally  to  the 
public  funds.  But  he  and  Tornel  had  enabled  Paredes  to  make 
himself  independent  of  them,  and  now  found  themselves 
dealing  with  a  master  instead  of  a  dupe.  The  troops  at 
Mexico  sided  with  the  majority  of  the  army,  and  Paredes 
notified  Valencia  that  he  would  shoot  every  one  opposing 
him  —  "archbishop,  general,  magistrate,  or  anybody  else." 
Then  with  military  pomp,  accompanied  by  officials  whose  sig- 
natures adorned  the  placards  denouncing  him,  he  took  possession 
of  Mexico,  while  the  public,  long  since  weary  of  the  incidental 
music  of  revolutionary  professions,  looked  on  in  silence.31 


100  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

The  classical  farce  of  an  electoral  junta  appointed  by  the 
victorious  general  was  now  enacted,  and  Paredes  became 
temporary  President.  Apparently,  however,  he  intended  to 
use  this  ill-gotten  power  with  integrity  and  force.  He  drew 
no  salary  except  that  of  a  general,  avoided  all  display,  and 
surrounded  himself  with  men  of  the  better  class;  and  when 
a  broker,  who  had  fattened  on  corrupt  dealings  with  the  govern- 
ment, offered  him  a  loan,  he  replied  with  blazing  eyes,  "I  do 
not  wish  money,  but  I  wish  to  prosecute  the  robbers  of  the 
Treasury."  With  equal  firmness  he  took  his  promised  attitude 
of  hostility  toward  the  United  States.  On  the  fourth  of  Janu- 
ary he  swore  publicly  to  defend  the  integrity  of  the  national 
territory ;  and  this  had  reference  to  Texas  —  every  foot  of 
Texas  to  the  Sabine  —  for  such  was  the  unqualified  claim  of 
Mexico.31 

With  a  government  based  upon  a  pledge  of  war  against  us 
and  swearing  to  carry  out  that  pledge,  it  seemed  as  if  the 
United  States  could  have  no  amicable  dealings;  but  our 
authorities  were  now  accustomed  to  forbear,  and  all  the  reasons 
for  desiring  a  restoration  of  diplomatic  intercourse  were  still 
in  force.  Indeed,  one  of  them  had  become  pressingly  urgent, 
for  the  European  monarchical  scheme  appeared  now  to  be 
unmistakable.  Remain  in  Mexico,  Buchanan  therefore  in- 
structed Slidell,  so  as  to  take  advantage  of  any  opening  for 
negotiations)  if  you  deem  it  wise  to  do  so,  let  Paredes  know 
that  his  financial  straits  can  be  relieved  by  arranging  matters 
with  us;  present  another  formal  request  for  a  hearing,  and 
make  "every  honorable  effort"  in  your  power  to  avoid  a 
rupture.32 

Accordingly,  on  the  first  day  of  March,  1846,  our  minister 
addressed  a  letter  to  Castillo,  the  new  minister  of  relations, 
summarizing  the  negotiations  with  Peiia,  placing  clearly  in 
view  the  alternatives  of  diplomacy  or  war  as  they  had  now 
been  defined,  and  asking  to  be  received.  Again  the  council 
of  state  was  consulted,  and  again  this  oracle  pronounced  for 
rejection.  Castillo  then  tried  to  frame  a  reply  to  Slidell; 
but  his  note,  drafted  in  opposition  to  his  own  ideas,  proved  so 
weak  and  halting  that  he  laid  it  before  the  Spanish  minister. 
In  the  view  of  this  diplomat  the  best  solution  of  the  imbroglio 
seemed  to  be  European  arbitration,  and  therefore  he  probably 


SLIDELL  MAKES  ANOTHER  EFFORT  101 

thought  it  well  to  show  the  United  States  that  we  could  reach 
no  understanding  with  Mexico  ourselves.  (Jit  was  also  desirable 
to  rally  the  nation  round  Paredes  by  assuming  a  bold,  aggressive 
tone.  And  a  fiery,  offensive  note,  suited  to  these  conditions, 
rejected  the  second  American  overture.33 

Here  stands  an  American  minister,  answered  Slidell,  "  clothed 
with  full  power  to  settle  all  the  questions  in  dispute  between 
the  two  nations."    Begone,  said  Mexico  once  more.34 


t 


X 


THE  MEXICAN  ATTITUDE  ON  THE  EVE  OF   WAfc 

In  tracing  the  mutual  relations  of  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  we  have  often  had  occasion  to  note  how  each  nation 
felt  about  the  other  and  about  a  possible  conflict;  but  it  is 
very  desirable  now  to  understand  as  completely  as  possible 
what  those  feelings  were  at  about  the  beginning  of  1846,  and 
this  will  require  the  consideration  of  many  additional  facts. 

Already  there  were  influential  and  wealthy  Mexicans, 
particularly  in  tbpjnnrfch,  whn  wished  or  half-wished  that  the 
':Psite3~S:tates  would  subjugate  their  country,  so  that  order 
"anoTprosperity  might  comej.  and  others  reflected  that  at  least 
7mr~a~ssistance  might  beaesired,  should  Paredes  undertake  to 
set  up  a  European  monarchy.  But  these  were  selfish  calcu- 
lations. They  seldom  implied  good- will.  Friends  we  have 
none  at  the  capital,  Slidell  reported ;  and  our  consul  at  the 
northern  city  of  Tampico,  even  though  but  a  faint  loyalty  to 
the  central  government  prevailed  in  that  section,  wrote  in 
September,  1845:  "The  most  stubborn  and  malignant  feeling 
seems  to  exist  in  the  mind  of  every  Mexican  against  the  United 
States."  1 

\  The  principal  cause  of  this  feeling  —  the  supposed  misconduct 
of  our  government  in  the  settlement,  revolution  and  successful 
resistance  of  Texas,  and  in  the  recognition^  and  annexation  of 
that  republic  ---rtes~ already  been  explained )  but  other  strong 
reasons  cooperated.  All  understood  that  intense  dissatis- 
faction existed  in  the  northern  departments.  Now  that  our 
frontier  had  been  advanced  so  far  south,  further  peaceful 
aggression  seemed  easy;  and  it  was  believed  that  we  intended 
to  pursue  the  Texas  method  progressively,  until  all  of  Mexico 
should  little  by  little  become  ours.  "This  first  invasion  is 
the  threat  of  many  more,"  said  the  official  journal.  It  was 
alleged  that  we,  fearing  the  competition  of  that  country  in  the 

102 


WHY  MEXICO  DISLIKED  THE  UNITED  STATES     103 

markets  of  the  world,  did  all  we  could  to  hinder  its  agricultural^ 
industrial  and  commercial  development,  and  excited  th6( 
revolutions  that  paralyzed  it;  and  it  was  even  believed  that 
we  incited  the  Indians  to  ravage  the  northern  frontiers,  and  so/ 
create  discontent  against  the  central  government  The  privi-\ 
leged  classes  dreaded  the  influence  of  our  democratic  ideas. 
The  clergy  were  afraid  that  Protestantism,  or  at  least  free 
thought,  might  cross  the  border,  and  that  so  far  as  Mexican  f 
territory  should  fall  under  our  sway,  secular  education,  the 
confiscation  of  their  property,  and  the  other  anti-clerical  plans 
of  the  Federalists,  who  appeared  to  draw  their  inspiration  and 
their  arguments  largely  from  this  country,  might  be  put  into 
force.)  The  numerous  misunderstandings  and  clashes  with 
the  JJnited  States  that  we  have  noted  had  produced  an  enduring 
resentment,  and  in  particular  our  claims  and  our  efforts  to 
have  them  settled  were  commonly  deemed  artificial  and  unjust.1 

Behind  all  these  facts  lay  the  general  anti-foreign  prejudice ;  - 
and  this,  we  should  now  observe,  was  in  our  case  more  than  a 
prejudice.  Even  in  the  eyes  of  the  intelligent  El  Siglo  XIX, 
an  American  was  "  a  being  detestable  to  the  nation  on  account 
of  the  little  accord  between  [him  and]  the  religion,  the  language, 
and  the  gentle,  affable,  frank,  and  generous  character  of  the 
Mexican."  Our  directness  of  thought,  speech  and  action,  and 
the  brusqueness  of  manner  that  naturally  accompanied  it 
appeared  inconsiderate  and  haughty ;  and  no  doubt,  in  dealing 
with  people  who  seemed  to  us  deceitful,  unreliable  and  un- 
friendly, our  citizens  often  emphasized  these  characteristics.  j 
\In  habits  and  customs  there  was  indeed  a  profound  unlikeness,  ^y 
and  below  this  lay  a  still  more  profound  racial  antagonism/) -  v 
Finally  the  politicians  of  all  parties,  fearing  to  be  outdone  in 
the  display  of  patriotism,  encouraged  the  anti- American  feeling. 
The  sharp  and  rancorous  Tornel  used  every  opportunity  to 
speak  against  us;  and  Santa  Anna,  whose  prestige  was  im- 
mense —  it  must  not  be  forgotten  —  as  late  as  1844,  both 
fearing  the  influence  of  our  freedom  and  wishing  his  fellow- 
citizens  to  consider  him  essential,  represented  the  United 
States  as  a  Minotaur  eager  to  devour  them.  Few  were  en- 
lightened enough  to  correct  the  misconceptions  regarding  us; 
no  one  had  the  power,  courage  or  wish  to  do  so;  and  in  the 
end,  very  naturally,  these  dominated  the  public  mind  —  or, 


104  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

to  be  more  precise,  created  and  kept  alive  a  general  impression. 
Americans  "scarcely  have  the  look  of  men/'  it  was  gravely 
asserted.1 

(In  regard  to  an  immediate  conflict  in  arms  with  us,  Mexico 
by  no  means  felt  like  the  dove  threatened  by  a  hawk,  as  people 
in  this  country  have  generally  supposed.  To  be  sure,  the 
national  existence  was  often  said  to  be  in  danger,  but  such 
talk  was  largely  for  effect.  Castillo  asserted  that  Slidell  had 
been  sent  in  order  to  obtain  a  pretext  for  war ;  but  this  was  in 
all  probability  a  bid  for  Mexican  and  European  support,  since 
he  knew  that  we  already  had  grounds  enough,  and  the  council 
of  state  evidently  believed  we  did  not  seek  a  conflict.  Paredes 
whispered  to  the  British  minister  at  a  banquet,  "I  hope  your 
government  does  not  mean  to  let  us^be  eaten  up;"  but  this 
was  a  plea  for  English  assistance.^  As  we  have  just  said,  not 
American  arms  but  American  settlers  were  the  chief  danger, 
in  the  opinion  of  Mexico.  The  very  men  who  clamored  that 
the  national  existence  was  threatened  by  the  United  States 
were  the  ones  who  called  most  loudly  for  war.  A  circular  to 
the  local  authorities  issued  by  the  central  government  in 
December,  1845,  invited  attention  to  the  prevailing  opinion 
that  armed  resistance  could  prevent  further  usurpations  like 
that  of  Texas ;  and  another  such  paper,  issued  in  November  of 
the  following  year,  dwelt  strongly  upon  this  point.  From 
military  force  also  there  was  danger,  to  be  sure.  Our  supe- 
riority in  numbers  and  resources  was  admitted.  But  there 
were  many  offsets  to  that  superiority,  and  the  Mexicans  closely 
studied  and  shrewdly  counted  upon  them.2 

Let  us  review  those  offsets.  In  the  first  place,  while  the 
government  of  the  United  States  deemed  its  course  honorable 
and  considerate,  in  the  eyes  of  many,  if  not  all,  Mexicans  we 
had  been  abject  as  well  as  knavish,  stealing  her  territory  and 
then  trying  to  buy  off  her  anger,  submitting  to  be  gulled, 
flouted  and  lashed,  and  each  time  going  back  for  more  of  the 
same  treatment ;  and  it  seemed  hardly  possible  that  we  should 
suddenly  adopt  a  bold,  positive,  unflinching  course.  It  was 
even  believed  that  we  dreaded  to  enter  the  lists.  Almonte, 
for  example,  in  reporting  that  his  protest  against  annexation 
had  caused  a  heavy  fall  on  the  stock  exchange,  observed,  "  The 
fears  of  a  war  with  Mexico  are  great;"   and  it  was  notorious 


THE  UNITED  STATES  DEEMED  FEEBLE  105 

that  his  departure  from  the  United  States  created  almost  a 
panic  in  our  money  market.3 
Q)  ( Besides,  it  was  assumed  that  party  feeling  would  go  to  about 
the  same  lengths  here  as  in  Mexico,  and  that  our  differences 
over  the  slavery  question  and  the  tariff  would  probably  make 
it  impossible  for  us  to  eonxhict  a  war  vigorously — perhaps 
impossible  to  wage  it  at  all. J  "The  northern  states,  I  again 
repeat  to  you,  will  not  aicPtnose  of  the  south  in  case  of  war 
with  Mexico,"  wrote  Almonte  while  minister  at  Washington 
in  June,  1844.  European  journals  like  Le  Constitutionnel  of 
Paris  confirmed  this  opinion ; 4  <  and  the  London  Times  remarked, 
It  would  be  a  war,  not  of  the  United  States,  but  of  a  party 
that  has  only  a  bare  majority,  and  "odious"  to  a  "large  and 
enlightened  minority  in  the  best  States."  Moreover,  argued 
the  official  journal  of  Mexico,  the  injustice  of  the  war  would 
of  itself  excite  American  opposition.5 
5/  (^From  a  militarx_as  well  as  a  political  point  of  view  this 
country  seemed  feeble.  Our  regular  army  was  understood 
to  be  numerically  insignificant  and  fully  occupied  with  frontier 
and  garrison  duties;  our  artillery  appeared  weak  in  quality 
as  well  as  in  numbers ;  and  our  cavalry  was  deemed  little  more 
than  a  cipher.  As  for  volunteers,  our  citizen-soldiers  were 
represented  in  Mexico  not  merely  as  unwarlike,  but  as  "  totally 
unfit  to  operate  beyond  their  frontiers."  Indeed,  as  competent 
a  judge  as  Captain  Elliot,  British  minister  in  Texas — who 
knew  the  United  States  well,  and  in  the  spring  of  1845  was  in 
close  touch  with  Mexican  leaders  at  their  capital  —  said  that 
the  greater  their  number,  the  greater  would  be  the  difficulty 
of  invading  Mexico.  "They  could  not  resist  artillery  and 
cavalry  in  a  Country  suited  to  those  arms, "  he  believed ;  "  they 
are  not  amenable  to  discipline,  they  plunder  the  peasantry, 
they  are  without  steadiness  under  reverses,  they  cannot  march 
on  foot."  Nor  did  there  exist  in  this  country,  added  Elliot, 
either  aptitude  or  adequate  means  for  a  regular  military  in- 
vasion.6 

"America,  as  an  aggressive  power  is  one  of  the  weakest  in 
the  world  ...  fit  for  nothing  but  to  fight  Indians,"  declared 
Britannia,  an  important  English  weekly;  and  apparently  the 
war  of  1812,  to  which  the  Mexicans  referred  with  peculiar 
satisfaction,  had  proved  even  more  than  this.     The  military 


) 


A 


106  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO, 

operations  in  a  war  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States 
would  be  "contemptible  and  indecisive,"  said  the  London 
Times.  /k$>  for  our  navy,  it  was  undoubtedly  small;  the 
Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans  reported  that  it  lacked  the 
discipline  commonly  attributed  to  it;  and,  however  efficient 
it  might  really  be,  Mexico  had  no  commerce  to  attack.7 

The  Mexicans,  on  the  other  hand,  were  deemed  by  many 
observers  decidedly  formidable.  "There  are  no  better  troops 
in  the  world,  nor  better  drilled  and  armed,  than  the  Mexicans," 
asserted  Calderon  de  la  Barca,  the  Spanish  minister  at  Wash- 
ington; and  some  of  the  generals  were  thought,  even  by 
foreigners,  equal  to  the  most  renowned  in  Europe.  The  Ameri- 
cans would  be  at  a  vast  disadvantage,  was  Captain  Elliot's 
opinion,  "in  rapidity  of  movement"  and  ability  to  endure 
"continued  fatigue  on  the  hardest  food."  The  soldiers  of  the 
tri-color  "are  superior  to  those  of  the  United  States,"  declared 
the  Mexico  correspondent  of  the  London  Times  flatly  in 
1845.8 

If  the  military  power  of  Mexico  was  rated  in  this  way  by 
outside  observers  of  such  competence,  one  can  imagine  how 
it  was  rated  at  home ^f The  Mexicans  regarded  themselves  as 
martial  by  instinct,  and  viewed  their  troops,  inured  to  war  by 
an  almost  unceasing  course  of  revolutions,  as  remarkably  good. 
Santa  Anna  once  boasted  that,  if  necessary,  he  would  plant  his 
flag  upon  the  capitol  at  Washington;  and  the  results  of  the 
wars  with  Spain  and  France  had  tended  powerfully  to  encourage 
the  self-confidence  of  his  fellow-citizens.  "We  have  numerous 
and  veteran  forces  burning  with  a  desire  to  gain  immortal 
renown,"  said  the  Boletin  Oficial  of  San  Luis  Potosi.  "Not 
to  speak  of  our  approved  infantry, "  it  was  argued,  "  our  artillery 
is  excellent,  and  our  cavalry  so  superior  in  men  and  horses  that 
it  would  be  an  injustice  not  to  recognize  the  fact;"  besides 
which  "our  army  can  be  rapidly  augmented."  Indeed  an 
officer  of  reputation  told  Waddy  Thompson  that  the  cavalry 
could  break  infantry  squares  with  the  lasso.  In  November, 
1845,  the  Mexican  minister  of  war  solemnly  predicted  that  his 
countrymen  would  gain  the  victory,  even  if ,  one  third  less 
numerous  than  their  American  adversaries.  /  To  clinch  this 
matter,  the  feeling  of  superior  power,  which  itWas  known  that 
we  entertained,  was  regarded  as  an  ignorant  over-confidence 


MEXICAN  CALCULATIONS  OF  THE  CHANCES     107 

that  would  ensure  our  defeat.  In  short,  "We  have  more  than 
enough  strength  to  make  war,"  cried  the  editors  of  La  Voz  del 
Pueblo;  "Let  us  make  it,  then,  and  victory  will  perch  upon 
our  banners."  9 

The  clash,  it  seemed  probable,  would  come  first  in  Texas, 
far  from  our  centres  of  strength.  On  that  field  Tornel,  the 
keenest  public  man  in  the  country,  insisted  that  Mexico  could 
triumph  over  any  force  we  could  bring  to  bear,  and  Almonte 
offered  some  reasons  for  entertaining  such  an  opinion.  The 
Texan  troops,  he  said,  would  exhaust  their  supplies  before  the 
campaign  would  really  begin;  and  consequently,  since  there 
would  be  no  way  to  subsist  a  large  American  force  in  that 
extensive,  poor  and  sparsely  settled  region,  the  greater  the 
number  coming,  the  greater  would  be  their  sufferings.  Even 
the  cultivated  districts,  wrote  Elliot,  could  support  only  a 
trifling  addition,  if  any,  to  the  resident  population.  Moreover, 
even  should  an  American  army  be  able  to  exist  there,  a  few  light 
troops  placed  along  the  frontier  would  keep  it  busy  on  the 
defensive,  said  Pakenham;  while  it  was  urged  by  Mexicans 
that,  should  our  line  break,  their  invading  host  would  soon 
find  itself  among  the  opulent  cities  of  the  southern  states, 
where  perhaps  it  could  not  only  exact  money,  but  free  two 
million  slaves,  obtain  their  grateful  and  enthusiastic  assistance, 
enroll  the  Indians  of  the  southwest,  who  detested  the  United 
States,  and  draw  aid  as  well  as  encouragement  from  the  abo- 
litionists of  the  north.  Almonte  himself  assured  his  govern- 
ment that  the  blacks,  the  savages  and  the  anti-slavery  extrem- 
ists could  be  reckoned  on.10 

Possibly,  of  course,  their' line  instead  of  ours  might  be  the  one 
to  give  way ;  but  in  that  case  the  Americans,  instead  of  meeting 
with  conditions  like  these,  would  be  confronted  by  immense 
distances,  great  deserts,  furious  rains,  long  droughts,  and 
barren,  easily  defended  mountains.  "If  the  war  should  be 
protracted  and  carried  beyond  the  Rio  Grande,"  said  Captain 
Elliot,  "I  believe  that  it  would  require  very  little  skill  and 
scarcely  any  exposure  of  the  defending  force  to  draw  the  in- 
vading columns  well  forward  beyond  all  means  of  support 
from  their  own  bases  and  depots  into  situations  of  almost 
inextricable  difficulty;"  and  a  correspondent  of  Calhoun, 
referring  to  such  natural  obstacles,  wrote,   "nothing  is  more 


108  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

certain  than  your  statement  that  [the]  war  will  have  to  become 
defensive  [on  our  part]."  u 

Moreover  it  was  argued,  said  the  Mexican  minister  of 
relations  in  1849,  that  the  invaders  would  be  unable  to  obtain 
resources  of  any  description  from  the  country  about  them, 
would  be  masters  of  nothing  but  the  ground  actually  occupied, 
and  would  find  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  themselves,  at 
such  a  distance  from  their  base,  "invincible."  On  the  other 
hand  should  invasion  by  sea  be  attempted,  the  Americans 
would  have  to  struggle  with  tempestuous  waters,  a  coast 
guarded  by  reefs  and  currents,  lowlands  protected  by  "a 
terrible  and  faithful  ally"  —  as  Cuevas  described  the  yellow 
fever,  more  than  one  tremendous  wall  of  mountains,  and  bad 
roads  that  could  easily  be  closed;  and  they  would  find  no 
vital  point  of  attack  within  practicable  reach.  The  United 
States  cannot  hope  to  conquer  Mexico,  was  the^  conclusion  of 
the  London  Morning  Herald,  commonly  regarded  as  a  minis- 
terial organ;  while  the  Paris  Globe,  reputed  to  be  Guizot's 
personal  voice,  went  farther,  and  predicted  that  undertaking 
to  do  it  would  be  "ruinous,  fatal"  to  us.12  ) 

Should  we,  however,  care  to  make  the  attempt,  Mexico  —  it 
was  pointed  out  —  would  not  only  fight  on  the  defensive,  and 
enjoy  all  the  advantages  of  knowing  the  ground,  moving  on 
inside  lines,  and.  using  fortifications,  but  would  also  be  able  to 
strike.  Nothing  would  be  paid  on  our  claims,  either  principal 
or  interest.  There  was  considerable  American  property  in  the 
country;  and  while  the  means  of  her  citizens  were  being  spent 
in  righteous  self-defence,  that  property  could  hardly  expect 
exemption.  Above  all,  one  "terrible  weapon,"  as  the  Mexican 
consul  at  New  Orleans  termed  it,  could  be  wielded  night  and 
day,  near  and  far,  without  expense  and  without  risk.  This 
was  the  issuance  of  commissions  to  privateers,  for  the  "  nefari- 
ous" conduct  of  the  United  States  in  using  this  weapon,  said 
the  London  Times,  authorized  Mexico  to  do  the  same.  The 
pursuit  of  slavers  had  been  so  close  of  late  that  many  fine 
Baltimore  clippers,  able  to  outsail  anything  but  a  steamer 
and  to  go  where  a  steamer  could  not,  were  lying  idle  in  Cuban 
ports,  ready  to  scour  the  Gulf  and  the  Atlantic.13 

No  less  vulnerable  seemed  the  United  States  in  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  where  —  according  to  the  New  York  Herald  —  American 


MEXICAN  CALCULATIONS  OF  THE  CHANCES      109 

property  worth  fifteen  or  twenty  millions  was  afloat.  Should 
letters  of  marque  be  "actively  and  prudently  distributed  on 
the  coasts  of  the  Pacific,"  wrote  consul  Arrangoiz  to  his  govern- 
ment, "the  Americans  would  receive  a  fatal  blow  in  the  cap- 
tures [of  whalers  and  merchantmen]  that  would  immediately 
be  made  in  the  seas  of  Asia,  where  the  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States  are  insignificant  and  could  not  promptly  be  in- 
creased"; and  he  reported  in  July,  1845,  that  owing  to  the 
prospect  of  hostilities  the  insurance  companies  at  New  Orleans 
were  refusing  to  take  war  risks.  Tornel  and  the  other  Mexican 
leaders  counted  heavily  on  the  value  of  this  weapon.  Our 
own  journals  were  full  of  the  subject,  and  could  find  no  remedy. 
(American  commerce  was  defenceless  against  such  an  attack, 
^he  London  Times  cheerfully  admitted.}4 

Under  these  conditions  it  was  most  natural  to  believe  that 
Mexico  could  make  the  war  "obstinate  and  tedious,"  as  the 
London  Standard  said,  and  therefore  extremely  expensive  for 
the  United  States.  She  could  "with  trifling  inconvenience  to 
Herself,"  Pakenham  told  Calhoun,  "impose  upon  this  Country 
the  necessity  of  employing  as  large  a  Naval  and  Military 
force  as  if  the  War  was  with  a  far  more  powerful  enemy." 
Obviously  a  great  number  of  warships  would  be  needed  to 
blockade  seven  hundred  leagues  of  coast  and  patrol  two  oceans, 
and  the  cost  of  soldiers  could  be  figured  thus,  it  was  thought : 
During  the  war  of  independence  in  Mexico  eighty  thousand 
royal  troops  and  sixty  thousand  insurgents  were  supported  by 
that  country ;  its'  population  and  resources  had  since  increased  ; 
the  United  States  would  therefore  have  to  send  probably  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men;  and  the  American  soldier 
was  very  expensive.15 

The  people  of  this  nation  were  looked  upon  as  worshippers 
of  the  dollar,  and  it  was  believed  that  war  taxes  would  not  be 
endured  here  long.  Consequently,  since  the  United  States  had 
no  credit  —  said  European  journals  —  the  conflict  would  soon 
have  to  end.  "The  invasion  and  conquest  of  a  vast  region 
by  a  state  which  is  without  an  army  and  without  credit  is  a 
novelty  in  the  history  of  nations,"  remarked  the  London  Times 
in  1845.  The  war  losses  were  expected  to  reinforce  the  effect 
of  war  taxes.  "War  with  the  United  States  would  not  last 
long,"  wrote  Arrangoiz,   "because  the   [American]   commerce 


110  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

finding  itself  attacked  on  all  seas  would  beg  for  peace."  When 
the  Mexican  corsairs  have  captured  a  few  American  ships  and 
the  Americans  have  thrown  a  few  bombs  into  Vera  Cruz, 
matters  will  be  arranged,  predicted  Le  Constitutionnel  of 
Paris.16 

Evidently,  then,  Mexico  was  not  likely  to  suffer  disastrously, 
and  certain  benefits  of  great  value  could  be  anticipated.  The 
act  of  crossing  swords  with  us  would  fulfil  a  patriotic  duty  and 
vindicate  the  national  honor.  Glory  and  the  satisfaction  of 
injuring  a  perfidious  and  grasping  enemy  would  more  than 
compensate  for  the  cost.  A  conflict  would  prevent  this  greedy 
neighbor,  as  the  London  Times  argued,  from  imagining  that 
Mexico  dared  not  resist  spoliation.  The  American  settlers, 
whom  every  effort  had  been  made  for  many  years  to  keep  out 
of  the  country,  would  be  driven  away,  and  the  danger  of 
American  ideas  averted.  Even  if  the  frontier  could  not  be 
forced  back  to  the  Sabine,  a  long  period  of  hostilities  would 
render  it  impossible  to  practice  near  the  border  our  arts  of 
political  seduction,  and  merely  a  short  contest  would  tend  to 
re-Mexicanize  thoroughly  the  northern  departments.  Indeed 
the  whole  country  would  be  re-Mexicanized,  for  the  first  effect 
of  the  war  would  be  to  cure  disunion  and  baptize  the  nation 
anew  in  the  fires  of  patriotism.  The  necessity  of  meeting  a 
foreign  foe  would  vitalize  the  courage  of  the  army,  which  had 
grown  somewhat  lax  in  battling  with  fellow-citizens,  restore 
discipline,  and  perfect  the  officers  in  their  difficult  but  noble 
profession.  A  blockade,  many  believed  with  Almonte  and 
Santa  Anna,  preventing  the  exportation  of  silver  and  the 
squandering  of  good  money  on  foreign  luxuries,  would  be 
"the  best  possible  thing"  for  the  country.  Stimulated  by 
exemption  from  ruinous  foreign  competition,  the  industries 
would  at  length  flourish,  and  the  boundless  natural  resources 
of  the  country  become  fountains  of  wealth.17 

War  is  no  doubt  a  great  evil,  argued  the  editors  of  La  Voz 
del  Pueblo,  "  but  we  recall  what  Polybius  said,  to  wit :  -  If 
many  empires  have  been  destroyed  by  war,  by  war  also  have 
many  risen  from  nothing/"  Prussia  owes  her  greatness  to 
the  Seven  Years  War,  pointed  out  El  Sigh  XIX.  The  con- 
quest of  the  Moors  cost  Spain  a  struggle  of  centuries,  but  what 
Spaniard  would  undo  it?   asked  others.     "Nations  determine 


MEXICO  RECKONS  ON  BENEFITS  111 

their  history  only  in  the  most  dangerous  crises,"  urged  an 
anonymous  but  able  pamphlet;  "and  such  a  crisis,  in  which 
posterity  will  admire  us,  has  arrived."17 

So  the  matter  presented  itself  to  many  when  studied  as  an 
exclusively  Mexican  af£air.  But  could  it  be  regarded  as 
exclusively  Mexican? (In  Central  and  South  America  there 
were  countries  that  nkturally  entertained  a  racial  prejudice 
against  the  "Anglo-Saxon."  They  were  fully  capable  of 
discovering  the  claim  to  monopoly  suggested  by  the  name 
United  States  of  "America,"  by  our  considering  none  except 
ourselves  "Americans,"  and  by  our  "Monroe  Doctrine";  and 
moreover  our  press  clamored  for  the  entire  continent.  Mexico 
had  her  eye  upon  them,  and  she  counted  on  drawing  support 
from  that  quarter.18 

As  early  as  1836  Cuevas,  then  minister  at  Paris,  after  pointing 
out  to  his  government  how  strongly  the  country  was  protected 
by  nature  against  the  United  States,  remarked :  "  Add  to 
this  the  interest  of  the  republics  of  the  South  to  defend  Mexico 
against  an  always  threatening  enemy,  which  with  its  ever 
monstrous  greed  seems  a  volcano  ready  to  burst  upon  them." 
The  next  year  a  Mexican  agent  at  Lima  reported  that  the  alleged 
unlawful  interference  of  this  country  in  Texas  was  the  subject 
of  general  conversation  and  of  just  alarm  in  the  Spanish- 
American  states.  In  1842  Dorsey,  bearer  of  despatches  from 
our  legation  at  Mexico,  stated  at  Savannah  that  Santa  Anna 
had  sent  envoys  to  all  the  South  American  republics  with  this 
message :  "  Unless  you  enable  us  to  resist  such  aggression 
as  will  be  perpetrated  by  the  United  States,  she  will  proceed  to 
embrace  in  her  mighty  grasp  the  whole  of  the  southern  conti- 
nent;" and  Dorsey  added  that  Colombia  had  already  promised 
financial  aid  and  two  thousand  men.  At  the  close  of  that  year, 
as  a  letter  from  Caracas  mentioned,  steps  were  said  to  have 
been  taken  toward  forming  a  league  to  support  Mexico  against 
American  encroachments.  In  1843  Almonte  made  up  a 
pamphlet  of  extracts  from  John  Quincy  Adams's  brilliant 
though  unfounded  speech  at  Braintree,  in  which  he  accused 
our  government  of  greed  and  unrighteousness  in  the  Texas 
business;  and  this  telling  document  was  distributed  in  the 
principal  cities  of  South  America.  During  the  following 
years  the  menace  of  our  ambition  to  all  of  the  Spanish  race  in 


112  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

this  hemisphere  continued  to  be  discussed  in  the  Mexican 
press.  "Republics  of  South  America/'  cried  La  Aurora  de  la 
libertad,  for  example,  "your  existence  also  is  in  danger ;  prepare 
for  the  combat ; "  and  it  was  easy  to  believe  that  official  appeals 
for  assistance,  in  the  event  of  actual  invasion,  would  not  fall 
upon  deaf  ears.18 

And  there  were  still  better  grounds,  it  was  reckoned,  for 
expecting  aid  from  abroad.  In  the  first  place,  holding  more 
or  less  honestly  that  we  had  trampled  on  the  law  of  nations, 
the  Mexicans  persuaded  themselves  that  every  civilized  country 
would  feel  an  interest  in  their  cause.  The  justice  of  our  case 
against  the  United  States,  declared  the  official  Diario,  will  be 
recognized  at  once  by  all  governments  to  which  "public  faith 
and  honor  are  not  an  empty  name."  This  view  was  encouraged, 
in  Europe.  The  cause  of  Mexico,  said  the  Liverpool  Mail, 
is  that  of  all  just  and  honest  governments.  The  Mexicans 
have  good  ground  to  complain,  proclaimed  the  sympathetic 
Journal  des  Debats,  for  "they  have  been  tricked  and  robbed."  19 

Covered  with  so  noble  a  sentiment  as  devotion  to  the  cause 
of  justice,  more  practical  considerations  could  be  expected  to 
exert  their  full  influence./ In  Mexico  as  well  as  in  the  United 
States,  the  monarchies  or-  Europe  were  believed  to  view  with 
jealousy  the  success  of  our  republican  institutions.  Our  policy 
of  "America  for  the  Americans,"  which  the  British  minister, 
Ward,  had  turned  against  Poinsett  at  Mexico,  was  contrary 
to  the  interest  of  every  commercial  nation  beyond  the  Atlantic. 
The  United  States,  exclaimed  Le  Correspondant  of  Paris, 
assumes  to  exclude  Europe  from  the  affairs  of  that  continent 
—  as  if  Europe  had  not  had  rights  and  possessions  there  before 
the  United  States  began  to^be !  as  if  the  United  States  did  not 
owe  its  existence  to  Europe  J  as  if  the  ocean  could  change  the 
law  of  nations;  and  leading  journals  in  London  expressed 
similar  indignation.20 

As  the  whole  world  understood,  great  Britain  had  not  yet 
forgiven  us  for  becoming  independent,  and  viewed  with  great 
repugnance  our  extensions  of  territory,  our  commercial  de- 
velopment and  our  control  over  raw  cotton ;  and  it  was  obvious 
that  she  would  be  glad  to  stop  our  growth.  Sooner  or  later, 
warned  the  British  press,  the  course  of  this  monster  will  have 
to  be  checked.  (  Guizot,  the  premier  of  France,  regarded  the 


EUROPEAN  AID  EXPECTED  113 

United  States  as  a  "young  Colossus,"  and  earnestly  desired 
to  aprjly  in  this  hemisphere  the  principle  of  the  balance  of 
power. \  Polk  was  by  no  means  popular  at  the  Tuilleries,  and 
the  Jmirnal  des  Debats,  commonly  regarded  as  the  mouthpiece 
of  the  government,  courteously  described  his  Messsage  of 
December,  1845,  as  bellicose,  passionate,  full  of  vain  and 
ludicrous  bravado,  arrogant,  detestably  hypocritical,  brutally 
sejfish  and  brutally  dishonest.21 

(The  planto  annex  Texas  had  greatly  disturbed  these  twc 
governments)  and  they  had  not  only  exerted  to  the  utmost 
against  it  tneir  diplomatic  strength,  both  separately  and  in 
concert,  but,  as  Mexico  knew,  had  been  disposed  to  take  upj 
arms  in  that  cause.  i^Aided  by  circumstances,  the  courage  anc 
skill  of  the  United  States  had  completely  foiled  them,  but  the^ 
could  not  be  supposed  to  view  the  result  with  satisfaction; 
and  there  was  good  reason  to  believe  that  they  contemplates 
a  possible  further  extension  of  this  country,   not  only  witl 
alarm,  but  with  a  strong  desire  to  prevent  it.     Said  the  London 
Morning  Herald  in  March,  1845 :    Mexico  will  turn  to  good 
account   the   support   of   her   powerful   protectors   and   their 
intense   repugnance   to   the   annexation   of   Texas;     and   the 
London   Times  predicted  that  our  greed  in  the  Texas  affair 
would  be  punished. 22 

Gifted  at  vaticination,  the  Times  predicted  also  that  our 
next  aim  would  be  the  mines  of  Mexico,  and  asked  the  nations 
of  Europe  how  they  would  like  to  find  their  monetary  circulation 
"dependent  on  the  caprice  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States/V)  In  September,  1845,  it  printed  the  assertion  of  its 
Mexican  correspondent,  that  England  must  interfere  or  be 
prepared  to  see  not^only  those  mines  but  also  California  in 
American  hands.  There  is  a  general  feeling,  announced  the 
London  Standard^h&t  only  the  interposition  of  England  and 
France  can  check  the  United  States.  The  United  States  will 
absorb  Mexico  unless  foreign  powers  avert  this,  preached 
the  London  Journal  of  Commerce.  "The  conquest  of  Mexico 
would  create  perils  for  the  political  balance  of  the  world," 
said  the  Journal  des  Debats ;  and  hence  "the  immense  aggran- 
dizements" contemplated  by  the  United  States  "could  not 
take  place  without  giving  umbrage  to  several  nations."  Europe 
would  certainly  forbid  a  conquest  of  Mexico,  threatened  Le 

VOL.   I  —  I 


114  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

Constitutionnel.  The  Mexicans  were  fully  capable  of  seeing 
all  this  for  themselves.  The  Monitor  Constitutional,  for  ex- 
ample, gave  currency  to  the  idea  that  certain  powers  would 
prevent  the  invasion  of  their  country.  Indeed  they  could  see 
even  more.  "Enlightened  nations  of  Europe,"  exclaimed 
La  Aurora  de  la  Libertad,  "a  people  consumed  with  ambition 
and  covetousness  is  already  taking  up  arms  to  conquer  the 
American  continent,  lay  down  the  law  to  your  interests  and 
possessions,  and  some  day  disturb  your  peace  at  home."  23 

Another  source  of  possible  trouble  for  the  United  States 
abroad  was  the  idea  that  any  territory  obtained  from  Mexico 
would  be  given  up  to  slavery.  This  point  came  out  strongly 
in  the  Journal  des  Debats,  for  example.  Considerably  more 
serious  was  the  danger  that  in  coping  with  Mexican  privateers 
we  should  offend  other  nations.  In  this  way,  so  the  British 
minister  warned  our  secretary  of  state,  the  Americans  were 
likely  to  become  involved  in  "complications  of  the  gravest 
character" ;  and  it  was  believed  by  the  Mexicans  that  a  block- 
ade of  their  coast,  in  addition  to  being  extremely  difficult,  was 
almost  or  quite  certain  to  have  that  effect.24 

To  these  points  they  added  characteristically  that  fear  of 
their  power,  as  well  as  antipathy  to  us,  might  lead  foreign 
nations  to  espouse  their  side;  and  all  the  supporters  of  the 
monarchical  plans  now  entertained  by  the  government  and  the 
upper  classes,  felt  that  if  carried  out  these  would  pave  the  way 
for  European  assistance.  In  fact  the  British  minister  himself 
believed  that  such  a  change  of  regime  would  guarantee  Mexico 
against  the  United  States,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
in  talking  with  her  public  men  he  disclosed  this  conviction. 
Being  a  jealous  nation,  thoroughly  given  up  to  politics,  and 
not  industrial  or  commercial,  Mexico  could  not  fail  to  exagger- 
ate the  probable  effect  of  all  these  influences  upon  England  and 
France,  and  to  underestimate  the  factors  that  were  tending 
to-keep  them  at  peace  with  us.25 

/  The  strongest  basis  of  hope  for  effective  aid  from  abroad  was, 
however,  none  of  jthese  considerations,  but  our  dispute  with 
England  over  Oregon)  In  January,  1846,  Bankhead  and  Slidell 
agreed  that  Mexico^  policy  toward  the  United  States  would 
depend  mainly  or  wholly  upon  the  outcome  of  that  issue,  and 
to  the  Mexican  eye  the  outcome  was  already  clear.     Each 


WAR  DESIRED  BY  MEXICO  115 


country  had  rejected  the  proposition  of  the  other,  and  Polk's 
Message  of  December  2,  1845,  committed  him  afresh  to  an 
extreme  position.  The  course  of  England  tended  to  confirm 
the  natural  inference.  Her  perfectly  excusable  intention  was 
to  hold  the  Mexicans  ready  to  cooperate  with  her,  should  war 
become  her  programme,  while  restraining  them  from  engaging 
us  alone.  Bankhead  replied  with  an  encouraging  vagueness 
to  Mexican  hints  that  British  assistance  was  desired,  and/Lord 
Aberdeen  talked  with~t]ie  Mexican  agent  at  London  of  a>pos- 
sible  alliance  against  us.)  Indeed  that  agent  reported  that  he 
believed  Aberdeen  would  like  to  see  Mexico  fight  the  United 
States  and  win.26 

For  superficial,  touch-and-go  people  here  was  enough  to 
build  upon,  and  the  long  entertained  hopes  of  British  aid  struck 
root  anew.  January  14,  1846,  our  minister  Slideli  stated  that 
the  idea  of  an  approaching  conflict  over  the  Oregon  question 
was  assiduously  nursed,  and  seventeen  days  later  the  corre- 
spondent of  the  London  Times  reported,  that  it  had  become 
a  general  conviction.  Aberdeen's  possible  alliance  seemed 
therefore  like  a  certainty,  and  he  himself  admitted  to  our 
minister  at  London  tha^ Mexico  had  counted  upon  a  war  over 
Oregon.     With  France,  as  we  know,  Mexico  did  not  stand  on 


the  best  of  terms  at  this  juncture ;  but  in  addition  to  the  other 
reasons  for  looking  to  her,  Guizot  and  Louis  Philippe  were 
strongly  pro-English,  and  in  fact,  so  Bankhead  reported, 
Paredes  hoped  for  assistance  from  that  country  also.27 

From  high  to  low,  as  we  have 'learned,  the  Mexicans  were  t__^^- 
inveterate  gamblers,  passionately  fond  of  calculating  prob- 
abilities and  accepting  chances,  and  a  situation  like  this  ap- 
pealed most  fascinatingly  to  their  instincts  and  their  habits. 
But  in  the  eyes  of  many  —  indeed  most,  it  is  likely  —  the  out- 
look seemed  more  than  promising.  Vain  and  superficial,  they 
did  not  realize  their  weaknesses.  "  We  could  not  be  in  a  better 
state  for  war,"  the  Diario  announced  in  March,  1845.  If  any 
one  thought  of  the  empty  treasury,  he  assured  himself  ttfat 
patriotism  and  the  boundless  natural  wealth  of  the  country 
would  afford  resources.  Enthusiasm  would  supply  everything, 
it  was  believed.  (Equally  unable  were  the  Mexicans  to  per-  ""^r* 
ceive  the  frailty  of  their  hopes  for  European  aid.  With  few 
exceptions  they  saw  through  a  veil,  darkly.     Even  Almonte, 


116  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

a  military  man  and  better  acquainted  with  the  United  States 
than  any  other  prominent  citizen,  assured  his  government  that 
in  such  a  conflict  the  triumph  of  Mexico  would  be  "certain/' 28 

Here  and  there  one  doubted.  Some  drew  back.  But  the 
nation  as  a  whole  —  if  Mexico  really  was  a  nation  —  felt 
convinced  that  pride  and  passion  could  safely  be  indulged. 
We  shall  dictate  our  own  terms,  thought  many.  At  any  rate, 
argued  others,  our  honor  will  be  vindicated  by  a  brilliant 
stroke  beyond  the  Rio  Grande;  European  intervention  will 
then  occur;  the  United  States  will  have  to  pay  a  round  sum 
for  Texas ;  and  we  shall  obtain  a  fixed  boundary,  guaranteed 
by  the  leading  powers  of  Europe,  that  will  serve  as  an  ever- 
lasting dike  against  American  aggression.  The  press  clamored 
for  war ;  the  government  was  deeply  committed  to  that  policy ; 
and  the  great  majority  of  those  who  counted  for  anything, 
panting  feverishly,  though  with  occasional  shivers,  to  fight 
the  United  States,  were  passionately  determined  that  no 
amicable  and  fair  adjustment  of  the  pending  difficulties  should 
be  made.28 

"For  us  [Mexicans],"  Roa  Barcena  admitted,  "the  war  was 
a  fact  after  Shannon's  declarations  of  October,  1844,  and  the 
fact  was  confirmed  by  the  admission  of  Texas  to  the  North- 
American  Union."  "Since  the  usurpation  of  Texas  no  ar- 
rangement, no  friendly  settlement  has  been  possible,"  said  La 
Reforma.  Besides,  a  faith  in  eventual  triumph,  strong  enough 
to  survive  a  series  of  disasters,  burned  in  the  heart  of  the 
nation.  The  Mexican  correspondent  of  the  Prussian  minister 
at  Washington  —  regarded  by  our  secretary  of  war  as  entirely 
trustworthy  —  reported  that  the  people  were  bent  upon  war. 
But  for  the  procrastination  and  vanity  of  Mexico,  no  conflict 
would  have  occurred,  said  J.  F.  Ramirez,  who  stood  high 
among  the  best  public  men  of  that  country.  "The  idea  of 
peace  was  not  popular,"  states  one  Mexican  historian;  the 
nation  was  responsible  for  the  war,  confess  others.  Mexico 
desired  it,  admitted  Santa  Anna  in  1847  and  the  minister  of 
relations  in  1849,  both  speaking  officially.28 


VI 

THE  AMERICAN  ATTITUDE  ON  THE  EVE  OF  WAR 

1845 


6> 


In  the  United  States  a  strong  feeling  against  the  dominant 
elements  in  Mexico  had  been  created  by  events  that  did  not 
directly  concern  us.  The  atrocious  massacres  perpetrated  at 
Goliad  and  the  Alamo  during  the  Texan  struggle  for  indepen- 
dence made  an  indelible  impression  on  the  public  mind.  Said 
Buchanan  on  the  floor  of  the  American  Senate :  "  I  shall 
never  forget  the  deep,  the  heart-rending  sensations  of  sorrow  and 
of  indignation  "  which  pervaded  this  body  when  we  first  heard 
of  Santa  Anna's  "inhuman  butcheries."  j  The  decimating  of 
Texan  prisoners  for  trying  to  escape  fromr  their  guards,  as  they 
had  a  perfect  right  to  do,  and  the  cruelties,  or  at  least  excessive 
hardships,  which  they  were  made  to  suffer  in  confinement, 
deepened  the  feeling.  The  official  threats  of  ruthless  war 
and  even  extermination  against  the  Texans,  and  the  belief 
that  Indians  were  incited  to  fall  upon  their  women  and  chil- 
dren, sharpened  it  still  more.  In  1844  one  Sentmanat  went 
from  New  Orleans  to  Tabasco  on  a  revolutionary  mission  but 
was  unsuccessful;  and  his  party  surrendered  to  the  Mexican 
leader,  General  Ampudia,  on  the  promise  of  good  treatment. 
Most  of  the  men,  however,  were  shot;  the  rest  of  them  dis- 
appeared in  prison;  Sentmanat  was  summarily  executed; 
and  his  head,  fried  in  oil  to  make  it  last  longer,  became  the 
chief  decoration  of  the  public  square  at  San  Juan  Bautista.1 

Such  acts  —  naturally  though  incorrectly  supposed  to 
represent  the  character  of  the  Mexican,  and  linked  with  the 
apparent  cowardice  of  Santa  Anna  and  his  army  in  the  Texan 
war  of  independence  —  caused  the  nation  in  whose  name  they 
were  perpetrated  to  be  looked  upon  by  not  a  few  Americans  as 
a  nest  of  poisonous  reptiles,  fit  only  to  be  stamped  upon. 

117 


118  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

Referring  to  one  of  the  Texan  outrages,  the  Indiana  State 
Sentinel  exclaimed  :  "  Should  that  blustering,  cowardly  nation 
ever  have  the  temerity  to  declare  war  against  the  United 
States,  think  you  not  that  the  remembrance  of  such  scenes 
will  make  every  soldier  feel  himself  'thrice  armed'?  "  When 
people  of  our  own  became  the  victims,  when  they  were  robbed 
and  deported  without  cause  on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  when 
they  were  shot  without  trial  at  Tampico,  when  they  were 
threatened  with  the  death  of  pirates  for  joining  the  Texans, 
and  especially  when  the  newspapers  told  how  Americans 
among  the  Santa  Fe  prisoners  were  insulted,  abused  and  forced 
to  work  in  chains  on  the  road  to  Santa  Anna's  palace,  so  that 
he  might  feast  his  cruel,  cowardly  eyes  upon  their  sufferings, 
fury  burned  like  a  flame  in  many  a  heart.  „  Time  appeased  the 
/  fire,  but  in  1846  the  embers  were  still  red.1 
\J  With  less  poignant  but  no  less  real  indignation  the  American 
public  noted  in  a  general  way  the  entire  (|pn£  series  of  our 
grievances^:  our  flag  insulted,  our  minister  traduced  and 
threatened,^  our  consuls  maltreated,  our  government  officially 
maligned,  agreements  broken,  treaties  ignored  or  violated, 
citizens  persecuted  and  imprisoned,  property  confiscated, 
trade  hampered  and  ruined,  complaints  more  or  less  politely 
mocked,  positive  demands  adroitly  evaded,  valid  claims  fraud- 
ulently defeated ;  and  heard  that  such  offences  were  not 
merely  committed  now  and  then,  but  repeated  over  and  over 
again  with  apparent  deliberation  and  malice.  The  highest 
Mexican  authorities  were  found  encouraging  prejudice  and  ill- 
will  against  our  citizens,  exerting  themselves  to  make  foreign 
nations  distrust  and  hate  us,  misrepresenting  our  efforts  to 
conciliate  them,  and  describing  our  honest  wish  to  be  on 
friendly  terms  as  hypocrisy  and  craft.  Our  people  saw  the 
legitimate  results  of  Mexican  misgovernment  charged  against 
this  country;  proceedings  of  our. authorities,  fully  warranted 
by  the  facts,  protested  against;  threats  of  war  freely  made 
to  influence  our  national  conduct ;  and  measures  looking  toward 
hostilities  openly  advocated  and  adopted  in  the  most  offensive 
manner.  Just  how  fully  the  details  were  noted  by  the  public, 
and  how  long  the  incidents  were  remembered,  it  would  obviously 
be  impossible  to  say ;  but  in  all  probability  they  sank  into  the 
general  consciousness,  and  produced  a  certain  state  of  mind. 


AMERICAN  FEELING  ABOUT  MEXICAN  OUTRAGES     119 

In  February,  1847,  the  Virginia  House  of  Delegates  declared 
that  the  war  had  been  "most  unrighteously  provoked  ...  by 
a  long  series  of  acts  of  injustice  and  outrage  towards  the  United 
States,"  and  this  is  only  one  of  almost  countless  equivalent 
expressions,  which  no  doubt  were  fairly  sincere.2 

On  the  other  hand  certain  factors  tended  to  neutralize  our 
ignation.  There  was  a  disposition,  traceable  to  natural 
good-heartedness,  political  expediency  and  commercial  interests, 
to  maintain  friendly  relations  with  our  neighbor.  Much  of 
what  seemed  like  misconduct  was  attributed  to -circumstances. 
We  had  a  rather  conceited  notion  that  Mexicans  could  not  be 
expected  to  know  very  much  or  do  very  well.  More  or  less 
faintly  the  idea  glimmered,  that  perhaps  it  was  easy  for  them 
to  misunderstand  the  Texas  affair,  and  natural  for  them  to  be 
angry  about  it.  Many  felt  inclined  on  general  principles  to 
suspect  that  our  aggrieved  citizens  were  not  entirely  exempt 
from  blame.  Money  ^was  used  by  the  agents  of  Mexico  to 
influence  our  press.  (Domestic  politics  warped  public  opinion 
in  her  favor  sometimes;  and  finally  the  anti-slavery  people 
went  great  lengths  in  championing  her  government  and  accus- 
ing their  own,  for  every  suggestion  of  war  upon  Mexico  was 
suspected  of  aiming  at  the  acquisition  of  territory  and  the 
reinforcement  of  a  hated  institution.3 

The  northeastern  states,  on  account  of  the  strong  anti- 
slavery  sentiment  existing  there,  were  not  a  little  disposed  to 
heed  these  influences,  but  elsewhere  they  signified  much  less, 
and  were  quite  unable  to  offset  the  prevalent  feeling  that  Mex- 
ico had  insulted,  outraged  and  cheated  us,  and  the  growing 
conviction  that,  in  dealing  with  her,  forbearance  had  proved 
to  be  a  mistake.  As  early  as  1830  Count  Lillers  wrote  from 
New  Orleans:  It  would  be  "impossible"  to  speak  of  Mexico 
with  "  more  bitterness  and  desire  of  vengeance  than  is  done  by 
certain  persons  whose  words  must  not  be  neglected,"  and  by 
1837  many  agreed  with  Jackson  that  satisfaction  ought  to  be 
required ;  yet  nothing  positive  was  done,  and  the  impatience 
grew.  The  lenity  of  our  authorities  began  to  be  denounced, 
and  the  New  Orleans  Pwayune  in  particular  attacked  what  it 
called  "the  known  imbecility  which  has  for  years  marked  our 
government  at  home  as  regards  its  external  relations  with 
Mexico."  4 


120  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

The  proceedings  of  her  claims  commissioners  had  a  signally 
bad  effect.  "  The  conduct  of  the  Mexican  government  towards 
the  American  claimants  under  the  treaty  between  the  two 
countries,"  declared  the  Picayune,  "has  been  the  most  infa- 
mously perfidious  ever  practised  by  one  country  and  submitted 
to  by  another."  "Many  earnest  remonstrances  and  com- 
plaints," wrote  Webster,  our  secretary  of  state,  officially  to  the 
Mexican  commissioners,  have  been  made  to  me  against  your 
proceedings  and  those  of  your  government  in  this  affair ;  and 
though  he  refrained  from  expressing  any  opinion  as  to  the 
justice  of  them,  such  a  declaration  was  evidence  of  an  in- 
dignation both  deep  and  general.  At  the  same  time  fresh 
grievances  accumulated  ;  and  the  Mexicans,  instead  of  showing 
any  appreciation  of  what  our  people  regarded  as  kindness 
toward  them,  appeared  even  less  willing  to  grant  effectual 
redress  than  ten  or  fifteen  years  before.  "Forbearance  and 
lenity  toward  such  creatures,"  protested  the  Jeffersonian 
Republican  of  New  Orleans  in  August,  1845,  "are  all  lost  and 
worse  than  lost,"  for  they  are  thought  signs  of  weakness,  and 
lead  to  greater  atrocities.5 

The  decision  of  Herrera's  administration  to  reject  Slidell, 
our  minister  of  peace,  was  generally  regarded  —  except  by 
the  partisan  opponents  of  our  government  —  as  a  crowning 
proof  of  the  vanity  of  forbearance  and  a  loud  call  for  action; 
This  nation,  said  the  St.  Louis  Republican,  "owes  it  to  herself 
and  her  character,  and  the  just  appreciation  of  her  ministers 
and  her  standing  in  all  foreign  countries  not  to  suffer  so  open 
an  insult  to  her  representative  to  pass  unnoticed."  "The 
indignity  to  our  Minister  requires  atonement,"  was  the  crisper 
utterance  of  the  Picayune,  which  was  widely  recognized  as 
the  best  informed  authority  on  Mexican  affairs  among  our 
newspapers.  The  revolution  of  Paredes  appeared  to  be  a 
further  evidence  of  hostility.  The  government  of  Mexico, 
observed  the  Delta  of  New  Orleans,  has  been  overthrown  with 
no  pretext  except  the  necessity  of  active  war  against  the 
United  States;  so  let  war  be  waged.  Finally,  the  definitive 
rejection  of  our  peace  overture,  announced  in  Castillo's  defiant 
and  offensive  note,  supplied  a  conclusive  argument  in  the  opin- 
ion of  many  against  further  hesitation.  "We  have  borne  and 
forborne  long  enough,  and  a  resolute  stand  should  be  taken  at 


BELIEF  THAT  EUROPE  WAS  BEHIND  MEXICO      121 

once,"  was  the  comment  of  the  Missouri  Reporter.  "  The  United 
States,"  declared  the  New  Orleans  Commercial  Bulletin,  "have 
borne  more  insult,  abuse,  insolence  and  injury,  from  Mexico, 
than  one  nation  ever  before  endured  from  another  .  .  .  they 
are  now  left  no  alternative  but  to  extort  by  arms  the  respect 
and  justice  which  Mexico  refuses  to  any  treatment  less  harsh."  6 

Another  consideration  that  intensified  public  sentiment  was  t- 
the  suspicion,  wKich  in  many  cases  deepened  into  something 
more,  that  she  was  to  be  used  against  us  by  the  monarchies  of  & 
Europe,  and  in  particular  by  Great  Britain.  In  1842,  when 
she  made  forays  into  Texas  and  threatened  a  serious  invasion, 
it  became  a  very  prevalent  opinion  in  the  United  States,  re- 
ported the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans,  that  England  stood 
behind  these  movements;  and  later  that  country  was  justly 
believed  to  be  working  in  Texas  to  defeat  and  injure  us.  Her 
influence  at  Mexico  was  understood  to  be  powerful;  and  the 
Americans,  not  aware  what  elements  of  strength  Mexico  felt 
able  to  count  upon,  thought  she  certainly  would  not  defy  us 
unless  assured  of  foreign  support.  "Our  people  are  prone  to 
the  opinion,  whether  well  or  ill-founded,"  said  the  Common- 
wealth  of  Lexington,  Kentucky,  in  February,  1846,  "  that  that 
ambitipus_and  mischievous  government  LoiLGreat  feritainl  is 
at  the  bottom ~of  MexicanTiostility  towards  us."  This  was 
provocation  enough.  "To  fight  the  Britishers,  all  the  States  , 
are  one,"  complained  the  London  Times,  and  on  this  point  it 
was  doubtless  much  closer  to  the  fact  than  in  most  of  its  deliver-  , 
ances  on  American  affairs.7 

England  was  not  supposed  to  be  alone,  however.  Our  people  I 
understood  that  .France  had  cooperated  with  her  against  the 
annexation  of  Texas,  and  not  a  few  suspected  her  of  pursuing 
the  same  course  to  bring  about  the  rejection  of  Slidell  and  the 
anti-American  revolution  of  Paredes.  In  February,  1846, 
the  Courrier  des  Etats  Unis  of  New  York,  which  could  be 
regarded  as  of  considerable  importance,  made  this  rather 
startling  announcement :  "  The  latest  intelligence  from  Mexico 
leaves  no  doubt  that  the  new  Government  of  that  country  is 
resolved  to  reject  all  peaceful  overtures  from  the  United  States 
and  solicit  the  intervention  of  European  powers  to  obtain  from 
the  Union  indemnification  for  the  loss  of  Texas  and  a  boundary 
line  under  the  protecting  guaranty  of  France  and  Great  Britain. 


122  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

We  know  personally  that  this  was  an  idea  entertained  by 
General  Almonte  when  he  left  New  York,  on  his  return  to 
Mexico,  where  he  now  occupies  an  influential  place  in  the 
government."  The  statement  that  Almonte  expressed  such 
a  view  early  in  1845  must  have  become  known  somewhat 
widely,  for  apparently  it  signified  much ;  and  the  scheme  could 
not  fail  to  give  offence  to  as  many  of  our  people  as  heard  of 
it.  Even  more  disagreeable  were  the  plans  for  a  European 
monarchy  now  looming  up  so  boldly  south  of  the  Rio  Grande, 
for  they  defied  the  "Monroe  Doctrine,"  and  threatened  to 
bring  some  great  power  —  perhaps  more  than  one  —  directly 
into  the  lists  against  us.  During  February,  1846,  the  New 
Orleans  papers,  especially  the  Picayune,  invited  the  attention 
of  the  country  vigorously  to  this  phase  of  the  situation.8 

PA\  things  considered,  it  seemed  imperative  to  stop  drifting, 
and  to  settle  our  affairs  with  Mexico  before  the  monarchs  of 
Europe  could  mature  plans  to  injure  us;  and  evidently,  from 
that  point  of  view,  no  further  delay  could  be  afforded.  At  this 
time,  therefore,  the  people  of  the  southwest,  the  region  most 
deeply  interested  in  the  situation  and  consequently  best  en- 
titled to  speak,  demanded  very  seriously  and  very  positively 
a  definitive  adjustment  of  our  relations  with  Mexico.  As 
matters  were,  the  thought  of  armies  and  privateers  appearing 
on  the  horizon  as  the  first  announcement  of  war  hardly  allowed 
nervous  people  to  sleep.  Actual  fighting,  it  was  often  argued, 
would  be  less  injurious  than  passive  hostility  with  its  threats 
and  possibilities.  The  desirability  of  Mexican  friendship  on 
the  score  of  commercial  and  political  interests  was  not  forgotten, 
but  many  believed  that  good  relations  could  not  be  had  without 
first  giving  her  a  lesson.  Finally,  urged  the  Picayune  with 
reference  to  the  monarchical  designs  of  Paredes,  it  was  now 
the  most  critical  time  since  the  Spanish  colonies  had  revolted ; 
the  future  of  republicanism  and  the  independence  of  America 
were  at  stake ;  and  as  matters  stood,  European  powers  had  the 
battlefield,  Mexico,  wholly  to  themselves./ 

These  broad  views  were  strongly  supported  by  more  limited 
and  often  by  less  justifiable  ones,  feie  trade  interests  of  the 
entire  Mississippi  valley  required  not  only  to  be  freed  from 
danger,  but  also  to  have  the  plan  of  non-intercourse,  which 
Mexico  had  practically  put  into  force,  given  up.     A  Mexican 


AMERICAN  DESIRE  FOR  TERRITORY  123 

army  would  march  into  Texas,  it  was  remarked,  "as  avowed 
abolitionists, "  and  slaveholders  may  naturally  have  preferred 
to  meet  this  peril  in  the  enemy's  territory.  Political  consider- 
ations of  a  personal  sort,  and  one  especially,  doubtless  had  an 
influence.  Calhoun,  the  dominant  figure  of  the  South,  con- 
templating a  possible  withdrawal  from  the  Union,  desired  the 
people  of  that  section  to  husband  their  strength.  "We  need 
our  young  men  for  other  troubles,"  he  said  with  reference  to 
their  fighting  Mexico.  Besides,  he  naturally  could  not  welcome 
a  great  disturbance  that  would  interfere  necessarily  with  his 
plans,  and  lead  to  political  results  of  an  unpredictable  sort.  Now 
there  were  men,  particularly  in  Mississippi,  by  no  means  unwill- 
ing to  embarrass  and  possibly  unhorse  that  overshadowing  leader 
by  forcing  him  to  antagonize  a  popular  movement ;  and  a  war 
with  Mexico  seemed  obviously  well-suited  for  such  a  purpose.10 
A  wish  to  extend  the  Union  was  undoubtedly  a  factor.11 
As  the  American  Review  said,  Burr  had  planted  in  the  lower 
Mississippi  valley  the  seeds  of  ambition  for  southern  conquest, 
and  the  soil  proved  very  fit  for  their  germination  and  growth.12 
As  early  as  1830  the  British  consul  at  New  Orleans  believed  the 
people  would  support  an  attack  upon  the  territory  of  Mexico. 
In  1835  a  French  visitor  of  some  prominence  concluded  that 
every  American  held  two  ideas  firmly :  that  our  prosperity 
resulted  from  our  republican  institutions,  and  that  Providence 
intended  the  new  world  for  the  Anglo-Saxon.  In  1843  Captain 
Elliot,  mistaking  an  instinct  for  a  determination,  felt  satisfied 
that  the  United  States  had  resolved  to  push  south.  By  1845 
the  appetite  for  more  territory  was  pronounced.  "There 
appears  to  be  no  limit  to  the  insatiable  lust  of  territorial  acqui- 
sition which  pervades  the  minds  of  many  of  our  citizens/' 
lamented  the  New  Orleans  Tropic.  When  the  annexation  of 
Texas  appeared  to  be  certain,  the  New  York  Morning  News 
exclaimed,  "Who's  the  next  customer,  California  or  Canada?" 
To  this  question  the  Tribune  replied,  that  its  neighbor  had 
tasted  blood  and  growled  for  more.  No,  we  don't  growl, 
retorted  the  News ;  more  "  will  come  soon  enough  —  come  of 
its  own  accord,"  for  our  destiny  is  to  possess  the  whole  con- 
tinent. Believers  in  this  convenient  theory  felt  bound  to  go 
forward,  and  should  Mexico  oppose  the  decree  of  Heaven,  so 
much  the  worse  for  her.13 


124  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Behind  our  voracity  and  largely  responsible  for  it  were  a 
restlessness  and  a  dissatisfaction  resulting  from  energies  that 
found  no  adequate  outlet.  In  all  parts  of  the  country  this 
was  the  case.  As  a  people  "we  are  restless,  fidgety,  discon- 
tented, anxious  for  excitement,"  confessed  the  New  York 
Herald.  In  IFinois  times  were  hard.  Every  attempt  at 
commercial  or  industrial  enterprise  had  failed;  farmers  could 
not  sell  their  crops  at  paying  rates,;  with  boundless  force  in 
heart  and  brain  the  young  man  coufd  find  nothing  worth  while 
to  do.  The  state  of  mind  in  other  parts  of  that  section  appears 
to  have  been  similar.  Indiana  gave  up  all  attempts  to  pay 
interest  on  her  debt  as  early  as  1840.  All  over  the  western 
border,  said  the  American  Review,  "are  great  numbers  of  bold 
and  restless  spirits,  men  gathered  out  of  all  the  orderly  and 
civilized  portions  of  society  as  its  most  turbulent  members, 
and  ready  for  any  enterprise  that  can  minister  to  their  reckless 
manner  of  life  and  love  of  danger  and  of  change;"  anc^  the 
West  was  already  powerful  in  our  national  affairs.  '^Our 
people,"  wrote  Calhoun,  "are  like  a  young  man  of  18,  full  of 
health  and  vigour,  and  disposed  for  adventure  of  any  de- 
scription." 14 

Such  an  intoxication  of  animal  vitality  demanded  a  fight, 
of  course.  "The  multitude  cry  aloud  .for  war,"  admitted  the 
New  York  Herald  in  August,  1845.  )  "Nine-tenths  of  our 
people,  ceteris  paribus,  would  rather-have  a  little  fighting  than 
not,"  was  the  opinion  of  its  neighbor,  the  Morning  News. 
"let  us  go  to  war,"  began  a  leader  in  the  New  York 
Journal  of  Commerce ;  "  The  world  has  become  stale  and  in- 
sipid, the  ships  ought  to  be  all  captured,  and  the  cities  battered 
down,  and  the  world  burned  up,  so  that  we  can  start  again. 
There  would  be  fun  in  that.  Some  interest,  —  something 
to  talk  about."/  If  such  was  the  feeling  in  a  high  latitude, 
it  must  have  burned  hot  at  the  south ;  and  the  young  men  of 
the  Mississippi  valley  had  special  reasons  for  their  ardor.  The 
region  of  western  Tennessee  had  been  settled  by  revolutionary 
soldiers,  and  they  had  left  a  rich  inheritance  of  military  tra- 
ditions. Jackson  towered  above  all  other  figures  at  the  south- 
west |  and  his  chief  distinction  was  that  of  the  sword.  Every- 
body talked  stillNof  the  war  of  1812  and  his  brilliant  exploit 
at   New   Orleans.     Indeed,    when   the   mind   wearied    of   the 


THE  POPULAR  EYE  FIXED  ON  MEXICO  125 

continual  hunting,  there  was  little  else  to  fasten  its  eye  upon. 
Military  glory  became  the  young  man's  dream.  All  aspired 
to  be  soldiers,  and  to  win  renown  by  fighting  for  their  country. 
This  was  their  inborn  and  incessantly  cultivated  ambition; 
and  it  need  not  be  added  that  all  the  young  ladies  felt  that 
only  a  military  hero,  or  at  least  the  makings  of  such  a  hero, 
deserved  their  attention.15 

Reasons  enough  why  this  feeling  concentrated  upon  Mexico 
have  already  been  given,  but  certain  others  are  in  order  here. 
That  "is  indeed  the  garden  spot  of  the  Americas\nd  presents 
allurements  more  tempting  than  did  the  sunny  plains  and  vine- 
yards of  Italy,  when  the  northern  hordes  swept  down  and 
drifted  like  a  snowstorm  over  the  south  of  Europe"  —  such 
was  the  picture  of  "that  magnificent  region"  held  up  by  the 
Commercial  Bulletin  of  New  Orleans  before  thousands  of  young 
sparks  bored  nearly  to  death  by  the  commonplace.  /  Besides, 
greatly  exaggerated  notions  of  Mexico's  wealth  got^abroad. 
Young  fellows  overstocked  with  energy  were  not  willing  to  hoe 
corn  at  five  shillings  a  day,  or  dig  potatoes  for  every  tenth 
bushel  when  the  mountains  of  a  near  and  hostile  country  were 
understood  to  be  packed  with  silver,  and  her  churches  to  be 
radiant  with  diamonds  and  gold.  /Stronger  than  all  else, 
perhaps,  the  vague  but  romantic  idea  of" "  revelling  in  the  halls 
of  the  Montezumas"  exercised  a  perfect  fascination.  \  A  letter 
from  New  York  published  in  August,  1845,  declared"  that  fully 
twenty  thousand  volunteers  could  be  raised  in  that  city  alone 
"without  fee  or  reward,  who  would  jump  at  the  chance  of 
marching  to  Mexico"  simply  to  enjoy  this  diversion.  In  short, 
said  the  New  York  Morning  News,  all  the  "young  and  ardent 
spirits  that  throng  the  cities  and  are  spread  over  the  face  of 
the  Union  want  but  a  direction  to  their  restless  energies,  and 

Ceir  attention  is  already  fixed  on  Mexico."  16 
What  made  this  outlook  peculiarly  inviting  was  the  belief  \*/ 
at  only  one  bold,  swift  dash  would  be  needed  —  no  dull, 
plodding,  grimy  campaigning  year  after  year.  Six  sevenths  of 
the  people  in  Mexico  were  said  to  be  Indians,  half-breeds  and 
negroes — "mere  slaves,"  and  the  rest  of  them  degenerate 
Spaniards ;  and  the  keepers  of  that  paradise,  the  guardians  of 
those  treasures,  were  represented  as  "a  feeble  and  degraded 
soldiery,  who  would  be  scattered  like  chaff  by  the  first  volley 


126  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

from  the  Anglo-Saxon  rifle,  the  first  charge  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
bayonet."  "An  adventure  full  of  fun  and  frolic  and  holding 
forth  the  rewards  of  opulence  and  glory,"  was  therefore  the 
Commercial  Bulletin's  golden  picture  of  a  war  with  Mexico, 
and  such  became  the  common  idea.17 

In  the  summer  of  1845  this  magnificent  dream  of  sport, 
glory  and  opulejice  appeared  to  be  on  the  point  of  realization, 
and  the  war  spirit  flamed  high.  Even  journals  that  had  stood 
firmly  against  annexing  Texas  took  fire.  "What  more  in- 
spiring strain  can  strike  the  ears  of  freemen,"  demanded  the 
Richmond  Enquirer,  "than  the  trumpet  note  which  summons 
our  people  to  the  punishment  of  tyrants?  .  .  .  We  utterly 
mistake  the  spirit  of  republicanism  in  America,  if  there  be  not 
one  voice  for  a  full  and  thorough  chastisement  of  Mexican 
arrogance  and  folly."  The  prospect  of  "coercing"  out  of 
Mexico  her  "spirit  of  depredation,  perfidy  and  aggression" 
and  thus  inaugurating  the  sweet  and  commercially  profitable 
reign  of  peace  excited  hot  zeal.  West  of  the  Alleghanies  the 
feeling  was  peculiarly  strong.  At  Nashville  the  Union  promised 
that  "any  number"  of  volunteers  the  government  might  call  for 
would  be  forthcoming.  At  St.  Louis,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Reveille,  only  a  prospect  of  service  in  the  field  was  needed  to 
induce  "the  most  active  volunteering"  among  the  "enthusi- 
astic population."  "Go  where  you. will,"  recorded  the  Pica- 
yune, "'tis  war  and  nothing  but  war;"  and  Buchanan  wrote, 
"You  can  have  no  adequate  conception  of  the  military  ardor 
which  exists"  in  the  west  and  southwest;  "It  will  be  easy  to 
bring  100,000  volunteers  into  the  field  from  those  States."  18 

When  Mexico  seemed  to  be  slow  about  striking,  the  New 
York  Morning  News  declared  that  "a  feeling  of  disappoint- 
ment" began  to  be  shown  by  the  public,  though  still,  it  added, 
"At  every  spring  of  the  whelp,  at  every  mail  from  the  Gulf, 
the  national  pulse  moves  quicker."  When  the  prospect  of 
immediate  hostilities  appeared  to  be  over,  the  Mobile  Herald 
and  Tribune  announced,  "After  all  the  visions  of  glory  and 
honor  which  have  been  dancing  through  the  popular  brain  for 
the  last  six  months"  nothing  has  been  done.  But  in  reality 
something  had  been  done.  Such  a  state  of  passion  could  not 
simply  go  out  of  existence,  especially  since  the  causes  of  it  still 
remained.     The    people    had    become    yet    more    thoroughly 


THE  CHARGE  THAT  POLK  WISHED  FOR  WAR     127 

inoculated  with  the  idea  of  fighting  Mexico,  and  the  country 
had  not  advanced  far  into  the  new  year  1846  before  all  were 
again  talking  about  it,  said  a  Mississippi  journal.  "Sunday 
editors"  in  particular,  it  added,  "shriek  out  'War!  War! 
War!'"  Will  Polk  be  able  to  withstand  the  clamor?  asked 
the  Memphis  Enquirer;  "We  fear  not."  The  final  rejection 
of  Slidell  naturally  intensified  the  martial  feeling.  "The 
almost  unanimous  voice  of  the  American  people,"  wrote  even 
Governor  Hammond  of  South  Carolina,  insisted  upon  war. 
ScMnuch  for  the  attitude  of  the  public.19  . 

Turning  now  to  the  attitude  of  the  government,  we  are  told 
at  once  that  Polk  deliberately  intended  to  attack  Mexico,  and 
are  offered  various  reasons  for  so  believing.  One  accuser  says 
that  he  was  ambitious  for  personal  glory;  another,  that  he 
desired  to  perpetuate  the  power  of  his  party ;  a  third,  that  he 
felt  anxious  to  cover  up  the  humiliating  result  of  the  Oregon 
negotiation ;  still  another,  that  he  wished  to  be  reelected ; 
and  more  than  one  allege  that  he  was  determined  to  obtain 
California.  For  this  last  view  there  is  just  evidence  enough 
to  create  a  suspicion.]  For  example,  Bancroft  remarked  more 
than  forty  years  after  the  event  that  Polk  said  the  acquisition 
of  that  province  would  be  one  of  his  aims,  and  this  remark  has 
been  cited  as  if  it  proved  the  charge.  But  there  was  not  the 
slightest  impropriety  in  his  desiring  an  immensely  valuable 
territory  that  Webster  had  endeavored  a  few  years  before  to 
acquire,  and  in  1845  Bancroft  himself  represented  the  Presi- 
dent's feeling  toward  Mexico  as  "most  conciliatory."  Indeed, 
after  the  conflict  had  begun,  Bancroft  wrote  privately  to 
Samuel  Hooper,  "We  were  driven  reluctantly  to  war."  20 

Again,  certain  facts  are  cited  and  aligned :  Polk  wanted 
California,  a  war  occurred,  and  he  promptly  took  advantage 
of  the  war  to  occupy  the  desired  territory .  ^But  the  existence 
of  several  points  in  line  does  not  prove  the  existence  of  a  path 
connecting  them,  and  there  is  weighty  evidence  against  the 
suspicion  which  these  facts  naturally  excite,  j While  directing 
Slidell  to  obtain  the  cession  of  northern  California,  if  he  could, 
Buchanan  intimated,  as  we  have  seen,  that  he  should  not  press 
this  matter,  if  so  doing  would  prevent  the  restoration  of  ami- 
cable relations  with  Mexico.  In  other  words,  instead  of 
desiring  to  precipitate  a  war  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  California, 


128  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

Polk  was  ready  to  let  California  go  —  or  at  least  wait  —  for  the 
sake  of  maintaining  peace.  \Besides,  as  we  shall  find  when  we 
come  to  the  operations  on-^ne  western  coast,  Polk  had  a  policy 
for  the  acquisition  of  that  region,  and  this  policy  did  not  con- 
template war.  With  nothing  solid  to  stand  upon,  then,  and 
much  to  stand  against,  this  theory  must  be  given  up.20 

The  other  explanations  of  Polk's  alleged  intention  to  fight 
Mexico  are  evidently  mere  conjectures,  and  prove  nothing. 
The  idea  that  contracts  and  offices  could  strengthen  the  ad- 
ministration and  build  up  the  party  is  mainly,  or  perhaps 
entirely,  fallacious.  ,  There  were  not  enough  to  satisfy  more 
than  a  small  percentage  of  the  hungry  patriots,  and  the  rest 
were  likely  to  take  offence*.  Moreover,  if  given  to  Democrats, 
these  favors  could  make  no  converts ;  while  if  given  to  Whigs, 
the  Democrats  were  sure  to  complain,  and  few  of  the  recipients 
could  change  their  party  for  such  a  reason.  Many  of  Polk's 
chief  troubles,  as  his  diary  shows,  came  from  dissatisfied  ap- 
plicants for  commissions,  and  any  person  well  versed  in  public 
affairs,  could  have  foreseen  that  it  would  be  so.21  And  yet,  after 
all,  the  charge  that  he  purposely  brought  on  the  war  has  been 
so  commonly  believed,  or  at  least  so  frequently  repeated,  that 
it  can  fairly  demand  a  more  extended  examination.22 

First  of  all,  then,  we  must  form  an  estimate  of  Polk.  For 
this  purpose  his  diary  is  extremely  useful.  No  doubt,  like  other 
documents  of  the  sort,  it  colors  some  things  and  omits  others; 
but  so  extremely  busy  a  man  could  not  have  practised  system- 
atic misrepresentation  in  his  daily  record  without  hopelessly 
enmeshing  and  entangling  himself  and  incurring  the  risk  of 
detection  at  many  points,  while  —  occupying,  as  he  did,  a 
position  where  his  every  word  and  act  were  noted  by  others  — 
he  would  have  exposed  himself  often  to  documentary  refutation. 
Besides,  the  marks  of  good  faith  are  without  number.  The  diary 
should  therefore  be  accepted,  and  has  been  accepted,  as  essen- 
tially truthful ;  and  the  man  it  shows  us  —  revealed  also  by  a 
large  amount  of  other  evidence  —  is  a  cold,  narrow,  methodical, 
dogged,  plodding,  obstinate  partisan,  deeply  convinced  of  his 
importance  and  responsibility,  very  wanting  in  humor,  very 
wanting  in  ideality,  very  wanting  in  soulfulness,  inclined  tojbe 
sly,  and  quite  incapable  of  seeing  great  things  in  a  great  way. 
All  know  the  type.     It  is  the  leading  citizen  and  schemer ~6f 


POLK'S  PERSONALITY  129 

the  small  town,  who  marches  up  the  centre  aisle  on  public 
occasions  with  creaking  shoes  and  a  wooden  smile,  and  takes 
his  seat  with  a  backward,  all-embracing  glance.23 

Such  a  person  —  lean,  stiff,  angular,  with  sharp  gray  eyes 
in  a  sad  face,  and  long,  grizzled  hair  brushed  straight  back 
behind  his  ears  —  makes  no  appeal  to  our  sympathies,  and  for 
that  reason  is  almost  sure  to  be  judged  unfairly.  For  example, 
Polk  has  been  called  the  "Mendacious";  but  that  is  unjust. 
Many  things  are  done  in  good  society  which,  if  thrown  upon  a 
screen  before  two  thousand  people,  would  be  recognized  in- 
stantly as  mean;  and  the  same  is  true  in  the  world  of  affairs. 
As  a  lawyer  and  politician  of  Nashville,  Polk  no  doubt  resorted 
to  devices  of  this  kind,  and  he  was  not  the  man  to  realize  the 
difference  between  a  provincial  town  and  a  nation,  and  adapt 
himself  to  his  new  position.  Compelled  to  act,  he  acted  as 
he  could;  used  the  tactics  with*  which  he  was  familiar.  In 
this  manner  he  deceived  men  or  permitted  men  to  deceive 
themselves,  and  those  accustomed-  to  broader  and  larger  and 
nobler  methods  thought  he  lied.^  In  reality  he  was  not  Polk 
the  Mendacious,  but  simply  Polk  the  Mediocre.23) 

Yet  he  was  mediocre  only  as  compared  with  great  standards. 
He  could  by  no  means  be  called  insignificant.  George  Ban- 
croft, secretary  of  the  navy,  has  testified  that  he  surpassed 
every  member  of  his  Cabinet  in  ability  —  not  as  high  a  dis- 
tinction, perhaps,  as  might  have  been  wished,  but  still  high. 
His  will-power  was  ample,  and  his  output  of  mental  energy 
large.  In  seriousness,  industry  and  fidelity  he  left  nothing  to 
be  desired.  Though  strongly  melinea  to  be  positive,  he  would 
listen  patiently  to  others,  discuss  weighty  matters  at  length, 
and  if  convinced  would  yield.  He  reflected  long,  and  yet 
when  the  time  for  decision  came,  he  did  not  shrink  from  taking 
a  stand.  He  intended  to  do  his  duty  as  he,  Polk,  was  able  to 
see  it,  and  spent  himself  liberally  in  that  cause.  He  certainly 
was  religious,  and  no  doubt  —  though  blind  to  the  beauty  of 
uprightness  and  unresponsive  to  the  delicacy  of  honor  —  he 
fully  believed  that  he  was  conscientious.23 

vTq  regard.such  a  man,  uninspired  and  uninspiring,  as  capable 

of  playing  the  brilliant  villain's  role  in  a  grand  international 

tragedy,  of  dreaming  the  conqueror's  dream  and  sacrificing 

his  fellow-citizens  on  the  altar  of  gory  but  gorgeous  ambition f 

vol.  i — k  - "-— 


130  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

of  smelling  the  battle  from  afar  like  the  war-horse  and  crying, 
"Ha,  ha!"  —  this  is  out  of  the  question.  It  was  not  in  him. 
Neither  intellect,  conscience  nor  imagination  permitted  it. 
The  Cabinet,  which  he  selected  with  care,  hampered  by  no 
preelection  agreements,  was  much  like  him;  and  as  Benton 
said,  it  is  "impossible  to  conceiye  of  an  administration  less 
warlike,  or  more  intriguing."  ^Mr.  Polk  never  dreamed  of 
any  other  war  than  a  war  upon  the  Whigs,"  admitted  Robert 
Toombs,  then  a  Whig  member  of  Congress,  in  February,  1846.28 
A  number  of  circumstances  almost  committed  him  to  a 
peaceable  course  toward  Mexico.  During  the  discussions  of 
the  annexation  project  one  of  the  strongest  objections  had  been 
that  it  would  involve  the  country  in  war,  and  its  advocates  had 
strenuously  denied  this  allegation.  The  President  belonged 
to  that  group,  and  Webster  said:  "That  Mr.  Polk  and  his 
Cabinet  will  desire  to  keep  the  peace,  there  is  no  doubt.  The 
responsibility  of  having  provoked  war  by  their  scheme  of 
annexation  is  what  they  would  greatly  dread."  (^Though  many 
plain  citizens  desired  a  fight,  an  influential  body  of  merchants, 
financiers  and  conservatives  did  not;  ) and  in  the  view  of  a 
still  greater  number  a  vital  discrepancy  between  the  pre- 
dictions of  the  annexationists  and  their  later  conduct  would 
surely  have  been  damaging.  (The  Oregon  question  threatened 
to  prove  serious;  and  it  is  hardly  credible  that  Polk,  even  if 
quite  willing  to  meet  an  attack  from  Mexico,  would  have 
desired  ^;o  attack  her  before  settling  this  controversy  with 
Englanq?  The  secretaries  of  state,  war  and  the  navy  did  not 
hail  from  fire-eating  communities.  (_  The  head  of  the  army, 
General  Scott,  was  a  Whig  and  a  recognized  candidate  for  the 
Presidency*)  and  the  chiefs  of  the  Democratic  party  had  fully 
sense  enough  to  understand  that  a  war  might  enable  him  to 
succeed  Polk.  In  fact  the  President's  diary  exhibits  painful 
writhings  due  to  such  a  possibility.  [Finally  war,  no  matter  how 
successful,  would  mean  taxes,  and  even*  these  who  demanded 
a  fight  might  not  be  willing  to  pay  for  itA  fcertainly  Polk  was 
not  self-sacrificing  enough  to  desire  the  odium  of  laying  war 
taxes  for  the  sake  of  bringing  Scott  into  the  White  House  A 
Besides,  it  looked  as  if  war  expenses  could  not  fail  to  strengthen 
the  tariff  system,. and  that  was  obnoxious  to  a  great  number  of 
the  Democrats.24 


POLK'S  COURSE  PACIFIC  131 

Polk's  professions  were  every  way  most  pacific.  The  assur- 
ances conveyed  to  Almonte  after  he  made  his  protest  have 
already  been  mentioned.  In  August,  1845,  Polk  wrote  con- 
fidentially to  a  Senator,  "We  will  not  be  the  aggressors  upon 
Mexico."  A  month  later  Buchanan  declared  in  a  "Private 
and  Personal"  letter  to  our  minister  at  London:  "The  Presi- 
dent does  not  intend  to  proceed  beyond  a  just  and  righteous 
self-defence,  and  he  is  ready  to  present  the  olive  branch  to 
Mexico  the  moment  he  knows  it  will  be  accepted."  It  is  hardly 
supposable  that  our  secretary  of  state  intended  to  deceive  our 
most  important  representative  abroad,  or  that  he  was  deceived 
himself  by  Polk  in  so  vital  a  matter.25 

The  confidential  orders  of  the  government  were  emphatically 
un warlike  in  tone.  To  Conner,  commanding  in  the  Gulf,  the 
secretary  of  the  navy  wrote  in  March,  1845,  "  The  disposition 
of  the  President  is  to  maintain  the  most  friendly  relations  with 
the  Mexican  Republic,  v  and  in  substance  this  declaration  was 
repeated  in  the  following  July  and  August.  "Take  special 
care,"  the  department  said  to  Stockton,  who  had  a  few  vessels 
on  the  Texas  coast,  "to  avoid  every  act  that  can  admit  of 
being  construed  as  inconsistent  with  our  friendly  relations" 
with  Mexico.  Commodore  Sloat,  in  the  Pacific,  was  told  in 
"Secret  and  Confidential"  instructions  dated  June  24,  1845, 
"The  President  hopes,  most  earnestly,  that  the  peace  of  the 
two  .countries  may  not  be  disturbed  ...  do  everything  con- 
sistent with  the  national  honor"  to  avoid  a  rupture;  and  these 
instructions  to  Sloat  were  most  noteworthy,  for  the  commander 
on  the  Pacific  station  was  liable  to  be  out  of  touch  with  the 
government  for  a  year  at  a  time,  and  he  needed  to  be  sure  as 
to  its  general  policy.26 

For  the  guidance  of  our  charge  in  Texas,  where  many  feared 
a  Mexican  invasion  and  called  for  American  troops,  a  clear 
statement  of  our  intentions  was  equally  necessary,  and  Bu- 
chanan wrote  to  Donelson  at  about  the  same  time,  "The 
Government  will  studiously  refrain  from  all  acts  of  hostility 
towards  that  republic  [Mexico],  unless  these  should  become 
absolutely  necessary  in  self-defence."  Quite  in  line  with  all 
this  was  the  order  cancelling  Fremont's  second  exploring 
trip  to  the  far  west,  because  he  had  equipped  his  party  in 
a  military  style  —  an  order  that  was  decidedly  over-strict, 


132  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

since  precautions  against  the  Indians  could  not  be  neglected. 
In  his  Message  to  the  Senate,  March  24,  1846,  the  President 
declared  it  his  "settled  purpose"  to  maintain  peace  with 
Mexico,  and  it  is  believed  that  no  expression  of  his  indicating 
a  desire  to  provoke  a  conflict  can  be  found.26 

The  measures  of  the  administration  corresponded  with  its 
professions.  In  the  first  place  this  was  true  negatively.  It 
would  not  be  easy  to  deny  that  Mexico's  refusal  to  pay  the 
instalments  of  our  awards  could  have  been  handled  by  our 
government  in  a  way  to  enrage  this  nation,  already  so  eager  for 
the  fray,  and  probably  her  severance  of  diplomatic  relations 
might  have  been  used  to  precipitate  an  issue;  but  no  advan- 
tage was  taken  of  either  opportunity.  Another  instance  is 
even  more  signal,  f One  can  hardly  doubt  that  Polk  might  have 
brought  on  a  war  in  the  summer  of  1845,  had  he  so  desired. 
Not  only  had  Mexico  grossly  insulted  us,  refused  to  pay  those 
awards,  and  severed  relations  with  us  both  at  her  capital  and 
at  our  own,  but  she  had  solemnly  announced  that  our  annexing 
Texas  would  be  regarded  as  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of 
war,  notified  her  agents  privately  and  the  world  at  large  pub- 
licly that  she  was  going  to  fight,  and  begun  preparations  for 
immediate  hostilities.  Had  Polk  summoned  Congress  and  laid 
all  the  facts  before  it,  a  declaration  of  war,  or  at  least  an  ulti- 
matum that  Mexico  would  in  all  probability  have  rejected, 
must  certainly,  or  almost  certainly,  have  been  the  response; 
and  if  one  may  judge  from  the  state  of  mind  existing  in  the 
United  States  at  the  time,  our  people  would  in  the  main  have 
supported  such  a  course.  (^"The  current  of  public  opinion," 
said  the  St.  Louis  Republican, J'  seems  now  strongly  inclined 
in  favor  of  a  war  with  Mexico."  "All  the  better  portions  of 
the  press  of  the  country, "  was  the  summary  of  the  New  Orleans 
Picayune,  "are  urgent  for  the  adoption  of  the  most  energetic 
measures"  against  that  country.  Almost  every  Democratic 
journal  and  a  vast  majority  of  the  Whig  journals,  declared  the 
Washington  Globe,  were  for  crushing  Mexico  at  once.  "The 
people  will  approve"  of  vigorous  action,  admitted  even  the 
Charleston  Courier.27 

But  Polk  did  not  adopt  a  course  of  that  sort.  Pie  took  no 
such  steps  to  settle  matters  with  England  as  a  President  of 
ordinary  common  sense  would  have  taken,  if  anxious,  to  fight 


POLK  DID  NOT  DESIRE  THE  WAR  133 

Mexico  ;  anrfqo  serious.. measures  werp  ad  ojpjgdjjijn  create  our 
nominal  .arrn^ia^urr^  In  September,  he  re- 

quested the  members  of  the  Cabinet  to  make  their  estimates  for 
the  coming  year  on  "the  most  economical  scale, y  and  in  fact 
only  twenty-six  hundred  additional  men  were  asked  for  the  army 
—  none  for  the  navy.  A  note  from  the  secretary  of  the  navy 
to  Captain  Perry  —  "  We  are  jogging  on  quietly  this  winter, 
not  anticipating  war" — well  represents  our  military  and  naval 
programme ;  and  a  letter  to  Conner  explains  it :  "  We  all 
hope  Mexico  will  agree  to  a  peace."  Knowing,  as  Polk  must 
have  known,  the  deep  and  widespread  fear  of  Mexican  priva- 
teers, he  would  have  been  prevented  by  a  merely  selfish  regard 
for  the  good  opinion  of  the  public  from  planning  war  without 
making  some  dispositions  to  protect,  or  at  least  warn,  our 
millions  of  floating  property.  And  apparently  even  the 
ardor  of  our  young  men  for  combat  did  not  seriously  move 
him.28 

/  In  the  second  place,  Polk's  action  pointed  the  same  way  as 
his  non-action.  No  one  could  tjunk^oJLjaJiaL^ati^ 
to  conciliate  Mp\j™Tjfra:fTifi  ^  ZLULJILLJL lntn  operation.  /  The 
chief  object  of  Parrott's  mission,  which  was  private  and  there- 
fore could  not  have  been  intended  for  effect  upon  the  world, 
was  understood  by  Parrott  himself  to  be,  "preventing  a  decla- 
ration of  war,  by  Mexico,  against  the  United  States."  (  In 
appointing  Slidell,  as  even  the  Am&rican  Review  admitted,  the 
President  was  evidently  sincere.^^At  the  end  of  March,  1846, 
Polk  received  advices  from  Slidell  which  made  it  seem  quite 
possible  that  he  would  finally  be  given  a  hearing,  and  im- 
mediately he  set  on  foot  a  plan  to  furnish  Paredes  with  funds, 
enable  him  to  keep  the  army  faithful,  and  thus  encourage  him 
to  settle  matters  amicably.  Indeed,  all  that  is  known  of  this 
mission  from  beginning  to  end,  including  SlidelPs  private 
letters  to  Buchanan  and  numerous  details  that  it  would  be 
wearisome  to  hear  specified,  show  that  Polk  strongly  desired 
1 —  as  the  Mexicans  accused  him  of  desiring  —  a  restoration 
of  friendly  intercourse;  and  when  the  purpose  had  evidently 
failed,  Slidell  gave  final  evidence  of  that  disposition  by  writing  : 
"I  am  greatly  mortified  at  the  total  failure  of  a  mission  com- 
menced under  auspices  apparently  the  most  flattering,  but 
that  mortification  is  much  mitigated  by  the  consciousness, 


134  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

that  no  fault  of  omission  or  commission,  can  justly  be  at- 
tributed either  to  the  Government  or  to  the  Legation."  29 

In  short,  then,  we  find  that  Polk  had  the  gravest  reasons  for 
desiring  friendly  intercourse?  with  Mexico,  and  probably  felt 
none  for  plotting  war ;  thatla  variety  of  personal  and  political 
circumstances  naturally  inclined  him  toward  peace;  that  his 
declarations,  both  public  and  private,  pointed  consistently  in 
that  direction  as  long  as  any  hope  of  an  amicable  settlement 
remained ;  \and  that  what  he  did  in  repeated  and  most  signifi- 
cant ways,  as  wfcll  as  what  he  refrained  from  doing,  had  the 
same  meaning.  I  We  must  therefore  give  up  the  idea  that  he^ 
desired,  and  fronithe  first  intended,  to  have  a  war  with  Mexico.  J 

\A\\  prospects  of  negotiation  came  to  an  end,  however,  and 
the  administration  found  itself  confronted  by  a  crisis.  The 
dignity  of  the  United  States  had  certainly  been  outraged  in 
a  defiant  and  contemptuous  manner)  By  the  acts  of  Mexico, 
diplomatic  relations  had  been  completely  severed,  and  she 
would  not  renew  them  on  any  terms  which  the  United  States 
could  think  of  accepting.  Commercial  intercourse  was  prac- 
tically at  an  end,  and  the  interests  of  our  citizens  were  so  gravely 
prejudiced,  that  from  this  point  of  view  even  a  London  paper, 
the  Examiner,  admitted  reluctantly  that  the  situation  was 
becoming  "intolerable  to  the  United  States. "f  Our  claims  and 
our  awards  were  still  facts.  "The  honor  of  this  government  is 
pledged  to  our  own  people  for  the  diligent  and  proper  prose- 
cution of  these  claims,"  our  secretary  of  state  had  said  in  1843, 
and  it  was  perfectly  true.  To  let  them  go  unpaid,  in  addition 
to  being  internationally  immoral,  would  have  wronged  our 
aggrieved  citizens;  and  to  pay  them  from  our  own  revenues, 
besides  being  immoral,  pusillanimous  and  ridiculous,  would 
have  been  unfair  to  all  of  our  tax-payers.  We  had  observed 
no  more  willingness,  although  the  Mexican  government  had 
nearly  always  been  sufficiently  strong,  to  do  us  justice  before  an- 
nexation became  an  issue  than  afterwards ;  and  in  fact  Ash- 
burnham,  a  British  representative  at  Mexico,  did  not  exaggerate 
when  he  wrote,  "They  will  not  pay  but  on  compulsion."  (There 
was  therefore  no  way  to  collect  our  due  except  by  force\r 

If  our  long  forbearance  appeared  to  American  editors  a 
mistake,  much  more  reason  had  the  administration  to  entertain 
that  opinion,  for  our  ministers  and  consuls  in  Mexico  had 


A  CRISIS  135 

repeatedly  urged  it,  and  Slidell  had  summed  up  his  experience 
there  in  the  following  words,  amply  justified  by  the  sequel : 
"We  shall  never  be  able  to  treat  with  her  on  fair  terms  until 
she  has  been  taught  to  respect  us  .  .  .  here  all  amicable  ad- 
vances are  considered  as  indicative  either  of  weakness  or  treach- 
ery." "Be  assured,"  he  added  privately  to  Buchanan,  "that 
nothing  is  to  be  done  with  these  people,  until  they  shall  have 
been  chastised."  The  solemn  declarations  of  a  succession  of 
trusted  agents  that  our  forbearance  was  a  tactical  error  were 
facts  that  our  government  was  bound  to  consider;  and  by 
way  of  confirmation  it  had  not  only  our  complete  failure  to 
get  on  with  Mexico,  but  the  success  of  a  power  which  seemed 
to  have  pursued  a  very  different  course,  for  in  October,  1845, 
our  consul  at  Vera  Cruz  had  given  the  state  department  a 
specimen  of  England's  tone.  Mexico,  said  she  to  the  minister 
of  relations,  must  fulfil  to  the  letter  every  contract  with  a 
British  subject,31 

Furthermore  our  government  feltx  seriously  concerned  about 
the  European  monarchical  schemes.  )  Early  in  January,  1846, 
the  London  Times  printed  a  letter  from  its  correspondent  at 
Mexico  in  which  the  opinion  was  expressed  that  a  foreign  prince, 
if  "seconded  by  any  leading  European  power,"  could  gain  a 
Mexican  throne.  A  week  later  the  same  journal,  recom- 
mending a  Spanish  king  as  the  only  possible  cure  for  the  ills  of 
Mexico,  had  remarked  that  the  United  States  could  not  oppose 
the  "united  policy  of  the  European  Powers";  and  at  about 
the  same  time  the  Picayune  had  announced,  that  it  was  pro- 
posed to  give  Cuba  to  England  for  her  cooperation  in  the 
monarchical  plan./  Our  government  had,  and  could  have, 
no  intention  of  submitting  to  such  European  manoeuvres. 
Any  attempt  of  England  and  France  to  place  a  king  on  the 
throne  of  Mexico,  wrote  Buchanan,  "  would  be  resisted  by  all 
the  power  of  the  United  States  0"*5nd  the  best  way  to  oppose 
it  was  to  effect  a  definitive  settlement  of  our  difficulties  with 
Mexico  at  once  —  first,  because  this  of  itself  would  very  likely 
make  the  development  of  the  rather  complicated  scheme 
appear,  in  view  of  the  "Monroe  Doctrine,"  impracticable, 
and,  secondly,  because  no  European  power  could,  with  any 
show  of  decency,  interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  that  coun- 
try, while  she  was  actually  at  war.32 


136  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Chivalry  does  not  govern  international  relations  even  at 
the  present  day,  and  in  1845  sentiment  was  perhaps  less 
tender  on  the  subject  than  it  now  is.  Vattel,  the  recognized 
authority  on  the  law  of  nations,  wrote  thus :  "  Every  nation 
.  .  .  has,  therefore,  a  right  .  .  .  to  preserve  herself  from  all 
injuries.  .  .  .  When  the  evil  is  done,  the  same  right  to  security 
authorizes  the  offended  party  to  endeavour  to  obtain  a  com- 
plete reparation,  and  to  employ  force  for  that  purpose,  if 
rfeeessary." 33 

l(  Moreover,  the  United  States  could  appeal,  not  only  to  strict 
L-  raw,  but  still  more  forcibly  to  broad  equity.  To  sum  up  the 
case  in  one  sentence,  Mexico,  our  next  neighbor,  on  no  grounds 
that  could  be  recognized  by  the  United  States,  repudiated  her 
treaties  with  us,  ended,  official  relations,  aimed  to  prevent, 
commercial  intercourse,  planned  to  deprive  us  of  all  influence 
on  certain  issues  vitally  connected  with  our  declared  foreign 
policy,  seemed  likely  to  sell  California  to  some  European  rival 
of  ours,  made  it  impossible  for  us  to  urge  long-standing  claims 
or  watch  over  citizens  dwelling  within  her  borders,  refused  to 
pay  even  her  admitted  debts  to  us,  claimed  the  privilege.of 
applying  to  our  government  publicly  the  most  opprobrious 
epithets  in  the  vocabulary  of  nations,  designed  to  keep  our 
people  in  a  constant  state  of  uncertainty  and  alarm,  intended 
to  cause  us  the  expense  of  maintaining  for  defensive  purposes 
a  large  army  and  a  large  navy,  planned  to  destroy  our  com- 
merce by  commissioning  privateers,  claimed  the  right  to  harry 
Texas,  a  part  of  the  Union,  at  will,  threatened  and  prepared  for 
war,  and  proposed  to  assume  such  an  attitude  that,  whenever 
encouraged  by  foreign  support  or  any  other,  circumstances, 
she  could  open  fire  upon  us  without  even  giving  notice,  She 
had  informed  the  world  that  it  was  her  privilege  to  keep  on 
harrying  Texas  from  generation  to  generation ;  and  on  a  broader 
scale,  but  in  a  manner  precisely  analogous,  it  was  now  pro- 
posed to  hang  upon  the  flank  of  the  United  States./  Foreign 
mediation  could  not  be  invoked,  for  all  the  American  states 
were  naturally  supposed  to  be  prejudiced,  and  it  was  contrary 
to  our  interest  and  avowed  policy  to  allow  European  inter- 
vention in  the  affairs  of  this  continent ;  and  tio  end  of  what 
had  become  truly  an  intolerable  state  of  affairs  could  be  seen) 
for  Mexico  declared  she  would  never  give  up  her  pretensions 


THE  CASE  URGENT  ".  137 

until  she  had  recovered  Texas,  which  it  was  now  beyond  her 
power  to  do.34 

(jt  rested  with  our  government,  therefore,  as  the  agent  of 
national  defence  and  the  representative  of  national  dignity 
and  interests,  to  apply  a  remedy)  Of  course,  too,  all  the  pres- 
sure of  warlike  sentiment  among  our  people,  es^eiiaiiy^njjie 
President's  party,  and  even  the  pressure  of  motives  distinctly 
selfish,  had  to  be  recognized  more  or  less,  for  such  is  the  nature 
of  popular  government.  Very  likely  Polk's  abandoning  a  part 
of  our  Oregon  claim  rendered  it  the  more  necessary  to  avoid 
flinching  in  the  Mexican  affair;  and  accordingly  on  April  21, 
1846,  after  long  consideration  of  the  matter,  he  informed  the 
Cabinet  that  our  relations  with  Mexico  "could  not  be  per- 
mitted to  remain"  as  they  were,  and  that  he  thought  he  should 
recommend  to  Congress  the  adoption  of  energetic  measures  for 
the  redress  of  our  grievances,  which  meant  also  of  course  a  full 
settlement  of  our  differences  jyjthjJiat  power.  In -.truth  no 
other  course  would  have  been  [patriotic  dr  even /rational.35 


VII 
THE  PRELIMINARIES  OF  THE  CONFLICT 
•^  April,  1845-April,  1846 

Strangely  enough,  although  our  diplomatic  troubles  with 
Mexico  would  almost  certainly  have  led  to  hostilities,  the  war 
actually  came  about  in  a  totally  different  way.1 

During  the  spring  and  early  summer  of  1845,  in  view  of 
Mexican-^rftreats  and  of  reports  from  trustworthy  sources  that 
an  invasion  of  Texas  might  be  expected,2  it  was  decided  by 
our  government  that  when  her  people  should  have  accepted 
our  annexation  proposal,  as  they  were  almost  sure  to  do,  it 
would  become  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  defend  her ; 3 
and  this  decision  made  the  question  where  her  southern  boun- 
dary lay  a  practical  matter.  It  was  a  thorny  subject.  In  1834 
Mexico  herself  did  not  feel  sure  about  the  line ;  and  according 
to  the  chief  technical  officer  in  our  state  department,  sole 
commissioner  to  negotiate  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Mexico,  if 
an  official  demarcation  had  existed,  the  war  between  Texas 
and  the  mother-country  had  rubbed  it  out.  The  former  now 
claimed  the  territory  as  far  as  the  Rio  Grande,  but  she  did  not 
establish  her  title  by  occupying  completely  and  effectively 
the  region  south  of  the  Nueces.  Only  by  an  agreement  with 
Mexico,  indeed,  could  limits  have  been  fixed.  So  far  as  it 
concerned  the  republic  of  Texas,  this  was  in  effect  the  situ- 
ation.4 

For  the  United  States,  however,  this  was  not  the  whole 
story.  Down  to  1819  our  government  had  insisted  that 
Louisiana  extended  to  the  Rio  Grande.  In  other  language, 
since  the  southern  part  of  Louisiana  was  called  Texas,  the 
official  view  was  that  Texas  bordered  on  that  stream.  Such, 
then,  was  in  effect  the  contention  of  Jefferson,  Madison,  Mon- 
roe,  John   Quincy   Adams,   Pinckney,   Livingston   and   Clay, 

138 


THE  UNITED  STATES  ARMY  139 

who  represented  three  administrations  in  upholding  the  claim. 
By  the  treaty  of  1819  we  did  not  withdraw  from  our  position, 
but  merely  arranged  to  "cede"  whatever  possessions  we  had 
west  of  the  Sabine  for  certain  valuable  considerations.  From 
1819  to  1845,  Texas,  considered  under  its  geographical  and 
historical  aspects  as  a  district  of  old  Louisiana,  appeared  to 
border  on  the  Rio  Grande  not  less  truly  than  before,  for  no 
other  line  became  established.  Hence  it  seemed  evident  from 
this  point  of  view,  that  by  annexing  Texas  we  revived  our 
old  claim,  our  old  official  view,  and  the  testimony  of  all  those 
eminent  statesmen.  Our  government  so  held.  November 
10,  1845,  in  explaining  to  Slidell  the  extent  of  Texas,  Buchanan 
went  back  to  Jefferson,  Madison,  Monroe,  Pinckney  and  the 
discussion  of  the  Louisiana  boundary.  Polk,  as  the  head  of 
our  government,  could  not  well  repudiate,  simply  on  his  own 
authority,  the  solemn  declarations  of  Presidents  and  other 
high  officials,  in  which  through  a  term  of  years  the  nation  had 
acquiesced.  The  fact  tjrat  for  a  considerable  time  the  Texans, 
asserting  the  Rio  Grande  line,  had  maintained  themselves 
against  Mexico  perhaps  had  some  confirmatory  value;  and 
Polk  was  further  bound,  not  only  by  his  apparently  sincere 
belief  in  our  old  claim,  but  by  the  pledge  he  had  given  to  Texas 
and  the  pledge  our  official  representative  had  given  her,  ex- 
pressly to  promote  the  cause  of  annexation,  that  he  would 
maintain  the  claim  as  President.     These  were  grips  of  steel.5 

To  meet  the  responsibility  thus  incurred,  we  had  eight 
regiments  of  infantry,  four  of  "artillery"  and  two  of  dragoons, 
including  about  7200  men.  The  "artillery"  regiments,  which 
were  theoretically  expected  to  serve  in  fortifications  with 
heavy  guns,  were  armed,  equipped  and  drilled  as  infantry; 
but  one  company  of  each  had  a  field  battery,  and  under  the 
instruction  of  excellent  officers  had  reached  a  high  state  of 
skill  in  using  it.  The  infantry  and  cavalry,  drilled  on  the 
French  system,  were  in  a  good  condition  generally,  though 
division  among  coast  and  frontier  stations,  besides  impairing 
discipline  and  efficiency,  had  prevented  manoeuvring  in  large 
bodies;  and  the  infantry  soldiers  in  particular,  inured  on  the 
border  to  hard  service,  felt  now  a  reasonable  confidence  in 
themselves  and  their  immediate  superiors.  The  forty-five 
capable  engineer  officers  understood  their  duties  fairly  well, 


140  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

except  that  a  lack  of  men  to  execute  operations  had  left  them, 
as  the  head  of  the  corps  admitted,  too  much  like  theoretical 
mariners.  A-  few  well-trained  topographical  engineers,  a 
small  medical  staff,  and  a  quartermaster's  department  rounded 
out  this  miniature  army.  Nearly  all  the  infantry  carried 
flint-lock  muskets,  and  numerous  defects  and  deficiencies 
existed ;  but  probably  the  forces  were  better  equipped  for 
service  than  has  generally  been  supposed.  In  view  of  possible 
difficulties  with  Mexico,  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  troops 
were  placed  at  or  near  Fort  Jesup  on  the  western  border  of 
Louisiana ;  and  in  June,  1845,  these  included  the  Third  In- 
fantry, eight  companies  of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  and  seven 
companies  of  the  Second  Dragoons.6 

Their  commander  was  Brevet  Brigadier  General  Zachary 
Taylor.  This  child  of  destiny,  born  in  1784,  had  grown  up 
and  gained  some  rudiments  of  an  education  amidst  the  Indian 
troubles  of  the  Kentucky  border.  At  the  age  of  twenty-three 
he  had  been  commissioned  first  lieutenant  in  the  Seventh  Infan- 
try, and  after  showing  remarkable  coolness  and  intrepidity  in 
two  small  affairs  during  our  second  war  with  England  and  the 
Black  Hawk  War,  he  had  won  a  stubborn  fight  in  1837  against 
the  Seminoles  at  the  head  of  some  1100  soldiers.  Three  years 
later  he  was  assigned  to  a  supervising  command  in  the  south- 
west, and  this  included  Fort  Jesup.7 

(Personally  Taylor  possessed  a  strong  character,  a  very  strong 
character,  neither  exhausted  by  self-indulgence  nor  weakened 
by  refinement  and  study.  He  was  every  inch  a  man^  with  a 
great  heart,  a  mighty  will,  a  profound  belief  in  himself )  and  a 
profound  belief  in  human  nature.  The  makings  of  a^nero  lay 
in  him,  and  to  a  large  extent  the  making  had  been  done.  He 
was  gifted,  too,  with  solid  common  sense,  not  a  little  shrewd- 
ness and  ambition,  a  thorough  knowledge  of  men  —  the  sort 
of  men  that  he  knew  at  all  —  a  military  eye,  and  a  cool,  re- 
sourceful intelligence  that  was  always  at  work  in  its  own  rather 
ponderous  fashion.  The  sharp  gray  eyes  and  the  contraction 
of  his  brows  that  made  the  upper  part  of  his  face  look  severe 
were  tempered  by  the  benignity  of  the  lower  part ;  and  the 
occasional  glimmer  of  a  twinkle  betokened  humor.7 

On  the  other  hand/  everything  about  him  suggested  the 
backwoodsman.     His    thick-set    and    rather    corpulent    body, 


GENERAL  ZACHARY  TAYLOR  141 

mounted  on  remarkably  short  legs,  typified  barbaric  strength. 
In  speech  he  was  rough  and  ungrammatical,  in  dress  unkempt 
and  even  dirty,  and  in  every  external  of  his  profession  unmili- 
tary.  He  never  had  seen  a  real  battle  nor  even  a  real  army. 
Ignorance  and  lack  of  mental  discipline  made  him  proud  of  his 
natural  powers  and  self-mastered  attainments,  and  he  saw  very 
distinctly  the  weaknesses  of  school-taught  and  book-taught  men. 
West  Pointers,  trim  in  person  and  in  mind  but  inferior  to  him  in 
strength,  practical  sense  and  familiarity  with  men  and  things, 
he  felt  strongly  inclined  to  belittle;  and  this  feeling  went  so 
far  that  he  despised,  or  at  any  rate  frequently  seemed  to  de- 
spise, knowledge  itself.  )  He  could  not,  however,  fail  to  recog- 
nize on  occasions  the  professional  superiority  of  his  trained 
officers,  and  no  doubt  found  himself  unable  now  and  then  to 
defend  his  opinions.  In  such  cases,  being  by  temperament 
extremely  firm,  he  naturally  took  refuge  in  obstinacy;  and 
sometimes  he  appears  to  have  been  positively  mulish,  holding 
to  his  own  view  after  he  must  have  seen  its  incorrectness.7 

/From  various  logical  results  of  these  limitations  Taylor  was 
happily  saved  by  Major  General  Winfield  Scott,  theTiead  of  the 
army,  who  purposely  gave  him  Captain  W.  W.  S.  Bliss  as 
adjutant  general.  Bliss  was  described  by  a  good  authority 
as  the  peer  of  any  man  alive  in  learning,  statesmanship  and 
military  capacity ;  and  he  felt  willing  to  give  the  General  — 
later  his  father^n-law  —  the  unstinted  benefit  of  all  his  talents 
and  attainments^  With  him  at  his  elbow  Taylor  could  be  sure 
of  trustworthy  information,  honest  and  competent  advice, 
a  friendly  hand  to  supplement  or  subtract,  and  a  skilful  pen 
to  report,  explain  and,  if  necessary,  discreetly  color  the  facts. 
Captain  Williams,  an  able  officer,  wrote  in  1848  that  he  could 
not  imagine  one  man's  being  more  indebted  to  another  than 
Taylor  was  to  his  assistant.  In  other  words,  "Taylor"  in  the 
history  of  the  Mexican  War  is  the  name  of  a  double  star,  one 
partner  in  which  was  the  dominating  personality  of  the  General, 
and  the  other  a  fine,  trained  intelligence  known  as  Bliss.8 

Taylor,  then,  having  been  warned  by  a  despatch  of  May  28, 
1845,  to  hold  the  troops  in  readiness,  was  confidentially  ordered 
on  the  fifteenth  of  June  to  place  them  at  some  port  where  they 
could  readily  embark  for  the  Texas  frontier,  and,  after  learning 
that  our  annexation  overture  had  been  accepted,  to  occupy 


142  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

"on  or  near  the  Rio  Grande  del  Norte"  such  a  position,  favor- 
able to  the  health  of  the  men,  as  would  be  "best  adapted 
to  repel  invasion."  Accordingly  he  concentrated  his  infantry 
at  New  Orleans,  where  official  notice  that  annexation  had  been 
accepted  by  Texas  reached  him.  Further  orders  from  William 
L.  Marcy,  the  secretary  of  war,  enjoined  upon  him  to  "avoid 
any  Acts  of  aggression,"  and  in  particular  to  refrain  from 
disturbing  any  Mexican  posts  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river 
"unless  an  actual  state  of  war  should  exist";  artd  under 
these  instructions  the  forces  left  New  Orleans  toward  the 
end  of  July  for  Aransas  Bay,  Texas.  His  troops  —  counting 
the  dragoons,  who  set  out  by  land  for  San  Antonio,  about  120 
miles  from  the  coast,  a  little  later  —  numbered  some  1500. 9 

Taylor  himself  with  a  part  of  the  command  reached  his 
destination  on  the  twenty-fifth;  landed  his  men,  with  such 
rapidity  as  meagre  facilities  and  heavy  surf  would  permit, 
on  St.  Joseph's  Island;  and  then,  with  row  boats  and  small 
sailing-craft,  conveyed  them  some  twenty-five  miles  farther 
to  Corpus  Christi,  a  hamlet  on  the  south  side  of  the  Nueces 
River  at  its  mouth.  News  that  Mexico  was  on  the  point  of 
beginning  hostilities  caused  great  alarm  presently;  but  no 
enemy  came,  and  by  the  end  of  August  the  General  felt  secure. 
The  rest  of  the  troops  from  Fort  Jesup  were  then  on  the  ground. 
Seven  companies  of  the  Seventh  Infantry,  collected  laboriously 
from  a  number  of  points,  had  arrived.  Two  volunteer  artillery 
companies  from  New  Orleans  had  come  to  the  rescue;  and 
a  party  of  Texan  rangers  were  near  him.  The  Mexicans,  on 
the  other  hand,  showed  no  signs  of  concentrating.10 

Naturally  the  public  inquired  whether  the  occupation  of 
Corpus  Christi,  and  especially  the  words  "on  or  near"  the 
Rio  Grande,  could  be  justified.  But,  as  the  London  Times  — 
a  witness  by  no  means  prejudiced  in  our  favor  —  observed, 
"When  the  United  States  Government,  with  the  full  sanction 
of  the  American  people,  consummated  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  .  .  .  they  should,  according  to  all  the  usages  of  civilized 
Governments,  have  proceeded  to  take  military  means  for  the 
protection  of  their  new  frontier."  The  performance  of  this 
duty  involved  giving  the  commander  a  somewhat  liberal  discre- 
tion, for  southern  Texas  was  a  region  of  which  the  Washington 
authorities  knew  very  little,  and  what  steps  it  would  be  proper 


CONDITIONS  AT  CORPUS  CHRISTI  143 

for  the  General  to  take,  should  the  Mexicans  launch  a  raid  at 
San  Antonio,  was  known  there  even  less.  It  would  have 
required  about  a  month  to  send  information  and  receive  orders 
based  upon  it.  Authority  to  occupy  such  a  post  as  might 
seem  necessary,  in  view  of  the  ground,  the  vicinity  and  the 
news,  had  to  be  given.  Taylor  understood  that  Corpus  Christi, 
which  belonged  to  Texas  by  the  same  right  of  effective  occu- 
pation as  Nacogdoches  or  Galveston,  satisfied  the  terms  of 
the  order ;  the  government  accepted  that  interpretation ;  and 
the  country  acquiesced.11 

Gradually  his  forces  assumed  rather  formidable  proportions. 
Some  of  the  troops  had  to  come  from  Detroit,  and  some  from 
Florida ;  but  it  was  feared  in  all  quarters  that  a  heavy  Mexican 
body  might  cross  the  Rio  Grande  any  day,  and  the  reinforce- 
ments made  quick  time.  October  13  the  army  included 
General  W.  J.  Worth's  command,  called  the  first  brigade, 
which  comprised  the  Eighth  Infantry  and  twelve  companies 
of  the  so-called  artillery  consolidated  as  a  battalion;  the 
second  brigade,  consisting  of  the  Fifth  and  the  Seventh  Infantry 
under  Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  S.  Mcintosh;  the  third  brigade 
under  Colonel  William  Whistler,  which  included  the  Third 
and  the  Fourth  Infantry;  the  Second  Dragoons,  commanded 
by  Colonel  D.  E.  Twiggs;  some  United  States  and  New 
Orleans  field  artillery,  and  the  Texas  rangers.  In  all,  officers 
and  men,  there  were  about  3900.12 

\Taylor,  accustomed  to  frontier  conditions,  described  his 
troops  as  healthy,  remarkably  well-behaved  and  very  com- 
fortable. I$ut  in  reality  the  tents  could  scarcely  keep  out  a 
heavy  dew ;  ^for  weeks  together  every  article  in  many  of  them 
was  thoroughly  soaked;  and  much  of  the  time  water  stood 
three  or  four  feet  deep  in  some.  The  weather  oscillated  sharply 
between  sultry  heat  and  piercing  northers,  so  that  one  lay 
down  gasping  for  breath  and  woke  up  freezing.  As  hardly 
enough  wood  could  be  obtained  for  the  cooks,  camp-fires  were 
usually  out  of  tjie,  question ;  and  only  brackish  drinking  water 
could  be  had.  tAt  one  time  nearly  twenty  per  cent  of  the  men 
were  on  the  sictlist,  and  half  of  the  others  more  or  less  ill. 
Taylor  knew  so  little  of  military  evolutions  that  he  could  not 
get  his  men  properly  into  line,  and  few  of  his  chief  officers 
excelled  him  very  much,  j  Despite  orders  from  the  President, 


144  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

military  exercises  were  given  up  after  a  time;  a  sullen  torpor 
and  silence  reigned  in  the  camp,  and  many  deserted.  Mean- 
while a  horde  of  gamblers  and  liquor-sellers  opened  booths 
near  by;  and  the  soldiers,  driven  to  desperation,  paid  what 
little  money  they  had  to  be  drugged  into  insensibility  or  crazed 
into  brawls  and  orgies.  Some,  if  not  many,  of  the  officers  gave 
up  acting  like  gentlemen,  and  one  at  least  even  forgot  how  to 
be  honest.13 

Then  a  dispute  regarding  precedence  brought  the  camp  to 
the  verge  of  battle.  Twiggs  had  the  honor  of  seniority  as 
colonel ;  but  Worth,  as  a  brevet  brigadier  general,  insisted 
that  should  Taylor  cease  to  hold  the  command,  it  would  fall 
to  him.  The  question  was  referred  to  Washington;  and 
Scott,  directed  by  Marcy  to  settle  it,  gave  a  ruling  in  favor  of 
brevet  rank.  This  decision  did  not,  however,  end  the  contro- 
versy. More  than  a  hundred  officers  joined  in  an  appeal  to 
Congress,  while  Worth  declared  he  would  maintain  his  rights 
"to  any  extreme."  Taylor,  instead  of  using  his  personal  and 
official  strength  to  enforce  a  modus  vivendi  until  the  issue  could 
be  properly  decided,  or  at  least  refraining  from  all  accentuation 
of  it,  ordered  a  general  review,  and  in  spite  of  the  ruling  an- 
nounced by  his  superior  officer,  assigned  Twiggs  to  command 
on  that  occasion ;  and  then,  finding  that  serious  trouble  would 
ensue,  proved  himself,  by  countermanding  the  review,  unable 
to  maintain  even  his  own  authority.  After  all  this,  discipline 
could  hardly  be  said  to  exist.  Moreover,  a  general  want  of 
confidence  in  the  commander  prevailed.  "Wrhether  an  idea, 
strategic  or -of  any  other  description,  has  had  the  rudeness  to 
invade  the  mind  or  imagination  of  our  chief  is  a  matter  of 
doubt,"  said  Worth;  "We  are  literally  a  huge  body  without  a 
head."  If  Taylor  succeeds,  it  will  be  by  accident,  concluded 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Hitchcock,  now  commanding  the  Third 
Infantry,  who  had  studied  and  taught  at  West  Point.14 

Toward  the  end  of  August  Marcy  wrote  :  "  Should  Mexico 
assemble  a  large  body  of  troops  on  the  Rio  Grande  and  cross 
it  with  a  considerable  force,  such  a  movement  must  be  re- 
garded as  an  invasion  of  the  United  States  and  the  commence- 
ment of  hostilities."  This  declaration  called  forth  protests, 
but  was  quite  fair.  By  stationing  troops  peaceably  in  the 
"intermediate  region"  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande 


THE  QUESTION  OF  RIGHT  145 

we  only  placed  ourselves  on  an  equality  with  Mexico;  and, 
as  we  ordered  Taylor  to  leave  her  posts  undisturbed,  we  showed 
a  friendly  recognition  of  the  principle  of  pacific  joint-occupation 
during  negotiations.  Our  forces,  to  be  sure,  outnumbered 
hers,  but  her  attitude  made  it  unsafe  to  despatch  a  smaller 
representation.  Unlike  us,  Mexico  had  no  occasion  to  send  an 
army  into  that  region  for  defensive  purposes.  The  United^ 
States  had  shown  every  sign  of  desiring  peace  and  none  of 
desiring  war,  and  at  this  time  was  endeavoring  to  bring  about 
a  friendly  settlement.  Such  an  army  could  not  have  prevented 
us  from  entering  the  intermediate  region,  for  at  Corpus  Christi 
Taylor  was  already  there;  and  it  could  not  have  saved  the 
Mexican  posts  and  citizens,  for  they  were  not  menaced.  Mex- 
ico, on  the  other  hand,  had  threatened  us  and  made  open 
preparations  to  strike;  it  was  now  understood  at  Washington 
that  no  declaration  of  war  should  be  expected  to  precede  a 
blow;  her  generals  had  proclaimed  that  hostilities  were  on 
the  point  of  beginning;  and  it  was  only  common  sense  to 
assume  that,  should  a  Mexican  army  cross  the  Rio  Grande, 
it  would  come  to  execute  the  announced  intention  of  those 
sent  it.15 

During  the  evening  of  January  12,  1846,  despatches  from 
lell  and  Black  arrived  at  Washington,  and  made  the  rejection 
of  our  pacific  overture  look  almost  certain.  This  unexpected 
turn  of  affairs  gave  new  seriousness  and  fresh  urgency  to  the 
Mexican  issue ;  and  the  next  day  Taylor  was  ordered  to  encamp 
on  the  Rio  Grande  at  whatever  point  he  should  consider  most 
advantageous^  He  was  cautioned,  however,  against  regarding 
Mexico  as  aj^enemy,  unless  war  should  be  declared  or  hostili- 
ties be  unde  take  l  by  her,  and  against  provoking  a  conflict  by 
insistence  upon  the  joint  navigation  of  the  river,  which  our 
claim  implied.16 

February  3  the  General  received  these  instructions,  and 
replied  that  he  should  lose  no  time.  Three  days  later  the 
army  was  formally  ordered  to  "be  prepared  for  a  field  move- 
ment at  short  notice."  But,  although  Taylor  had  been  on 
the  ground  for  six  months,  he  was  "utterly  ignorant"  —  said 
Hitchcock  —  of  the  way  to  Matamoros,  and  had  now  to  in- 
vestigate the  matter.  By  February  24  he  possessed  the 
necessary  data,  and  ordered  the  troops  to  be  in  readiness  to 

VOL.   I  —  L 


146  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

set  out  "at  forty-eight  hours  notice";  yet  it  was  not  until  the 
eighth  of  March  that  his  cavalry,  led  by  the  impetuous  Twiggs 
and  accompanied  by  Ringgold's  handsome  battery,  actually 
moved  off.  The  infantry  brigades  followed  at  intervals  of  a 
day  with  Duncan's  and  Bragg's  field  artillery ;  and  transports 
prepared  to  remove  the  convalescents,  extra  baggage  and  Major 
Munroe's  artillery  company  to  Point  Isabel,  near  the  mouth 
of  the  Rio  Grande.17 

Soon  after  receiving  the  instructions  to  advance,  Taylor  had 
given  notice  of  his  orders  to  influential  citizens  of  Matamoros 
then  at  Corpus  Christi,  explaining  that  his  march  would  be 
entirely  pacific,  and  that  he  expected  the  pending  questions  to 
be  settled  by  negotiation;  and  similar  assurances  were  con- 
veyed to  the  Mexican  customhouse  office  at "  Brazos  Santiago, " 
near  Point  Isabel.  March  8  a  more  formal  announcement 
appeared  in  General  Orders  No.  30.  Taylor  here  expressed 
the  hope  that  his  movement  would  be  "beneficial  to  all  con- 
cerned," insisted  upon  a  scrupulous  regard  for  the  civil  and 
religious  rights  of  the  people,  and  commanded  that  everything 
required  for  the  use  of  the  army  should  be  paid  for  "at  the 
highest  market  price."  These  orders,  which  merely  antici- 
pated instructions  then  on  their  way  from  Washington,  were 
translated  into  Spanish,  and  placed  in  circulation  along  the 
border.18 

(To  the  troops  the  march  proved  a  refreshing  and  beneficial 
cnaTige.  The  weather  was  now  fine,  the  road  almost  free  from 
mud,  and  the  breeze  balmy.  Frequently  the  blue  lupine,  the 
gay  verbena,  the  saucy  marigold  and  countless  other  bright 
flowers  carpeted  the  ground.  The  cactus  and  the  cochineal 
excited  and  gratified  curiosity.  Ducks  and  geese  often  flew 
up  from  the  line  of  advance.  Many  rabbits  and  many  deer 
scampered  across  the  plain;  and  occasionally  wolves,  cata- 
mounts and  panthers  were  frightened  from  cover.  Wild 
horses  would  gaze  for  an  instant  at  their  cousins  in  bondage, 
and  then  gallop  off,  tossing  their  manes  disdainfully ;  and  once 
a  herd  of  them,  spaced  as  if  to  allow  room  for  cannon,  were 
taken  for  Mexican  cavalry.  Innumerable  centipedes,  taran- 
tulas and  rattlesnakes  furnished  a  good  deal  of  interest,  if 
not  of  charm.  The  boundless  prairie  had  somewhat  the 
fascination  of  the  sea;    and  occasionally,  when  a  mirage  con- 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  RIO  GRANDE  147 

jured  up  a  range  of  blue  mountains  —  clothed  with  forests  and 
reflected  in  lakes  —  that  melted  presently  into  the  air,  one 
had  a  sense  of  moving  on  enchanted  ground.19 

To  be  sure,  the  march  was  not  entirely  agreeable.  For 
about  196  miles  it  stretched  on  and  on,  and  most  of  the  way 
it  lay  through  deep,  sandy  plains,  here  glistening  with  salt, 
and  there  varied  with  briny  marshes  or  sticky  black  dirt.  In 
some  places  Mexicans  had  burned  the  herbage;  and  the  light 
ashes,  raised  by  the  tramp  of  many  feet,  settled  on  the  soldiers' 
faces  till  they  could  scarcely  recognize  one  another.  Tortured 
with  thirst,  they  would  occasionally  break  ranks  pell-mell 
at  the  sight  of  water;  but  as  a  rule  they  found  it  brackish. 
All  suffered  alike;  and  we  have  a  picture  of  Taylor  himself 
breakfasting  at  the  door  of  his  tent  with  a  mess-chest  for 
table,  his  rugged  countenance  flaming  with  sunburn,  his  long 
lips  cracked  and  raw,  and  his  long  nose  white  with  peeling 
skin.  /But  the  experience,  even  at  its  worst,  proved  a  whole- 
some tonic  after  the  degeneration  of  Corpus  Christi.19  ) 

March  20  the  army  came  to  the  Arroyo  Colorado,  a  salt 
lagoon  about  a  hundred  yards  wide  and  three  or  four  feet  deep. 
Here  General  Mejia,  the  commander  at  Matamoros,  who 
knew  all  about  our  troops  and  their  movements,  had  intended 
to  win  a  sheaf  of  laurels;  but  orders  from  his  government, 
not  quite  ready  for  action,  arrived  in  time  to  curb  this  am- 
bition. He  concluded  then  to  try  the  effect  of  a  ruse,  and  his 
officer  convinced  the  Americans,  with  solemn  warnings,  bugle- 
calls  here  and  there,  and  a  clever  showing  of  heads  among  the 
bushes  and  trees  on  the  southern  side  of  the  lagoon,  that  a 
hard  fight  would  result  from  attempting  to  cross  it.  But 
without  the  least  hesitation  Taylor  prepared  for  battle.  Ring- 
gold's pieces  were  made  ready.  Worth  dashed  into  the  stream 
at  the  head  of  an  advance  party ;  and  on  gaining,  unopposed, 
the  opposite  bank,  he  saw  —  dust  in  the  atmosphere,  and  far 
away  a  dozen  small  black  specks  rapidly  growing  smaller. 
But  morally  it  was  a  victory ;  and  the  troops,  though  cheated, 
Jelt  encouraged.20 

March  23,  after  making  fifteen  miles  across  a  clear,  dry 
prairie,  the  army  came  to  a  road  that  led  to  Matamoros,  about 
eighteen  miles  away  on  the  right,  and  to  Point  Isabel,  distant 
nine  or  ten  on  the  other  side;    and  Taylor,  ordering  Worth 


148  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

and  the  infantry  to  camp  and  watch  for  the  enemy  at  a  suitable 
place  in  the  former  direction,  proceeded  to  the  coast  with  his 
cavalry.  There  he  found  the  transports  in  sight  and  the 
wind  favorable.  Defences  were  planned  at  once;  and  on  the 
27th,  leaving  an  engineer,  supported  by  a  guard  under  Munroe, 
to  superintend  the  construction  of  them,  the  General  returned 
to  the  army,  then  some  ten  miles  from  Matamoros.  The  next 
morning  all  advanced,  and  soon  came  to  rough  defiles.  On 
each  side  bristled  what  a  soldier  described  as  an  irregular, 
impenetrable  mass  of  "scraggly,  scrubby,  crooked,  infernally 
illegitimate  and  sin-begotten  bushy  trees  loaded  with  millions 
of  thornpins" —  that  is  to  say,  chaparral.  Passing  this  and 
a  few  cabins  in  the  midst  of  corn,  cotton  and  pomegranates, 
the  troops  found  themselves  at  the  end  of  their  march,  Rio 
Bravo;  the  "Bold  river  of  the  North,"  brown  with  mud,  rolled 
swift  and  boiling  at  their  feet;  and  in  plain  view  about  half 
a  mile  distant  —  black  with  crowded  house-tops,  gay  with 
flags,  and  noisy  with  bugles  and  barking  dogs  —  lay  Mata- 
moros. A  rude  pole  was  soon  raised;  to  the  music  of  our 
national  airs  the  colors  went  up ;  and  a  small  masked  battery 
of  field  guns  was  planted  near  them.21 

A  singular  political  game  then  took  place  between  Taylor 
and  Mejia.  The  former  did  everything  possible  to  convince 
the  Mexican  general  that  his  movement  was  entirely  pacific, 
and  offered  to  "enter  into  any  arrangements  to  secure  the 
peace  and  harmony  of  the  frontier"  during  negotiations  be- 
tween the  two  governments;  but  the  latter  insisted  over  and 
over  again  that  a  state  of  war  had  been  created  by  the  American 
advance.  In  spite  of  this  Taylor  reminded  his  officers  of  the 
"essentially  pacific"  and  "conciliatory"  intentions  of  the 
army ;  yet  at  the  same  time  he  reported  the  Mexican  attitude 
as  distinctly  hostile,  asked  for  reinforcements,  mounted  four 
18-pounders  to  command  the  city,  and  about  April  7  began 
what  came  to  be  known  as  Fort  Brown,  a  large,  bastioned 
"field-work"  opposite  the  lower  end  of  the  city.22 

On  April  1 1  General  Ampudia,  the  assassin  of  Sentmanat,  § 
arrived  at  Matamoros  to  assume  the  chief  command,  accom- 
panied by  cavalry  and  followed,  as  the  Americans  understood, 
by  two  or  three  thousand  more  troops.     The  next  day  he  signal- 
ized his  advent  by  ordering  Taylor  to  decamp  at  once  for  the 


THE  MEXICAN  ATTITUDE  149 

other  side  of  the  Nueces  —  a  proposal  to  which  a  courteous 
negative  was  returned  —  and  by  compelling  "all  the  Americans 
in  the  city,  "under  open  threats  of  violence/'  to  leave  town 
within  twenty-four  hours.  Taylor  retaliated  by  requesting 
our  naval  commander  off  the  Rio  Grande  to  stop  the  use  of 
that  stream.  As  the  Mexican  attitude  made  it  impossible  for 
us  to  have  the  joint  navigation  implied  by  our  claim,  this 
appeared  reasonable ;  but  essentially  the  measure  was  defensive, 
since  without  supplies  coming  by  water  a  large  force  could  not 
remain  long  at  Matamoros.  When  Ampudia  complained, 
the  General  pointed  out  that  sealing  up  the  river  was  only  the 
"natural  result  of  the  state  of  war  so  much  insisted  on  by  the 
Mexican  authorities  as  actually  existing,"  and  offered  to  re- 
open it  if  Ampudia  would  join  him  in  maintaining  an  armistice 
during  the  negotiations  of  the  two  governments;  but  this  led 
to  no  result.23 

Ampudia's  orders  and  intention  had  been  to  attack  the 
Americans  as  soon  as  possible,  but  his  glorious  prospects 
darkened  immediately.  Though  given  the  place  of  Major 
General  Arista,  long  at  the  head  of  military  affairs  in  this 
quarter,  because  he  supported  the  revolution  of  Paredes  while 
Arista  not  only  frowned  upon  it,  but  seemed  to  aim  at  making 
northeastern  Mexico  independent,  Ampudia  was  detested 
and  thought  incompetent  —  an  opinion  he  did  not  share  —  by 
not  a  few  in  the  northern  army,  whereas  Arista  stood  high  in 
his  caste,  and,  as  a  person  of  wealth  and  position,  had  strong 
friends  well  able  to  make  trouble  for  the  central  government. 
Consequently  an  order  dated  April  4  made  Arista  commander 
in-chief  with  Ampudia  as  lieutenant.  The  latter  was  im- 
mediately forbidden  to  shine  on  the  field  of  glory,  and,  finding 
his  officers  would  not  support  him  in  disobedience,  he  sub- 
mitted.24 

Arista,  however,  bearing  instructions  dated  April  4  to  attack 
the  Americans,  reached  the  scene  on  the  24th,  and  ordered  his 
cavalry  general,  Torre j on,  to  cross  above  Matamoros  with 
fk  about  1600  men.  Hearing  a  rumor  of  this  movement,  Taylor 
sent  Captain  Thornton  and  about  sixty  dragoons  late  that 
afternoon  to  reconnoitre ;  and  the  next  morning,  some  twenty- 
eight  miles  from  camp,  finding  himself  completely  shut  in  by 
overwhelming    forces,  the    Captain  tried  to    break    through, 


150  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

lost  several  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  then  with  all  the 
rest  surrendered.  This  was  war.  "Hostilities  have  begun," 
announced  Arista  on  the  day  of  his  arrival.  "Hostilities  may 
now  be  considered  as  commenced,"  reported  Taylor  on  the 
26th ;  and  —  besides  advising  Polk  to  organize  twelve-months 
volunteers  —  he  at  once  called  upon  Texas  and  Louisiana  for 
about  5000  men.25 

It  was  a  tragic  and  most  regrettable  denouement;  yet,  on 
a  close  review  of  all  the  data  now  accessible,  one  does  not  find 
it  easy  to  censure  Polk\  If  he  had  wished  and  meditated  war 
from  the  first,  why  did  he  work  for  an  amicable  settlement 
through  Parrott,  Black  and  Slidell?  For  the  sake  of  appear- 
ances, many  said.  But  in  the  first  place  we  have  found  that 
Polk  was  honest  in  those  negotiations ;  and,  in  the  second,  had 
war  been  his  aim  and  appearances  his  care,  he  would  not  have 
permitted  the  order  of  January  13  to  be  issued  that  day.  On 
January  12  it  looked  at  Washington  as  if  the  question  of  receiv- 
ing Slidell  would  soon  be  decided.  The  President  could  afford 
to  wait  a  little,  and  he  would  have  done  this,  for  it  was  clear 
that  an  unnecessary  military  step,  taken  while  he  was  extending 
the  olive  branch,  would  needlessly  make  him  appear  either 
treacherous  or  ridiculous.  Moreover  if  he  sought  a  war,  he 
knew  on  January  12  that  matters  were  shaping  themselves 
to  his  taste ;  that'  Mexico  was  almost  sure  to  close  the  door 
of  negotiation  soonpand  consequently  that  he  would  soon  be 
able  to  demand  of  Congress  the  forcible  redress  of  our  griev- 
ances.26 

Here  lay  a  casus  belli  amply  endorsed  by  international  law, 
the  practice  of  civilized  powers,  and  the  general  opinion  of  the 
world  J  It  was  a  ground,  too,  that  Polk  himself,  as  we  have 
seen7  felt  entirely  satisfied  to  stand  upon,  and  one  that  our 
people,  feeling  as  they  did,  would  almost  certainly  have  ac- 
cepted. Having,  then,  apparently  within  his  reach  a  pretext 
for  war  that  almost  everybody  thought  good,  he  would  not 
have  exerted  himself  to  obtain  one  that  almost  everybody 
thought  bad ;  and  in  fact  —  evidently  expecting  no  event  of^ 
decisive  importance  to  occur  near  the  Rio  Grande  —  he  went  on 
day  after  day  with  his  plan  to  lay  our  grievances  before  Con- 
gress, until  news  of  the^attack  on  Thornton  burst  upon  Wash- 
ington like  a  rocket.     On  the  hypothesis  that  he  had  wished 


REASONS  FOR  POLK'S  COURSE  151 

and  meditated  war  from  the  first  and  merely  stuck  at  appear- 
ances, his  conduct  was  therefore  irrational ;  and,  besides,  we 
have  seen  adequate  reasons  for  believing  that  he  desired  peace.26 

Discarding  that  hypothesis,  however,  leaves  us  the  important 
question,  How  did  the  idea  of  sending  Taylor  forward -present 
itself  to  Polk?.  First,  then,  from  his  point  of  view  it  seemed 
entirely  permissible.  A  proprietor  is  not  debarred  from  going 
where  a  squatter  has  built  a  cabin;  and  in  the  light  of  our 
official  claim  and  arguments  Mexican  occupation  above  the 
Rio  Grande  was  merely  by  sufferance.  The  so-called  "provo- 
cative act"  of  pointing  guns  at  Matamoros  could  not  be  charged 
against  the  government,  for  Marcy  had  suggested  other  points 
also  for  Taylor's  camp,  leaving  the  choice  to  him.  It  was  a 
defensive  measure  adopted  by  the  General  for  military  reasons 
in  conjunction  with  pacific  assurances  and  proposals  ;\  and  we 
learn  from  Arista  and  others  that  it  had  a  sedative  effect  on 
the  property  owners  of  that  flimsily  built  city  and  on  the 
army  authorities.27 

No  encroachment  upon  the  powers  of  Congress  appeared 
to  be  involved.  Had  Polk's  aim  been,  as  Calhoun  alleged, 
to  establish  a  boundary,  he  could  not  have  tolerated  Mexi- 
can posts,  for  the  troops  of  foreign  states  cannot  be  permitted 
to  sojourn  within  our  officially  defined  limits.  Besides,  Polk 
had  sent  Slidell  to  treat  on  this  very  question,  and  Slidell  had 
not  given  up  the  task.  Though  it  rested  with  Congress  to 
declare  war,  a  President  could  legally,  in  the  exercise  of  his 
discretion,  take  steps  liable  to  bring  about  hostilities.  More- 
over Congress  appeared  to  have  authorized  Taylor's  movement. 
Corpus  Christi,  claimed  by  Tamaulipas,  had  been  made  an 
American  port  of  delivery.  A  collection  district  had  been 
established  in  the  intermediate  region.  The  declaration  of 
Polk's  Message,  December,  1845,  that  our  jurisdiction  had 
been  extended  to  the  Rio  Grande,  and  Marcy's  appended 
report,  which  announced  that  Taylor's  instructions  were  to 
regard  that  stream  as  our  boundary,  had  raised  no  storm.  For 
six  months,  admitted  the  chief  Whig  organ,  our  doings  in  this 
field  not  only  had  appeared  to  be  endorsed  by  the  people,  but 
had  gone  on  openly  without  calling  forth  "  a  single  question  from 
any  public  authority."  Officially  notified  of  the  military 
occupation  of  Corpus  Christi,  Congress,  instead  of  protesting, 


152  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

had  voted  supplies  for  the  troops.  Finally,  Congress  had 
instructed  the  Executive,  in  the  resolutions  for  annexing  Texas, 
to  reach  an  agreement  with  Mexico  regarding  the  boundary; 
it  was  his  duty  to  persevere  in  the  attempt  until  convinced  he 
could  not  succeed;  and  Taylor's  advance,  as  will  presently 
be  seen,  appeared  to  him  a  proper  step  in  the  discharge  of  this 
obligation.28 

Familiar  precedents  and  principles  were  believed  to  sanction 
the  movement  of  our  troops.  In  1794  Washington  had  ordered 
Wayne  to  conduct  hostilities  in  disputed  territory,  and  had 
threatened  to  destroy  a  British  fort  there.  In  accordance  with 
a  resolution  of  Congress,  Madison  had  seized  the  "Florida 
parishes"  claimed  by  Spain.  Just  before  Taylor  was  ordered 
to  move,  Hilliard  informed  the  House  of  Representatives  that 
England  had  magistrates  in  the  southern  part  of  Oregon ;  and 
John  Quincy  Adams  proposed  to  take  military  possession  of 
that  disputed  territory  before  concluding  negotiations.  If 
such  a  method  could  be  employed  in  dealing  with  countries 
willing  to  treat,  very  naturally  —  in  the  case  of  one  that  had 
pronounced  for  war  —  pacific  occupation,  leaving  the  compet- 
ing jurisdiction  undisturbed,  seemed  fully  justifiable.29 
,  Taylor's  advance  appeared  also  to  be  highly  expedient. 
For  one  thing,  our  j^laim  upon  the  intermediate  region  would 
have  been  weakened,  had  we  refrained  from  sharing  with 
Mexico  in  the  occupation  of  it.  For  another,  it  seemed  wise 
to  place  ourselves  in  a  strategic  position  that  would  be  of  great 
value,  should  Mexico's  threat  of  war  be  carried  into  effect. 
And  for  a  third  it  was  believed  that  a  bold  military  attitude, 
indicating  that  at  last  the  United  States  had  made  up  its  mind, 
would  count  with  Mexico  as  a  strong  argument  for  negotiation. 
Such  was  the  opinion  of  Parrott,  Slidell,  Worth,  Taylor,  Scott, 
Archer,  now  chairman  of  the  Senate  committee  on  foreign 
relations,  Brantz  Mayer,  formerly  secretary  of  legation  at 
Mexico,  Polk  himself,  the  administration  circle  in  general,  and 
well-informed  persons  outside  it.  January  17  Conner  was 
ordered  to  assemble  all  his  vessels  and  exhibit  them  off  Vera 
Cruz  —  evidently  in  pursuance  of  this  design.  The  government 
organ  stated,  and  opposition  writers  conceded,  that  such  a 
purpose  was  in  view.30 

But  essentially,   as  already  has  been   suggested,   Taylor's 


REASONS  FOR  POLK'S  COURSE  153 

advance  rested  on  the  necessity  of  military  defence ;  and  indeed 
there  is  reason  to  consider  Scott  the  prime  factor  in  the  business, 
for  the  order  of  January  13  was  based  upon,  and  in  part  ver- 
bally reproduced,  a  "projet"  submitted  by  him,  whereas 
Polk's  diary  for  January  12  and  13  does  not  even  allude  to  the 
subject.  Now  not  only  were  defensive  measures  called  for 
on  general  principles,  as  we  have  just  been  informed  by  the 
London  Times,  but  the  Texans  actually  and  urgently  needed 
a  sheltering  arm.  During  the  latter  part  of  1845  the  chief 
Mexican  engineers  drew  detailed  plans  for  crossing,  not  only 
the  Rio  Grande,  but  the  Sabine.  Merely  the  refusal  of  Paredes, 
growing  out  of  his  revolutionary  designs,  to  reinforce  the  troops 
on  the  frontier  with  2400  men  prevented  an  attack  at  this 
time.  Almonte,  who  had  particularly  recommended  incursions 
into  Texas,  held  the  post  of  war  minister  in  January,  1846. 
The  Mexican  troops  were  extremely  mobile.  Ampudia's 
main  force,  at  the  end  of  a  long  march,  did  180  miles  in  four 
days.  Screened  by  rancheros  and  living  on  a  little  corn  and 
jerked  beef  carried  in  their  pouches,  a  body  of  light  cavalry 
could  have  reached  San  Antonio  by  way  of  Laredo,  ruined  the 
town,  and  been  well  on  their  way  toward  home  before  their 
movement  would  have  been  suspected  at  Corpus  Christi. 
The  government  received  warnings  of  this  danger  from  Dimond 
and  from  Parrott  in  1845 ;  Marcy  and  Polk  feared  it ;  and  the 
probable  rejection  of  Slidell  —  which  meant  a  triumph  of  the 
war  party  —  seemed  likely  to  accentuate  the  peril.  In  fact 
Mejia  ordered  irregulars  into  Texas  on  February  16  and  March 
17,  though,  as  their  commander  aspired  to  execute  a  revolution 
with  American  aid,  he  did  us  no  harm.31 

Nor  were  only  such  formal  incursions  to  be  guarded  against. 
The  war  of  1836  in  Texas  had  shown  what  outrages  Mexicans 
were  capable  of  committing,  and  similar  affairs  had  now  begun 
to  occur.  In  one  instance  a  party  of  fifteen,  including  women, 
after  having  been  induced  to  surrender,  were  all  butchered 
except  a  single  person,  who  survived  though  seriously  wounded. 
In  April,  1846,  the  Mexicans  opposite  Matamoros  confessed 
that  bloodthirsty  guerillas  were  abroad.  Ampudia,  whose 
murderous  record  had  been  his  chief  distinction,  commanded 
there.  May  13  the  British  consul  in  that  city  reported  that 
licensed   bands   of   assassins,    "caressed,    rewarded,    and   en- 


J 


154  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

couraged"  by  the  authorities,  were  committing  atrocities  near 
the  Rio  Grande;  and,  had  the  way  been  open,  such  gangs 
might  have  robbed  and  murdered  in  the  settlements  of  Texas.32 

The  position  selected  by  Taylor  was  admirably  suited  to  this 
emergency.  Scott,  though  a  Whig,  wrote  out  a  long  explana- 
tion, showing  that  on  the  Rio  Grande  the  army  had  a  more 
healthful  camp  than  before,  better  drinking  water,  more 
abundant  fuel,  better  grazing  and  a  better  port.  Information 
could  be  obtained  more  quickly;  the  border  watched  more 
closely;  an  invading  force  pursued  more  promptly;  and  its 
line  of  retreat  cut  more  certainly.  Besides,  the  river  amounted 
to  a  great  breastwork}  for  this  part  of  it  could  be  crossed  with 
safety  at  only  certain  points,  and  a  body  of  men,  even  though 
comparatively  small,  could  not  cross  anywhere  on  its  lower 
course  without  peril.  It  was  not,  however,  simply  that  the 
Rio  Grande  position  seemed  far  the  best.  The  nature  of  the 
region  made  it  essential.  Taylor  had  to  be  in  that  vicinity 
or  else  near  Corpus  Christi,  and  for  purposes  of  defence  the 
latter  point  could  not  be  deemed  satisfactory.  Now  the 
necessity  of  defence  was  entirely  due  to  the  threatening  con- 
duct of  Mexico.  Therefore  she  could  not  reasonably  complain 
of  our  precautions;  and  if  she  could  not  complain,  then  no 
one  could  do  so  in  her  name.33 

But  the  challenge  was  triumphantly  thrown  out :  Can  it  be 
denied  that  our  taking  a  position  on  the  river  did  in  fact  cause 
the  war?  In  view  of  the  data  it  can  and  should  be  denied. 
First,  joint  occupation  of  the  disputed  region  might  have  gone 
on  peaceably,  as  occupation  of  that  character  has  continued 
elsewhere,  but  for  a  distinctly  aggressive  step  on  the  part  of 
Mexico;  and,. secondly,  for  her  the  Rio  Grande  had  no  partic- 
ular significance.  She  claimed  all  of  Texas,  and  intended  to 
drive  us  from  it,  if  she  could.  )  Furthermore,  the  crass  vanity 
and  ambition  of  Mexican  generals  and  the  exigencies  of  domestic 
politics  would  probably  have  led^o  an  attack  upon  us,  had 
Taylor  remained  at  Corpus  Christi,  jor  even  pitched  his  camp 
at  San  Antonio.  In  spite  of  express  orders,  Mejia  actually 
attempted  an  offensive  in  the  intermediate  region.  When 
the  Mexican  government  gave  formal  notice  to  England  and ' 
France  in  the  summer  of  1845  that  war  had  become  inevitable, 
our  army  lay  far  from  the  Rio  Grande.     Taylor's  advance  to 


MEXICO  THE  AGGRESSOR  155 

the  Bold  River  no  more  produced  the  war  than  Pitcairn's 
march  to  Lexington  produced  the  American  revolution  £  It 
wa^an  effect  and  an  occasion,  but  not  a  cause.3f 

(Finally,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  hostilities  were  deliberately 
precipitated  by  the  will  and  act  of  Mexico.  The  circumstances 
proved  this  and  testimony  illuminates  them.  In  October, 
1847,  a  pamphlet  written  by  Mariano  Otero,  editor  of  El  Sigh 
XIX  and  Senator  from  the  state  of  Jalisco,  appeared.  His 
object  was  by  no  means  to  defend  the  United  States,  but  he 
said :  "  The  American  forces  did  not  advance  to  the  Rio 
Grande  until  after  the  war  became  inevitable,  and  then  only 
as  an  army  of  observation.  .  .  .  The  military  rebellion  pf 
San  Luis  [Potosi]  gave  rise  to  a  government  [that  of  Paredes] 
.pledged  to  resist  all  accommodation  [with  the  United  States] 
.  .  .  which  government  .  .  .  began  hostilities."  Arista  de- 
clared in  December,  1847,  "I  had  the  pleasure  of  being  the 
first  to  begjn  the  war."  In  short,  Polk  told  only  the  truth 
when  he  said  the  conflict  was  forced  upon  us.  Mexico  wanted 
it;  Mexico  threatened  it;  Mexico  issued  orders  to  wage  it; 
and  on  April  18  her  President,  no  doubt  in  view  of  his  political 
difficulties,  insisted  upon  those  orders.  "It  is  indispensable," 
he  wrote  urgently  to  Arista,  "that  hostilities  begin,  yourself 
taking  the  initiative."  *y 

"If  in  a  litigious  affair,"  declared  Vattel,  "our  adversary 
refuses  the  means  of  bringing  the  right  to  proof,  or  artfully 
eludes  it;  if  he  does  not,  with  good  faith,  apply  to  pacific 
measures  for  terminating  the  difference,  and  above  all,  if  he  is 
the  first  who  begins  acts  of  hostility,  he  renders  just  [even]  the 
cause  which  was  before  doubtful."  Every  condition  of  this 
judgment  fitted  the  course  of  Mexico.36 


VIII 

PALO  ALTO,   RESACA  DE  LA  PALMA 

May,  1846 

The  Mexico  of  1845  had  an  elaborate  military  organization. 
In  addition  to  the  comandantes  general  —  regularly  one  in 
each  department  or  state  —  there  were  six  generals  at  the 
head  of  the  six  military  Divisions  in  which  the  political  divisions 
of  the  country  had  been  grouped.  The  college  at  Chapultepec 
provided  a  full  course  of  instruction  for  officers;  and  though 
it  seemed  hardly  worth  while  to  spend  three  years  there  in 
order  to  become  a  second  lieutenant,  when  one  could  leap  at 
once  into  a  captaincy  or  something  better  by  acting  as  the 
tool  of  a  revolting  general,  there  were  never  less  than  one 
hundred  students.1 

At  the  head  of  the  army  stood  a  sort  of  general  staff  called 
the  plana  mayor;  but  the  duties  of  this  inefficient  body  fell 
mostly  to  the  engineers,  some  of  whom  possessed  excellent 
qualifications,  while  others  —  admitted  to  the  corps  for  political 
or  personal  reasons  —  did  not.  The  artillery,  which  included 
nominally  four  brigades  with  fourteen  batteries,  suffered  from 
this  all-pervading  evil  and  also  from  defects  of  its  own.  Many 
of  the  guns  had  come  down  from  olden  times,  though  a  large 
number  of  the  field  pieces  equalled  any  the  United  States 
possessed ;  not  a  few  were  honeycombed ;  and  the  carriages 
were  mostly  of  the  old  Gribeauval  pattern.  To  convey  am- 
munition, carts  had  to  be  obtained  when  needed.  For  the 
transportation  of  ordnance,  mules  or  oxen  were  usually  hired 
by  contract;  and,  as  the  drivers  had  no  acquaintance  with 
artillery  drill  and  tactics/  battery  evolutions  were  out  of  the 
question,  and  guns  could4?ermoved  but  slowly,  if  at  all,  during 
an  engagement.1  J 

The  so-called:  Permanent  infantry  consisted  substantially 
of  three  Light  (Ligero)  and  twelve  Line  regiments,  and  there 

156 


THE  MEXICAN  ARMY  157 

were  also  twenty-five  Active  (Activo)  corps,  large  or  small, 
which,  though  originally  designed  as  a  sort  of  reserve  to  be 
called  out  in  emergencies,  were  now  constantly  under  arms. 
Owing  to  the  great  extent  of  the  country  the  regiments  were 
broken  into  sections,  which  assumed  to  be  independent;  and 
for  this  reason  drill,  discipline  and  esprit  de  corps  suffered 
greatly.  Training  and  equipment  left  much  to  be  desired. 
When  four  simple  manoeuvres  were  understood,  soldiers  were 
pronounced  perfect.  For  arms  almost  all  the  infantry  had 
flint-lock  muskets,  many  of  which  had  been  discarded  by  the 
British  army.  Firing  from  the  hip  to  avoid  the  recoil  marred 
their  aim ;  and,  partly  in  consequence  of  using  too  much  pow- 
der, they  generally  fired  high.  Of  horse  there  were  ten  Per- 
manent and  five  Activo  regiments  besides  numerous  minor 
units.  The  cavalry  included  also  nearly  fifty  Presidial  com- 
panies, originally  designed  to  guard  the  frontier  against  Indian 
raids ;  but  these  had  almost  vanished  except  in  name,  and  the 
remnants  were  extremely  inefficient.  The  mounted  men  car- 
ried in  general  a  sword  and  a  sort  of  blunderbuss  called  the 
escopeta,  but  many  used  lances  instead  of  swords.  About  3000 
Coast  Guards  are  also  to  be  mentioned,  but  as  a  rule  they  were 
expected  merely  to  defend  the  ports  where  they  lived  and  the 
immediate  vicinity.  In  all  there  may  have  been  32,000  men 
under  arms  in  1845.1 

The  medical  corps  suffered  at  all  times  from  the  low  quality 
of  its  personnel  and  from  its  defective  equipment;  and  the 
accommodations  for  surgeons  in  a  campaign  were  so  poor  that 
many  found  pretexts  for  remaining  behind  when  their  corps 
took  the  field.  The  commissaries  had  peculiar  difficulties  to 
meet.  A  Mexican  army  drew  supplies  from  places  near  it 
and  not  from  government  depots;  and  when  money  failed,  as 
it  often  did,  payments  had  to  be  made  with  drafts  on  the 
treasury,  which  possessed  an  uncertain  value.  Hence  people 
often  would  not  part  with  supplies,  the  troops  went  hungry, 
and  the  natural  tendency  toward  inefficiency  and  desertion 
was  accentuated.  In  order  to  release  the  army  from  service 
in  the  interior,  when  hostilities  became  imminent  in  1845,  it 
was  decided  to  organize  volunteer  corps;  but  almost  every 
one,  however  anxious  to  see  the  United  States  chastised,  pre- 
ferred to  let  somebody  else  do  the  work.1 


158  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

Mexico,  then,  did  not  exactly  rise  en  masse  to  sweep  Taylor 
away,2  yet  the  forces  gathered  at  Matamoros  could  be  termed 
respectable.  /Arista  seems  to  have  had  about  175  artillerymen, 
3500  infantry,  1100  cavalry,  425  irregular  horse  under  General 
Antonio  Canales  and  some  500  Matamoros  volunteers  —  in  all, 
say,  5700  men  including  officers  and  ineffectives.  His  first 
brigade  consisted  of  infantry  led  by  Garcia,  a  fine  man  and 
officer;  the  second,  also  infantry,  had  Vega,  a  brave  and 
patriotic  soldier,  for  commander;  and  the  third  brigade, 
cavalry,  was  under  Torre j on,  who  possessed  one  excellent 
quality  —  the  instinct  of  self-preservation.  Canales  could 
be  described  succinctly  as  a  border  ruffian  and  conspirator; 
and  Ampudia,  second  in  general  command,  was  about  the  same 
thing  plus  a  cosmopolitan  varnish.3 

After  news  of  Taylor's  intention  to  advance  reached  Mata- 
moros, the  Mexicans  worked  most  zealously  in  constructing 
fortifications  there,  and  by  the  end  of  April  had  a  series  of 
earthworks.  Just  above  the  city  was'  erected  Fort  Paredes, 
laid  out  in  regular  style  for  800  men,  which  guarded  the  ferry 
of  Las  Anacuitas.  Two  redoubts,  crossing  their  fires,  were 
planted  opposite  Fort  Brown  at  a  distance  of  seven  or  eight 
hundred  yards;  and  two  or  three  minor  forts  commanded 
approaches.  Gabions  or  wicker-work  strengthened  the  embra- 
sures, and  fascines  and  sand-bags  were  freely  used.  No  guns 
heavier  than  12-pounders  defended  the  works,  and  no  platforms 
were  laid ;  but  in  general  the  ordnance  was  of  brass,  well  cared 
for  though  somewhat  honeycombed.4 

For  a  number  of  reasons  the  garrison  felt  confident.  Through 
deserters  and  spies  they  knew  as  much  as  they  were  capable 
of  understanding  about  the  American  army.  To  Mejia  our 
general  seemed  "  more  contemptible  than  the  lowest  of  Mexican 
tailors,"  and  to  Ampudia  "an  absolute  nullity."  The  martial 
Worth,  who  did  impress  them,  left  the  front  at  the  beginning 
of  April  because  Polk  decided  against  him  on  the  question  of 
brevet  rank.  Hitchcock  had  been  compelled  to  go  north  on 
sick  leave.  For  some  good  reason  every  infantry  colonel  and 
many  others  in  high  positions  were  absent.  One  regiment  had 
not  a  field  officer,  and  in  another  only  a  single  company  could 
boast  a  captain.  Personally  the  officers  in  general  were  believed 
to  lack  harmony  and  zeal,  and  the  men  to  be  discontented, 


MEXICAN  PREPARATIONS  AT  MATAMOROS       159 

hopeless,  unwilling  to  fight,  and  enfeebled  by  their  hardships 
and  misbehavior  at  Corpus  Christi.  According  to  Mexican 
reports  our  cavalry  could  neither  shoot  nor  control  their  hard- 
bitted  horses,  and  our  infantry,  chiefly  composed  —  except 
the  officers  —  of  needy  foreigners,  came  short  in  discipline, 
training  and  every  other  soldierly  qualification  save  appetite. 


MATAMOROS 

AND    FORT    BROWN 

SKETCH  MAP 


Fort  Parei 


Wuis.Eng.Co.,N.Y. 


A  Fort  Brown 
I  i -pounders 
C  Traverse 
D  Amcrica.it  Infantry 
E  American.  Drajoons 
F  American  Cannon 
G  Artillcru  Batt-Mu 
H  Mexican  Mortars 
I  Mexican  Batteries 
J  Mexican  Infantry 
K  Mexican  Cavalry 


"Those  adventurers  cannot  withstand  the  bayonet  charge  of 
our  foot,"  said  Mejia,  "nor  a  cavalry  charge  with  the  lance. " 5 
No  very  alarming  degree  of  intelligence  had  appeared  to 
direct  the  American  operations.  Our  troops  were  on  a  point 
exposed  to  a  convergent  fire;  Fort  Brown  enfiladed  none  of 
the  hostile  batteries,  though  it  might  have  been  planned  to  do 
this ;  near  the  cavalry  camp  stood  thick  groves  offering  shelter 
to  assailants ;   behind  our  main  position  was  a  lagoon  forming 


r 


160  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

—  with  a  bend  of  the  river  —  almost  a  circle ;  and  the  enemy, 
once  in  possession  of  the  single  road,  which  ran  for  seven  or 
eight  miles  through  rough  country,  would  have  had  the  army 
in  a  bottle.  All  the  ammunition  and  provisions  were  brought 
by  wagon  from  the  coast,  exposed  to  attack  at  every  step.  The 
imperfectly  fortified  base  at  Point  Isabel,  stored  with  indis- 
pensable supplies,  had  a  garrison  of  only  two  companies  aside 
from  two  or  three  hundred  sutlers,  clerks,  teamsters  and  the 
like ;  and  vessels  could  approach  the  landing  only  by  a  narrow 
passage  between  two  islands,  which  could  have  been  closed  by 
a  few  6-pounders.  Yet  we  should  have  encouraged  Mexico 
beyond  calculation,  and  might  have  been  injured  greatly  in 
Europe,  had  we  now  given  up  Fort  Brown.6 

A  number  of  small  disasters  overtook  the  Americans.  Colonel 
Cross,  chief  of  the  quartermaster's  department,  went  out  and 
never  came  back.  April  22  Lieutenant  Porter  and  ten  men, 
operating  against  the  banditti,  allowed  their  arms  to  get  wet, 
and  were  scattered  with  loss  by  a  party  of  Mexicans.  Twenty 
of  the  Texas  rangers  commanded  by  Captain  Walker  permitted 
themselves  to  be  surprised,  and  half  of  them  were  either  killed 
or  driven  beyond  recall.  Taylor  attributed  these  mishaps  to 
a  lack  of  experience,  but  the  enemy  regarded  them  as  proofs 
of  inferiority;  and  when  Thornton's  party  succumbed,  the 
enthusiasm  burst  all  bounds.  "Honor  and  glory  a  thousand 
and  one  times"  to  the  "brave  men"  of  the  army,  cried  a 
Tampico  leaflet,  and  a  triumph  in  the  anticipated  battle  ap- 
peared certain.7 

From  another  source  also  the  Mexicans  drew  encouragement. 
While  Taylor's  officers  were  nearly  all  WTest  Pointers  and  per- 
haps quite  all  native  Americans,  many  of  the  privates  were  in 
fact  of  European  birth  and  a  large  percentage  Roman  Catholics. 
To  these  Mejia,  Ampudia  and  Arista  issued  moving  appeals 
based  upon  religious  prejudice  and  alleged  foreign  condem- 
nation of  our  course  toward  Mexico,  gilded  with  generous 
promises  of  rewards  for  deserting,  supported  by  the  luring 
voices  of  gayly  dressed  sirens  who  lined  the  opposite  bank  of 
the  river  all  day,  and  reinforced  by  two  captured  American 
dragoons,  who  were  given  back,  and  reported  that  deserters 
received  handsome  treatment.  A  considerable  number  of 
men,  largely  veteran  offenders  from  the  British  army,  stole 


MEXICAN  CONFIDENCE  161 

across;  most  of  the  Seventh  Infantry  were  believed  ready  to 
change  sides;  and  the  Mexicans  boasted  exultingly  that  "Old 
Taylor  "  himself  would  soon  be  over.8 

Arista,  who  had  spent  several  years  in  the  United  States, 
did  not  feel  very  sanguine.  Ampudia's  predictions  of  glory 
he  regarded  as  "castles  in  the  air/'  or  as  perhaps  intended  to 
raise  expectations  that  Ampudia's  successor  would  be  unable 
to  satisfy.  But  the  officers  and  the  troops  felt  impatient  for' 
combat.  So  loudly  and  so  long  had  the  charges  of  haughtiness, 
perfidy,  aggressiveness  and  greed  been  reiterated  against  us, 
that  all  believed  them  true.  The  Americans  were  in  their 
eyes  accursed  heretics,  eager  to  trample  under  foot  their  holy 
religion :  and  they  were  also  barbarians,  capable  of  everything 
rough  and  cruel.  In  the  event  of  their  success  the  family 
hearth  was  to  be  polluted,  the  glorious,  dearly-bought  indepen- 
dence of  the  nation  crushed,  and  the  adored  accents  of  the, 
mother-tongue  stifled.  To  the  Indian  rank  and  file  the  word 
"patriotism,"  indeed,  meant  little;  but  they  loved  their 
villages,  and  could  imagine  even  worse  tyrants  than  Mexicans. 
The  name  "foreigner"  had  a  terrible  sound  in  their  ears,  and 
fanatical  devotion  to  the  Roman  church  set  their  passionate 
natures  aflame.  At  the  first  sight  of  the  "detestable"  Stars 
and  Stripes  fluttering  in  the  breeze,  they  had  loudly  demanded 
battle,  and  later  the  confident  hope  of  triumph  gave  a  still 
keener  edge  to  their  enthusiasm.  Taylor  evidently  despised 
the  enemy,  believing  there  was  no  fight  in  them ;  but  those 
tawny  fellows,  though  miserably  clothed  and  apparently  spirit- 
less, were  trained  to  "blind  obedience,"  could  fight  like  devils 
while  their  strength  and  fury  lasted,  and  had  now  reached  a 
good  state  of  discipline.  Even  Captain  Hardee  of  Thornton's 
command,  a  prisoner  at  large  in  Matamoros,  believed  the 
Mexicans  would  gain  the  coming  battle.9 

One  of  Taylor's  most  obvious  needs  in  taking  post  on  the 
Rio  Grande  was  a  light  corps  available  for  scouting,  and  in 
ordering  him  to  advance,  Marcy  had  expressly  authorized  him 
to  call  upon  the  Texans  —  by  whom  legs  were  valued  chiefly 
as  the  means  of  sticking  to  a  horse  —  for  assistance ;  but 
nothing  was  done  about  the  matter.  On  April  11  a  friend  in 
Matamoros  warned  him  that  an  attempt  might  be  made  to  cut 
his  line  to  Point  Isabel,  but  he  did  not  seem  to  feel  concerned. 
vol.  i  —  M 


162 


THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 


His  troops  were  merely  drawn  beyond  the  effective  range  of 
Ampudia's  artillery;  the  work  of  fortifying  was  quickened; 
on  the  23d  he  described  the  fort  complacently  as  "  in  a  condition 
of  defence";  and  a  week  later  he  contented  himself  with 
having  the  road  inspected  for  seven  miles.  Point  Isabel,  he 
said  as  early  as  April  12,  could  withstand  attack.10 

Arista,  for  his  part,  decided  quite  naturally,  while  on  his  way 
to  Matamoros,  that  he  would  plant  himself  on  the  American 
line  of  communication,  and  prevent  our  army  from  receiving 
ammunition,  provisions  and  reinforcements.     Accordingly  the 


1600  men  under  Torrejon,  after  disposing  of  Thornton's  com- 
mand, passed  Fort  Brown,  held  the  road  for  some  days  without 
the  knowledge  of  Taylor,  and  then  by  a  grave  blunder  were 
drawn  away,  and  concentrated  on  the  Rio  Grande  opposite 
Longoreno,  eight  or  ten  miles  below  the  city,  to  protect  the 
crossing  of  the  other  troops,  who  proceeded  to  that  point  by 
several  routes  in  order  to  deceive  the  Americans.  The  last 
day  of  the  month  Ampudia  with  his  brigade  and  four  guns 
went  over ;  and  on  May  1  Arista  —  leaving  Mejia  with  about 
1400  men  to  hold  Matamoros  —  followed  with  his  other  brigade 
and  eight  pieces.  Unfortunately  for  him  three  scows  of  little 
capacity  were  the  only  boats  available ;  and  as  these  had  been 
taken  to  Longoreno  in  carts  by  a  circuitous  route  nearly  fifteen 


TAYLOR  ALARMED  163 

miles  in  length,  so  as  to  avoid  exciting  our  suspicions,  they 
were  not  in  good  order.  One  or  two,  in  fact,  seem  to  have 
been  almost  useless,  and  hence  many  precious  hours  were  lost ; 
but  at  any  rate  the  army  succeeded  in  crossing  a  swift  river 
without  injury  almost  under  the  eyes  of  the  Americans.11 

By  about  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  on  the  first  of  May 
Taylor  heard  that  Mexicans  were  below  him,  and  awoke.  He 
saw  now  that  Fort  Brown  required  munitions  and  food,  and 
that  Point  Isabel  could  not,  even  yet,  resist  a  serious  attack. 
Tents  came  down  in  haste ;  the  wagon  train  was  made  ready ; 
and  at  about  half-past  three  —  leaving  behind  the  Seventh 
Infantry  commanded  by  Major  Brown,  with  Captain  Lowd's 
four  18-pounders,  Lieutenant  Bragg's  field  battery  and  the 
sick,  under  orders  to  hold  out  as  long  as  possible  —  Taylor 
marched  for  the  coast.  No  time  was  lost  in  getting  there. 
The  troops  bivouacked  that  night  on  the  damp,  chilly  plain 
without  fires,  and  early  the  next  morning  set  out  again.  The 
shallow,  greenish-brown  lagoons  rimmed  with  broad,  flat, 
oozing  banks  of  mud,  the  marshes  full  of  tawny  grass,  and  the 
low  ridges  mottled  with  patches  of  herbage  and  bald  surfaces 
of  gleaming  dry  dirt,  seemed  interminable;  but  as  hours 
passed  the  now  sultry  air  began  to  be  streaked  with  salt  odors, 
and  by  noon  the  panting  troops  caught  the  sparkle  of  blue 
waves.  Fortunately  they  could  not  hear  the  shouts  of  joy  in 
Matamoros  over  what  was  called  their  precipitate  flight.12 

As  it  was  necessary  to  strengthen  the  defences,  all  the  troops 
now  exchanged  their  muskets  for  picks  and  shovels.  May  6 
the  engineer  in  charge  was  authorized  to  continue  the  work 
by  employing  a  hundred  laborers;  and  at  about  three  o'clock 
the  next  day,  escorting  more  than  200  loaded  wagons,  the  little 
army,  preceded  by  a  body  of  dragoons,  moved  out  on  the 
return  march.  As  the  small  garrison  of  Fort  Brown  had 
provisions  for  at  least  three  weeks,  and  the  Mexicans  could 
not  be  expected  to  attack  it  seriously  with  Taylor  approaching 
their  rear,  whereas  they  were  practically  sure  to  be  met  on  the 
road,  Taylor's  best  officers  entreated  him  to  gain  freedom  of 
action  by  leaving  the  train  behind,  which  at  most  would  have 
delayed  it  only  a  day  or  so ;  but  he  would  not.  No  fears  dis- 
turbed his  mind.  Reinforced  with  perhaps  200  men  just 
landed  at  the  Point,  the  army  now  with  him  numbered  2228, 


164  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

all  told.  Recent  exercise  and  drill  had  left  it  in  a  splendid 
physical  condition.  Recollecting  how  long  popular  orators 
had  been  mocking  at  the  "regulars,"  it  longed  to  do  something. 
The  attacks  upon  Cross,  Walker,  Porter  and  Thornton  had 
exasperated  its  temper;  nothing  could  have  pleased  the  great 
majority  of  the  soldiers  better  than  a  fight;  and  the  General 
felt  very  much  the  same  way.13 

When  it  had  made  about  seven  miles  the  army  bivouacked, 
and  early  the  next  day  it  resumed  the  march.  Soon  after 
noon,  when  some  ten  or  twelve  miles  more  had  been  covered, 
a  low,  dark  line  could  be  seen  across  the  plain  in  front,  some 
two  or  three  miles  away.  It  was  the  Mexican  army.  As  the 
pond  or  water-hole  of  Palo  Alto  lay  near,  the  tired  and  thirsty 
troops  were  permitted  to  halt,  rest  a  little,  drink  and  fill  their 
canteens ;  and  then  Taylor  had  them  posted  in  order  of  battle. 
At  the  extreme  right  the  Fifth  Infantry  led  by  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Mcintosh  was  placed,  and  on  its  left  in  succession 
came  Major  Ringgold's  battery,  the  Third  Infantry  (Captain 
Morris),  two  18-pounders  on  siege  carriages  under  Lieutenant 
Churchill,  and  the  Fourth  Infantry  (Major  Allen).  The 
Third  and  Fourth  made  up  a  brigade,  commanded  by  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Garland;  and  all  the  troops  just  mentioned, 
together  with  Twiggs's  dragoons,  some  250  strong,  in  two 
squadrons  led  by  Captains  Kerr  and  May,  formed  the  right 
wing.  The  other  wing,  known  as  the  first  brigade  and  com- 
manded by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Belknap,  consisted  of  the 
Artillery  Battalion  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Childs,  Captain 
Duncan's  battery,  and  the  Eighth  Infantry,  posted  in  this 
order  from  right  to  left.  The  wagons  were  then  assembled 
near  the  pond  at  the  side  of  some  woods,  and  Kerr  was  detached 
with  his  squadron  to  guard  them.14 

During  these  days  Arista  had  waited  for  Taylor's  return; 
but,  in  order  to  hasten  that  and  perhaps  accomplish  direct 
results,  he  had  ordered  the  guns  of  Matamoros  to  begin  cannon- 
ading Fort  Brown  on  the  morning  of  May  3,  and  two  days 
later,  believing  the  garrison  were  near  starvation,  sent  Ampudia 
to  invest  it.  For  the  sake  of  water  and  to  cover  all  of  the 
roads  that  might  be  taken  by  the  American  army,  he  placed 
himself  at  Los  Tanques  del  Ramireno;  and  about  noon  on 
the  eighth,  learning  of  Taylor's  approach,  he  set  out  for  Palo 


*c-^fl 


su 


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j'*     -<*•  ir  Q     '   ^  & 

■^  „i$    ^f 

&\  w 


BATTLE  OF  PALO  ALTO 

May  8,  1846 


American  Forces 
Mexican  Forces 
Regmcutal  numeral 
Artillery  battalion 
Kerr's  squadron 
May's  squadron 
Ringold's  battery 
Duncan's  battery 
Churchill's  battery 
Tampico  Corps 
Zapadores  (Sappers ) 
Presidiales 
Light  Cavalry 


Black 
Red 

in 

A 
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M 
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y. 


Infantry -First  position  i^waCjawj 

Intermediate  position  cr~^-—-z 

Final  position  CT 

Cavalry-First  position 

Intermediate  position 

Final  position  Y^\ 

Artillery- First  position  ».*,..?!,, 

Intermediate  position         m  =  =  a 
Final  position  .  'I'     *. 

Wagon  Train-First  position  *   *'  j 

'r>  T,  % 
(The  positions  of  the  troops  can  be  indi- 
cated only approximately. J 


BATTLE  OF  PALO  ALTO  165 

Alto,  some  five  mile^s  away.  Shortly  before  gaining  that  point 
he  saw  through  his  glass  blue  American  dragoons  in  the  far 
distance,  and,  as  quickly  as  he  could,  put  his  troops  in  position. 
At  the  extreme  right  were  placed  about  150  horse  under 
Noriega,  and  then  came  a  4-pounder,  a  corps  of  Sappers,  the 
Second  Light  Infantry,  the  Tampico  Veteran  Company  and 
Coast  Guards,  five  4-pounders,  the  First,  the  Sixth  and  the 
Tenth  Infantry,  and  finally,  beyond  an  interval  of  about  400 
yards  and  somewhat  in  advance,  Torre j on  and  the  rest  of  the 
cavalry  —  their  front  extended,  their  right  strengthened  with 
two  small  guns,  and  their  left  reaching  beyond  the  Point 
Isabel  road  to  a  piece  of  chaparral  on  a  slight  elevation  beside 
a  swamp.  In  the  rear  of  the  line  were  some  thickets;  just 
behind  the  right  wing  an  eminence  eighteen  or  twenty  feet 
high  rose  above  chaparral;  protected  by  this  lay  a  watering- 
place;  and  in  front  there  were  some  boggy  pools  and  wide 
fields  of  stiff  grass  almost  shoulder-high.14 

As  soon  as  formed,  the  Americans  advanced  in  silence  —  the 
18-pounders,  drawn  by  oxen,  following  the  road  —  while 
Lieutenant  Blake  reconnoitred  the  Mexican  line  within 
musket  range  to  look  for  artillery.  At  about  two  o'clock 
Ampudia  came  in  sight  with  the  Fourth  Infantry,  commanded 
by  Colonel  Uraga,  a  company  of  Sappers,  two  8-pounders, 
and  about  400  irregular  horse  under  Canales.  Upon  this 
Arista  and  his  staff,  a  blaze  of  gold  lace,  passed  rapidly  down 
the  line.  It  seemed  strange  to  find  in  his  position  a  tall, 
raw-boned  man  with  red  hair  and  sandy  whiskers;  but  he 
showed  the  martial  bearing  of  his  nation,  and  harangued  the 
troops  with  genuine  Mexican  eloquence.  They  were  found 
ready  for  battle.  Answering  him  with  loud  vivas  they  made 
ready  their  arms.  The  silken  banners  fluttered;  the  bands 
played;  and  at  about  half-past  two  or  three  o'clock,  by  the 
General's  order,  his  artillery  opened.  The  hostile  armies  were 
then  approximately  half  a  mile  apart;  and  the  Mexicans  — 
drawn  out,  except  the  cavalry,  only  two  deep  on  a  front  about 
a  mile  in  length  without  reserves  —  seemed  to  number  6000, 
though  probably  not  more  than  two  thirds  as  many.14 

Apparently  Taylor's  plan  had  been  to  force  a  passage  by 
charging,  for  his  aim  was  to  reach  Fort  Brown,  and  his  infantry 
had  been  instructed,  the  day  before,  to  rely  mainly  on  the 


166  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

bayonet;  but  he  now  halted.  All  his  infantry  except  the 
Eighth  regiment  deployed  into  line.  At  strange  words  of 
command  —  "Haw,  Brindle!"  "Whoa,  Brandy!"  —  ten  yoke 
of  oxen  wheeled  each  ammunition  wagon  into  its  place;  and 
the  cannon  advanced.  At  this  juncture  Ampudia's  column 
approached  the  field.  Canales  led  his  men  a  considerable 
distance  forward  into  the  scattered  chaparral  on  the  Mexican 
left,  probably  with  a  view  to  cutting  off  Taylor's  retreat,  and 
thus  put  himself  entirely  out  of  the  battlefield;  but  the  rest 
of  the  command  proceeded  toward  their  appointed  place 
between  Torre j  on  and  the  infantry,  and  as  this  movement 
appeared  to  mean  a  charge,  the  American  fire  was  turned  in 
that  direction.  Without  faltering,  however,  they  moved  up 
to  the  line  and  deployed,  but  their  route  was  marked  with  the 
fallen.14 

Now  ensued  about  an  hour  of  cannonading,  supported  by 
our  troops  with  shouts  that  often  drowned  the  roar  of  the 
guns,  and  endured  by  the  Mexicans  with  unfailing  constancy. 
Arista's  pieces,  though  bravely  and  skilfully  served,  were 
mostly, too  light.  The  balls  generally  fell  short,  and  as  they 
ricocheted,  our  men  stepped  aside.  But  the  American  prac- 
tice met  every  hope.  Sometimes  a  single  shot  appeared  to 
mow  down  a  whole  platoon  of  mounted  men ;  and  here,  there, 
everywhere  gaps  opened  in  the  infantry.  With  vivas  the  gaps 
instantly  closed,  but  they  would  not  stay  closed.14 

Arista,  a  bold  and  experienced  officer,  expecting  Taylor  to 
act  on  such  a  plan  as  Taylor  seems  actually  to  have  formed, 
intended  to  charge  both  flanks  of  the  advancing  Americans 
with  cavalry  supported  by  infantry ;  but  the  American  artillery 
surprised  him  almost  as  much  as  if  Taylor  had  used  shooting 
stars.  Probably  the  right  course  for  him  would  have  been  to 
attack  anyhow,  for  his  men  were  still  eager  to  fight,  a  cannon 
could  be  discharged  only  about  once  a  minute,  and  our  batteries 
would  not  have  done  much  more  harm  at  70  than  at  700 
yards.  But  apparently  it  seemed  impracticable  to  wallow 
slowly  for  such  a  distance  through  the  grass,  the  sharp  edges 
of  which  would  have  cut  the  legs  of  his  poorly  dressed  soldiers 
badly,  under  so  withering  a  fire.  Something  had  to  be  done, 
however,  for  the  troops  grew  impatient.  He  therefore  directed 
his  right  wing  to  prepare  for  a  charge,  and  ordered  Torrejon 


BATTLE  OF  PALO  ALTO  167 

and  his  two  small  guns  to  attack  the  American  right,  rear  and 
wagons.  Reluctantly  Torrejon  obeyed.  Passing  to  the  left, 
his  "red  lancers "  —  probably  a  thousand  strong  and  "por- 
tentous" with  trumpets,  banners  and  lance  points  —  advanced 
through  the  scattered  chaparral  and  across  a  slough,  becoming 
somewhat  broken  on  the  way,  and  found  themselves  at  another 
small  morass.  Evidently  the  nature  of  the  ground  on  which 
he  was  likely  to  operate  had  not  interested  Torrejon.14 

Taylor,  sitting  unconcernedly  with  one  leg  over  the  pommel 
of  his  saddle,  writing,  was  notified  of  this  movement  and  simply 
replied,  "Keep  a  bright  lookout  for  them."  But  some  one  — 
probably  Twiggs,  who  commanded  the  right  wing  —  had  the 
Fifth  Infantry  march  rapidly  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to 
the  right  and  rear,  and  throw  itself  into  a  square.  Torrejon 
awkwardly  approached  this  body  in  column  instead  of  line  with 
some  of  the  worthless  Presidials  in  the  lead,  fired  ineffectively, 
was  answered  with  a  disconcerting  though  not  very  injurious 
volley,  and  recoiled  some  300  yards.  He  then  sent  word  to 
Arista  that  a  morass  rendered  his  movement  impracticable; 
but  on  receiving  instructions  to  persevere,  he  made  a  circuit, 
advanced  upon  the  second  front  of  the  square,  and  once  more 
exchanged  a  volley.  Now,  however,  he  found  our  Third  In- 
fantry moving  to  defend  the  wagons,  and  saw  two  of  Ring- 
gold's cannon  hurrying  to  the  scene  at  a  gallop,  while  his  own 
pieces  had  not  come  up.  As  rapidly  as  possible,  therefore, 
and  quite  willingly,  he  retreated,  but  not  without  a  salute  from 
our  two  cannon,  which  he  was  unable  to  return.  This  unsuc- 
cessful manoeuvre  exhausted  Arista's  ingenuity,  and  he  only 
waited  now  for  darkness,  hoping  to  get  away  and  find  a  better 
position.14 

During  these  operations  a  wad  from  Duncan's  battery  had 
fired  the  grass.  The  wind  from  the  Gulf,  nearly  parallel  to 
the  American  front,  drove  a  wall  of  roaring,  crackling  flame 
and  a  cloud  of  thick  smoke  across  the  plain ;  and,  as  the  armies 
could  see  each  other  only  now  and  then  and  in  spots,  firing  had 
to  be  suspended  for  nearly  an  hour.  Meanwhile,  believing 
the  Mexican  left  had  given  way,  Taylor  shifted  his  position 
behind  the  screen  with  a  view  to  advancing.  Churchill  pushed 
on  by  the  road  nearly  to  where  Torrejon  had  been ;  the  Fourth 
Infantry  moved  up  to  support  him ;   the  Fifth  went  ahead  on 


168  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

the  extreme  right;  the  rest  of  the  army  made  corresponding 
changes;  and  as  a  whole  the  line  diverged  now  thirty  or  forty 
degrees  from  its  original  direction,  while  the  wagons  came 
nearly  up  to  it.14 

But  the  Mexican  left  had  not  yielded,  and  so  Taylor  found 
when  he  sent  a  squadron  of  dragoons  to  open  the  way.  To 
avoid  being  enfiladed,  Arista  swung  his  line  forward  in  excellent 
order,  using  the  Fourth  Infantry  as  a  pivot,  and  again  it  stood 
firm  under  an  artillery  fire  more  destructive  than  at  first. 
Indeed  our  Fourth  Infantry  began  to  suffer  a  galling  cannonade, 
and  Torrejon  again  assumed  the  offensive.  Canister  from  the 
18-pounders  checked  him,  however,  and  after  sharp  musketry 
exchanges  between  the  Mexican  line  and  our  Artillery  Battalion, 
which  had  advanced  and  formed  a  square,  'serious  infantry 
operations  in  this  quarter  came  to  an  end.  As  for  the  artillery, 
Arista  had  now  used  up  his  650  cannon  balls ;  but  the  Americans 
kept  at  work  until  nightfall.14 

On  our  left,  however,  important  events  occurred.  From 
the  first  Captain  Duncan's  battery,  which  made  two  fire-units 
because  handled  in  sections,  played  a  brilliant  and  effective 
role,  supported  by  the  Eighth  Infantry  and  either  Kerr's  or 
May's  dragoons,  and  advancing  or  retiring  as  the  course  of  the 
battle  dictated.  When  Arista's  change  of  front  threw  his 
right  forward  nearly  700  yards  and  seemed  to  threaten  a  flank 
attack,  these  pieces  became  more  active  and  more  daring  than 
ever,  and  under  their  blasting  discharges,  aided  more  or  less 
at  this  time  by  the  18-pounders,  the  Mexicans  fell  rapidly. 
Again  they  grew  impatient  —  not  principally  because  they 
were  suffering  so  terribly,  but  because  they  were  inactive, 
and  because  hints  that  Arista  had  sold  them  began  to  arrive 
from  Ampudia's  quarter;  and  finally  the  extreme  right  wing 
broke.14 

After  a  time  some  of  the  officers  and  Arista,  who  exposed 
himself  bravely  throughout  the  battle,  induced  these  troops 
to  go  back,  and  as  they  were  still  in  much  confusion,  the  rem- 
nants of  Noriega's  corps,  reinforced  with  200  men  from  To- 
rrejon, were  ordered  to  support  them.  The  cavalry,  however, 
badly  demoralized  themselves,  dashed  blindly  at  a  trot  against 
the  infantry;  the  resulting  disorder  extended  even  to  the 
Tampico  men;    and  these  desperate  corps,  ordered  to  charge 


BATTLE  OF  PALO  ALTO  169 

as  the  only  possible  way  to  prevent  them  from  bolting,  moved 
forward  aimlessly  in  succession.  Duncan,  when  he  saw  this 
large  force  advance,  withdrew  a  little,  still  firing;  but  soon 
under  cover  of  the  smoke  he  came  up  again,  and  gained  an 
enfilading  position.  Suddenly  with  a  sharp  crack  his  guns 
opened,  and  against  the  fading  horizon  his  shells  and  shrapnel 
could  be  seen  bursting,  with  almost  the  regularity  of  signal 
rockets,  over  those  dark  masses.  Driven  like  sheep  by  this 
fire,  the  Mexican  right  wing  turned  toward  the  left  and  hurried 
across  the  entire  field,  presenting  their  flank  and  to  some 
extent  their  rear  to  the  Americans  at  a  distance  of  200  paces 
or  even  less,  while,  in  a  somewhat  more  orderly  manner,  the 
First  Infantry,  which  stood  next  in  line,  followed  them.  Now 
was  the  time  to  decide  the  battle ;  but,  though  Taylor  had 
come  to  this  part  of  the  field,  nothing  could  be  done,  for  it 
was  feared  that  should  a  charge  be  made,  the  enemy's  cavalry 
might  reach  the  wagons,  and  cripple  our  army  by  destroying 
the  provisions.  Indeed,  the  Americans  appear  to  have  drawn 
back  a  little  toward  the  train;  and  the  disordered  Mexicans, 
having  reached  the  extreme  left  and  finally  the  rear  of  their 
line,  were  re-formed.14 

It  was  now  about  seven  o'clock.  The  Americans  had  lost 
five  killed  and  forty-three  wounded,  and  the  Mexicans  prob- 
ably seven  times  as  many.  The  afterglow  of  sunset  lighted 
up  the  dun  clouds  of  smoke.  Darkness  was  close  at  hand. 
Necessarily,  therefore,  the  struggle  ended;  and  while  the 
Mexicans  retired  through  the  chaparral  to  the  low  eminence 
behind  the  original  position  of  their  right  wing,  and  there 
camped  in  order  of  battle,  the  Americans  bivouacked  where 
they  stood,  or  in  the  fitful  glare  of  the  still  burning  grass  gave 
attention  to  such  of  both  armies  as  could  be  discovered  lying 
on  the  field.  At  last  the  prairie  fire  burned  out;  the  smoke 
of  battle  drifted  away ;  the  full  moon  appeared ;  and  the  tired 
troops,  watched  over  by  pacing  guards,  slept  between  the  stacks 
of  arms  like  images.14 

Important  moral  results  had  been  gained  by  the  Americans, 
but  they  were  not  aware  of  the  fact,  and  expected  the  battle 
to  be  resumed.  At  about  seven  o'clock  the  next  morning, 
however,  as  the  light  mist  slowly  dissolved,  their  astonished 
eyes  beheld  the  Mexican  line  gliding  off  into  the  road ;    and 


170 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


presently,  like  the  tail  of  a  huge  serpent,  its  rear  wound  away 
into  the  chaparral,  and  vanished.  Taylor  gazed  and  reflected, 
moved  a  short  distance,  waited  to  ascertain  through  a  party 
of  dragoons  that  it  was  a  genuine  retreat,  consulted  with  some 
of  his  principal  officers,  and  then  decided  on  pursuit;  but 
the  forenoon  had  to  be  spent  in  erecting  breastworks  and 
planting  four  heavy  cannon  to  defend  the  train,  which  he  now 
saw  should  be  left  behind;    and  he  merely  sent  forward  a 


composite  force  of  220  men,  under  Captain  McCall  of  the 
Fourth  Infantry,  to  harass  the  Mexican  rear.15 

Arista  turned  this  delay  to  good  account.  The  chaparral 
and  woods  that  his  troops  had  been  seen  to  enter  extended 
with  some  interruptions  to  the  Rio  Grande,  a  distance  of 
approximately  seven  miles;  and  two  hours  before  noon, 
after  marching  about  halfway  through  it,  he  stopped  at 
the  Resaca  de  Guerrero.  The  Resaca  was  an  ancient  channel 
of  the  river,  but  it  now  consisted  merely  of  a  shallow,  muddy 
ravine  somewhat  in  the  shape  of  a  bow,  several  hundred  feet 


ARISTA  IN  A  NEW  POSITION  171 

wide  and  three  or  four  feet  deep  at  the  banks,  lying  substan- 
tially east  and  west  across  the  route,  with  its  concave  side 
toward  Palo  Alto.  At  the  bottom  of  it,  both  to  the  right  and 
to  the  left  of  the  road,  lay  narrow  ponds,  and  the  space  between 
the  water  and  the  banks  was  rather  closely  filled  with  bushes 
and  small  trees.  Facing  round  here,  Arista  planted  three  or 
four  guns  at  the  right,  or  east,  of  the  road  from  Palo  Alto  where 
it  approached  the  Resaca,  two  at  least  —  hidden  with  branches 
of  trees  —  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Resaca,  and  other 
pieces  at  suitable  points  toward  his  left.  The  infantry  were 
placed  in  two  wings  divided  by  the  road,  with  much  the  greater 
weight  on  the  right  hand,  some  of  the  troops  taking  position 
just  in  the  rear  of  the  ravine,  some  behind  its  northern  bank, 
and  some  in  the  chaparral  still  farther  forward.  The  head- 
quarters tent  was  pitched  in  a  small  clear  space  or  placeta 
about  500  paces  back  on  the  left  of  the  road,  and  Torrejon's 
cavalry  halted  in  the  same  road  still  farther  away;  while 
Canales  with  two  guns,  placing  himself  on  the  left  a  considerable 
distance  back  from  the  Resaca,  guarded  a  cross-road  leading 
to  Arista's  rear.16 

The  Mexican  position,  besides  covering  every  line  to  Fort 
Brown,  offered  a  number  of  other  advantages.  It  did  not 
call  for  much  use  of  artillery,  and  therefore  neutralized  Arista's 
deficiency  in  cannon  ammunition.  The  woods  made  it  im- 
possible for  the  Americans  to  employ  that  dreaded  arm  effec- 
tively. The  bank  of  the  Resaca  formed  a  natural  breastwork, 
and  it  seemed  likely  that  the  troops,  protected  in  this  manner, 
would  be  confident  and  firm.  But  evidently  a  bold  and  enter- 
prising enemy  could  take  advantage  of  the  woods  to  conceal 
his  movements;  and  evidently,  too,  Arista's  main  batteries 
could  fire  only  in  the  direction  of  the  road,  since  there  were 
Mexicans  in  advance  of  the  Resaca  both  to  right  and  to  left. 
Another  handicap  lay  in  the  impossibility  of  surveying  the 
field  and  manoeuvring'  troops  —  particularly  the  cavalry ; 
the  soldiers,  unable  to  see  far,  lacked  that  sense  of  union  and 
support  which  Mexicans  peculiarly  needed;  and  the  want  of 
reserves,  though  to  a  certain  extent  a  part  of  the  Fourth  In- 
fantry stationed  on  the  right  behind  the  Resaca  could  act  as 
such,  was  an  additional  source  of  weakness.16 

A  still  more  serious  feature  of  Arista's  situation  was   the 


172  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

condition  of  his  troops.  Many,  and  probably  most  of  them, 
had  not  eaten  for  more  than  twenty-four  hours.  The  suffer- 
ings they  had  witnessed  and  the  neglect  of  their  fallen  comrades 
had  worked  upon  their  feelings.  The  dreadful  effectiveness 
of  the  American  artillery  had  been  profoundly  discouraging; 
many  of  their  officers  had  proved  unworthy  of  confidence; 
and  above  all,  accustomed  to  the  duplicity  of  Mexican  leaders 
and  unable  to  understand  their  general's  inactivity  the  day 
before,  many  concluded  that  Arista,  who  was  accused  of  seek- 
ing American  support  for  his  alleged  revolutionary  scheme, 
had  betrayed  them.  This  idea,  if  we  may  trust  common 
sense  and  Mexican  intimations,  was  suggested  or  at  least 
encouraged  by  Ampudia  himself;  and  the  cooperation  of 
all  these  depressing  influences  had  spread  a  general  conviction 
through  the  army  by  the  forenoon  of  May  9  that  a  great  dis- 
aster would  befall  it  that  day.  A  few,  it  was  said,  broke  their 
weapons  in  despair;  and  utter  dejection  could  be  read  in  the 
faces  of  every  corps.  Some  reinforcements  were  drawn  from 
the  city,  but  they  did  not  materially  improve  the  situation.16 

Taylor,  then,  advancing  at  about  two  o'clock,  after  detaching 
most  of  the  Artillery  Battalion  and  perhaps  Kerr's  dragoons 
to  guard  the  train,  moved  forward  to  the  edge  of  the  woods, 
and  halted  at  what  was  called  the  Resaca  de  la  Palma  to  await 
information.  The  advance  corps  under  McCall,  which  con- 
sisted principally  of  the  light  companies  of  the  first  brigade 
under  Captain  C.  F.  Smith,  was  now  feeling  its  way  toward 
the  enemy.  At  a  little  after  two  o'clock,  turning  a  bend  in 
the  road,  it  found  cannon  in  front.  Instantly  they  fired. 
About  half  a  dozen  Americans  fell,  and  the  rest  quickly  with- 
drew. At  three  o'clock  McCall's  report  arrived  at  head- 
quarters. Taylor  pushed  on  immediately,  and  in  about  an 
hour  came  up  with  the  advance  party.  Ringgold's  battery, 
now  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Ridgely,  was  sent  forward  on 
the  road,  and  McCall's  command,  thrown  into  the  chaparral 
on  both  sides,  began  a  slow  and  painful  advance  through  the 
bushes.  Almost  immediately  it  found  itself  in  contact  with 
the  enemy.16 

Under  such  circumstances  McCall  could  give  the  battery  no 
support,  of  course,  and  the  only  reasonable  expectation  was 
that  Ridgely's  men  and  horses  would  be  shot  from  the  woods^ 


BATTLE   OF  RESACA  DE   LA  PALMA  173 

and  his  guns  be  taken.  That,  however,  made  no  differ- 
ence to  him.  His  orders  were  to  advance,  and  advance  he 
would.  Once  a  body  of  lancers  charged  his  guns,  but  by  a 
combination  of  courage,  skill  and  good  luck  he  routed  it. 
Some  of  the  Mexican  artillery  seems  to  have  moved  up  the 
road  a  little  way  after  McCall  retired;  but  Ridgely,  pushing 
on  even  into  the  very  smoke  of  the  enemy's  cannon,  drove 
them  in  spite  of  stubborn  resistance  beyond  the  edge  of  the 
Resaca,  and  then  sent  back  for  troops  to  help  him  capture 
them.  When  the  battle  became  more  general  he  continued 
to  fire  upon  the  Mexican  batteries;  and,  as  far  as  he  could 
without  endangering  Americans,  he  also  swept  the  woods  with 
canister,  frightening  the  enemy  with  a  terrible  noise  in  the 
tree-tops  that  reminded  them  of  the  slaughter  at  Palo  Alto.16 

To  right  and  to  left  the  battle  soon  raged.  All  the  Americans 
on  the  ground,  numbering  about  1700,  were  put  in.  No  general 
guidance  could  be  exercised.  "Chance  was  the  lord  of  all 
save  the  good  right  arms"  of  the  troops,  wrote  an  officer.  In 
such  woods  and  thickets  lines  could  not  be  formed.  Even 
companies  found  it  impossible  to  remain  intact.  A  field 
officer  was  no  more  than  a  captain,  and  a  captain  no  more 
than  a  subaltern.  All  got  into  the  work  promptly,  and  all 
did  their  best  when  there.  As  fast  as  they  could,  singly  or 
in  little  squads,  they  pushed  on,  cheering  and  shouting.  Often 
it  required  one's  utmost  exertions  to  squeeze  through  or  hack 
through  the  dense  and  thorny  chaparral  under  pelting  showers 
of  bullets.  Now  there  was  shooting,  and  now  the  cold  steel 
struck  fire.  "My  orders  was  to  make  free  use  of  the  bayonet," 
said  the  General  afterwards,  and  the  orders  were  borne  in  mind. 
Here  Lieutenant  Meade,  the  future  victor  of  Gettysburg, 
had  a  chance  to  win  his  spurs;  and  he  was  but  one  of  many 
heroes,  though  perhaps  the  most  conspicuous  in  his  quarter.16 

Nor  did  the  Americans  have  it  all  their  own  way.  Those 
Mexicans  who  fought  at  all  this  day,  fought  like  tigers.  On 
the  right  near  the  road  the  Second  Light  Infantry,  which 
had  been  placed  there  in  ambush  just  before  the  real  battle 
opened,  stood  firm ;  but  most  of  its  field  officers  were  struck 
down,  and  it  had  to  give  way.  A  company  of  Uraga's  regiment 
did  nobly  close  by,  and  every  man  of  it,  we  are  told,  was  either 
killed  or  wounded.16 


174  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Farther  toward  Arista's  left,  however,  our  men  pushed  for- 
ward rather  easily,  though  it  seemed  evident  from  the  firing 
that  Mexicans  were  in  front.  Gaining  ground  in  this  direction 
some  Americans  probably  came  upon  a  path  which  led  round 
the  western  end  of  the  pond,  and  gave  access  to  the  Mexican 
flank.  Just  before  the  battle  began  Ampudia  learned  of  the 
path,  and  stationed  a  company  of  the  Sappers  and  a  company 
of  the  Fourth  Infantry  in  this  quarter;  and  later  he  sent 
another  detachment  from  the  Fourth  with  a  gun.  Besides 
these  meagre  forces  probably  no  corps  guarded  the  left  except 
a  few  Tampico  troops.  These  also  fought  well ;  but  the  splen- 
did silk  banner  of  the  Veterans,  the  bravest  corps  in  the  army, 
was  captured,  and  only  at  heavy  cost  could  they  fight  their 
way  back.  Meantime  the  rest  of  Uraga's  regiment  came  over 
from  beyond  the  road,  but  it  could  not  stop  the  Americans; 
and  brave  Captain  Barbour,  followed  by  a  small  party,  soon 
approached  the  placeta.  The  effect  was  electrical.  Nobody 
knew  how  many  troops  were  following  him.  Canales  took 
flight.  The  sense  of  defeat,  already  imparted  by  hurrying 
soldiers  of  the  Second  Light,  spread  across  the  road  from  the 
broken  left,  and  at  about  half-past  five  o'clock  Arista's  right 
wing,  the  strength  of  the  army,  crumbled  like  a  sand  fort 
struck  by  a  wave.  Except  perhaps  one,  all  the  corps  dissolved ; 
and  in  a  moment,  as  it  seemed,  nothing  was  left  but  a  mob  of 
fugitives.16 

During  all  this,  Taylor,  exposing  himself  as  much  as  any 
one,  had  been  fighting  at  the  centre.  The  proper  course  to 
adopt  there  was  to  charge  the  Mexican  guns  on  the  road 
with  infantry,  but  for  some  reason  he  sent  May's  dragoons 
against  them.  In  a  way  the  effort  succeeded.  Slashing  as 
they  galloped,  the  horsemen  quickly  ran  over  the  batteries  — 
more  than  a  quarter  of  a  mile  beyond  them,  in  fact ;  and  then, 
coming  back  in  a  scattered  condition,  had  a  chance  to  slash 
again,  for  the  batteries  had  been  reoccupied.  But  the  thickets 
on  both  sides  were  full  of  Mexican  infantry.  Against  their 
muskets  the  dragoons  were  mere  targets  —  broad  ones,  too ; 
and  before  long  the  squadron,  much  the  worse  for  its  charge, 
recrossed  the  Resaca.  Taylor  was  disgusted.  Turning  to 
Belknap  and  the  Eighth  Infantry  he  exclaimed,  "Take  those 
guns,  and  by keep  them  I H    A  part  of  the  Fifth  joined 


BATTLE  OF  RESACA  DE  LA  PALMA  175 

Belknap;  and  these  men,  rushing  in  furiously  all  together, 
yelling  like  fiends,  after  a  brief  though  sharp  struggle  with  the 
artillerymen  —  for  the  supporting  infantry  had  now  abandoned 
their  position  —  captured  the  pieces.  But  the  battle  had 
already  been  won.16 

Before  McCall  had  shown  himself  Arista,  dazed  perhaps  by 
his  reverse  at  Palo  Alto,  valuing  too  highly  his  new  position, 
and  probably  overestimating  the  injury  inflicted  on  Taylor 
the  day  before,  had  made  up  his  mind  that  no  immediate  attack 
was  to  be  expected,  and  after  placing  the  army  had  withdrawn 
to  his  tent,  and  busied  himself  in  writing.  Even  when  firing 
began,  he  said  it  was  only  a  skirmish;  and  after  our  troops 
reached  his  left  flank,  he  merely  ordered  Ampudia  and  the 
rest  of  the  Fourth  Infantry  to  go  and  settle  things  in  that 
quarter.  When  Americans  appeared  at  the  placeta,  however, 
he  awoke.  Pouring  curses  on  the  cowards  of  his  army,  he 
hurried  to  the  cavalry,  and  taking  the  place  of  Torre j on,  who 
had  refused  to  charge,  dashed  up  the  road.  His  men  lanced 
a  few  lingering  American  dragoons  and  helped  a  few  comrades 
to  escape,  but  the  battle  could  not  be  saved.  On  one  side  of 
the  road  at  least,  Americans  already  held  the  chaparral,  and 
like  May  he  could  not  stand  against  protected  infantry.16 

At  the  head  of  the  cavalry  he  retreated,  therefore,  and  turn- 
ing to  the  left  crossed  the  Rio  Grande  by  one  of  the  lower 
passages.  Other  fugitives  got  over  at  various  points;  and 
a  great  number,  passing  Fort  Brown,  which  was  about  three 
miles  from  the  battlefield,  crowded  to  the  Anacuitas  ferry. 
Here  they  found  a  couple  of  scows ;  and  some  troops,  that  had 
been  engaged  all  this  time  in  annoying  Fort  Brown,  stood  on 
guard.  But  the  fleeing  soldiers  were  panic-stricken,  the  boats 
moved  slowly,  and  the  Americans  were  looked  for  at  every 
moment.  Men  fought  for  places.  Clothing  and  arms  were 
thrown  away.  Many  tried  to  swim  or  fell  accidentally  into  the 
water,  and  an  unknown  number  perished  in  the  swift  current.16 

"Rio  Bravo !  Rio  Bravo ! 
Saw  men  ever  such  a  sight 
Since  the  field  of  Roncesvalles 
Sealed  the  fate  of  many  a  knight  ?  " 

But  the  Americans  did  not  come.  Taylor  had  scarcely 
any  fresh  troops  except  those  guarding  the  wagons  nearly  or 


176  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

quite  five  miles  in  the  rear.  May's  dragoons  had  been  used  up. 
Apparently  no  effort  had  been  made  to  communicate  with 
Fort  Brown,  and  have  its  defenders  —  now  tired  but  not 
exhausted  —  sally  forth  to  help  reap  the  fruits  of  the  expected 
victory.  Taylor  only  claimed  to  have  captured  "a  number" 
of  this  utterly  broken  army  facing  a  difficult  river.  Even 
badly  wounded  men  got  safely  across,  it  would  seem;  and 
very  soon,  in  spite  of  everything,  nearly  four  fifths  —  that  is 
to  say,  about  4000  besides  those  under  Canales  —  of  the  troops 
commanded  by  Arista  on  the  first  of  the  month  appear  to  have 
been  in  safety  on  the  south  shore.  Pie  lost  on  May  9,  according 
to  his  official  report,  160  killed,  228  wounded  and  159  missing, 
but  the  accuracy  of  the  figures  may  be  doubted.  Fourteen 
officers,  eight  guns  and  a  large  amount  of  property  were  cap- 
tured by  the  Americans,  while  their  casualties  were  only  33 
killed  and  89  wounded.16 

During  the  whole  week  so  dramatically  concluded,  Fort" 
Brown  had  been  under  attack.17  On  May  3  it  replied  vigor- 
ously, though  with  trifling  results,  to  the  guns  of  Matamoros; 
but  as  Taylor,  with  more  than  a  month  of  good  weather  and 
about  300  wagons  at  his  disposal,  had  neglected  to  bring  up 
a  stock  of  ammunition,  it  fired  only  occasionally  after  that  in 
order  to  notify  both  friend  and  foe  that  its  courage  still  held 
good.  On  the  4th  Canales  occupied  the  road,  and  on  the  next 
day  Ampudia  arrived  with  four  guns  and  nearly  a  thousand 
men.  Arista,  however,  believing  his  cannon  were  not  heavy 
enough  to  breach  the  wall  and  confident  that  hunger  would 
soon  reduce  the  garrison,  forbade  assault.  The  besiegers  made 
themselves  extremely  disagreeable ;  but  by  this  time  the  Ameri- 
cans had  bomb-proofs  and  "gopher  holes,"  and,  aside  from  the 
death  of  Major  Brown,  met  with  no  serious  losses.  Taylor's 
profound  silence,  after  as  well  as  before  the  battle  of  Palo  Alto, 
caused  intense  anxiety;  but  when  the  cannon  began  to  "bark" 
again  on  the  9th,  and  especially  when  a  throng  of  panic-stricken 
fugitives  could  be  seen  rushing  past,  haggard  faces  put  on 
smiles.  Finally  a  solitary  messenger  approached  at  a  gallop 
with  his  reins  on  the  horse's  neck,  waving  cap  and  sword,  and 
shouting  "Victory!"  and  the  long  strain  ended  in  exultation.18 
>  /  The  Mexican  army  was  now  hanging  like  a  plum,  overripe, 
shaken  by  the  wind  and  ready  to  fall.     To  the  British  consul 


SITUATION  OF  THE  MEXICANS  177 

it  seemed  utterly  demoralized,  and  beyond  the  possibility  of 
reorganization.  Yet  there  it  was  permitted  to  rest  and  re- 
cuperate undisturbed.  "XThe  official  explanation  said  that  al- 
though a  pontoon  trjin  had  been  proposed  a  long  time  before, 
the  dim  prospect  of  hostilities  had  not  seemed  to  warrant  that 
expense ;  but  like  numerous  other  official  statements  put  out  in 
the  course  of  the  war,  this  explanation  hid  more  than  it  told.19 
A  bridge  might  have  been  in  readiness ;  but,  though  several 
officers  had  been  laboring  for  more  than  a  month  to  focus 
Taylor's  mind  upon  the  subject,  "the  old  gentleman,"  wrote 
Meade,  "would  never  listen  or  give  it  a  moment's  attention.', 
Flat-boats  and  scows,  towed  by  the  light  steamers  belonging 
to  the  army,  might  have  been  sent  from  Point  Isabel  into  the 
river,  and  the  troops,  reienforcemnts  and  light  batteries, 
crossing  at  the  much-used  ferry  of  Burrita,  less  than  twenty 
miles  from  Matamoras,  and  by  land  appearing  at  the  town, 
say,  in  early  morning,  could  probably  hove  taken  army,  cannon 
and  ammunition  substantially  complete.  Instead  of  doing 
anything  of  this  description,  Taylor  now  sent  down  to  Point 
Isabel  for  mortars  and  for  plank  to  make  into  boats,  and  went 
there  himself.  A  slight  illness  delayed  him  further;  and  in 
eight  days  nothing  was  accomplished  in  the  direction  suggested 
beyond  placing  at  Burrita  a  battalion  of  the  First  Infantry 
and  some  200  volunteers  just  landed  at  Point  Isabel.19 
(Still,  though  let  alone,  Arista  occupied  no  enviable  position. 
He"" was  commonly  charged  with  incompetence,  treason  or 
both.  Many  of  the  officers  had  forsaken  their  troops  in  the 
hour  of  danger,  and  were  now  viewed  with  distrust  and  con- 
tempt. The  men  felt  exhausted  and  profoundly  disheartened. 
Even  the  dogs  kept  still.  Provisions,  ammunition  and  funds 
were  scant.  Fierce  complaints  and  recriminations  became  rife. 
Panic  brooded  over  all.  Taylor's  inaction  seemed  an  encourag- 
ing sign,  however,  and  on  the  17th  a  request  for  a  suspension 
of  hostilities,  accompanied  with  hints  of  a  peaceful  settlement, 
was  made  by  Arista.  This  petition  Taylor  rejected.  But, 
not  aware  that  a  general's  first  duty  in  war  is  to  eliminate  the 
fighting  strength  of  the  enemy,  he  said  that  Arista  might 
retire  with  his  army,  the  skk  and  the  wounded,  if  he  would 
give,  up  all  public  property.)  In  fact,  as  if  anxious  to  fight 
these  men  again  after  letting  them  get  nicely  rested,  he  threat- 

VOL.   I  —  N 


s 


178  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

ened  to  bring  Matamoros  down  about  their  ears,  unless  they 
would  move  to  a  safer  place.20 

(Arista  had  been  ordered  to  hold  the  city  as  long  as  possible, 
but  a  council  of  officers  pronounced  it  indefensible;  and, 
besides  feeling  no  violent  wish  to  sacrifice  himself,  he  doubtless 
realized  that  nobody  was  ready  to  stand  by  him.  He  therefore 
ordered  now  an  immediate  retreat,  and  a  wild  scramble  ensued} 
The  transportation  facilities  were  entirely  inadequate.  Some  of 
the  guns  and  ammunition  had  to  be  thrown  into  the  river.  The 
troops  of  Canales  were  dismissed.  A  large  number  of  men 
deserted ;  and  the  rest,  leaving  four  or  five  hundred  sick  and 
wounded  in  the  town,  hurried  away.  Fatigues  and  miseries 
almost  unspeakable  were  their  lot,  and  also  for  some  time  a  terri- 
ble fear  of  pursuit.  Heat,  cold,  thirst,  famine,  tempest,  sickness, 
desertion,  a  route  lined  with  dead  animals,  sleep  in  the  mud  as 
profound  as  the  sleep  of  the  grave,  troopers  carrying  their  horse 
furniture,  deaths  from  exhaustion  or  broken  hearts,  and  even 
suicides  —  these  made  up  the  record.  Finally,  almost  at  the 
end  of  the  month  2638  men,  according  to  an  officer,  crawled 
painfully  into  Linares,  and  a  week  later  Arista  received  orders 
to  place  Mejia  in  command.21 

Taylor,  all  this  while,  had  been  proceeding  in  his  deliberate 
way.  Boats  were  made  and  put  on  the  river  two  or  three 
miles  above  the  town,  and  early  on  the  eighteenth  troops  began 
to  cross;  but  when  the  first  of  them  were  over,  a  report  that 
Arista  had  retreated  was  confirmed,  and  the  greater  part  of 
the  army,  retracing  their  steps,  used  the  regular  Anacuitas 
ferry.  As  they  approached  Fort  Paredes  the  city  officials  — 
dressed  all  in  white,  bearing  white  flags  and  riding  white  horses 
—  came  forth  to  surrender  Matamoros.  No  terms  of  capitu- 
lation were  granted,  but  the  General  said  he  would  protect 
persons  and  property,  and  allow  the  civil  laws  to  continue 
in  force;  and  already  he  had  promised  to  respect  the  religion 
of  the  people.  To  their  surprise  the  Americans  appeared  to 
find  themselves  among  friends,  for  the  lately  implacable  but 
seldom  tactless  Mexicans  came  up  smiling,  cried  "Amiga, 
amigoj."  and  with  sunny  enthusiasm  offered  their  hands; 
and  Although  a  feeble  pursuit  of  Arista  produced  only  insig- 
nificant results,  the  victors  felt  well  content.  Their  superiority 
as  fighting  men  had  been  demonstrated.     Their  artillery  had 


EFFECTS  OF  THE  BATTLES  179 

evidently  surpassed  the  Mexican  artillery  in  both  mechanical 
and  personal  qualities.  The  officers  had  exhibited  the  finest 
courage,  esprit  de  corps  and  skill.  An  army  supposed  to  out- 
number ours  three  to  one  had  been  scattered,  and  a  prestige 
of  the  utmost  value  at  home,  in  Mexico  and  in  Europe,  had 
been  gained.2^) 

(Regarding  Taylor,  thoughtful  officers  did  not  feel  enthusiastic, 
however.  The  General  had  shown  himself  slow,  unskilful, 
wanting  in  nenetration  and  foresight,  and  poorly  grounded 
professionally}  Nine  tenths  of  the  regular  officers  felt  that 
no  talents  had  been  displayed  by  him,  even  in  the  battles. 
He  had  shown,  said  Meade,  "  perfect  inability  to  make  any  use 
of  the  information"  given  him.  In  the  opinion  of  another 
excellent  officer  he  seemed  "utterly,  absurdly  incompetent  to 
wield  a  large  army."  He  had  failed  to  realize  the  difficulties 
of  his  position;  had  undervalued  the  enemy;  and,  as  Bliss 
admitted,  had  had  "no  conception"  of  the  Mexican  prepara- 
tions. This  last  fact  dimmed  his.  credit,  even  for  courage,  in 
the  minds  of  discerning  critics j^J But,  after  all,  his  resolution 
had  been  superb  and  inspiring.  He  had  succeeded;  and 
among  us  Americans  "Nothing  succeeds  like  success.".  The 
reports  written  for  him  read  admirably.  Terse  remarks  of 
his,  often  tinged  with  soldierly  humor,  delighted  the  general 
taste  at  home,  and  mere  questions  of  tactics  or  strategy  signified 
in  comparison  rather  less  than  zero.  Besides,  he  was  so  demo- 
cratic—  no  military  stiffness,  no  West  Point  "aristocracy" 
about  him^A  tidal  wave  of  popularity  rose  in  his  favor,  )and 
soon  Thurlow  Weed  of  New  York,  the  Warwick  of  the  Whig 
party,  came  out  for  him  as  Presidential  candidate.  A  com- 
mission as  brevet  major  general  and  other  official  honors  did 
not  fail  to  arrive.23 

(At  Mexico  the  news  of  these  events  produced  utter  amaze- 
ment and  consternation.^)The  public,  reported  the  British 
minister,  had  been  assured  "in  the  most  inflated  Tone  that 
Victory  would  follow  the  steps  of  the  Mexican  Army  and  that 
annihilation  and  dishonour  would  be  the  portion  of  their 
enemies."  Even  General  Vega,  a  man  of  sense,  had  predicted 
a  victory  that  would  end  the  war.  Now,  alas,  the  cards  had 
fallen  badly.  "Profound  and  bitter  sorrow,"  as  it  privately 
admitted,  was  the  feeling  of  the  government.     Down  like  a 


180  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

plummet  went  expectations,  confidence  and  courage;  down 
went  the  plausible  hope  of  Paredes  that  all  the  nation,  glowing 
with  pride  and  enthusiasm  over  a  victory,  would  rally  about 
him ;  and  down  also,  reported  Bankhead,  went  his  monarchical 
scheme,  which  four  out  of  five  on  the  Congressional  committee 
appointed  to  draft  a  new  constitution  had  favored.24 


IX 

THE  UNITED  STATES  MEETS  THE  CRISIS 

May-July,  1846 

Polk  believed  in  pursuing  "a  bold  and  firm  course"  toward 
fexico.  In  this  policy  —  as  her  character  and  methods,  the 
comparative  success  of  England  in  dealing  with  her,  and  the 
many  humiliating  failures  of  the  United  States  indicated  —  he 
was  right.1  More  and  more  positive,  during  his  examination 
of  the  case  before  and  after  the  end  of  April,  1846,  became  his 
intention  to  place  the  subject  before  Congress  in  a  strong 
Message;  and  when  he  found  that  Slidell,  who  called  at  the 
White  House  on  Friday,  May  8,  held  the  same  opinion,  he 
decided  to  send  that  Message  "very  soon."  The  next  day  he 
and  the  Cabinet  discussed  the  question  at  length  once  more. 
George  Bancroft,  secretary  of  the  navy,  was  not  ready  to 
advise  the  employment  of  force,  unless  Mexico  should  commit 
a  hostile  act;  but  when,  at  about  six  o'clock,  Taylor's  report 
of  the  Thornton  affair  presented  itself,  this  difficulty  vanished. 
In  the  evening,  at  the  President's  request,  the  Cabinet  reassem- 
bled, and  after  another  full  discussion  all  agreed  that  a  war 
Message  should  be  delivered  to  Congress  on  Monday.  Sunday 
Polk  worked  on  the  paper  both  before  and  after  going  to  church, 
and  conferred  with  leading  Congressmen.  The  military  com- 
mittee of  the  House,  meeting  in  haste,  agreed  unanimously 
to  recommend  50,000  men  and  ten  million  dollars  for  the 
prosecution  of  hostilities;  and  the  Senators  and  Representa- 
tives gathering  in  excited  and  quickly  changing  groups, 
anxiously  discussed  and  planned.4 

About  noon  on  Monday  the  expected  Message  arrived  at 
the  capitol,  and  was  read  to  thronged  and  agitated  Houses. 
Our  forbearance  has  been  misconstrued,  said  the  President. 
"After  reiterated  menaces,  Mexico  has  passed  the  boundary 
of  the   United  States,   has  invaded  our   territory  and   shed 

181 


182  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

American  blood  upon  the  American  soil.2  She  has  proclaimed 
that  hostilities  have  commenced,  and  that  the  two  nations  are 
now  at  war  .  .  .  war  exists,  and,  notwithstanding  all  our 
efforts  to  avoid  it,  exists  by  the  act  of  Mexico  herself."  "The 
most  energetic  and  prompt  measures  and  the  immediate  appear- 
ance in  arms  of  a  large  and  overpowering  force  are  recom- 
mended to  Congress  as  the  most  certain  and  efficient  means 
of  bringing  the  existing  collision  with  Mexico  to  a  speedy  and 
successful  termination."  Volunteers  to  serve  not  less  than 
six  or  twelve  months,  with  liberal  financial  provision  for  the 
war,  were  therefore  suggested ;  but  at  the  same  time  a  desire 
for  an  "amicable"  as  well  as  early  settlement  of  the  pending 
difficulties  was  expressed,  and  a  pledge  was  given  to  negotiate 
whenever  Mexico  would  either  make  or  hear  proposals.4 

(Objections  greeted  the  Message  at  once.  Calhoun  in  par- 
ticular strongly  opposed  the  President's  fundamental  idea. 
Hostilities  have  occurred,  he  said;  but  as  Congress  has  not 
acted,  there  is  no  war  "  according  to  the  sense  of  our  Con- 
stitution." Archer,  a  leading  Whig  Senator,  concurred  in 
this  view,  adding  that  perhaps  the  Mexican  proceedings  had 
been  justifiable,  and  that  first  of  all  a  careful  investigation  of 
the  facts  was  requisite.  Clayton,  another  Whig,  went  farther, 
and  said  that  by  having  Taylor  advance  to  the  Rio  Grande  Polk 
had  made  himself  the  aggressor.  There  is  no  evidence,  it 
was  urged,  that  Mexico  has  declared  war  or  sanctioned  hostil- 
ities. Recognition  of  a  state  of  war  would  extinguish  all 
treaties  with  that  country,  jeopardize  the  persons  and  property 
of  our  citizens  on  sea  and  land,  wipe  out  our  claims  upon 
Mexico,  expose  the  nation  to  untold  evils,  and  perhaps  give 
offence  in  Europe,  objected  others ;  hence  let  us  merely  author- 
ize the  President  to  repel  invasion.  On  Benton's  motion  the 
Senate  divided  the  subject  of  the  Message,  referring  the  matter 
of  invasion  to  the  committee  on  military  affairs  and  the  broad 
question  of  waging  war  to  that  on  foreign  relations.3  Excellent 
possibilities  of  delay  seemed  to  lurk  in  this  decision.  Calhoun 
favored  it.4 

But  the  House  was  prompt  and  positive.  \  Conveniently 
reposing  on  the  table  there  was  a  bill,  presumably  growing  out 
of  the  Oregon  issue,  which  proposed  that  Polk  should  be  author- 
ized to  accept  volunteers  and  repel  invasion;    and  this  was 


THE  ACTION  OF  CONGRESS  183 

now  modified  to  fit  the  President's  recommendations.  It 
was  also  given  a  preamble,  which  stated  that  "by  the  act  of 
the  Republic  of  Mexico,  a  state  of  war  exists  between  that 
Government  and  the  United  States."  This  phraseology 
displeased  most  of  the  Whigs;  but  they  were  powerless  to 
change  it.  In  the  committee  of  the  whole  about  an  hour  and 
a  half  were  allowed  for  a  partial  reading  of  the  Message  and 
the  accompanying  documents,  and  thirty  minutes  for  debate. 
Amidst  a  great  uproar  the  bill  was  then  reported,  ordered 
without  discussion  to  its  third  reading,  and  under  the  spur  of 
the  "previous  question"  passed. /One  hundred  and  seventy- 
four  supported  it  and  fourteen  ^  five  from  Massachusetts, 
five  from  Ohio,  and  one  each  from  Maine,  Rhode  Island,  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania  —  voted  in  the  negative.  The  next 
morning  this  bill  was  reported  in  the  Senate.4 

Calhoun  pleaded  now  for  at  least  a  pause  of  twenty-four 
hoursj)and  this  appeared  not  unreasonable,  since  the  documents 
that  Supported  the  Message  had  not  yet  come  from  the  printer; 
but  the  party  caucus  had  resolved  upon  a  course  of  action, 
and  Benton  and  Allen,  chairmen  of  the  committees  on  military 
affairs  and  foreign  relations,   announcing  that  consideration 
had  already  been  given  to  both  aspects  of  the  war  measure, 
favored   immediate   action.     Cass   made   an   effective   speech 
in  the  same  sense ;   and,  although^ test  showed  that  eighteen 
Senators  objected  to  the  preamble^the  bill,  somewhat  amended, 
was  passed  finally  by  a  strong  majority  —  forty  against  only     ^ 
two.     Calhoun,  Berrien  of  Georgia  and  Evans  of  Maine  did 
not  vote,  j  Crittenden  and  Upham  answered  to  their  names, 
"Aye,  except  the  preamble."     Webster  and  a  few  others  were 
absent.    ^ji  the  evening  the  House  accepted  the  amendments, 
and  the^next  day  afabout  one  o'clock  Polk  received  and  signed ' 
the   bill)  Later  some  of  the  Whig  Congressmen  pretended 
that  all  they  had  voted  for  was  to  save  Taylor's  army;  but  the 
50,000  soldiers  and  ten  millions  of  money  were  not  asked  for 
a  mere  rescue  party,  and  it  was  pointed  out  in  the  discussion 
that  the  General's  fate    woulcL  be    decided   long  before    the 
bill  would  give  him  troops.  (By  an  overwhelming  majority 
in  both  houses,  then,  voting  intull  accord  with  the  president 
and  his  Cabinet,  war  on  a  large  scale  was  provided  foi\)  "The 
gates  of  Janus  are  open,"  wrote  Alexander  H.  Stephens.4 


184  THE  WAR   WITH   MEXICO 

(  At  every  stage  of  these  proceedings  flowed  a  tide  of  real 
national  feeling,  but  there  were  also  devious  currents  that  need 
to  be  mentioned.  Probably  few,  if  any,  of  the  chief  actors 
expected  very  serious  trouble  with  Mexico. )  Polk  for  his  part 
assured  Benton  that  if  Congress  would  recognize  the  war  and 
provide  large  forces,  he  believed  the  affair  could  speedily  be 
terminated ;  and  he  promised  to  use  no  more  funds  and  men 
than  should  prove  "absolutely  necessary  to  bring  the  present 
state  of  hostilities  to  an  end."  Many  Congressmen,  who 
talked  with  members  of  the  Cabinet,  were  told  that  without 
firing  another  gun  the  United  States  would  have  a  satisfactory 
treaty  within  four  months.5  The  Washington  correspondent 
of  the  New  York  Tribune,  an  anti-slavery  Whig  journal,  re- 
ported that  on  learning  of  the  action  taken  by  the  House-Polk 
said,  "I  shall  now  give  you  peace  —  I  have  the  power."  ("The 
war  was  declared  as  the  means  of  peace"  —  as  a  part  of  the 
President's  policy  of  intimidating  Mexico  into  making  a  settle- 
ment, wrote  the  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Journal 
of  Commerce)  So  thought  the  New  York  Herald.  Merely 
passing  the  war  bill  will  be  enough,  it  said ;  and,  especially 
since  Polk's  Message  exhibited  the  same  combination  of  sword 
and  olive  branch  as  his  employing  Slidell  and  Taylor  jointly, 
so  to  speak,  one  cannot  well  reject  this  view,  which  is  supported 
aha  by  evidence  previously  offered.10 

/The  Democrats,  being  the  administration  party,  naturally 
srood  by  the  President^  and  a  wish  to  make  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  impressive  and  effective  was  an  additional 
reason  for  their  urgency  and  haste.  But  probably  these  were 
not  the  only  inducements.  /The  party  was  falling  into  dissen- 
sions. The  Van  Buren  group  felt  indignant  that  New  York 
should  occupy  a  secondary  place  in  the  Cabinet,  and  be  repre- 
sented there  by  the  Old  Hunker,  Marcy,  while  the  rest  of  the 
Democrats  complained  that  Van  Buren's  faction,  the  Barn- 
burners, were  dictating  everything.  A  short,  inexpensive 
and  successful  war  —  especially  one  without  gunpowder  — 
seemed  likely  to  please  the  country,  provide  offices,  consolidate 
the  party,  and  compel  the  Whigs  to  lose  prestige  by  endorsing 
the  policy  of  their  opponents,  or  else  to  sacrifice  popularity 
by  antagonizing  it.  Moreover  it  looked  as  if  a  discussion  of 
Polk's  course  in  sending  Taylor  to  the  Rio  Grande,  however 


THE  MOTIVES  OF  CONGRESS  185 

correct  that  course  had^been,  might  prove  at  such  a  juncture 
dampening  and  vexatious")  and  for  all  of  these  reasons  it  seemed 
expedient  that  a  war-Wil,  with  exactly  the  preamble  already 
quoted,  should  be  rushed  through  Congress  at  the  quickest 
pape.10 

(The  Whigs  were  no  less  perspicacious,  and  they  especially 
hated  to  lose  the  partisan  advantage  of  charging  that  Polk 
had  been  the  aggressor.  Mexico  has  not  declared  war,  they 
insisted;  and  with  more  or  less  honesty  they  complained  that 
a  regard  for  sacred  truth  forbade  them  to  endorse  the  preamble?) 
But  their  position  was  exceedingly  delicate.  Not  only  iitfa 
Mexico  long  threatened  hostilities,  prepared  openly  for  them, 
and  severed  her  diplomatic  relations  with  us  at  both  capitals, 
but  she  had  in  effect  made  a  declaration  of  war.  Her  only 
official  voice  at  this  time  was  that  of  Paredes;  and  his  agent, 
Arista,  an  officer  of  the  highest  rank,  had  given  Taylor  formal 
notice  of  hostilities.  Arista  had  been  sent  but  recently  to 
command  against  the  Americans,  and  nobody  could  reasonably 
suppose  that  he  had  proceeded  at  once  to  transgress  or  ignore 
deliberately  the  wishes  of  his  master  in  so  grave  an  affair.10 
(^Taylor  on  the  other  hand  had  shown  the  most  pacific  dis- 
position both  in  word  and  in  deed.  Nothing  serious  could)" 
be  alleged  against  us  except  the  peaceable  joint-occupation 
of  territory  long  claimed  by  the  United  States;  and  in  short, 
unless  Jefferson,  Madison,  Monroe,  Pinckney  and  John  Quincy 
Adams  were  to  be  disavowed,  it  seemed  legitimate  for  Polk  and 
for  Congress  to  hold  now  that  Arista's  attack  upon  Thornton 
had  been  the  first  hostile  act.^YThe  preamble,  therefore,  could 
not  well  be  rejected;  and^heariy  all  of  the  Whigs,  having 
before  their  eyes  the  doom  of  those  who  opposed  the  war  of 
1812,  choked  down  some  honest  though  mistaken  compunc- 
tions and  in  most  cases  a  probably  more  troublesome  lump 
of  partisan  regret,  and  voted  for  the  bill.10) 

As  already  has  been  suggested,  however,  there  was  in  Con- 
gress a  third  party  —  John  C.  Calhoun,  and  for  later  as  well 
as  for  present  reasons  it  is  desirable  to  understand  his  opinions. 
To  him  it  seemed  highly  advisable  to  forestall  European  inter-  ^ 
ference,  and  quite  possible  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  Mexico, 
by  adjusting  the  Oregon  question  before  coming  decisively 
to  an  issue  in  the  Mexican  difficulty,  and  therefore  he  thought 


186  THE  WAR   WITH   MEXICO 

the  United  States  ought  by  all  means  to  limit  itself  now  to 
repelling  invasion.  Personal  reasons  also  led  him  to  deplore 
the  prospect  of  a  conflict  in  arms.  The  culmination  of  his 
fiery  life,  the  fulfilment  of  his  brilliant  dream,  had  seemed 
in  April  to  be  drawing  near.  By  his  convenient  method  of 
bending  facts  and  principles  to  his  purpose,  as  the  sparrow 
makes  a  nest  for  herself,  he  had  found  it  possible  to  cooperate 
with  the  West  in  spending  great  sums  on  internal  improvements, 
and  expected  in  this  way  to  make  the  Northeast  a  helpless 
minority;  but  he  could  easily  see  that  war  might  empty  the 
treasury  and  bring  about  new  political  alignments.  For  the 
same  reason  it  looked  as  if  his  project  of  a  low  tariff  also  would 
vanish;  and,  as  we  have  seen,  contemplating  the  possibility 
of  secession,  he  did  not  wish  8  the  youth  of  the  southern  states 
to  expend  their  blood  in  Mexico.10J 

Before  the  news  of  ThorntoaVencounter  arrived  he  argued 
with  Polk  against  sending  to  Congress  the  proposed  Message 
on  our  relations  with  Mexico.  During  the  excitement  on 
that  eventful  Sunday  he  not  only  planned  with  his  partisans 
in  Senate  and  House  to  oppose  war,  but  worked  for  the  same 
purpose  with  leading  Whigs,  urging  —  for  example  —  that 
Mexico  should  be  given  more  time  to  consider  the  risk  of  a 
conflict,  as  if  she  had  npi  already  been  speculating  upon  it 
for  several  years.  Therein  the  Senate  he  gravely  proclaimed 
the  truism  that  border  hostilities  do  not  necessarily  constitute 
war,  and  turned  it  into  a  sophism  by  applying  it  in  the  present 
case.  To  compare  Arista's  attack  upon  Thornton  to  an  un- 
meaning border  squabble  was  truly,  in  view  of  the  long  series 
of  preliminaries,  ridiculous;  and  equally  ridiculous  was  the 
endeavor  to  support  this  fallacy  with  another :  that  since 
Congress  had  not  declared  war,  a  state  of  war  with  Mexico 
could  not  lawfully  exist  at  this  time/j)  "  Is  not  Calhoun  de- 
ranged?" exclaimed  our  minister  atl'aris  on  hearing  of  this.10 

To  be  sure,  Congress  is  the  only  branch  of  our  central  govern- 
ment that  can  legally  declare  war;  but,  for  instance,  other 
nations  are  not  hampered  by  our  Constitution,  and  might 
attack  us  in  such  a  manner  as  to  prevent  Congress  —  for 
a  time,  at  least  —  from  acting.  None  the  less  we  should 
fight,  and  it  would  be  nonsense  to  describe  our  resistance  as 
unconstitutional.     As  a  matter  of  fact  Congress  did  not  declare 


THE   MOTIVES   OF  CONGRESS  187 

war  against  Mexico,  and  on  Calhoun's  theory  we  had  no  lawful 
war  with  that  country.  On  that  theory,  not  only  our  military 
men,  Congress  and  the  President,  but  our  Supreme  Court, 
which  fully  recognized  the  war,  acted  unconstitutionally. 
Indeed,  he  himself  illustrated  the  untenability  of  his  idea. 
In  order  to  avoid  the  weakness  of  advocating  purely  defensive 
operations  a  Whig  leader,  Senator  Crittenden,  said  that  by 
repelling  invasion  he  meant  pursuing  the  enemy  until  we 
could  be  sure  that  no  repetition  of  the  outrage  would  occur. 
This  programme  would  have  involved  substantially  all  that  we 
did  against  Mexico.  It  would  have  meant  a  war  without  a 
declaration;  yet  Calhoun  endorsed  it.  In  short,  even  one  so 
acute  and  so  deeply  interested  as  he  could  not  find  a  real  > 
argument  against  the  .war  bill,  and  his  "friends"  abandoned 
him  on  this  issue.  /By  an  overwhelming  majority  Congress^ 
rejected  his  interpretation  of  the  organic  law.  War  existed. y1 
No  American  who  recognized  our  claim  to  the  intermediate 
region,  formally  made  by  national  authorities  and  never  with- 
drawn, and  especially  none  who  recognized  the  claim  of  Texas, 
could  logically  deny  that  it  existed  by  the  act  of  Mexico ;  and  in 
the  light  of  its  antecedents,  including  Arista's  declaration 
of  war  and  attack  upon  Thornton,  the  war  bill  committed  the 
nation  properly  as  well  as  completely.10 

/We  were,  then,  under  arms;  but,  after  all,  why?  What 
was  the  cause  of  the  war  ?  It  was  not  —  as  will  plainly  appear 
in  another  chapter,  it  is  believed  —  an  unholy  determination 
to  obtain  California  at  the  cost,  if  necessary,  of  fifty  thousand 
lives.  It  cannot  have  been  a  difficulty  as  to  the  boundary  of 
Texas,  for  two  nations  do  not  fight  over  an  issue  that  exists 
for  only  one  of  them  —  and  that  one  not  the  aggressor ;  and 
for  Mexico  the  question  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande 
had  no  international  significance  except  when  it  could  be  used, 
as  an  argumentum  ad  hominem,  to  embarrass  Americans.14 

Nor  was  it  a  scheme  to  extend  the  field  of  negro  servitude.  <> 
Even  a  cormorant  requires  time  for  digestion,  and  in  1845 
the  acquisition  of  Texas  appeared  so  powerful  a  bulwark  for 
the  peculiar  institution,  that  no  strong  and  widespread  craving 
for  additional  areas  can  be  supposed  to  have  existed  at  the 
beginning  of  1846.  Besides,  as  pro-slavery  Taylor,  Calhoun 
and   Polk,  anti-slavery  Webster   and  time-serving   Buchanan 


188  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

agreed,  free  labor  was  practically  sure  to  dominate  California ; 
and  hence,  in  view  of  the  slight  probability  that  much  cultivable 
territory  could  be  obtained  in  the  south  against  the  stubborn 
opposition  of  the  free  states,  the  war  seemed  more  likely  to 
diminish  than  to  increase  the  relative  strength  of  slavery. 
Moreover,  the  soil  south  and  west  of  the  Rio  Grande  was 
unsuitable  for  cotton,  sugar,  rice  or  tobacco.  Rich  proprietors 
already  owned  the  land,  and  had  no  thought  of  parting  with  it. 
The  system  of  peonage  was  extremely  economical,  and  it  held 
the  ground  so  firmly  that  negro  slavery,  though  tried,  had 
been  unable  to  make  headway  against  it.  The  free  laborers 
of  northeastern  Mexico  would  have  been,  admitted  the  North 
American,  particularly  hostile  to  our  southerners  and  their 
methods;  and  the  colored  population,  it  was  pointed  out, 
could  have  escaped  gradually  from  its  bonds  by  amalgamating 
with  the  natives.  Now  the  leaders  of  the  "slavocracy" 
doubtless  inquired  into  the  conditions;  and,  as  most  of  our 
ministers  and  probably  most  of  our  consuls  in  Mexico  were 
from  their  section,  they  could  easily  obtain  information. 
Waddy  Thompson  and  A.  J..  Donelson,  for  example,  believed 
and^said,  that  slavery  would  not  thrive  in  northern  Mexico.14 
/Polk's  diary  and  papers  reveal  no  evidence  that  he  seriously 
considered  the  interest  of  the  peculiar  institution  in  connection 
with  our  Mexican  problem.  ;  The  debates  of  Congress  are 
equally  barren.  Soon  after  "the  war  opened,  as  we  shall  dis- 
cover, northeastern  Mexico  seemed  ready  to  join  the  United 
States  or  accept  our  protection,  and  there  is  no  sign  that  the 
slavocracy  attempted  to  improve  the  opportunity.  The 
politicians  most  eager  to  acquire  Mexican  territory  were  Dick- 
inson of  New  York,  Hannegan  of  Indiana  and  Walker,  an 
anti-slavery  man.  A  northern  correspondent  of  Calhoun 
wrote  that  many  in  New  York  insisted  on  extending  that 
way  "to  augment  the  strength  of  the  non-slaveholding  states," 
while  a  Mobile  correspondent  said,  "I  would  let  the  war 
continue  forever  before  I  would  take  697,000  [square  miles]  of 
territory,  which  must  be  free  territory."  A  meeting  in  Ohio 
declared  for  taking  all  of  that  country,  and^this  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  paralleled  in  the  South. /South  Carolina  was 
preeminently  the  champion  of  slavery ,Vyet  Governor  Aiken 
publicly  opposed  making  acquisitions  in  that  quarter.     Cal- 


THE  CAUSE  OF  THE  WAR  189 

houn,  the  leader  of  the  southern  ultras  there  and  elsewhere, 
did  the  same.  So  did  Waddy  Thompson,  Botts,  Toombs, 
Lumpkin,  Campbell  and  many  other  southerners.  W.  R. 
King  said  that  while  the  South  would  insist  —  as  a  point  of 
pride  and  right  —  upon  sharing  the  benefit  of  any  territory 
gained  from  Mexico,  it  was  a  gross  libel  to  representxTier  as 
desiring  to  increase  in  that  way  the  strength  of  slavery^ 

King  deplored  the  war.     One  of  the  South  Carolina  Senators  t 
wrote  that  it  was  detested  nowhere  more  than  in  his  state.   ( 
In  Georgia,  too,  the  conflict  was  bitterly  opposed.    The  people 
did  not  desire  the  war,  said  Toombs.     Half  of  the  slaveholders  i 
oppose  it,  admitted  Ritchie,  a  Virginian,  editor  of  the  adminis- 
tration organ.     Besides  all  other  objections,  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  southern  policy  of  conservatism  and  her  stand 
for  a  strict  construction  of  the  Constitution  would  be  endangered 
by  absorbing  a  large  area   mainly  populated   by  extremely 
inferior  aliens.  /  To  combat  all  this  evidence,  we  find  hardly 
anything n   except   the    characteristic   hints,    imaginings   and 
assertions  of  certain  abolitionists.14 

On  the  other  hand,  the  evidence  that  the  annexation  of 
Texas  was  essentially  the  cause  12  of  the  war  is  impressive  both 
in  quantity  and  in  quality.13  Benton,  Clay,  Robert  C.  Win- 
throp,  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  Andrew  Johnson  and  many  other 
public  men  agreed  on  this  point.  J  As  Van  Buren  and  substan- 
tially all  the  Whig  organs  hachfJredicted  that  immediate  an- 
nexation would  entail  war  with  Mexico,  they  must  be  counted 
in  the  same  class.  Charles  Sumner  drew  up  a  resolution 
declaring  that  such  was  the  primary  cause,  and  it  passed  the 
legislature  of  Massachusetts,  where  the  subjects-was  rather 
closely  studied,  by  overwhelming  majorities.  ('The  House 
committee  on  foreign  affairs  took  that  ground  in  its'  report  of 
February  24,  1847.  All  agree  upon  this,  was  Winthrop's 
declaration.  Paredes  expressed  the  same  view  in  the  most 
formal  manner.  The  Mexican  minister  of  war  under  the 
government  that  overthrew  Paredes  publicly  endorsed  it; 
and  at  least  two  well-qualified  foreign  observers,  Duflct  de 
Mofras  and  the  biographer  of  Lord  Aberdeen,  took  the  same 
view.  Indeed,  the  proposition  seems  demonstrated  by  the 
plain  course  of  events.14 
,  The  mere  annexation  of  Texas  cannot,  however,  be  regarded 


^ 


190  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

as^  the  sole  cause  of  the  war.  But  for  the  loudly  expressed 
/  wrath  of  the  Americans,  due  mainly  to  Mexican  barbarities 
/  in  Texas  and  outrages  upon  the  persons  and  property  of  Ameri- 
can citizens,  Mexico  would  have  been  far  less  irritable,  and 
the  annexation  difficulty,  which^came  so  near  to  being  patched 
I  up,  might  have  been  adjusted :)  while,  as  Polk  maintained, 
if  the  policy  of  the  United  States  regarding  our  claims  had 
been  firm,  consistent  and  strong  from  the  first,  Mexico  would 
not  have  dared  to  risk  so  much  in  dealing  with  us  later.14 

The  general  cause  of  hostilities  was,  therefore,  the  series  of 
unpleasant  incidents  occurring  in  the  mutual  relations  of  the 
two  countries  from  the  scandalous  treatment  of  Poinsett 
down  to  the  scandalous  treatment  of  Slidell,  from  the  first 
mutterings  of  discontent  in  Texas  down  to  the  setting  of  her 
one  fair  star  in  the  broad  sea  of  the  American  Union ;  and  in 
this  long  series  the  annexation  of  Texas  was  the  chief  event.14 

But  one  can  speak  much  more  definitely.  For  a  term  of 
years,  mainly  in  consequence  of  the  use  made  of  these  affairs 
by  self-seeking  politicians/the  people  of  Mexico  had  fed  on 
the  ideas  of  despising,  fearing,  hating  and  fighting  the  United 
States;  Paredes  had  gained  supreme  authority  on  this  basis; 
public  sentiment  demanded  that  he  should  pursue  the  route 
marked  out  by  his  professions  J  to  beat  the  small  and  apparently 
demoralized  American  araly,  led  by  a  backwoods  general, 
seemed  quite  feasible ;  it  appeared  likely  that  a  victory  would 
confirm  the  dictator's  power,  while  a  failure  to  strike  would 
ensure  his  doom ;  and  hence  an  attack  upon  our  army  was 
ordered.     Xfos  was  the  precise  jcause  of  the  war.14 

Let  us  now  return  to  Congress.  The  war  bill  of  May  13 
gave  the  President  authority  to  use  the  army,  the  navy,  the 
militia  and  not  more  than  50,000  volunteers  —  to  serve  twelve 
months  after  reaching  the  rendezvous  "or  to  the  end  of  the 
war,  unless  sooner  discharged"  —  to  expend  not  more  than 
$10,000,000,  to  complete  the  vessels  of  war  already  authorized, 
and  to  purchase  additional  vessels.  By  other  Acts  he  was 
authorized  (May  13)  to  increase  by  enlistment  the  number 
of  privates  in  the  regular  army  from  sixty-four  to  not  over 
one  hundred  per  company,  thus  bringing  the  rank  and  file 
up  to  15,540;  a  company  of  sappers,  miners  and  pontoniers 
and  a  regiment  of  mounted  riflemen,  originally  intended  to 


THE  WAR   MEASURES  191 

protect  emigrants  and  traders  on  the  Oregon  route,  were 
created  (May  15  and  19) ;  and  numerous  details  concerning 
organization  were  either  prescribed  or  entrusted  to  the  Execu- 
tive (June  18  and  26). 15  Under  the  last  head  authority  was 
given  to  appoint  all  the  necessary  general  officers.16  Mean- 
time (May  13)  the  President  issued  a  war  proclamation, 
modelled  upon  that  of  1812,  in  which  he  announced  that  an 
appeal  had  been  made  to  "the  last  resort  of  injured  nations"; 
and  the  state  department  (May  14)  sent  a  confidential  circular 
to  our  agents  abroad,  explaining  that  we  had  taken  up  arms 
reluctantly,  and  "solely  for  the  purpose  of  conquering  an 
honorable  and  permanent  peace."  17  T 

"The  war  sense  of  the  United  States,"  it  has  been  remarked,^ 
"seems  to  be  in  inverse  ratio  to  its  war  spirit;"  and  in  general 
the  military  measures  of  the  government  exhibited  more  zeal 
than  discretion.  In  particular  they  put  into  action  the  very 
system  that  had  proved  disastrous  a  generation  before. )  For 
this  Taylor  was  primarily  responsible,  for  after  having  seen 
the  war  of  1812  and  that  of  Florida  languish  and  crawl,  he 
strongly  urged  that  volunteers  be  called  out  for  one  year  of 
service.  Polk's  Message  deepened  the  mischief  by  expressing 
confidence  in  raw  troops,  although  in  1838  the  secretary  of  war 
had  assured  him  that  the  difference  in  expense  between  volun- 
teers and  regulars  was  "at  least  as  four  to  one,"  besides  the 
waste  resulting  from  their  total  ignorance  of  administration, 
the  cost  of  marching  to  and  from  distant  points  for  short 
periods  of  service,  and  the  disproportionate  growth  of  the  pen- 
sion list.18  The  President  was  indeed  authorized  to  increase 
the  number  of  privates  in  a  regular  company,  but  the  roll 
of  officers  remained  as  before ;  and  enlistment  was  not  stimu- 
lated, as  it  might  have  been,  by  adding  something  to  the  pay.19 
Having  a  choice  between  a  definite  and  an  indefinite  period, 
the  volunteers  were  sure,  as  Marcy  foresaw,  to  elect  the  former, 
although  —  as  the  sequel  appeared  to  show  —  a  sufficient 
number  would  almost  certainly  have  engaged  for  the  war, 
had  that  been  the  only  proposal.  The  Mexicans  were  com- 
monly regarded  as  cowardly  and  inefficient.  Very  few  Ameri- 
cans expected  them  to  hold  out  as  long  as  they  did;  and 
intending  volunteers  would  naturally  have  counted,  therefore, 
upon  returning  soon.     There  were  also  the  enthusiastic  feelings 


192  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

natural  at  the  opening  of  a  war,  and  a  deep  interest  resulting 
from  the  supposed  peril  of  Taylor's  army.  Yet  the  government 
chose  to  accept  gratuitously  the  risk,  which  in  due  time  became 
a  certainty,  of  embarrassing  itself,  disappointing  the  country 
and  encouraging  the  enemy  by  offering  a  brief  term  of  service.19 
i  (^Instead  of  retaining  control  of  the  organization  and  officering 
or  the  regiments,  it  entrusted  this  worl$  to  the  states,  and  as 
a  rule  the  men  chose  their  own  officers  ;20/  but  in  these  features 
of  the  system,  as  in  our  governmental  methods  generally, 
there  was  some  advantage  as  well  as  much  loss.  Webster, 
for  example,  held  that  volunteers  ought  to  have  the  right  of 
electing  for  leaders  men  whom  they  knew  and  could  trust ; 
and  if  they  preferred  to  sicken  and  bleed  under  captains  as 
ignorant  as  themselves,  whom  they  knew  and  could  trust, 
rather  than  fare  otherwise  under  trained  officers  whom  they 
would  have  had  to  obey  without  fully  understanding  them, 
they  were  perhaps  entitled  to  the  privilege,  and  no  doubt  they 
learned  something  from  exercising  it.  Anyhow,  said  Webster, 
the  other  method  would  have  been  degrading;  and  American 
citizens  must  not  be  degraded.  As  for  generals,  the  law  of 
June  18  compelled  the  Executive  to  take  them  from  the  militia, 
although  they  would  be  under  no  obligation  to  serve  more  than 
three  months,  and  might  withdraw  in  the  midst  of  a  campaign. 
There  was  no  provision  for  filling  vacancies  resulting  from 
death  or  discharge;  and  finally  the  appropriations  were  so 
poorly  arranged  that  the  quartermaster's  office  had  to  juggle 
with  funds  as  even  Polk  himself  could  not  lawfully  have  done.19 
Such  as  it  was,  however,  the  system  went  promptly  into 
effect.  Beginning  on  May  15,  the  secretary  of  war  sent  requi- 
sitions for  volunteers  to  the  governors  of  the  states,  deeming 
this  method  of  application  advantageous  as  well  as  due  to  their 
official  position,  since  they  were  supposed  to  know  the  troops 
of  their  jurisdictions  and  the  best  places  from  which  to  draw 
them.  In  general  the  plan  was  to  summon  about  25,000  from 
the  northeastern  states,  to  be  enrolled  and  await  orders,  and 
to  call  out  nearly  as  many  from  the  other  states  for  immediate 
service.  The  former  were  all  to  be  infantry;  the  latter, 
horse  and  foot  in  the  ratio  of  about  one  to  three.  It  was 
expected  that  existing  militia  organizations  —  regiments  or 
parts  of  regiments  —  would  offer  their  services,  and  that  new 


THE  WAR  MEASURES  193 

men  would  fill  the  ranks  as  they  felt  moved  to  come  forward. 
Not  only  privates  but  officers  were  to  approach  the  national 
service  by  that  portal,  and  then  be  ^mustered  into  the  army 
at  the  appointed  state  rendezvous  by  a  United  States  officer 
detailed  for  the  purpose.21  In  four  days  the  calls  were  nearly 
all  on  their  way.24 

The  purpose  of  distributing  requisitions  over  the  whole  ( 
country  was  to  interest  every  state,  Polk  explained;  and  to 
stimulate  the  executive  officials  he  urged  upon  the  secretary 
of  war  the  most  prompt  and  energetic  action  and  personal 
attention  to  each  detail,  insisting  for  his  own  part  upon  being 
kept  "constantly  advised  of  every  important  step  that  was 
taken."  22  This  charge  Marcy  accepted  with  all  seriousness.23 
Whether  bowing  his  massive  head  ponderously  over  a  big  desk, 
sifting  callers  with  keen  glances  through  shaggy  brows,  or  giving 
instructions  to  subordinates  in  a  voice  roughened  with  snuff, 
he  devoted  his  faculties  to  his  task  with  a  rare  power  of  concen- 
tration. But  he  preferred  the  quiet  of  his  home;  and  there, 
comfortably  wrapped  in  his  dressing  gown  with  a  box  of  the 
brown  powder  and  an  old  red  handkerchief  on  the  table,  he 
did  his  best  work.24 

Polk  believed,  or  tried  to  believe,  that  "multitudes"  were 
eager  to  volunteer,  but  others  feared  it  would  not  be  easy  to 
raise  troops  after  so  long  a  peace.  Strong  influences  were  at 
work,  however.  Though  evidently  the  fireside  was  not  in 
danger,  patriotism  urged  men  to  take  the  field,  for  did  not 
the  nation  call  ? 

"Arm !  arm  !  your  country  bids  you  arm  ! 
Fling  out  your  banners  free  — 
Let  drum  and  trumpet  sound  alarm, 
O'er  mountain,  plain  and  sea;" 

thus  wrote  Park  Benjamin  the  day  Polk  signed  the  war  bill. 
A  longing  to  escape  from  the  dulness  of  bare  existence,  ambition 
to  see  the  world  and  test  one's  powers,  a  passion  for  adventure 
and  frolic  in  a  far  clime  believed  to  be  all  glitter,  beauty  and 
romance,  the  prospect  of  revelling  in  the  Halls  of  Montezuma, 
a  feeling  that  one  who  was  not  "in  it"  would  have  to  spend 
the  rest  of  his  days  explaining  why,  the  expectation  of  honors 
and  popularity  that  would  make  success  easy  in  any  pursuit, 

VOL.  i  —  o 


194  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

quarrels  with  sweethearts  or  hopes  of  becoming  irresistible 
to  the  "girls,"  were  among  the  motives.  For  the  high  officers 
it  was  a  "  political  tour,"«said  one  of  them ;  and  with  everybody 
the  barbarities  perpetrated  by  the  Mexicans  in  Texas  counted 
for  much.  The  hardships  of  campaigning  were  unknown. 
While  every  one  understood  that  some  would  fall,  it  was  practi- 
cally impossible  for  an  ardent  young  fellow,  well  and  strong, 
to  imagine  his  particular  person  stretched  lifeless  on  the 
ground ;  or,  if  such  an  end  was  ever  contemplated,  it  appeared 
as  something  quick,  unfelt  amidst  the  excitement,  and  sweetened 
byj^he  greatness  of  one's  cause.24 

(-  (Behind  all  of  this  lay  certain  facts  too  deep  for  the  soldiers 
themselves  to  perceive,  but  not  too  deep  for  them  to  feel. 
One  instinctively  shunned  that  "misery  of  cowardice,"  which 
—  as  Pericles  told  the  Athenians  —  is  more  dreadful  to  men 
of  spirit  than  death  in  battle.  As  the  ages  have  demonstrated, 
man  is  naturally  a  fighting  animal,  and  therefore  he  finds  in 

v  war  the  keenest  sense  of  his  vital  selfhood.  It  is  our  chief 
glory  to  will  and  to  do ;  and  in  mortal  combat  this  glory  js 
more  intense,  if  not  more  real,  than  in  peaceful  occupations) 
Besides,  if  a  man  comes  to  his  end  in  being  supremely  himself, 
he  triumphs  over  death,  and  indeed  he  wins  another  victory, 
too,  for  life  —  so  rich  in  menaces  —  can  threaten  him  no  longer. 
The  validity  of  nearly  all  these  motives  was  more  or  less 
transitory.  When,  for  example,  a  man  had  proved  that  he  could 
face  a  cannon,  it  seemed  unnecessary  to  keep  on  facing  it. 
But  while  they  lasted,  they  were  strong.24 

t   fin  almost  every  section,  therefore,  except  New  England, 

I  where  the  annexation  of  Texas  could  not  yet  be  forgiven,  the  war 
spirit  rose  high,  astonishing  even  the  most  sanguine.  At  New 
York  the  walls  were  covered  with  placards  headed,  "  Mexico  or 
Death,"  or  "Ho,  for  the  halls  of  the  Montezumas!"  and  the 
streets  echoed  to  the  song  : 

"Come  all  ye  gallant  volunteers 

Who  fear  not  life  to  lose, 
The  martial  drum  invites  ye  come 

And  join  the  Hickory  Blues  : 
The  gallant  Hickory  Blues, 
The  daring  Hickory  Blues  — 
To  Mexico  they  proudly  go, 
The  gallant  Hickory  Blues." 


TROOPS  COME  FORWARD  195 

At  Philadelphia  20,000  citizens  of  all  parties  gathered  "to 
sustain  the  country."  In  the  central  states  banks  advanced 
money  without  security,  farmers'  wives  issued  free  rations, 
ladies  made  clothing  and  flags  by  the  wholesale,  roads  turned 
black  with  men.  Ohio  looked  with  disfavor  on  the  annexation 
of  Texas  and  the  war  with  Mexico,  regarding  them  as  measures 
favorable  to  slavery;  yet  in  less  than  two  weeks  after  the 
requisition  for  volunteers  arrived,  three  thousand  of  her  sons 
were  marching  to  the  rendezvous.  At  Indianapolis  Lew 
Wallace  hung  out  a  flag  and  a  four-sided  transparency  in- 
scribed, "For  Mexico;  fall  in";  and  in  three  days  his  com- 
pany was  full.  "Illinois  must  rally  now  and  win  a  character," 
James  Shields  wrote  to  Koerner;  and  fourteen  regiments 
volunteered  instead  of  the  four  that  could  be  taken.24 

In  Kentucky,  said  reports,  the  quota  of  the  state  was  com- 
plete by  May  26,  and  the  governor  had  to  stop  the  volunteering 
by  proclamation.  Tennessee  was  called  upon  for  about  3000 
men,  and  nearly  30,000  came  forward.  None  would  retire, 
and  the  selection  was  made  by  lot  or  ballot.  #  At  Memphis 
troops  organized  before  the  call  arrived.  "  May  glory  and  honor 
await  them!"  cried  the  Daily  Eagle.  St.  Louis  began  to  drill 
on  May  12,  and  in  a  few  days  the  excitement  was  so  deep  and 
universal  that  the  courts  adjourned.  North  Carolina  offered 
more  than  three  times  her  quota.24 

In  the  Gulf  states  many  feared  that  not  enough  citizens 
would  remain  at  home  to  police  the  negroes.  "Governor, 
do  —  if  possible  —  get  them  into  the  service,"  was  the  tune  in 
Alabama.  Mississippi  complained  bitterly  that  so  few  of  her 
sons  had  a  chance.  At  New  Orleans  the  roar  of  business  was 
almost  drowned  by  a  still  more  clamorous  roar : 

"The  drums,  the  drums,  the  busy,  busy  drums, 
The  drums,  the  drums,  the  rattling,  battling  drums, 
The  drums,  the  drums,  the  merry,  merry  drums ! " 

As  rapidly  as  possible  Brigadier  General  Wool  and  other 
officers  mustered  the  regiments  into  service;  and,  leaving  the 
rendezvous  and  the  crowds  of  praying,  cheering  people  amidst 
the  saddest  good-bys  and  the  warmest  good  wishes,  the 
volunteers  bravely  set  out  for  the  war.24 
Before  very  long  new  views  of  military  life  began  to  dawn 


196  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

upon  the  soldiers.  At  the  old  battlefield  below  New  Orleans, 
where  many  of  the  troops  camped,  mud  and  water  covered 
what  was  below  their  boot-tops  while  mosquitos  covered 
what  was  above.  Going  down  the  river  they  brightened  at 
the  sight  of  sycamores  and  live-oaks,  draped  with  Spanish 
moss,  and  of  the  ducks,  jays,  mocking-birds  and  Virginia 
nightingales,  that  seemed  to  find  life  so  merry.  But  soon  the 
lighthouse  of  the  Southwest  Pass  was  gleaming  astern^  the 
muddy  water  became  blue,  and  these  landsmen  were  on  the 
deep.  Sharks,  diving  porpoises,  squadrons  of  nautili  and 
shoals  of  little  flying-fish  gave  them  some  pleasure;  but  the 
motion,  especially  to  men  packed  like  sardines  in  the  dirty 
holds  of  schooners  and  small  brigs  or  lying  spoon-fashion 
—  if  there  was  even  room  to  do  that  —  on  deck,  seemed  hor- 
rible. On  the  slow  voyage  the  water,  which  was  often  impure, 
fermented  sometimes,  and  ten  cents  was  the  price  of  a  whole- 
some drink.25 

And  then  the  Gulf  storms!  The  wind  howled;  the  sea 
opened  its  jaws ;  the  heavens  were  now  like  ink,  and  now  one 
burst  of  flame ;  thunders  rolled ;  ropes  hissed  and  shrieked ; 
spars  cracked,  snapped  and  were  swept  away ;  the  vessel 
tossed  from  beam-end  to  beam-end;  the  maddened  horses 
almost  kicked  the  planking  from  the  ribs,  and  the  men  cursed, 
prayed  or  stolidly  awaited  their  fate.  But  sooner  or  later 
nearly  all  of  them  perceived  on  the  horizon  a  line  of  sandy 
beach  spotted  with  tents.  It  was  Brazos  Island  off  Point 
Isabel,  and  they  anchored  about  four  miles  from  it  in  the  open 
sea.  Meanwhile  Brevet  Major  General  Gaines,  commanding 
the  military  department  of  the  West,  had  begun  on  May  3 
at  his  own  instance  to  requisition  troops  for  the  relief  of  Taylor, 
and  a  considerable  number  of  these  men  also  set  out  for  the 
Point.25 
\The  question  of  a  commander  now  had  to  be  decided.  Polk 
felt  little  confidence  in  Taylor.  The  General's  separating  his 
army  so  far  from  his  base  and  exposing  both  to  imminent 
peril  seemed  inexcusable;  and  furthermore  General  Scott, 
not  only  the  head  of  the  army  but  the  famous  hero  of  Lundy's 
Lane,  was  the  natural  chief  of  the  large  forces  now  called  out. 
Certain  facts,  however,  injured  ,§cott's  chances.  He  was 
now  almost  exactly  sixty  years  old, .and  many  thought  him, 


THE  CHOICE  OF  A  COMMANDER  197 

as  did  Senator  Fairfield,  "too  much  of  an  old  granny. 'Y  In 
1839  he  had  been  given  57  votes  at  the  Whig  Presidential 
convention,  and  of  late  the  brilliancy  of  his  political  anticipa- 
tions had  made  him  look  "ten  feet  high,"  said  Corwin.  His 
want  of  reverence  for  the  President's  decision  respecting  brevet 
rank  had  led  Polk  and  Benton  to  think  of  banishing  him  to 
a  post  on  the  northern  frontier.  General  Gaines  and  his 
many  friends  had  long  hated  him;  and  Mrs.  Gaines  insisted 
that  no  one  was  "much,"  whose  lips  could  be  covered  with 
a  button.  Finally,  he  was  called  vain,  and  so  he  appeared 
tojbe.30 

('But  the  ostentation  that  won  him  the  nickname  "Old  Fuss 
and  Feathers,"  in  addition  to  being  much  exaggerated  by 
report,  was  doubtless  attributable  in  large  measure  to  military 
policy  and  respect  for  his  rank.  No  one  ever  saw  it  interfere 
with  serious  affairs,  and  one  who  could  remark  on  the  weak 
point  of  his  own  personal  appearance,  the  point  ridiculed  by 
Mrs.  Gaines,  was  not  so  extremely  vain  after  all.  The  right 
word  for  Scott  was  egotism.  Now  egotism  —  in  others  —  is 
doubtless  a  shocking  trait ;  yet  merely  to  seem  aware  of  what 
everybody  knows,  does  not,  as  many  think  it  does,  convert 
merits  into  demerits.  General  Scott  had  a  magnificent  presence 
—  fully  six  feet  and  four  inches  of  height  and  a  corresponding 
weight  —  the  brightest  fame  as  an  intrepid  soldier,  the  honor 
of  a  long  and  eminent  career,  the  first  place  in  our  army,  a 
high  social  position,  superior  talents  and  attainments,  unusual 
knowledge  of  the  world,  charming  personal  graces,  and  a 
character  of  rare  quality  —  powerful,  gentle  and  true.  That 
he  did  not  dissemble  nor  cloak  his  value  was  a  fault ;  but  those 
who  felt  entitled  to  censure  him,  merely  because  they  had  no 
such  merits  to  be  aware  of,  were  somewhat  in  error.30 

Besides,  almost  every  great  artist  is  egotistical,  and  Scott 
was  a  great  artist.  In  more  ways  than  one  this  was  true.  He 
could  instruct  the  baker  in  the  mysteries  of  making  bread,  and 
superintend  ably  the  roasting  of  a  ham;  damn  his  delighted 
black  body-servant  for  hiding  everything  and  then  hiding 
himself;  rave  at  an  admiring  guest  for  cutting  lettuce  instead 
of  rolling  it  round  his  fork,  or  lament  in  tragic  tones  at  whist 
that  he  had  to  play  against  three;  and  the  next  moment  he 
would   be   analyzing   a   campaign   of   Turenne,    monologuing 


198  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

inimitably  about  the  great  men  he  had  met  in  Europe,  or 
criticizing  and  comparing  the  best  authors  of  French  prose. 
His  foibles  —  particularly  a  sensitiveness  of  temper,  an  ambition 
for  the  Presidency  and  a  fondness  for  relieving  heavy  thought 
with  light  words,  as  Marcy  did  with  light  snuff  —  were  numer- 
ous; the  openness  of  his  large  and  generous  nature,  superior 
to  the  prudence  of  smaller  minds,  prevented  his  concealing 
them;  certain  peculiarities  of  language  and  manner,  from  a 
delicacy  about  commas  to  a  fondness  for  literary  effects, 
were  easily  ridiculed;  and  in  non-military  affairs  his  indiscre- 
tion was  now  and  then  glaring  ;£  but  he  must  be  described 
emphatically  as  a  soldier,  a  gentleinan,  a  "character,"  a  great 
general  and  a  great  man.30 

Distrusting  Taylor,  and  profoundly  alarmed  about  the 
situation  on  the  frontier,26  Polk  sent  for  Scott  on  May  13,  ajod 
conferred  upon  him  verbally  the  chief  command  in  Mexico ;) 
yet,  while  admitting  that  he  saw  proofs  of  experience  in  file 
General's  remarks,  he  pronounced  him  too  "scientific  and 
visionary,"  as  the  master  of  a  difficult  business  must  always 
appear  to  the  tyro.27  Probably  he  knew  that  a  man  could  not 
become  a  soldier  overnight,  as  he  could  become  a  militia 
colonel  or  a  "statesman,"  or  —  in  Santa  Anna's  opinion  —  a 
professor  of  jurisprudence;  but  he  believed  that,  should 
fighting  really  need  to  be  done,  even  an  improvised  army 
would  make  "a  brisk  and  a  short  war  of  it,"  as  the  administra- 
tion paper  neatly  said,  and,  if  necessary,  dictate  a  peace  "in 
the  Halls  of  the  Montezumas."  Under  circumstances  like  these 
prevision  and  science  appeared  rather  superfluous.  The  only 
things  needful  were  to  march  now  and  triumph  to-morrow.30 

Scott,  however,  felt  that  waging  war  might  involve  military 
operations.  He  undertook  to  prove  by  elaborate  calculations 
that  the  greater  part  of  the  volunteers  could  not  at  the  best 
arrive  on  the  Rio  Grande  before  the  first  week  in  August; 
and,  since  that  would  be  the  rainy  season,  when  the  hoofs 
of  mules  and  horses  would  be  unfit  for  hard  use,  and  various 
other  difficulties  would  arise,  he  recommended  that  most  of 
the  new  troops,  after  remaining  under  instruction  at  salubrious 
points  in  the  United  States  during  the  summer,  should  be 
placed  upon  that  river  by  September  25,  so  as  to  make,  with 
the  volunteers  and  regulars  already  there,  25,000  or  possibly 


THE  CHOICE  OF  A  COMMANDER  199 

30,000  healthy,  properly  equipped  and  more  or  less  trained 
soldiers,  ready  „to  invade  Mexico  in  a  decisive  manner.  In 
the  execution  of  this  plan  he  did  not  intend  to  shirk  or  dally.28 
May  15  he  gave  the  chiefs  of  the  general  staff  directions  about 
throwing  supplies  of  all  kinds  upon  the  various  rendezvous 
in  advance  of  the  volunteers,  prompted  the  quartermaster 
general  to  obtain  wagons,  and  even  called  attention  to  the 
necessity  of  seasonably  obtaining  light  boats  for  the  navigation 
of  the  Rio  Grande.30 

His  feeling  was,  however,  particularly  after  news  of  what 
he  called  Taylor's  "great  and  brilliant  victories"  arrived, 
that  it  would  not  seem  proper  —  especially  to  military  men  — 
for  him  to  supersede  that  officer  except  with  heavy  reinforce- 
ments; and  no  doubt  he  saw  it  would  scarcely  enhance  a 
prestige  that  was  dear  to  him  personally  and  invaluable  to 
him  as  the  commander-in-chief,  to  lie  idle  in  hot  mud  for 
several  months.  He  therefore  proposed  to  leave  Washington 
about  May  30,  give  his  personal  attention  to  the  troops  and 
supplies  en  route  and  at  the  rendezvous,  and  reach  the  scene 
of  action  a  little  before  them.30 

Such  procrastination  disgusted  Polk,  and  such  "schemes" 
annoyed  Marcy,  both  of  whom  doubtless  had  an  eye  on  political 
considerations. (Democratic  members  of  Congress  protested 
that  Scott  was^low,  and  also  that,  if  successful  in  Mexico, 
he  would  be  the  ruin  of  their  party.  In  short,  it  seemed  neces- 
sary to  get  rid  of  him.29  May  19,  therefore,  without  saying 
a  word  to  Scott,  the  secretary  of  war  had  a  provision  attached 
to  the  bill  which  finally  became  the  law  of  June  18,  enabling 
the  Executive  to  appoint  an  officer  new  to  the  army  as  com- 
mander-in-chief of  thesvolunteers,  and  at  the  end  of  the  war 
eliminate  Scott  entirely/)  This  led  to  sharp  language  between 
Marcy  and  Scott.30  — ^ 

Marcy,  the  politician,  intimated  that  the  militia,  who  had 
gone  to  Taylor's  assistance  and  were  to  serve  only  three  months, 
must  have  a  chance  to  do  something,  and  Scott,  the  soldier, 
declined  to  take  the  field  if  liable  to  be  fired  on  from  the  rear. 
In  one  of  his  notes  the  General  remarked  that  he  had  taken 
for  lunch  merely  "a  hasty  plate  of  soup"  —  a  fact  that  really 
proved  his  extreme  devotion  to  the  business  in  hand;  and  in 
another  he  specified  a  number  of  the  reasons  why  a  summer 


200  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

campaign  was  not  feasible.  At  this  juncture,  too,  a  private 
note  of  his,  to  the  effect  that  no  eastern  man,  Whig  or  West 
Pointer  was  likely  to  be  given  a  commission,  turned  up  at  the 
White  House.  Polk  regarded  the  note  as  disrespectful,  and 
also  thought  the  expression  "fire  upon  my  rear"  was  a  reflection 
on  the  Executive.  Scott  protested  that  his  words  referred 
to  Marcy  and  the  members  of  Congress,  and  apparently  did 
all  he  could,  without  sacrificing  his  professional  convictions, 
to  satisfy  the  President ;   but  his  efforts  were  in  vain.30 

The  army  on  the  Rio  Grande  was  now  out  of  danger ;  Taylor 
seemed  not  so  extremely  incompetent  after  all ;  and  Scott  was 
still  a  scientific,  visionary  schemer  and  a  promising  candidate 
for  the  chair  of  state,  whom  it  was  more  politic  to  disgrace 
than  to  honor.  f Polk  decided  therefore  that  he  was  meddle- 
some, insubordinate,  hostile,  foolish,  vindictive  and  untrust- 
worthy, a  procrastinating  obstructionist,  and  above  all  a 
)  "violent  partisan";  and  on  May  25  he  received  orders  to 
stay  at  Washington  and  hasten  the  preparations?)  His  cor- 
respondence with  Marcy  was  published.  The  hig  dogs  and 
little  —  Blanche,  Tray  and  all  —  began  to  bark.  He  was 
called  a  farrier  general  for  speaking  of  hoofs,  and  "Marshal 
Tureen"  for  admitting  that  he  took  soup.  His  off-hand 
remarks  were  termed  flippant,  his  close  calculations  fussy, 
and  his  deliberate  plans  dilatory.  His  allusion  to  the  "rear," 
fully  justified  by  what  had  occurred  and  what  was  to  follow, 
seemed  even  to  some  friendly  critics  disrespectful  and  uncalled 
for.  Political  intrigue,  not  war,  was  said  to  occupy  his  mind. 
The  General  has  "committed  suicide  with  a  goose-quill," 
announced  the  Boston  Courier;  Marcy  himself  confided  to 
a  friend  that  Scott  had  lost  a  position  he  would  never  be  able 
^  )  to  regain ;  andHTaylor,  assigned  to  duty  with  his  new  brevet 
rank,31  was  continued  in  the  chief  command.30 

All  this  while  the  administration  felt  extremely  anxious, 
on  both  domestic  and  international  grounds,  regarding  the 
Oregon  issue.  The  West,  which  Representative  Graham  called 
"the  ruling  star"  in  Congress,  clamored  for  "fifty-four  forty  or 
fight."  Cass  admitted  that  he  found  it  necessary  to  sacrifice 
to  its  demand  his  preference  for  a  boundary  at  the  forty-ninth 
degree,  and  Polk's  yielding  to  the  same  pressure  is  readily 
understood.32     It   was    believed    that    England's    interest    in 


THE  OREGON  ISSUE  SETTLED  201 

peace  would  forbid  her  fighting  the  United  States  for  a 
small  area  of  unrecognized  value,  and  the  Democratic  leaders 
probably  had  no  expectation  of  getting  into  a  war.  The 
British  Cabinet,  however,  had  its  public  to  deal  with,  and  felt 
that  it  could  not  live  a  day  should  it  appear  submissive  to 
American  "bullying."  Hence  on  February  4,  1846,  when 
the  United  States  finally  rejected  arbitration,  the  two  nations 
w^re  almost  at  the  grips.33 

^  Yet  each  contained  powerful  elements  favorable  to  accom- 
modation. The  strong  tone  of  the  American  government 
impressed  England,  and  Polk  realized  that  while  compromising 
on  the  lower  line  would  anger  the  Northwest,  an  opposite 
course  might  throw  upon  him  the  responsibility  of  disrupting 
his  party,  ruining  his  administration,  and  plunging  the  country 
into  an  abyss.  The  American  Congress,  like  the  people, 
took  a  more  and  more  serious  view  of  the  situation ;  and  the  roar 
of  the  "fifty-four  forty"  men  subsided  into  a  growl.  On  a 
hint  from  the  United  States  Great  Britain  presented  in  May 
a  compromise  practically  similar  to  that,  which  her  minister 
at  Washington  had  rejected  the  previous  year.  The  Senate, 
whose  advice  Polk  asked  in  order  to  escape  from  his  radical 
declarations,  recommended  the  acceptance  of  it  on  June  12, 
and  the  crisis  ended.33 

/During  the  same  anxious  period  a  less  public  negotiation 
al§o  was  on  foot.     There  were  signs  of  a  revolution  in  Mexico, 
and  it  behooved  Polk  to  consider  who  might  come  to  the  front. 
Farias  and  Almonte  had  many  partisans,  and  both  were  hostile 
to  the  United  States;    but  Santa  Anna,  now  living  in  exile 
near  Havana   and   spending  his  time  on  gamecocks,   monte 
and  a  huge  mail  from  Mexico,  seemed  quite  likely  to  regain 
the  power]   and  it  was  believed  that  his  intelligence,  ambition  5 
and  knowledge  of  his  country's  weakness,  combining  in  favor  \ 
of  peace,  were  more  than  enough  to  offset  any  stirrings  of  I 
patriotic  enthusiasm  in  his  breast.     Reports  from  trustworthy 
sources  —  particularly  from  Slidell,  Consul  Dimond  at  Vera 
Cruz,  and  Consul  Black  at  Mexico  —  tended  to  support  this 
belief  ;34  andf  it  was  understood  also  that  past  actions  and  present 
circumstances   bound    Santa   Anna    to    oppose    all    European  J 
and   monarchical  designs  upon  Mexico.     Not  having  begun 
the  conflict  with  the  United  States,  he  could  pronounce  peace 


202  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

a  necessity,  it  was  thought,  and  throw  upon  Paredes  all  the 
odium  of  the  abortive  war)  Moreover  A.  J.  Atocha,  a  naturals 
ized  American  citizen,  wno  had  been  a  confidant  and  tool  of 
Santa  Anna,  had  assured  Polk  in  February  that  the  General, 
should  he  regain  power,  would  be  ready  to  treat.35  From  the 
despatches  of  the  Spanish  minister  at  Mexico  we  know  that 
it  was  impossible,  as  Polk  asserted,  to  prevent  a  man  possessing 
large  resources  from  landing  on  the  Mexican  coast ;  /and  it 
seemed  evident  that  Santa  Anna's  presence  in  the  country, 
should  he  fail  to  regain  power  and  make  a  treaty,  would  in 

/  all  probability  lead  to  a  distracting  civil  war.  On  the  day 
Polk  signed  the  war  bill,  an  order S6  to  let  him  pass  through 
our  blockading  squadron^off  Vera  Cruz  was,  therefore,  issued 

'  to  Commodore  Conner.38  J 

(And  this  was  not  alk-^Though  deeply  distrustful  of  Atocha, 
Polk  seems  to  have  derived  from  a  conversation  with  him  the 
idea  of  despatching  a  secret  emissary  to  Santa  Anna,  and  on 
the  evening  of  July  5  Commander  Mackenzie  of  the  United 
States  navy  arrived  at  Havana.37  Two  days  later  he  passed 
three  hours  with  the  ex-dictator\  informing  him  of  the  order 
to  let  him  pass,  and  giving  hirqjjre  substance  of  a  conversation 
with  Polk,  in  which  the  President  had  expressed  these  inter- 
esting sentiments :  first,  a  hope  of  seeing  the  General  once 
more  in  authority ;  secondly  a  desire  for  peace  —  on  the 
basis  of  a  boundary  via  the  Rio  Grande  and  thence  west, 
ample  payment  in  cash  for  the  territory  thus  transferred,  and 
permanent  friendly  relations  with  Mexico;  and,  thirdly, 
a  willingness  to  stop  military  operations  and  send  a  minister, 
should  Santa  Anna,  on  regaining  his  former  position,  be  willing 
to  negotiate.38 

(Jji  reply  the  General  drew  up  a  note,  which  was  copied  by 
Mackenzie  and  then  destroyed.  In  this  he  professed  liberal 
intentions  regarding  commerce  and  politics,  anti-monarchical 
and  anti-European  principles,  and  a  disposition  —  in  case 
the  United  States  would  promote  his  "patriotic  desires"  —  to 
respond  with  a  treaty  of  the  desired  sort)  Taylor,  he  said, 
must  promote  the  scheme  by  marchmg^to  Saltillo,  forcing 
Paredes  to  fight,  defeating  him,  and  then  advancing  perhaps 
to  San  Luis  Potosi,  so  as  to  constrain  the  Mexicans  of  all  parties 
to  recall  the  Hero  of  Tampico ; )  and  he  offered  valuable  hints 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  SANTA  ANNA  203 

about  attacking  Tampico  and  Vera  Cruz,  which  seemed  to 
attest  his  sincerity.  Mackenzie  then  took  his  leave,  and, 
impressed  by  Santa  Anna's  military  suggestions,  transcended 
his  instructions  by  visiting  Taylor  on  the  way  home  —  thus 
rendering  himself  and  his  mission  unduly  conspicuous.38 
/  In  these  ways,  combining  diplomacy  and  force  as  he  loved 
to  do,  Polk  imagined  that  our  Mexican  crisis  had  been  fully 
met. ) 


THE  LEADERS  ADVANCE 

May-September,  1846 

On  taking  possession  of  Matamoros  Taylor  pitched  his  tent 
in  the  shade  of  a  small  tree  about  half  a  mile  from  town,  and 
there  he  remained.  Dressed  in  attakapas  pantaloons  and 
a  linen  roundabout  he  sat  enthroned  on  a  box  cushioned  with 
an  Arkansas  blanket,  and  for  dinner-table  had  a  couple  of 
rough  blue  chests.  The  slight  pursuit  of  Arista  and  the  search 
for  concealed  ordnance,  arms  and  munitions  did  not  require 
his  personal  attention.  June  6  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson 
with  his  four  companies  of  the  First  Infantry,  Price's  company 
of  rangers  and  two  of  Bragg's  guns  under  Lieutenant  Thomas, 
the  future  "Rock  of  Chickamauga,"  marched  for  Reynosa, 
about  sixty  miles  distant  by  the  road,  which  had  asked  for  the 
protection  of  American  troops,1  and  on  the  fifteenth  Captain 
McCulloch  and  his  company  were  sent  off  on  a  scouting 
expedition;  but  the  General  had  ample  time  for  reflection, 
and  his  thoughts  were  not  entirely  agreeable.2 
/^Despite  newspaper  glorification,  the  low  opinion  of  his 
abilities  that  was  entertained  by  the  officers  must  have  im- 
pinged somewhat  upon  his  consciousness.  Captain  Larnard, 
in  fact,  believed  that  he  not  only  realized  his  inadequacy, 
but  longed  to  retire;  and  certainly  Taylor's  private  letters 
exhibited  the  profoundest  mental  discomfort.  Scott  should 
come,  he  insisted  over  and  over  again;  the  campaign  would 
be  a  failure,  and  the  officer  conducting  it  would  be  ruined. 
He  distrusted  the  intentions  of  the  administration,  and  he 
condemned  its  policy.  As  early  as  May  9  he  feared  too  many 
volunteers  —  whom  he  disliked  — ■  were  coming  ;J)  by  May  20 
he  knew  what  Gaines  had  done;  and  Scott'lTfetter  of  May 
18  informed  him  that  about  20,000  such  troops  were  "to  march 
upon  Mexico."  2 

204 


THE  TROOPS   ON   THE  RIO  GRANDE  205 

Under  this  head  all  his  fears  were  realized.  First,  three- 
months  men  (militia)  sent  for  by  himself  in  April,  then  six- 
months  men  called  out  by  Gaines,  and  then  twelve-months 
men  raised  under  the  war  bill  poured  in.  By  June  3  his  army 
had  risen  to  nearly  8000.  Three  weeks  later  the  First  Ten- 
nessee Infantry  —  advance  guard  of  the  Congressional  troops 
—  appeared,  and  it  found  on  the  scene  six  regiments  from  Loui- 
siana, one  from  St.  Louis,  one  from  Kentucky,  seven  companies 
from  Alabama  and  twelve  or  fifteen  from  Texas.  All  of  these 
had  come  in  response  to  the  calls  of  Taylor  or  Gaines;  and 
some  had  been  on  the  ground  more  than  a  month.  In  all 
about  8000  of  these  two  classes  arrived,  and  in  accordance 
with  Taylor's  desire  nearly  all  of  them  —  except  a  very  few, 
who  agreed  to  serve  twelve  months  —  were  sent  home  about 
the  first  of  August.3  Before  they  took  their  leave,  at  least 
20,000  American  soldiers  were  on  the  Rio  Grande,  besides  an 
inevitable  number  of  American  civilians  more  or  less  directly 
connected  with  the  army  or  not  connected  at  all ;  and  by  far 
the  greater  part  of  their  subsistence  had  to  come,  of  course, 
from  the  United  States.4 

The  men  were  stationed  in  a  series  of  camps.  The  best  of 
all  these  was  probably  at  Point  Isabel,  where  the  dry,  undulat- 
ing ground  and  fresh  breezes  made  for  health  and  comfort. 
Fort  Polk,  as  the  station  was  now  called,  included  about  fifty 
acres.  The  shallowness  of  the  harbor  impaired  the  con- 
venience of  the  Point  somewhat,  however;  and  the  primary 
camp  lay  three  or  four  miles  away  at  the  north  end  of  Brazos 
Island,  which  consisted  of  low  hills  on  the  side  toward  the 
mainland,  a  swamp  in  the  centre,  a  wreck-strewn  beach  on 
the  outer  side,  and  in  general  three  blades  of  grass  to  fifty 
square  feet  of  sand,  as  Lieutenant  George  B.  McClellan  wrote 
home.  Here,  too,  the  air  was  excellent;  but  the  brackish 
water  caused  many  complaints,  and  the  sand  blew  into  every- 
thing —  hair,  nose,  eyes  and  food.  Marching  the  entire  length 
of  the  island  the  soldiers  found  themselves,  at  its  southern 
end,  about  eighty  yards  from  the  mainland,  waded  across  the 
bayou  or  strait  known  as  Boca  Chica,  and  after  going  about 
seven  miles  farther  came  to  another  camp  and  group  of  store- 
houses, ten  miles  or  so  from  their  point  of  departure,  called 
Mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  where  the  river  steamers  tied  up 


X 


206  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

or  anchored.5  Here,  as  at  Camp  Brazos,  the  ground  was 
"working  A  live  with  magotes  and  land  crabs,"  as  a  soldier  put 
it;  but  the  same  breezes  usually  tempered  the  heat.  Eight 
miles  from  the  Gulf  by  land  —  twenty-five  or  thirty  by  water 
—  one  came  to  Burrita,  a  cluster  of  huts  on  a  ridge  close  to 
the  stream,  and  this  high  ground  was  made  the  site  of  a  roomy 
camp.  On  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  and  separated  from 
it  by  a  mile  of  swamp  lay  Camp  Belknap,  a  spot  fit  only  for 
the  snakes,  tarantulas,  centipedes,  fleas,  scorpions  and  ants 
that  infested  it.  Above  this  point  lay  several  more  camps,6  and 
still  others  enveloped  Matamoros.7 

Except  Belknap  all  of  these  places  were  fairly  salubrious  for 
men  of  reasonable  prudence,  and  several  of  them  distinctly 
healthful;  yet  considerable  sickness  prevailed.  At  Brazos 
Island  a  sort  of  dysentery  made  trouble,  and  by  some  the 
water  of  the  Rio  Grande  itself  was  thought  injurious.  Until 
May  13  no  funds  available  for  tents  had  been  within  the  reach 
of  Quartermaster  General  Jesup;  and  after  this  difficulty  was 
removed,  feeling  that  he  could  not  wait  for  duck,  he  used 
common  muslin,  which  let  the  rain  through;  and  many  of 
the  troops,  even  regulars,  had  no  protection  against  the  weather 
except  a  screen  of  brush  or  a  blanket  thrown  over  a  bush. 
Measles  invaded  the  camps,  and  lying  on  the  damp  ground 
made  the  disease  fatal  in  many  instances.  What  was  worse, 
the  heedlessness  and  homesickness  of  the  volunteers  caused 
much  sickness  even  at  Point  Isabel.  The  regulars,  however, 
were  comparatively  healthy  and  contented.7 

The  heat,  softened  by  constant  breezes,  was  thought  by 
many  less  oppressive  than  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  though 
sometimes  men  fainted  at  the  drills.  Bathing  proved  a  valuable 
resource;  and  on  the  seashore  there  were  oysters,  crabs  and 
a  large  variety  of  beautiful  fish  to  catch  and  eat.  Stately 
processions  of  herons  and  scarlet-winged  flamingos  and  the 
chatter  of  jackdaws  and  many  other  birds  amused  the  soldiers ; 
and  some  of  those  addicted  to  sport  discussed  the  project  of 
crossing  the  mosquitos  with  gamecocks,  we  are  told.  The 
roar  of  the  sea  and  the  mirages  along  the  river,  innumerable 
flowers,  the  solemn  burros  (donkeys)  almost  buried  by  their 
loads,  the  Mexicans  vending  eatables  at  exorbitant  prices, 
the  long  lines  of  tents  where  such  a  luxury  as  tents  existed, 


THE  MORALE  OF  THE  ARMY  207 

target  shooting,  and  now  and  then  the  muffled  drum  helped 
occupy  one's  attention.  On  July  5  occurred  a  Sunday  and 
a  sermon  —  the  last  of  the  campaign.  At  sunset  a  tremulous 
orange  haze  in  the  west  was  due,  followed  by  the  twinkling 
lights  of  the  camp,  that  were  so  agreeable  to  view  from  a  dis- 
tance, and  then  by  the  howling  of  wolves,  the  tenor  chorus 
of  the  swamps,  and  the  agonized  baritone  fugues  of  the  donkeys. 
It  was  now  time  for  singing,  story-telling  and,  above  all,  gam- 
bling —  perhaps  Old  Sledge  on  a  blanket,  perhaps  Chuckle- 
luck,  perhaps  monte,  perhaps  faro;  and  now  and  then  came 
a  fandango  (dance)  on  the  hard  ground  with  such  American 
and  Mexican  women  as  there  were.  The  camp  life  was  "a 
rough  furnace  and  a  hot  fire,"  wrote  Sergeant  Miller;  but 
the  novelty  of  it  soon  wore  off,  and  the  volunteers  grew 
discontented.7 

/Theyshad  come  for  glory  and  a  good  time,  and  were  having 
neither .)  They  wanted  to  do  something,  and  to  do  it  at  once 
or  go  home.  One  at  least  of  them  believed  that  assignment 
to  garrison  duty  would  have  led  to  general  desertion.  Wherever 
they  were,  they  panted  to  be  somewhere  else.  Having  come 
to  gamble,  with  their  lives  for  a  stake,  they  clamored  to  have 
the  game  begin.  If  there  was  no  enemy  to  fight,  they  were 
ready  to  fight  friends ;  and  in  one  of  the  many  brawls  and  riots 
Colonel  Baker  was  shot  in  the  neck. ("Four  or  five  months 
of  training  under  expert  officers  and  strict  discipline  were 
necessary  to  prepare  regulars  for  the  field ; 8  and  naturally 
these  volunteers,  almost  wholly  alien  to  the  habits,  feelings 
and  efficiency  of  the  real  soldier,  often  felt  at  liberty  to  thwart 
and  even  defy  their  commander,  and  were  unable  to  cooperate 
with  him  intelligently  when  really  disposed  to  do  so.  J  In  spite 
of  positive  orders  they  wasted  ammunition  recklessly,  and 
Lieutenant  Meade  thought  a  day  passed  in  his  tent  no  less 
perilous  than  a  stiff  battle.11 

/The  officers  were  very  similar.  One  brigadier  general 
came  with  a  light  buggy,  in  which  he  proposed  to  make  the 
campaign.  Another  had  enlisted  as  a  private,  and,  not  being 
deemed  worthy  to  command  the  company,  had  been  elected 
a  lieutenant 7)  but  the  executive  fiat  provided  him  with  quali- 
fications,   ^in  the  name  of  God,"  wrote  a  soldier  to  Senator 

Vllen,  don't  let  Hamer  be  a  brigadier  general ;    he  is  talented, 


X 


208  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

but  doesn't  dare  undertake  to  drill  a  squad ;  yet  the  commis- 
sion was  issued.9  Pillow,  another  of  the  same  rank,  ambitious 
to  figure  but  not  acquainted  with  his  proper  work,  did  what 
was  not  proper.  Some  of  the  volunteer  generals  on  horseback 
reminded  Lieutenant  Jamieson  of  the  line, 

**  Woe  to  the  mullein-stalk  that  came  in  our  way." 

Persons  of  a  mature  age,  who  had  bulked  large  at  home,  would 
not  stoop  to  plod  through  the  rudiments  of  a  new  profession. 
Even  good  officers  were  in  fear  of  the  letters  written  by  their 
men  and  the  revenge  that  might  be  taken  later,  should  real 
discipline  be  enforced ;  while  those  less  conscientious  threatened 
to  resign  if  kept  in  the  background,  stood  in  the  way  of  su- 
periors belonging  to  the  opposite  political  party,  in  order  to 
prevent  them  from  making  a  reputation,  or  even  took  part 
with  the  men  in  the  hope  of  getting  into  Congress  by  and  by.11 

In  short,  the  volunteers  were  all  one  costly  mass  of  ignorance, 
confusion  and  insubordination,  said  Meade ;  while  the  regular 
olficersfelt  discourage^.^orm¥rel^y~dis^vering  that  civilians 
were  preferred  to  educated  soldiers  for  high  appointments, 
but  by  finding  themselves  in  the  shadow  and  even  under  the 
command  of  men  who  had  been  discharged  from  West  Point 
for  incapacity  or  from  the  army  for  gross  misconduct.10  At 
the  height  of  this,  General  Taylor,  who  was  disqualified  by 
lack  of  experience  and  mental  discipline  for  organizing  an 
efficient  staff,  and  therefore  needed  to  use  his  own  eyes  and  his 
own  voice,  held  aloof.  "I  very  seldom  leave  my  tent,"  he 
wrote  on  July  25,  adding  helplessly,  "How  it  will  all  end  time 
alone  must  tell."  Besides,  every  mail  brought  letters  about 
the  Presidency  to  distract  his  attention.11 

Probably  he  saw  he  had  blundered.  On  April  26  he  knew 
that  war  had  begun,  and  called  upon  Louisiana  and  Texas 
for  soldiers  with  a  view  to  the  invasion  of  Mexico,  which  he 
must  have  believed,  under  the  circumstances,  that  his  govern- 
ment wished.  By  the  rules  of  the  service  it  was  then  his  duty, 
as  he  well  knew,  to  make  requisitions  for  everything  the 
campaign  would  require,12  and  a  zealous  commander,  gather- 
ing —  as  Taylor  had  been  instructed  to  do  —  all  the  infor- 
mation he  could  find  regarding  the  local  conditions,  might 
reasonably  have  sent  on  to  Washington  with  it  an  able  officer 


TROOPS  ADVANCE  209 

to  assist  the  department.  With  a  scorn,  however,  for  science 
and  vision  that  should  have  delighted  Polk,  Taylor  did  neither ; 
but,  assuming  that  the  Mexicans  would  not  fight  —  if  at  all  — 
north  of  the  mountains  beyond  Monterey,  he  determined  to 
advance  with  about  6000  men.  Unfortunately  he  neglected 
to  have  his  engineers  inspect  the  three  steamboats  on  which 
his  plan  depended,  and  these  proved  to  be  worm-eaten  and 
practically  useless.13 

About  the  middle  of  June,  boats  for  the  Rio  Grande  began 
to  be  despatched  from  New  Orleans,  but  —  in  addition  to 
mishaps  at  the  coast  resulting  from  gales  and  the  freaks  of 
the  shifting  bars  —  a  serious  embarrassment  soon  occurred 
above.  A  direct  advance  against  Monterey  by  land  was 
deemed  impracticable,  because  the  route  lacked  water.  Taylor 
had  therefore  planned  to  have  his  troops  march  to  Camargo, 
the  head  of  navigation  toward  that  city,  and  send  their  supplies 
to  that  point  by  the  river;  but  during  the  first  eleven  days 
of  July  rain  fell  heavily  and  flooded  the  country.  The  freshet, 
however,  ensured  a  sufficient  depth  in  the  Rio  Grande,  and  on 
July  6  the  Seventh  Infantry  set  out  for  Camargo.  The  dis- 
tance, called  about  120  miles  by  land,  was  more  than  twice 
as  long  by  water ;  and  the  river  wandered  about  so  much  that 
according  to  humorous  natives  a  bird  could  never  get  across 
—  always  alighting  on  some  projection  of  the  bank  from  which 
it  had  risen.  It  proved  a  hard  task  for  the  light  and  feeble 
steamboats,  with  only  green  wood  for  the  boilers,  to  stem  the 
fierce  current;  the  pilots  were  unacquainted  with  the  difficul- 
ties of  such  navigation ; 14  and  in  making  one  of  the  sharp 
turns  a  boat  was  frequently  caught  by  the  current,  and  swept 
downstream  or  against  the  bank  —  breaking  the  rudder 
perhaps.16 

But  in  one  way  or  another  the  steamers  puffed  ahead  past 
great  cornfields,  and  occasionally  there  was  a  small  village, 
where  the  people  stared  in  wonder  at  the  strange  Craft,  and  the 
girls  laughed  and  shouted  to  see  the  soldiers  throw  kisses  to 
them.  After  some  200  miles  of  this  came  Reynosa  on  a  high 
limestone  point,  dominated  by  a  heavy,  stunted  church  tower 
like  an  ancient  castle;  and,  farther  along,  the  mouth  of  the 
Alcantro  was  passed.  The  country  became  still  better  now, 
with  fertile  valleys  running  back  to  the  tablelands;  and  not 
vol.  i  —  p 


210  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

only  corn  but  potatoes,  wheat,  beans,  and  cotton  could  be 
seen.  Forty  miles  of  such  a  landscape,  and  the  steamboats 
entered  the  San  Juan;  and  after  struggling  on  for  three  or 
four  more  they  stopped  early  on  July  14  at  Camargo,  where 
Captain  Miles,  who  commanded  the  regiment,  sent  at  once 
for  the  alcalde,  an  official  who  acted  as  mayor,  judge  and 
paterfamilias  in  a  Mexican  town,  and  formally  took  possession. 
The  rest  of  the  regular  infantry  pursued  the  same  route  as 


Matamoros  < 


O  Montemorelos 


■  Linares 


0Villagran 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


Wii.s.F.ng.Co.,N.l\ 


fast  as  possible,  and  on  July  30  most  of  the  volunteers  were 
ordered  to  do  so.16 

August  4  Taylor  himself  embarked,  and  the  next  day  artillery 
and  infantry  began  to  advance  by  the  southern  shore  of  the 
river.  The  road  was  in  places  deep  with  mud  or  covered  with 
water ;  thick  chaparral  cut  off  the  friendly  breeze ;  the  intense 
v  heat  felled  many  a  soldier,  and  thirst  tormented  all  who  re- 
tained their  senses;  but  after  a  time  the  plan  of  moving  by 
night  lessened  the  suffering,  and  at  last  the  painful  march  was 
achieved.  The  cavalry  and  wagons  also  proceeded  in  due 
course  to  the  general  rendezvous ; 15   and  meanwhile   Mier,  a 


DREADFUL  CAMARGO  211 

hill  town  only  a  short  distance  from  the  Rio  Grande,  was 
occupied  without  resistance  on  July  31.16 

Camargo,  a  place  of  perhaps  5000  inhabitants,  was  said  to  be 
some  400  miles  from  the  Gulf  by  water.  It  stood  well  up  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  river,  here  about  one  hundred  yards  in 
width;  but  the  recent  freshet,  rising  to  an  unprecedented 
height,  had  nearly  destroyed  it,  replacing  houses  and  gardens 
with  about  a  foot  of  mud.  This  was  dug  away,  and  the  banks 
were  cleared  of  vegetation;  "acres  and  acres"  of  tents 
rose;  and  by  the  end  of  August  some  15,000  men  were  en- 
camped along  the  San  Juan  for  a  distance  of  three  miles  or 
so  up  and  down  and  several  hundred  yards  back,  while  a 
quantity  of  stores  that  dumfounded  the  Mexicans  and  satisfied 
Taylor,  was  gradually  piled  up.  Worth,  who  had  returned 
to  his  brigade  at  the  end  of  May,  commanded  the  place  and 
insisted  on  firm  discipline.  No  American  trader  was  tolerated ; 
and  all  persons  caught  smuggling  liquor  into  camp  suffered 
"a  punishment  cruel  to  use  on  tender  skins."  17 

This  was  well,  but  it  did  not  redeem  the  situation.  Natives 
regarded  Camargo  as  the  sickliest  point  in  the  region,  and  the 
freshets  had  made  it  worse.  Every  breath  of  air  raised  a 
stifling  cloud  of  dust  from  the  dried  and  pulverized  mud. 
Barren  hills  of  limestone  cut  off  the  breeze  to  a  great  extent 
and  concentrated  the  fierce  heat,  frequently  sending  the  mer- 
cury in  "this  hottest  of  all  hot  places,"  as  a  soldier  called  the 
town,  to  112  degrees.  Scorpions,  tarantulas,  mosquitos  and 
centipedes  abounded.  There  was  a  plague  of  small  frogs. 
"Last  night  the  ants  tried  to  carry  me  off  in  my  sleep,"  wrote 
a  soldier.  The  only  drinking  water  came  from  the  San  Juan, 
and  it  made  trouble.  The  ignorance  of  the  volunteers  about 
caring  for  their  health  was  fairly  matched  by  that  of  their 
officers  and  medical  men.  Days  of  sweltering  under  a  cruel 
sun,  with  nothing  to  do  and  apparently  nothing  to  hope  for, 
were  followed  by  cool  nights  and  heavy  dews,  the  heart-rending 
groans  of  the  sick,  and  the  yelping  of  numberless  prairie  wolves. 
In  almost  all  the  volunteer  regiments  at  least  one  third  of 
the  men  were  ill,  wrote  Meade,  and  in  many  of  them,  one  half. 
The  three  volleys  at  the  graves  became  well-nigh  a  continuous 
roll;  and  the  "dead  march"  was  played  so  often  that,  as  an 
officer  said,  the  very  birds  knew  it)  The  First  Tennessee, 


212  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

originally  1040  prime  young  fellows,  was  reduced  by  deaths 
and  discharges  to  less  than  500.  "Oh,  what  a  horror  I  have 
for  Camargo,"  exclaimed  one  of  the  generals ;  "it  is  a  Yawning 
Grave  Yard";  a  thousand  soldiers  torn  and  mangled  on  the 
battlefield  would  be  nothing  to  its  suffering  and  dying  regiments.17 

And  all  this  appears  to  have  been  unnecessary.  As  we  have 
seen,  Taylor  had  no  intention  of  using  more  than  about  6000 
men  in  the  near  future ;  and  there  were  salubrious  places  not 
only  near  the  Gulf  but  near  Camargo.  No  local  maladies 
prevailed  in  the  Rio  Grande  valley,  said  Meade.  "There 
are  no  causes  for  disease,"  wrote  Captain  Henry.  The  climate 
of  that  region,  said  an  Illinois  officer,  equalled  in  salubrity  the 
climate  of  "any  Western  state."  Reynosa  was  described  by 
the  General  Sedgwick  of  Civil  War  days  as  perfectly  healthy. 
Mier,  selected  the  following  year,  with  a  particular  view  to 
salubrity,  as  the  site  of  a  camp  for  instruction,  lay  near  by  on 
the  road  to  Monterey;  and  Cerralvo,  farther  along  on  the 
same  route,  was  a  kind  of  Eden.  The  best  comment  on  what 
the  General  did  is  what  the  General  himself  said.  His  first 
duty,  he  told  Senator  Crittenden,  was  to  place  the  troops  in 
a  healthful  situation.17 

touring  all  this  while,  Mexico,  too,  had  been  preparing  for 
the  war,  and  preparing  characteristically.  Paredes  began 
with  good  intentions,  a  serious  and  fairly  honorable  Cabinet, 
and  sound  ideas  of  economy *J  Though  he  did  not  seem  to  be 
very  strong  either  physically  or  intellectually,  his  many  scars 
and  the  bull-like  expression  of  his  face  inspired  respect  and 
caution.  He  lived  quietly  and  honestly,  and  the  correspondent 
of  the  London  Times  thought  Mexico  had  a  better  prospect 
of  being  well  governed  than  at  any  previous  period  since  1821. 
It  was  the  dictator's  hope  that  such  a  policy  and  a  bold  cam- 
paign against  the  Americans  would  rally  the  country  to  his 
banner. 20 

/About  April  1,  as  we  already  know,  he  gave  orders  to  attack 
Taytor.  In  May  he  severed  all  consular  relations  with  the 
United  States.18  June  6  the  new  Congress  met ;  and  Paredes, 
in  opening  the  session,  announced  that  the  time  had  come  to 
declare  waiv-and  summoned  all  Mexicans  to  the  support  of 
the  country./ Six  days  later  he  was  elected  President  as  a 
matter  of-c6urse,  and  the  action  of  the  American  government 


MEXICAN  PREPARATIONS  213 

regarding  war  with  Mexico  was  made  known  by  the  official 
Diario.  On  the  sixteenth  Tornel  —  the  enemy  of  the  United 
States  and  worse  enemy  of  his  own  country,  who  had  now 
wormed  himself  into  the  war  department  in  place  of  Almonte 
—  proposed  to  Congress  a  declaration  of  war ;  and  on  July 
6  Paredes  proclaimed,  as  Congress  had  voted  five  days  before, 
that  Mexico  would  repel  the  aggression  and  invasion  of  the 
Americans.  It  was  further  stated  that  besides  completing 
the  Permanent  and  Active  corps,  the  government  would  create 
additional  forces  to  serve  during  the  war.^A  million  dollars 
were  supplied  by  the  clergy  to  pay  for  a  campaign.^)  Paredes 
obtained  permission  to  command  the  army  in  person,  and  his 
intention  to  do  so  was  publicly  announced.20 
(but  as  usual  the  war  plans  ended  mostly  in  talk.  Except 
aV"the  far  distant  .north,  denunciation  of  the  United  States 
moderated  somewhat\nd  even  at  Mexico  bragging  lost  a  part 
of  its  flavor ; 19  ye£<4hough  really  discouraged,  pepple  would 
not  recognize  the  war  as  anything  very  serious.  £  After  news 
of  Arista's  defeat  arrived  at  the  capital,  the  shiver  of  astonish- 
ment and  disgust  lasted  for  a  time  n  but  the  glib  fellows  in 
the  cafes  were  soon  remarking,  "Wel£  that's  over;  that  won't 
happen  again."  Explanations  abounded.  After  all,  Arista 
was  only  making  a  reconnaissance  in  force,  it  was  pointed  out. 
"Such  is  the  fortune  of  war;  a  defeat  to-day  and  glory  to- 
morrow," remarked  one  of  the  generals.  The  hour  chosen  by 
Providence  to  give  the  world  a  lesson  by  terribly  punishing 
the  aggressive  Americans  has  not  yet  arrived,  explained  the 
governor  of  San  Luis  Potosi.  Reverses  have  occurred,  but 
they  can  easily  be  repaired  and  will  be,  the  minister  of  war 
assured  Congress  airily ;  and  moreover  the  enemy  had  suffered 
most  severely,  it  was  believed.  Even  the  evacuation  of  Mata- 
moros  was  eclipsed  by  domestic  politics.  The  triangular 
difficulties  between  Scott,  Gaines  and  the  American  govern- 
ment were  cited  as  illustrating  the  state  of  discipline  in  our 
army.  The.  wreck-strewn  coast  near  the  mouth  of  the  Rio 
Grande  and  the  billows  laden  with  boxes  and  barrels  afforded 
no  little  encouragement ;  and  editorials  from  the  London  Times, 
proving  in  detail  the  hopelessness  and  risk  of  an  American 
attack  upon  Mexico,  were  translated  and  printed  by  the  official 
journal.20 


214  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

So  the  nation  took  heart.  Its  case  did  not  look  desperate 
after  all.  Heroics  appeared  unnecessary.  The  military  men 
have  seized  the  country,  thoughtful  citizens  reflected;  let 
them  defend  it.  The  people  did  not  fly  to  arms.  The  depart- 
ments opened  their  strong  boxes  by  only  a  chink  or  not  at  all. 
"A  dreadful  and  cruel  lethargy  has  buried  the  Republic," 
exclaimed  El  Indicador.  How  the  Mexicans  could  be  roused, 
nobody  knew.  To  proclaim  a  levee  en  masse  and.  place  a  weapon 
in  every  hand  seemed  politically  dangerous.  (Paredes,  observ- 
ing that  his  plan  to  go  north  received  the  cordial  endorsement 
of  his  enemies,  and  fully  warned  that  his  departure  would  be  the 
signal  for  an  uprising,  dared  not  set  out;  and  as  for  the  idea 
of  British  aid,  upon  which  great  expectations  had  been  erected, 
the  minister  of  England  gave  lectures  instead  of  promises.20 

Indeed,  Paredes  found  himself  struggling,  not  merely  to 
achieve,  but  even  to  survive.  Knowing  well  that  his  political 
existence  depended  upon  paying  the  army,  he  devoted  all  the 
revenues  to  it  from  the  first,  and  made  every  exertion  to  solve 
the  all-important  problem  of  moneyy  In  March  he  tried  to  bor- 
row heavily  on  the  security  of  Church  property,  but  failed.  In 
May  the  payment  of  all  treasury  obligations  was  suspended,  and 
a  cut  in  pensions  and  salaries  made ;  but  the  principal  results 
were  to  anger  multitudes  already  offended  by  his  economies, 
destroy  credit,  paralyze  business,  and  call  forth  an  emphatic 
protest  from  the  British  legation.  On  the  principle,  perhaps, 
of  setting  a  thief  to  catch  a  thief,  the  cynical  Iturbe,  one  of 
the  corrupt  jobbers  in  government  contracts,  was  appointed 
minister  of  the  treasury;  and  extraordinary  powers  to  raise 
funds  were  conferred  upon  the  President  by  Congress.  But 
this  very  law  shielded  private  and  Church  property,  and  there 
was  no  help  in  laying  taxes  that  could  not  be  collected.  Be- 
sides, the  army  was  now  but  a  fragile  staff.  /  The  defeats  of  the 
north  had  smitten  its  confidence  and  prestige;  being  badly 
paid  it  was  unreliable;  and  it  really  preferred  Santa  Anna, 
the  natural  chief  of  its  unprincipled  and  rapacious  officers.22 

Paredes  counted  upon  the  monarchical  party)  Beyond  a 
doubt  he  aimed  to  place  it  in  power.21  Alaman,  an  avowed 
advocate  of  that  policy,  was  not  only  his  principal  adviser  but 
the  chief  editor  of  a  monarchist  newspaper,  El  Tiempo,  set 
up  at  this  time  and  protected  by  the  government;    and  the 


PAREDES  IN   DIFFICULTIES  215 

conwcatoria  summoning  the  new  Congress,  prepared  by 
Alaman,  pointed  in  the  same  direction.  (But  his  party  had  no 
"substantial  plan,"  as  the  British  minister  well  said,  and  the 
idea  commanded  no  popular  support.  To  the  army  it  meant 
a  permanent  throne  in  the  place  of  a  Presidential  chair  to 
which  every  successful  general  might  aspire,  and  imported 
troops  instead  of  Mexicans  behind  the  foreign  prince  y  while 
the  departments,  under  the  pretence  that  local  interests  were 
neglected  but  mainly  to  facilitate  access  to  the  public  treasury, 
turned  away  from  even  the  idea  of  a  centralized  republic 
toward  a  revival  of  Federalism.  The  convocatoria,  which 
denied  Congressional  representation  to  six  sevenths  of  the 
people,  was  generally  and  furiously  denounced  as  an  open 
rupture  with  the  nation ;  and  Archbishop  Posada,  the  strongest 
support  of  the  monarchists,  fell  sick  and  passed  away.  (Paredes 
found  it  wise,  therefore  —  in  fact,  unavoidable  —  to  declare 
for  the  Republic.  But  his  action  seemed  a  confession  of  weak- 
ness, dishonesty  and  inconsistency)  and  this  impression  was 
deepened  by  a  futile  decree  agatrfst  the  freedom  of  the  press 
and  a  vain  endeavor  to  gain  the  support  of  Pedraza,  who  led 
the  conservative  wing  of  the  Federalists.22 

(Numerous  other  difficulties  embarrassed  the  President.  Like 
all  the  successful  revolutionaryleaders,  he  found  it  impossible  to 
keep  the  promises  he  had  made^)  It  was  complained  that  he  did 
not  protect  northern  Mexico  against  the  Indians.  His  adjust- 
ment of  the  foreign  debt  raised  a  loud  clamor:  Many  charged 
that  his  bringing  the  principal  military  forces  to  the  capital 
had  laid  the  frontier  open  to  the  Americans,  and  he  was  accused 
of  using  them  still  as  his  personal  bodyguard.  The  Army 
of  Reserve  is  too  much  reserved,  cried  the  Monitor  Republicano; 
and  over  and  over  again  the  opposition  press  demanded  that 
he  should  take  the  field,  which  nobody  believed  he  intended 
to  do.22 

By  June  the  spirit  of  revolt,  which  had  shown  itself  early 
in  February,  seemed  formidable.  Almonte,  who  had  left  the 
Cabinet  ostensibly  because  opposed  to  monarchical  designs, 
was  believed  to  be  at  work  for  himself,  and  Santa  Anna  was 
known  to  be  plotting.  The  President's  ability  fell  conspicu- 
ously short  of  his  needs,  and  he  clouded  with  drink  such  talents 
as  he  possessed.     His  weak  and  vacillating  course  fortified 


216  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

every  enemy,  and  estranged  almost  every  sensible  friend ;  and 
it  came  to  be  felt,  even  by  those  hostile  to  the  monarchical 
idea,  that  a  more  energetic  ruler  must  be  found.  In  short, 
six  months  after  taking  the  reins  Paredes  had  no  real  strength 
whatever.  (The  door  stood  actually  ajar  for  a  new  revolution.22/ 
Preparations  for  such  a  change  had  then  been  going  on  for 
a  long  while.  In  the  London  Times  of  February  10,  1846,  its 
correspondent  at  Mexico  had  said  that  Santa  Anna's  coming 
into  power  again  "would  be  regarded  by  all  classes  as  the 
greatest  affliction  that  could  befall  the  nation,"  and  other 
good  observers  entertained  similar  opinions.  The  Federalists 
in  particular  dislike  1  him.  But  on  February  20  a  protest 
of  his  against  monarchical  schemes  appeared  in  print  at  Mexico, 
and  newspapers  were  soon  advocating  his  return.23  Farias, 
leader  of  the  radical  Federalists,  was  easily  won  over  by  a 
patriotic  letter  full  of  penitence  and  unselfish  zeal,  and  with 
Rejon  as  intermediary  an  alliance  of  his  faction  and  the  Santan- 
nistas,  based  upon  the  idea  of  uniting  army  and  people,  was 
at  length,  with  much  difficulty,  brought  about.  Almonte 
joined  the  combination;  by  the  first  of  April  it  planned  to 
"pronounce"  at  Vera  Cruz;  and  although  disagreement 
regarding  the  terms  of  the  plan  and  a  dispute  whether  Santa 
Anna  or  Almonte  should  be  named  the  leader  prevented  this 
action,  Juan  Alvarez,  who  had  been  a  turbulent  partisan 
fighter  in  the  Acapulco  region  ever  since  1821,  and  was  cogni- 
zant of  this  conspiracy,  inaugurated  a  revolution,  April  15, 
in  favor  of  a  provisional  triumvirate :  Santa  Anna,  Herrera 
and  Rincon.26 

Santa  Anna  insisted  upon  his  own  views,  and  Almonte, 
whom  Paredes  appointed  minister  to  France  in  order  to  get 
rid  of  him  and  then  obligingly  detained  at  Havana  by  with- 
holding funds  for  the  journey,  yielded.  In  May  Paredes  put 
Farias  and  fifteen  other  suspected  men  into  prison,  and  this 
enabled  them  to  plot  at  their  leisure.  On  the  twentieth  of 
that  month  all  the  scheming  came  to  a  head  at  Guadalajara, 
where  the  people  cried,  "Viva  la  Republica!  Death  to  the 
foreign  prince ! "  The  officers  despatched  against  them  proved 
unsuccessful.24  The  country  was  soon  like  a  tossing  sea ;  and 
insurrections,  attempted  or  planned,  showed  themselves  at 
various  places.26 


PAREDES  OVERTHROWN  217 

The  government  now  proceeded  to  commit  suicide.  Pared es 
announced  that  he  was  going  to  make  his  long  deferred  cam- 
paign against  the  Americans.  About  4000  troops  marched 
for  the  north  —  really  destined,  it  was  believed,  for  Guada- 
lajara —  and  near  the  end  of  July  Vice  President  Bravo  re- 
luctantly accepted  the  reins  of  government.  It  was  hoped 
to  rally  the  conservatives  to  his  support,  and  to  that  end  he 
proclaimed  on  August  3  the  revival  of  the  constitution  {Organic 
Bases)  that  had  been  in  force  during  the  Presidency  of  Herrera, 
while  urgent  appeals  for  union  and  harmony  were  put  forth 
by  the  new  ministers.  It  was  hoped  also  to  conclude  the  war. 
Paredes  had  wished  to  do  this  in  May,  and  a  member  of  the 
Cabinet  had  indirectly  proposed  to  Consul  Black  that  a  minister 
should  be  sent  by  the  United  States;  but  the  government 
finally  concluded  that  the  matter  was  "too  delicate."  The 
new  Executive,  however,  had  not  committed  himself  in  favor 
of  war  as  the  President  had,  and  it  was  understood  that  his 
administration  fully  intended  to  end  the  conflict.26 

Bravo's  course  alarmed  the  conspirators,  for  many  of  the 
Federalists,  besides  distrusting  Santa  Anna,  believed  the 
Organic  Bases  could  be  made  over  into  a  satisfactory  con- 
stitution. Nobody  felt  sure,  however,  that  such  was  the  real 
intention  of  Paredes;  the  new  Cabinet  did  not  please  the 
radicals  /  the  revolution  had  gone  so  far  it  could  not  easily 
be  stopped ;  and  when  word  came  on  the  third  of  August 
that  the  garrison  of  Vera  Cruz  had  pronounced  for  Santa 
Anna,)  General  Salas,  the  comandante  general  at  Mexico, 
who-was  believed  to  be  a  firm  supporter  of  the  government, 
declared  at  the  "citadel"  the  following  night  —  with  the 
concurrence  of  Farias  —  for  Santa  Anna  and  federation, 
citing  particularly  as  excuses  the  monarchical  designs- of  the 
administration  and  its  failure  to  prosecute  the  war.  (  Paredes, 
who  had  remained  secretly  in  town,  hastily  set  on* now  to 
bring  back  his  troops ;  but  the  second  in  command  of  his  escort 
betrayed  himJand,  overtaken  by  a  cavalry  regiment  despatched 
by  Salas,  the  man  who  had  boasted  that  at  any  rate  his  fall 
would  be  no  comedy,  was  brought  back  to  town  by  the  ear,  so 
to  speak,  like  a  truant  schoolboy.26 

Bravo,  having  few  men  and  no  artillery,  could  not  resist, 
and  his  retirement  on  the  sixth  of  August  left  Salas  in  supreme 


218  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

de  facto  command,25  pledged  only  to  carry  on  the  war  against 
the  United  States  and  assemble  Congress,  but  really  destined, 
as  his  organ  modestly  assured  an  indifferent  public,  to  open 
"a  new  epoch,  an  epoch  of  liberty,  of  movement  and  of  life, 
an  epoch  of  deeds  and  realities  and  not  of  fraudulent  and  vain 
promises."  "Federation,  Santa  Anna  and  Texas,"  was  his 
motto.  An  abundance  of  reassuring  laws,  and  especially  the 
annulment  of  all  edicts  repressing  the  liberty  of  the  newspapers, 
a  restoration  of  curtailed  pensions  and  salaries,  and  the  procla- 
mation of  a  political  amnesty  relieved  anxious  minds ;  and  the 
spring  of  patriotism  was  touched  by  summoning  all  Mexicans 
to  unite  against  the  invader.  Salas,  however,  counted  only 
as  a  herald ;  it  was  time  for  the  hero  to  appear.26 

Early  in  the  forenoon  on  the  sixteenth  of  August,  a  salvo 
of  artillery  from  the  fortress  of  Uliia  at  Vera  Cruz  announced 
the  advent  of  something  unusual.  At  about  nine  o'clock 
a  "crack"  regiment,  the  Eleventh  Infantry,  marched  down  to 
the  customhouse,  and  after  manoeuvring  for  some  hours 
was  formed  by  dint  of  cuffing  into  two  lines,  which  faced  each 
other  and  extended  to  the  "Palace";  and  finally,  at  a  quarter 
before  one,  a  well-groomed  and  somewhat  portly  man  in  the  full 
uniform  of  a  Mexican  major  general  came  up  from  the  wharf 
between  the  lines.  He  stood  about  G.\e  feet  and  ten  inches  in 
height,  looked  forty  years  old  though  really  fifty-one,  seemed 
capable  of  great  endurance,  and  bore  himself  with  an  air  of 
blended  suavity  and  command.  "The  Flower  of  Mexico," 
a  very  young  and  very  pretty  little  blonde,  his  wife,  preceded 
him  on  the  arm  of  an  officer,  and  a  retinue  followed  in  his 
wake.28 

The  guns  of  Ulua  boomed  again;  such  of  the  soldiers  as 
chose,  fired  their  muskets  or  saluted;  but  not  a  viva  was 
heard.  The  young  and  pretty  woman  pouted  at  the  cool 
reception.  The  glittering  dark-gray  eyes  of  her  husband 
clouded;  his  dignified  and  courtly  manner  seemed  a  little 
disturbed ;  and  his  tawny  face,  whereon  a  studied  graciousness 
and  self-control  could  not  hide  from  a  close  observer  the  marks 
of  duplicity,  treachery,  avarice  and  sensuality,  seemed  to  grow 
black.  But  he  went  on  to  the  palace ;  and  presently,  as  he  sat 
there  surrounded  by  officers  in  more  or  less  brilliant  uniforms, 
a  tinman,  speaking  in  the  name  of  the  people,  lectured  him 


SANTA  ANNA'S  RETURN  TO  MEXICO  219 

roundly  on  his  past  misdeeds.  (^Such  was  the  home-coming 
of  "The  Illustrious  General,  Benemerito  de  la  Patria,  the 
Most  Excellent  Sefior,  Don  Antonio  Lopez  de  Santa  Anna,"./ 
"Champion  of  Independence,  Hero  of  Tampico,  Tmmoffal 
Commander,"  as  he  was  officially  styled ; 27  and  such  was 
"the  most  pronounced  enthusiasm"  with  which,  according  to 
Almonte,  the  people  received  him.28 

Santa  Anna  put  forth  at  once  an  allocution  to  the  troops, 
which  exhibited  in  proper  style  the  ecstatic  joy  that  he  ex- 
perienced on  finding  himself  among  such  devoted  patriots; 
and  a  manifesto,  composed  by  Rejon,  laid  his  programme 
before  the  public.  The  latter  address  rambled  somewhat, 
and  even  J.  F.  Ramirez  said  he  could  not  gather  its  meaning; 
but  it  declared  plainly  against  monarchy  and  ecclesiastical 
domination.  "Habits  of  passive  obedience  no  longer  exist," 
the  paper  said ;  "  and  if  there  remains  a  sentiment  of  religion, 
dnie  has  undermined  the  power  of  the  directors  of  consciences. " 
(Peace,  democracy  and  "the  concert  of  the  army  and  the 
people"  were  said  to  be  the  General's  political  principles,  and 
he  declared  himself  "the  slave  of  public  opinion."  \As  for 
the  past,  his  mistakes  as  a  ruler  had  been  due  to  circumstances 
and  errors  of  judgment;  and  in  regard  to  the  future,  "Mexi- 
cans," he  exclaimed,  "there  was  a  day,  and  my  heart  expands 
with  the  recollection,  when,  leading  forward  the  popular 
masses  and  the  army  to  demand  the  rights  of  the  nation,  I 
was  hailed  by  you  with  the  enviable  title,  Soldier  of  the  People. 
Allow  me  again  to  take  it,  nevermore  to  be  given  up,  and  to 
devote  myself,  until  death,  to  the  defence  of  the  liberty  and 
independence  of  the  republic."  At  the  same  time,  as  a  pledge 
of  sincerity,  he  advised  restoring  the  federal  constitution  of  1824, 
and  giving  the  new  Congress  full  control  over  the  executive.28 

Having  thus  placed  himself  before  the  country,  Santa  Anna 
proceeded  to  his  pretty  house  at  Manga  de  Clavo,  about 
sixteen  miles  from  Vera  Cruz,  and  thence  to  his  more  preten- 
tious country-seat,  El  Encero,  a  little  way  below  Jalapa. 
By  this  time  —  so  it  was  reported  to  excuse  the  suspension 
of  his  journey  and  perhaps  to  remind  the  public  of  his  part 
in  the  war  with  France  —  the  stump  of  his  leg  had  become 
painful;  but  in  reality  he  paused  to  consider  the  situation. 
In  that  he  did  well.     His  position  was  extremely  critical.28 


220  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

Santa  Anna  did  not  merely  enjoy  an  occasional  game  of 
chance;  he  was  a  gambler  through  and  through.  He  did  not 
merely  stoop  now  and  then  to  see  two  game  birds  prove  their 
mettle ;  he  was  essentially  a  "  sporting  man."  Not  without  rea- 
son did  the  London  Atlas  refer  to  him  as  "  that  very  sorry  hero 
but  most  determined  cock-fighter."  Possessing  the  strong, 
he  possessed  also  the  weak  points  of  this  type.  He  was  not 
only  uneducated,  but  incapable  of  study.  He  could  improvise 
variations  on  a  given  theme  with  astonishing  volubility, 
throwing  back  —  wonderfully  elaborated  —  an  idea  suggested 
to  him ;  but  he  was  not  a  thinker.  He  could  shuffle  and  deal 
current  political  notions  most  shrewdly,  but  his  only  principle, 
either  political  or  moral,  was  that  having  accidentally  pro- 
claimed the  republic  of  Mexico,  he  owned  it.  He  understood 
the  shallow  and  selfish  manoeuvres  in  the  midst  of  which  he 
lived,  but  had  no  deep  insight,  and  found  it  much  easier  to  do 
things  than  to  perceive  what  needed  to  be  done.  His  power 
to  dupe  others  grew  mainly,  perhaps,  from  being  a  dupe  him- 
self. He  was  in  statesmanship  only  by  force  of  circumstances ; 
and  he  always  hated  a  business  like  that,  for  it  perplexed  and 
wearied  his  passionate,  untrained  character.  In  a  critical 
Mexican  situation  his  narrow  but  intense  perspicacity,  his 
unreflecting  but  unequalled  quickness,  his  reckless  but  in- 
genious adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  and  his  magnetic  skill 
in  "reaching"  and  combining  men  governed  by  self-interest 
gave  him  for  the  time  being  an  immense  advantage,  and, 
when  viewed  under  the  dazzling  arc  lights  of  prestige  and 
power,  seemed  truly  brilliant;  but  his  ability  was  essentially 
thin,  short-sighted  and  weak.  Indeed  Consul  Campbell,  who 
saw  him  at  Havana  without  his  trappings,  declared  that 
in  any  American  village  of  a  thousand  persons  he  would  be 
thought  intellectually  feeble.  Intellectually  undeveloped  he 
certainly  was.29 

In  the  present  instance  he  had  supposed  in  the  Mexican 
style  that  a  phrase  was  a  philosophy,  that  a  catchword  was 
a  magical  formula,  that  an  eloquent  peroration  would  be  as 
mighty  after  he  had  been  found  out  as  it  had  been  before, 
that  a  profession  of  repentance  would  erase  long  years  of 
deliberate  bad  conduct ; 30  and  from  the  hour  of  setting  foot 
upon  Mexican  soil  his  mistake  had  been  growing  every  hour 


SANTA   ANNA'S    POLICY  221 

more  evident/  Only  the  army  felt  confidence  in  him,  and  that 
not  altogether>for  he  now'called  himself  a  Federalist,  and  the 
Federalists  aimed  to  substitute  for  the  army  a  citizen  soldiery 
called  the  National  Guard.31  After  the  experience  of  many 
sad  years,  "people"  and  "army"  could  no  more  unite  than 
oil  and  water.  Owing  to  suspicions  that  resembled  those  of 
the  army,  the  moderates  also  held  aloof;  and  although  the 
country  in  general,  aware  of  his  preeminent  energy  and  re- 
sourcefulness and  reduced  to  the  unhappy  necessity  of  fighting 
fire  with  fire,  consented  to  his  resumption  of  power,  it  did  not, 
even  when  somewhat  reassured  by  his  connection  with  Farias, 
trust  him.32  How  can  he  speak  truth  who  has  no  truth  in 
his  heart?  men  asked;  and  he  himself  could  feel  what  the 
answer  was.41 

As  to  Farias  and  his  party  of  extreme  democrats,  who  were 
good  enough  in  Santa  Anna's  opinion  for  servants  but  not  for 
masters,  they  evidently  intended  to  control  him,  which  could 
not  be  tolerated  long;  and  as  to  relations  with  the  United 
States,  the  people  seemed  far  more  bent  upon  war  than  a  mere 
gamester  could  have  supposed.  Moreover,  to  declare  now 
for  peace  33  looked  very  much  like  playing  into  the  hands  of 
ex-President  Herrera,  the  champion  and  martyr  of  that  cause, 
round  whom  an  opposition  party  of  citizens,  military  men  and 
journalists  was  gathering  at  the  capital ;  and  to  do  this  ap- 
peared even  to  endanger  Santa  Anna's  personal  safety,  for  as 
yet  he  was  only  a  returning  exile,  expelled  but  yesterday  from 
the  country  like  a  felon,  and  ordered  never  to  come  back.  The 
civil  authorities  of  the  nation  in  general  seemed  to  be  un- 
friendly; and  the  second  city,  Puebla,  which  lay  across  his 
road  to  Mexico  and  had  the  power  to  wreck  his  cause,  was 
found  to  be  ill-disposed.  Not  only  famous  and  rich,  but 
hardened  by  extraordinary  reverses  —  especially  that  of 
December,  1844  —  he  was  no  longer  the  hopeful,  daring  adven- 
turer. His  wish  now,  as  he  told  an  American  at  this  time, 
was  to  play  a  safe  game.  At  Havana,  so  Campbell  said,  he 
had  not  fathomed  the  crisis,  but  he  now  realized  that  he  was 
treading  the  crust  of  a  volcano.  His  plans  collapsed ;  and 
when  the  government,34  which  had  become  alarmed  by  accounts 
of  his  hesitation,  deputed  Baranda  to  act  as  his  escort  or  custo- 
dian, he  refused  to  move.41 


222  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

He  did,  however,  send  Rejon  and  Almonte  forward  to  help 
guide  Salas,  who  did  not  relish  the  'tutelage  of  Farias ;  and  on 
August  22  with  proper  solemnities  and  a  lavish  ringing  of  bells 
the  federal  constitution  of  1824  came  forth  from  its  tomb.35 
The  people  then  felt  a  little  more  confidence  in  the  future, 
though  Santa  Anna,  if  at  all  able  to  forecast  that  future,  would 
probably  have  felt  less.  (About  a  week  later,  at  his  instance, 
Rejon  was  appointed  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  Almonte 
minister  of  war,  Farias  minister  of  the  treasury,  and  Pacheco 
minister  of  justice  ;36  and  a  broad  scheme  of  war  measures  went 
into  effect.37  A  levy  of  30,000  troops  was  assigned  to  the 
states  in  quotas;)  Guardians  of  the  Peace  were  decreed,  so 
that  all  the  regulars  might  be  able  to  take  the  field;  every 
Mexican  between  the  ages  of  sixteen  and  fifty  was  ordered 
to  be  ready  for  service;  and  steps  were  taken  to  buy  up  the 
weapons  belonging  to  citizens  as  well  as  promote  the  impor- 
tation of  arms.  The  apprehensions  of  the  military  class  had 
recently  been  assuaged  by  declarations  that  the  army  stood 
in  no  danger  of  abolition;  and  they  now  tolerated  not  only 
an  order  to  enroll  National  Guards,  but  an  offer  of  pardon 
to  all  deserting  from  the  regular  corps  within  three  months.41 

While  these  events  were  taking  place,  the  sort  of  ability  that 
Santa  Anna  possessed  and  the  sort  of  advice  that  he  could 
obtain  enabled  hin>~to  decide  firmly  upon  a  policy  for  the 
immediate  future.  (^He  knew  that  no  way  could  be  seen  to 
meet  the  present  embarrassments  of  the  government;  he 
knew  that  the  hot-headed  radicals,  if  given  a  chance,  would 
soon  discredit  themselves;  he  knew  that  whoever  should 
control  the  army  would  be  safe  and  strong ;  and  he  knew  that 
one  victory  over  the  Americans  would  make  him  omnipotent. 
He  determined,  therefore,  to  accept  no  public  share  in  the 
government,  pose  as  the  single-minded  patriot-soldier,  and 
ask  only  the  privilege  of  fighting  at  the  head  of  the  troops. 
At  one  time  he  refused  even  to  enter  the  capital,  but  he  was 
notified  by  the  administration  that  such  marked  aloofness 
from  the  government  would  be  regarded  as  an  open  breach.41 

September  14,  therefore,  after  several  delays  on  his  part, 
the  bell  of  the  cathedral  and  a  salvo  of  artillery  announced 
at  half-past  one  that  the  professional  saviour  of  Mexico,  who 
never  saved  her,  had  entered  the  city.     Everything  possible 


SANTA  ANNA'S  POLICY  223 

was  done  by  the  authorities  to  give  an  appearance  of  concord 
and  enthusiasm.38  Watched  as  he  knew  he  was  by  ostensible 
friends,  Santa  Anna  played  out  his  distasteful  role,  and  so 
did  the  rest  of  the  actors.  Emblems  abounded.  Eloquence 
overflowed.  The  cathedral  chanted  Te  deums.  "Immense 
multitudes"  (hardly  perceived  by  ordinary  observers)  cheered 
incessantly  —  in  the  official  journal.  Not  only  public  but 
private  edifices  were  lavishly  decorated  —  by  order.  A  hired 
band  perambulated  the  streets.  The  General  listened  patiently 
to  a  lecture  from  another  man  of  the  people,  and  replied  with 
edifying  humility;  and  he  asked  that  a  well-known  statue 
of  himself  should  be  replaced  with  the  national  arms.  But 
it  was  noticed  that  he  and  Farias,  facing  each  other  in  the 
carriage  of  honor  under  a  huge  picture  of  the  Constitution, 
looked  more  like  victims  than  victors;  and  he  would  not  be 
present  at  the  grand  banquet.41 

Having  complied  with  the  ultimatum  of  the  government, 
Santa  Anna  was  now,  September  17,  appointed  commander-in- 
chief  of  "The  Liberating  Army."  /\Every  day  that  passes 
without  fighting  at  thenorth  is  a  century  of  disgrace  for  Mex- 
ico," he  then  exclaimeoU  and  although  he  remained  in  Tacu- 
baya,  a  suburb  of  the  capital,  and  was  said  to  be  ill,  he  exerted 
himself  to  forward  troops,  hoping  to  concentrate  25,000  rapidly 
at  San  Luis  Potosi.  Tidings  from  the  seat  of  war  foreshadowed 
a  battle  at  Monterey,  and  increased  his  anxiety.  He  exhorted 
tfye  war  department  unsparingly.41 

I  But  the  government  was  exceedingly  poor.  According  to 
the  Diario  only  1839  pesos  (dollars)  lay  in  its  treasury  on 
September  6.  Voluntary  offerings  for  the  war  took  mostly 
the  form  of  eloquence.39  (The  million  raised  by  Paredes  had 
nearly  vanished  in  his  preparations  and  the  Citadel  revolution.; 
Pressure  was  applied  to  the  clergy,  and  the  Diario  asked,  Is  it 
not  worth  while  for  the  merchant  to  give  100,000  pesos  in 
order  to  save  900,000?  But  both  of  these  classes  held  back 
stubbornly,  and  managed  the  affair  so  as  to  escape.  One 
brigade  formed  on^three  successive  days  to  march,  but  had 
to  wait  for  funds.  C^At  length,  however,  with  extreme  difficulty 
about  90,000  pesos  were  borrowed;  and  on  September  28, 
after  piously  seeking  the  Divine  Blessing  at  Guadalupe,40 
Santa  Anna  with  some  2500  men  set  outN   About  3000  were 


224  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

already  on  their  way,  and  he  expected  to  find  a  large  force 
at  San  Luis  Potosi.41 

As  he  rolled  along  in  his  coach  for  about  380  miles,  drawn 
by  relays  of  fleet  mules,  the  General  probably  congratulated 
himself  upon  his  policy.  He  was  on  living  terms  with  the 
radicals,  had  been  accepted  by  the  Church,  had  soothed  the 
army,  and  through  Pedraza  —  recently  his  enemy  and  still 
the  enemy  of  Farias  —  had  reached  an  understanding  with 
the  Moderados.  Unquestionably  he  stood  much  better  with 
the  public  than  a  month  before ;  and  he  probably  did  not  per- 
ceive that  his  recent  course  had  ensured  for  himself  and  the 
nation  a  series  of  most  unpalatable  surprises.41 

Through  it  all,  however,  the  capital  managed  easily  to  be 
gay,  and  six  "arrogant  bulls"  were  artistically  sacrificed  in 
the  Plaza  de  Toros  on  one  of  these  anxious  days.42 


XI 
TAYLOR  SETS  OUT  FOR  SALTILLO 

June-September,  1846 

f  Arista  had  scarcely  reached  Linares  when  he  began,  though 
he  knew  his  military  standing  had  been  destroyed,  to  rebuild 
the  army.  Mejia  followed  in  his  predecessor's  footsteps,] 
adopted  a  policy  that  was  both  conciliatory  and  stern  to  checK 
desertion  and  bring  offenders  back  to  the  colors,  kept  guards 
out  on  the  roads  leading  to  the  Rio  Grande,  and  exerted  him- 
self to  improve  the  morale  of  his  troops.  Though  Linares 
was  a  central  point  within  easy  reach  of  all  the  principal  towns 
of  northeastern  Mexico,  he  justly  regarded  Monterey,  a  city 
of  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  inhabitants  and  capital  of  Nuevo 
Leon,  as  the  vital  spot,  and  about  the  ninth  of  July  transferred 
his  army  to  that  place.  Desertion  had  now  ceased,  he  reported ; 
morale  had  been  restored ;  and  the  troops  were  described  as 
eager  to  avenge  the  disasters  of  May  8  and  9,  which  in  their 
opinion  "they  had  suffered  but  not  caused."1 

This  view  of  the  situation,  however,  must  be  described  as 
rather  imaginative  and  extremely  incomplete.  It  was  hard 
to  find  money  and  hard  to  find  mounts.  As  late  as  August 
19  Mejia  admitted  that  neither  Mexicans  nor  foreigners  would 
advance  him  funds,  and  even  after  paying  for  horses  he  could 
not  obtain  them.  Two  of  the  governors  in  this  quarter  would 
give  him  no  aid,  and  still  less  were  the  people  inclined  to  rise 
for  the  national  defence.  Both  troops  and  artillery  came  far 
short  of  the  requirements.  Though  Arista  had  called  for 
reinforcements  on  April  24,  not  a  man  from  the  south  had 
arrived  by  August  20.  Including  the  scattered  and  almost 
worthless  Presidials,  the  total  number  of  soldiers  in  the  region 
—  outside  of  Tampico  —  was  less  than  3000,  and  about  one 
third  of  these  could  not  easily  be  concentrated  at  headquarters. 
vol.  i  —  q  225 


226  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Ill-fed,  ill-clothed,  soured  by  misfortune,  smarting  under  the 
general  contempt,  some  desiring  Mejia  and  some  Ampudia 
for  commander,  still  more  wishing  Arista  back,  and  all  wrangling 
bitterly,  even  if  less  bitterly  than  at  first,  over  the  conduct 
of  their  generals  and  officers,  the  army  had  for  chief  a  little, 
pockmarked  man  in  blue  glasses,  who  looked  like  a  sot,  and 
thus  far  in  the  campaign  had  been  distinguished  only  for  bad 
health  and  a  pompous  vocabulary.2 

/Mejia's  plan  was  to  conduct  a  guerilla  warfare,  save  the 
ariny  from  further  disgrace  in  the  field,  and  make  a  stand  at 
Monterey)  General  Canales  and  the  irregulars  were,  there- 
fore, his-^rst  line;  but  the  "Chaparral  Fox,"  who  entertained 
revolutionary  designs  for  which  he  desired  American  support, 
had  managed  so  as  to  do  us  no  harm  in  the  battles  of  May 
8  and  9,  and  proposed  to  continue  that  policy.  Mejia  suspected 
his  intentions,  yet  could  not  prove  him  a  traitor,  and  sent  him 
funds  and  horses  grudgingly;  whereupon  Canales,  protesting 
that  his  loyal  aims  were  paralyzed  by  Mejia's  personal  ill-will 
and  stinginess,  made  the  cause  of  Mexico  odious  by  robbing 
and  outraging  the  people  under  cover  of  her  flag.  At  length, 
early  in  August,  Mejia  concluded  to  give  him  about  a  thousand 
men,  and  ordered  him  to  annoy  the  Americans  in  every  pos- 
sible way ;  but  the  General  reported  that  his  horses  were  too 
weak  to  trot  three  miles,  and  that  he  saw  little  prospect  of 
injuring  or  even  delaying  the  enemy.  In  the  northeast,  there- 
fore, to  all  intents  and  purposes  no  aggressive  Mexican  army 
existed.  The  business  of  the  nation  at  this  time  was  changing 
masters.3 

(  Taylor  intended  to  invade  Mexico,  and  having  been  favored 
Tff  Providence  and  the  government  with  enough  men  and 
supplies,  his  next  need  was  information  regarding  the  enemy, 
the  roads  and  the  towns.  Plenty  of  this  he  could  easily  have 
obtained,  one  must  believe.  A  strong  feeling  against  the 
government  and  even  in  favor  of  joining  hands  with  the  Ameri- 
cans now  prevailed  in  this  quarter ;  and  a  large  number  of  the 
inhabitants  on  the  border,  long  engaged  in  smuggling  operations, 
had  the  training,  as  well  as  the  natural  gifts  of  disloyalty,  daring 
and  secretiveness,  needed  by  the  spy.  A  well-informed  Mexican 
of  this  region  stated  that  some  of  his  fellow-citizens  were  quite 
ready  to  serve  the  Americans  faithfully.    Taylor  could  have 


TAYLOR'S  PROCEEDINGS  227 

made  it  for  their  interest  to  do  so,  and  in  addition  the  circum- 
stances gave  him  countless  hostages  for  their  fidelity.  Scott 
advised  him  to  employ  a  large  force  of  secret  agents  in  a  sys- 
tematic way.  But  this  was  not  done,  and  his  information 
continued  to  be  meagre.4 

Another  subject  of  prime  importance  was,  of  course,  the  means 
of  transportation.  Taylor  had,  as  we  have  seen,  a  large  outfit 
of  wagons,  but  not  enough  of  them  for  the  expedition  in  view. 
A  train  of  pack-mules  was  the  natural  supplement.  Those 
animals  were  almost  universally  employed  in  Mexico;  the 
country  abounded  in  them ;  and  it  was  the  General's  obvious 
duty  to  use  the  facilities  within  his  reach.  At  Washington 
the  practice  of  the  region  was  understood,  and  it  could  only  be 
inferred  that  good  wagon  roads  did  not  exist.  Besides,  Taylor 
intimated  that  he  expected  to  follow  the  usual  system,  and 
indeed  he  was  not  aware  until  August  that  army  wagons  could 
be  used  where  he  intended  to  go.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  by  the  first  of  that  month  fully  3000  pack-mules  could 
have  been  at  his  command.  Under  such  circumstances,  to 
suppose  the  war  department  would  expend  a  million  dollars 
or  so  in  the  manufacture  of  wagons,  without  having  a  requisition 
from  the  army  or  even  definite  information  as  to  Taylor's 
plans,  went  beyond  reason.  But  the  matter  was  overlooked 
at  the  front ;  and  finally,  gathering  barely  1700  of  those  animals 
Taylor  complained  loudly,  though  he  himself  recognized  that 
the  fate  of  the  administration  depended  upon  the  success  of 
the  war,  that  departmental  neglect  had  inexcusably  delayed 
and  crippled  his  advance.5 

Still,  the  General"  decided  to  move,  for  he  knew  the  public 
demanded  action;  and  he  wished  —  as  he  said  —  to  sustain 
the  government.  Indeed,  he  now  declared  it  necessary  to  go 
forward  immediately,  "be  the  consequences  what  they  may." 
"I  must  attempt  something,"  he  wrote  privately.  The  govern- 
ment, however,  had  not  requested  him  to  support  the  adminis- 
tration or  to  incur  such  a  risk;  and  Taylor  — who  stood  con- 
spicuous now  in  the  Whig  party,  and  suspected  that  "Polk, 
Marcy  and  Co."  were  aiming  to  discredit  and  ruin  him  —  can 
scarcely  have  felt  a  passionate  desire  to  sustain  them.  In 
short,  as  may  be  inferred  from  his  correspondence,  he  under- 
stood that  he  himself  was  the  person  chiefly  blamed  by  the 


228  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

country  for  inactivity;  and,:  assuming  that  no  serious  re- 
sistance would  be  encountered  he  determined  —  primarily, 
it  would  appear,  for  his  own  sake  —  to  occupy  Monterey 
and  Saltillo.  Nj  For  the  head  of  an  invading  army,  both  the 
motive  and^tne  assumption  were  somewhat  improper.6 

He  understood,  however,  that  resistance  might  possibly 
be  offered,  and  for  that  his  plan  seems  to  have  been  ready. 
As  early  as  the  middle  of  June  there  were  at  his  disposal  ten 
18-pound  siege  guns,  two  10-inch  mortars  and  four  24-pound 
howitzers;  and  we  know  that  at  least  the  mortars  and  half 
a  dozen  of  the  18-pounders  were  then  at  Fort  Brown.  Before 
July  some  of  the  howitzers  were  certainly  at  Point  Isabel. 
It  was  entirely  feasible  to  carry  heavy  ordnance  to  Monterey, 
for  Santa  Anna  did  a  much  harder  job  of  the  same  kind ;  and 
Engineer  Sanders  had  warned  Taylor  that  field  pieces  would 
not  be  effective  against  the  stone  houses  of  Mexican  towns. 
But,  probably  quite  unaware  how  much  the  moral  effect 
produced  by  his  guns  on  May  8  had  contributed  to  his  victory 
the  following  day,  he  seems  to  have  retained  his  low  opinion 
of  artillery.  Even  while  Taylor  was  protesting  against  the 
number  of  volunteers  thrown  upon  him,  Ridgely  complained 
bitterly  that  he  could  not  get  enough  men  for  his  battery. 
The  cold  steel  —  simple,  direct,  positive,  unflinching  —  was 
a  weapon  such  as  Taylor  could  understand.  One  required 
no  book  learning  to  use  that.  And  no  doubt  he  already  in- 
tended, as  we  know  he  intended  later,  to  overcome  resistance 
at  Monterey,  should  any  be  offered,  "pretty  much  with  the 
bayonet."  7 

Careful  attention  was  paid  to  the  choice  of  a  route.  That 
through  Cadereita  offered  the  better  grazing ;  but  the  General 
wisely  determined  to  march  by  way  of  Mier  and  Cerralvo, 
a  distance  believed  to  be  140  miles  but  in  reality  only  about  125. 
This  route  was  a  little  shorter  and  better  provided  with  water. 
The  roads  were  much  more  satisfactory.  The  problem  of 
crossing  the  San  Juan  without  boats  or  graded  approaches 
did  not  present  itself.  The  groves  and  ravines  where  an  enemy 
could  make  trouble  were  few,  and  but  one  stream  had  to  be 
forded.  On  August  19,  therefore,  Brevet  Brigadier  General 
Worth,  commanding  the  Second  Division  of  regulars,  crossed 
the  river  with  his  first  brigade  over  a  bridge  of  steamboats, 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  AMERICANS  229 

and  moved  off  to  establish  a  depot  at  Cerralvo,  about  sixty 
miles  away.  All  the  pack-mules,  which  were  to  return  under 
escort  and  make  a  second  trip,  accompanied  the  troops.  Briga- 
dier General  Persifor  F.  Smith  and  the  second  brigade, 
Brigadier  General  Twiggs  with  the  First  Division  of  regulars 
and  about  180  wagons,  and  Major  General  W.  O.  Butler  with 
a  "Field  Division"  of  volunteers  followed.  September  5 
headquarters  moved,  and  in  a  day  or  two  the  last  of  the  men 
belonging  to  the  expedition  set  out.8 

The  advance  to  Cerralvo  did  not  prove  entirely  agreeable. 
At  first  there  was  trouble  because  the  mules  could  not  be 
loaded  until  after  daybreak,  and  it  was  hard  for  the  troops 
to  march  during  the  hot  hours;  but  after  a  little  experience 
the  troops  moved  off  at  about  three  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
and  the  train  proceeded  later  under  escort.  The  road  proved 
to  be  full  of  sharp  stones  most  of  the  way ;  and  everything  — 
even  the  frogs  and  the  grass  —  had  thorns,  reported  the  sol- 
diers. Although,  as  Worth  said,  there  was  no  dangerous  lack 
of  water,  the  men  suffered  not  a  little  during  a  part  of  the  time. 
Some  almost  raved  from  thirst,  and  brushing  the  yellow  scum 
aside,  would  drink  eagerly  from  any  pool.  The  heat  baked 
them,  and  in  spite  of  wet  cotton  in  their  caps  a  considerable 
number  were  overcome.  Mier,  the  only  town  of  any  impor- 
tance on  the  route,  proved  to  be  the  roughest  and  gloomiest 
sort  of  a  place.  Gloomy,  too,  was  the  long  line  of  wooden 
crosses  beside  the  road,  for  every  one  marked  a  grave,  and 
not  a  few  signified  a  murder.  After  a  while,  however,  came 
the  inspiring  sight  of  distant  mountains  —  the  fantastic,  pale- 
blue  summits  of  the  Sierra  Madre,  which  rose  higher  and  stood 
out  more  boldly  day  by  day;  and  the  occasional  inhabitants 
appeared,  as  Worth  reported,  "cordial  in  the  highest  degree.,,  9 

Particularly  sunny  were  the  Mexican  smiles  at  beautiful 
Cerralvo,  where  the  advance  arrived  at  noon,  August  25; 
and  there"  were  still  more  substantial  reasons  for  satisfaction. 
The  town,  a  place  of  some  1800  people,  was  built  of  stone,  and 
hence  formed  a  strong  military  position.  It  had  enough 
springs  of  excellent  water  to  supply  New  York  City,  declared 
Taylor.  Standing,  all  in  white,  on  a  ridge  at  the  foot  of  a 
spur  from  the  Sierra  Madre,  surrounded  with  groves,  pastures 
and  fields,  it  gave  promise  of  abundance  and  kept  the  promise. 


230  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Sheep,  cattle  and  goats,  watermelons,  pecans,  half  a  dozen 
delicious  fruits,  ample  grazing,  and  large  stores  of  corn  were 
to  be  had,  and  plenty  of  oak,  walnut,  ebony,  cypress  and  willow 
for  the  cooks'  fires.  By  the  morning  of  September  15,  with 
the  exception  of  the  Texas  contingent,  which  had  marched  by 
way^of  China  and  Cadereita,  all  the  troops  concentrated  here.10 
Mexico,  anticipating  Taylor's  advance,  had  now  taken  steps 
to  meet  it.,  In  July  Paredes  had  sent  three  brigades  of  regulars 
from  the'  capital  to  operate  against  the  revolutionists  of  Guada- 
lajara, and  on  August  6  these  were  ordered  to  Monterey. 
Ampudia,  who  was  to  supersede  Mejia,  received  instructions 
to  make  haste;  and  the  commander  of  the  third  brigade,  on 
leaving  San  Luis  Potosi,  went  so  far  as  to  destroy  all  baggage 
that  could  hinder  the  march.  News  of  the  revolution,  which 
overtook  these  forces  tardily,  delayed  the  advance,  for  of 
course  many  of  the  officers  felt  they  must  "pronounce";  and 
almost  the  whole  of  one  brigade,  abandoning  their  general, 
went  back  to  Mexico.  The  number  deserting  was  quite  serious, 
for  besides  the  usual  reasons  for  leaving  a  distasteful  service, 
the  troops  were  alarmed  by  the  prospect  of  real  fighting,  and 
the  sombre  monotony  of  the  deserts  that  had  to  be  crossed 
disheartened  them.11 

But  on  August  29  the  first  brigade,  about  1400  infantry 
with  three  8-pounders,  arrived  at  Monterey.  The  second 
came  on  September  6,  and  the  third  only  a  few  days  later. 
The  garrison  was  now  strong.  Mejia  had  concentrated  some 
4000  regulars  and  auxiliaries,  and  according  to  the  detailed 
official  report  there  were  in  all,  on  September  10,  7303  officers 
and  men.  The  arrival  of  the  new  forces  greatly  encouraged 
the  soldiers  of  Palo  Alto  and  the  Resaca  —  who  had  felt  little 
desire  to  meet  the  Americans  again  —  and  hence  checked  their 
deserting.  As  the  cavalry  had  now  been  re-mounted,  it  seemed 
likely  to  be  efficient;  and  when  the  Senorita  Dosamantes, 
equipped  as  a  captain,  volunteered  to  fight  the  invader,  and  was 
exhibited  on  horseback  to  the  entire  army,  its  enthusiasm  rose 
high-11 
(  From  the  forced  march  of  Ampudia  and  his  troops  one  might 
infer  that  the  government  had  positively  decided  to  make  a 
stand  at  Monterey,  but  such  was  by  no  means  the  fact.  Be- 
fore leaving  Vera  Cruz  and  again  later  Santa  Anna  warned 


MEXICAN  PLANS  231 

both  Salas  and  the  minister  of  war  emphatically  against  this 
idea,  and  on  August  20  Ampudia  was  therefore  notified  that 
unless  Mejia's  troops  and  the  fortifications  were  certainly 
of  sufficient  strength  to  check  the  enemy,  he  should  "on  no 
account  risk  an  action."  Three  days  later  the  department 
informed  him  that  (the  general-in-chief  was  "convinced"  that 
Monterey  could  not  be  defended,  and  that  his  forces  were 
"not  strong  enough  to  resist  the  Americans";  and  in  view 
of  this  opinion  he  was  directed  to  halt  at  Saltillo,  and  order 
Mejia  by  special  express  to  demolish  his  fortifications,  and 
remove  his  army  and  military  effects  to  that  city  "without 
loss  of  time"  —  the  purpose  of  the  government  being  "to 
gather  an  army  capable  of  winning  a  victory)  without  risking 
thejionor  and  great  interests  of  the  nation."1* 

(The  new  commander  at  the  north,  however,  was  doubtless 
thinking  for  himself.  In  view  of  Santa  Anna's  purpose  to 
organize  a  grand  army  under  his  personal  orders,  this  was 
Ampudia's  last  opportunity  to  shine  independently,  and  he 
did  not  wish  to  lose  it.  On  learning  the  strength  of  Mejia's 
and  Taylor's  armies  and  the  condition  of  the  fortifications, 
he  believed  he  could  not  only~jrepulse  the  Americans  but  drive 
them  beyond  the  Rio  Grande.)  Mejia  took  the  ground  that 
it  would  be  dishonorable  to  give  up  Monterey  and  the  pass 
between  that  city  and  Saltillo  without  a  fight,  and  that  it 
might  be  very  hard  to  recover  the  road  through  the  mountains 
after  giving  the  Americans  an  opportunity  to  fortify  it.  His 
officers,  who  met  by  Ampudia's  order  in  a  council  of  war, 
appear  to  have  shared  this  opinion;  and  the  comandante 
general  of  Nuevo  Leon,  "as  a  Mexican  and  an  officer  in  the 
national  army,"  protested  "before  God  and  men"  against 
the  instructions  to  retreat,  leaving  twenty  guns  that  could 
not  be  taken  away,,  and  permitting  the  enemy  to  triumph 
"without  hearing  a  shot  from  the  Mexican  arms."  So  the 
die  was  cast ;  and(on  learning  of  Ampudia's  decision,  together 
with  his  reasons,  tne~ war  department  endorsed  it.13.; 

On  reaching  the  ground,  Ampudia  proceeded  to  inspect 
Mejia's  works.  The  importance  of  erecting  fortifications 
at  Monterey  had  been  clearly  seen.  May  27  the  minister  of 
war  gave  orders  accordingly,  and  Mejia  promptly  sent  an 
engineer  there  to  reconnoitre  and  draw  a  plan.     Since,  however, 


232 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


\ 


he  could  not  afford  to  hire  or  even  feed  laborers,  only  soldiers 
carried  on  the  work,  and  little  was  accomplished  before  the 
end  of  July;  but  people  were  then  required  to  labor  without 
pay,  and  the  progress  became  more  rapid.  Ampudia  now 
brought  men  from  the  neighboring  towns  also ;  and  Monterey, 
excited  by  the  news  of  Taylor's  advance,  became  a  hive  of 
industry.14 

The  opportunities  for  defence  were  excellent.     Lying  en- 
compassed —  except  on  the  north  and  east  —  with  steep,  high 


spurs  of  the  Sierra  Madre,  where  the  Saltillo  road  and  the 
small  but  swift  Santa  Catarina  River  debouched  from  Rinco- 
nada  Pass,  the  city  formed  a  sort  of  rectangle  somewhat  more 
than  a  mile  in  length  from  east  to  west  and  about  nine  squares 
wide  at  the  broadest.  Only  a  short  distance  from  the  western 
end  rose  high  and  steep  foothills,  and  some  of  these  were  now 
crowned  with  redoubts.  Along  the  southern  side  the  river 
and  its  high,  rough  bank  were  almost  a  sufficient  protection; 
but  they  were  supplemented  with  fortified  buildings  and  yard 
walls,  barricades  at  the  ends  of  the  streets,  and  for  about  half 
the  way  a  solid  parapet.15 

The  eastern  part  of  the  town  was  given  special  attention, 
for  here  entered  the  principal  roads  from  the  north.  In  the 
city  proper  nearly  all  the  streets  ran  straight  either  at  right 
angles  or  parallel,  and  in  each  of  the  central  ones  now  rose  a 


MONTEREY   MADE   READY  FOR  DEFENCE        233 

double  line  of  overlapping  barricades  or  breastworks  of 
masonry,  provided  with  embrasures  and  with  ditches.  Outside 
these  a  series  of  redoubts  was  constructed ;  and  wherever  the 
enemy  seemed  likely  to  come,  the  houses  —  almost  always  one 
story  high  —  were  loopholed  and  provided  with  ammunition. 
As  they  had  been  constructed  very  solidly  of  rubble-work, 
were  protected  with  strong  doors  and  iron-barred  windows, 
and  had  flat  roofs  (azoteas)  defended  with  sand-bags  in  addition 
to  their  stone  parapets,  they  were  veritable  fortresses.  At 
the  heart  of  the  town  stood  the  cathedral  with  its  elaborately 
carved  facade,  a  chime  in  one  spire  and  in  the  other  a  clock. 
This  became  the  general  magazine.  In  front  of  it  was  the  main 
plaza,  bounded  on  the  western  side  by  the  prison ;  and  beyond 
the  prison  lay  the  market  square.15 

The  north  side  of  the  town  had  even  stronger  protection. 
Within  12-pounder  range  of  almost  every  part  of  the  city  stood 
a  solid  pile  of  masonry,  twenty-five  or  thirty  feet  high,  blackened 
by  time.  This  was  an  unfinished  cathedral;  and,  taking  it 
as  a  donjon,  Mejia's  engineers  threw  round  its  columns  and 
buttresses  a  quadrangular  bastioned  earthwork,  intended  for 
about  thirty  guns.  The  high  parapet,  eleven  and  a  half  feet 
thick,  was  faced  on  both  sides  with  a  soft  gray  tufa,  in  which 
cannon  balls  were  expected  to  embed  themselves.  The  ditch, 
though  not  wide  enough  and  not  completely  excavated,  was 
twelve  feet  deep.  A  garrison  of  four  hundred  with  eight  guns 
occupied  the  position ;  and  although  the  two  small  magazines 
were  not  adequately  protected  against  falling  projectiles, 
and  still  other  faults  could  be  pointed  out  by  an  expert,  this 
fort,  comjnonly  known  as  the  citadel,  was  a  powerful  work, 
and,  standing  on  a  slight  elevation,  it  could  sweep  the  roads 
and  the  plain  east  and  north  of  the  town.  A  sort  of  telegraph 
enabled  its  commander,  Colonel  Uraga,  to  communicate  with 
headquarters.16 

Plenty  of  ammunition  and  an  adequate  store  of  provisions 
were  accumulated.  General  Requena  labored  indefatigably 
in  repairing  discarded  cannon,  and  about  forty  guns  were  found 
available.  American  deserters,  who  either  had  been  or  had 
become  skilful  gunners,  were  on  hand  to  point  some  of  them. 
There  was  one  capital,  underlying  defect  in  the  whole  plan 
of  defence.     To  hold  all  the  works  firmly  required  a  much 


234  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

larger  garrison  than  Ampudia  had.  More  or  less  clearly  the 
mistake  was  understood ;  but  the  active  cooperation  of  the 
cavalry  and  the  reserves  was  expected  to  offset  it.17 

Santa  Anna's  policy  was  not  merely  to  give  up  indefensible 
towns,  and  he  ordered  Ampudia  to  drive  away  all  cattle  that 
the  Americans  might  otherwise  obtain,  destroy  provisions 
and  make  the  water  supply  useless  whenever  a  place  had  to 
be  abandoned,  besides  urging  the  inhabitants  to  leave  their 
homes  on  Taylor's  approach,  so  as  to  show  the  Americans  and 
the  world  that  Mexico  could  never  be  subdued ;  and  Ampudia 
not  only  endeavored  to  execute  these  instructions,  but  adopted 
measures  of  his  own  to  supplement  the  efforts  of  his  troops. 
The  people  were  ordered  to  intercept  messengers  and  convoys, 
capture  small  parties,  and  in  every  possible  way  imitate  the 
royalists  of  Spain,  who  had  made  the  soldiers  of  Napoleon 
so  much  trouble.  Martial  law  went  into  effect,  and  thus 
in  addition  to  other  advantages  the  authority  of  the  indifferent 
or  disloyal  governor  was  obliterated.18 

Disloyalty  and  indifference  among  the  people  were  combated 
at  the  same  time,  as  Ampudia  informed  the  government,  by 
a  twofold  policy  of  "moderation"  and  "decisive  energy," 
in  which  the  second  ingredient  appeared  the  more  conspicuous. 
All  the  citizens  of  the  region  received  a  summons  to  come  and 
help  defend  the  nation.  Notice  was  publicly  given  that  any 
person  voluntarily  affording  the  enemy  direct  or  indirect  aid 
would  be  shot;  everybody  was  required  to  denounce  offences 
of  this  kind ;  and  all  authorities  were  ordered  to  inflict  the 
penalty.  A  circular  in  English  inviting  Americans  to  desert  met 
our  troops,  and  the  inhabitants  were  directed  to  succor  and 
protect  all  such  repentant  foes.  Taylor  had  but  a  few  regulars, 
Ampudia  proclaimed,  and  the  rest  of  his  army  was  "a  mob 
of  adventurers  without  valor  or  discipline."  Moreover  the 
sacred  cause  of  independence  itself  appealed  for  support,  and 
could  not  be  ignored.  "Soldiers,"  he  cried,  "Victory  or  death 
must  be  our  only  motto."  Thanks  to  this  vigorous  policy 
and  the  increased  numbers  of  the  army  at  Monterey,  by  the 
middle  of  September  the  temper  of  the  people  towards  the 
Americans  noticeably  changed.19 

In  other  respects,  however,  the  General  did  not  feel  so  well 
pleased.     In  person  large  and  strong,  with  a  soldierly  mustache 


AMPUDIA  UNDER  A  CLOUD  235 

and  goatee  and  a  martial  bearing,  he  figured  well  on  horseback ; 
but  he  was  really  small  and  mean,  and  his  measure  had  been 
taken.  His  obtaining  the  command  of  the  army  —  first  at 
Matamoros  and  again  recently  —  through  political  intrigue 
was  fairly  well  understood.  Many  attributed  the  disaster 
of  May  9  to  his  machinations  against  Arista.  A  dominant 
regard  for  personal  safety  was  known  to  be  one  of  his  charac- 
teristics. His  chief  distinction,  said  the  British  minister  at 
Mexico,  arose  from  acts  of  violence  done  in  abuse  of  power, 
and  he  now  acted  out  his  disposition.  However  the  general 
public  might  be  deceived,  such  a  man  could  not  impress  the 
officers  by  talking  about  a  sacred  cause  and  "victory  or  death" ; 
and  old  personal  animosities  against  him  supplemented  the 
want  of  confidence  based  on  public  grounds.  One  of  the 
officers  wrote  bluntly  to  him  that  the  disgust  and  discourage- 
ment produced  by  the  news  of  his  appointment  could  be  seen 
plainly  on  the  faces  of  nearly  all.  Complaints  against  him 
were  forwarded  to  the  government.  The  press  voiced  this 
hostile  sentiment,  and  fresh  enmities  were  rapidly  engendered.20 

Nor  did  military  affairs  prosper  very  well.  The  funds  were 
scanty,  and  that  state  of  things  could  not  fail  to  cause  dis- 
satisfaction. Ampudia's  appointing  Ramirez,  who  understood 
tactics  but  not  engineering,  to  supervise  the  construction  of 
works  met  with  disapproval.  Numerous  changes  of  policy 
had  a  similar  reception.  At  first  he  adopted  Mejia's  plan  of 
attempting  nothing  serious  in  the  field,  and  then  he  decided 
to  meet  the  enemy  at  Marin,  some  twenty  miles  from  the 
city.  A  council  was  held ;  and  finally,  as  most  of  the  officers 
opposed  this  project,  it  was  given  up.  Then  another  council 
decided  to  abandon  certain  incomplete  fortifications  between 
the  citadel  and  the  western  defences;  and  at  the  instance  of 
Ramirez  a  very  important  fort,  the  Teneria  redoubt  at  the 
eastern  end  of  the  town,  was  demolished.  Such  vacillation 
and  such  waste,  both  moral  and  material,  undermined  the 
courage  and  confidence  of  the  garrison  and  stimulated  its 
dissensions.21 

At  Cadereita,  August  31,  there  were  a  thousand  regular 
cavalry,  and  they  were  ordered  to  attack  five  hundred  Texan 
horse  then  at  China;  but  they  accomplished  nothing.  The 
Americans  march   carelesslv  and   in   small  bodies,   observers 


236  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

reported;  they  loosen  their  arms  and  stoop  down  to  drink 
at  the  first  water ;  they  sleep  as  if  at  home ;  they  carry  little 
ammunition;  and  their  muleteers  are  hoping  the  train  will 
be  attacked.  With  such  opportunities  the  six  hundred  troopers 
now  under  Canales  were  expected  to  do  something;  but  that 
astute  leader  merely  gave  reasons  why  they  could  not.  "  Noth- 
ing, absolutely  nothing  will  either  the  regular  cavalry  or  the 
auxiliaries  do  against  the  enemy/'  exclaimed  Ampudia  bitterly; 
and  on  September  18  the  whole  mounted  force  of  about  three 
thousand  meekly  retreated  to  the  town,  leaving  the  roads 
practically  open.21 

Early  on  September  12  all  the  pioneers  of  Taylor's  army 
advanced  from  Cerralvo  to  prepare  the  road  for  his  artillery 
and  wagons.  Ahead  of  them  went  a  strange-looking  company. 
Mounted  on  quick,  tough  horses  and  marching  at  will,  the  men 
were  dressed  as  they  pleased;  but  they  agreed  substantially 
on  leggings,  trousers  belted  round  the  waist,  coarse  red  or  blue 
shirts,  and  either  a  buckskin  cap  or  a  soft  felt  hat.  Each 
carried  a  heavy  rifle,  a  pouch  of  bullets,  a  large  powderhorn 
and  a  bowie  knife,  and  some  had  Colt  revolvers.  At  every 
saddle-bow  hung  a  braided  lariat  for  a  tether;  and  a  bag  of 
parched  and  pounded  corn,  together  with  whatever  else  the 
rider  thought  he  needed,  was  bound  to  the  saddle  with  thongs. 
This  company  was  Captain  McCulloch's  rangers  —  a  part 
of  the  First  Texas  regiment  —  Taylor's  finest  body  of  scouts ; 
and  they,  assisted  by  a  squadron  of  dragoons,  covered  the 
pioneers.  On  the  following  three  days  the  First,  Second  and 
Field  Divisions  moved  successively,  carrying  forty  rounds  of 
ammunition  and  rations  for  eight  days,  besides  what  went  as 
freight ;  and  only  the  sick,  with  a  guard  of  two  Mississippi 
companies,  remained  at  Cerralvo.22 

The  spell  of  Mexico,  that  was  to  charm  away  so  often  the 
pains  of  a  hard  existence,  now  fell  upon  the  soldiers.  The 
country  became  more  fertile.  One  broad  plain  shone  with 
Spanish  dahlias,  and  curious  trees  and  plants  could  be  seen 
on  all  sides.  Every  few  miles  a  stream  of  cool,  sparkling 
water  leaped  across  the  road.  In  the  morning  a  curtain  of 
gray,  thinning  little  by  little,  went  slowly  up  at  last,  and 
revealed  a  world  of  hills,  edged  with  burnished  gold,  where 
one  or  two,  catching  the  sun  aslant  on  a  bare,  crystalline  side, 


TAYLOR  PRESSES  FORWARD  237 

would  flash  out  amidst  the  lingering  shadows  in  all  the  colors 
of  a  diamond;  while,  farther  on,  lilac  mountain  rose  above 
lilac  mountain  and  purple  range  looked  over  purple  range  until 
the  crowning  peaks  touched  the  firmament.  In  one  town  after 
another  grapes,  figs  and  pomegranates  delighted  the  eye,  and, 
as  an  officer  quoted  to  himself, 

"The  air  was  heavy  with  the  sighs  of  orange  groves." 

And  finally,  as  night  came  on,  the  jagged  blue  sierras,  growing 
almost  black,  were  silhouetted  perhaps  against  a  pale  yellowish- 
green  streaked  with  crimson.  A  spice  of  danger  added  zest, 
for  about  a  thousand  Mexican  cavalry  hovered  constantly 
in  the  front,  and  once  near  Ramos  McCulloch's  rangers  got 
near  enough  to  exchange  shots  with  a  party  of  them.  But 
Torrejon's  men  employed  themselves  principally  in  driving 
the  Mexicans  from  their  homes  under  Santa  Anna's  and  Ampu- 
dia's  instructions;  and  on  September  17,  after  passing  through 
Papagallos,  the  Americans  now  marching  with  Taylor  concen- 
trated near  Marin.23 

Very  early  the  next  morning  a  bugle  broke  the  silence  of 
the  camp ;  other  bugles  answered  it ;  the  drums  awoke ;  the 
fifes  joined  in ;  the  army  sprang  to  its  feet.  As  soon  as  possible 
the  advance  guard  moved  off.  The  First  Division  followed 
at  eight  o'clock,  and  the  others  at  intervals  of  an  hour.  After 
sleeping  that  night  at  San  Francisco  the  army,  completed  by 
the  arrival  of  the  Texas  Division,  set  out  again  at  about  sun- 
rise on  the  nineteenth.  Since  reaching  Marin  Taylor  had 
rather  come  to  the  conclusion  that  he  would  scarcely  reach 
Saltillo  on  time  —  that  first  he  would  have  something  to  do  at 
Monterey;  and  this  opinion  was  now  confirmed.  At  about 
nine  o'clock,  accompanied  by  his  staff  and  an  escort  of  Texas 
mounted  men,  he  came  to  the  edge  of  the  plain,  and  passed 
on  down  the  gentle  slope  of  the  San  Juan  valley.21 

In  front  lay  a  stretch  of  broken  ground.  Beyond  it  cattle 
were  feeding  peacefully  in  green  fields,  and  corn  was  ripening 
under  a  hot  sun.  Farther  away  still  lay  Monterey,  the  holy 
city  of  the  frontier,  as  if  in  a  niche  of  the  vast  sierra,  its  white 
houses  partly  hidden  with  green  and  the  spires  of  its  cathedral 
soaring  above ;  and  now  and  then  the  music  of  a  bell,  a  bugle 
or  a  drum  came  faintly  across  the  plain.     A  little  at  the  right 


238  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

could  be  seen  the  long,  low  line  of  the  citadel  wall,  surmounted 
by  the  dark  bulk  of  the  "donjon"  and  its  flag  of  red,  white 
and  green.  But  suddenly  the  tranquillity  of  the  scene  was 
broken.  A  white  puff  rose  from  the  fort,  and  a  12-pound  ball 
tore  up  the  dirt  in  front  of  the  General.  Another  dropped 
near  him,  and  a  body  of  Mexican  cavalry  advanced.  Hays's 
regiment  of  horse  was  ordered  to  charge ;  but  seeing  the  enemy 
retire  as  if  to  lure  the  Americans  under  the  guns  of  the  fortress, 
Taylor  recalled  him.24 

Meanwhile  the  rest  of  our  troops,  excited  by  the  rolling  echoes 
from  the  mountains,  pressed  on.  Some  threw  away  their 
packs  of  cards,  but  mostly  the  men  joked,  laughed,  cheered 
each  report  from  the  citadel  guns,  and  shouted  that  they  were 
going  to  a  grand  fandango  at  Monterey.  "No  one  discussed 
depots  of  supplies,  base  of  communications,  lines  of  retreat, 
or  strategic  positions,"  we  are  told  by  General  S.  G.  French, 
then  a  lieutenant  of  artillery;  "but  every  one  knew  that  the 
brave  old  soldier  would  fight  the  enemy,  wherever  he  found 
them,  to  the  end."  The  victories  at  Palo  Alto  and  the  Resaca 
had  filled  the  men  with  confidence;  and  in  this  happy  mood 
the  army  encamped  about  three  miles  from  the  city  at  Walnut 
Grove  (Bosque  de  San  Domingo),  an  extensive  and  beautiful 
group  of  pecans  and  live-oaks,  watered  by  large,  pure  springs, 
where  pleasure  parties  of  weji-to-do  Mexicans  were  accus- 
tomed to  enjoy  themselves,  vjhe  army  now  consisted,  all 
told,  of  some  3080  regulars  and.  3150  ^  volunteers.  About  1350 
of  the  troops  were  mounted  men ;  and  for  artillery  there  were 
four  field  batteries,  and  a  pair  of  24-pound  howitzers,  but  no 
real  siege  ordnance  except  one  10-inch  mortar.  In  the  front  lay 
a  city  of  stone,  protected  with  strong  and  rather  skilfully 
planned  works,  and  guarded  by  an  army  larger  than  Taylor's.25 ) 


XII 
MONTEREY 

September,  1846 

At  once  American  reconnoitring  parties  accompanied  by 
engineers  hurried  out  (September  19),  and  both  ends  of  the 
city  were  examined.  Despite  the  fire  of  the  citadel,  particular 
attention  was  paid  to  the  western  fortifications,  for  the  idea  of 
turning  them  had  already  presented  itself.  By  ten  o'clock 
that  night  Brevet  Major  Mansfield,  the  chief  engineer,  returned 
to  camp  with  five  prisoners  to  be  questioned  and  with  satis- 
factory evidence  that  the  Saltillo  road  could  be  gained  in  spite 
of  the  forts ;  and  then  a  council  decided  to  make  the  attempt.1 

Evidently,  however,  this  meant  a  severe  struggle.  Going 
three  quarters  of  a  mile  west  from  the  main  plaza  of  Monterey 
by  the  Saltillo  route,  passing  a  cemetery,  and  keeping  on  about 
a  mile  and  a  quarter  farther,  one  found  on  a  low  eminence  at 
the  right  a  dilapidated  but  massive  stone  building  known  as 
the  Bishop's  Palace,  close  below  which  stood  now  a  half-moon 
battery  facing  and  commanding  the  town.  Beyond  this 
redoubt,  called  La  Libertad,  the  eminence  became  an  ascending 
ridge,  and  some  three  hundred  yards  from  the  Palace  the  ridge 
ended  sharply  as  the  summit  of  an  extremely  steep  height 
known  by  the  Americans  as  Independence  Hill  (Loma  de  In- 
dependencia) ,  where  a  small  sand-bag  redoubt  had  been  con- 
structed. Immediately  west  of  this  hill,  what  was  known  as 
the  Topo  road  left  the  Saltillo  highway  and  struck  off  toward 
one's  right,  and  near  the  farther  edge  of  this  road  a  spur  of 
the  mountain  began  to  ascend.  On  the  other  side  of  the  high- 
way flowed  the  Santa  Catarina,  passing  by  the  city  and  joining 
the  San  Juan  some  distance  below.  Farther  to  the  left  and 
parallel  to  the  river  rose  a  high,  bristling  hill  named  Federation 
Ridge.     At  the  western  end  ; —  the  summit  —  of  this  ridge, 

•     239 


240 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


FIRST  OPERATIONS  AT  MONTEREY  241 

which  extended  some  distance  beyond  La  Libertad,  stood  a 
redoubt  occupied  by  some  eighty  men ;  and  about  six  hundred 
yards  to  the  east,  in  a  depression  of  the  ridge,  was  a  substantial 
masonry  fort  called  El  Soldado,  armed  with  two  9-pounders, 
which  were  dragged,  before  the  fighting  began,  to  the  redoubt 
on  the  summit.2 

Meantime  the  Mexicans  also  were  observing.  It  was  gen- 
erally believed  that  Taylor  had  thirty  guns,  which  meant  a 
hard  fight ;  but  the  soldiers  were  excited  and  ready  for  battle. 
"The  enthusiasm  is  great,  the  determination  greater,  the 
desire  to  sacrifice  ourselves  for  the  sacred  rights  of  the  nation 
unbounded/7  wrote  the  comandante  general  of  Nuevo  Leon. 
But  Ampudia  —  "the  Culinary  Knight,"  as  Worth  called  him, 
who  had  fried  Sentmanat's  head  —  already  trembled.  We 
have  food  for  barely  twenty  days,  he  reported  to  the  govern- 
ment; the  troops  at  San  Luis  Potosi  are  few  in  number  and 
little  inclined  to  advance ;  through  spies  the  enemy  are  aware 
of  these  facts ;  they  will  gain  the  pass  between  here  and  Saltillo, 
and  from  that  position  "  it  will  be  almost  impossible  to  dislodge 
them."  3 

Sunday  morning  all  was  bustle  in  the  American  camp,  and 
at  length,  a  little  before  two  o'clock,  Hays  and  about  400 
mounted  Texans  rode  away.  A  long  sky-blue  line  of  infantry 
followed  them,  and  then  another  line  of  men  in  dark-blue 
jackets  and  trousers  with  a  red  stripe  down  the  leg  —  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Childs's  Artillery  Battalion.  Blanchard's  Com- 
pany of  Louisiana  volunteers,  dressed  in  every  sort  of  clothes 
and  carrying  every  sort  of  weapon,  and  Duncan's  and  Mackall's 
batteries  with  their  gleaming  pieces  and  clattering  caissons 
completed  the  detachment,  which  included  some  2000  men,  all 
told.  The  rest  of  the  army  watched  their  departure  with  keen 
interest,  for  their  design  looked  well-nigh  desperate,  and  yet  the 
fate  of  the  campaign  was  believed  to  depend  upon  it.4 

Especially  they  watched  the  commander.  In  the  usual 
undress  uniform  but  on  a  splendid  horse,  which  he  managed 
with  consummate  address,  rode  Worth.  He  was  a  man  of 
average  height  but  noticeably  strong,  with  a  trim  figure  and 
a  strikingly  martial  air.  Conversing  easily  with  his  staff  he 
seemed  the  elegant  gentleman ;  but  his  face  was  stern,  and  his 
restless  dark  eyes  flashed.  In  war  he  found  his  element ; 
vol.  i — R 


242  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

and  at  present  behind  his  natural  ardor  burned  a  new  flame. 
His  withdrawing  from  the  army  in  April  had  injured  both  his 
prestige  and  his  relative  position,  and  his  motto  now  was, 
"A  grade  or  a  grave."  His  orders  were  to  turn  Independence 
Hill,  occupy  the  Saltillo  highway,  and  so  far  as  practicable 
carry  the  works  in  that  quarter;  and  no  doubt  he  intended 
to  do  more  rather  than  less.4 

Soon  taking  leave  of  the  road,  this  command  plunged  into 
cornfields  and  chaparral.  Progress  was  difficult  and  slow. 
For  the  benefit  of  the  artillery,  ditches  had  to  be  bridged  or 
filled  and  brush  fences  opened.  The  enemy  promptly  ob- 
served and  understood  the  movement,  and  a  body  of  cavalry 
embarrassed  it  somewhat.  Once  they  nearly  surrounded  the 
General  and  his  staff,  who  were  some  distance  in  advance ;  but 
after  a  time,  fearing  his  artillery,  they  withdrew  to  the  citadel. 
Ampudia  himself  rode  to  Independence  Hill,  watched  the  blue 
line  a  while,  ordered  one  hundred  infantry  to  the  summit,  and 
had  a  12-pounder  and  a  howitzer  planted  there.5 

By  six  o'clock  Worth  made  nearly  or  quite  seven  miles. 
He  was  now  on  the  Topo  road ;  and,  halting  just  beyond  the 
range  of  the  battery  on  Independence  Hill,  he  pushed  a  recon- 
noitring party  toward  the  Saltillo  highway.  Infantry  and 
cavalry  had  now  been  posted,  however,  in  that  vicinity.  The 
party  was  fired  upon ;  and,  owing  to  this,  to  nightfall  and  to 
the  torrents  of  rain,  its  purpose  was  not  accomplished  until 
the  lateness  of  the  hour  prevented  further  operations.  With 
great  difficulty  the  Americans  were  placed  in  a  fairly  defensible 
position;  and  without  fires,  food,  blankets  or  shelter,  they 
lived  through  the  stormy  night  as  best  they  could.  By  this 
time  the  rest  of  the  Mexican  cavalry  had  been  withdrawn  from 
its  position  between  the  Bishop's  Palace  and  the  citadel,  and  a 
part  of  it  retired  into  the  town.6 

Monday,  a  day  of  fate,  broke  heavy,  dark  and  ominous. 
Dense  clouds  covered  the  sky,  and  for  a  time  a  thick  mist  cut 
off  the  outlook.  By  about  six  o'clock  Worth  moved,  however, 
and,  saluted  occasionally  with  harmless  grape  from  Inde- 
pendence Hill,  advanced  by  the  Topo  road.  Anticipating 
trouble,  he  arranged  the  column  so  as  to  be  ready  for  prompt 
action.  The  Texans  led ;  Captain  C.  F.  Smith  and  the  light 
companies  of  the  Artillery  Battalion,  deployed  as  skirmishers, 


AT  THE  WESTERN  GATES  243 

came  next;  Lieutenant  Colonel  Duncan's  battery  was  third; 
and  the  rest  of  the  command  followed.  Two  or  three  hundred 
yards  or  so  from  the  Saltillo  highway,  at  a  turn  round  the 
mountain,  some  two  hundred  lancers  could  be  seen  approaching. 
It  was  a  gallant  sight.  The  horses,  though  small,  showed 
plenty  of  spirit;  many  of  the  saddles  were  silver-mounted; 
the  cavaliers  wore  brilliant  uniforms,  and  green  and  red  pennons 
fluttered  gayly  from  their  poised  lances.  At  the  head  of  the 
advance  rode  Lieutenant  Colonel  Najera,  a  tall,  fine-looking 
trooper  with  a  fierce  black  mustache.  Smith's  corps  and  a 
part  of  the  Texas  riflemen  were  thrown  behind  a  strong  fence ; 
Duncan  halted  and  unlimbered;  and  then,  like  a  whirlwind, 
Najera  struck  McCulloch.7 

The  shock  was  terrible ;  and  like  a  lion  and  a  tiger  grappling 
the  two  bodies  writhed  and  fought.  The  weight  of  the  Ameri- 
can horses  proved  a  great  advantage,  but  numbers  were  on  the 
other  side.  Najera,  after  running  a  Texan  through  with  his 
lance,  fell;  but  a  gallant  successor  took  his  place,  and  the 
soldiers  proved  worthy  of  him.  Many  lances  were  shivered, 
and  others,  useless  at  close  quarters,  were  dropped ;  but  sword 
and  escopeta  served  instead.  On  our  part  Smith's  infantry 
fired  well,  and  the  Mexicans  could  not  break  through  the 
fence.7 

After  recoiling  a  little  they  formed  to  charge  again.  Other 
troops  of  Worth's  came  up,  took  post  beside  the  road,  and  began 
work.  A  minute  or  two  more  and  Duncan,  on  higher  ground, 
was  firing  over  the  Americans.  By  this  time  Najera's  squadron 
was  nearly  accounted  for;  but  behind  it  were  the  rest  of 
Romero's  cavalry  brigade  and  a  party  of  infantry.  However, 
Mackall's  battery  was  now  cooperating  with  Duncan's  and 
both  did  splendidly.  The  Mexican  foot  withdrew  instead  of 
advancing.  A  part  of  the  cavalry  soon  retreated  toward 
Saltillo  and  a  part  into  the  town ;  and  the  brief  but  important 
struggle  ended.  Probably  more  than  one  hundred  Mexicans 
had  been  killed  or  wounded,  while  our  own  casualties  appear  to 
have  numbered  about  a  dozen,  and  the  way  to  the  Saltillo  high- 
way lay  open.  By  a  quarter  past  eight  Worth's  command  was 
on  this  road ;  and  he  reflected  with  exultation  that  the  Mexican 
line  of  communication,  supply,  reinforcement  and  retreat  had 
been  cut.     Nor  was  that  all  or  even  the  best  of  it,  he  believed. 


244  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

"The  town  is  ours,"  he  scrawled  in  pencil  to  the  commander- 
in-chief.  The  battery  on  Independence  Hill  now  became 
active,  however;  and  as  Federation  redoubt,  of  which  the 
Americans  had  not  heard,  began  to  drop  round  shot  among 
our  troops,  they  had  to  be  withdrawn  about  half  a  mile  in  the 
direction  of  Saltillo.7 

Worth's  courage  and  spirit  were  inflexible,  but  he  was  a  little 
wanting  in  steadiness.  His  impetuous,  restless  mind  would 
leap  to  a  decision  without  fully  grasping  all  the  facts,  and  then 
it  was  necessary  to  reconsider  and  re-decide.  In  the  face  of 
the  present  unexpected  situation  he  changed  his  plan  several 
times,  and  fatigued  the  troops  perhaps  with  some  unnecessary 
movements;  but  by  noon  he  concluded  to  storm  Federation 
Ridge  first,  and  Captain  C.  F.  Smith  was  assigned  to  this  task 
with  four  Artillery  and  iive  dismounted  Texan  companies  — 
about  three  hundred  or  three  hundred  and  fifty  effectives. 
Riding  up  to  the  command  Worth  exclaimed  in  his  bold, 
magnetic  way,  which  went  straight  to  the  soldier's  heart, 
"  Men,  you  are  to  take  that  hill  —  and  I  know  you  will  do  it." 
"We  will,"  they  answered,  and  the  detachment,  followed  by 
the  most  anxious  hopes  of  all  the  other  corps,  moved  off.  It 
seemed  like  charging  the  clouds,  but  it  had  to  be  done.8 

The  intention  was  to  gain  the  rear  of  the  fort,  and  hence 
a  circuitous  route  leading  to  the  southern  flank  of  the  ridge 
was  chosen.  After  hurrying  through  cornfields  and  sugar- 
cane to  the  river  and  then  upstream  a  considerable  distance 
to  find  a  crossing  place,  the  men  slid  down  the  rough  bank 
of  the  Santa  Catarina,  and  plunged  in.  The  swift  stream, 
waist-deep,  was  hard  to  resist,  especially  as  one  could  not  help 
slipping  on  the  loose  round  stones,  and  the  water  hissed  and 
boiled  with  grape  and  bullets;  but  by  good  luck  no  casualty 
occurred,  and  the  men  clambered  up  the  opposite  bank.  Push- 
ing on  then,  after  pausing  for  breath  under  the  cover  of  thickets, 
they  came  at  length  to  a  low  eminence,  and  concealed  them- 
selves behind  a  hedge  while  the  captain  reconnoitred.  The 
main  hill,  which  appeared  to  be  nearly  four  hundred  feet  high, 
was  rough,  steep  and  covered  with  chaparral.  The  garrison 
seemed  to  be  strong  and  resolute.  The  two  guns  made  heavy 
odds.  For  quite  a  while  Smith  studied  the  hard  problem, 
doubting  whether  it  was  practicable  to  assault  the  position, 


AMERICAN  SUCCESSES  245 

but  finally  he  ordered  the  men  forward;  and  soon  lines  of 
dark  blue  Mexican  skirmishers,  descending  from  the  redoubt, 
stationed  themselves  at  favorable  points  to  meet  him.8 

Meanwhile,  noting  this  delay  and  certain  preparations  of 
the  enemy,  Worth  despatched  the  Seventh  Infantry  under 
Captain  Miles  to  support  Smith;  and  then,  worried  at  the 
sight  of  reinforcements  on  their  way  to  the  redoubt,  he  sent  the 
Fifth  Infantry  (Major  Scott)  and  Blanchard's  Company  in  the 
same  direction,  with  General  Smith  to  take  charge  of  all  these 
forces.  Miles  had  not  only  the  voice  of  a  trumpet  but  the 
eyes  of  a  hawk,  and  striking  at  once  upon  a  direct  line  of  march, 
he  promptly  reached  the  main  ridge ;  and  soon  General  Smith 
found  him  supporting  the  wary  but  steady  charge  already 
launched.  Discovering  now  El  Soldado  and  believing  he 
would  not  be  needed  at  the  redoubt,  General  Smith  moved 
to  his  right  along  the  southern  side  of  the  ridge  with  all  the 
troops  except  Captain  Smith's.  Like  a  fiery  serpent,  these 
now  forced  their  way  up  in  a  winding  but  ever  advancing  line. 
The  hill  blazed  and  smoked.  The  sharp  crack  of  the  rifles 
punctuated  the  duller  reports  of  the  muskets.  Soon  the 
Mexican  skirmishers  were  driven  back;  the  9-pounders  could 
not  be  depressed  enough  to  be  effective ;  the  Texans  and 
"red-legged  infantry"  conquered  the  slope;  and  finally, 
struggling  breathlessly  to  the  redoubt,  they  found  the  garrison 
already  in  flight,  carrying  off  one  of  their  guns.8 

Some  of  the  victors  then  joined  the  rest  of  General  Smith's 
command,  which  could  be  seen  winding  through  a  gorge  toward 
the  other  fort.  Those  who  did  not,  quickly  remounted  the 
second  piece,  which  the  Mexicans  had  upset  in  trying  to  drag 
it  away,  and  at  the  first  shot,  luckily  knocking  the  El  Soldado 
gun  out  of  position,  sent  the  garrison  flying.  At  the  double- 
quick  the  attacking  column  reached  that  position  an  instant 
later,  and  brave  Captain  Gillespie,  followed  by  other  brave 
men,  despising  the  grape  from  Independence  Hill  that  shrieked 
above  their  heads,  clambered  over  the  parapet.  The  Mexican 
piece,  quickly  righted,  saluted  the  fugitives  and  then  offered  its 
compliments  to  the  Palace  works.  The  other  captured  piece 
was  then  brought  down  to  El  Soldado ;  and  Miles's  command, 
moving  still  farther  east  along  the  ridge  with  one  of  the  guns, 
took  a  third  fortification;    and  thus  by  about  the  middle  of 


246  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

the  afternoon,  at  a  trifling  cost,  we  had  three  forts,  intended 
to  protect  the  rear  and  flank  of  Monterey,  fighting  for  us.8 

But  a  still  harder  task  now  confronted  the  Americans. 
Shortly  before  nightfall  three  companies  of  the  Artillery  Bat- 
talion, three  of  the  Eighth  Infantry  and  some  two  hundred 
Texas  riflemen  —  in  all  about  five  hundred  —  accompanied 
by  Captain  Sanders,  Lieutenant  Meade  and  a  Mexican  guide 
and  commanded  by  Childs,  were  sent  forward  to  the  skirt  of 
Independence  Hill.  The  peak  before  them  was  almost  or 
quite  as  high  as  the  summit  of  Federation  Ridge;  and  in 
addition  to  the  redoubt,  guns  and  garrison  on  the  top,  a  stronger 
position,  more  guns  and  a  larger  force  were  just  below  at  the 
Palace.  The  Mexican  generals  regarded  the  point  as  unassail- 
able.9 

The  night  was  tempestuous.  The  men  were  tired  out. 
Few  had  eaten  for  thirty-six  hours  —  none  since  breakfast. 
The  rain  fell  in  torrents,  and  they  had  not  even  blankets. 
Small  rivers  flowed  down  the  slope.  Sometimes  heavy  stones, 
loosened  by  the  water,  rolled  upon  them.  The  darkness  was 
absolute.  Most  of  them  sat  up,  holding  their  firearms,  covering 
the  locks,  and  dozing  when  they  could.  At  three  o'clock  the 
sleepers  were  roughly  shaken,  and  a  hoarse  whisper,  "Fall 
in,"  passed  along.  The  storm  was  still  raging.  There  was 
a  chill  in  the  wet  air.  Muscles  were  stiff.  Teeth  actually 
rattled.  Strict  orders  to  make  no  noise  under  any  circum- 
stances were  circulated.  Then  came  another  whisper,  "For- 
ward!" and  in  two  columns  —  one  under  Childs  and  the  other 
under  Captain  Vinton  —  the  almost  vertical  climb  began.9 

Feet  were  placed  cautiously  but  firmly.  Despite  the  thorns, 
bushes  had  to  be  seized  for  support.  Sometimes  the  men 
crawled.  Above  all,  the  gun-locks  were  to  be  kept  dry.  Now 
and  then  a  stone,  pried  out  by  the  rain,  would  go  clattering 
down;  and  with  beating  hearts,  expecting  to  be  challenged, 
the  men  would  pause.  If  discovered,  they  could  have  been 
annihilated  with  rocks.  But  the  storm  drowned  all  the  noise 
except  its  own,  and  kept  the  Mexicans  under  cover.  Slowly 
but  steadily  the  ragged  line  mounted.  The  night  began  to 
look  grayish.     The  outline  of  the  summit  could  be  made  out.9 

Suddenly  burst  forth  a  blaze  and  a  roar.  It  came  from  a 
picket-guard   about  a  hundred   yards  down,   that  had   been 


AMERICAN  SUCCESSES  247 

sheltering  themselves  among  some  rocks.  The  hasty  fire 
was  ineffective,  .except  that  some  of  the  Americans  were  burned. 
Not  a  musket  answered  it  —  only  a  yell  and  a  rush.  Finally, 
sixty  feet  or  so  from  the  top  it  was  time  to  fire,  and  the  musket 
and  rifle  spoke.  Real  fighting  began  now,  give  and  take ;  and 
the  Mexicans  had  the  advantage  of  position.  But  there  were 
only  about  fifty  or  sixty  of  them.  The  line  closed  in.  There 
was  a  fierce  grapple;  the  Mexicans  broke,  and  as  the  rising 
sun  glimmered  faintly  through  the  clouds,  the  Stars  and  Stripes 
were  unfurled.  Then  the  victors  cheered  and  cheered.  Cheers 
came  up  from  their  comrades  in  the  valley.  Taylor's  men, 
who  had  watched  the  double  line  of  fire  and  smoke  go  higher 
and  higher  till  it  crowned  the  top  and  ceased,  cheered  and  threw 
their  caps  into  the  air;  and  the  echoing  mountain  seemed  to 
cheer  back.9 

But  the  work  was  not  yet  done.  Indeed  the  Americans 
only  had  the  bull  by  the  horns.  Too  exhausted  to  pursue 
effectively  at  once,  they  had  to  let  the  Mexicans  escape.  See- 
ing how  the  fight  would  end,  some  of  the  garrison  had  removed 
the  guns  of  the  redoubt  —  accidentally  throwing  one  of  them 
down  the  hill;  but  the  saved  piece  and  two  6-pounders  now 
opened  fire  on  our  men,  and  a  counter-attack  from  the  Palace 
garrison  was  to  be  expected.  That  garrison  probably  numbered 
two  hundred  and  fifty  and  perhaps  more.  Some  fifty  dis- 
mounted dragoons  reinforced  it  now;  and  probably  not  less 
than  two  hundred  and  fifty  horse  occupied  the  slope  below.9 

But  Worth  had  no  intention  of  losing  his  prize.  Three 
companies  of  the  Seventh  Infantry  were  already  moving  down 
Federation  Ridge,  and  they  took  post  near  enough  the  Palace 
to  menace  any  troops  going  from  that  point  against  the  summit, 
cheering  loudly  to  attract  attention.  The  Fifth  and  Blan- 
chard's  Company  reinforced  Childs;  and  about  noon  "with 
infinite  difficulty,"  as  Worth  said,  a  12-pound  howitzer,  taken 
apart,  was  dragged  up  with  straps.  As  the  Palace  had  no 
roof  and  the  windows  were  poorly  barricaded,  the  interior 
could  be  searched  with  shrapnel.  The  Mexicans  reciprocated, 
and  desultory  fighting  continued  all  the  morning.  In  the 
afternoon  Mexican  reinforcements  were  seen  in  the  distance, 
and  a  prompt,  decisive  stroke  appeared  to  be  necessary.  One 
body  of  Americans  therefore  went  about  halfway  to  the  Palace, 


248  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

and  concealed  themselves  among  some  rocks  and  bushes 
in  a  small  ravine,  while  another  were  placed  out  of  sight  on  the 
slope.  Then  the  howitzer  opened,  and  a  force  of  skirmishers 
advanced  in  full  view.9 

Ampudia's  policy  was  a  strict  defensive,  and  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Berra,  who  commanded  at  this  position,  had  been 
forbidden  to  take  the  aggressive.  But  the  howitzer  had  made 
itself  extremely  disagreeable ;  his  artillery  had  become  disabled ; 
his  only  chance  lay  in  charging;  and  this  appeared  to  be  the 
time.  Foot  and  horse,  the  Mexicans  therefore  sallied  out, 
and  gallantly  they  moved  up  the  ridge,  closing  their  ranks 
when  the  howitzer  opened  them.  Then  the  signal  was  given, 
and  the  men  in  ambush,  springing  up  like  a  flight  of  blackbirds, 
fired.  The  enemy  broke  and  ran ;  many  of  them  did  not  stop 
till  they  reached  the  city ;  and  the  massive  gate  of  the  Palace 
was  closed.  The  howitzer  soon  broke  the  gate,  however,  and 
the  Americans  poured  in.  For  a  time  the  struggle  was  fierce 
yet  indecisive ;  but  suddenly  the  cry  was  heard,  "  Throw  your- 
selves flat!"  and  instantly  over  the  prostrate  Americans  the 
howitzer  belched  a  double  charge  of  canister.  This  was 
enough;  and  soon  the  Mexicans,  harassed  with  grape  by 
Duncan  and  Mackall,  who  arrived  now  at  a  gallop,  by  the 
fire  of  apiece  captured  at  La  Libertad  and  by  that  of  El  Soldado, 
were  fleeing  into  the  city,  spreading  consternation  on  every 
hand.     It  was  now  about  four  o'clock.9 

Leaving  Worth  and  his  gallant  men  thus  in  full  possession 
of  the  western  gate  of  Monterey,  we  will  now  trace  Taylor's 
operations  at  the  opposite  end  of  the  town.  Sunday  afternoon, 
observing  the  Mexican  reinforcements  hastening  to  the  summit 
of  Independence  Hill  and  fearing  Worth  might  be  overpowered, 
he  displayed  most  of  his  troops  before  the  city  until  dark  as 
a  menace.  During  the  night  his  10-inch  mortar  and  two 
24-pound  howitzers  were  planted  about  seven  eighths  of  a 
mile  from  the  citadel,  near  the  forward  edge  of  a  depression 
which  screened  them  from  the  enemy,  and  at  seven  o'clock 
the  next  morning  these  pieces  fired  for  twenty  minutes,  doubtless 
encouraging  rather  than  alarming  the  enemy  by  their  ineffec- 
tive work.10 

At  the  same  time,  to  divert  attention  from  Worth,  as  a  note 
from  that  officer  had  suggested,  all  the  available  infantry  were 


AT  THE  EASTERN  GATES  249 

drawn  out  before  the  citadel  as  if  to  assault  it.  The  First 
Division  (regulars)  stood  at  the  left  of  this  line;  Quitman's 
brigade  —  the  Tennesseeans  under  Campbell  and  the  Mis- 
sissippi riflemen  under  Davis  —  came  next  it,  and  Hamer 
with  the  Ohio  regiment  occupied  the  extreme  right.  Mean- 
while the  work  of  reconnoitring  continued.  Believing  that 
he  would  meet  with  no  serious  resistance  at  Monterey,  Taylor 
had  apparently  felt  little  or  no  anxiety  to  ascertain  how  the 
town  had  been  fortified;  but  now  he  may  have  realized  that 
such  information  was  desirable.10 

In  a  general  sense  we  are  already  aware  what  defences  had 
been  prepared  in  this  quarter  —  particularly  the  barricaded 
streets  and  the  stone  houses  turned  into  forts ;  but  the  situation 
must  now  be  investigated  more  closely.  West  of  the  grand 
plaza  and  toward  the  northern  edge  of  the  city  there  was  a 
large  spring.  The  outlet  of  this  flowed  toward  the  east,  widened 
into  a  pond,  then  contracted  into  a  stream,  passed  under 
Purisima  bridge  —  a  heavy  structure  of  stone  by  which  the 
Marin  road  entered  the  city  proper  —  veered  a  little  toward 
the  right,  and  finally  left  the  town  at  its  northeastern  corner. 
On  the  inner  side  of  this  watercourse  below  Purisima  bridge 
there  were  two  simple  redans  capable  of  holding  fifty  or  seventy 
men  each;  and  some  distance  farther  down,  on  the  top  of 
a  rather  steep  slope,  stood  a  strong  earthwork  named  El  Rincon 
del  Diablo  (The  Devil's  Corner),  commonly  known  by  the 
Americans  as  El  Diablo,  which  had  two  or  three  guns,  and 
could  accommodate  a  garrison  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  or 
two  hundred.10 

On  the  outer  side  of  the  watercourse  an  irregular  but  strong 
fortification  (tete  de  pont),  armed  with  a  12-pounder,  defended 
Purisima  bridge.  East  and  northeast  of  this  lay  a  confused 
suburban  district  occupied  in  part  with  streets,  lanes,  houses 
and  huts,  and  in  part  with  orchards,  gardens  and  yards  enclosed 
with  high  stone  walls.  Near  the  edge  of  it  all,  some  four  hun- 
dred yards  in  front  of  El  Diablo,  was  the  most  advanced  Mexi- 
can position.  This,  occupied  by  about  two  hundred  men, 
consisted  of  a  stone  tannery  building,  often  spoken  of  by  the 
Americans  as  a  distillery,  the  flat  roof  of  which,  protected  with 
sand-bags  in  addition  to  the  parapet,  was  held  by  a  competent 
garrison,  and  of  an  earthwork  in  front  of  it  called  the  Teneria 


250  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

(Tannery)  redoubt,  which,  after  having  been  erected  and  demol- 
ished, was  rebuilt  with  desperate  exertions  during  Sunday  night.10 

This  fortification  consisted  of  two  short  parallel  sides  pro- 
longed and  drawn  together  in  front  so  as  to  meet  at  a  sharp 
angle;  and  the  north  side  was  similarly  prolonged  and  drawn 
in  toward  the  rear  so  as  to  protect  partially  the  opening  or 
throat.  The  approaches  were  not  cleared;  the  ditch  was 
neither  sufficiently  deep  nor  sufficiently  wide;  steps  used  in 
the  process  of  construction  made  it  easy  to  scale  the  face 
(scarp) ;  the  parapet  was  completed  with  sand-bags  made  with 
ordinary  cotton  cloth;  and  the  guns,  mounted  in  barbette 
without  platforms,  were  hard  to  manage  on  fresh  dirt  soaked 
with  rain;  but  the  redoubt,  armed  with  a  4-pounder  and  an 
8-pounder  —  its  northern  side  protected  by  the  guns  of  the 
citadel,  its  southern  face  by  the  tannery  building,  and  its 
throat  by  El  Diablo  —  was  a  serious  obstacle  for  infantry.10 

Why  Taylor  did  not  plant  his  mortar  in  front  of  it  Sunday 
night  —  for  it  was  plainly  visible  and  there  was  a  transverse 
ridge  within  short  grape-shot  range  —  drive  the  garrison  out 
with  half  a  dozen  well-aimed  bombshells  Monday  morning, 
and  repeat  the  operation  the  following  night  and  morning 
with  El  Diablo,  is  rather  hard  to  understand.  But  it  must 
be  remembered  that  he  had  probably  never  seen,  and  had 
certainly  never  attacked,  a  scientific  earthwork;  these  "mud- 
forts,"  as  the  soldiers  termed  them,  did  not  look  impressive; 
and  his  plan  to  capture  Monterey  "pretty  much  with  the 
bayonet"  had  been  determined  upon.  He  was  nothing  if 
not  stubborn ;  and  he  doubtless  believed  that  his  officers  and 
men,  given  a  chance  at  the  Mexicans,  would  certainly  whip 
them  somehow.10 

Accordingly,  as  Twiggs,  commander  of  the  First  Division, 
was  too  ill  for  battle,  Taylor  gave  Lieutenant  Colonel  Garland 
this  verbal  order,  written  down  by  one  of  Garland's  aides : 
"  Colonel  lead  the  head  of  your  column  off  to  the  left,  keeping 
well  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy's  Shot,  and  if  you  think  (or  you 
find)  you  can  take  any  of  them  little  Forts  down  there  with  the 
bay'net  you  better  do  it  —  but  consult  with  Major  Mansfield, 
you'll  find  him  down  there."  Garland  then  advanced  with 
the  First  and  Third  regiments  and  the  Washington-Baltimore 
Battalion,  about  800  men,  and  made  his  way  forward  a  con- 


MONTEREY  ASSAULTED  251 

siderable  distance  over  broken  and  obstructed  ground.  He 
soon  came  in  sight  of  Mansfield,  and  before  long  that  officer 
galloped  back  to  meet  him.  Garland  no  doubt  communicated 
Taylor's  orders  at  this  time;  and  Mansfield,  supported  by 
some  skirmishers,  then  went  forward  again.10 

The  responsibility  now  resting  upon  the  engineer  was  ex- 
tremely heavy.  A  map  prepared  by  Meade  from  data  brought 
by  a  spy  probably  showed  the  Mexican  works  fairly  well, 
but  of  course  did  not  fully  reveal  the  intricacies  of  the  situation. 
Taylor  had  seen  this  map,  and  must  have  known  everything 
thus  far  discovered  by  the  reconnoitring  officers,  and  he  evi- 
dently saw  nothing  to  forbid  an  infantry  attack.  Under  the 
fire  of  the  citadel  and  other  fortifications,  a  close  and  detailed 
examination  of  the  ground,  screened  not  only  by  the  maze 
already  alluded  to  but  by  hedges,  bush  fences,  trees  and  corn- 
fields lying  just  outside  the  suburb,  was  impossible;  and  to 
send  the  troops  back  without  an  overwhelming  reason  in  the 
face  of  the  two  armies,  and  look  "Old  Rough  and  Ready"  in 
the  eye,  was  unthinkable.  Taylor's  order  was  therefore  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  an  order,  not  merely  for  a  demonstration, 
but  for  an  assault.10 

So  Garland,  after  marching  for  some  time  over  and  through 
all  manner  of  obstructions,  as  Mansfield  directed,  kept  on  for 
a  considerable  distance  under  the  fire  of  the  citadel  and  re- 
doubts, and  at  length  saw  that  officer  running  ahead  on  foot 
at  the  northeastern  angle  of  the  town,  and  waving  the  troops 
on  with  his  spy-glass.  To  obey  this  order  involved  turning 
to  the  right  and  then  to  the  left  —  movements  that  discon- 
certed and  scattered  the  raw  Washington-Baltimore  corps  — 
and  finally  charging  at  a  venture  into  the  maze  already  de- 
scribed, but  it  was  done ;  the  Mexicans  reinforcing  the  redoubt 
meanwhile  with  150  men  and  an  8-pounder.  Owing  to  the 
trend  of  the  streets  the  Americans,  now  greatly  reduced  in 
numbers,  took  a  course  that  led  them  to  the  right  instead  of 
the  left,  and  failed  to  discover  the  throat  of  the  redoubt,  Mans- 
field's objective.  Caught  in  the  maze  and  falling  rapidly  under 
an  artillery  and  musketry  fire  that  seemed  to  come  from  every- 
where, they  found  themselves  totally  helpless.  Bragg's  battery 
was  thrown  in,  but  it  could  accomplish  nothing ;  and  on  Mans- 
field's recommendation  Garland  fell  back.10 


252  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Shortly  before  this,  judging  from  the  heavy  fire  that  a  serious 
engagement  was  on,  Taylor  had  ordered  Butler  to  advance 
with  his  Field  Division.  By  a  sad  blunder  three  companies 
of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  which  had  been  covering  the  mortar 
and  howitzers,  were  sent  ahead  of  this  corps  against  the  re- 
doubt, and  "almost  in  a  moment "  —  as  the  official  report 
admitted  —  a  third  of  the  men  fell.  The  rest,  including 
Lieutenant  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  then  retired;  and  Quitman's 
brigade,  which  now  formed  the  left  of  the  line,  was  ordered 
to  support  the  regulars  —  in  other  words,  renew  the 
attack.10 

With  ample  courage  and  enthusiasm  the  men  advanced 
nearly  a  mile  under  the  fire  of  the  citadel  —  which,  as  Taylor 
privately  admitted,  "done  considerable  execution"  —  and 
before  long  under  the  worse  fire  of  the  redoubt  in  front ;  but 
they  staggered  in  the  smashing  blast  of  lead  and  iron,  their 
formation  became  very  irregular,  and  after  a  time,  though 
not  within  effective  musket  or  rifle  range,  they  began  to  fire 
at  will.  Colonel  Davis,  then  some  distance  in  advance  on 
his  iron -gray,  Pompey,  grew  impatient  at  the  waste  of  time, 
ammunition  and  life,  and  as  the  redoubt  stopped  firing  just 
then,  he  cried,  "Now  is  the  time.  Great  God,  if  I  had  fifty 
men  with  knives  I  could  take  that  fort."  Then  he  waved  his 
sword,  and  called  on  his  men  to  charge.  Colonel  Campbell, 
equally  ignoring  his  brigade  commander,  did  the  same;  and 
both  regiments  hurried  on  as  groups  and  individuals,  each 
man  trying  to  outstrip  the  rest.10 

Fortunately  the  time  was  ripe.  Worn  down  by  several 
hours  of  excitement  and  exertion  —  for  noonday  was  now 
approaching  —  the  Mexicans  felt  a  reaction.  The  stubborn 
perseverance  of  the  Americans  daunted  them.  Captain  Backus 
and  about  100  men  of  the  First  Infantry,  not  receiving  the 
order  to  withdraw,  had  climbed  to  the  parapeted  roof  of  a 
building  about  130  yards  from  the  redoubt  and  now  persistently 
annoyed  them.  They  looked  for  the  reserves;  but  perhaps 
Garland's  operations  prevented  sending  them,  and  certainly 
none  came.  Ammunition  began  to  fail.  The  muskets  were 
hot  and  foul.  The  cloth  of  the  sand-bags  took  fire,  and  made 
the  parapet  extremely  uncomfortable.  Carrasco,  the  com- 
mander, who  had  run  away  at  the  Resaca,  now  openly  took 


MONTEREY  ASSAULTED  253 

flight  again ;  and  a  part  of  the  garrison,  formed  to  charge  upon 
the  Americans,  were  seen,  or  at  least  were  supposed,  to  be 
retreating.  A  panic  seized  the  troops,  and  almost  in  an  instant 
the  guns  were  abandoned  and  the  redoubt  stood  nearly  empty. 
A  few  minutes  more,  and  tall,  powerful  McClung  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi Rifles  leaped  upon  the  parapet  and  waved  his  sword. 
By  the  same  way  or  bursting  through  the  sallyport,  equally 
brave  men  of  both  regiments  came  close  after  him.  Thirty 
or  thirty-five  prisoners  were  seized.  An  American  flag  went 
up ;  and  after  a  brief  conflict  the  tannery  also  —  practically 
abandoned  by  the  enemy  —  was  taken.10 

During  Quitman's  advance  the  First  Ohio  approached  the 
city  farther  to  the  right.  It  was  well  officered,  for  besides 
its  colonel,  Brigadier  General  Hamer,  the  Hooker  of  Chancel- 
lorsville,  the  Johnston  of  Shiloh,  Major  General  Butler  and 
Major  General  Taylor  accompanied  it ;  but  it  failed  to  accom- 
plish anything.  A  second  attempt  was  equally  unfortunate,  but 
when  Taylor  —  evidently  despairing  of  success  —  had  ordered 
it  out  of  town,  word  came  of  Quitman's  achievement.  The 
regiment  was  then  sent  into  the  fight  again.  Garland's  remnant, 
still  in  the  outskirts  of  the  city,  came  up;  Quitman's  troops 
were  ordered  to  cooperate ;  and  a  determined  effort  was  made 
to  gain  the  rear  of  El  Diablo.  Both  grand  and  pitiful  that 
effort  was.  As  an  exhibition  of  pluck  it  could  hardly  have 
been  surpassed.  Taylor,  fighting  on  foot,  matched  Richard 
Cceur  de  Lion  storming  Front  de  Bceuf's  castle;  and  his 
intrepidity  was  so  flawless  and  unforced  that  courage  appeared 
to  all  round  him  the  easy  and  only  way.  To  die  under  such  a 
leader  seemed  the  acme  of  living.  It  was  not  war,  but  it  was 
grand  fighting.10 

"We  were  not  many,  we  who  stood 
Before  the  iron  sleet  that  day ; 
Yet  many  a  gallant  spirit  would 
Give  half  his  years  if  but  he  could 
Have  been  with  us  at  Monterey. 


And  on,  still  on  our  column  kept 
Through  walls  of  flame  its  withering  way ; 
Where  fell  the  dead,  the  living  stept, 
Still  charging  on  the  guns  which  swept 
The  slippery  streets  of  Monterey." 


254  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

But  the  enemy,  seldom  visible,  appeared  to  be  everywhere. 
A  large  part  of  the  groping  Americans  got  in  front  of  Purisima 
bridge,  and  went  down  fast  under  a  rain  of  bullets  from  the 
tete  de  pont,  while  Captain  Gutierrez,  who  had  now  masked 
his  gun  on  the  opposite  bank,. poured  grape  and  canister  upon 
them  at  short  range.  Ridgely  came  up  and  fired  several  times 
at  the  bridgehead,  but  without  effect.  Among  our  troops,  as 
one  of  the  surgeons  wrote,  "All  was  confusion."  Smoke  hid 
the  outlook;  and  the  Mexican  shots,  breaking  the  limestone, 
mortar  and  adobe,  raised  a  blinding  dust.  The  assailants 
did  not  know  where  to  turn  or  what  to  do.  Taylor,  Butler, 
Hamer,  Quitman  and  other  officers  shouted  orders  that  few 
could  hear  amidst  the  uproar,  and  perhaps  fewer  could  reconcile. 
It  was  proposed  to  cut  through  from  house  to  house,  but  the 
necessary  implements  had  not  been  brought.  Ridgely's  and 
Bragg's  batteries  and  the  captured  Mexican  guns  fired  on  El 
Diablo,  and  finally  the  24-pound  howitzers  were^brought  in; 
but  nothing  could  be  accomplished  in  that  way.  (Many  of  the 
best  and  the  bravest  fell ;  and  eventually,  at  about  five  o'clock, 
^  the  Americans  retreated  from  all  of  Monterey  except  the  Teneria 
redoubt  and  a  few  adjacent  buildings.10 

So  the  fight  ended.  It  hacLbeen  one  long  scene  of  gallantry, 
confusion,  mistakes  and  wastey  Lieutenant  D.  H.  Hill,  after- 
wards General  Hill  of  the"  Confederate  army,  wrote  in  his 
journal  on  learning  the  details :  "  It  seems  that  every  sort  of 
folly  was  committed."  To  pitch  handfuls  of  infantry  into  an 
unknown  maze  of  obstacles,  fortifications  and  cannon  as  if 
they  had  been  fighting  Indians  in  a  Florida  swamp,  and  to 
send  field  batteries  into  narrow  streets  —  in  the  suburb  crooked, 
too  —  against  heavy  stone  works  and  roofs  filled  with  pro- 
tected marksmen  was  extraordinary.  And,  it  was  credibly 
reported,  Taylor  did  more.  He  ordered  Ridgely  out  into  the 
open  to  try  conclusions  with  El  Diablo.  Ridgely  was  abso- 
lutely fearless.  To  satisfy  the  General  he  went  out  himself 
and  reconnoitred,  but  he  would  not  lead  his  battery  to  de- 
struction. The  Tennessee  regiment  was  needlessly  taken 
back  and  forth  six  times  within  range  of  the  citadel. 10 

Now  —  to  get  shelter,  food,  ammunition  —  the  troops  had 
to  march  separately  or  in  groups  all  the  way  to  camp,  exposed 
for  a  long  distance  not  only  to  the  citadel  guns  but  also  to  the 


A  COSTLY  AMERICAN  TRIUMPH  255 

lancers,  who  nearly  caused  a  disaster  and  might  have  done 
so,  had  all,  instead  of  but  a  part  of  them,  obeyed  the  order  to 
charge.  A  howitzer,  aided  by  the  captured  guns,  still  ex- 
changed compliments  now  and  then  with  El  Diablo,  but  the 
battle  of  the  day  was  over.  A  redoubt  had  been  won,  and 
Worth's  operations  against  the  Federation  Ridge  redoubts  had 
been  assisted ;  but  these  advantages  might  have  been  gained 
far  more  cheaply.10 

The  Teneria  position  was  garrisoned  for  the  night  by  Gar- 
land's exhausted  command,  the  Kentucky  regiment  (Louisville 
Legion),  which  had  been  on  guard  at  the  mortar,  and  Ridgely's 
battery.  This  was  not  an  agreeable  task.  The  rain  fell  in 
torrents,  and  the  interior  of  the  fort  was  so  thoroughly  searched 
by  the  guns  of  El  Diablo,  that  a  part  of  the  men  had  to  lie  on 
their  backs  in  the  mud.  Some  defences  were  thrown  up, 
however;  Tuesday  morning  Quitman's  brigade  relieved  the 
garrison ;  and  Taylor's  men,  cheered  now  by  the  sight  of  their 
comrades  taking  Independence  Hill,  were  given  a  necessary 
rest.  Both  sides  used  their  artillery  to  some  extent,  and  in 
spite  of  the  Mexican  fire  our  position  was  further  strengthened ; 
but  on  this  day  nothing  was  done  at  the  eastern  end  to  assist 
Worth.10 

During  Tuesday  night  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  in  motion. 
They  should  have  made  an  attack ;  and  the  Americans  —  with- 
out blankets,  overcoats  or  food,  soaked  with  rain,  and  chilled 
by  a  north  wind  —  passed  the  hours  reconnoitring  or  standing 
in  water  behind  their  breastwork.  Far,  however,  from  Ampu- 
dia's  mind  was  the  thought  of  a  vigorous  offensive.  Dismayed 
by  the  cutting  of  his  communications  and  by  the  stubborn 
valor  of  the  Americans,  and  weakened  by  the  cowardice  of 
certain  officers,  he  ordered  all  the  outworks  abandoned,  and 
concentrated  his  forces  in  and  near  the  grand  plaza.  Such  a 
change  could  not  be  made  at  night  without  much  con- 
fusion. Many  of  the  troops,  too,  were  indignant;  some 
refused  to  leave  their  posts;  all  felt  disheartened,  and  a  few 
broke  out  in  riotous  disorder.  The  work  of  fortifying  the 
inner  line  went  on,  but  the  loss  of  morale  far  more  than  offset 
this  advantage.10 

At  daybreak  Wednesday,  suspecting  that  the  Mexicans  had 
left  or  were  leaving  El  Diablo,  Quitman  advanced,  and  found 


256  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

that  both  men  and  guns  had  been  withdrawn;  but  other 
works  not  far  distant  were  still  held  too  strongly  to  be  captured. 
Attempts  were  made  to  gain  ground  in  various  directions; 
and  finally,  an  hour  or  two  before  noon,  with  assistance  from 
the  Second  Texas  regiment,  dismounted,  and  the  Third  and 
the  Fourth  Infantry,  extensive  and  well-supported  operations 
began  to  be  undertaken.  In  particular,  a  systematic  plan 
of  breaking  through  the  continuous  line  of  houses  and  firing 
from  the  roofs  was  adopted.  At  each  cross-street  vigorous 
fighting  had  to  be  done,  for  the  Mexicans,  though  inferior  as 
marksmen,  resisted  obstinately  at  every  favorable  point;  and 
the  musketry  and  artillery  behind  their  barricades  swept  the 
approaches  fiercely.  Five  out  of  the  twelve  commissioned 
officers  of  the  Third  Infantry  were  killed,  says  General  Grant. 
Two  sections  of  field  artillery  came  up,  but  the  gunners  were 
shot  down  rapidly  in  spite  of  all  precautions;  and  at  length, 
finding  the  pieces  too  light  for  effective  service,  Taylor  ordered 
them  to  retire.  A  gun  at  the  Teneria  redoubt  was  tried, 
but  after  a  time  the  advance  of  the  Americans  made  it  dangerous 
to  fire  toward  the  plaza.10 

The  infantry  pushed  on,  however,  and  by  three  o'clock  were 
only  one  square  from  the  grand  plaza.  Here  ammunition 
began  to  fail,  and  Lieutenant  Grant,  hanging  over  the  side 
of  his  horse  by  an  arm  and  a  foot,  dashed  across  the  streets 
too  swiftly  to  be  fired  at,  and  went  in  search  of  it.  With 
a  view  to  preparing  for  a  general  assault,  however,  or  for  some 
other  reason  Taylor  ordered  the  troops,  now  working  safely 
inside  the  houses,  to  withdraw  —  under  fire,  of  course.  Re- 
luctantly, though  many  of  them  had  not  eaten  for  thirty-six 
hours,  they  marched  back  to  the  redoubts  and  thence  after 
dark  to  Walnut  Grove ;  and  the  Ohio  and  Kentucky  regiments 
went  on  duty  at  the  captured  redoubts.10 

Strangely  enough,  Taylor  seems  to  have  made  no  effort, 
after  the  storming  of  the  Bishop's  Palace,  to  arrange  with 
General  Worth  for  concerted  action  or  to  give  him  fresh  orders, 
although  he  could  easily  have  done  so,  and  knew  that  all  the 
work  assigned  to  that  division  had  been  completed.  Wednes- 
day morning,  therefore,  after  the  long,  deep  slumber  of  exhaus- 
tion, Worth's  men  found  themselves  mostly  in  idleness,  and 
a  large  part  of  them,   concentrated  near  the  Palace,  gazed 


WORTH  ADVANCES  AGAIN  257 

upon  the  city  at  their  leisure  as  the  dissolving  mists  revealed 
it.  Not  far  away  in  the  suburb  were  General  Arista's  gardens, 
full  of  orange,  lemon,  pomegranate  and  fig  trees,  bananas, 
grapes  and  flowers,  watered  by  canals  that  sparkled  in  the 
sun.  Once  in  a  while  a  blue-frocked  monk,  girded  with  a  white 
cord  and  tassel,  could  be  seen ;  and  flashes  from  the  streams  that 
ran  through  almost  every  street  were  caught  here  and  there. 
Beyond  lay  the  white  or  lightly  tinted  houses  with  leafy  squares 
here  and  there,  dominated  by  the  cathedral  spires.  At  due 
intervals  the  clock  bell  peacefully  tolled  the  hour  or  the  quarter. 
On  the  left  the  dark  citadel  belched  occasionally  a  cloud  of 
white  smoke.  On  the  right  the  Santa  Catarina  hurried  along 
between  the  city  and  the  picturesque  villas  on  its  opposite 
bank.  Farther  away,  but  still  near,  the  twisted  strata  and  the 
vast,  splintered  buttresses,  battlements  and  pinnacles  of  the 
Sierra  Madre,  thinly  draped  with  soft  clouds,  towered  aloft; 
and  overhead  great  birds  that  seemed  to  be  eagles  travelled 
like  dark  planets  round  their  orbits  in  the  blue.10 

But  though  they  gazed  with  deep  interest,  these  haggard 
fellows  with  bloodshot  eyes  were  not  in  a  mood  to  enjoy  the 
scene.  No  orders  came  from  Taylor.  Hardly  a  shot  had 
been  heard  this  morning  from  the  lower  town.  Mexicans 
boasted  of  gaining  a  victory  on  that  side,  and  "Your  turn  will 
come  next,"  our  men  were  told.  Heavy  reinforcements  from 
Saltillo,  it  was  rumored,  would  soon  arrive  by  the  pass.  Worth, 
nervous  and  anxious,  climbed  to  the  Palace  tower  with  his 
glass,  and  searched  every  quarter  for  news.  Meantime  the 
cannon  were  planted  at  more  commanding  points.  A  howitzer 
opened  on  the  town.  Preparations  to  make  an  assault  were 
continued ;  and,  as  Mexicans  from  the  south  were  now  said 
to  be  approaching,  a  detachment  went  about  three  miles  up  the 
Saltillo  highway  to  a  strong  position.  An  hour  or  two  before 
noon,  however,  the  roar  of  battle  began  to  come  from  the 
lower  town;  and  Worth,  judging  that  it  meant  a  serious 
attack,  ordered  a  column  forward  by  each  of  the  two  main 
streets.10 

With  a  cheer  that  sounded  like  a  roar  the  troops  hurried 
down  the  slope,  and  burst  into  the  suburb.  For  some  time 
the  work  was  easy,  for  in  fear  of  the  Libertad  guns  all  the  west- 
ern section  had  been  evacuated ;  and  raising  a  fierce  cry  that 
vol.  i  —  s 


258  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

afterwards  came  to  be  known  as  the  "rebel  yell,"  which  began 
with  a  growl  and  rose  to  a  falsetto  scream,  the  Americans 
dashed  on  at  a  run.  Beyond  the  cemetery,  however,  Mexican 
troops  opened  fire,  and  until  some  of  Duncan's  and  Mackall's 
guns  came  up,  fought  like  demons.  Barricaded  streets  and 
garrisoned  roofs  were  next  encountered,  and  again  the  Ameri- 
cans dived  into  the  houses.  Making  a  small  hole  in  the  wall 
that  divided  two  dwellings  they  would  drop  through  it  a  six- 
inch  shell  with  a  three-seconds  fuse  lighted,  and  throw  them- 
selves flat.  Results  followed  promptly.  The  aperture  was 
then  enlarged;  and  crawling  through,  they  repeated  the 
operation,  while  the  best  marksmen  fought  from  the  roof.10 

Taylor's  withdrawal  from  the  city,  however,  supplied  the 
Mexicans  with  reinforcements.  The  enemy  fairly  seemed  to 
swarm,  and  their  courage  seemed  to  rise.  "  Cannons  and  small 
arms  flashed,  crashed  and  roared  like  one  mighty  storm  of 
wind,  rain,  hail,  thunder  and  lightning,"  wrote  a  soldier; 
while  the  thud  of  planks  against  heavy  doors  and  the  blows 
of  pickaxes  on  walls  of  stone  swelled  the  uproar.  Once  the 
advance  was  halted.  But  Colonel  Hays,  a  shy  man  with  a 
broad  forehead,  a  Roman  nose,  brilliant,  restless  hazel  eyes, 
and  the  courage  of  twenty  lions  packed  in  his  delicate  frame, 
had  been  a  prisoner  in  the  Monterey  post-office  once,  and  had 
sworn  a  great  oath  to  sleep  this  night  in  the  post-office  or  in 
hell,  and  nothing  could  stop  him/  By  dark  the  Americans 
were  only  a  square  from  the  market-place,  and  the  Colonel 
had  the  postal  accommodations  at  his  command.10 

Ampudia's  case  was  by  no  means  desperate  even  now. 
His  losses  had  been  small  —  twenty-nine  officers  and  338 
men  killed  and  wounded,  according  to  his  report.  There 
were  provisions,  ammunition  and  artillery  enough ;  the  strong 
buildings  round  the  plaza  and  market-place,  defended  with 
resolution  by  a  large  garrison,  could  not  easily  have  been 
taken ;  and  the  division  of  the  Americans  into  widely  separated 
commands  invited  a  sortie.10) 

The  situation  was,  however,  by  no  means  agreeable.  After 
nightfall  the  Americans  planted  two  howitzers  and  a  6-pounder 
on  the  top  of  a  high  building  close  to  the  western  side  of  the 
plaza.  Taylor's  mortar  had  been  carried  to  Worth  during 
the  day,  and  after  sunset  it  began  to  fire  now  and  then  on  the 


NEGOTIATIONS  259 

cathedral,  where  tons  of  gunpowder  were  stored.  The  citadel 
undertook  to  reply,  but  the  mortar,  planted  behind  the  stone 
wall  of  the  cemetery,  was  not  likely  to  be  struck,  and  a  single 
one  of  its  bombs  might  conceivably  have  blown  the  Mexican 
army  to  pieces.  In  fact  so  might  a  shot  from  Taylor's  24- 
pound  howitzers,  which  delivered  two  shells  effectively  after 
dark.  On  the  southern  side  of  the  river,  opposite  the  town, 
the  Fifth  Infantry  had  planted  one  of  the  El  Soldado  guns  at 
the  third  work  on  Federation  ridge,  where  it  could  at  least 
have  proved  annoying.  The  horses  of  the  cavalry  were  in 
the  way.  The  garrison  of  the  citadel  could  not  promptly 
cooperate  with  the  troops  in  town,  for  it  had  sealed  up  the  exit. 
Ampudia's  defensive  policy  discouraged  the  soldiers,  for  even 
though  some  of  them  flanked  the  retiring  Americans  on  Wednes- 
day afternoon,  they  were  not  permitted  to  reoccupy  the 
houses  abandoned  by  Taylor,  and  still  less  to  attack  the  re- 
doubts. Despondency  was  general;  some  of  the  leading 
officers  urged  surrender;  and  Ampudia,  it  was  reported, 
keeping  the  choicest  corps  near  his  person,  shut  himself  up 
in  the  cathedral  until  a  shell  dropped  near  it,  and  then  fled 
to  a  private  house.10 

(Naturally,  then,  early  on  Thursday  morning  one  of  his 
aides  carried  to  the  American  general  a  proposition  to  give 
up  the  city,  and  retire  with  the  troops  and  military  material. 
Taylor  replied  with  a  demand  for  unconditional  surrender, 
and  insisted  upon  having  an  answer  by  noon.  Instead  of 
complying  Ampudia  sent  a  request  for  a  personal  interview. 
The  result  was  a  joint  commission.  Vexatious  negotiations 
followed.  The  tedious  and  wily  methods  of  Mexican  diplomacy 
were  thoroughly  tried;  but  at  length  an  ultimatum  from 
Taylor's  representatives  ended  the  affair,  and  the  terms  of 
capitulation  were  signed.  These  provided  that  the  citadel 
should  be  given  up  immediately,  that  within  a  week  the 
Mexican  troops  with  their  arms,  accoutrements  and  six  field 
pieces  should  retire  —  without  giving  their  parole  not  to  fight 
again  —  beyond  the  line  of  Rinconada  Pass,  Linares  and  San 
Fernando  de  Presas,  that  before  this  evacuation  of  Monterey 
the  town  should  be  occupied  by  the  Americans  for  hospital 
and  storage  purposes  only,  and  that  for  eight  weeks — "or 
until  the  orders  or  instructions  of  the  respective  governments 


260  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

caiKbe  received"  —  the  Americans  would  not  cross  the  specified 
line£) 

As  Polk  asserted  and  the  General  himself  admitted,  Taylor 
violated  his  orders  in  granting  such  terms,  and  his  excuses  for 
doing  so  were  signally  unconvincing,  while  some  of  them 
involved  perhaps  the  virtual  assumption  on  his  part  of  a  political 
authority  superior  to  the  President's.  But  substantial  reasons 
for  the  terms  did  exist.  "  Considering  our  situation,"  explained 
the  General  privately,  they  were  not  over-liberal ;  and  that 
was  true.  Being  very  short  of  ammunition  and  provisions, 
he  could  only  negotiate,  assault  or  retreat.  According  to  his 
spokesmen  in  the  Senate,  his  effectives  numbered  only  some 
5000  and  probably  they  did  not  reach  those  figures.  About 
one  third  of  them  had  no  bayonets.  The  First  Division  of 
regulars  had  been  crippled ;  the  Second  was  tired  out ;  and 
the  volunteers  had  been  so  far  demoralized,  that  in  Meade's 
opinion  they  could  no  longer  be  depended  upon.  Worth, 
chief  American  representative  on  the  joint  commission,  had 
not  "the  slightest  confidence"  left  in  Taylor's  leadership, 
and  wrote  privately  that  "many  others"  shared  his  opinion, 
while  a  still  greater  number  felt  doubtful.12 

With  such  troops,  feeble  artillery  and  scant  ammunition, 
to  attack  an  enemy  of  proved  fighting  quality,  now  at  bay  in 
stone  houses,  fully  supplied  with  guns  and  munitions,  and 
comparatively  fresh,  was  not  an  inviting  proposition.  In 
short,  as  Crittenden  and  Clayton  stated  in  defence  of  Taylor 
on  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  it  was  not  feasible  to  storm  the 
city ;  and  to  retreat  with  sick  and  wounded  over  such  a  route, 
pursued  by  mobile  infantry  and  sleepless  mounted  men,  and 
harried  by  an  exultant  population,  would  have  meant  ruin. 
It  was  a  wise  course  to  escape  from  this  dilemma  as  he  did, 
and  the  truth  could  not  be  told.12  *. 

*  ^September  25  the  citadel  was  evacuated)  and  the  next  day 
with  drums  beating  and  banners  flying  the  first  brigade  of 
Mexicans  left  the  city  —  all  noting  with  curious  interest  the 
difference  between  their  trim  uniforms  and  freshly  pipe-clayed 
belts  and  the  unkempt  appearance  of  the  victors,  who,  as  an 
American  said,  were  as  dirty  as  they  could  be  without  becoming 
real  estate.  The  second  brigade  followed  on  the-next  day,  and 
the  rest  of  the  troops  on  the  twenty-eighth.   (Monterey,  with 


MONTEREY  OCCUPIED  261 

a  quantity  of  indifferent  gunpowder  and  a  number  of  cannon, 
many  of  them  bad,  was  ours,  and  soon  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  whom  a  costly  but  valorous  battle  impressed  far  more 
than  orderly,  scientific  operations  could  have  done,  were  again 
acclaiming  Taylor.)  By  distance,  by  his  courage,  by  his  pictur- 
esque individuality,  and  by  his  very  position  as  commander 
of  the  one  American  army  fighting  the  Mexicans,  he  was 
idealized.  His  excellent  reports  —  the  work  of  Bliss  —  con- 
firmed every  favorable  impression ;  and  the  writers  of  the  day, 
fully  aware  that  he  was  already  a  popular  hero  and  anxious 
to  suit  the  prevailing  taste,  colored  the  facts  until  these  could 
hardly  be  recognized.  (. Men  on_  the  ground,  in  contact  with 
the  crude  realities,  felt  otherwise.)  Taylor's  want  of  prevision 
and  of  generalship  was  in  fact  bitterly  censured  there.  Worth 
"is  the  high  comb  cock  of  the  army,"  wrote  one  officer.  He 
has  won  all  the  laurels,  though  Taylor  will  have  the  glory  at 
honxe,  remarked  a  surgeon.13 

(As  for  the  conduct  of  the  troops  in  general,  however,  there 
could  be  only  one  opinion.  "  Three  glorious  days,"  was  General 
Scott's  description  of  the  struggle.  War  is  —  war.  Dread- 
ful things  were  done,  splendid  men  were  cut  down.  Yet  if 
there  be  glory  in  fidelity  and  courage,  in  meeting  extraordinary 
hardships,  and  in  triumphing  oveR  extraordinary  difficulties, 
then  Scott's  description  was  correct.13) 


XIII 

SALTILLO,  PARRAS,  TAMPICO 

August-December,  1846 

(  For  men  supposed  to  have  won  a  splendid  victory,  Ta\lor  and 
his  army  seem  to  have  been  rather  low  in  their  spirits  after  the 
capture  of  Monterey.  Taylor  admitted  that  his  forces  had 
been  "greatly  reduced^'  Learning  that  a  part  of  the  Second 
Infantry  had  arrived  on  the  Rio  Grande,  he  described  this 
trifling  reinforcement  as  "most  welcome."  The  Texas  troops 
wished  to  go  home  and  were  discharged.  To  replace  them  he 
counted  on  the  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  horse;  but  these 
regiments,  having  been  ordered  to  San  Antonio,  were  long  in 
reaching  the  front.  October  15  he  estimated  his  aggregate 
effective  strength  as  less  than  ^OOO.1  Chills  and  fever,  a 
depressing  malady,  was  extremely  prevalent;  and  a  strong 
tendency  to  desert  appeared  to  indicate  a  generally  unsatis- 
factory state  of  things.2  Not  only  priests  but  Mexican  officers 
remaining  at  Monterey  to  convalesce  or  to  care  for  the  sick, 
stimulated  this  tendency ;  and  about  the  middle  of  November 
all  such  officers,  not  indispensably  needed  by  the  sick  and 
wounded,  received  peremptory  orders  to  go  south.  A  little 
later,  it  was  reported,  the  alcalde  was  imprisoned  for  the  same 
offence.  Moreover  bands  of  Mexicans,  not  dismayed  by  the 
American  triumphs,  hung  upon  Taylor's  lines  to  rob  and  kill.6 
The  General  had  other  troubles  also.  There  was  a  plan  at 
Washington,  promoted  by  reports  of  his  inefficiency  and  by 
letters  from  certain  ambitious  officers  left  in  the  rear,  to  put 
in  his  place  one  of  the  new  brigadier  generals.  Scott,  however, 
protected  his  interests,  i,nd  by  having  him  assigned  to  duty 
with  his  brevet  rank,  threw  a  great  obstacle  before  the  schemers. 
They  encountered  other  difficulties  as  well,  and  finally  Polk 
sent  him  word  confidentially  that  he  need  have  no  fear  of  dis- 

262 


TAYLOR  AND  THE  GOVERNMENT  263 

placement.  This,  however,  did  not  prevent  a  serious  clash 
between  him  and  the  administration  over  another  matter. 
Perceiving  that  Mexico  could  not  defend  effectively  the  remote 
and  disaffected  provinces  of  the  north  against  even  our  volun- 
teer forces,  realizing  that  the  possession  of  territory  would  be 
an  advantage  in  making  a  treaty,  and  wishing  particularly 
to  impress  the  Mexican  Congress,  which  was  to  meet  on  D  cem- 
ber  6,  Polk  felt  extremely  anxious  to  extend  our  occupation 
as  much  as  possible  at  once,  and  with  all  this  in  view  it  was 
proposed  to  Taylor  on  September  22  that,  should  he  see  fit, 
he  should  have  General  Patterson,3  who  was  now  the  command- 
ing officer  at  Camargo,  occupy  the  chief  points  in  Tamaulipas.6 
As  Taylor  had  bitterly  complained  of  receiving  hordes  of 
volunteers  for  whom  there  was  nothing  to  do,  it  was  naturally 
presumed  at  Washington  that  such  an  expedition  could  be 
organized  without  interference  with  his  plans;  and,  supposing 
also  that  Patterson  was  at  Matamoros,  far  from  Monterey, 
Marcy  instructed  that  general  to  begin  his  preparations  while 
awaiting  definitive  orders  from  Taylor  on  the  subject.  Such 
a  movement,  however,  not  being  permissible  under  the  terms 
of  the  armistice,  a  plan  in  which  the  government  felt  deeply 
interested  came  to  nothing;  and  Taylor,  perhaps  to  divert 
attention  from  this  aspect  of  the  case,  not  only  vetoed  the 
expedition,  but  protested  violently  against  the  course  of  the 
government  in  addressing  one  of  his  officers.4  Polk  was  natu- 
rally and  properly  incensed,  but  he  believed  Taylor  was  now 
in  the  field  for  the  Whig  Presidential  nomination,  and  wanted 
to  force  a  quarrel  upon  the  administration ;  and  hence  Marcy 
replied  mildly  to  the  General  that  the  right  of  the  commander- 
in-chief  to  offer  mere  "suggestions"  could  hardly  be  denied.6 
(On  another  point  also  there  was  a  clash.  Polk  and  his 
Cabinet  ^condemned  at  once  and  unanimously  the  Monterey 
armistice  j)  but,  shrewdly  or  charitably  suspecting  that  undis- 
closed reasons  for  it  might  have  existed,  they  decided  to  end 
it  in  such  a  manner  as  to  express  neither  approval  nor  censure. 
Marcy  therefore  directed  on  October  13  that  it  Should  be 
terminated,  explaining  that  it  stood  in  the  way  of  prosecuting 
the  war  vigorously  and  forcing  Mexico  to  seek  peace.  As  by 
its  terms  the  agreement  was  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
respective  governments,  no  difficulty  stood  in  the  way  of  cancel- 


264  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

ling  it;  and  on  November  5  Taylor  notified  Santa  Anna,  that 
since  the  Washington  authorities  disapproved  of  the  armistice, 
he  should  consider  himself  at  liberty  to  resume  offensive  opera- 
tions on  the  fifteenth,  since  by  that  date  he  reckoned  that  his 
despatch  would  reach  San  Luis  Potosi.6 

In  reply  the  wily  Mexican  attempted  to  convey  an  insinu- 
ation of  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  the  American  government. 
This  Taylor  properly  noticed  in  his  rejoinder,  expressing  at 
the  same  time  a  hope  that  Mexico  would  accept  the  offer  of 
the  United  States  to  negotiate,  and  that  permanent  friendly 
relations  between  the  two  republics  might  ensue.  Santa 
Anna  had  now  a  better  opening;  and  he  protested  that  his 
country  would  do  all  she  could  to  justify  her  title  to  sovereignty 
and  independence,  and  would  never  listen  to  any  proposal  of 
peace,  until  the  American  army  should  evacuate  her  soil,  and 
the  American  vessels  lay  aside  their  hostile  attitude.5  The  cor- 
respondence was  published  of  course  in  the  Diario,  and  obviously 
tended  to  unite  the  nation,  as  well  as  to  enhance  the  prestige 
of  jts  leader.6 

rThe  termination  of  the  armistice  enabled  Taylor  to  occupy 
Salfillo,  upon  which  his  eye  had  long  been  fixed.  For  several 
reasons  he  deemed  the  town,  a  place  of  some  18,000  souls, 
important.  It  was  the  capital  of  the  state  of  Coahuila,  a 
support  for  Monterey  and  the  chief  pass  through  the  Sierra 
Madre)  a  station  on  the  high  road  to  the  south,  and  the  dominat- 
ing point  in  a  region  full  of  corn,  wheat,  cattle  and  other  supplies. 
At  this  time  the  city  was  entirely  without  protection.  Mejia 
had  been  ordered  in  May  to  fortify  it,  but  had  not  been  able 
to  do  so;  and  Santa  Anna's  first  thought,  on  learning  that 
Monterey  had  capitulated,  was  to  bring  Ampudia  back  to  San 
Luis  Potosi  with  his  demoralized  soldiers.10 

Accordingly  General  Worth  received  orders  on  November  8 
to  march  for  that  place  four  days  later  with  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Duncan's  battery,  the  Artillery  Battalion  (eight  companies), 
the  Fifth  and  the  Eighth  Infantry,  and  Blanchard's  Company — 
in  all  abo'ut  1000  men ; 7  and  Taylor  with  two  squadrons  of 
the  Second  Dragoons  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  May  deter- 
mined to  accompany  him.  The  morning  of  the  twelfth  brought 
a  despatch  from  Marcy  dated  October  22,  expressing  the  wish 
of  the  government  that,  in  view  of  Santa  Anna's  threatening 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  SALTILLO  265 

posture  and*  the  increasing  unfriendliness  of  the  people,  no 
attempt  should  be  made  to  hold  territory  beyond  Monterey, 
or  at  most  beyond  the  mountains;  but  the  decision  was  con- 
fided to  the  General,  and  he  set  out  the  next  day.10 

Advancing,  then,  by  the  left  bank  of  the  swift  Santa  Catarina 
River,  at  this  time  of  the  year  but  an  insignificant  stream,  the 
column  ascended  gradually,  passed  the  village  of  that  name, 
and  after  marching  nearly  28  miles  came  to  a  small  bridge 
and  a  group  of  handsome  live-oaks.  Next  the  road  descended 
a  little,  and,  enclosed  much  of  the  way  by  lines  of  trees  and 
maguey,8  pursued  the  same  general  direction  until  it  reached 
the  hacienda  of  Rinconada,  a  mile  or  so  farther  on.  Up  to 
this  point  the  majestic  ranges  of  the  Sierra  Madre,  nearly 
destitute  of  vegetation,  though  here  and  there  brightened  by 
a  white  thread  of  water,  had  stood  about  six  miles  apart ;  but 
now  they  closed  in,  and  the  road,  turning  sharply  to  the  left, 
plunged  into  a  grand  and  sombre  gorge  known  as  the  Pass  of 
Rinconada.  For  three  miles  or  more  it  ascended  steeply 
between  gray  and  frowning  walls  of  stone  decorated  only  with 
a  few  hardy  and  prickly  growths,  and  sometimes  partly  hidden 
by  the  clouds ;  but  finally  the  summit  was  gained,  and  before 
long  the  farm  of  Los  Muertos  (The  Dead)  came  in  sight  with 
its  bare,  vertical  cliffs  and  its  huge  cairn  of  cobble-stones  — 
probably  a  memorial  to  some  party  of  travellers  murdered  by 
robbers  —  which  gave  a  grim  significance  to  the  name.10 

Here  the  Americans  gazed  with  special  interest  at  Mexican 
works  intended  to  check  their  advance.  Not  willing  to  give 
up  this  natural  fastness  Ampudia,  in  spite  of  the  orders  to 
withdraw,  had  undertaken  to  fortify  it;  but  soon,  discovering 
that  more  extensive  defences  than  he  possessed  the  means 
to  erect  and  equip  would  be  needful,  to  prevent  the  position 
from  being  turned,  he  had  prudently  concluded  to  dismantle 
his  fortifications  and  retreat.  The  gorge  now  expanded,  and 
gave  place  to  a  long,  wide,  open  valley  extending  to  Saltillo. 
Here  gardens,  fields  and  crops  were  seen  once  more,  but  how 
different !  Instead  of  the  orange  and  lemon  groves,  the  bananas 
and  figs  of  Monterey,  with  the  languid  smokes  of  sugar-houses 
rising  in  the  distance,  the  soldiers  beheld  fields  of  wheat  and 
oats,  and  orchards  of  cherries  and  apples.  In  short,  a  march 
of  65  or  70  miles  had  transported  them  to  New  England.10 


266  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Gathered  with  great  difficulty  on  November  15,  the  legis- 
lature of  Coahuila  had  elected  and  inaugurated  J.  M.  de  Aguirre 
as  governor,  and  on  approaching  Saltillo  the  following  day 
Taylor  received  from  him  a  formal  protest  against  the  American 
advance.9  The  General  kept  on,  however,  without  replying, 
and  leaving  Worth's  command  in  the  city  square,  pitched  his 
tent  on  the  farther  side  of  the  town.  There  was  little  to  make 
the  place  agreeable.  Saltillo  lay  on  the  southeastern  side  of 
a  slightly  concave  plain,  with  mountains  close  behind  it  that 
looked,  in  the  afternoon  of  a  sunny  day,  like  immense  drifts 
of  dusty  snow.  The  city  itself,  consisting  mostly  of  low  adobe 
houses  —  protected  with  grated  windows  —  clinging  to  steep, 
narrow  streets,  wore  the  aspect  of  dilapidation  and  age  that 
was  characteristic  of  provincial  Mexico;  and  the  common 
people,  apparently  less  intelligent  then  the  populace  of  Mon- 
terey, probably  more  dominated  by  the  priests,  and  certainly 
more  secluded  from  contact  with  Americans,  looked  sullen 
and  hostile.10 

Some  of  better  standing  attempted  to  charge  exorbitant 
prices;  but  the  General  promptly  seized  whatever  supplies 
he  could  lay  hands  upon,  ascertained  the  owners,  and  proposed 
to  pay  what  had  been  the  current  rates  or  nothing.  He  treated 
the  chief  magistrate  well,  however,  assuring  him  that  his 
desire  was  to  see  peace  restored  as  soon  as  possible,  and  good 
order  preserved  meanwhile  at  Saltillo;  and  after  ordering 
certain  reconnaissances  made  in  the  surrounding  region,  he 
set  out  for  Monterey  about  the  twenty-first.  His  gruff,  un- 
polished ways  did  not  entirely  please  the  Mexicans,  and  they 
were  glad  to  find  themselves  now  under  the  courtly  Worth, 
to  whom  they  ascribed  "better  feelings."  10 

Meanwhile  two  other  American  commands,  one  on  each 
side  of  Taylor,  were  conducting  aggressive  operations.  If 
the  occupation  of  Tamaulipas  was  likely  to  influence  Mexico 
and  facilitate  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty,  so  was  that  of  Chihua- 
hua ;  and  the  western  as  well  as  the  eastern  of  these  provinces 
was  believed  to  be  disaffected  toward  the  general  government 
on  account  of  the  overthrow  of  the  federal  constitution.  As 
early,  therefore,  as  the  middle  of  May,  Polk  proposed  to  the 
Cabinet  an  expedition  against  Chihuahua,  and  the  suggestion 
was   immediately   accepted.     Naturally   such   a   diversion   of 


THE  CHIHUAHUA  EXPEDITION  267 

strength  from  an  effective  line  of  attack  to  a  remote  section, 
where  the  people  were  hardly  strong  enough  to  cope  with  the 
savages,  occasioned  both  at  the  time  and  later  much  criticism ; 
and  not  only  on  this,  but  on  other  grounds  as  well,  the  Presi- 
dent's action  in  the  matter  could  be  criticized  fairly.11 

Indeed,  in  almost  every  case  that  required  a  thorough  com- 
prehension of  the  Mexican  problem,  he  blundered.  Yet  this 
was  not  his  fault.  He  did  his  best;  and  one  is  tempted  to 
lay  the  charge  against  a  system  of  government  which  confers 
on  politicians,  ignorant  or  poorly  informed  regarding  vital 
matters,  the  honors  and  responsibilities  of  statesmanship. 
So  broad  a  censure  is,  however,  unjust,  as  one  scarcely  needs 
to  say.  At  all  events  we  do  not  place  in  power,  as  others  have 
done,  mere  faineants  or  persons  qualified  only  for  social  func- 
tions and  palace  intrigues.  Very  few  Americans  reach  a  high 
public  station  unless  they  have  ability  of  some  kind,  a  more 
or  less  healthful  ambition  to  achieve,  and  much  force  of  char- 
acter ;  and  thus  we  stand  about  as  well  perhaps  as  the  Chinese, 
who  used  to  reason  that  a  man  who  could  surpass  a  multitude 
of  rivals  in  memorizing  —  and  thus  absorbing  more  or  less 
fully  —  the  best  thought  and  language  of  his  race,  would  be 
able  to  perform  the  commonplace  duties  of  a  magistrate.  In 
reality  our  troubles  arise  from  the  infirmities  of  human  nature 
and  the  defectiveness  of  all  human  institutions,  no  doubt, 
and  this  reflection  may  help  us  feel  the  proper  resignation  as 
we  view  the  blunders  of  the  Mexican  war;  yet  one  cannot 
quite  forget  the  opinion  of  Meade  :  "Well  may  we  be  grateful 
that  we  are  at  war  with  Mexico!  Were  it  any  other  power, 
our  gross  follies  would  have  been  punished  severely."  n 

About  the  middle  of  June  Brigadier  General  Wool,  then  at 
Louisville,  received  instructions  to  take  command  at  San 
Antonio,  Texas  —  for  which  point  certain  troops  were  already 
under  orders  —  report  to  Taylor,  and  prepare  for  an  expedition 
against  Chihuahua.  He  proceeded  to  New  Orleans,  accord- 
ingly, and  from  there  he  wrote  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  July 
that  within  twenty  days,  he  hoped,  the  whole  of  his  force  would 
be  at  the  rendezvous.  In  this  he  was  disappointed.  La  Vaca, 
Texas,  about  160  miles  from  San  Antonio,  was  the  chief  base 
on  the  coast,12  and  wet  weather  made  the  so-called  roads 
almost    impassable.     To    get    1112    heavy  loads    of    supplies 


268  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

through  bottomless  mud,  churned  by  about  500  wagons  going 
and  returning,  was  an  almost  inconceivable  task.  Though 
excessive  rains  had  been  falling,  the  troops,  marching  under 
an  August  sun,  were  tormented  by  thirst ;  an  occasional  bunch 
of  delicious  grapes  or  slice  of  prime  venison  could  hardly  solace 
them  for  the  abundance  of  rattlesnakes,  tarantulas,  scorpions 
and  centipedes;  and  sleep  was  broken  by  the  screaming  of 
panthers  and  howling  of  wolves  —  positively  unearthly  when 
near,  one  of  the  soldiers  wrote,  and  resembling,  when  distant, 
the  wail  of  some  terrible  monster  gasping  for  life.  In  spite 
of  hardships  and  labors,  however,  men  and  wagons  finally 
reached  San  Antonio,  and  on  August  14  Wool  himself  arrived 
at  that  point.26 

Here  the  troops  had  time  to  rest,  and  they  found  much 
of  interest.  The  old  Mexican  town  —  where  one  could  still 
see  now  and  then  a  fig  tree  spreading  itself  in  the  patio  (court- 
yard) of  a  crumbling  house,  or  gaze  at  the  heavy,  earth-brown 
or  moss-covered  walls  of  the  Alamo,  pitted  by  Santa  Anna's 
cannon  balls  —  looked  in  their  eyes  like  some  ancient  oriental 
city  "just  dug  up,"  as  one  of  them  said;  and  the  cactus,  the 
live-oaks,  the  mocking-birds,  the  pellucid  river  and  the  many 
varieties  of  grapes  extinguished  soon  the  memory  of  past 
fatigues.26 

For  Wool,  on  the  other  hand,  there  was  no  repose.  Now, 
as  always  during  the  Mexican  war,  operations  were  unspeakably 
embarrassed  by  the  necessity  of  drawing  supplies  from  so 
great  a  distance  and  by  sea,  and  naturally  San  Antonio,  a 
town  of  only  some  2000  persons,  could  furnish  much  less  than 
cities  like  Vera  Cruz  or  even  Matamoros.  Each  particular 
article  that  would  be  necessary  on  the  expedition  had  to  be 
provided  now;  and  departmental  errors,  like  delaying  arms 
and  misdirecting  parts  of  wagons,  were  therefore  peculiarly 
unfortunate.  But  the  greate  t  difficulty  was  disorder  The 
command  was  a  chaotic  mass  like  that  on  the  Rio  Grande, 
turbulent,  impatient,  insubordinate.  Wool,  however,  attacked 
the  problem  without  shrinking,  and  what  a  soldier  called 
"  the  iron  hand "  of  military  discipline  soon  began  to  set  things 
right.26 

Highly  unfortunate,  therefore,  in  this  as  well  as  in  other 
regards,  was  an  escapade  of  Brevet  Colonel  Harney,  a  man 


HARNEY'S  ESCAPADE  269 

as  brave  as  a  lion  and  also  as  untamable,  who  had  been  occupy- 
ing San  Antonio  for  some  time  with  three  companies  of  the 
Second  Dragoons.  Obtaining  permission  to  ask  for  Texan 
troops  to  defend  the  frontier  against  the  Indians/3  he  called 
for  eight  companies,  and  shortly  before  Wool's  arrival,  on 
the  pretext  of  a  threatened  Mexican  invasion  of  which  he 
entertained  little  or  no  fear,  he  moved  off  with  his  entire  com- 
mand, although  he  knew  of  the  intended  concentration  at 
San  Antonio,  and  advanced  to  the  Rio  Grande.14  Imprudently 
crossing  the  river,  he  was  cut  off  by  one  of  its  quick  rises.  Only 
the  refusal  of  his  officers  to  follow  him  prevented  a  ridiculous 
dash  against  Monterey.  Finally,  near  the  end  of  August, 
he  obeyed  the  order  to  return,  but  left  three  companies  behind  ; 
and  a  part  of  this  detachment,  engaged  in  procuring  a  large 
supply  of  grain  and  flour  in  Mexico,  lost  the  supplies  and  three 
of  their  number,  killed  or  wounded.  The  rest  of  the  three 
companies  escaped  under  fire  in  a  disgraceful  manner,  burning 
public  stores  to  prevent  the  Mexicans  from  taking  them ;  and 
of  course  news  that  Americans  had  been  repulsed  flew  like  fire 
through  the  border.26 

Such  presumption  on  the  part  of  a  regular  officer,  such 
imprudence,  and  above  all  such  disregard  of  his  government's 
known  intentions  were  intolerable,  and  Wool  felt  them  with 
peculiar  intensity.  He  was  a  high-strung  person.  Being 
devoutly  pious  he  loathed  swearing,  for  example;  but  on 
special  occasions  his  feelings  got  the  better  of  his  tongue,  and 
when  this  occurred  he  would  instantly  raise  his  eyes  to  heaven 
and  implore  forgiveness.  While  not  a  great  man,  and  appar- 
ently incapable  of  inspiring  soldiers  or  gaining  their  sympathetic 
support,  he  understood  his  profession  and  lived  up  to  it.  When 
campaigning  he  seemed  to  sleep  —  if  he  slept  at  all  —  with 
both  eyes  open,  and  the  outposts  were  liable  to  receive  a  visit 
at  any  hour  of  the  night.  Never  sparing  hi  n  self,  he  was 
equally  stern  with  others;  and  towards  officers,  presumably 
more  intelligent  and  responsible  than  privates,  he  seemed 
especially  exacting.  So  now  he  treated  Harney  with  such 
rigor  that  some  of  the  volunteer  officers,  little  disposed  to  favor 
strict  discipline,  sympathized  with  the  culprit,  and  Wool  came 
to  be  regarded  by  not  a  few  as  a  narrow  martinet,  jealous 
and  harsh  in  temper  and  weak  in  judgment.     Possibly  some 


270  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

ground  for  these  opinions  could  be  found,  but  substantially 
they  were  unjust.15 

Finally,  on  September  23,  a  topographical  party  went  for- 
ward to  study  routes,  inquire  about  wood,  water  and  forage, 
and  select  halting  places ;  and  two  days  later  some  1400  men, 
the  first  section  of  the  "array,"  advanced  into  an  almost  un- 
known region  with  about  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  wagons 
and  provisions  for  two  months.16  The  distance  to  Presidio 
del  Rio  Grande,  a  small  Mexican  town  five  or  six  miles  beyond 
the  river,  was  about  175  or  possibly  185  miles.  Much  of  the 
country  proved  to  be  rough  and  wild,  but  there  were  also 
barren  prairies,  deep  "hog- wallows/'  rich  bottom-land  and  one 
fine,  broad  valley.  Several  streams  had  to  be  crossed,  and 
among  these  were  counted  the  Medina  and  the  Leona,  not  less 
beautiful  than  their  names.  Population  there  was  almost 
none,  though  on  the  first  day's  march  Castroville,  a  German 
town  planted  on  American  soil  by  a  Frenchman  bearing  a 
Spanish  name,  offered  quite  cosmopolitan  suggestions.  A 
drought  of  several  weeks  had  made  the  roads  hard  and  the 
streams  fordable,  and  no  serious  difficulty  was  encountered 
until  on  October  8  the  advance  came  to  the  Rio  Grande.26 

The  river  was  here  swift  and  rather  more  than  four  feet  in 
depth;  but  with  the  aid  of  boats  and  a  pontoon  bridge,  pro- 
vided beforehand  by  Wool,  the  troops  effected  a  crossing 
safely  during  the  next  few  days,  established  a  small  fort  at 
each  end  of  the  bridge  —  to  hold  it  and  to  guard  the  boats 
for  the  second  section  under  Colonel  Churchill,  which  was 
still  waiting  at  San  Antonio  for  the  means  of  transportation 
—  and  then  camped  three  or  four  miles  beyond  the  town  for 
rest  and  repairs.  Some  of  the  teams  had  come  all  the  way 
from  La  Vaca,  330  miles,  without  stopping  for  a  day.  As 
the  small  Mexican  border  force  had  retired  and  the  citizens 
were  friendly,  there  was  nothing  to  fear ;  and  Wool's  amicable 
assurances,  reinforced  with  strict  orders  to  molest  no  one, 
promoted  kind  relations.  The  government  had  left  him  with- 
out specie,  and  the  people  would  accept  only  hard  cash;  but 
with  private  means  and  by  dint  of  borrowing  he  obtained  half- 
rations  of  corn.  This  brightened  the  outlook  noticeably, 
for  subsistence  was  to  be,  of  course,  the  greatest  problem ;  and 
the  arrival  here  of  Brigadier  General  Shields,17  who  brought 


WOOL'S  MARCH 


27i 


S.  Fernando  p. 


S.Antonio 
J* ...  ^ 

/»  Castroville 


Monciova  <jf 


WOOL'S  MARCH 

Based  on  Reconnaissances  of  Capt.  Hughes, 
Lieut.  Sitgreaves  and  Lieut.  Franklin 


10 


SCALE  OF  MILES 

H h- 


20 


30 


•  Parras 


•  Saltillo 


••oPatos 


•o  Agua  Nueva 


Wm».EnK.Co..N.r. 


272  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

not  only  another  body  of  the  troops  but  news  that  Monterey  had 
fallen,  and  took  command  of  all  the  infantry,  together  with  a 
small  force  of  mounted  men,  appeared  to  strengthen  the  ex- 
pedition materially.26 

Wool  had  received  no  definite  instructions  from  Taylor, 
and  on  October  16  with  about  1800  men  he  struck  out  according 
to  his  own  judgment  for  Monclova,  taking  a  circuitous  route 
practicable  for  wagons  and  artillery.  This  brought  the  army 
soon  to  San  Fernando  de  Rosas,  a  garden  of  roses  lying  in  a 
beautiful  plain  on  the  cool  *and  limpid  Hidden  River  (the 
Escondido),  surrounded  with  trees  and  encompassed  at  a  dis- 
tance with  superbly  grand  peaks.18  Here  the  road  turned  more 
toward  the  south,  and  the  country  soon  became  broken.  For- 
midable mountains  upreared  themselves  ahead,  and  before 
long  the  troops  were  among  them,  traversing  valley  after  valley 
in  order  to  turn  their  huge  flanks.26 

The  San  Jose  range,  some  4000  feet  high,  had  to  be  climbed. 
It  was  a  hard  task;  but  when  the  mists  dissolved,  Wool 
and  his  men  gazed  with  delight  over  two  beautiful  valleys, 
where  meandering  lines  of  dark  foliage  marked  the  water- 
courses, while  on  the  west,  like  a  battlemented  wall,  towered 
the  Sierra  de  Santa  Rosa,  its  precipitous  buttresses  festooned 
with  white  and  purple  clouds.  Descending  then  through  a 
gorge  to  the  plain  of  San  Jose,  the  army  next  encountered  the 
Alamos  and  Sabinos  Rivers,  each  about  four  feet  deep  and 
racing  like  a  torrent.  To  get  the  wagons  across  looked  at 
first  impossible;  but  with  incredible  exertions  and  the  aid  of 
ropes  and  improvised  bridges  the  feat  was  accomplished.26 

At  the  foot  of  the  next  range  lay  Santa  Rosa,  a  town  of  some 
2500  people,  where  the  troops  arrived  on  October  24.  All 
were  Federalists  here.  Their  interests  had  suffered  greatly 
from  the  dishonesty  and  inefficiency  of  the  central  government, 
and  the  presents  of  cake,  fruit  and  confectionery  offered  to 
the  Americans  told  their  own  story.  Beyond  this  point  the 
road  entered  a  sterile  region,  where  almost  the  sole  inhabitants 
were  sheep  and  goats.  Now  and  then  water  could  only  be 
obtained  by  scooping  it  from  holes  in  salty  ground,  and  some- 
times there  was  hardly  fuel  enough  to  boil  the  coffee.  At 
length  coffee  and  sugar  gave  out,  'but  the  magnificent  range 
on  either  side  helped  the  men  keep  up  their  spirits.     A  protest 


WOOL'S  TRIALS  273 

against  the  American  advance  was  received,  and  some  2500 
men  gathered  under  Colonel  Blanco  to  enforce  it ; 19  but  as 
the  loss  of  Monterey  had  cowed  the  people,  and  there  were  no 
funds  to  stimulate  them,  Blanco  dissolved  his  army;  and  on 
October  29  Wool  formally  occupied  Monclova  without  opposi- 
tion. A  week  later  Churchill  with  a  hundred  wagons  and  nearly 
all  of  the  rear  section  came  up.26 

At  this  town,  a  place  of  about  5000  population,  lying  amid 
hills  on  the  fine  Monclova  River,  Wool  remained  almost  four 
weeks,  for  on  account  of  the  armistice  Taylor  forbade  a  further 
advance  toward  the  south;  and  the  army,  camping  a  mile 
or  so  from  the  city,  had  time  to  drill,  recruit,  reconnoitre  and 
make  repairs.  It  was  a  pleasant  sojourn.  Rivulets  of  pure 
water  freshened  the  streets;  highly  cultivated  fields,  mostly 
planted  with  corn,  filled  the  wide  valley,  and  far  mountains 
clung  to  the  horizon  like  azure  clouds.  Being  now  almost 
600  miles  from  La  Vaca,  Wool  sent  for  the  last  supplies  waiting 
with  escorts  at  San  Antonio,  prepared  to  break  up  his  com- 
munications with  that  point,  and  opened  a  connection  with 
Camargo,  not  more  than  200  miles  distant.  At  the  same  time 
he  collected  some  local  provisions,  though  most  of  the  surplus 
had  already  been  drawn  away  by  Ampudia,  and  he  studied 
the  routes.  Strict  rules  were  made  for  both  officers  and  men 
about  entering  the  town;  the  sale  of  liquor  to  soldiers  was 
prohibited  under  penalty;  and  the  arrival  of  some  gold  aided 
materially.26  ., 

Things  went  substantially  well,  in  fact,  yet  they  did  not  go 
smoothly.  Considerable  sickness  prevailed  among  the  troops. 
For  a  time  the  daily  ration  per  man  had  to  be  fixed  at  nine 
ears  of  corn,  ground  in  the  portable  steel  mill  of  each  company ; 
and  the  soldiers  grumbled.  Orders  were  issued  requiring  every 
man  to  shave,  as  the  regulations  provided ;  and  beardless 
young  fellows,  lacerating  their  faces  in  order  to  prove  them- 
selves "men,"  grumbled  again.  The  volunteers  abominated 
the  "tarnal  regulars,"  who  were  naturally  the  chief  reliance 
for  enforcing  rules,  and  when  an  opportunity  came,  retaliated. 
Many  of  their  officers  were  outspokenly  dissatisfied  with  the 
conduct  of  the  expedition.  W  ol's  bearing  was  denounced 
as  harsh;  but  perhaps  their  own  deportment  had  something 
to  do  with   that,  for  the  punctilious  Mexicans  thought  his 

VOL.    I  —  T 


274  .  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

manners  good.  Officers  as  well  as  men  chafed  under  the 
discipline;  but  the  General  could  easily  reply  that  good-will 
on  the  part  of  the  Mexicans  was  essential,  and  that  not  a  single 
complaint  had  yet  been  made  by  the  people.20  In  alfprobability 
it  was  argued  that  a  flying  column  of  half  Wool's  numbers 
would  have  been  far  preferable ;  but  it  could  be  answered  that 
wastage  from  disease  and  battle  had  been  anticipated,  that 
so  small  a  column  would  probably  have  been  attacked  by 
Colonel  Blanco's  irregulars  and  by  other  forces,21  and  that  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  armistice  Ampudia  might  have  to  be 
reckoned  with.26 

Certainly  the  dissatisfied  officers  ridiculed  unmercifully 
the  number  of  wagons.  Here  their  ground  was  somewhat 
firmer.  Jesup  himself  had  taken  the  position  that  such  a 
train  could  neither  reach  Chihuahua  nor  be  sent  back  to  the 
base.  But  in  this  matter  Wool  stood  at  the  centre  and  the 
quartermaster  general  stood  at  the  circumference.  It  seems 
very  doubtful  whether  an  adequate  mule  train  could  have 
been  organized  at  San  Antonio  in  season.  Without  the  wagons 
the  army  would  probably  have  been  compelled  to  live  more  or 
less  upon  the  country ;  and  this  would  have  led  to  the  conceal- 
ment, or  even  the  destruction  of  supplies,  to  bloodshed,  to  a  state 
of  things  not  Compatible  with  the  conciliatory  methods  ordered 
by  Taylor  and  the  government,  perhaps  to  a  serious  lack  of 
rations,  and  possibly  to  the  ruin  of  this  isolated  command. 
Moreover  artillery  was  essential ;  and  Wool  may  have  reasoned 
that  where  cannon  could  go,  wagons  could  follow.26 

The  wagons  and  guns  were,  however,  a  serious  embarrass- 
ment, and  while  at  Monclova  Wool  satisfied  himself  that  he 
could  not  march  from  there  to  Chihuahua  by  the  direct  route. 
A  lack  of  water  also  was  a  grave  difficulty.  Besides,  a  large 
force  appeared  under  the  present  circumstances  unnecessary. 
Ampudia  retreated  to  San  Luis  Potosi;  and  although  Santa 
Anna  had  taken  steps,  before  the  American  expedition  left 
the  Rio  Grande,  to  prepare  for  the  defence  of  Chihuahua, 
the  military  forces  holding  that  point  had  fallen  back  on  Du- 
rango.  There  was  indeed  nothing  for  Wool  to  conquer  now 
but  distance,  and  he  felt  that  five  or  six  hundred  men  could 
do  this  as  well  as  more.  In  his  opinion,  therefore,  the  proper 
course  was  to  proceed  about   180  miles  in  a   southwesterly 


THE  CHIHUAHUA  EXPEDITION  ABANDONED    275 

direction  to  Parras,  where  he  would  be  on  a  good  road  to 
Chihuahua  and  only  about  90  miles  from  Saltillo;  and  indeed 
he  thought  it  advisable  to  join  the  main  army.  His  views 
were  duly  expressed  to  his  superior  officer,  and  Taylor  con- 
curred. The  government,  concluding  that  the  revival  of  the 
federal  system  at  Mexico  would  change  the  sentiment  of  the 
northern  states,  and  that  Chihuahua  was  in  effect  already 
in  our  grasp,  took  a  similar  position;22  and  accordingly  on 
the  twenty-fourth  of  November,  leaving  four  companies  to 
guard  the  stores  at  Monclova,  Wool  set  out  for  Parras.26 

The  long  march,  generally  through  deserts  and  rugged 
mountains,  was  cheered  by  a  halt  at  a  fine  estate  belonging 
to  gentlemen  who  had  received  their;  education  in  Kentucky, 
and  still  cherished  the  most  cordial  recollections  of  their  Ameri- 
can experiences;  and  on  December  5  the  army  pitched  its 
gray  tents  in  front  of  the  town.  By  many  Parras,  a  place 
of  about  the  same  size  as  Monclova,  was  called  an  Eden.  It 
lay  where  a  wide  plain  and  a  long  hill  met,  and  most  of  the 
streets  were  extremely  narrow  and  crooked;  but  streams  of 
clean  water  flowed  through  them,  and  most  of  the  residences 
were  buried  in  gardens  or  vineyards.  But  even  amidst  the 
luxury  of  romantic  nature  firm  discipline  continued.  The 
soldiers  were  kept  at  their  drills  and  parades;  their  arms 
and  clothing  had  to  be  ready  at  all  times  for  a  close  inspection; 
as  at  Monclova,  a  system  of  calls  and  signals  made  surprises 
impossible ;  and  Wool  busied  himself  in  procuring  corn  and 
flour  and  in  reconnoitring.26 

All  the  while  he  looked  for  orders,  and  finally  the  summons 
came.  December  17,  at  a  little  before  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  he  rode  hastily  into  town  with  staff  and  escort, 
holding  despatches  in  his  hand ;  and  at  once  the  aides  and  men 
hurried  through  the  markets  crying  out,  "Soldiers,  to  the 
camp  instantly!"  As  will  appear  in  due  time,23  the  call  was 
urgent.  But  it  found  Wool  ready  as  usual,  and  in  two  hours 
his  army  — leaving  the  sick  under  guard  and  taking  with  it 
350  wagons,  provisions  for  60  days,  400,000  cartridges  and 
200  rounds  for  the  cannon  —  set  out.  No  blundering  occurred. 
Thanks  to  his  reconnaissances  Wool  knew  which  of  the  routes 
to  pursue.  And  there  was  no  loitering.  Once  the  troops 
made   thirty-five   miles   in   twenty-four   hours;    and   in   four 


276 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


days  they  shook  hands  with  General  Worth's  brave  men,  then 
some  twenty  miles  beyond  Saltillo  and  110  or  perhaps  120 
from  Parras.26 

"An  entire  failure,"  was  Taylor's  comment  on  Wool's  expe- 
dition, and  in  a  sense  his  judgment  appeared  to  be  correct.24 
But  this  was  Polk's  fault.  Where  there  is  nothing  to  do, 
nothing  can  be  done.25  Before  laying  out  the  campaign  the 
government  should  have  seen  what  it  had  now  seen  —  that 
Saltillo  was  the  key:  of  Chihuahua,  and  that  a  properly  equipped 
expedition  could  not  reach  the  latter  city  without  passing  rather 

close  to  the  former.  But  in 
reality  Wool  accomplished  a 
great  deal.  He  showed  how 
a  real  soldier,  without  fear 
and  without  political  yearn- 
ings, could  lead  an  expedition 
through  an  enemy's  country. 
Nine  hundred  miles  this  army 
marched.  Swift  rivers  were 
quickly  crossed,  ravines  filled, 
hills  cut  down,  mountains 
climbed.  Provisions  never 
failed.  No  wreckage  marked 
the  route.  Not  a  drop  of 
blood  was  shed ;  not  a  shot 
fired.  Wool  made  enemies 
only  among  those  who  were 


SCALE  OF  MILES 


under  obligations  to  be  friends,  and  made  friends  among  those 
who  were  under  obligations  to  be  enemies.  And  out  of  a  crude, 
heterogeneous  mass  he  forged  a  keen,  tough,  highly  tempered 
blade,  that  was  to  prove  its  value  soon  in  a  terrible  crisis.26 
f  The  other  lateral  expedition  moved  against  the  city  of  Tam- 
piCO.  )  This  place,  the  principal  town  in  the  state  of  Tamaulipas/ 
and^fter  Vera  Cruz  the  chief  port  of  Mexico  on  the  Gulf  coast, 
was  physically  remarkable.  Land  and  water  are  perhaps 
nowhere  more  freakishly  intermingled.  But  for  practical 
purposes  one  may  describe  it  adequately  as  on  a  low  ridge 

—  with  the  immense  lagoon  of  Carpintero  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  deep,  wide,  heavy,  greenish-brown  Panuco  on  the  other 

—  a  little  more  than  five  miles  from  the .  Gulf,  as  the  river 


TAMPICO  IN  VIEW  277 

flows.  For  ten  years  beginning  in  1835  political  upheavals 
and  vexatious  commercial  regulations  had  militated  against 
its  prosperity ;  but  the  port  was  highly  prized  by  the  govern- 
ment, and  in  April,  1846,  was  taken  into  its  particular  care.38 

All  the  old  fortifications  having  been  demolished  lest  they 
should  be  turned  to  account  by  insurgents,  Parrodi,  the  com- 
andante  general,  was  ordered  to  prepare  the  town  for  defence, 
and  a  number  of  badly  planned  and  badly  constructed  works 
—  particularly  a  redoubt  equipped  with  two  8-pounders  on 
the  north  side  of  the  Panuco  at  the  bar  —  gave  a  semblance 
of  security.  Some  twenty-five  light  or  fortress  guns  were 
placed;  but  efforts  to  obtain  additional  heavy  ordnance  from 
Vera  Cruz  were  frustrated  by  the  blockade,  and  when  Ampudia, 
going  north  in  the  summer,  was  directed  to  give  his  first  at- 
tention to  reinforcing  the  garrison,  circumstances  again 
intervened.  The  people  were  spirited,  however;  and  the 
daily  Eco  voiced  their  sentiments  by  exclaiming,  "With  such 
officers,  with  such  troops,  with  such  citizens  let  the  Yankees 
come  whenever  they  please ! "  38 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Yankees  had  thoughts  of  coming 
quite  soon.  Possession  of  the  town  seemed  to  be  desirable, 
in  the  first  place,  because  for  some  time  it  was  supposed  to  be 
the  starting-point  of  a  carriage-road  to  San  Luis  Potosi,  and 
apparently  could  be  made  a  more  convenient  base  than  the 
Rio  Grande  for  a  deep  advance  into  Mexico;  but  the  war 
department  found  before  long  that  wagons  and  artillery  could 
not  cross  the  mountains  by  that  route.  In  the  second  place 
occupation  of  Tampico  appeared  to  be  a  logical  feature  of  the 
Tamaulipas  movement,  in  which  Patterson  was  expected  to 
play  a  leading  role ; 27  and  moreover,  Santa  Anna  himself  had 
explained  to  Mackenzie  that  it  would  be  advantageous  as  well 
as  easy  to  make  this  conquest.38 

Conner  had  his  eye  upon  the  place,  of  course;  but,  aside 
from  the  question  of  overcoming  its  defenders,  he  felt  con- 
siderable hesitation.  It  was  regarded  as  the  most  dangerous 
port  on  the  coast,  and  vessels  could  not  ride  out  a  gale  at 
anchor  off  the  shore.  The  bar,  on  which  eight  feet  of  water 
stood  normally,  had  only  a  fathom  in  August,  1846;  and  as 
the  fleet  would  have  to  rendezvous  and  prepare  for  battle  in 
the  open  roadstead,  he  was  afraid  that  one  of  the  frequent 


278  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

northers  would  assail  him  before  he  could  assail  the  town. 
September  22,  however,  when  deciding  upon  the  Tamaulipas 
expedition,  Polk  and  his  Cabinet  agreed  that  Conner  should 
attack  Tampico,  and  the  order  was  issued  that  day.38 

Santa  Anna  seems  to  have  remembered  the  advice  given  to 
Mackenzie,  and  while  at  Mexico  he  instructed  Parrodi  to  retire, 
if  attacked,  unless  he  could  be  sure  of  resisting  successfully. 
On  his  way  to  San  Luis  he  evidently  received  Marcy's  inter- 
cepted letter  of  September  2,  which  announced  that  a  move- 
ment upon  Tampico  was  contemplated.28  Hence  on  October 
3,  with  a  view  to  the  confirmation  of  those  instructions,  he 
directed  the  war  office  to  notify  Parrodi  of  the  American  plan. 
Two  days  later  the  comandante  general  reported  to  Santa 
Anna  that  he  could  not  defend  the  town  victoriously,  and 
explained  in  detail  why.  His  garrison,  including  some  200 
sick,  consisted  of  less  than  1200  men  besides  200  available 
National  Guards,  ignorant  of  the  use  of  arms.  Only  870  of 
these  men  could  be  employed,  according  to  a  later  statement 
of  his,  at  the  town  and  the  bar,  and  having  but  150  regular 
gunners  he  could  not  man  the  numerous  and  widely  separated 
positions.  Indeed  he  would  not  be  able  to  subsist  the  garrison 
more  than  eleven  days  longer.29  The  enemy,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  was  said,  included  a  shore  party  of  3000,  and  could  attack 
by  water  and  by  land  at  the  same  time.38 

In  response,  Parrodi  received  from  Santa  Anna  on  October 
14  an  order,  confirmed  three  days  later,  that  all  the  heavy 
guns,  the  stores,  and  his  three  gunboats,  light  but  effective 
craft,  should  be  sent  up  the  river,  and  that  he  himself  with 
his  troops  and  what  field  pieces  could  be  taken  along,  should 
withdraw  to  Tula,  a  place  behind  the  mountains.  Parrodi, 
who  did  not  believe*  in  the  war,  liked  these  instructions,  and 
proceeded  to  execute  them.  The  government,  however, 
seemed  unwilling  to  abandon  Tampico,  and  the  comandante 
general,  perplexed  by  this  difference  of  sentiment  and  by  the 
protests  of  the  governor,  troops,  people  and  foreign  consuls, 
offered  to  Santa  Anna  some  arguments  against  his  instructions : 
but  the  latter,  annulling  without  ceremony  the  government's 
action,  impatiently  ordered  immediate  evacuation.  His  reasons 
were,  in  brief,  that  he  could  not  reinforce  the  garrison  adequately 
without  dividing  the  army  in  a  manner  incompatible  with 


TAMPICO  EVACUATED   BY  THE   MEXICANS       279 

his  plans;  that,  even  should  he  undertake  to  do  so,  this  aid 
could  not  arrive  in  time;  and  that,  since  a  victorious  defence 
could  not  be  expected,  it  was  important  not  only  to  save  the 
men  and  material,  but  especially  to  avoid  the  moral  effect  of 
another  American  triumph ;  and  no  doubt,  on  the  assumption 
that  Conner  was  prepared  to  make  a  strenuous,  unflinching 
attack  with  such  forces  as  Parrodi  described,  these  reasons 
were  sound. 38 

Excited  by  the  urgency  of  his  instructions,  which  were 
received  on  the  twenty-second,  the  comandante  general  now 
endeavored  to  atone  for  the  time  lost,  and  executed  a  flight 
instead  of  an  evacuation.30  The  redoubt  at  the  bar  was  de- 
stroyed ;  large  quantities  of  war  material  were  thrown  into 
the  river;  with  the  aid  of  the  British  consul  a  pretended  sale 
of  the  gunboats  was  effected;  and  on  October  27  and  28  the 
troops  hastily  withdrew.38 

While  these  events  were  taking  place,  timely  notice  of  them 
was  forwarded  to  Conner.  Chase,  the  American  consul, 
had  been  expelled  and  had  taken  refuge  on  a  blockading  vessel ; 
but  his  wife,  who  was  a  British  subject,  remained  in  Tampico, 
and  on  October  20  she  wrote  to  the  Commodore  that  Parrodi 
would  evacuate  the  town  on  the  following  day,  and  that  no 
resistance  would  be  made  against  an  American  attack.  By 
November  5  Conner  received  this  news,  but  a  lack  of  provisions 
made  it  impossible  for  him  to  set  out  the  next  day,  as  he  desired 
to  do.  On  the  tenth,  eleventh  and  twelfth,  however,  eleven 
vessels  made  sail  from  Anton  Lizardo  with  orders  to  rendezvous 
fifteen  miles  from  the  shore  on  a  certain  east  and  west  line  a 
little  south  of  Tampico.  The  frigates  Raritan  and  Potomac 
did  not  appear  there;  but  as  the  weather  was  fine,  Conner 
decided  to  proceed,  and  at  break  of  day,  November  14,  the 
Mississippi,  Princeton,  St.  Mary's,  three  small  steamers  —  the 
Spitfire,  Vixen  and  Petrel  —  and  three  schooner-gunboats 
joined  the  blockading  vessel  off  Tampico  bar.  By  this  time 
the  Commodore  knew  that  Parrodi  had  not  evacuated  the  city 
on  the  twenty-first,  and,  supposing  the  garrison  was  still 
there,  expected  some  hard  work ; 31  but  the  weather  looked 
favorable,  and  he  prepared  at  once  to  attack.38 

Lieutenant  Commanding  Hunt,  the  blockading  officer, 
had  examined  the  bar;    and  piloted  by  him  the  three  small 


280  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

steamers  towed  the  gunboats  across  it.  By  ten  o'clock  the 
river  was  entered  successfully,  and  the  Commodore  advanced 
immediately  toward  the  city.  The  low  shores  were  covered 
with  rich  vegetation ;  the  huts,  thatched  with  palmetto  leaves, 
appeared  cosey  if  not  grand ;  broad-leaved  bananas  and  loaded 
orange-trees  grew  beside  them;  tall  cocoanut  palms  languidly 
waved  their  graceful  fronds  above ;  and  the  long  line  of  steamers 
and  schooners,  followed  by  nine  boats  from  the  frigates  packed 
with  officers,  marines  and  sailors,  made  an  impressive  spectacle 
as  they  moved  slowly  up  the  smooth  but  rapid  Panuco  under 
an  azure  sky.38 

Conner  himself  was  on  the  Spitfire.  As  he  approached  the 
town,  he  was  met  by  a  deputation  from  the  ayuntamievto 
(city  council),  who  stated  that  having  neither  the  means  nor 
the  disposition  to  resist,  they  desired  to  capitulate.  Perry 
and  two  other  officers  then  went  ashore  with  the  deputation 
to  arrange  terms;  but  after  a  long  conference,  finding  this 
impossible  —  though  of  course  the  expediency  of  surrendering 
was  not  in  debate  —  all  returned  to  the  Spitfire,  and  at  length 
an  informal  agreement  was  reached.  Next  morning  the  chief 
points  of  this  were  embodied  in  the  following  declaration : 32 

" United  States  Steamer  Spitfire.  Off  the  City  of  Tampico,  November 
15,  1846.  Commodore  Conner  declines  a  Capitulation  with  the  Author- 
ities of  Tampico  as  he  considers  it  unnecessary.  He  accepts  the  surrender 
of  the  City,  and  takes  military  possession  of  it.  He  assures  the  Inhab- 
itants, at  the  same  time,  that  he  will  not  interfere  with  their  Municipal 
Regulations,  or  their  Religion ;  and  that  private  property  shall  be  respected, 
provided  that  the  public  property  of  all  kinds,  be  delivered  up  at  once, 
and  in  good  faith.  Should  an  assault  be  made  by  the  Inhabitants  of  the 
City,  on  the  American  Forces,  the  Inhabitants  will  be  held  responsible 
for  the  consequences.  Commodore  Conner,  so  long  as  the  Authorities 
and  Inhabitants  of  the  City  observe  good  faith  towards  him,  will  consider 
them  under  his  protection ;  —  a  different  course  will  expose  them  to 
serious  evils."  38 

The  danger  of  an  assault  was  not  imminent,  for  the  National 
Guards  could  find  but  one  hundred  serviceable  muskets,  and 
all  the  people  of  the  town,  who  usually  numbered  about  15,000 
but  were  now  perhaps  half  as  many,  lined  the  streets  and  gazed 
at  the  Americans  as  mere  spectators.  All  the  public  property 
that  was  movable  had  been  carried  away,  but  the  public  build- 
ings were  now  occupied;    and,  as  the  fraudulent  sale  of  the 


TAMPICO  GARRISONED  281 

gunboats  was  detected,  three  much  needed  vessels,  built  at 
New  York,  were  added  to  our  navy.33  Steps  were  then  taken 
to  recover  what  Parrodi  had  transported  up  the  river.34  No- 
vember 18  Tattnall  set  out  with  the  Spitfire  and  Petrel,  and 
the  next  forenoon  he  reached  Panuco  town,  the  head  of  navi- 
gation, some  eighty  miles  from  Tampico,  where  it  was  known 
that  heavy  guns  had  been  left.  Everything  had  been  concealed 
but  the  concealment  proved  ineffectual.  He  disabled  nine 
18-pounders,  threw  into  the  river  a  quantity  of  balls,  and  burned 
some  camp  equipage ;  and  a  24-pounder  was  taken  aboard.38 

In  ordering  the  capture  of  Tampico,  the  American  govern- 
ment had  intended  that  Patterson  should  be  at  hand  to  occupy 
the  town,  and  as  this  calculation  had  been  upset  by  Taylor, 
it  now  became  a  question  how  to  retain  the  prize.  The  place 
of  the  squadron  was  at  sea;  without  the  help  of  every  man 
it  looked  almost  impossible  to  manage  the  vessels  in  bad 
weather ;  and  officers  of  nearly  all  grades  were  actually  wanting. 
So  Perry  in  the  steamer  Mississippi  sailed  from  Tampico  on 
the  evening  of  November  15  for  Brazos  Island,  and  the  next 
day  left  an  officer  there  to  explain  the  situation.  Without 
delay  the  news  was  forwarded  to  Patterson  at  Camargo,  and 
he  directed  that  men  and  cannon  should  go  "forthwith"  to 
the  captured  city.  His  instructions  were  not  waited  for, 
however.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Belton,  who  occupied  Camp 
Belknap  with  six  companies  of  the  so-called  artillery,  em- 
barked for  the  mouth  of  the  river  on  hearing  from  Perry; 
and  on  November  21  Colonel  Gates  and  about  500  men  sailed 
from  the  Brazos  in  the  Neptune,  leaving  two  more  companies 
to  follow  the  next  day  in  the  Sea.To  Both  vessels  were  driven 
ashore,  but  fortunately  the  troops  were  saved  in  both  cases. 
By  the  twenty-third  Tampico  had  therefore  a  garrison  of  about 
650  good  regulars.  Some  ordnance  also  arrived ;  and  Conner, 
besides  landing  a  pair  of  carronades,  remained  in  the  harbor 
with  four  or  five  gunboats.  Fortunately  the  only  land  ap- 
proaches were  by  a  neck  at  each  end  of  the  town  between  Car- 
pintero  Lake  and  the  river ;  and  the  work  of  fortifying  these, 
begun  at  once,  was  prosecuted  night  and  day.38 

Perry,  meanwhile,  kept  at  work.  November  21  the  Missis- 
sippi, bearing  the  red  pennant  of  a  vice  commodore  at  the 
masthead,    appeared    at    New    Orleans.36       Announcing    the 


282  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

capture  of  Tampico,  Perry  conferred  with  General  Brooke 
and  the  governor  of  the  state,  and  obtained  sixteen  cannon 
—  half  of  them  borrowed  from  the  Louisiana  arsenal  —  and 
with  these,  an  engineer  officer,  110  regular  recruits  and  a  quan- 
tity of  ammunition,  he  arrived  off  Tampico  on  the  twenty- 
ninth.37  Before  long  the  Alabama  regiment  came  from  the 
Rio  Grande,  and  the  government,  which  heard  of  the  capture  of 
Tampico  on  November  28,  ordered  about  460  additional  regulars 
to  be  sent  from  the  United  States.  There  was  great  anxiety 
at  Washington  to  make  the  port  secure,  for,  as  will  soon  be 
discovered,  a  particular  reason  for  holding  it  had  now  arisen. 
Gates  issued  stringent  regulations  to  govern  the  citizens  in  case 
of  a  Mexican  attack;  and  by  December  19  Brigadier  General 
Shields  was  in  command  there  with  an  adequate  and  fairly 
well-protected  garrison.  Yet  the  Mexicans  endeavored  to  feel 
cheerful.  No  battle  had  been  lost,  for  none  had  been  fought, 
said  the  government  with  convincing  logic ;  and  the  Americans 
had  not  triumphed,  for  they  had  merely  taken  what  had  been 
abandoned;  but  the  governor  of  Tamaulipas  recalled  bitterly 
that  "  in  former  times  Tampico,  almost  by  herself,  had  repulsed 
more  than  4000  veterans."  38 

f  Substantially  all  of  northeastern  Mexico  was  now  in  American 
hands,  and  the  question  of  Taylor's  future  operations,  which 
had  long  been  under  consideration,  became  urgent.  On  that 
matter  the  General  himself  entertained  a  definite  opinion.  He 
was  for  adopting  a  boundary  line  that  would  include  enough 
territory  to  pay  all  just  American  claims,  and  standing  there 
on  the  defensive.  As  already  drawn,  the  line  ran  from  Parras, 
where  he  expected  Wool  to  remain,  and  Patos,  a  rich  hacienda 
on  the  Parras  route  about  thirty-five  miles  from  Saltillo,  to 
Saltillo  itself,  to  Camp  Butler,  six  miles  north  of  that  city 
toward  Rinconada  Pass,  and  to  Monterey.  Between  Mon- 
terey and  Tampico  lay  a  wide  gap,  but  the  General  proposed 
to  fill  this  now  'by  occupying  certain  points  in  Tamaulipas. 
Victoria,  the  capital  of  that  state,  was  exposed  to  attacks 
proceeding  from  Tula,  and  there  he  planned  to  have  a  large 
fojce^ 

('How  many  troops  were  available  is  not  precisely  known; 
but  according  to  Meade,  who  seems  to  have  been  in  rather 
close  touch  with  headquarters,  Worth  was  to  have  some  2500 


TAYLOR'S  POLICY  283 

at  Saltillo  and  eight  guns,  Butler  1500  at  Monterey,  Taylor 
and  Patterson  about  5000,  to  be  divided  between  the  posts 
in  Tamaulipas  and  a  new  position  in  advance  of  Saltillo,  and 
the  commanders  on  the  lines  of  communication  about  2000;  . 
which  meant  that  some  14,500  men,  including  Wool's  2400  or  \ 
2500  and  about  1000  occupying  Tampico,  were  to  hold  lines 
approximately  800  miles  long  in  an  enemy's  country.39  Over 
against  them  stood  the  Mexicans  under  Santa  Anna,  who  in 
Taylor's  opinion  were  potentially,  if  not  actually,  more  than 
^Q^OQO^mnumber,  and  were  occupying  before  Ciiristmas  a 
position  onlyaoout  sixty  miles  from  the  Americans  \y  and  in 
addition  to  these  it  was  necessary  to  consider  the  Targe  bands 
of  irregulars,  like  those  of  Colonel  Blanco,  who  were  liable  to 
gather  suddenly  almost  anywhere.41 

When  Taylor  reported  his  plan  to  the  war  department, 
a  good  deal  of  anxiety  and  perhaps  distress  was  felt  there. 
To  be  sure,  he  pointed  out  that  artillery  could  be  moved  north 
by  way  of  Saltillo  only,  and  that  water  and  provisions  were 
scanty  on  that  road,  while  doubtless  he  as  well  as  others  con- 
sidered the  Mexicans  too  deficient  in  vigor  and  enterprise  to 
be  feared.  How  just  were  these  calculations  will  appear  in 
the  sequel,  and  they  failed  now  to  satisfy  the  government. 
Though  not  informed  by  Taylor  precisely  how  many  posts 
he  intended  to  establish  in  Tamaulipas,  Marcy  was  afraid 
that  widely  separated  forces  and  lines  of  communication  would 
be  assailed,  and  it  was  clear  that  a  small  Mexican  success, 
doing  us  no  actual  harm  but  diminishing  our  prestige  materially, 
might  rouse  the  people  against  us.  Even  the  line  to  Monterey 
was  long,  the  Secretary  feared.  Taylor  evidently  had  no 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  passes,  for  he  was  now  preparing 
to  take  a  very  hasty  look  at  a  few  of  them.  Besides,  it  had 
been  Marcy 's  expectation  of  late  that  Wool's  column  would 
be  drawn  back  to  Monterey;  and  at  the  end  of  the  year,  as 
well  as  earlier,  he  said  he  did  not  wish  to  occupy  territory  in 
advance  of  that  city.  Polk  appealed  in  his  diary  to  the  Gen- 
erals-own opinion  that  he  could  not  safely  advance  beyond 
it.(  Scott,  as  well  as  Marcy  and  the  President,  believed  the 
troops  were  being  scattered  too  much.  Officers  on  the  ground  yC 
also  held  that  view ;  but  such  was  Taylor's  deliberate  policy.41 j 


V 


XIV 

SANTA  FE 

June-September,  1846 


(  Not  only  Tamaulipas  and  Chihuahua  but  New  Mexico 
la*y  within  the  scope  of  the  government's  war  policy,  and  certain 
features  of  the  .situation  made  the  outlook  in  that  quarter 
peculiarly  inviting^ 

The  province  was  cut  into  an  eastern  and  a  western  section 
by  the  Rio  Grande,  which  ran  approximately  north  and  south ; 
and  usage  divided  the  best*  settled  part  of  it  into  the  Rio  Arriba 
(Upstream)  district  near  Santa  Fe,  the  capital,  which  lay 
some  twenty  miles  east  of  the  great  river,  and  the  Rio  Aba  jo 
(Downstream)  district,  which  had  for  its  metropolis  Albu- 
querque, a  small  town  on  the  Rio  Grande  about  seventy-five 
miles  to  the  southwest.  According  to  a  recent  census  the 
population  was  100,000,  of  which  the  greater  part  belonged 
in  the  lower  district;  and  more  than  half  the  wealth  also  was 
attributed  to  that  section.  The  caravan  trade,  which  made 
its  way  from  Independence,1  Missouri,  to  Santa  Fe,  Chihuahua, 
Lagos  and  even  Mexico  City,  gilded  the  name  of  the  province, 
for  it  had  advanced  rapidly  from  the  humble  beginnings  of 
1821,  and  now  employed  1200  men,  involved  a  capital  of  some 
two  millions,  and  usually  paid  a  net  profit  of  thirty  or  forty 
per  cent  on  the  goods  transported.  The  favorable  climate 
believed  to  prevail  in  New  Mexico  was  an  additional  source 
of  interest.2 

/The  political  situation  appeared  singularly  promising.  In 
March,  1845,  the  war  department  of  Mexico  admitted  publicly 
that  the  northern  sections  of  the  country  were  "abandoned 
and  more  than  abandoned"  by  the  general  government/)  Sen- 
sible Mexicans  held  that  the  connection  of  the  province  with 
their   miserable   system   involved   injury   instead   of   benefit. 

284 


THE  STATE   OF  THINGS  IN  NEW  MEXICO       285 

(The  people  received  no  protection  against  the  ravages  of  the* 
Indians.)  The  national  troops  were  a  constant  menace  to  the 
citizens^  If  a  man  desired  to  give  his  note  for  $3000,  he  was 
compelled  to  pay  eight  dollars  for  stamped  paper.  The  duties 
and  extortions  levied  upon  the  caravan  merchants  increased 
the  price  of  their  goods;  and  of  late  the  central  government 
had  been  trying  to  deprive  the  provincial  authorities  of  money 
an4  the  people  of  comforts  by  stopping  that  business  entirely.2 
(The  citizens  appeared  weary  of  oppression.  They  would  not 
pay  the  taxes.)  It  was  found  necessary  in  1845  to  excuse  them 
from  one  of  the  most  profitable  but  most  annoying  imposts. 
Indifference  toward  the  general  government  —  a  natural  return 
for  its  neglect  and  its  vexations  —  prevailed,  and  the  continual 
changes  in  that  government  aggravated  the  lack  of  patriotism. 
Indeed,  there  was  more  than  indifference.  (A  move  to  follow 
the  example  of  Texas  had  been  made  in  18a7,  and  the  idea  of 
joining  the  United  States,  which  had  existed  in  that  year, 
became  so  strong  by  the  early  months  of  1846  that  represent- 
atives of  the  province  in  the  national  Congress  openly  avowed 
it.  Finally,  a  revolution  against  misgovernment,  that  had 
recently  occurred  in  the  neighboring  state  of  Sonora,  appeared 
to^offer  a  strong  hint.2) 

(All  power,  civil  and  military,  lay  in  the  hands  of  Manuel 
Arniijo,)  governor  and  comandante  general ;  and  that  of  itself 
was  an  ample  ground  for  insurrection.  Born  of  disreputable 
parents,  this  precious  adventurer  had  achieved  a  career  still 
more  disreputable.  A  man  of  unusual  energy,  though  now  a 
mountain  of  flesh,  he  could  assume  at  will  an  air  of  ingenuous 
affability;  could  threaten,  bluster,  brag,  intrigue  or  coax; 
and  when  dressed  up  in  his  blue  frock  coat,  with  blue  striped 
pantaloons,  shoulder  straps,  a  red  sash,  and  plenty  of  gold  lace, 
could  look  —  although  at  heart  only  a  cunning  and  cowardly 
robber  —  quite  impressive.  His  personal  habits  were  said 
to  be  grossly  immoral ;  his  only  principle  was  to  succeed ; 
and  his  type  of  mind,  shrewd  though  low,  was  indicated  by 
one  of  his  favorite  sayings,  "It  is  better  to  be  thought  brave 
than  to  be  so."  Such  force,  cleverness  and  lack  of  scruple 
had  naturally  made  him  rich.  His  family  now  owned  Albu- 
querque and  the  neighboring  estates.  His  position  and  close 
relations  with  the  priests  gave  him  a  firm  hold  on  the  ecclesi- 


286  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

astical  arm;  it  was  believed  that  an  understanding  with  the 
savages  enabled  him  to  use  them  against  his  enemies;  and  he 
engaged  rather  deeply  in  the  American  trade.  Yet  his  ambition 
was  not  yet  satisfied ;  and  he  entertained  the  idea,  it  would 
seem,  of  making  the  province  an  independent  country.2 

At  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  the  New  Mexican  situation  was 
doubtless  fairly  well  understood,  and  a  deep  interest  in  the 
caravan  business  existed.  The  merchants,  it  was  felt  when 
the  war  became  probable,  deserved  to  be  protected,  and  many 
urged  the  prompt  despatch  of  an  expedition  for  that  purpose. 
Other  arguments  for  such  a  step  were,  that  it  would  forestall 
Indian  troubles  on  the  border-- would  incline  the  enemy  —  by 
laying  open  their  weak  side  — (to  make  terms,  would  encourage 
the  people  of  New  Mexico  to  rise  in  our  favor,  and  would  secure 
the  key  to  Chihuahua  and  California;  and  in  all  probability 
influential  men  brought  these  ideas  to  the  President's  notice.4 

The  occupation  of  Santa  Fe  was  411  fact  decided  upon  as  one 
of  the  very  earliest  war  measures  — )  primarily  for  the  sake  of 
the  traders,  but  also  with  a  view  fo  the  permanent  retention 
of  the  province.  The  move  was  intended  to  be  pacific,  how- 
ever. Polk  doubtless  expected  that  no  serious  opposition, 
if  any  at  all,  would  be  offered  by  the  people ;  and  there  seem 
to  have  been  hopes  that  Chihuahua  and  her  sister  states 
could  be  persuaded  by  arguments  backed  with  force  to  let 
the  caravan  trade  go  on  despite  the  war.  In  that  case  the 
burdensome  duties  imposed  at  Santa  Fe  would  no  longer  have 
had  to  be  paid,  and  the  discrimination  in  favor  of  Mexican 
competitors,  that  had  prevailed  there,  would  have  ceased J^jOn 
May  13,  therefore,  the  governor  of  Missouri  was  directed  to 
raise  eight  companies  of  mounted  troops  and  two  of  light 
artillery  for  an  expedition  to  New  Mexico,  and  Colonel  S. 
W.  Kearny  of  the  First  Dragoons  was  directed  to  command 
them/) 

Sonne  an  opportunity  for  adventure  appealed  instantly  to 
the  bold,  hardy  and  energetic  young  fellows  of  Missouri,  and 
as  early  as  June  6  volunteers  were  hurrying  into  the  service 
at  Fort  Leavenworth  —  a  square  of  wooden  buildings,  with  a 
blockhouse  at  each  corner  and  a  plot  of  grass  in  the  middle  — 
which  crowned  a  high  bluff  on  the  Missouri  River  about  312 
miles  from  St.  Louis ;   and  about  1660  troops  were  soon  assem- 


KEARNY'S  MARCH 


287 


Wm«.Knt.Co..N.r. 


288  THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO 

bled  at  that  point.  Of  Kearny's  dragoons  there  were  some 
300.     The  First  Regiment  of  Missouri  Mounted    Volunteers 

—  which  chose  Alexander  W.  Doniphan  as  colonel  —  numbered 
about  860.  The  artillery,  including  nearly  250  men,  consisted 
of  "Battery  A"  of  St.  Louis  under  Captain  Weightman  and 
a  company  under  Captain  Fischer,  a  graduate  of  the  Prussian 
artillery  service,  and  formed  a  battalion  commanded  by  Major 
M.  L.  Clark,  a  West  Pointer.3  There  were  also  two  small 
companies  of  volunteer  infantry,  a  St.  Louis  mounted  body  of 
about  one  hundred  called  the  Laclede  Rangers,  which  Kearny 
attached  to  his  regulars,  about  fifty  Delaware  and  Shawnee 
Indians,  and  finally,  though  by  no  means  last  in  importance, 
a  Roman  Catholic  priest  familiar  with  the  Spanish  language.4 

Without  lingering  to  complete  the  outfit,  Kearny  sent  the 
command  off  by  sections.  June  5  a  detachment  of  the  dragoons 
advanced.  By  the  twenty-eighth  all  of  Doniphan's  regiment 
were  on  the  march  for  Santa  Fe  and  —  none  of  them  cared  how 
much  farther;  and  two  days  later  Weightman's  fine  brass 
cannon,  gleaming  radiantly  in  the  bright  sunshine,  wheeled 
into  the  trail.  For  several  days  the  troops  had  to  break  their 
way  through  a  rough  country,  but  about  fifteen  miles  south 
of  the  Kansas  River  they  struck  the  Santa  Fe  road,  a  broad, 
well  marked,  natural  highway  running  toward  the  southwest.* 

Council  Grove,  the  famous  rendezvous  of  Indians  and 
frontiersmen,  was  the  last  place  from  which  a  single  person 
could  safely  return ;  and  now  for  nearly  four  weeks  not  one 
"stick  of  timber"  was  to  cheer  the  eye.  After  pressing  on 
in  the  same  direction  to  the  Arkansas,  the  troops  left  the  main 
trail,  marched  wearily  along  the  northern  bank  of  the  river 

—  ascending  about  seven  feet  in  each  mile  —  till  they  were 
beyond  the  great  bend,  and  finally,  crossing  the  shallow  stream, 
turned  their  faces  toward  Bent's  Fort,  a  protected  trading  post, 
which  stood  near  the  present  site  of  Las  Animas,  Colorado, 
about  650  miles  from  Fort  Reaven worth.  Belts  had  been 
tightened  over  and  over  again  by  this  time.  Drinking  water 
that  no  horse  would  touch  had  sickened  many  a  tough  rider. 
Mosquitos  and  buffalo  gnats  had  tormented  the  flesh  day  and 
night.  Faces  had  been  scorched  by  siroccos,  and  tongues  had 
swollen  with  thirst.  Many  had  become  so  tired  that  a  rattle- 
snake in  the  blanket  seemed  hardly  worth  minding,  and  so 


KEARNY'S  MARCH  2S9 

utterly  wretched  that  in  blind  fury  they  sometimes  raved  and 
cursed  like  maniacs.  Out  of  one  hundred  fine  horses  belonging 
to  Battery  A  sixty  had  perished.  Yet  in  places  there  had  been 
cool  breezes,  carpets  of  brilliant  and  spicy  flowers,  great  herds 
of  buffalo,  curious  mirages,  and  inspiring  glimpses  of  Pike's 
Peak,  the  towering  outpost  of  the  Rockies.6 

At  length  on  July  29  Kearny  escorted  by  Doniphan's 
regiment  gained  the  rendezvous,  a  grassy  meadow  on  the 
Arkansas  about  nine  miles  below  the  Fort.  There  within  a 
few  days  the  Army  of  the  West  assembled,5  and  two  additional 
companies  of  the  dragoons,  which  had  made  an  average 
of  twenty-eight  miles  a  day  from  Fort  Leavenworth,  joined 
their  regiment.  Nor  were  the  troops  alone.  Several  mer- 
chants had  left  Independence  about  the  first  of  May.  Notified 
by  order  of  the  government  that  war  had  begun,  they  had 
stopped  here;  and  the  Colonel  found  under  his  protection 
more  than  four  hundred  wagons  and  merchandise  worth  up- 
wards of  a  million.6 

Armijo,  for  his  part,  had  received  ample  warnings.  In 
March  the  central  government  informed  him  that  war  might 
be  expected,  and  authorized  him  to  make  preparations  for 
defence.  By  June  17  news  of  the  coming  invasion  reached 
Santa  Fe,  and  nine  days  later  the  first  caravan  of  the  season 
confirmed  it.  Manuel  Alvarez,  the  American  consul,  endeav- 
ored now  to  persuade  Armijo  that  it  would  "be  better  for  him- 
self and  the  people  under  his  government  to  capitulate,  and 
far  preferable''  to  become  Americans  than  to  be  citizens  of 
a  country  so  disordered  and  so  impotent  as  Mexico ;  but  while 
his  advisers  and  subordinates  fancied  they  could  obtain  offices 
under  an  elective  system,  and  "were  rather  easily  won  over,'' 
the  governor  himself  probably  could  not  believe  that  people 
so  long  robbed  and  oppressed  would  choose  the  wolf  as  their 
shepherd.  Besides,  he  doubtless  had  some  national  spirit 
and  some  desire  to  justify  his  gratuitous  title  of  general.  After 
confirming  the  news  further  by  a  spy,  he  sent  south  on  July 
1  an  appeal  for  aid  —  representing  the  Americans  as  6000  in 
number  —  and  began  to  prepare  for  defence.  A  letter  from 
Ugarte,  the  comandante  general  of  Chihuahua,  stating  that  he 
could  set  out  on  a  moment's  notice  with  five  hundred  cavalry 
and  as  many  infantry,  seemed  encouraging,  and  no  doubt 
vol.  i  —  u 


290  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

Armijo  was  aware  that  Durango,  too,  had  been  ordered  by 
the  authorities  at  Mexico  to  aid  him.7 

Meanwhile  reinforcements  for  Kearny  were  gathering  in 
his  rear.  On  the  third  of  June  Marcy  informed  the  governor 
of  Missouri  that  if  Sterling  Price,  then  a  member  of  the  Mis- 
souri legislature,  and  certain  other  citizens  of  the  state  would 
raise  and  organize  a  thousand  mounted  men  —  that  is  to  say, 
a  regiment  and  a  battalion  —  to  follow  Kearny  promptly, 
they  would  be  appointed  to  the  chief  commands.  This  method 
of  getting  troops  aroused  considerable  opposition  among  the 
people,  for  it  ignored  the  militia  system  and  the  aspirations 
of  the  militia  officers,  and  many  felt  that  a  politician  like 
Price  was  unfit  for  the  command ;  but  young  men  were  ready 
to  volunteer  under  any  sort  of  conditions  that  promised  a 
chance  to  reach  the  front,  and  about  the  time  Kearny  left 
Fort  Bent  this  new  force,  including  artillery  under  regular 
officers,  was  mustered  into  the  service  at  Fort  Leavenworth.8 

At  the  same  time  steps  were  taken  to  obtain  reinforcements 
of  a  totally  different  character.  A  large  number  of  Mormons, 
recently  driven  from  Nauvoo,  Illinois,  had  gathered  at  Council 
Bluffs,  and  were  planning  to  settle  in  California.  It  was  impor- 
tant that  feelings  of  hostility  toward  this  country  should  not 
prevail  among  them,  and  apparently  their  assistance,  not  only 
on  the  coast  but  in  New  Mexico,  might  be  valuable.  Kearny 
was  therefore  authorized  to  accept  a  body  of  these  emigrants 
not  larger  than  a  quarter  of  his  entire  force,  and  about  five 
hundred  of  them  were  enlisted  in  June  and  taken  to  Fort 
Leavenworth  by  Captain  Allen  of  the  First  Dragoons.  Allen 
soon  died,  but  under  Lieutenant  Smith  of  the  same  regiment 
this  party  marched  for  Santa  Fe.8 

On  July  31  Kearny  issued  a  proclamation,  which  declared  that 
he  was  going  to  New  Mexico  "  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  union 
with,  and  ameliorating  the  condition  of  its  inhabitants,"  urged 
them  to  follow  their  usual  vocations,  and  promised  that  all 
who  should  pursue  this  course  would  be  protected  in  their 
civil  and  religious  rights;  and  the  next  day  he  addressed 
Armijo  in  the  same  strain,  telling  him  that  resistance  would 
not  only  be  in  vain,  but  would  cause  the  people  to  suffer,  and 
adding  that  submission  would  be  greatly  for  his  interest  and 
for  theirs.9     Captain  Cooke  of   the  dragoons   was  made  the 


KEARNY'S  POLITICAL  ACTION  291 

bearer  of  this  communication,  and  with  an  escort  of  twelve 
picked  men  he  went  forward  under  a  white  flag.16 

August  1  the  "long-legged  infantry,"  who  were  almost  able 
to  outmarch  the  cavalry,  left  the  rendezvous,  and  on  the  follow- 
ing day  the  so-called  army  was  all  in  motion.  After  crossing 
the  Arkansas  a  little  way  above  the  Fort,  it  soon  turned  off 
to  the  southwest,  and  followed  in  general  the  line  of  the  present 
Atchison,  Topeka  and  Santa  Fe  Railroad.  Before  long  the 
troops  found  on  the  right  a  high  range  of  mountains,  thrusting 
up  twin  peaks  into  the  region  of  perpetual  snow,  while  the 
gleaming  wall  of  the  far  Rockies  came  every  day  nearer;  and 
on  the  left  gazed  over  wide  plains  —  broken  with  ridge,  plateau 
or  butte  —  which  stretched  away  toward  the  east,  until  one 
could  not  say  where  earth  and  sky  met.  Near  the  present 
boundary  of  New  Mexico  began  the  ascent  of  Raton  Pass; 
and  the  men,  winding  up  the  rugged  valley,  discovered  most 
beautiful  flowers.  But  they  were  hardly  in  a  condition  to 
enjoy  them,  for  the  rations  —  cut  down  one  half  or  more  — 
consisted  of  flour  stirred  up  in  water,  fried,  and  eaten  with  a 
little  pork;  and  the  implacable  Kearny,  an  embodiment  of 
energy  and  resolution,  hurried  them  along  by  marches  that 
were  almost  incredibly  hard.  What  lay  ahead  nobody  knew. 
It  was  not  even  certain  that  the  present  scanty  rations  would 
hold  out.  But  the  watchword  was  always,  Forward;  and 
even  the  magnificent  views  at  the  summit  of  the  Pass,  where 
Raton  Mountain  upreared  a  series  of  castellated  pinnacles 
somewhat  like  those  of  the  Ichang  gorge  on  the  upper  Yangtse 
Ri^er,  attracted  but  little  attention.16 

f  August  15,  at  the  new  and  unimportant  village  of  Las  Vegas 
bfcgan  Kearny's  political  work.  From  the  flat  roof  of  a  house 
the  General  —  for  his  commission  as  brigadier  general  had  now 
overtaken  him  —  said  to  the  people  substantially  this :  "  For 
some  time  the  United  States  has  considered  your  country  a 
part  of  our  territory,  and  we  have  come  to  take  possession  of  it. 
We  are  among  you  as  friends  —  not  as  enemies ;  as  protectors 
—  not  as  conquerors ;  for  your  benefit  —  not  your  injury. 
I  absolve  you  from  all  allegiance  to  the  Mexican  government 
and  to  Armijo.10  They  have  not  ^defended  you  against  the 
Indians,  but  the  United  States  will,  j  All  who  remain  peace- 
ably at  home  shall  be  safeguarded-tn  person  and  in  property. 


292  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Their  religion  also  shall  be  protected.  A  third  of  my  army  are 
Roman  Catholics.  I  was  not  brought  up  in  that  faith  myself, 
yet  I  respect  your  creed,  and  so  does  my  government.  But 
listen!  If  any  one  promises  to  be  quiet  and  is  found  in  arms 
against  me,  I  will  hang  him.  Resistance  would  be  useless. 
There  are  my  soldiers,  and  many  more  are  coming.  You, 
then,  who  are  in  office  will  now  take  the  oath  of  allegiance 
to  the  United  States,  and  I  will  support  your  authority."  16 

Tecolote  also,  at  the  bottom  of  the  valley,  witnessed  a  scene 
of  this  kind ;  and  the  next  day,  crossing  the  swift  Pecos,  Kearny 
followed  a  similar  course  at  the  red  adobe  town  of  San  Miguel. 
Here  the  alcalde  said  he  would  rather  wait  until  after  the 
capture  of  Santa  Fe.  "  It  is  enough  for  you  to  know,  Sir,  that 
I  have  captured  your  town,"  was  the  stern  reply.  Doubtless, 
in  their  muddled  way,  the  people  wondered  at  this  first  illus- 
tration of  liberty;  but  with  characteristic  politeness,  timidity 
and  guile  they  wrinkled  their  faces  as  if  pleased.  In  spite  of 
orders  and  sentinels  the  fields  of  waving  corn,  full  of  ears 
just  prime  for  roasting,  suffered  a  little ;  but  Kearny  paid 
for  the  damage,  and  that  at  least  was  appreciated.16 

By  this  time  officers  sent  forward  to  learn  the  state  of  public 
sentiment  at  the  city  of  Taos,  an  important  seat  of  the  Pueblo 
Indians,  and  at  Santa  Fe  had  returned  with  unwelcome  reports, 
and  several  American  residents  had  brought  warnings  of  danger. 
The  activity  of  Mexican  spies  —  kindly  treated  when  captured, 
and  in  some  cases  released  at  once  with  friendly  messages  — 
proved  that  Armijo  was  alert ;  and  on  August  14  his  reply 
to  the  note  sent  by  Cooke,  while  proposing  that  Kearny  halt 
and  that  negotiations  be  opened,  informed  the  General  that 
the  people  were  rising  en  masse  to  defend  the  province,  and  that 
Armijo  would  place  himself  at  their  head.11  Fifteen  hundred 
dragoons  had  reached  or  were  near  Santa  Fe,  it  was  reported ; 
and  at  a  natural  gateway,  cutting  a  ridge  about  four  hundred 
feet  high,  a  hostile  force  was  said  to  be  waiting.  On  hearing 
this  news  all  the  weary  men  and  their  drooping  steeds  came  to 
life.  The  banners  and  guidons  were  unfurled.  "To  horse!" 
blared  the  trumpets;  "Trot!  Gallop!  Charge!"  And  with 
sabres  glittering  under  a  brilliant  sun  the  troopers  dashed 
round  a  sharp  turn  into  the  pass,  while  the  artillery  thundered 
after  them,  and  the  infantry  scrambled  over  the  ridge.     Not 


CROSS-CURRENTS  293 

an  enemy  was  found ;  but  the  reports  agreed  that  Apache 
Canyon,  some  distance  farther  on,  would  be  stiffly  and  strongly 
defended.16 

This  was  extremely  serious  news.  To  march  nearly  2000 
soldiers  eight  or  nine  hundred  miles  through  a  wilderness 
involved  fearful  risks,  and  the  expedition  was  now  at  the 
breaking  point.  The  men  had  become  travel- worn  and  half- 
starved;  many,  if  not  all,  were  suffering  from  the  effects  of 
the  water,  loaded  with  acrid  salts,  which  they  had  been  drink- 
ing ;  the  horses  generally  were  on  their  last  legs ;  and  hundreds 
of  horses  and  mules  actually  could  not  march  another  day. 
It  had  already  been  necessary  to  attach  cattle  to  the  am- 
munition wagons,  and  the  cannon  were  now  dragged  along  with 
extreme  difficulty.  The  provisions  had  practically  been 
exhausted.  And  here  lay  a  defile  seven  or  eight  miles  long, 
guarded  by  several  thousand  militia,  a  force  of  regulars  and 
considerable  artillery.16         s~ 

As  these  facts  indicate/the  New  Mexicans  did  not  seem 
willing  to  justify  Polk's  expectations.  Whatever  Armijo's 
own  opinions,  public  sentiment  appeared  to  demand  action. 
There  existed  a  good  deal  of  warlike  spirit  in.  the  province, 
and  naturally  the  prospect  of  an  armed  invasion  excited  resent- 
ment. The  ignorant  and  suspicious  people  were  easily  per- 
suaded, after  their  hard  experience  under  Mexican  rule,  that 
the  Americans  were  coming  to  take  their  property;  and  the 
priests  added,  that  besides  abusing  the  women  these  ruffians 
would  brand  them  on  the  cheek  as  mules  were  branded.  August 
8  the  governor  therefore  issued  a  proclamation,  summoning 
the  people  to  take  up  arms  in  the  cause  of  "sacred  indepen- 
dence "")  the  prefect  of  Taos  and  presumably  other  local  author- 
ities followed  his  example ;  and  several  thousand  of  the  people,12 
Mexicans  or  Indians,  many  of  them  armed  only  with  bows  and 
arrows,  clubs  or  lariats,  but  all  apparently  eager  to  fight,  were 
placed  at  Apache  Canyon  under  Colonel  Manuel  Pino.16 

At  this  juncture,  however,  Cooke,  a  Chihuahua  merchant 
named  Gonzalez  and  one  James  Magoffin,  a  jovial  and  rich 
Kentucky  Irishman,  prominent  in  the  caravan  trade  and  long 
a  resident  of  Chihuahua,  arrived  at  Santa  Fe.  Magoffin  had 
been  introduced  by  Senator  Benton  to  Polk,  and  after  some 
talk  had  consented  to  act  as  a  sort  of  informal  commissioner 


294  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

to  Armijo  in  the  interest  of  peaceful  relations.  He  now  argued, 
according  to  the  very  reasonable  statement  of  the  governor, 
that  American  rule  would  enhance  the  price  of  real  estate  and 
make  New  Mexico  prosperous.13  Undoubtedly  he  dwelt 
upon  the  impossibility  of  successful  resistance;  and  probably 
he  suggested  —  though  Armijo's  avarice  required  no  hint  on 
this  point  —  that  should  cordial  feelings  prevail,  the  duties 
on  the  approaching  merchandise,  a  fortune  in  themselves, 
would  be  paid  at  the  Santa  Fe  customhouse,  where  the  governor 
could  handle  them.16 

On  the  other  hand,  no  aid  was  coming  from  the  south.  The 
1500  dragoons  were  not  even  phantasmal.  Ugarte's  cheering 
statement  that  he  could  bring  1000  men  to  New  Mexico  had 
no  doubt  been  intended,  and  no  doubt  was  understood,  as 
mere  stimulation.  According  to  the  latest  returns,  New 
Mexico,  Chihuahua,  Durango  and  Zacatecas  together  had  less 
than  2000  poorly  equipped  and  poorly  subsisted  troops,  the 
greater  part  of  whom  were  the  scattered  and  almost  worthless 
Presidials.  The  general  government,  when  officially  notified 
of  the  coming  invasion,  merely  issued  a  few  nugatory  orders 
and  expressed  "profound  regret."  The  people's  loyalty  to 
the  government  and  especially  to  the  governor  appeared  un- 
certain. Armijo  understood  that  he  was  not  a  general,  and 
no  doubt  understood  also  that  he  was  a  coward ;  and  for  all 
these  reasons  he  decided  —  though  wavering  to  the  end  —  that 
hostilities  were  to  be  avoided,  should  that  be  possible.  Diego 
Archuleta  also,  one  of  the  chief  military  officers,  was  approached 
by  Magoffin,  and  under  genial  manipulation  proved  to  be  much 
less  bloodthirsty  than  had  been  supposed.  Consul  Alvarez, 
it  will  be  recalled,  had  previously  found  the  subordinate  officials 
tractable,  and  it  may  safely  be  supposed  in  general  that  very 
little  desire  to  fight  the  Americans  existed  in  the  governor's 
entourage.16 

Pino  seems  to  have  felt  differently,  however,  and  when 
Armijo  was  on  the  road  to  the  canyon,  August  16,  with  two  or 
three  hundred  soldiers  and  about  eight  guns,  he  received  a 
message  from  that  officer  threatening  to  come  and  fetch  him, 
if  he  did  not  join  the  militia.  This  augured  ill,  and  the  augury 
proved  correct.  The  people  demanded  to  be  led  against  the 
enemy,  but  Armijo  said  the  Americans  were  too  strong.     Pino 


OPPOSITION  COLLAPSES  295 

offered  to  attack  if  he  could  have  a  part  of  the  regulars,  but  the 
governor  was  determined  to  keep  them  all  for  his  own  protec- 
tion. Then  he  was  called  a  traitor,  and  retaliated  by  calling 
the  people  disloyal  and  cowardly.  They  threatened  him ;  and 
he,  more  afraid  of  his  own  army  than  of  Kearny's,  urged  the 
militia  to  go  home  and  let  the  regulars  do  the  fighting. 
Threatened  again,  he  forbade  the  people  to  come  near  his 
ip ;  and  finally  he  turned  his  cannon  in  their  direction.16 
In  reality  the  people  themselves  had  no  great  hunger  for 
:t\e.  Besides  detesting  Armijo,  they  were  doubtless  in- 
fluenced by  much  lurking  anti-Mexican  or  pro-American 
sentiment;  had  probably  learned  to  question  the  diabolical 
intentions  attributed  to  Kearny's  troops;  were  fully  aware 
in  a  general  way  of  American  superiority';  and  felt  deeply 
impressed  by  tales  about  the  great  number  of  the  invaders, 
their  long  train,  their  many  guns,  their  enormous  horses  and 
the  terrible  men  themselves  —  an  army,  in  short,  such  as  they 
had  never  dreamed  of  before.  The  quarrels  of  their  leaders 
both  disgusted  and  disheartened  them;  and  they  began  to 
think,  too,  of  their  lives,  families  and  property.  August  17, 
therefore,  they  broke  up,  and  went  every  man  his  own  way. 
A  council  of  the  regular  officers  favored  retreat.  The  Presidials 
deserted  or  were  dismissed;  the  cannon  were  spiked  and  left 
in  the  woods ;  and  in  about  two  weeks  Armijo  —  though  offered 
personal  security  and  freedom  at  Santa  Fe  —  turned  up  at 
Chihuahua  with  ninety  dragoons.  He  had  proved  not  exactly 
a  traitor,  perhaps ; 14  but  certainly  not  a  patriot,  and  still  more 
certainly,  if  that  was  possible,  not  a  hero.16 
('The  result  was  that  on  August  17  a  fat  alcalde  rode  up  to 
Kearny  on  his  mule  at  full  speed,  and  with  a  roar  of  laughter 
cried,  "Armijo  and  his  troops  have  gone  to  hell  and  the  Canyon 
is  all  clear."  The  news  was  confirmed ;  and  early  the  next 
day,  instead  of  turning  the  pass  by  a  difficult  and  circuitous 
route,  of  which  the  General  had  learned,  the  Americans  ad- 
vanced boldly,  though  still  with  caution,  on  their  last  hard 
march  —  twenty-eight  miles  to  Santa  Fe.)  Just  beyond  the  de- 
file, at  a  position  that  might  easily  have  been  made  impregnable, 
were  found  light  breastworks,  a  sort  of  abatis,  a  spiked  canr.on, 
and  tracks  which  guided  some  of  Clark's  men  to  the  rest  of 
Armijo's  ordnance.     At  three  o'clock,  after  receiving  a  note 


296    *  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

of  welcome  from  Vigil,  the  acting  governor,  General  Kearny, 
riding  at  the  head  of  the  troops,  came  in  sight  of  the  town. 
Neither  man  nor  beast  had  been  allowed  to  stop  for  food  that 
day,  and  the  column  dragged  heavily;  but  the  rear  was  up 
three  hours  later,  and  then,  leaving  the  artillery  on  a  com- 
manding hill,  the  rest  of  the  troops  eagerly  entered  Santa  Fe.16 

Alas,  the  Mecca  of  so  many  dreams  and  hopes  was  promptly 
rechristened  "Mud  Town,"  for  it  proved  to  be  only  a  straggling 
collection  of  adobe  hovels  lying  in  the  flat  sandy  valley  of  a 
mountain  stream,  where  a  main  line  of  the  Rockies  came  to 
an  end  amidst  a  gray-brown,  dry  and  barren  country.15  Even 
the  palace,  a  long  one-story  adobe  building,  had  no  floor ;  and 
after  partaking  of  refreshments,  addressing  the  people  in 
his  usual  tone  of  mingled  courtesy  and  firmness,  and  listening 
to  the  salute  of  thirteen  guns  which  greeted  the  raising  of  the 
Stars  and  Stripes,  Kearny  had  to  sleep  on  its  carpeted  ground, 
while  most  of  the  troops,  too  exhausted  to  eat,  camped  on  the 
hill.16 

The  next  day  Kearny  delivered  a  more  formal  address,  but 
the  style  of  his  remarks  was  the  same  as  before ;  and  His  kindly, 
simple,  determined  manner  produced  an  excellent  impression. 
Thundering  vivas  answered  him;  and  then  Vigil,  basing  his 
remarks  on  the  conviction  that  "  no  one  in  the  world  has  resisted 
successfully  the  power  of  the  stronger,"  expressed  a  joyless 
yet  hopeful  acceptance  of  the  situation.  We  now  belong  to 
a  great  and  powerful  nation,  he  said,  and  we  are  assured  that 
a  prosperous  future  awaits  us.  Such  of  the  officials  as  desired 
to  retain  their  places  then  took  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
United  States.  The  following  day  chiefs  of  the  Pueblo  Indians 
came  in  and  submitted,  and  on  the  twenty-second  Kearny 
issued  a  proclamation.  This  embodied  the  same  assurances 
and  warnings  as  the  addresses,  but  it  added  that  western  as 
well  as  eastern  New  Mexico  was  to  be  occupied,  that  all  the 
inhabitants  were  claimed  as  American  citizens,  and  that  a  free 
government  would  be  established  as  soon  as  possible.17 

By  this  time  a  fort,  named  after  Marcy,  had  begun  to  be 
visible  on  the  hill.  The  site  was  not  well  adapted  for  a  regular 
work;  but  as  it  commanded  the  town  perfectly  at  a  distance 
of  about  six  hundred  yards  from  the  palace,  and  was  not  com- 
manded by  any  eminence,  it  served  the  purpose  admirably. 


NEW  MEXICO  OCCUPIED  «    297 

One  point,  however,  still  caused  anxiety.  There  seemed  to 
be  danger  that  the  Rio  Abajo  district,  supported  by  troops 
from  the  south,  might  rise  against  the  invaders;  and  reports 
came  that  pointed  toward  precisely  such  an  event.  Kearny 
went  down  the  river,  therefore,  on  September  2  with  seven 
hundred  men.  But  he  found  no  enemy.  The  Americans 
were  everywhere  well  received  and  entertained.  Ugarte  had 
indeed  left  EI  Paso  del  Norte  for  New  Mexico  on  August  10, 
but  his  troops  numbered  only  four  hundred;  they  had  little 
ammunition  and  no  artillery;  Armijo  discouraged  him  by  say- 
ing that  6000  Americans  were  on  their  way  south ;  the  prospect 
of  marching  eighteen  days  —  a  part  of  the  time  in  a  desert  — 
was  not  inviting;  and  so  the  expedition  went  home.  Kearny 
returned  to  Santa  Fe  on  September  11,  and  about  noon  on 
the  twenty-fifth  he  set  out  with  his  effective  dragoons  for 
California,  dreaming  of  a  new  conquest.17 


x 


XV 

CHIHUAHUA 
December,  1^46-May,  1847 

Foreseeing  that  more  troops  would  go  to  Santa  Fe  than 
New  Mexico  would  require,  Kearny  had  written  to  General 
Wool  on  August  22  that  he  would  have  the  surplus  join  that 
officer  at  Chihuahua,1  and  shortly  before  marching  for  the 
coast  he  gave  orders  that  Price  with  his  command,  Clark's 
artillery,  a  part  of  the  Laclede  Rangers  and  the  two  companies 
of  infantry  should  hold  Santa  Fe,  and  that  Doniphan's  men 
should  execute  this  plan;  but  on  October  6  an  order  was 
received  from  him  that  Doniphan  should  first  ensure  the  security 
of  the  people  by  settling  matters  with  the  Eutaw  and  Navajo 
Indians.  September  28  Price  arrived,  and  by  the  twentieth  of 
October,  1220  new  Missouri  volunteers  and  500  Mormons 
were  on  the  scene.  The  Eutaws  had  now  been  reduced,  it 
was  believed,  to  a  peaceable  frame  of  mind;  and  while  the 
warlike  and  superior  Navajos  proved  a  harder  problem,  a 
remarkable  seven-weeks  campaign  amid  snow  and  mountains, 
which  ended  with  a  treaty,  seemed  to  ensure  their  good  be- 
havior. The  caravans  bound  for  Chihuahua,  becoming 
alarmed,  had  now  stopped  at  Valverde,  a  point  not  far  south 
of  the  wretched  settlement  named  Socorro,  and  begged  for 
protection.  Without  losing  time,  therefore,  Doniphan  con- 
centrated his  force  at  Valverde  by  December  12,  and  with 
856  effectives,  all  mounted  and  armed  with  rifles,  prepared 
to  set  out  on  a  long,  adventurous  march  into  an  unknown  and 
hostile  country.6 

No  less  extraordinary  than  such  an  undertaking  were  the 
commander  and  the  men  who  undertook  it.  Doniphan  was 
a  frontier  lawyer,  entirely  unacquainted  with  military  science, 
but  a   born  leader.     When   in  Washington  during  the   civil 

298 


DONIPHAN  AND   HIS  MEN  299 

war  he  stood  back  to  back  with  Abraham  Lincoln,  it  is  said, 
and  overtopped  that  son  of  Anak  by  half  an  inch.  The  only 
distinguished  man  he  had  ever  met  that  "came  up  to  the 
advertisement,"  was  the  President's  comment.  High  cheek 
bones,  a  prominent  chin,  thinnish  and  tightly  closed  lips,  a 
mop  of  carroty  hair  parted  well  down  on  the  left,  a  beard  of 
the  same  hue  under  his  chin,  small,  deep-set  eyes,  a  strongly 
built  nose,  spare  cheeks  and  a  ruddy  complexion  told  of  enter- 
prise, daring,  endurance,  wary  judgment  and  kind,  sincere 
impulses.  In  council  he  was  shrewd  and  in  danger  fearless, 
with  always  a  twinkle  in  his  eye,  a  smile  on  his  lips,  and  a 
cheering,  well-timed  pleasantry  on  his  tongue.6 

His  men,  recruited  from  the  rural  districts,  had  felt  they  were 
scorned  a  little  by  the  St.  Louis  contingent,  and  had  vowed  to 
show  them  what  "country  boys"  were  made  of;  but  they 
proposed  to  do  it  in  their  own  way.  While  the  city  men  had 
uniforms  and  military  discipline,  the  riflemen  neither  had  nor 
wanted  such  embarrassments.  As  every  officer  was  a  man  of 
their  own  choice,  they  felt  at  liberty  to  choose  also  how  far  to 
respect  and  obey  him.  Doniphan,  who  loved  his  "boys" 
like  a  father,  was  loved  in  return,  and  they  were  ready  to  do 
anything  for  him;  but  a  minor  authority  who  meddled  with 
their  reserved  rights,  whatever  these  might  happen  to  be,  was 
likely  to  hear  some  vigorous  cursing.  Any  form  of  manly 
dissipation  was  to  their  taste,  as  a  rule ;  and  they  despised  all 
carefulness,  all  order,  all  restraint.  Yet  they  were  "good 
fellows"  at  heart,  and  as  full  of  fight  as  gamecocks;  and  now 
—  on  half  rations,  no  salt  and  no  pay2  —  they  felt  ready  for 
wjiatever  Mexico  could  offer.6 

At  Valverde  Doniphan  heard  that  forces  were  coming  from 
iihuahua  to  defend  El  Paso,  some  two  hundred  miles  from 
Socorro,  and  sent  an  order  to  Santa  Fe  that  Major  Clark  with 
six  guns  and  one  hundred  men  should  march  as  soon  as  possible 
to  his  assistance;  but  without  waiting  for  him  the  command 
advanced  in  three  sections  on  the  fourteenth,  sixteenth  and 
eighteenth  of  December/)  Below  Valverde  the  Rio  Grande 
makes  a  great  bend  towafas  the  west,  and  runs  through  a  wild, 
mountainous  region;  and  hence  travellers  bound  for  the  south 
left  it  on  the  right.  Adopting  this  course,  the  Americans  now 
marched  for  ninety  or  ninety-five  miles  through  the  dreaded 


300  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Jornada  del  Muerto  {Bead  Man's  Journey),  where  they  found 
no  settlements  except  some  prairie-dog  towns,  little  vegetation 
except  sage  brush,  and  no  water  at  all.  At  the  coldest  season 
of  the  year,  when  sentries  at  Santa  Fe  were  having  their  feet 
frozen,  to  make  such  a  march  at  an  elevation  of  more  than  a 
mile  and  a  quarter  without  fuel  or  tents3  was  clearly  a  good 
beginning.  At  Dona  Ana,  the  only  settlement  between  El 
Paso  —  sixty  or  sixty-five  miles  farther  on  —  and  Valverde, 
the  straggling  command  was  supposed  to  concentrate;  but 
the  concentration  seemed  rather  nominal.  Dirty,  unshaven 
and  ragged,  the  troops  marched  almost  as  they  pleased.  They 
were  determined  to  survive,  go  ahead  and  fight,  but  little  else 
appeared  to  them  requisite.  It  was  now  reported  that  seven 
hundred  soldiers  and  six  guns  were  awaiting  them  at  El  Paso ; 
but  on  December  23  the  command  moved  on.6 

The  likelihood  of  invasion  from  the  north  had  long  been 
foreseen  by  the  authorities  of  Chihuahua,  and  the  expediency 
of  making  a  stand  at  the  threshold  was  obvious.  But  the 
citizens  of  El  Paso,  the  border  town,  who  were  practical, 
industrious  and  thrifty  people,  had  been  greatly  influenced, 
like  those  of  New  Mexico,  by  interest  in  the  caravan  business, 
contact  with  American  traders  and  wagoners,  and  acquaint- 
ance with  the  ideas  and  methods  of  the  United  States.  Almost 
openly,  men  said  the  town  would  thrive  more  under  American 
rule,  argued  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  government  at 
Mexico  to  sacrifice  the  people  for  the  aggrandizement  of  its 
partisans  and  the  privileged  classes,  pointed  out  that  no  sub- 
stantial forces  had  come  north,  and  asserted  that  what  soldiers 
had  arrived  were  under  orders  to  withdraw  without  fighting, 
and  leave  the  citizens  to  be  punished  for  their  loyalty.6 

Public  spirit  fell  to  a  low  ebb,  and  there  it  remained.  No 
one  thought  it  endangered  health  to  shout  "Viva  Mexico  !  " 
But  it  was  believed  by  many  that  in  a  community  so  honey- 
combed with  treason,  active,  determined  efforts  in  her  cause 
would  be  liable  to  bring  on  an  attack  of  cold  steel  or  lead  in 
some  dorsal  area;  and  when  the  governor  of  Chihuahua  sent 
the  prefect  instructions  on  September  19  to  retire,  on  the 
approach  of  the  enemy,  with  all  the  armed  forces,  cattle  and 
provisions,  collect  the  resources  of  the  district,  and  fight  stub- 
bornly on  the  guerilla  system,  no  intention  of  obeying  this 


SKIRMISH  AT  EL  BRAZITO  301 

order  could  be  observed.  October  12  an  expedition  designed 
to  forestall  invasion  set  out  for  the  north ;  but  at  Dona  Ana 
some  of  the  troops  —  covertly  stimulated  by  officers  —  be- 
came insubordinate;  the  commander  understood  public 
sentiment  well  enough  to  take  their  side;  the  whole  body 
returned  at  full  speed  to  El  Paso ;  and  the  prefect  dared  not, 
or  did  not  wish,  to  discipline  anybody.6 

There  were  now  on  the  scene  and  in  arms  about  four  hundred 
and  fifty  troops  and  apparently  about  seven  hundred  National 
ceuards  with  four  guns.4  In  general  two  accepted  schools  of 
thought  divided  the  soldiery.  Some  were  for  not  fighting 
hard,  and  some  —  including  most  of  the  Presidials  and  Na- 
tional Guards  —  for  not  fighting  at  all ;  while  the  few  and  un- 
popular zealots  felt  paralyzed  by  a  want  of  confidence.  Colonel 
Cuylti,  the  commander,  belonged  to  the  second  school  of 
thought ;  and  on  the  evening  before  he  was  to  move  against 
Doniphan,  whose  march  had  been  reported  about  a  week 
before,  he  fell  sick  with  a  subjective  disability  officially  diag- 
nosed as  brain  fever,  and  set  out  for  Chihuahua  with  his  ac- 
commodating surgeon.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Vidal  succeeded 
to  the  command  and  also,  it  would  seem,  to  the  disability, 
for  after  proclaiming  martial  law  and  pitching  his  camp  some 
three  miles  from  El  Paso,  he  concluded  to  halt.  The  American 
van,  described  as  consisting  of  about  three  hundred  straggling 
countrymen  in  tatters  without  artillery,  could  be  surrounded 
and  lanced  like  so  many  rabbits,  he  said ;  but  he  was  not 
personally  in  the  mood  for  sport,  and  hence  conceded  this 
pleasure  to  the  second  in  command,  Brevet  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Ponce  de  Leon,  assigning  to  him  at  least  five  hundred  men5 
and  a  2-pound  howitzer.6 

At  about  three  o'clock  on  Christmas  afternoon  Doniphan, 
with  less  than  five  hundred  of  his  careless,  confident  volun- 
teers, reached  a  level  spot  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Rio 
Grande  named  Temascalitos,  though  often  called  El  Brazito, 
approximately  thirty  miles  from  El  Paso.  Pickets  and  sentries 
—  but  not  supper  —  being  superfluous,  the  men  scattered 
in  search  of  water,  fuel  and  other  conveniences.  Mexican 
scouts  were  observing  their  operations;  but,  strong  in  con- 
scious rectitude,  the  Missourians  neither  knew  nor  cared  what 
the  enemy  were  about.     Suddenly  armed  men  could  be  seen 


302  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

in  fine  order  on  a  hill  about  half  a  mile  distant.  The  rally 
was  sounded.  The  volunteers  rushed  for  their  arms,  and  with 
all  speed  they  were  loosely  formed  as  a  line  of  infantry,  bent 
back  at  the  extremities  toward  the  river,  and  resting  at  the 
left  on  the  wagons  of  the  caravan.6 

With  graceful  consideration  Ponce  gave  them  time  by  sending 
a  lieutenant  with  a  black  flag  to  demand  that  Doniphan  should 
present  himself.  Otherwise,  added  the  messenger,  we  shall  charge 
and  take  him,  neither  giving  nor  asking  quarter.  "Charge 
and  be  damned!"  was  of  course  the  reply;  and  the  Mexicans 
then  advanced,  opening  fire  at  about  four  hundred  yards  from 
our  line.  Several  volleys  were  delivered  while  the  Americans, 
either  lying  down  or  standing  firmly  with  cocked  rifles,  with- 
held their  fire.  But  the  powder  of  the  Mexicans  was  mostly 
bad,  they  shot  high,  and  their  little  gun  was  mismanaged.6 

By  this  time  they  had  come  within  easy  range.  At  command 
the  American  volunteers  now  fired  with  great  effect,  and  a 
flanking  movement  against  the  wagons  was  received  with  equal 
spirit  by  the  traders  ana  their  men.  Evidently  there  was 
a  mistake.  These  fellows  were  not  rabbits ;  and  the  Presidials 
and  El  Paso  militia,  candidly  recognizing  Vidal's  blunder, 
retired  in  disorder,  compelling  the  rest  of  the  body  to  do  the 
same.  Speed  now  compensated  for  any  possible  want  of 
courage ;  and  a  party  of  fifteen  or  twenty  mounted  Americans, 
who  pursued  the  enemy  for  miles,  could  not  bring  any  of  them 
to  a  stand.  Doniphan's  loss  amounted  to  seven  men  slightly 
wounded;  that  of  the  Mexicans  to  a  howitzer  captured  and 
perhaps  a  hundred  men  killed  or  wounded ;  and  this  farcical 
brush,  lasting  thirty  or  forty  minutes  in  all,  has  figured  in 
American  annals  as  the  "battle"  of  Brazito.6 
/The  Mexican  troops  now  evacuated  the  district ;  the  National 
(Skiards  disbanded ;  and  presently  a  humble  deputation  from 
El  Paso  was  explaining  to  Doniphan  that  arms  had  been  taken 
up  by  the  citizens  under  compulsion.  Two  days  after  the  skir- 
mish, therefore,  amid  a  general  appearance  of  satisfaction, 
he  and  his  rough  troopers  concluded  they  had  reached  paradise. 
Along  the  Rio  Grande,  mostly  on  the  southern  side,  ten  or 
twelve  thousand  people  occupied  settlements  extending  down- 
stream for  many  miles.  Above,  there  was  a  dam ;  and  artificial 
streams  from  that  point  not  only  irrigated  the  rich  fields  and 


EL  PASO  OCCUPIED  303 

vineyards,  but  watered  the  orchards,  in  which  many  of  the 
houses  were  buried,  and  freshened  the  long  and  regular  streets, 
which  not  only  were  shaded  by  lines  of  trees  full  of  lively  and 
tuneful  birds,  but  were  kept  neat  by  daily  sweeping.  To  drill, 
practice  twice  a  day  at  the  targets,  and  feast  on  the  abundant 
fruits  in  such  a  place  was  a  most  agreeable  change  from  the 
Jornada  del  Muerto.11 

El  Paso  did  not  prove,  however,  to  be  exactly  a  paradise. 
Unlimited  self-indulgence  led  to  considerable  sickness,  and 
several  men  died.  It  led  also  to  disorders  and  to  outrages 
on  the  people,  and  before  long  two  lieutenants,  both  intoxicated, 
fought  with  dirks.  Moreover  it  was  now  learned  that  Wool 
had  not  gone  to  Chihuahua,7  that  great  preparations  for  resist- 
ance were  making  there,  and  that  a  serious  insurrection  — 
purposely  exaggerated  by  the  Mexican  reports  —  had  occurred 
in  the  rear.8  The  boldest  appeared  therefore  to  be  the  wisest 
course  —  to  push  forward,  and  conquer  or  die.9  But  without 
cannon  only  the  second  alternative  was  possible,  and  the 
artillery  did  not  arrive.  Price  was  in  fact  extremely  unwilling 
to  part  with  it,  and  owing  to  this  and  other  difficulties  Clark 
was  unable  to  set  out  for  El  Paso  until  January  10.  Then  his 
men  encountered  even  more  painful  hardships  than  Doniphan's 
had  undergone,  for  they  had  to  struggle  with  snow  —  to  say 
nothing  of  almost  perishing  with  hunger,  and  being  nearly 
buried  in  a  sandstorm;  and  it  was  not  until  February  5  that 
men,  guns  and  wagons  joined  the  impatient  command.11 

Three  days  afterwards  the  belated  expedition  set  out  on 
march  for  ChihuahuaX —  nearly  three  hundred  miles  distant 
—  with  924  effective  .soldiers,  besides  about  three  hundred 
traders  and  teamsters,  who  were  sworn  into  the  service  by 
Doniphan  and  elected  a  merchant  named  Owens  as  their 
major.  About  seven  hundred  of  the  troops  belonged  to  the 
First  Missouri  regiment,  about  one  hundred  to  Clark's  artil- 
lery, and  about  one  hundred  to  a  body  named  the  Chihuahua 
Rangers,  made  up  at  Santa  Fe.10  There  were  four  6-pounders, 
two  12-pound  howitzers,  and  about  315  goods- wagons  besides 
the  wagons  belonging  to  the  companies  and  the  commissary 
department,  each  with  its  quota  of  attendants;  and  as  the 
column,  with  every  banner  unfurled,  wound  into  the  distance 
as  far  as  the  eye  could  see,  it  made  a  gallant  and  picturesque 


iW 


304  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

sight.  It  was  exposed  to  a  rear  attack  from  Sonora ;  but  that 
state,  while  alive  to  the  opportunity,  had  not  the  means  to 
take  advantage  of  it.11 

Troubles  enough  presented  themselves,  however.  The 
country  was  bare  and  monotonous,  producing  little  except  the 
crooked  mezquite  and  an  occasional  willow.  A  desert  sixty- 
five  miles  wide  and  another  nearly  as  large  had  to  be  crossed. 
Heat  alternated  with  cold,  and  one  day  it  was  necessary  to 
kindle  fires  repeatedly  to  warm  benumbed  limbs.  Tents 
were  blown  down  by  storms.  More  than  once  no  fuel  and  no 
water  could  be  had  for  days.  Antelopes  and  hares  could 
frequently  be  seen;  but  the  tarantulas,  rattlesnakes  and 
copperheads  were  far  more  numerous,  and  far  more  willing  to 
be  intimate.  One  day,  when  the  army  was  in  camp  at  a  lake, 
the  grass  took  fire,  and  in  an  instant  a  small  flame  went  scud- 
ding off,  burning  a  narrow  trail.  Soon  this  was  driven  by  a 
whirlwind  up  the  mountain  side,  spreading  into  a  vast  blaze; 
and  then,  gathering  force,  it  rolled  back  upon  the  camp  like 
a  tidal  wave.  By  arts  known  to  the  plainsman  almost  every- 
thing was  saved;  but  with  a  fearful  roaring  and  crackling  a 
surge  of  fire  swept  over  the  encampment,  proving  hovv  great 
the  danger  had  been.11 

The  state  of  things  in  the  country  farther  south  could  not 
easily  be  ascertained,  for  the  authorities  at  Chihuahua  had  cut 
off  all  communication  with  the  north;  but  there  were  hostile 
spies,  and  some  of  them,  taken  prisoners,  had  to  give  instead 
of  obtaining  information.  About  seven  hundred  Mexican 
cavalry  —  said  to  be  twice  as  many  —  were  discovered  in  front 
looking  for  a  favorable  opening,  which  they  did  not  find.  At 
length,  crossing  a  handsome  plain  on  February  27,  the  expedition 
came  at  nightfall  to  the  hacienda  of  El  Sauz,  and  learned  that 
strong  fortifications  had  been  erected  at  the  Sacramento  River, 
fifteen  miles  farther  on.  That  was  the  next  watering-place, 
and  evidently  it  would  have  to  be  fought  for ;  so  a  halt  was 
made  and  a  plan  devised.  "Cheer  up,  boys,"  said  Doniphan 
with  a  twinkle ;  "  To-morrow  evening  I  intend  to  have  supper 
wkh  the  Mexicans  on  the  banks  of  a  beautiful  spring."  " 
(As  early  as  August,  1846,  Chihuahua  had  expected  this  visit ; 
and  the  governor,  saying  that  Kearny's  army  had  occupied 
New  Mexico  "as  easily  as  it  would  have  pitched  its  tents  in 


THE  SITUATION  AT  CHIHUAHUA 


305 


the  desert/'  seemed  ready  to  let  the 
his  own  state.  Perhaps  he  was  me 
pro-American  influences  of  a  com- 
mercial nature  that  we  have  observed 
at  El  Paso  and  Santa  Fe  were  rife 
about  him,  and  there  was  also  much 
sentiment  in  favor  of  establishing 
the  northern  provinces  as  an  inde- 
pendent republic  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  United  StatesN  Over 
against  these  ideas,  however,  and 
possibly  because  of  them,  existed  a 
peculiarly  intense  hatred  of  us,  exas- 
perated now  by  the  loss  of  New 
Mexico  and  the  fear  of  American 
outrages.13 

Near  the  end  of  August  the  gov- 
ernor was  forced  out,  and  Angel 
Trias,  an  active,  ambitious  man, 
rich,  and  most  unfriendly  to  the 
Americans,  took  his  place ;  and  the 
great  body  of  the  citizens,  either 
anxious  to  defend  themselves  against 
invasion  or  dreading  to  be  thought 
disloyal,  rallied  about  him.  The 
central  government  became  inter- 
ested, ordered  several  northern  states 
to  aid  Chihuahua,  and  instructed 
Reyes,  comandante  general  of  Zaca- 
tecas,  to  assume  the  defence  of  New 
Mexico,  Chihuahua  and  Durango. 
But  embarrassments  then  arose; 
delays  ensued ;  and  Santa  Anna, 
according  to  his  policy  of  concen- 
trating the  military  strength  of  the 
country  under  his  own  command  and 
disregarding  non-essential  territory, 
frowned  upon  all  national  efforts 
to  defend  the  northern  frontier, 
and    the    government,    appointing 


operation  be  repeated  in 
rely  weak,  but  the  same 


*<•** 


Chihuahua 


EL  PASO  TO  ROSALES 

,    Scale  of  Miles      , 
10  20         30         40         50 


It  was  now  November; 
the    unpopular    Heredia 


306  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

comandante  general  at  Chihuahua,  yielded  to  Santa  Anna's 
views.13 

(Trias,  however,  did  not  abandon  hope.  The  resources  of 
the  state  were  scanty  indeed.)  The  effective  colonial  method 
of  protecting  the  border  haer  long  since  been  given  up,  and 
Indian  raids,  beginning  about  1831,  had  fast  impoverished 
the  haciendas.  During  the  past  year,  perhaps  because  the 
savages  believed  the  Mexican  troops  would  be  required  for  the 
war,  these  incursions  had  been  worse  than  ever  before.  A 
single  party  of  Comanches  had  numbered  more  than  eight 
hundred.  It  was  indispensable,  therefore,  to  employ  some 
of  the  military  forces  in  the  protection  of  the  settlements; 
but  more  than  10,000  men  were  enrolled  in  the  National  Guard, 
and  Trias  felt  sure  that  Chihuahua  state  was  inherently  strong 
enough  to  defeat  Doniphan,  whose  approach  was  duly  reported.18 

The  chief  needs  were  money  and  armament.  Artillery  had 
been  practically  unknown  in  that  region,  but  it  was  found 
possible  to  cast  and  mount  a  number  of  pieces,  and  infantry 
soldiers  learned  to  use  them.  Arms  were  gathered  and  re- 
paired; ammunition  and  clothing  were  manufactured;  and 
by  dint  of  local  borrowing  the  expenses  were  met.  Santa 
Anna  finally  had  255  men  sent  from  Durango ;  and  in  the  end 
nearly  1200  mounted  troops  (many  of  them  Presidials),  some 
1500  infantry  including  about  seventy  regulars  of  the  Seventh 
Regiment,  119  artillery,  probably  more  than  1000  rancheros 
armed  with  long  knives  {machetes)  and  rude  lances,  ten  brass 
cannon  ranging  from  4-pounders  to  9-pounders,  and  nine 
musketoons  on  carriages  appear  to  have  been  assembled.12 
The  men  were  enthusiastic  and  eagerly  obedient,  and  the 
leaders  —  Heredia  for  chief  and  Trias  as  second  in  command  — 
felt  proud  of  their  army.  As  for  the  Brazito  affair,  which  had 
caused  much  discouragement,  it  seemed  now  like  a  bad  dream.13 

February  10  a  portly,  handsome  officer  arrived  at  Chi- 
huahua. This  was  General  Garcia  Conde,  and  the  next  day 
he  and  the  other  chiefs,  after  reconnoitring  the  pass  at  the 
Sacramento  River,  fifteen  or  eighteen  miles  to  the  north, 
decided  to  make  a  stand  at  that  point.  It  was  a  wise  decision. 
The  stream,  running  here  toward  the  east,  was  crossed  at  a 
ford  by  the  route  from  El  Paso,  which  had  a  north  and  south 
direction.      Rather  more  than  two  miles  north  of  the  river 


THE  SACRAMENTO  POSITION 


307 


and  approximately  parallel  with  it,  there  was  a  broad  water- 
course, now  dry  and  sandy,  known  as  the  Arroyo  Seco,  which 
after  crossing  the  El  Paso  highway  continued  in  its  easterly 
course  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  turned  then  toward  the  south, 
and  joined  the  river  about  a  mile  and  a  half  below  the  ford. 
Along  the  northern  bank  of  the  Arroyo  lay  a  road,  which  ex- 
tended on  the  eastern  side  of  the  highway  to  the  junction  of  this 


XV 


I    BATTLE  OF  SACRAMENTO 
Feb.  28,  1847 


V" 


watercourse  with  the  Sacramento,  while  on  the  western  side, 
bending  toward  the  south,  it  crossed  that  river  three  miles 
or  so  above  the  ford,  passed  the  hacienda  of  El  Torreon,  pene- 
trated a  defile  in  the  steep  and  rocky  foothills  thrust  out  here 
by  the  western  Cordillera,  and  rejoined  the  highway  about  six 
miles  farther  on  toward   Chihuahua.     A  triangular  block    of 


308  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

rugged  hills  lay  thus  between  this  road,  the  highway  and  the 
river,  the  northeastern  corner  of  which  (called  Sacramento 
Hill)  almost  reached  the  solid  adobe  buildings  of  Sacramento 
hacienda  near  the  ford.13 

Between  the  river  and  the  Arroyo  lay  elevated  ground  cut 
straight  across  by  the  highway.  The  portion  west  of  the  high- 
way was  a  fairly  smooth  plateau  ascending  very  gently  toward 
the  western  cordillera,  but  the  other  part  rose  immediately  east 
of  the  highway  about  fifty  feet,  and  formed  —  roughly  speaking 
■ —  a  square  one  and  a  half  miles  on  a  side,  with  a  broad,  smooth 
hollow  in  the  middle  that  debouched  at  the  southeastern  corner 
toward  the  Sacramento,  and  a  dominating  hill  called  the  Cerro 
Frijoles  at  the  northeastern  corner,  toward  which  the  square 
sloped  up.  On  the  north  and  west  edges  of  the  square  the 
Mexicans  constructed  a  series  of  well-planned  and  well-exe- 
cuted redoubts  alternating  with  breastworks  —  which  extended 
from  Cerro  Frijoles  at  the  northeast  to  what  we  may  call  Fort 
N  at  the  southwest  —  supplemented  near  the  ford  with  forti- 
fications on  both  banks  of  the  river,  and  finally  with  a  redoubt 
halfway  up  Sacramento  Hill;  and  these  works  commanded 
perfectly  the  highway,  the  Arroyo  road  and  the  valley  of  the 
river.  The  Torreon  route  seemed  impracticable  for  the  Ameri- 
can wagons,  but  even  here  fortifications  were  erected ;  and  still 
others  guarded  the  Arroyo  near  its  junction  with  the  Sacra- 
mento. The  principal  camp  lay  in  the  hollow  of  the  square, 
which  not  only  protected  the  troops  but  concealed  both  their 
numbers  and  their  movements.13 

In  a  word,  the  position  consisted  essentially  of  a  tongue  of  land 
crossed  near  its  elevated  tip  by  the  El  Paso  highway,  with  the 
Sacramento  'River  and  the  Arroyo  Seco  on  its  edges,  a  series  of 
fortifications  round  its  tip,  and  an  answering  fortification 
beyond  the  river  on  a  hill.  It  seemed  to  bar  the  way  of  the 
Americans  completely.  The  Mexicans  felt  sure  that  it  did 
so,  and  on  the  evening  of  February  27,  jubilant  and  boastful, 
they  even  talked  of  recovering  New  Mexico.  Anyhow  these 
presumptuous  and  contemptible  Yankees  were  to  be  cut  up, 
and  the  booty  would  include  a  caravan  worth  a  million.  Yet 
influential  Chihuahuans  had  a  financial  interest  in  that 
caravan,13  and  one  may  be  sure  they  were  not  asleep.14 

Next  morning  the  Americans  awoke   early.     Already   the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SACRAMENTO  309 

horses  had  been  carefully  inured  to  explosions  of  powder. 
Now  swords  were  filed,  rifles  loaded  afresh,  straps  tested,  and 
even  the  linch-pins  of  the  wagons  inspected ;  and  by  daybreak 
the  command  set  out.  To  make  it  compact,  ready  for  attack 
from  any  quarter  and  perplexing  to  hostile  observers,  the 
wagons  were  formed  in  four  well-separated  columns  of  about 
one  hundred  each ;  the  artillery  and  most  of  the  troops  marched 
between  these  columns,  and  the  companies  of  Reid,  Parsons 
and  Hudson  —  regarded  as  proper  cavalry  and  not  simply 
mounted  men  —  rode  in  front  as  advance  guard  and  screen; 
and  in  this  formation,  with  banners  and  guidons  flaunting  to 
impress  the  enemy,  it  rolled  forward  through  a  valley  about 
four  miles  wide,  bounded  on  each  hand  by  a  massive,  barren 
cordillera,15  until  at  about  half-past  one  the  troops,  coming  in 
sight  of  the  Mexican  works,  noticed  a  quick,  sharp  flash  there : 
the  Mexican  cavalry  drawing  their  sabres.17 

Doniphan  and  his  principal  officers  now  galloped  ahead,  and 
at  a  distance  of  two  or  three  miles  reconnoitred  most  carefully 
with  glasses  the  Mexican  position.  It  looked  impregnable; 
and  when  the  command  was  about  a  mile  and  a  half  distant 
from  it,  the  Colonel  —  first  ordering  his  cavalry  screen  to  ke<  p 
on  advancing  —  turned  the  main  body  sharply  to  the  right, 
intending  to  cross  the  Arroyo  Seco  higher  up,  and  gain  the 
plateau  there.  It  was  a  brilliant  scheme  but  perilous.  Good 
troops,  not  encumbered  with  artillery  or  baggage,  might 
undertake  such  a  manoeuvre  even  in  the  face  of  the  enemy, 
but  with  four  hundred  wagons,  most  of  them  extremely  heavy, 
it  seemed  impossible  for  untrained  volunteers  to  cross  the 
Arroyo,  and  mount  the  high  bank  of  the  plateau;  yet  not 
only  was  it  a  chief  part  of  the  soldiers'  business  to  protect  the 
wagons,  but  it  looked  as  if  the  wagons  might  soon  be  needed 
to  protect  the  soldiers.  Hence  this  desperate  attempt  had  to 
be  made.  Heredia  observed  it  immediately;  and,  concluding 
that  the  Americans  were  aiming,  as  a  last  hope,  to  avoid  his 
works  and  follow  the  Torreon  route/ he  instructed  Garcia 
Conde,  the  chief  cavalry  officer,  to  hold  them  in  check  until 
the  artillery  and  infantry  could  arrive  and  finish  them.17 

But  these  Americans  were  no  ordinary  men ;  and  while  they 
had  little  fear  of  death,  it  was  their  belief  that  defeat  would 
mean  dungeons  and  torture.     After  marching  for   some  dis- 


310  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

tance  with  all  possible  speed  up  the  Arroyo  road,  they  stopped 
at  the  point  selected.  Instantly  shovels,  pickaxes,  crowbars 
and  ropes  were  out  of  the  supply  wagon,  and  for  a  few  moments 
the  sand  flew  as  if  electrified.  Then  the  drivers  yelled  like 
Apaches;  the  mules  were  stimulated  by  every  art  known  to 
drivers ;  and  the  swaying  wagons  headed  for  the  ravine.  At 
the  brink  many  of  the  frightened  animals,  twisting  their  necks 
back  till  they  almost  broke,  stopped  short ;  but  the  men  pushed 
them  along,  and  down  they  all  plunged,  floundering,  biting  and 
kicking.  Across  the  deep,  sandy  bottom  they  were  driven 
or  dragged  amid  shouts,  curses  and  "hell  let  loose,"  as  a  soldier 
put  it ;  and  then  came  the  real  struggle  —  the  opposite  ascent, 
forty  or  fifty  feet  high.  Wild  with  excitement,  pain  and  fright, 
the  animals  exerted  every  nerve,  scrambling,  jumping,  rearing 
and  panting ;  the  teamsters  yelled  and  flogged ;  and  the  soldiers 
tugged  and  lifted  at  the  wheels,  or  pulled  with  hundreds  of 
ropes.  In  a  few  minutes,  as  it  seemed,  the  incredible  was 
done,  and  the  command,  forming  on  the  plateau  as  before, 
advanced.  Already  the  Mexican  horse  were  dashing  on, 
brandishing  their  lances  in  the  sun,  fluttering  their  bright 
pennons,  and  waving  a  black  flag  decorated  with  a  skull  and 
crossbones;  but,  as  Doniphan  did  not  appear  to  be  making 
for  El  Torreon,  they  concluded  to  halt,  and  let  the  infantry 
and  artillery  overtake  them.17 

It  was  now  a  little  before  three  o'clock,  and  when  enough 
ground  had  been  gained  so  that  the  traders  and  teamsters 
could  make  the  caravan  into  a  fort,  Major  Clark's  trumpeter 
sounded  "Trot!"  and  Battery  A  emerged  from  the  masking 
wagons.  "Form  battery,  action  front,  load  and  fire  at  will!" 
rang  out  Weightman's  clear  voice ;  and  at  a  range  of  about 
half  a  mile  solid  shot,  chain-shot  and  shells,  perfectly  aimed, 
saluted  the  lancers,  who  had  never  listened  to  such  music 
before.  Three  rounds,  and  they  broke.  With  great  efforts 
they  were  rallied,  but  the  fourth  round  sent  them  flying  to 
the  camp;  and  Ponce  de  Leon,  the  hero  of  El  Brazito,  who 
had  led  the  advance,  also  led  the  flight.  The  infantry,  now 
exposed  to  the  American  fire,  caught  the  panic,  and  at  the  sound 
of  the  cannon-balls  men  crouched  or  lay  down.17 

An  artillery  duel  followed.  Most  of  the  Mexican  projectiles, 
falling  short  and  bounding  once  or  twice,  lost  enough  velocity 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SACRAMENTO  311 

to  become  visible,  and  the  Americans  —  laughing  till  the  tears 
furrowed  their  dusty  cheeks  —  quickly  became  expert  in 
dodging  them.  After  a  time,  however,  the  Mexicans  discon- 
tinued their  fire ;  and  Doniphan,  as  the  last  of  the  wagons  had 
come  up,  did  the  same,  wishing  to  form  again  and  advance. 
Heredia  now  reoccupied  his  works ;  but  the  original  defensive 
attitude  could  but  very  imperfectly  be  resumed,  and  the  former 
confidence  was  gone.  The  whole  plan  of  the  battle  had  been 
blown  to  pieces,  it  was  seen.  The  splendid  fortifications  now 
meant  very  little;  the  boasted  cavalry  were  demoralized; 
the  prospect  of  plundering  the  wagons  had  vanished,  and  the 
Brazito  rout  became  a  fact  once  more.  Heredia  ordered  two 
guns  to  occupy  the  fort  on  Sacramento  Hill,  and  rake  the 
Americans  from  that  elevated  point ;  and  several  other  pieces 
went  there  without  orders,  abandoning  the  redoubts.  A 
great  portion  of  the  infantry  leaked  away,  and  soon  Heredia 
did  the  same.17 

The  Americans  felt  correspondingly  elated ;  and,  obliquing 
toward  the  right  in  order  to  avoid  the  principal  mass  of  the 
works  and  approach  the  ford,  they  moved  on  toward  Forts 
N  and  O,  into  which  Trias,  observing  their  approach,  now 
threw  the  best  of  his  troops  —  the  regular  infantry  and  a  part 
of  the  Second  Durango  squadron.  "Storm  the  fort,  storm  the 
fort!"  shouted  the  Americans;  and  at  the  proper  distance 
Weightman  and  the  howitzer  section  were  ordered  to  charge 
the  work  at  N,  supported  by  the  companies  of  Reid,  Parsons 
and  Hudson.16  This  order  failed  to  reach  Parsons  and  Hudson, 
but  Reid  and  others  advanced  all  the  same.  Unfortunately  a 
deep  gully  was  soon  encountered  in  front  of  the  fort,  and  the 
assailants  found  themselves  at  a  loss.  With  a  few  backers 
Major  Owens,  who  seems  to  have  desired  to  die,  rushed  across, 
emptied  his  pistols  into  the  midst  of  the  enemy,  and  fell.  Still 
others  dismounted  and  skirmished.  The  howitzers,  galloping 
to  the  left,  succeeded  in  turning  the  gully,  and  unlimbered 
within  fifty  yards  of  the  enemy,  while  a  part  of  Reid's  troopers, 
now  supported  by  Hudson's,  did  the  same,  and  then  charged 
at  O.     Entrance  to  the  fort  was  gained.17 

But  the  enemy  there  and  in  the  adjacent  breastworks,  proved 
too  strong,  and  the  Americans,  veering  again  to  the  left,  passed 
along  the  front  of  the  fortifications,  drawing  their  fire  and 


312  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

shooting  with  some  effect,  but  discovering  no  place  for  a  serious 
blow.  The  fall  of  Owens,  who  was  supposed  by  the  Mexicans 
to  be  our  leader,  and  the  failure  of  the  attack  upon  the  fort 
encouraged  the  enemy.  Trias  and  Garcia  Conde  managed 
to  rally  some  lancers  for  a  charge,  and  artillerymen  with  two 
guns  prepared  to  follow  them.  Before  such  odds  a  few  of  our 
howitzer  force  gave  way.17 

The  rest  did  not.  A  round  of  canister  scattered  the  lancers, 
and  then  a  large  body  of  Americans,  rushing  in  at  a  gallop, 
threw  themselves  frcm  their  horses.  Parsons'  and  Hudson's 
men  jo:ned  them,  and  all  pressed  up  the  slope  of  O  together, 
firirg  at  will.  The  Mexicans  learned  quickly  not  to  show  their 
heads.  Raising  their  muskets  above  the  parapets  at  arm's 
length  and  blazing  away  without  effect,  they  soon  used  up  their 
ammunition.  By  this  time  the  Americans,  bravely  aided  by 
the  howitzers,  were  near  their  goal.  Rifles  were  dropped. 
A  rush  was  made.  "With  a  whoop  and  a  yell  and  a  plunge," 
wrote  a  soldier,  "we  were  over  into  their  fort,  man  to  man, 
grappling  in  a  merciless  fray,  neither  giving  nor  receiving 
quarter."  Six-shooters,  knives  and  even  stones  were  made 
to  serve,  and  in  a  moment  the  fort  was  taken.17 

Meantime  Clark's  guns  had  repulsed  a  body  of  cavalry  that 
were  making  for  the  wagons,  and  then,  in  cooperation  with 
Parsons  and  the  force  of  dismounted  troopers,  he  silenced 
and  captured  the  works  north  of  Fort  O,  while  other  troops 
took  N,  went  down  into  the  valley,  and  occupied  the  fortifica- 
tions near  the  river.  It  was  now  five  o'clock,  and  the  battle 
had  been  gained.  Yet  not  quite.  The  guns  on  Sacramento 
Hill,  where  many  of  the  Mexican  infantry  and  cavalry  had 
taken  refuge,  were  annoying,  even  though  aimed  so  high  as  to 
do  no  actual  harm;  and  Clark  turned  some  pieces  in  that 
direction.  The  range  was  1225  yards;  but  the  first  shot  dis- 
mounted a  cannon,  and,  as  a  soldier  remarked,  every  shell 
knew  its  place.  Soon  Weigh tman  took  the  howitzers  across 
the  river.  A  part  of  the  Americans  flanked  the  redoubt  on 
one  side  by  scaling  the  mountain,  and  then  a  wild  gallop  up 
the  road  on  the  other  side  to  its  rear  ended  the  fighting.  Pursuit 
followed,  but  under  the  first  beams  of  the  moon  Doniphan's 
command  re-assembled  on  the  field  of  victory.  Not  a  man  had 
lost  his  life  except  Owens,  and  only  five  had  been  wounded.     Of 


CHIHUAHUA  TAKEN  313 

the  Mexicans  three  hundred  had  been  killed,  it  was  thought, 
and  an  equal  number  wounded.  Forty  at  least  were  captured, 
and  also  great  numbers  of  horses,  mules,  sheep  and  cattle, 
and  quantities  of  provisions  and  ammunition.17 
(  Further  resistance  was  out  of  the  question,  for  the  Mexican 
army  scattered,  and  the  Presidials  and  National  Guards  fled 
to  their  hemes ; 18  and  the  next  day  Chihuahua,  a  city  of  about 
14,000  inhabitants,  was  peaceably  occupied.  Obviously,  how- 
ever, this  triumph  did  not  end  the  difficulties  of  the  Americans. 
To  remain  in  the  enemy's  country  with  no  prospect  of  reinforce- 
ment was  perilous,  yet  the  traders  and  their  merchandise 
could  not  be  left  without  protection,  and  the  Mexicans  were 
said  to  be  in  great  force  near  Saltillo.  Doniphan  therefore 
undertook  to  make  an  arrangement  with  the  state  and  city 
authorities  that  would  free  him  from  responsibility.  But  the 
negotiations  failed,  for  while  the  officials  did  not  refuse  protec- 
tion, they  would  not  promise  to  remain  neutral  during  the  war^ 
as  Doniphan  insisted ;  and  Heredia  proved  no  less  obstinate.19) 

Doniphan  then  determined  to  retaliate  and  also  appeal~To 
their  fears  by  marching  for  Durango,  and  by  capturing  on  his 
way  the  town  of  El  Parral,  where  Heredia  and  the  state  govern- 
ment had  taken  refuge.  April  5,  leaving  about  three  hundred 
men  to  protect  the  merchants,  he  set  out  with  the  rest  of  his 
command,  and  in  three  days  made  fifty  miles.  Then  he  re- 
ceived notice  that  large  Mexican  forces  were  approaching, 
and  at  once  retraced  his  steps.  Concluding  soon,  however, 
that  Doniphan  had  been  hoaxed  and  no  Mexicans  were  coming, 
the  men  grew  impatient.  Their  term  of  service  was  to  end  on 
May  31 ;  and  as  they  had  been  poorly  fed  nearly  all  of  the 
time,  and  for  nine  months  had  received  no  money  from  the 
government,  they  naturally  felt  dissatisfied.19 

Doniphan  seems  to  have  renewed  his  negotiations,  therefore, 
with  the  state  authorities;  but  as  large  quantities  of  the 
merchandise  had  already  been  sold  regularly  or  smuggled  into 
circulation  under  the  cover  of  night,  he  doubtless  cared  less 
about  the  matter  than  before.  A  Missouri  trader  named  John 
Collins,  who  had  undertaken  with  a  party  of  thirteen  fearless 
men  to  reach  Wool  and  obtain  instructions,  returned  on  April 
23  from  his  daring  journey  of  more  than  a  thousand  miles, 
and  in  two  sections  the  command  set  out  for  Saltillo  a  few  days 


314  '      THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

later.  May  21,  after  a  series  of  hardships  and  perils,  a  certain 
amount  of  lawlessness,  and  a  little  fighting  with  the  Indians, 
they  arrived  near  that  point.20  The  next  day  Wool  reviewed 
them.  In  honor  of  the  occasion  they  tried  to  improve  their 
appearance,  but  it  still  suggested  a  classic  line,  "The  beggars 
have  come  to  town."  Some  were  dressed  like  the  Mexicans 
and  some  like  the  Comanches,  and  all  were  described  by  their 
commander  as  "ragged."  21 

(A  few  days  later  they  were  greeted  by  Taylor  at  Monterey ; 
and  finally,  after  passing  down  the  Rio  Grande  and  sailing  to 
New  Orleans,  they  regained  Missouri,  where  they  had  for  re- 
wards a  speech  of  congratulations  from  Senator  Benton,  the 
unstinted  admiration  of  their  fellow-citizens,  a  series  of  ban- 
quets and  barbecues,  and  the  consciousness  of  having  aided 
certain  American,  Mexican  and  European  traders  to  dispose 
of  their  wares.  They  had,  however,  done  more  than  promote 
commerce.  They  had  built  a  large  stone  into  the  edifice  of 
American  prestige  in  Mexico,  and  had  gained  for  themselves 
a  notable  place  in  military  history .2M 


XVI 
THE  CALIFORNIA  QUESTION 

1836-1846 

Under  Mexican  rule  California,  the  Golden  West,  was  any- 
thing but  golden.  It  was  poor,  shiftless  and  pitiful ;  unpro- 
tected, undeveloped,  unenlightened,  unconsidered;  helpless 
and  almost  hopeless.  Although  the  province  extended  from 
the  Pacific  to  the  Rocky  Mountains,  only  a  strip  some  fifty 
miles  wide  was  occupied  by  white  men,  and  but  a  small  part 
of  that  fraction  consisted  of  farms  regularly  owned.  The 
famous  missions,  wrecked  by  the  Mexican  government,  lay 
in  ruins.  In  ten  degrees  of  latitude  there  was  but  one' con- 
siderable seaport,  Monterey,  a  village  of  about  one  hundred 
small  houses;  and  the  only  other  sizable  town,  Los  Angeles, 
contained  some  1500  persons,  with  perhaps  an  equal  number  in 
places  depending  upon  it.  The  total  population  in  1845 
amounted  probably  to  something  like  10,000  whites,  5000 
Indians  in  the  stage  of  civilization  represented  by  the  breech- 
clout,  and  10,000  other  savage^?  The  real  inhabitants  were 
the  countless  horses  and  cattle,  which  roamed  for  the  most 
part  at  will.  More  than  half  bore  the  mark  of  a  branding 
iron;  but  probably  the  greater  number  even  of  these  rendered 
no  service  to  humanity,  and  many  had  not  even  a  technical 
owner.4 

The  Californians  were  genial,  kindly,  hospitable,  faithful 
in  their  married  life  and  gracefully  polite;  but  in  the  view 
of  many,  if  not  the  majority,  courage  and  truthfulness  were 
either  follies  or  luxuries,  and  no  element  of  practical  efficiency 
entered  into  their  composition.  A  man  got  up  some  time 
before  noon.  He  would  not  work  or  even  walk.  He  neither 
read  nor  thought.     A  monotonous  diet  of  beef,  beans,  wine, 

315 


/ 


316 


THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 


brandy  and  chocolate,  supplemented  with  cigarettes  and  a 
guitar,  satisfied  his  appetite  perfectly.  What  he  demanded 
next  was  a  horse.  As  an  infant  he  had  begun  life  with  a  ride 
to  be  baptized,  and  the  saddle  was  his  real  home.4 

Given  a  dashing  steed  with  a  long,  flowing  mane,  an  arching 
neck,  a  broad  chest,  full  flanks,  slender  legs  and  the  gentle 
but  fiery  eye  that  proved  its  Arabian  descent,  the  Californian 
was  fairly  on  the  road  to  happiness;  and  when  dressed  up  in 
his  dark,  glazed  sombrero  with  a  conical  crown,  wide  brim 


CALIFORNIA   COAST 
1846 

Scale  of  Miles 


and  betasselled  silver  cord,  his  close  blue  jacket,  flashy  shawl 
(serape)  and  red  sash  —  possibly  fringed  with  gold  —  his  loose 
trousers,  decorated  like  his  jacket  with  silver  buttons  and 
slashed  below  the  knee  to  reveal  snow-white  drawers,  his  buck- 
skin leggins  and  his  mammoth  spurs  —  as  big  as  a  small  plate 
—  he  felt  completely  satisfied.4 

He  could  lasso  the  foot  of  a  running  steer,  ride  one  hundred 
and  forty  miles  a  day  for  a  week  at  a  time,  or  check  a  full  gallop 


/ 


THE  CALIFORNIANS 


317 


and  turn  round  on  a  bullock's  hide ;  and  anybody  less  polite, 
gaudy,  dexterous  and  lazy  he  pitied.  That  a  cow  could  be 
milked  without  the  aid  of  a  calf,  he  was  unable  to  imagine; 
but  he  could  ride  five  hundred  miles  to  a  family  reunion,  and 
dance  two  days  and  nights  without  stopping  except  for  some- 
thing to  eat  and  drink.  A  glass  window  and  a  board  floor 
were  usually  beyond  his  means;  but  he  could  afford  to  pay 
24  per  cent  interest,  and 
throw  his  borrowed  money 
away  on  cards  and  horse- 
races. The  women  were 
counterparts  to  the  men. 
They  were  affectionate,  loyal, 
generous.  An  orphan  had 
its  choice  of  mothers.  But, 
had  you  entered  the  open 
door  of  a  California  house, 
you  would  probably  have 
found  its  mistress  either 
smoking  on  the  bed  with  two 
or  three  dirty  children  about 
her,  or  dressed  up  with  an 
extravagance  that  made  her 
lord's  game  of  monte  seem 
economical.4 

There  was,  however,  a 
very  different  element  in 
the  population,  composed  of 
several  nationalities  but  com- 
monly named,  and  naming 

itself,  "the  foreigners."  Some  French  and  Germans  could  be 
found  among  them ;  the  British  —  almost  all  of  them  nat- 
uralized —  were  still  more  numerous ;  but  at  the  end  of  1845 
about  three  out  of  four  were  Americans.  In  1822  a  Boston 
trading  vessel  had,  so  to  speak,  discovered  California,  and 
from  that  date  the  business  of  collecting  hides  and  bartering 
for  them  such  manufactured  articles  as  the  people  needed  or 
could  be  induced  to  buy,  was  almost  monopolized  by  New 
Englanders.1  This  naturally  led  a  few  shrewd,  enterprising 
Americans  —  among  whom  were  Thomas  O.  Larkin  of  Mon- 


NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA 

Scale  of  Milea 
5    10    15  20  25 


Wm».Eng.Co.,N.Y, 


318  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

terey,  Abel  J.  Stearns  of  Los  Angeles  and  Jacob  Leese  of 
Sonoma  —  to  establish  themselves  in  this  new  country  as 
traders.  Runaway  sailors  from  the  ships,  hunters  and  trappers 
from  the  mountains,  and  occasional  adventurers  from  almost 
anywhere,  gradually  introduced  themselves.4 
(  By  1836  the  foreigners  had  become  an  important,  if  not 
always  highly  esteemed,  element^  In  the  autumn  of  1840 
some  two  hundred  emigrants  are  said  to  have  gone  there  from 
the  Platte  country,  and  in  May,  1841,  we  know  that  about 
one  hundred  men  and  thirty  women  and  children  set  out  in 
that  direction  from  Independence,  Missouri.  Many  who 
undertook  to  settle  in  Oregon  decided  to  exchange  that  wilder- 
ness for  the  more  hospitable  region  close  at  hand.  By  August, 
1844,  our  people  were  described  by  Larkin  as  " flocking' '  to 
California ;  and  Whittier  sang, 


Pr< 


1  By  many  a  lonely  river,  and  gorge  of  fir  and  pine, 

On  many  a  wintry  hill-top,  their  nightly  camp-fires  shine."  4 


Probably  by  the  end  of  1845  there  were  about  eight  hundred 
American  residents  —  men,  women  and  children  —  in  the 
province.2  Quite  a  number  pushed  on  to  the  shore  of  San 
Francisco  Bay,  but  most  of  them  lived  in  the  Sacramento  valley, 
because  immigrants  from  the  United  States  naturally  came  to 
that  region  first,  and  because  the  Mexicans  were  too  much 
afraid  of  the  savages  to  settle  there;)  and  as  a  sort  of  base  they 
had  the  fortified  trading  post  of  l*?ew  Helvetia,3  situated  about 
a  hundred  miles  from  the  coast  on  the  site  of  the  present  Sacra- 
mento City,  where  Captain  John  A.  Sutter  —  a  German 
naturalized  in  Switzerland  —  received  the  wayfarers  with  an 
open  purse,  an  open  countenance  and  an  open,  hazy  head.4 

Some  of  the  Americans  took  the  trouble  to  go  through  the 
process  of  acquiring  citizenship,  and  so  could  become  the  legal 
owners  of  land ;  but  far  the  greater  number  were  mere  squatters, 
or  else  hung  about  the  ranches  of  other  Americans,  working 
a  little,  hunting  or  trapping  more,  but  mainly  waiting  for 
something  to  turn  up.  They  were  in  general  a  rough-looking 
set:  the  vicious,  devil-may-care  sailor,  the  gaunt,  awkward, 
ragged  immigrant,  and  the  heavily  bearded,  leather-coated 
hunter  with  his  long  hair  turbaned  in  a  colored  handkerchief ; 
and  while  some  had  excellent  brains  and  hearts  of  gold,  the 


AMERICANS  IN  CALIFORNIA  319 

scale  ran  down  to  a  very  low  point.  Little  work  and  less  law 
was  the  motto  of  not  a  few.  Some  of  the  lowest  were  out-and- 
out  for  blood  and  plunder;  some  of  the  best  had  practically 
the  same  thought  —  regarding  California  as  a  new  Canaan, 
out  of  which  they  were  appointed  by  Providence  to  drive  the 
new  Hittites,  Hivites  and  Jebusites;  and  probably  almost 
all  agreed  in  despising  the  inefficiency  of  the  native,  his  passion 
for  dress  and  dancing,  his  guitar,  his  bland  smile  and  his  dainty 
politeness.4 

With  such  and  so  meagre  a  population,  scattered  from  San 
Diego  to  Sacramento,  an  air-line  distance  of  about  four  hun- 
dred and  fifty  miles,  the  outlook  for  progress  appeared  un- 
certain enough ;  and  California  was  also  hampered  by  a  state 
of  chronic  misgovernment  and  rebellion.  /  In  1836  the  people, 
aided  by  a  few  Americans  and  other  foreigners,  took  up  the  same 
battle-cry  as  Texas,  and  raised  the  same  blue  flag  illumined 
with  a  single  star.  The  Mexican  troops  were  expelled;  and 
J.  B.  Alvarado,  M.  G.  Vallejo  and  Jose  Castro,  all  of  them 
natives,  assumed  the  control  of  the  province.  Two  years 
later  Bustamante  recognized  their  government;  but  in  1843 
Santa  Anna  sent  up  General  Micheltorena,  with  soldiers  that 
were  mostly  convicts  and  officers  that  were  mostly  debauchees, 
to  restore  the  national  supremacy.  Countenanced  and  pro- 
tected by  their  commander  these  men,  instead  of  repressing 
the  savages,  harassed  the  people  with  insults,  outrages  and 
murders.  At  length,  in  November,  1844,  Alvarado  and  Castro 
took  up  the  sword;5  and  the  following  February,  after 
some^  almost  bloodless  fighting,  the  Mexicans  were  driven 
out.9 

r  Once  more  the  government  abjectly  accepted  a  revolutionary 
situation,  recognizing  as  governor  the  senior  member  of  the 
provincial  assembly,  Pio  Pico,  and  as  comandante  general 
Jose  Castro,  who  had  appointed  himself  to  that  position ;  and 
meantime  her  destroying  the  missions  and  selling  their  property  . 
(1835-44)  seemed  to  emphasize  these  hints  that  California 
was  virtually  to  be  thrown  away.  It  has  practically  been 
abandoned,  wrote  the  German  traveller,  Lowenstern,  in  1843 ; 
and  this  fact  was  rendered  still  clearer  by  the  proposal  of 
May,  1846,  that  England  should  take  military  possession  of 
the  province,  which  Bankhead,  the  British  minister,  described 


320  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

as  "an  indirect  offer  of  sale,"  and  by  an  explicit  suggestion 
/\  that  Prussia  occupy  it.  Mexico  had  substantially  abdicated.9 
In^  such  a  state  of  things  the  country  could  not  advance. 
Indeed  it  was  going  backwards.)  The  only  source  of  revenue 
was  the  duties  collected  at  Monterey,  and  this  — amounting 
to  $80,000  or  $100,000  a  year,  and  signifying  the  virtual  con- 
fiscation of  about  one  third  of  all  the  property  in  California  — 
mostly  disappeared  in  official  pockets.  No  military  force 
able  to  cope  with  the  savages  was  maintained.  In  consequence 
of  their  incursions  farms  were  being  abandoned,  and  they  even 
raided  within  the  settlements.  The  laws  were  openly  dis- 
regarded. There  were  practically  no  courts  and  no  police, 
and  each  man  had  to  defend  his  own  person  and  property. 
No  sort  of  regular  postal  facilities  existed,  and  even  communi- 
cation with  Mexico  was  rare  and  mostly  by  chance.  The  only 
carriage  in  the  country  had  been  one  belonging  to  Micheltorena. 
There  were  no  real  schools,  not  a  single  newspaper,  and  of 
course  hardly  any  books  except  in  a  very  few  hands.9 

With  gold  in  sight  and  actually  seen,  people  did  not  look  for 
it.  In  a  region  where  the  wild  clover  grew  several  feet  high 
and  a  single  grapevine  would  yield  a  barrel  of  juice,  the  govern- 
ment did  nothing,  and  the  citizens  could  do  little,  to  promote 
the  cultivation  of  the  soil.  With  all  the  boundless  coast  of 
the  Pacific  waiting  for  horses,  beef  and  lumber,  droves  of 
unbroken  colts  tossed  their  manes  in  a  wilderness,  beeves  were 
slaughtered  for  their  hides,  and  huge  trees  crashed  to  the 
ground  amidst  the  stillness  of  an  untenanted  forest.  Six-cent 
muslins  cost  fifty  cents,  and  the  coarsest  of  straw  hats  paid 
a  duty  of  three  dollars.  If  a  man  wanted  a  kettle  mended, 
he  looked  for  some  one  trained  abroad ;  and  even  a  child's 
torn  skirt  could  not  be  patched  without  first  getting  a  hank  of 
thread  from  Boston.9 

\Naturally  the  people  felt  dissatisfied,  and  their  complaints 
reached  far  beyond  the  misbehaving  soldiers.  Every  official 
professed  intense  loyalty  in  public,  but  that  signified  nothing. 
The  people  were  determined  to  shake  off  Mexican  authority. 
California  will  soon  declare  its  independence,  wrote  the  British 
minister  at  Mexico  in  1841,  while  his  French  colleague,  who  was 
in  close  touch  with  the  situation,  believed  it  would  merely  be 
a  question  between  England  and  the  United  States.  )  Cali- 


MEXICAN  RULE  DETESTED  IN  CALIFORNIA     321 

fornia  is  almost  ready  to  separate  from  the  mother-country, 
concluded  Sir  George  Simpson,  governor-in-chief  of  the  Hudson 
Bay  Company,  who  was  there  a  year  later.  As  a  rule  the 
people  are  disaffected,  it  was  directly  reported  in  June,  1844. 
The  principal  men  have  decided,  wrote  Forbes,  the  British 
vice  consul,  in  September,  1844,  that  progress  under  Mexican 
rule  is  impossible,  and  they  will  not  have  it.  The  Californians 
are  unanimously  determined  to  be  rid  of  the  Mexican  military* 
government,  declared  the  British  consul  at  Tepic,  under  whom 
Forbes  acted,  a  few  months  later;  and  of  course  all  Mexican 
rule  was  military.  A  separation  is  probably  inevitable,  con- 
cluded Lord  Aberdeen,  head  of  the  British  Foreign  Office,  at 
the  end  of  the  year.  California  "must  change  owners,"  said 
a  letter  from  that  coast  in  July,  1845.  "The  people  hardly 
care  what  Flag  is  exchanged  for  their  own,"  stated  a  competent" 
American  observer  two  months  later,  while  a  Calif ornian  was 
predicting  that  the  Stars  and  Stripes  would  certainly  go  up 
there.9 

"The  situation  of  Upper  California  will  cause  its  separation 
from  Mexico  before  many  years,"  predicted  Wilkes's  book  in 
1845.  The  people  of  southern  California  are  agreed  to  cut 
loose  from  Mexico,  wrote  a  British  admiral.  "Mexican  rule 
had  become  intolerable,"  concluded  Walpole,  a  British  officer 
in  1846.  It  had  long  been  "only  a  shadow,"  said  a  young 
American,  afterwards  famous  as  General  William  T.  Sherman ; 
but  it  was  a  shadow  that  blighted.  Another  Mexican  expedi- 
tion would  not  be  tolerated,  said  Larkin ;  and  in  fact  a  com- 
missioner from  California  so  notified  the  government.  To  get 
on  at  all  with  the  people,  a  Mexican  had  to  become  Californian 
in  head  and  in  heart,  and  even  then  he  was  less  welcome  than 
an  Englishman  or  an  American.9 

Nor  were  such  opinions  merely  expressed  —  they  were  made 
known  to  Mexico.  Many  warnings,  both  official  and  private, 
went  from  California,  and  the  province  maintained  commis- 
sioners at  the  capital,  who  presented  information  regarding 
the  wholly  unsatisfactory  conditions  existing  there.  That 
part  of  the  country  has  been  "forgotten  for  more  than  twenty 
years,"  wrote  one  of  these  commissioners  to  the  war  depart- 
ment in  1844 ;  and  the  following  year  he  said  that  it  had  been 
"injured  by  every  one  of  our  administrations."     Alarms  were 

VOL.  i — Y 


322        .  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

sounded  publicly  in  such  newspapers  as  the  London  Times 
and  London  Chronicle.  Notices  regarding  the  danger  of 
American  encroachment  —  particularly  by  the  method  of 
emigration,  a  declaration  of  independence  and  early  annexation 
—  were  received  over  and  over  again  from  the  Mexican  minister 
at  Washington,  the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans,  Paken- 
ham,  the  British  minister,  and  Bankhead,  who  succeeded 
Jiim.  This  peril  was  notorious,  declared  General  Mora  y 
Villamii  near  the  close  of  1845;  and  the  government  itself 
recognized  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  In  March  of  that 
year  the  minister  of  war  and  the  minister  of  relations  ad- 
mitted publicly  that  California  had  been  grossly  misgoverned 
and  was  liable  to  slip  away.6  Yet  the  government  did  nothing, 
aiKl-confessed  that  nothing  could  be  done.9 
*  /virtually,  we  say  again,  it  was  abdication.  Both  morally 
and  physically  Mexico  had  thrown  away  and  forever  lost  her 
control  of  the  province.  She  had  nothing  left  except  the  bare 
thread  of  legal  proprietorship;  and  in  certain  cases  legality 
is,  according  to  enlightened  modern  ideas,  nothing.  It  is  our 
conviction  that  humpn  wpjfarejs  thp  supreme-test ;  and  the  wel- 
fare, not  merely  of  California  but  of  all  the  world,  certainly 
required  that  so  rich  a  portion  of  the  earth  should  be  developed 
and  occupied.  In  our  opinion  a  child,  neglected  and  abused 
by  drunken  parents  who  are  always  fighting  each  other,  has 
good  grounds  for  leaving  home,  though  not  legally  independent. 
We  believe  in  the  right  of  revolution,  which  means  that  when 
a  country  misgoverns  persistently  a  considerable  part  of  the 
population,  it  forfeits  all  claims  to  domineer  over  them;  and 
California,  though  her  weakness  led  officials  to  practice  a  lip 
service  that  deceived  nobody,  had  more  than  once  rebelled, 
had  made  good  her  cause,  and  entertained  no  thought  of  accept- 
ing Mexican  rule  again.9 

She  was,  therefore,  being  in  every  way  unable  to  establish 
herself  as  an  independent  nation  and  gain  the  recognition  of 
the  world  as  such,  quite  adrift.  jThe  province  is  now  "at  the 
mercy  of  whoever  may  choose^to  take  possession  of  it,"  wrote 
the  nearest  British  consul  in  1845.  Calif ornians,  Mexicans, 
Britons,  French  and  Americans,  who  were  qualified  to  judge, 
agreed  on  that.  (She  was  the  homeless  child,  whom  any  kind, 
intelligent  and  well-to-do  person  may,  and  some  kind,  intel- 


THE  AMERICANS  INTERESTED  IN  CALIFORNIA     323 

ligent  and  well-to-do  person  should,  provide  for.  Any  one  of 
the  nations  then  leading  the  march  of  civilization,  if  disposed 
to  perform  a  parent's  duty  toward  California,  could  rightfully 
have  taken  charge  of  her,  and  some  one  of  them  was  under 
obligation  to  do  so.7  Of  those  nations  the  United  States  was 
more  favorably  situated  than  any 'other  to  fulfil  the  trust,8 
and  she  felt  ready  to  accept  it.9  \ 

Jndeed  our  people  were  profoundly  interested  in  the  matter. 
As  early  as  1839  a  Congressional  report  on  Oregon  said  enough 
about  the  territory  farther  south  to  excite  attention;  and 
Forbes's  history  of  California,  published  the  same  year,  did 
much  to  fix  it  and  create  the  fear  that  European  powers  might 
encroach  there.  The  seizure  of  American  residents  in  1840, 
the  appearance_of  Dana's  "Two  Years  Before  the  Mast," 
and  the  incidents  connected  with  Jones's  landing  at  Monterey 
deepened  these  impressions.  By  1842  glowing  letters  from 
American  settlers  began  to  appear  in  our  newspapers,  and  the 
suspected  purposes  of  England  received  ample  notice.  Gold 
existed  there,  it  was  reported ;  the  country  was  attractive,  salu- 
brious and  rich;  the  port  of  San  Francisco  had  a  value  that 
words  could  not  represent,  and  the  British  already  held  a 
mortgage  on  the  country.  Our  Pacific  whaling  fleet  was  said 
by  the  New  Bedford  member  of  Congress  to  include  before 
the  end  of  1844  six  hundred  and  fifty  vessels,  which  had  cost 
twenty  millions  and  employed  17,000  men;  and  not  only  was 
this  harbor  most  important,  since  the  bar  at  the  Columbia 
River  hampered  navigation,  but  American  control  was  needed 
there,  for  the  uncertain  and  vexatious  Mexican  regulations 
caused  great  annoyance.  Besides,  it  was  pointed  out,  we 
required  a  fortified  port  on  that  coast,  else  in  case  of  war  with 
England  our  whalers  would  be  unable  to  avoid  capture.10 
/All  these  ideas  took  root,  and  in  the  spring  of  1845  the  press 
from  New  York  to  St.  Louis  and  New  Orleans  broke  into  quite 
a  furore  about  California.  Its  value  became  a  popular  subject ;  ■ 
the  known  fact  that  English  holders  of  Mexican  bonds  had  thei/ 
eyes  upon  it  was  recalled;  the  designs  of  the  British  govern- 
ment seemed  to  be  clear ;  and  annexation  was  not  only  urged, 
but  represented  as  near  at  hand.  So  keen  became  the  fear 
that  England  would  forestall  us,  that  in  January,  1846,  the 
ease  with  which  she  could  acquire  California  was  dwelt  upon 


324  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

in  our  national  Senate,  while  in  the  House  the  enormous  advan- 
tages of  our  holding  the  territory  attracted  attention.10 

Our  government  was  even  in  advance  of  the  people.  In 
1835  an  attempt  was  made  to  purchase  the  Bay  of  San  Fran- 
cisco. The  next  year  Ellis,  who  represented  the  United  States 
at  Mexico,  expressed  the  opinion  that  .northern  California 
would  be  of  "immense  importance"  to  us.  Four  years  later 
a  personal  letter  to  President  Van  Buren  pointed  out  that 
England,  as  a  great  creditor  of  Mexico,  was  likely  to  appro- 
J  priate  the  territory,  and  steps  were  taken  to  obtain  information 
regarding  it  for  the  use  of  Congress  and  the  Cabinet.  Daniel 
Webster  felt  strongly  by  this  time  that  we  should  acquire  it. 
In  1842,  while  he  was  secretary  of  state,  our  minister  at  Mexico 
not  only  expatiated  on  the  value  of  the  territory,  but  reported 
that  England  had  taken  steps  to  anticipate  us;  and  the 
minister  was  instructed  to  ascertain  whether  an  offer  from  this 
country  would  be '  acceptable.  Our  strained  relations  with 
Mexico  and  especially  Jones's  occupation  of  Monterey  made  it 
unwise  to  follow  up  the  matter  that  year ;  but  after  an  interval 
Tyler  and  Webster  planned  an  arrangement  which  —  had 
it  been  carried  through  —  would  have  given  us  the  port  of 
San  Francisco.11 

The  expansive  course  of  Great  Britain,  remarks  dropped 
by  English  writers,  repeated  warnings  from  our  diplomatic 
and  consular  agents  at  Mexico,  and  the  consensus  of  opinion 
in  California,  Mexico,  France  and  the  United  States  were 
quite  enough  to  warrant  suspicions  of  England,  and  the  cir- 
cumstances connected  with  the  visit  of  Duflot  de  Mofras, 
attache  of  the  French  legation  at  Mexico,  to  California,  and 
the  publication  of  his  book  by  order  of  the  king,  hinted  of 
danger  from  another  quarter;  but  neither  country  took  any 
positive  action,  and  our  government  —  doubtless  noting  that 
a  tide  of  emigration  to  the  far  west  had  begun  —  refrained 
from  every  move  that  could  excite  the  jealousy  of  Mexico  or 
Europe.  Early  in  1843  Larkin,  who  was  deficient  in  education 
but  not  in  shrewdness,  activity  or  patriotism,  was  appointed 
consul  at  Monterey ;  but  the  value  of  American  commerce 
fully  justified  the  step.  During  1845  he  did  not  receive  one 
letter  from  the  state  department,  and  for  a  long  time  no 
American  war  vessel  could  be  seen  on  the  coast.11 


OUR  GOVERNMENT  INTERESTED  325 

Early  in  1845,  owing  to  the  annexation  of  Texas,  a  breach 
with  Mexico  had  seemed  probable,  and  the  danger  that  she 
would  somehow  dispose  of  California  in  order  to  place  it  be- 
yond our  reach  had  been  deemed  acute.  But  our  government 
did  not  intend  to  have  war,  the  tide  of  emigration  to  that 
quarter  was  rising,  and  Polk  warned  off  European  interference 
by  re-asserting  the  "Monroe  Doctrine."  On  July  10,  1845, 
however,  Larkin  wrote  that  England  was  maintaining  there 
a  vice  consul  without  consular  business,  and  that,  according 
to  the  universal  belief  in  his  vicinity,  she  was  promoting  a  new 
Mexican  expedition  to  California ;  and  at  about  the  same  time 
as  this  letter,  news  of  an  extensive  British  plan  to  colonize 
in  that  province  arrived  from  London.11 

The  question  was  then  maturely  considered  at  Washington. 
Apparently  the  American  emigrants,  unless  checked,  were 
sure  to  bring  California  into  the  Union.  That  was  natural 
and  logical;  such  a  peaceful  invasion  had  given  us  Texas; 
and  in  the  opinion  of  the  best  qualified  observers  it  seemed 
likely  to  be  efficacious  again.  Larkin,  the  Californians,  the 
British  vice  consul,  the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans,  the 
Mexican  minister  at  Washington,  and  Mexican,  British, 
French  and  American  journals  agreed  on  this.  Larkin  believed 
the  matter  would  be  settled  in  that  way  by  1848.  "Without 
striking  a  blow  and  without  incurring  any  expense,"  wrote 
Vice  Consul  Forbes,  the  United  States  will  obtain  a  secure  foot- 
hold in  the  coveted  region.)  The  Americans  do  not  need  to 
fight  for  California,  said^Le  Constitutionnel  of  Paris.  "No 
more  convenient  mode  of  conquest  was  ever  devised,"  remarked 
the  Baltimore  American.  To  suppose  that  Polk  and  the 
Cabinet  failed  to  see  what  was  not  only  obvious  but  often 
pointed  out,  would  be  absurd.  The  .condition  and  political 
feeling  of  California,  which  were  quite  well  known  through 
Larkin  and  others,  fully  warranted  a  procedure  so  amicable 
and  so  beneficial;  and  it  only  remainjsd  to-^uard  against 
European  interference,  which  our  government  now  considered 
a  real  danger.11 

On  October  17,  1845,  therefore,  confidential  instructions, 
based  upon  the  fact  that  British  and  French  consuls  having 
no  commercial  business  were  maintained  in  California,  were 
issued  to  Larkin,  who  was  now  to  be  confidential  agent  as  well 


326  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

as  consul.  "The  interests  of  our  commerce  and  our  whale 
fisheries  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  demand/'  he  was  informed,  "that 
you  should  exert  the  greatest  vigilance  in  discovering  and 
defeating  any  attempt,  which  may  be  made  by  foreign  govern- 
ments to  acquire  a  control  over  that  country."  Against  such 
an  attempt  the  United  States  would  "vigourously  interpose"; 
but  r  should  California  assert  and  maintain  her  independence, 
we  snail  render  her  all  the  kind  offices  in  our  power";  and 
"whilst  the  President  will  make  no  effort  and  use  no  influence 
to  induce  California  to  become  one  of  the  free  and  independent 
states  of  this  Union,  yet  if  the  people  should  desire  to  unite 
their  destiny  with  ours,  they  would  be  received  as  brethren, 
whenever  this  can  be  done  without  affording  Mexico  just  cause 
of  complaint  J  Their  true  policy  for  the  present  in  regard  to 
this  question,  is  to  let  events  take  their  course,  unless  an  at- 
tempt should  be  made  to  transfer  them  without  their  consent 
either  to  Great  Britain  or  France."  On  the  same  day  instruc- 
tions to  ascertain  the  designs  of  those  powers  were  issued  to 
/Commodore  Sloat,  commanding  the  Pacific  squadron,  and 
^Lieutenant  Gillespie  of  the  Marine  Corps  was  ordered  to 
California  as  a  co-agent  with  Larkin.11 

All  this  has  been  called  an  intrigue ;  but,  if  that  word  is  in 
fairness  applicable,  the  "intrigue"  was  only  designed,  so  far 
as  it  concerned  Mexico  and  California,  to  rescue  with  a  gentle 
hand  the  neglected,  abused  and  lost;  so  far  as  it  concerned 
England  and  France,  to  ward  off  an  interposition  which,  if 
attempted,  would  probably  have  led  to  war;  and,  so  far  as 
it  concerned  the  United  States,  to  safeguard  and  advance 
most  important  national  interests  while  promoting  the  general 
good  of  the  world.  (Such  "intrigues"  are  among  the  most 
^  legitimate  achievements. of  true  statecraft.11 

This  leads  us  to  the  more  serious  charge,  that  Polk  brought 
i/upon  two  nations  the  curse  of  war  and  endangered  the  peace 
of  the  world,  for  the  purpose  of  tearing  California  from  the 
parent  stem;  and  we  find  ourselves  here  at  the  best  point  of 
view  from  which  to  consider  it.  Not  only,  then,  have  we  no 
sound  evidence  in  support  of  the  charge ;  not  only  was  he  per- 
sonally unfitted  to  play  the  role  of  conqueror;  not  only  did 
he  exert  himself  to  restore  friendly  relations  with  Mexico; 
not  only  did  he  virtually  forbid  Slidell  to  work  for  the  sale 


A  CHANGE  OF  RULE  IMMINENT  327 

of  California,  if  so  doing  would  militate  against  this  endeavor ; 
not  only  did  his  taking  certain  other  important  steps  and 
refraining  from  still  others  imply  the  same  intentions;  but  it 
appears  that  he  looked  forward  to  obtaining  the  territory 
without  war,  should  he  be  unable  to  purchase  it,  by  a  method 
peculiarly  suited  to  his  characteristics  and  to  those  of  Buchanan. 
We  therefore  do  not  need  to  consider  one  of  our  Presidents  a 
wretch  unhung,  as  many  Americans-4mve  seemed  eager  to  do, 
and  should  finally  dismiss  the  charge.12) 

While  the  instructions  to  Larkin_jBere  on  their  way,  the  year 
1846  came  in,  and  to  California  it  brought  fresh  perplexities. 
The  desire  to  escape  from  what  a  citizen  described  as  "  a  positive 
state  of  anarchy"  was  more  pronounced  than  ever.  One  plan 
contemplated  a  French  protectorate;  but  the  men  of  that 
nationality  were  few,  their  government  did  nothing,  and  their 
consul  exerted  himself  only  to  acquire  unpopularity.  A  much 
greater  number  favored  American  control.  Probably  all  of 
the  foreigners  thought  such  a  regime  preferable  to  the  existing 
state  of  things.  Even  the  British  vice  consul  admitted  that 
his  personal  judgment  pointed  in  that  direction.  Some  of 
the  Californians  also  leaned  our  way.  They  recognized  the 
merits  of  our  institutions  and  the  growth  of  our  power.  The 
good  order  maintained  by  Commodore  Jones's  forces  had  left 
a  favorable  impression,  and  so  had  the  conduct  of  our  naval 
officers  who  went  ashore  from  time  to  time.16 

But  the  participation  of  Americans  in  the  California  revolts 
had  excited  suspicion  and  fear.  Our  acquisition  of  Texas, 
as  described  by  Mexicans  writers,  had  bee:i  resented,  and 
probably  it  was  known  that  Mexicans  residing  there  had  fared 
none  too  well.  American  hunters  —  or  men  believed  to  be 
such  —  had  sometimes  helped  themselves  to  property.  In 
consequence  very  likely  of  misdeeds  committed  by  our  sailors 
the  Americans  were  generally  disliked  at  Monterey.  The 
constantly  increasing  immigration  despite  Mexican  laws  ap- 
peared intrusive  and  menacing.  All  the  faults  of  our  people, 
who  were  better  known  than  other  foreigners,  came  to  be  under 
stood.  Their  brusque,  overbearing,  strenuous  ways  impressed 
the  polite,  indolent  Californians  as  almost  ferocious.  Indeed 
a  natural  antipathy  —  social,  religious  and  racial  —  made 
harmony    well-nigh     impossible.      Finally,    doubts    were    felt 


328  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

whether  we  should  be  able  to  offer  immediate  and  effective 
protection  against  Mexico  and  the  Indians,  and  whether  our 
flag  would  not  go  down  after  a  time,  as  when  Jones  had  raised 
it,  leaving  our  friends  to  settle  with  the  mother-country  as 
best  they  could.16 

The  British,  on  the  other  hand,  while  in  every  way  as  free  and 
as  responsible  as  the  Americans,  were  comparatively  exempt 
from  such  objections;  their  government  had  a  strong  fleet 
in  the  Pacific ;  and  hence,  as  was  natural,  most  of  the  substan- 
tial citizens  —  especially  in  the  south  —  desired  the  shelter 
of  her  flag.  But  Forbes  could  not  meet  their  views.  Warned 
not  to  meddle,  save  to  hinder  any  other  nation  from  establish- 
ing a  protectorate,  he  could  make  no  promises  and  give  no 
encouragement.  He  conveyed  to  the  government  of  California 
the  declaration  of  England  that  she  would  feel  greatly  dis- 
pleased to  have  the  province  pass  under  the  control  of  any 
other  power,  but  his  only  advice  was  to  elude  American  rule  by 
declaring  unqualified  independence;  and  this  plan,  as  all 
thjaughtful  men  understood,  could  not  be  carried  out.16 
f  Governor^Pico,  a  fat,  swarthy,  good-natured  farmer  of  toler- 
ably good  sense  but  little  ability,  and  educated  only  about 
enough  to  write  his  name,  was  the  chief  of  the  British  party, 
and  wanted  no  Americans  in  the  country.  Jallejp —  who  was 
now  inactive  but  had  great  influence  —  favored  the  Americans, 
for  he  believed  that  we  held  the  winning  cards,  and  foresaw, 
like  many  other  landowners,  that  American  rule  would  enhance 
the  value  of  real  estate.  Qastro,  a  man  of  quick  but  not  pro- 
found intelligence  and  more  ambitious  for  power  and  fame 
than  for  wealth,  probably  desired  independence  with  himself 
as  the  autocrat;  but  he  knew  the  time  had  not  arrived,  and 
felt  that  his  grip  on  the  customhouse  must  not  be  loosened. 
For  the  present,  therefore,  while  he  showed  much  amiability 
toward  the  Americans  and  occasionally  masked  his  real  views 
behind  cordiality  toward  France,  he  posed  at  Mexico  as  an 
ardent  patriot,  j  In  order  to  save  his  responsibility,  whatever 
might  happen^  and  perhaps  fortify  his  position,  he  urged  the 
need  of  preparing  for  war  against  the  United  States,  and  called 
for  plenty  of  money  and  a  few  soldiers  —  not  more  than  he 
could  be  sure  of  handling.  At  the  same  time,  holding  that 
Pico  was  only  an  acting  governor,  he  recommended  that  during 


A  CRASH  AT  HAND  329 

the  crisis,  at  least,  the  civil  authority  should  be  united  with  the 
military.  In  March  he  invited  a  number  of  leading  citizens 
to  discuss  the  situation  with  him,13  but  no  agreement  on  a  line 
of  action  could  be  reached.16 

Forbes  congratulated  himself  that  no  American  of  commanding 
influence,  familiar  with  the  language,  customs  and  prejudices 
of  the  people,  resided  in  California ;  but  Larkin  seems  to  have 
been  on  good  terms  with  all  the  officials  at  least.  His  firm 
chin,  ample  brow  and  correct  side-whiskers  inspired  respect, 
while  his  notable  energy,  hospitality  and  public  spirit  gained 
him  esteem ;  and  when  Gillespie,  after  crossing  Mexico  to  Maza- 
tlan  in  the  guise  of  a  mercantile  agent  and  then  sailing  perforce 
to  the  Hawaiian  Islands,14  arrived  at  Monterey  on  April  17, 
and  repeated  to  him  from  memory  Buchanan's  instructions 
of  precisely  six  months  before,  which  it  had  not  been  thought 
safe  to  bring  in  writing,  he  promptly  bestirred  himself.  The 
main  points  of  his  instructions  were  transmitted  in  confidence 
to  friends  at  other  towns;  here  and  there  an  official  had  an 
opportunity  to  see  a  good  argument,  written  out  in  Spanish, 
for  American  rule;  and  Castro  was  assured  that  he  and  his 
friends  might  derive  personal  advantages  from  such  a  change.16 

As  if  all  these  currents  and  cross-currents  did  not  produce 
commotion  enough,  civil  war  now  loomed  up.  Both  Los 
Angeles  and  Monterey  desired  to  be  the  capital  and  possess 
the  customhouse.  Herrera  had  assigned  two  thirds  of  the 
revenue  to  Pico  and  one  third  to  Castro ;  but  Paredes  reversed 
this  arrangement,  and  Castro  improved  still  further  upon  it 
by  taking  the  whole.  In  April  the  comandante  general  and 
his  officers  repudiated  Herrera,  on  whom  Pico's  authority 
depended,  came  out  for  Paredes,  and  resolved  to  propose, 
on  the  ground  of  Mexico's  threatening  relations  with  the 
United  States,  that  the  governor  should  place  himself  in 
Castro's  power  by  coming  to  Monterey  —  the  latter,  in  case 
of  a  refusal,  to  act  according  to  his  discretion.16 

Pico,  who  doubtless  knew  as  well  as  others,  that  Castro  was 
aiming  to  upset  him,  appealed  to  the  people  and  summoned 
a  general  convention,  which  was  to  meet  at  Santa  Barbara 
on  June  15,  and  avert  the  "external  and  internal  disasters" 
that  were  threatening  California.  The  promoters  of  the 
scheme  intended  to  audit   Castro's  use  of  the  public  funds, 


330  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

declare  for  independence,  and  invite  foreign  protection  — 
preferably  that  of  England.  Castro  denounced  it  as  treason- 
able, defeated  it  by  preventing  the  northern  delegates  from 
going  to  Santa  Barbara,15  and  proclaimed__mfl rtifl J  1  a-w  ^jmH 
about  the  middle  of  June  Pico  advanced  against  him  with  all 
the  forces  he  could  raise.  It  seemed  as  if  a  crash  would  have 
to  come :  and  a  crash  did  come.16 


XVII 

THE  CONQUEST  OF  CALIFORNIA 

1846-1847 

(^In  December,  1845,  Brevet  Captain  John  C.  Fremont  of 
the  United  States  army,  who  was  engaged  with  a  party  of 
about  fifty  or  sixty  men  —  necessarily  armed  but  not  soldiers 
—  in  looking  for  a  satisfactory  road  to  the  Pacific,  reached 
New  Helvetia,  and  at  the  end  of  January  he  presented  him- 
self at  Monterey  to  obtain  funds  and  supplies,  and  ask  for 
permission  to  recruit  his  followers  and  horses  in  California. 
Castro  gave  this  permission ;  but  unfortunately  one  of  the  two 
men  either  misunderstood  or  violated  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment, and  when  the  surveying  party  was  discovered  early  in 
March  near  Monterey,  Castro  denounced  Fremont  as^aving 
invaded  Mexican  territory  and  aiming  to  excTte"a  revolt.M 

It  was  an  admirable  opportunity  to  figure  at  homeland  at 
Mexico  as  a  dauntless  patriot,  and  the  comandante  general 
made  the  most  of  it.  His  narrow  but  high  forehead,  framed 
with  curling  black  hair,  seemed  to  expand,  and  his. brilliant 
black  eyes  darted  fire,  as  he  galloped  about  the  countryside 
rallying  militia.  Fremont  placed  himself  in  a  strong  position, 
built  some  fortifications,  raised  the  American  flag  and  announced 
that  he  would  perish  fighting;  but  after  cannon  were  seen  in 
the  distance  he  retired  under  cover  of  darkness,  and  slowly 
proceeded  toward  Oregon.  Castro  then  put  out  a  bombastic 
proclamation,  of  course,  declaring  that  he  had  driven  the 
American  intruder  away.1 

(Far  to  the  north  Fremont  was  overtaken  early  in  May  by 
Gillespie,  and  went  back  to  the  Sacramento.2  On  June  6  he 
decided  to  act.  At  his  instance  Americans  captured  a  drove 
of  horses  that  Castro  had  sent  for.  Some  days  later  a  sizable 
company  took  Sonoma,  a  military  post  north  of  San  Francisco 

331 


332  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Bay,  seized  the  cannon,  arms  and  munitions,  appropriated 
horses,  cattle  and  miscellaneous  property,  carried  away  Vallejo 
and  other  leading  citizens  as  prisoners,  and  raised  a  home- 
made flag  decorated  with  a  particularly  home-made  semblance 
of  a  bear.  Some  hostilities  then  occurred;  some  blood  was 
shed;  and  early  in  July  the  tragi-comedy  reached  its  climax 
in  a  declaration  of  independence,  which  probably  not  one 
Calif ornian  acclaimed.6 

What  could  have  precipitated  such  an  astounding  perform- 
ance ?  Clearly  no  directions  from  our  government.3  A  policy 
calculated,  not  to  outrage  and  affright,  but  on  the  other  hand 
to  conciliate  and  win  the  people,  had  been  enjoined  upon  Sloat, 
Larkin  and  Gillespiej  and  under  Buchanan's  order  Gillespie 
had  acquainted  Fremont  with  Larkin's  instructions.  But 
Fremont,  like  the  others,  was  to  counteract  foreign  designs, 
and  knowing  —  for  Larkin  was  aware  of  the  fact  on  April 
17  and  hence  Gillespie  knew  it  —  that  Slidell  had  been  rejected, 
he  said  and  presumably  believed,  that  war  had  by  this  time 
begun;  and  he  doubtless  feared  that  England,  supposably 
in  collusion  with  Mexico,  would  try  to  occupy  California  before 
the  United  States  could  act  there.  Forbes,  on  behalf  of  the 
British,  could  see  that  a  declaration  of  independence  would 
keep  the  Americans  out.  Hence  possibly  Fremont  argued 
that  such  a  step  would  help  to  do  as  much  for  the  British; 
and  evidently  a  flag  put  up  by  himself  could  be  lowered  any 
day.6 

Besides,  as  we  learn  from  the  President,  Gillespie  had  secret 
instructions;  and  these,  while  not  contradicting  the  others, 
very  possibly  stated  that  Polk  was  determined  to  have  a 
complete  settlement  with  Mexico,  and  in  case  of  war  to  acquire 
California,  for  such  was  soon  his  policy;  )and  presumably 
they  ordered  that  Fremont  should  hover  about,  and  be  ready  to 
cooperate  at  the  proper  time.  These  circumstances,  taken 
together,  presented  to  his  roving  imagination  a  brilliant  vista 
of  achievements  and  glory;  and,  as  he  said,  he  "resolved  to 
move  forward  on  the  opportunity."  4  Moreover  many  of  the 
Americans  in  the  Sacramento  valley,  believing  that  Castro 
intended  to  expel  them  shortly  from  the  country,  appealed 
to  Fremont  for  aid  ;5  and,  finally,  that  officer  probably  burned 
to  vindicate  himself  as  a  soldier  from  the  imputation  of  having 


THE   "BEAR"   MOVEMENT  333 

run  away  in  March.  Hence  the  determination  to  overthrow 
the  government.  Cannon,  munitions  and  horses  were  logical 
necessities;  and  it  seemed  likely  that  Vallejo  and  his  friends 
could  be  used  to  influence  the  public  or  possibly  at  the  worst 
asjaostages.6 

(The  Calif ornians,  however,  did  not  relish  Fremont's  total 
disregard  of  their  feelings  and  rights.  They  viewed  the  Bear 
uprising  as  an  inexcusable  outrage  —  predatory,  murderous 
and  cruel,  and,  since  Fremont  was  an  American  army  officer, 
as  fully  justifying  every  suspicion  and  fear  entertained  against 
our  government.  The  exasperation  was  intense;  the  resent- 
ment bitter.  J  Who  could  think  his  person  or  property  safe 
under  the  law  of  the  rifle  enforced  by  robbers?  they  asked. 
To  make  the  situation  worse  Fremont,  under  the  pretence 
that  he  was  getting  ready  for  the  long  journey  home,  obtained 
munitions  and  supplies  from  the  United  States  vessel  of  war 
Portsmouth,  anchored  at  San  Francisco;  and  this  fact  became 
publicly  known.  Larkin  was  kept  entirely  Jn  the  dark,  but 
probably  not  one  Californian  thought  so.  (in  short,  the  plan 
of  the  government  was  completely  upset.  Moreover  Fremont's 
operations  tended  to  defeat  his  cwn  aim  also,  for  they  enabled 
Pico  to  solicit  British  protection  on  a  definite  and  substantial 
ground.6 

These  events,  however,  were  soon  eclipsed.  June  24,  1845, 
instructions  for  his  guidance,  in  view  of  our  strained  relations 
with  Mexico,  had  been  issued  to  Commodore  Sloat  of  the 
Pacific  squadron.  He  was  told  that  he  should  be  "assiduously 
careful  to  avoid  any  act,  which  could  be  construed  as  an  act 
of  aggression";  yet,  should  he  ascertain  "with  certainty" 
—  "beyond  a  doubt"  —  that  Mexico  had  "declared  war," 
he  was  to  occupy  San  >Francisco  and  occupy  or  blockade  such 
other  ports  as  he  could.]  In  consequence  of  this  order  Sloat, 
so  he  reported  in  Novejaemer,  proceeded  to  Mazatlan  as  the  like- 
liest place  to  receive  information;7  and  on  May  17  he  learned 
from  United  States  Consul  Parrott  of  Mazatlan,  then  at  Guada- 
lajara, of  Thornton's  defeat.  Upon  this  he  decided  to  execute 
his  orders  immediately;  but  on  considering  the  June  instruc- 
tions again,  he  thought  action  was  not  warranted.8  May 
31  came  news  of  Palo  Alto  and  the  Resaca,  and  on  June  5 
confirmation  of  the  news.     That  hostilities  had  begun  he  felt 


334  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

no  doubt;  but,  "sicklied  o'er"  with  something  that  resembled 
thought  "as  the  mist  resembles  rain,"  and  with  an  anxiety 
about  his  personal  fortunes  that  obscured  national'  interests, 
his  resolution  still  wavered.  On  the  seventh  of  June,  however, 
he  learned  from  Surgeon  Wood,  recently  of  the  squadron  but 
now  on  his  way  home  with  Parrott  via  Mexico  City,  that  the 
Mexican  government  admitted  the  battles  had  occurred,  and 
learned  also  that  an  American  fleet  was  blockading  Vera  Cruz. 
The  next  day  he  sailed;  and  on  July  2  he  was  in  Monterey 
harbor,9  fourteen  hundred  miles  to  the  northwest,  where  for 
some  strange  reason  he  made  the  usual  call  on  the  authorities.15 

Larkin,  with  whom  the  Commodore  had  been  instructed  to 
confer,  soon  hastened  aboard,  and  opened  Sloat's  astonished 
eyes  to  the  situation.  They  agreed  —  for  their  instructions 
agreed  —  that  kindness  toward  the  people  was  to  characterize 
all  action;  but  Larkin,  who  did  not  believe  war  had  begun, 
wanted  action  postponed,  hoping  that  American  rule  would  be 
invited,  or  at  least  welcomed,  by  the  Californians,10  while 
Sloat  —  though  doubtless  he  now  learned  of  the  government's 
plan  to  acquire  the  province  through  immigration  and  a  period 
of  independence  —  remembered  that  he  was  under  orders  to 
occupy  or  blockade  the  ports  without  unnecessary  delay,  and 
perceived  that  the  state  of  things  called  upon  him  to  take 
immediate  possession  of  the  interior  also,  regarding  which 
no  instructions  had  been  given  him.11  News  that  an  American 
officer,  to  whom  another  officer  had  recently  been  sent  from 
Washington,  was  apparently  conducting  hostilities  at  a  dis- 
tance from  the  sea  appeared  like  a  clue  to  the  maze ; 12  and, 
finally,  after  several  days  of  anxious  and  wavering  deliberation, 
the  idea  that  Sir  George  Seymour,  admiral  of  the  British 
Pacific  fleet,  who  had  seemed  to  be  watching  his  movements,13 
might  appear  at  any  hour  and  raise  the  British  flag,  drove 
him  into  action.15 

July  7,  as  the  sun  rose  above  the  mountains  on  the  east, 
Monterey  in  its  amphitheatre  of  pine-clad  hills,  with  trim- 
looking  white  and  balconied  houses  dotted  along  its  two  parallel 
streets  among  the  trees  and  along  the  waters  of  the  broad  cove, 
which  lay  rippling  at  its  very  feet,  presented  a  very  attractive 
appearance,  but  certainly  was  insignificant  enough.  Not  so, 
however,  what  occurred  there.     Old  Captain  Silva,  the  com- 


SLOAT  OCCUPIES   MONTEREY  335 

mandant,  when  invited  at  half-past  seven  to  give  up  the  town, 
replied  that  he  and  the  troops  had  left  the  place,  and  there 
was  nothing  —  not  even  a  flag  —  to  surrender ;  and  at  about 
half-past  ten  Captain  Mervine  with  some  two  hundred  and 
fifty  sailors  and  marines  landed  from  boats.15 
(Marching  to  the  little  customhouse  Mervine  read  a  procla- 
mation drawn  by  Sloat  and  Larkin.  The  United  States  \ 
and  Mexico  being  now  at  war,  I  take  possession  of  upper 
Calif ornia),  said  the  Commodore  in  effect,  but  I  do  so  as  her  best 
friend^rhe  territory  becomes  a  part  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  people  shall  be  protected  in  all  their  present  rights; 
they  may  stay  here  as  neutrals,  or  depart;  they  may  choose 
their  own  officials ;  products  of  the  United  States  will  come  in 
duty-free,  and  other  articles  pay  one  quarter  of  the  Mexican 
rate;  civil  security,  religious  freedom  and  material  prosperity 
will  be  the  fruits  of  American  rule.14  The  Stars  and  Stripes 
were  then  run  up  on  the  customhouse  flagstaff,  our  men  — 
both  afloat  and  ashore  —  cheered,  the  boom  of  twenty-one 
guns  from  the  Savannah  filled  the  amphitheatre^of  hills,  and 
the  great  province  of  California  had  a  future.  (By  July  14  our 
colors  were  flying  ^t  every  important  point,  and  the  Bear 
ensign  had  vanished)  Stringent  orders  to  prevent  misbehavior 
and  plundering  were  issued ;  measures  were  adopted  to  support 
the  flag  and  repress  the  Indians;  and  Fremont  was  earnestly 
invited  to  cooperate.15 

Both  Sloat  and  Larkin  endeavored  to  bring  Castro  in,  but 
he  would  not  come;  and  he  retorted  by  demanding  an  ex- 
planation of  the  Sonoma  affair.  Doubtless  that  episode  had 
thoroughly  angered  him,  and  he  felt  besides  that  a  man  in  his 
official  position  would  not  be  forgiven  by  the  people,  should 
he  condone  it.  (Alvarado  and  Pico,  both  of  whom  were  cor- 
dially addressed,  held  entirely  aloofj)  and  before  long  the 
governor  and  the  comandante  general,  forced  into  a  reconcilia- 
tion by  Fremont's  operations,  united  their  commands. (  But 
as  the  people  of  northern  California  generally,  thankful  to 
escape  from  the  clutches  of  the  Bear  and  pleased  with  Sloat's 
proclamation,  appeared  willing  to  accept  the  change  of  flags, 
these  two  leaders  withdrew  to  the  vicinity  of  Los  Angeles^ 
where  with  about  eight  hundred  men  and  ten  cannon  they 
supported  —  or  pretended  to  support  —  the  cause  of  Mexico ; 


336  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

and  the  situation  was  further  clarified  by  Admiral  Seymour, 
who  arrived  at  Monterey  on  July  16,  and  a  week  later,  ad- 
mitting that  he  could  not  interfere,  sailed  away.15 

July  23  Sloat,  who  felt  ill  and  probably  felt  worried,  turned 
over  the  command  on  shore  to  Robert  F.  Stockton,  who  had 
arrived  in  the  Congress  about  a  week  before,16  and  some  days 
later,  giving  up  the  squadron  also,  left  the  coast.  The  new 
Commodore  seems  to  have  been  a  smart,  but  vain,  selfish, 
lordly  and  rampant  individual,  thirsting  for  glory;  and  little 
glory  could  be  seen  in  following  after  his  predecessor  under 
so  mild  a  policy.  Besides,  another  character  was  now  on  the 
stage.  July  19  about  one  hundred  and  sixty  horsemen  entered 
Monterey  from  the  north  —  men  with  gaunt  bodies,  frames  of 
steel,  shaggy  beards,  and  an  air  of  indomitable  courage  and 
endurance,  armed  with  a  long,  heavy  rifle  on  the  shoulder  and 
a  big  knife  on  the  hip,  and  speaking  a  lingo  sometimes  hard 
to  understand.  These  were  the  youngest  and  hardiest  of  the 
Sacramento  men,  reinforced  with  the  pick  of  the  immigrants 
just  arrived.  At  their  head  rode  a  short,  sle  der,  active  man 
in  buckskin  blouse,  leggings  and  moccasins,  a  blue  shirt  open 
at  the  neck,  and  a  cotton  handkerchief  in  lieu  of  a  hat,  with 
plenty  of  hair,  a  small,  bearded  face,  and  therein  eyes  —  "  such 
eyes."    This  was  Fremont.20 

He  was  a  counsellor  far  more  to  Stockton's  taste  than  Larkin ; 
and,  in  addition  to  believing  the  Californians  dangerous  and 
unreliable,  and  entertaining  deep  resentment  on  account  of 
the  March  episode,  he  doubtless  could  see  that  California, 
reposing  contentedly  under  the  American  flag,  would  make  a 
poor  background  for  his  violent  operations.  The  outcome 
was  a  ridiculous  address,17  which  ranted  at  length  against 
Castro,  especially  for  his  treatment  of  Fremont,  explained 
Sloat's  action  as  due  to  this,  declared  that  Stockton's  only 
object  was  to  protect  life  and  property,  and  announced  that 
when  Castro  should  be  put  down  and  the  duties  of  govern- 
ment be  assumed  by  responsible  officials,  he  would  remove  the 
American  forces.20 

July  23,  with  a  view  to  the  conquest  of  the  whole  province, 
Fremont's  men  were  taken  into  the  naval  service  as  the  Califor- 
nia Battalion,  with  himself  as  major  and  Gillespie  as  captain ; 
and  they  sailed  promptly  for  San  Diego  to  gain  Castro's  rear. 


CALIFORNIA  IN  AMERICAN  HANDS  337 

A  few  days  later  Stockton  followed  in  the  Congress,  raised  the 
American  flag  at  Santa  Barbara,  and  anchored  at  San  Pedro, 
some  eighteen  miles  from  Los  Angeles.  Larkin,  still  most 
anxious  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  arrangement,  came  with 
him.  Believing  that  war  had  not  been  and  would  not  be 
declared,  he  urgently  recommended  through  Stearns  of  Los 
Angeles  that  Pico  and  the  legislature  meet  the  dubious  emer- 
gency, prevent  the  country  from  falling  a  prey  to  disorder, 
save  the  interests  of  all  officials,  and  ensure  lasting  prosperity 
by  declaring  California  independent  under  American  protec- 
tion; and  Castro  proposed  that  Stockton  halt  at  San  Pedro 
with  a  view  to  negotiations.20 

Alvarado  said  later  that  a  satisfactory  arrangement  could 
probably  have  been  made,  but  the  Commodore  haughtily 
insisted  that  Castro  should  begin  by  accepting  independence 
and  the  American  flag.18  To  do  this  would  have  left  him 
nothing  to  trade  upon;  and  hence,  apparently  overestimating 
Stockton's  military  strength,  lacking  money,  and  finding 
round  him  no  popular  enthusiasm  or  even  genuine  harmony, 
he  retired  hastily  on  August  10  with  a  handful  of  men  toward 
Sonora,  leaving  behind  him  a  cloud  of  eloquence ; 19  and  the 
governor  also  left  the  country.20 

On  their  disappearance  all  military  opposition  vanished. 
Larkin  with  a  couple  of  friends  took  Los  Angeles  on  the  twelfth 
of  August;  the  Commodore  with  his  marines  and  sailors, 
headed  by  a  brass  band,  and  Fremont  with  a  part  of  his  bat- 
talion arrived  the  next  day;  and  on  the  seventeenth,  when 
positive  information  that  war  had  begun  reached  the  town, 
Stockton  issued  another  proclamation.  California  now  be- 
longs to  the  United  States,  he  announced  in  effect,  and  is 
under  military  law;  all  who  adhere  to  the  new  regime  will 
be  protected,  but  no  others  may  remain  in  the  country.  Some 
of  the  Californian  leaders  were  arrested  and  a  number  sur- 
rendered, but  all  of  them  were  given  their  liberty  on  parole. 
Friends  rallied  of  course  to  the  winning  side ;  the  Commodore 
became  attentive  and  kindly  toward  the  people;  and  Larkin 
soon  reported  that  matters  were  settling  down.20 

Stockton  realized  that  under  the  law  of  nations  and  the  law 
of  humanity  a  conqueror  had  the  right  and  the  duty  of  softening 
military  rule,  and  felt  that  pursuing  such  a  course  here  would 
vol.  i — z 


V 


338  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

tend  to  confirm  the  victory.  Already,  with  his  assistance, 
the  first  schoolhouse  and  the  first  newspaper  of  California 
had  made  their  appearance ;  steps  were  now  taken  to  establish 
postal  facilities;  and  this  very  proclamation  announced,  that 
officials  elected  by  the  people  might  govern  according  to  the 
prevailing  usages.  In  September  regular  municipal  elections 
top]*:  place,  and  good  results  were  obtained.20 
(The  reign  of  justice  began  to  dawn.  Chaplain  Colton, 
appointed  alcalde  of  Monterey,  gave  general  satisfaction). 
American  officers  recovered  a  large  number  of  horses  driven 
off  by  the  Indians,  and  astonished  the  Californians  by  returning 
them  to  their  owners.  The  Commodore,  besides  adjusting 
disputes  in  a  manner  that  gratified  the  people,  made  and  for- 
warded to  Washington  for  approval  what  he  called  laws; 
announced  that  a  legislative  council  would  be  created,  and 
called  himself  governor.  This  office,  however,  it  was  not 
his  intention  to  hold  long.  The  fantastic  idea  of  landing  at 
Acapulco  and  moving  upon  the  capital  had  taken  possession 
of  his  mind.  He  therefore  sent  Fremont  north  to  enlist  men 
for  him  on  the  Sacramento,  proposed  to  set  out  for  Mexico 
in  October,  and  promised  to  inaugurate  that  officer  as  governor 
on  leaving  California.20 

But  he  did  not  leave  so  promptly.  In  arranging  for  the 
security  of  the  country  he  divided  it  into  three  military  dis- 
tricts, appointing  Fremont  commandant  at  the  north  and 
Gillespie  at  the  south.  Gillespie's  task  was  peculiarly  im- 
portant, because  news  and  troops  from  Mexico  would  arrive 
first  at  Los  Angeles,  and  because  that  section  had  the  largest 
percentage  of  restless  people,  the  smallest  percentage  of  Ameri- 
cans, and  the  weakest  pro-American  sentiment.  He  seems 
to  have  been  an  elegant,  precise  man  with  a  stiff,  pointed 
beard  and  a  temper  of  the  same  description;  but  at  any  rate 
he  was  a  soldier,  understood  his  responsibility,  and  knew  what 
military  government  signified.27 

Larkin  urged  that  a  respectable  command  should  be  given 
him,  but  Stockton  had  neither  men  nor  funds  for  land  service, 
and  only  about  fifty  of  the  disdainful  and  intolerant  volunteers, 
perhaps  including  some  of  the  detested  Sonoma  "brigands," 
could  be  spared  for  Los  Angeles.  A  garrison  of  that  strength, 
far  from  support,  was  almost  an  insult  and  certainly  a  provo- 


INSURRECTION  339 

cation  to  the  people.  (Though  told  by  Stockton  to  temper 
military  law,  Gillespie  doubtless  felt  that  his  only  safety  lay 
in  maintaining  strict  order ;  and  if,  unfamiliar  with  Calif ornian 
character  and  ways,  he  extended  his  discipline  too  rigidly  over 
the  free  and  easy  natives,  as  he  seems  to  have  done,  the  mistake 
was  but  natural.  \  Stockton  himself  had  given  the  cue,  declar- 
ing in  his  proclamation  of  August  17  that  men  found  in  arms 
outside  their  houses  were  to  be  banished,  ordering  that  all 
must  be  at  home  from  ten  o'clock  at  night  until  sunrise,  and 
indulging  in  a  general  tone  that  has  been  thought  super- 
cilious. Here  were  causes  enough  of  trouble ;  and  behind  them 
lay  an  inevitable  clash  of  races,  temperaments  and  customs, 
unavoidable  friction  resulting  from  a  forcible  change  of  flags, 
anpLa  restlessness  due  to  the  ambition  of  would-be  leaders.27 

I As  the  signs  of  disaffection  began  to  show  themselves,  Gil- 
lespie naturally  arrested  suspicious  persons,  and  punished 
those  whom  he  deemed  conspirators.  This  precipitated  an 
outburst.  In  the  night  of  September  22  some  turbulent 
fellows  made  an  attack  on  the  American  quarters.  In  a  mili- 
tary way  it  was  contemptible;  but,  as  such  affairs  often  do, 
it  crystallized  popular  sentiment.  Within  a  few  days  about 
four  hundred  Calif ornians  were  in  arms;  and  when  the  sur- 
render of  Lieutenant  Wilson  with  some  twenty-five  men  at 
the  Chino  farm  to  about  one  hundred  and  ten  insurgents 
heightened  confidence,  the  movement  spread  still  more.  Some 
of  the  malcontents  were  persons  of  standing,  who  felt  that 
self-respect  called  upon  them  to  break  a  lance  against  the 
invader,  even  though  sure  to  be  defeated;  but  the  great 
majority  appear  to  have  been  irresponsible  characters  ready 
for  anything  except  work.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Flores,  the 
leader,  and  nearly  all  of  his  officers  had  violated  their  paroles, 
of  course;  but  breaking  an  oath  seemed  to  them  a  trivial 
matter,  for  they  knew  they  could  make  another  equally  good 
on  a  moment's  notice.21  Without  fortifications,  adequate 
equipment  or  supplies,  Gillespie  could  see  no  hope  of  resisting 
such  odds,  and  September  29  he  capitulated  on  favorable 
terms.22  The  next  day  he  proceeded  to  San  Pedro  with  his  men, 
and  they  soon  embarked  there  on  a  merchant  ship,  the 
Vandalia.27 

About  the  first  of  October  Stockton,  then  at  San  Francisco, 


340  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

learned  of  the  insurrection.  By  his  order  Mervine  sailed 
promptly  for  San  Pedro  in  the  Savannah,  and  on  October  7 
with  sailors,  marines  and  Gillespie's  command  —  all  on  foot 
—  the  captain  marched  for  Los  Angeles.  Stockton,  however, 
had  provided  him  with  no  artillery,  while  the  Californians 
were  supported  by  a  small  field  piece.  When  the  Americans 
charged,  this  gun  was  hurried  beyond  their  reach  by  mounted 
men  with  lariats;  but  as  soon  as  the  Americans  halted  from 
exhaustion,  it  was  drawn  back  and  set  at  work.  The  case 
appeared  hopeless,  and  after  losing  about  a  dozen  men,  killed 
or  wounded,  Mervine  found  it  necessary  to  retreat.  Naturally 
the  Californians  felt  immensely  encouraged,  and  large  numbers 
gathered  on  the  hills  behind  San  Pedro.27 

Late  in  October  Stockton,  after  lingering  a  while  at  San 
Francisco  to  attend  a  glorification  meeting  and  stopping  at 
Monterey  to  land  ordnance  and  men  for  the  defence  of  that 
point,  arrived  at  San  Pedro  and  undertook  to  accomplish 
something;  but  the  attempt  proved  a  failure,  and  he  sailed 
for  San  Diego,  at  that  day  a  small  group  of  adobe  houses 
about  four  miles  northeast  of  the  present  city.23  Insurgents 
were  now  besieging  the  place,  and  neither  provisions  nor 
horses  could  be  obtained  in  the  vicinity ;  but  Stockton  procured 
both  from  lower  California,  and  began  to  make  ready  for  land 
operations.27 

By  this  time  Flores  had  been  elected  provisional  governor 
and  comandante  general  by  the  legislature,  and  martial  law 
had  been  declared;  but  the  insurgent  leader  found  himself 
without  adequate  resources.  Foreigners  aided  him  with  a 
little  money  at  an  exorbitant  rate  of  interest,  but  on  October 
24  he  stated  that  only  some  forty  rounds  of  cannon  ammunition 
remained,  and  a  thousand  for  the  muskets  of  his  four  hundred 
men.  Campaigning  without  supplies  or  funds  and  driving 
stock  to  the  interior  were  found  extremely  irksome  by  the  in- 
dolent Californians;  a  general  discouragement  prevailed; 
and  the  legislature  could  not  obtain  a  quorum.  Soon  dis- 
affection showed  itself;  and  being  a  Mexican,  Flores  dared 
not  adopt  strong  measures.  Finally,  in  the  night  of  December 
3  he  was  imprisoned  by  malcontents;  and  although  the  legis- 
lature and  people  soon  extinguished  the  revolt,  much  con- 
fusion  grew   out   of   it.    Moreover,    Stockton's   troops   out- 


KEARNY'S  ARRIVAL 


341 


numbered  his;  other  Americans  were  gathering  in  northern 
California,  he  knew;  and  thousands  of  immigrants  were 
expected  at  New  Helvetia,  he  was  informed.27 

(^-None  of  these  forces,  however,  gave  him  the  first  blow. 
May  26  Polk  had  proposed  an  overland  expedition  to  Cali- 
fornia, and  a  week  later  it  was  decided  upon.  Accordingly 
Kearny  was  ordered  to  advance  after  securing  New  Mexico, 
should  the  season  permit;  and  on  September  25,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  left  Santa  Fe  for  the 
coast.  Soon  meeting  Stock- 
ton's bearer  of  despatches, 
he  learned  that  California 
had  been  occupied,  sent  back 
all  but  about  one  hundred  of 
his  dragoons,  and  with  these 
and  a  pair  of  mountain  how- 
itzers marched  on.  At  the 
beginning  of  December  he 
reached  Warner's  ranch 
(Agua  Caliente),  the  frontier 
settlement  of  California,  and, 


Pic</s  2nd  position 
Kearny's  attack 


having  learned  of  the  insurrection,  wrote  on  to  Stockton  for  aid 
and  information.  Gillespie  was  therefore  sent  forward  with  a 
brass  4-pounder  and  thirty-eight  men,  met  him  December  5, 
and  told  him  among  other  news  that  a  party  of  insurgents 
lay  at  San  Pascual,  about  eight  miles  distant  on  the  road  to 
San  Diego. -v  Probably  the  force  numbered  rather  less  than 
one  hundred.)  A  capable  man,  however,  Andres  Pico,  brother 
of  the  ex-governor,  commanded  them.24 

Kearny  sent  off  a  scouting  party,  which  not  only  saw  but 
was  seen,  and  reported  to  him  at  two  o'clock  the  next  morning. 
An  attack  upon  the  Calif ornians  was  highly  inadvisable.  The 
Americans  and  the  pack-mules  that  many  of  them  rode  were 
almost  worn  out.  Some  horses  recently  bought  or  captured 
were  accustomed  to  the  terrible  Mexican  bits,  and  could  not 
be  controlled  by  their  new  riders.  Kearny  had  had  no  experience 
in  fighting  lancers  or  California  horsemen,  and  did  not  know 
how  many  were  before  him.  It  was  clear  that  the  enemy 
were  aware  of  his  presence.  The  dampness  of  the  night  made 
firearms  unreliable,  and  the  men  were  so  chilled  they  could 


342  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

not  use  them  quickly.  Finally,  it  would  not  have  been  diffi- 
cult to  hold  the  insurgents  off  with  his  three  cannon,  and  march 
safely  in  a  compact  body  to  San  Diego,  now  only  about  forty 
miles  distant.  Kearny  decided,  however,  to  attack  before 
daybreak,  and  advanced.24 

Pico  had  not  desired  nor  expected  a  battle ;  but,  perceiving 
what  kind  of  troops  were  in  his  front,  he  did  not  flinch. 
Kearny's  advance  guard  fared  very  badly,  and  when  his  main 
body  came  into  action,  the  enemy  adopted  the  familiar  ruse 
of  a  pretended  flight.  In  pursuing,  the  Americans  became 
separated  according  to  the  speed  of  their  mounts;  and  then 
Pico  turned  furiously  upon  them.  The  net  result  was  that 
Kearny,  Gillespie  and  thirteen  other  Americans  received 
ugly  wounds,  and  eighteen  were  killed,  while  the  enemy's  loss 
appears  to  have  been  trifling.  After  ten  or  fifteen  minutes, 
however,  the  Californians  drew  off,  expecting  guns  and  large 
reinforcements,  which  Flores  had  promised.  As  one  con- 
sequence of  the  revolt  against  his  authority,  these  did  not 
arrive.  Hence  Pico,  who  had  not  been  prepared  for  either 
the  fight  or  the  revolt,  made  no  serious  efforts  to  follow  up 
his  advantage;  and  Kearny,  though  he  lost  his  cattle,  had  to 
live  on  mule  meat,  and  was  burdened  with  his  wounded,  suc- 
ceeded, with  additional  aid  sent  him  by  Stockton,  in  reaching 
San  Diego  on  December  12.24 

Stockton's  preparations  to  do  something  were  then  resumed. 
Sailors  felt  strongly  averse  to  shore  duty,  but  he  overcame 
their  repugnance.  The  ships  furnished  them  pikes,  carbines 
and  pistols,  and  shoes  were  manufactured  out  of  canvas; 
and  so  with  Kearny's  dragoons,  Gillespie's  detachment,  some 
friendly  Californians  and  about  four  hundred  sailors  and 
marines,  drilled  somewhat  for  their  new  work,  the  Commodore 
had  a  respectable  force.25  It  was  not,  however,  his  intention 
to  attack  the  main  body  of  the  insurgents,  for  he  felt  afraid 
the  enemy  would  then  get  behind  him.  His  plan  was  to  move 
up  the  coast  and  make  a  diversion,  expecting  Fremont  and  his 
riflemen  to  take  the  bull  by  the  horns;  but  Kearny  urged 
him  to  march  for  Los  Angeles,  about  one  hundred  and  forty 
miles  distant,  and  at  length  on  December  29,  after  having 
brushed  away  the  Californians  operating  against  San  Diego, 
he  set  out,  greatly  embarrassed  by  having  to  drag  miserable 


STOCKTON  MOVES  AGAINST  LOS  ANGELES        343 

ox-carts  through  the  deep  sand.  Kearny  declined  the  chief 
command,  but  finally  asked  for  and  was  given  the  post  of 
lieutenant  or  executive  officer  under  Stockton.27 

Flores  now  found  himself  in  a  desperate  situation.  Natu- 
rally officers  who  knew  they  had  violated  their  paroles  dreaded 
to  give  up;  but  most  of  his  troops  felt  half-hearted,  people 
hid  to  avoid  serving,  and  some  of  the  Indians  were  in  arms 
against  him.  In  order  to  gain  time  for  a  blow  at  Fremont, 
he  tried  to  inveigle  Stockton  into  a  truce,  holding  out  as  a 
reason  that  Mexico  and  the  United  States  had  probably  ad- 
justed their  differences ;  but  the  Commodore  refused  to  treat 
with  an  officer  guilty  of  breaking  his  parole.  Then,  having 
some  four  hundred  and  fifty  badly  armed  men,  though  not 
enough  powder  for  a  long  fight,  he  set  an  ambuscade  where  he 
supposed  the  Americans  would  pass;  but  Stockton  avoided 
it  by  turning  to  the  right,  and  made  for  the  Bartolo  ford  of 
the  San  Gabriel  River,  twelve  miles  from  Los  Angeles,  where 
the  stream  was  only  knee-deep.  The  Calif ornians  followed 
suit,  and  occupied  an  eminence  fifty  feet  high,  parallel  to  the 
stream  and  about  six  hundred  yards  beyond  it.27 

As  the  Americans  crossed  —  the  first  of  them  deploying  and 
waiting  behind  the  bank,  here  breast-high  and  masked  with 
trees  —  Flores  greeted  them  from  the  top  of  the  hill  with  four 
small  guns;  but  his  inferior  powder  and  sometimes  ill-fitting 
balls  proved  ineffective.26  When  the  Americans  were  mostly 
across  the  river  and  formed  in  a  square,  he  undertook  to  charge. 
But  the  movement  seems  to  have  been  rather  faint-hearted 
or  badly  managed ;  his  left  was  demoralized  by  hearing  one 
of  the  aides  —  who  seems  to  have  been  seized  with  a  panic  — 
shout  "  Halt ! "  as  it  was  advancing ;  and  his  right  accomplished 
nothing.  Stockton  then  cannonaded  the  hill,  particularly 
with  his  two  9-pounders,  for  about  forty  minutes,  while 
most  of  his  troops  lay  down ;  and  finally  he  charged.  Crying 
"New  Orleans !"  in  memory  of  Jackson's  great  victory,  gained 
on  the  same  day  of  the  year,  January  8,  the  men  rushed  on, 
and  easily  took  possession  of  the  ground.  The  Calif  ornians 
made  a  fruitless  attack  on  their  rear,  and  then  most  of  them 
dispersed.27 

The  next  morning  Stockton,  leaving  the  road  in  order  to 
avoid   the  danger  of  ambuscades,  pushed  slowly  on  toward 


344 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


Los  Angeles ;  and  after  a  time  some  three  hundred  Calif ornians, 
whom  Flores  had  managed  to  rally,  placed  themselves  upon 
his  line  of  march.  An  ineffective  cannonade  from  a  ravine 
used  up  the  rest  of  their  ammunition,  while  the  Americans 
replied  with  equally  meagre  results.  As  a  last  effort,  Flores 
now  ordered  a  charge,  giving  the  signal  for  it  —  as  he  himself 
reported  ■ —  by  sending  forward  a  white  flag.27 

The  attack  was  made  with  considerable  spirit  but  no  success 
at  all  on  both  of  the  American  flanks,  and  then  Flores  took 


/ 


/  ^t^mamsi«* 


2nd  position  of  the  Mexicans 


*££ %"X 


„ **» 

''""'""aill.l,,;/, 

1st  position  of 
the  Mexicans 


Depression  in  the  plain 


^ntsmmm 


"«*■*,, 


American  Position  in  Battle 


Enclosing  wagons 
and  cattle 


N      8 


\\ 


Wms.Eiig.Co.>N.Y. 


post  at  a  point  on  the  road  to  Mexico,  where  Pasadena  now 
stands.  He  admitted  losing  only  five  killed  and  twenty-two 
wounded  during  the  two  days,  but  probably  these  figures 
needed  to  be  multiplied  by  three;  while  Stockton  lost  one 
killed  and  fourteen  wounded.  That  night  the  Americans 
encamped  near  Los  Angeles;  and  the  next  day,  January  10, 
after  a  deputation  had  come  to  arrange  matters,  they  took 
possession  of  the  town  —  annoyed  a  little  by  drunken  bullies 

/^and   replaced   Gillespie's   flag   on   the   government   house. 

(  Most  of  the  California  troops  now  scattered,  and  those  who 


remained    were    insubordinate.     Flores    could    see   there 


was 


FREMONT'S  OPERATIONS  345 

no  hope;  and  the  following  night,  leaving  to  Andre?  Pico  the 
chief  command  and  probably  about  one  hundred  men,  he  set 
out  hastily  with  a  few  others  for  Sonora.27 

Up  to  this  time  nothing  had  been  heard  of  Fremont's  oper- 
ations during  almost  three  months.  Probably  that  officer 
did  not  wish  to  take  part  in  the  hostilities.  Expecting  to  be 
governor  and  seeing  before  him  a  prospect  of  brilliant  oppor- 
tunities, he  desired  to  conciliate  the  people.  Stockton,  on 
learning  of  the  revolt  in  the  south,  had  ordered  him  back 
from  the  Sacramento,  and  about  October  12  he  sailed  for  Santa 
Barbara  with  instructions  to  march  from  that  place  to  Los 
Angeles.  Learning  on  the  way,  however,  that  Mervine  had 
been  defeated,  and  that  all  the  horses  and  cattle  had  been 
driven  away  from  Santa  Barbara  by  insurgents,  he  returned 
on  his  own  responsibility  to  the  Sacramento,  and  began  to 
collect  not  only  horses  but  men.28  By  the  end  of  November 
he  found  at  his  back  about  four  hundred  mounted  rii 
and  at  least  three  guns,  the  strongest  force  in  California.3 

The  Savannah  had  been  sent  north  expressly  to  assist  hTm  ;2 
but,  with  little  reference  to  his  army  commission  or  his  naval 
obligations,  he  now  proceeded  slowly  by  land  to  San  Luis 
Obispo,  where  he  fortunately  captured  Jestis  Pico,  a  cousin 
of  Andres ;  and  after  his  prisoner  had  been  sentenced  to  death 
for  breaking  parole,  he  assumed  the  authority  of  pardoning 
him.  Then,  for  no  discoverable  reason  unless  to  spare  about 
sixty  insurgents,  whom  he  could  have  scattered  in  ten  minutes, 
he  led  his  command  through  the  mountains,  where  it  suffered 
terribly  in  the  stormy  weather.  At  Santa  Barbara  he  took 
a  week  for  repose ;  and  finally,  with  a  nicety  of  calculation 
or  felicity  of  luck  that  excites  wonder,  he  arrived  near  the 
scene  of  action  —  three  months  after  receiving  orders  to  go 
tjiere  —  precisely  as  the  Americans  were  entering  Los  Angeles.30 
/Then  with  his  devotee,  Jesus  Pico,  he  betook  himself  to  the 
camp  of  Andres,  and  finally,  although  he  knew  that  American 
forces  had  beaten  the  Californians  and  entered  Los  Angeles, 
and  understood  that  a  superior  officer  was  near,  he  arranged  X 
with  the  insurgents  a  capitulation,  which  Stockton  had  refused 
to  grant.32 

This  capitulation,  the  "treaty"  of  Cahuenga,  conceded  sub- 
stantially all  the  insurgents  could  have  asked.     They  promised 


346  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

to  give  up  the  public  arms,  go  home,  obey  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  help  restore  tranquillity ;  but  on  the  other 
hand  they  and  the  rest  of  the  Californians  were  to  be  pro- 
tected in  person  and  property,  to  enjoy  the  same  rights  as 
Americans,  to  be  excused  from  serving  under  arms  or  taking 
an  oath  of  allegiance  during  the  war,  and  to  leave  the  country 
freely  should  they  wish  to  do  so.31  Naturally  such  a  settlement 
was  displeasing  to  Stockton,  but  he  felt  extremely  anxious  to 
resume  his  proper  work  as  a  naval  officer,  and  of  course  was 
glad  to  have  this  difficult  business  off  his  hands;  so  after 
hesitating  for  a  time  he  confirmed  the  pact.32 

fit  was  a  singular  denouement.  Men  defeated,  without  a 
hope  left,  and  in  danger  of  execution  for  breaking  parole, 
virtually  dictated  terms  to  the  conquerors.  A  brevet  captain, 
just  blossoming  into  a  lieutenant  colonel,  eclipsed  a  commodore 
and  a  brigadier  general;  and  the  arch-ruffian  of  the  Bear  cult 
reappeared  as  a  fairy  godmother  to  save  and  bless  the  Cali- 
fornians,  who  detested  him.  But  the  ending  was  after  all  a 
happy  one.  jThe  Americans  felt  a  new  respect  for  the  people, 
and  they— rtere  able  to  see  that,  although  destitute  of  gun- 
powder, the  insurgents,  if  driven  to  extremities,  could  have 
done  much  harm  with  lance,  dagger  and  torch,  and  could  have 
sowji  the  seeds  of  perennial  hate.32 

(On  the  other  hand,  while  the  Californians  felt  well  pleased 
with  their  own  audacity  and  valor,  they  not  only  realized  that 
it  was  impossible  to-iight  the  United  States,  but  were  thoroughly 
disgusted  with  Floresjwho  took  away  hundreds  of  horses  and 
mules  belonging  tonis  friends,  and  with  Mexico,  which  in 
three  and  a  half  months  had  sent  neither  a  man  nor  a  peso  to 
encourage  and  sustain  them.  Indeed,  as  their  agent  in  Mexico 
frankly  said,  their  political  attitude  had  completely  changed. 
Most  of  them  intended  to  abide  by  the  terms.  They  were 
disposed  to  look  forward  instead  of  back.  And  the  curtain 
was  already  beginning  to  rise  on  the  Golden  West  that  we 
know.32 


XVIII 

THE  GENESIS  OF  TWO  CAMPAIGNS 

July,  1846-February,  1847 

The  operations  described  in  the  preceding  chapters  were  all 
favorable  to  American  arms,  and  they  placed  under  our  control 
a  very  large  portion  of  the  territory  belonging  to  Mexico; 
but  as  they  proceeded,  it  became  evident  that  she  had  no 
thought  of  consenting  to  negotiate.  Indeed  Santa  Anna's 
course  and  the  utterances  of  the  press  were  unflinchingly  war- 
like; and  our  consul  at  Mexico  wrote,  "Nothing  but  some 
very  severe  blow  will  ever  bring  them  to  their  senses."  The 
policy  and  expectations  of  the  American  government  were 
therefore  palpably  wrong.  The  programme  of  a  short  and  a 
brisk  war  was  a  mistake  and  a  failure.  The  nation  found  itself 
in  a  contest  of  unforeseen  duration  and  extent.4 

Heedless  enthusiasm  was  consequently  sobered,  if  not  exactly 
chilled.  By  the  end  of  September,  1846,  Pakenham,  the  British 
minister  at  Washington,  reported  that  a  growing  distaste 
for  the  war  could  be  seen  more  clearly  each  day.  Large  ex- 
penses had  to  be  faced,  and  heavy  losses  of  men  seemed  in- 
evitable. Many  believed  that  neither  troops  nor  money 
enough  could  be  raised ;  many,  besides  deploring  the  loss  of 
precious  lives,  complained  that  needed  laborers  had  already 
been  drawn  away ;  and  many  others  asked  themselves  whether 
the  outlay  would  be  really  worth  while.  Taylor's  famous 
letter  to  Gaines  expressed  the  opinion  that  even  complete 
success  would  be  of  no  advantage;  and  his  idea  of  simply 
fixing  and  holding  a  boundary  north  of  which  there  would 
be  enough  territory  to  pay  all  fair  claims  for  indemnity,  and 
throwing  upon  Mexico  the  responsibility  for  offensive  operations 
naturally  appealed  to  not  a  few.  Moreover,  he  argued,  no 
other  sort  of  a  peace  could  be  made,  since  the  enemy  had  no 

347 


348  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

government  sufficiently  stable  to  treat  with.  Calhoun  took 
up  eagerly  the  defensive  idea.  Buchanan  favored  it;  and 
Polk  himself,  dreading  to  alarm  the  country  by  demanding 
great  numbers  of  men  and  fearful  that  the  credit  of  the  nation 
would  not  bear  the  strain  of  active  warfare,  did  the  same.4 

On  the  other  hand  such  a  plan  was  clearly  unsuited  to  the 
enterprising  temper  of  the  American  people,  and  precisely 
what  the  Mexicans,  whose  ancestors  had  fought  the  Moors 
of  Spain  for  hundreds  of  years,  desired.  It  reminded  one  of 
the  menaces  and  forays  that  had  been  the  policy  of  Mexico 
against  the  Texans.  It  would  have  been  received  by  her  as 
a  cheering  confession,  on  our  part,  of  military  impotence. 
Had  it  been  adopted,  her  people  would  have  found  a  chain 
of  profitable  markets  established  for  them ;  and  at  any  time 
she  could  have  dashed  either  with  regular  or  with  irregular 
troops  upon  any  part  of  our  line,  done  what  harm  she  could, 
and  retired  like  a  wave  on  the  beach,  to  prepare  fresh  assaults 
in  a  perpetual  series.  Only  one  campaign  of  the  sort  now 
proposed  was  on  record,  said  Cass  —  that  of  Sisyphus.  Be- 
sides, every  mile  of  the  boundary  would  have  required  its 
guard ;  even  at  that  a  broad  space  along  the  frontier  would 
have  become  practically  uninhabitable;  expenses  approaching 
those  of  offensive  operations  would  have  mounted  up;  we 
could  have  laid  no  contributions  upon  the  enemy;  national 
honor  would  have  been  tarnished  and  national  spirit  exasperated 
by  a  succession  of  small  defeats;  and  no  progress  whatever 
toward  conquering  a  peace  would  have  been  made.4 

Politically  and  commercially  the  unfavorable  condition  of 
things  which  the  United  States  had  been  so  anxious  to  end, 
would  have  become  chronic.  European  nations  would  soon 
have  gained  a  monopoly  of  trade  and  influence  in  Mexico; 
they  would  have  protested  against  an  endless  blockade ;  and 
what  further  steps  they  would  have  taken  in  regard  to  a  vexa- 
tious and  apparently  aimless  contest  it  was  easy  to  imagine. 
Furthermore,  simply  to  seize  and  hold,  with  no  legal  title, 
provinces  which  Mexico  had  not  been  able  to  protect  against 
the  Indians  would  have  seemed  to  place  the  United  States 
in  the  class  of  mere  pilferers.  Honor  —  at  least  military 
honor  —  demanded  that  we  should  meet  the  enemy,  whom 
we  had  challenged,  at  the  centre  of  their  pride  and  power. 


BOLDER  IDEAS  349 

Finally,  the  weakness  exhibited  in  "backing  out"  of  a  war 
with  Mexico,  begun  without  a  question  of  triumph,  would 
have  excited  ridicule  abroad,  and  compromised  our  inter- 
national position.  Confronted  with  such  objections  to  the 
defensive  plan,  Polk  was  "  extremely  distressed,"  said  Pakenham. 
Evidently  some  decisive  achievement  was  needed  to  save  the 
administration,  the  party  and  the  country;  but  he  dared  not 
face  the  cost  nor  incur  the  risk  of  a  still  more  signal  failure.4 

There  was,  however,  no  lack  of  bolder  ideas.  Not  only  did 
every  newspaper  come  forward  with  a  "cut  and  dried"  plan, 
as  Marcy  rather  bitterly  said,  but  the  government  itself  knew 
what  needed  to  be  done.  In  fact  mere  animal  instinct  was 
enough  to  suggest  that  a  blow  should  be  struck  at  the  enemy's 
heart,  and  as  the  project  of  maintaining  a  line  of  operations 
from  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  capital  —  more  than  800  miles 
—  was  out  of  the  questioif;  the  idea  of  attacking:  Mexico  City 
by  the  way  of  Vera  Cruz  came  forward  early.  J  On  July  4, 
1846,  Benton  formally  suggested  landing  beyond  the  range 
of  Ulua,  the  island  fortress  which  guarded  that  port,  attacking 
the  town  in  the  rear,  and  after  its  fall  advancing  to  the  capital. 
Santa  Anna  advised  through  Mackenzie  almost  exactly  that 
method  of  approach,  adding  that  three  or  four  thousand  men 
could  easily  capture  the  port;  and  at  nearly  the  same  time 
a  letter  from  Taylor,  arguing  that  a  lunge  from  the  Rio  Grande 
base  would  be  unwise,  reinforced  this  project ; 1  but  there  was 
no  certainty  that  an  army  could  be  placed  in  the  rear  of  Vera 
Cruz,  and  a  number  of  other  difficulties  had  to  be  considered.4 

In  1838  a  French  squadron  had  been  unable  in  six  hours  to 
injure  Ulua  seriously,  though  it  had  been  permitted  to  choose 
its  positions  unmolested.  Such  an  advantage  could  not  be 
expected  now,  and  besides,  as  Conner  reported,  the  number 
of  guns  in  the  fortress  had  been  increased  fourfold.  The 
parapet  of  the  main  work  had  an  elevation  of  forty  feet  above 
the  water;  three  10-inch  guns  throwing  shells  were  twenty 
feet  higher,  and  there  were  outworks  —  connected  with  the 
principal  fort  only  by  drawbridges  —  commanded  so  thor- 
oughly by  the  gun  and  musketry  fire  of  the  garrison  that  it 
would  be  fatal  to  enter  them,  reported  the  Commodore.2  In 
short,  said  that  prudent  officer,  Ulua  could  certainly,  if  well 
garrisoned,  resist  successfully  any  naval  force  brought  against 


350  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

it;  while  in  the  opinion  of  Pakenham,  formerly  the  British 
minister  to  Mexico,  a  combined  army  and  naval  attack  on 
Ulua  and  Vera  Cruz  would  be  "a  very  hazardous  undertak- 
ing," and,  in  consequence  of  "the  deadly  nature  of  that  Climate 
to  foreign  constitutions,  success  would  probably  prove  in  the 
end  as  disastrous  as  failure."  Moreover^  Conner  pointed  out, 
Vera  Cruz  would  be  of  value  solely  as  a  depot,  and  from  that 
point  of  view  he  considered  Tampico  preferable.  Consequently, 
although  at  the  end  of  August  Polk  brought  up  the  subject 
of  attacking  Mexico  City  by  way  of  Vera  Cruz,  nothing  was 
done  about  it  save  to  ask  the  Commodore  for  additional 
information.4 

Not  long  before  October  10,  however,  it  was  ascertained 
beyond  a  doubt  that  Vera  Cruz  could  be  approached  in  the  rear 
by  a  landing  force,  and  beginning  immediately  Polk  and  his 
advisers,  aided  by  Dimond,  recently  our  consul  at  that  city, 
and  by  other  experts,  labored  on  the  question  of  future  opera- 
tions for  nearly  two  weeks.  (The  result  was,  first,  a  decision 
that  since  a  farther  advance  in  the  north  would  be  hazardous 
and  would  accomplish  nothing  towards  bringing  about  peace, 
Monterey  and  its  vicinity  should  be  the  limit  of  serious  opera- 
tions in  that  quarter.])  Such  was  the  deliberate  and  unanimous 
conclusion  oLthe  I^resident  and  his  official  family  after  long 
discussions.^Instructions  to  General  Taylor  were  then  care- 
fully drafted,  studied,  amended  and  agreed  upony  To  make 
sure  that  he  should  understand  their  significance,  Major 
McLane,  son  of  the  minister  to  England  and  a  graduate  from 
West  Point,  was  taken  into  the  full  confidence  of  the  Executive 
regarding  this  matter,  and  was  then  despatched  to  Monterey 
with  the  letter  of  October  22,  which,  as  well  as  the  explanations 
of  the  envoy,  Taylor  interpreted,  we  have  already  learned, 
aceording  to  his  own  ideas.  So  much  for  the  first^oint.4 
(The  second  was  a  decision  to  attack  Vera  Cruz/\  This  did 
not  mean,  however,  a  decision  to  proceed  against^fene  capital. 
Though  Scott  argued,  as  Conner  had,  that  gaining  possession 
of  the  city  and  then  reducing  or  starving  out  Ulua  would 
practically  be  sterile  triumphs,  unless  the  army  should  go 
farther,  it  was  intended  at  this  time  to  do  no  more  in  that 
quarter,  and  three  or  four  thousand  men  were  thought  sufficient 
for  the  undertaking.4 


A  NEW  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  351 

November  7,  however,  Benton  made  an  evening  call  at  the 
White  House,  drew  the  President's  attention  to  the  unfavorable 
results  of  the  Congressional  elections,  declared  that  a  bold 
stroke  must  be  delivered  upon  the  Mexicans  at  once,  and  urged 
that  after  capturing  Vera  Cruz  and  Uliia  the  army  should 
execute  "a  rapid  crushing  movement''  against  the  capital. 
Two  days  later  he  repeated  j£e  lesson,  and  on  the  tenth  he 
amplified  it.  Polk  began  to  realize  now  that  while  it  might 
be  dangerous  to  call  for  men  and  funds,  it  was  even  more 
dangerous  not  to  do  so.4 

Benton  kept  on  calling,  and  finally  he  submitted  a  written 
plan.  Scott  presented  a  memorial  of  the  same  tenor.  Taylor 
wrote  that  in  order  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  troops  must  land 
at  Vera  Cruz  or  near  that  point;  and  Conner  reported  that 
a  descent  could  be  made  under  cover  of  the  fleet,  batteries 
could  be  planted  on  sand-hills  behind  the  city,  and  Ulua^  if 
not  Vera  Cruz  also,  could  probably  be  reduced  by  starvation. 
As  early  as  November  14  Polk  decided  to  call  out  6750  men  — 
that  is  to  say,  nine  volunteer  regiments  —  for  the  duration  of 
the  war,  and  to  capture  Vera  Cruz  immediately.3  Yet  *  even 
this  involved  no  determination  to  strike  at  the  capital. 
Polk  was  distinctly  in  favor  of  so  doing,  should  that  course 
be  necessary  to  obtain  peace ;  but  Buchanan  strongly  opposed 
it,  insisting  upon  the  cost  of  such  an  expedition,  the  chances 
of  failure,  and  the  danger  that  by  leading  to  a  national,  racial 
and  religious  conflict  it  would  militate  against  a  settlement; 
Marcy  had  no  faith  in  the  project;  others  of  the  Cabinet 
agreed  with  him ;  and  hence  this  question  remained  open,  to 
be  answered  by  circumstances.4 

^he  next  problem  was  the  choice  of  a  commander)  In 
October  Patterson,  a  good  Democrat,  had  been  selected?  but 
it  had  been  found  that,  as  he  was  not  a  native  American,  he 
could  not  be  developed  into  a  Presidential  candidate,  that  his 
experience  had  not  been  adequate,  that  his  appointment 
would  involve  the  retiring  of  both  Taylor  and  Scott,  and  that, 
as  Buchanan  learned  at  this  time  from  Slidell,  he  did  not 
possess  the  confidence  of  the  army.  Butler,  another  Democrat, 
was  Polk's  next  choice,  but  he  clearly  held  no  titles  to  the 
position.9 

Taylor  had  to  be  considered  then ;   but  he  was  regarded  by 


352  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

the  Executive  and  his  advisers  as  professionally  unequal  tc 
the  task  and  personally  unfitted  for  it,  and  both  of  the^e 
opinions  were  fully  warranted.  While  events  had  proved 
him  a  born  leader  of  men  and  a  splendid  fighter,  they  had  also 
demonstrated  plainly  his  lack  of  generalship  and  executive 
efficiency.  He  distrusted,  loathed  and  misconstrued  the  ad- 
ministration, failed  to  supply  it  with  plans  and  information, 
endeavored  to  throw  upon  it  the  responsibility  for  mistakes 
of  his  own,  lectured  it  harshly  for  misdeeds  it  had  not  com- 
mitted, and  frustrated  the  cardinal  intent  of  its  policy  and 
orders  by  failing  to  press  the  campaign  with  all  poss  ble  vigor 
during  the  summer  and  autumn.5  "I  have  not  the  slightest 
respect, "  he  wrote,  for  any  member  of  the  Cabinet  except  the 
secretary  of  the  navy.  "Evil  men  bear  sway,"  was  another 
of  his  remarks.9 

Indeed,  the  General's  natural  kindliness  and  sober  judgment 
seem  to  have  become  largely  perverted  by  this  time.  He 
knew  that  for  several  months  friends  of  his  had  been  at  work 
to  gain  for  him  the  political  place  long  occupied  by  Scott, 
and  to  use  him  as  a  battering  ram  against  the  party  in  power ; 6 
and  it  was  easy  to  assume  that  he  would  be  repaid  in  kind. 
Stories  of  intrigues  and  machinations,  doubtless  exaggerated 
in  his  mind  through  inexperience  and  remoteness  from  the 
scene,  must  have  been  a  constant  subject  of  thought,  and  he 
seems  to  have  fallen  gradually  into  an  abnormal  state  of  sensi- 
tiveness and  suspicion.9 

His  private  correspondence  contained  the  harshest  opinions 
regarding  nearly  all  of  the  chief  men  thus  far  prominent  in 
the  war.  Of  Commodore  Perry  he  entertained  "  a  contemptable 
opinion."  Shields,  who  was  a  good  man  and  officer  as  men  and 
officers  went,  he  described  as  "without  one  particle  of  prin- 
ciple to  restrain  him,  save  the  laws  of  his  country  and  ready 
to  minister  body  and  soul  to  the  vilest  passions  of  a  vile  ad- 
ministration." Quitman,  who  deserved  high  respect,  appeared 
to  him  unreliable, .  of  mediocre  ability  and  "  afflicted  with 
unbounded  vanity."  The  quartermaster  general,  he  said, 
was  partially  deranged.  Of  Scott  he  had  written  in  August, 
"He  means  well  on  all  occasions,"  but  now  he  was  able  to  view 
his  superior  officer  as  a  military  "humbug"  and  low  politician, 
eager  to  advance  himself  and  ruin  others  by  the  most  nefarious 


A  COMMANDER  SELECTED  353 

arts ;  and  he  could  no  longer  see,  what  the  administration  fully 
recognized,  that  it  was  essentially  for  its  advantage  to  have 
the  generals  win  victories.  So  far  as  the  government  was 
concerned,  Taylor  had  some  grounds  for  apprehension,  per- 
haps. In  all  probability  it  entertained  by  this  time  unfriendly 
feelings  toward  him.  The  veteran  F.  P.  Blair  had  warned 
Marcy  distinctly  that,  as  even  the  novice  could  see,  a  Democratic 
administration  was  waging  war  to  make  a  Whig  President, 
and  under  our  system  it  was  legitimate  as  well  as  natural  to 
look  for  an  avenue  of  escape.  Scott,  however,  seems  to  have 
been  his  friend,  privately  exerting  a  strong  influence  in  his 
favor  on  several  occasions ;  and  while  the  lawful  rights  of 
superior  rank  were  made  use  of  by  the  commander-in-chief, 
the  same  thing  was  done  by  Taylor  himself  with  far  less  con- 
sideratenessJ* 

Finally(Taylor  had  a  particular  moral  disability,  for  he 
did  not  believe  in  the  Vera  Cruz  expedition  actually  contem- 
plated^ The  season  of  yellow  fever  —  in  his  opinion  a  worse 
enem/  than  100,000  Mexican  bayonets  —  was  now  too  near, 
he  wrote,  and  an  army  besieging  that  port  would  be  swept 
away  by  the  pestilence.7  He  lacked,  therefore,  some  of  the 
most  necessary  qualifications,  and  was  not  in  a  state  of  mind 
to  work  harmoniously  and  effectively  with  the  administration, 
the  commander-in-chief  or  his  own  principal  subordinates  in 
the  exceedingly  difficult  and  delicate  situations  which  the  pro- 
posed expedition  was  liable  to  create  9 

(^Gaines  being  out  of  the  question,  there  was  but  one  man  left, 
and  he  moreover,  as  an  officer  of  experience  and  the  head  of 
the  army,  possessed  exceptional  claims  to  the  appointment. 
JScottjseems  to  have  accepted  his  professional  and  political 
reverses  of  May  very  quietly,  illustrating  that  fine  aphorism 
of  King  Stanislaus,  "A  man  greater,  than  his  misfortunes 
shows  that  he  does  not  deserve  them)"  Friends  fell  away 
rapidly,  yet  he  kept  up  his  courage.  ^To  one  of  them  indeed 
he  wrote,  "Perhaps  you  might  do  well  to  imitate  the  example 
of  that  heathen  who  touched  his  hat  to  the  fallen  statue  of 
Jupiter  —  saying,  'Who  knows  but  he  may  be  replaced  upon 
his  pedestal?'"  and  about  the  middle  of  September,  having 
learned  through  several  channels  that  his  presence  in  Mexico 
had  been  desired  by  Taylor,  to  whom  he  generously  referred 

VOL.    I 2  A 


354  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

as  "that  gallant  and  distinguished  commander,"  he  reminded 
the  government  that  he  was  ready  still  to  serve  at  the  front.8 
This  merely  brought  him  another  curt  rebuff;  but  when  the 
Vera  Cruz  expedition  became  a  practical  question  he  took 
part  in  the  discussion  without  pique,  and  he  suggested  inciden- 
tally that  he,  as  the  highest  officer  in  the  service,  was  the  proper 
individual  to  divide  the  troops  between  the  two  fields  of  activity, 
and  to  command  personally  in  the  more  important  one.9 

Taylor  having  pronounced  it  Scott's  duty  after  the  battles 
of  May  to  assume  the  leadership  in  the  field,  could  not  logically 
object  now  to  his  acting  according  to  his  rank;  but,  though 
time  had  vindicated  Scott's  military  policy  and  he  now  was 
viewed  —  Marcy  admitted  —  as  politically  harmless,  Polk 
still  deemed  him  scientific  and  visionary,  and  still  resented  his 
allusion  to  fire  from  the  rear.  Long  discussions  were  held, 
but  Marcy  felt  satisfied  that  Scott  was  the  only  fit  commander 
in  sight.  By  rather  cunning  management  he  brought  Senator 
Benton  to  that  opinion ;  others  of  the  Cabinet  reached  the  same 
conclusion;  and  finally  the  President  admitted  with  "reluc- 
tance" that  such  was  "the  only  alternative."  Very  likely, 
too,  as  many  believed,  Polk  saw  a  chance  to  play  one  Whig 
leader  against  the  other.  Anyhow,  after  demanding  "Scott's 
confidence,"  which  —  in  view  of  the  intention  to  grant  his 
dearest  wish  —  Scott  easily  gave,  he  appointed  him  on  the 
eighteenth  of  November  to  command  the  expedition.  An 
apparently  heartfelt  and  complete  reconciliation  followed. 
Scott  almost  shed  tears  of  emotion,  recorded  the  President; 
and  he  received  assurances  in  turn  that  his  confidence  would 
be  reciprocated,  and  that  bygones  were  to  be  considered  by- 
gones. A  new  David  and  a  new  Jonathan  seemed  to  have 
discovered  each  other.9 

(  Scott  believed  that  Ultia,  if  properly  garrisoned,  could  not 
be  taken  with  naval  batteries,  or  even  with  naval  batteries 
and  an  escalade,  except  at  a  disproportionate  sacrifice  of  life, 
and  a  loss  of  time  that  might  subject  the  troops  to  the  yellow 
fever,  quadruple  the  waste  of  men,  and  ruin  the  campaign. 
He  therefore  planned  to  make  a  landing  near  Vera  Cruz, 
capture  the  town,  reduce  the  fortress — unless,  as  appeared  quite 
probable,  it  could  soon  be  starved  out  —  by  naval  operations 
and  land  attacks  based  upon  the  city,  and  then  escape  the 


SCOTT'S  VIEWS  355 

pestilence   by   advancing   promptly   toward   the   capital.     In 
his  opinion  the  Mexicans  were  likely  to  have  20-30,000  troops 
on  the  ground,  and  therefore  he  thought  15,00ChS^SiraBfeJ 
Relying  necessarily  on  the  figures  of  the  adjutant  general 
he  reckoned  (November  16)  that    7000    regulars  and  13,500 
volunteers  were,  or  soon  would  be,  under  Taylor's  command, 
making  with  the  new  volunteers  and  recruits  for  the  regular 
army  over  27,000,10  and  he  therefore  proposed  (November  21) 
to  take  about  5000  of  these  regulars,  6000  of  the  volunteers 
and  the  first  4000  of  the  new  regiments.    But  he  deemed 
10,000 —  to  be  increased  later  to  double  that  number  — an 
adequate  minimum,  and  he  felt  willing,  for  the  sake  of  gaining 
time,  to  launch  the  campaign  with  the  first  8000  soldiers  that 
could  be  set  afloat  off  Brazos  Island.     Anticipating  a  stubborn 
resistance  at  the  point  of  disembarkation,  he  desired  to  have 
140  surf-boats  in  order  to  land  5000  men  and  eight  guns  at 
once,  and  he  made  ample  requisitions  for  transports,  ordnance 
and  ordnance  stores.11    As  for  Taylor,  the  General  proposed 
that  he  should  retain  forces  enough  to  defend  Monterey  and 
his  communications,12  and  stand  for  a  time  on  the  defensive.16 
(Scott  of  course  desired  official  instructions  of  this  tenor 
fed  even  drafted   them,   but  Marey  only  wrote  as  follows 
(November  23):    You  have  been  ordered  by  the  President 
himself  to  go  to  Mexico,  take  command  there,  and  set  on  foot 
a  Gulf  expedition,  "if  on  arriving  at  the  theatre  of  action  you 
shall  deem  it  to  be  practicable.     It  is  not  proposed  to  control 
your  operations  by  definite  and  positive  instructions,  but  you 
are  left  to  prosecute  them  as  your  judgment,  under  a  full  view 
of  all  the  circumstances,  shall  dictate.)  The  work  is  before 
you,  and  the  means  provided,  or  to  be  provided,  for  accomplish- 
ing it,  are  committed  to  you,  in  the  full  confidence  that  you  will 
use  them  to  the  best  advantage.     The  objects  which  it  is 
desirable  to  obtain  have  been  indicated,  and  it  is  hoped  that 
you  will  have  the  requisite  force  to  accomplish  them.     Of  this 
you  must  be  the  judge  when  the  preparations  are  made,  and 
the^time  for  action  has  arrived."  16 

/Marcy  seldom  laughed,  but  occasionally  he  shook  like  a 
bowlful  of  jelly,  and  as  he  signed  this  letter  he  must  have 
shaken  prodigiously.  Assuming  no  responsibility,  making  no 
promises,  the  government  simply  unloaded  the  whole  burden 


356  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

of  the  expedition  upon  Scott.13  Should  he  succeed,  a  Demo- 
cratic administration  would  reap  a  great  profit ;  should  he 
fail,  a  Whig  general  would  have  to  bear  a  great  reproach.  In 
order  to  obtain  the  essential  troops  it  would  be  necessary  for 
him  to  incur  the  odium  of  taking  many  of  them  from  Taylor, 
who  in  Polk's  opinion  was  not  willing  to  give  them  up;  and 
thus  not  only  would  Taylor's  rising  star  become  clouded,  but 
a  bitter  quarrel  between  these  two  Whig  leader&.and  their 
friends  would  almost  certainly  be  precipitated  J  Besides, 
Taylor  might  throw  up  his  command  in  a  fit  of  ^temper,  and 
relegate  himself  to  obscurity.  No  wonder  the  President  felt 
remarkably  in  spirits  just  after  this.16 

/ocottjiowever,  was  determined  to  forestall  the  danger  of  a 
quarrel.  ) Immediately  on  suggesting  to  the  government  that 
as  head  of  the  army  he  was  the  proper  individual  to  command 
the  Vera  Cruz  expedition,  he  notified  Taylor  of  this  action, 
and  only  two  days  after  receiving  his  appointment  he  drafted 
a  letter  informing  that  officer  about  the  matter ;  but  the  Presi- 
dent, regarding  absolute  secrecy  as  a  prime  requisite,  would 
not  permit  him  to  mention  it.14  A  few  days  later  (November 
25)  he  wrote  from  New  York  to  this  effect :  I  am  going  to 
Mexico  and  shall  conduct  operations  in  a  new  field ;  where 
that  is  to  be  I  cannot  safely  state,  but  with  the  aid  of  advices 
received  from  Washington  you  can  imagine;  new  forces  have 
been  called  out,  yet  —  as  the  season  of  yellow  fever  is  at  hand 
—  I  shall  have  to  take  most  of  your  troops ;  your  victories, 
however,  have  placed  you  on  such  an  eminence  that  you  can 
afford  to  act  on  the  defensive  for  a  time,  and  before  spring  I 
think  you  will  be  able  to  resume  active  operations;  I  desire 
to  consult  with  you,  and  plan  to  be  at  Camai^o  for  that  pur- 
pose about  the  twenty-third  of  December.15  The  letter  was 
confidential  and  cordial ;  and  having  now  done  what  he  could 
to  conjure  the  tempest,  as  well  as  to  prepare  for  his  work,  the 
General  sailed  from  New  York  the  last  day  of  November. 
The  voyage  to  New  Orleans,  hindered  by  the  weather,  took 
nearly  three  weeks.  He  made  a  brief  and  busy  stay  in  that 
city,  and  two  days  after  Christmas  he  reached  Brazos  Island.16 
Certain  steps  tending  to  facilitate  his  enterprise  had  now 
been  taken  by  General  Taylor.  December  10  the  temporary 
Field  Division  organized  at  Camargo  was  broken  up  —  the 


TAYLOR'S  WINTER  OPERATIONS  357 

Georgia,  Mississippi  and  First  Tennessee  regiments  reporting 
to  Quitman,  and  the  Ohio  and  Kentucky  regiments  to  Butler ; 
the  First  Division  (regulars)  under  Twiggs  was  reorganized  ;17 
on  December  13  and  14,  a  day  apart,  this  division  and  Quit- 
man^ brigade  set  out  for  Victoria,  nearly  200  miles  distant; 
and(on  the  fifteenth  Taylor  himself,  leaving  Butler  behind  to 
command  at  Monterey,  followed  them.23 

It  was  not  pleasant  marching,  for  a  long  drought  had  burned 
everything  up,  the  sun  blazed  with  intense  heat,  and  the  road, 
when  not  covered  with  small,  sharp  stones,  was  ankle-deep 
in  light  dust;  but  the  inspiring  Saddle  Mountain  seemed  to 
keep  company  with  the  troops  all  day,  Cerralvo  Mountain 
hung  like  a  dark  shadow  on  the  left,  the  cool  blue  line  of  the 
Sierra  Madre  extended  on  the  right  farther  than  the  eye  could 
see,  and  the  town  first  reached  —  Cadereita,  about  twenty-five 
miles  from  Monterey  —  burying  its  white  houses  in  orange 
groves,  looking  out  over  gardens,  and  looking  down  from  a  low 
bluff  into  the  clear  waters  of  the  Topo  Grande,  was  delightful. 
December  17  the  infantry  arrived  at  Montemorelos,  a  small 
town  at  the  foot  of  the  sierra,  planted  beside  a  swift,  cool 
stream,  full  of  trout,  that  watered  a  beautiful  valley,  and  sug- 
gesting at  a  distance  under  the  blue  sky  —  wrote  a  surgeon  — 
a  pearl  set  in  an  azure  stone.  Here  the  command  absorbed 
the  Second  Infantry  and  the  Second  Tennessee;  and  it  now 
amounted  to  some  3500  men,  of  whom  rather  more  than  a  third 
were  regulars.23 

But  Santa  Anna  was  not  asleep.  Learning  of  Taylor's 
proposed  march  and  believing  that  Wool  had  left  Parras  for 
Chihuahua,  he  determined  to  advance  about  December  24, 
strike  at  Saltillo  and  M  nterey  in  person  with  9000  picked 
infantry,  4000  cavalry  and  twelve  guns,  despatch  troops  from 
Tula  against  the  Americans  at  Victoria,  and  finally  close  in 
upon  Taylor  with  his  own  forces;  and  a  large  part  of  these 
troops  actually  set  out.  Worth  got  wind  of  danger,  however, 
on  December  16;  in  accordance  with  instructions  previously 
given  he  called  for  help  ;18  and  in  the  evening  of  the  next  day 
four  grimy  troopers  burst  upon  Taylor  at  Montemorelos  with 
the  startling  intelligence,  that  Santa  Anna  would  attack  Worth 
in  three  days.  Ordering  Quitman  to  proceed,  Taylor  therefore 
set  out  on  December  18  with  his  regulars  for  Saltillo.     Butler, 


358  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

calling  a  regiment  from  Camargo  to  Monterey,  reached  the 
front  with  his  own  forces  on  December  19,  and  Wool  arrived 
there  two  days  later.  Santa  Anna,  discovering  Wool's  march 
by  December  24,  countermanded  his  orders;  and  Taylor, 
learning  on  December  20  while  between  Monterey  and  Saltillo, 
of  Wool's  advance  and  the  non-appearance  of  the  Mexicans, 
and  concluding  there  was  no  danger,  turned  back.23 

On  the  twenty-third  he  again  left  Monterey,  and  the  next 
day  he  received  Scott's  New  York  letter.19  His  presence  with 
the  forces  was  not  at  all  requisite.  No  serious  fight  was  in 
prospect,  for  Quitman  had  reported  nothing  of  the  sort.  There 
was  at  least  one  topographical  engineer  in  the  command,  who 
could  make  better  notes  of  the  country  than  he.20  Probably 
his  military  engineers  also,  among  whom  figured  Robert  E. 
Lee,  afterwards  the  famous  Confederate  leader,  were  there; 
and  as  for  disposing  of  the  troops,  General  Scott's  letter  gave 
him  reason  to  believe,  that  a  superior  officer  was  now  on  the 
ground  with  new  plans.  His  obvious  duty  was  therefore  to 
report  at  Camargo,  the  place  mentioned  by  Scott,  or  at  least 
await  instructions  at  Monterey.  But  the  stout  old  gentleman 
in  the  loose  olive-brown  frock-coat,  wool  socks  and  Mexican 
sombrero  had  a  temper  and  several  ideas  of  his  own.  Prob- 
ably he  did  not  wish  to  arrange  matters  amicably;  and  he 
kept  straight  on  for  ten  days,  plunging  farther  and  farther 
toward  the  remotest  portion  of  his  field,  inaccessible  from  any 
and  every  point  where  Scott  might  by  any  reasonable  pos- 
sibility chance  to  be.  Indeed,  Scott's  letter  was  not  answered 
for  two  days,  and  eight  more  passed  before  the  answer,  which 
stated  that  General  Taylor  was  going  to  Victoria,  reached 
Camargo.23 

Beyond  Montemorelos  a  great  deal  of  the  country  was 
rough,  and  it  was  intersected  with  chilly  streams,  waist-deep, 
that  cut  like  a  knife  as  the  hot  soldiers  plunged  in;  but  an 
incessant  variety  of  novel  scenes  kept  up  their  spirits.  Groves 
of  ebony  sheltered  bears  and  wolves.  Wild  turkeys  and  wild 
hogs  abounded;  and  almost  every  evening  ten  or  twelve 
deer  were  brought  in.  Here  flourished  pecans,  live-oaks  and 
immense  trees  of  lignum  vitas;  there  an  endless  procession 
of  ants  wound  along  their  smoothly  worn  trail ;  yonder  towered 
a  mountain  of  gleaming  porphyry  set  off  with  dark  green 


TAYLOR'S  MARCH  TO  VICTORIA  359 

foliage,  and  at  all  times  fleecy  clouds  could  be  seen  drifting 
languidly  across  the  slopes  of  the  curiously  wrought  sierra. 
Finally  the  troops  entered  the  rich  valley  of  Linares.  On  the 
one  hand  lay  wide  cornfields  or  perhaps  a  thousand  acres  of 
sugarcane  in  a  single,  well-irrigated  lot;  on  the  other  apple 
and  peach  orchards,  orange  and  lemon  groves  with  tempting 
gleams  amidst  their  dark  leaves,  and  half  a  mile  or  so  of  fig- 
trees.  Then  came  the  gardens  and  flat  houses  of  the  town 
itself,  a  dull  place,  with  some  smiling  and  some  tearful  eyes 
looking  out  from  the  grated  windows.23 

Then  forward  again  marched  the  troops,  passing  out  of  the 
valley  into  wild  country  full  of  chaparral  and  mesquite,  where 
sometimes  wolves  trotted  along  the  road  ahead  of  them  like 
dogs.  The  need  of  water  determined  the  length  of  the  daily 
march ;  but  usually  there  was  enough  of  it,  shaded  sometimes 
by  noble  cypresses  dripping  with  Spanish  moss.  Once  a  real 
norther  set  in,  and  the  troops  choked  for  twenty  miles  in  a 
driving  cloud  of  dust;21  but  through  it  they  caught  glimpses 
of  a  high  cliff  that  looked  like  an  immense  pink  and  yellow 
dome,  and  another  cheering  bit  of  color  now  and  then  was 
Sefior  Don  So-and-so,  the  alcalde,  dressed  in  white  and  a  red 
sash,  with  silver  coins  all  over  his  clothing,  saddle  and  bridle. 
Usually  the  weather  held  fair,  and  a  blanket  supported  by 
four  stakes  answered  the  purpose  of  a  tent  well  enough.23 

But  the  faces  of  the  people  grew  dark  occasionally,  and 
once  they  muttered  something  like  "Fandango  poco  tiempo," 
which  signified,  "You'll  be  fighting  pretty  soon."  Then  the 
soldiers  cheered  till  they  were  hoarse.  Fatigue  and  supper 
were  forgotten.  "Turn  out,  turn  out!"  was  the  cry.  The 
column  formed,  and  dashed  down  the  hill  at  a* double  quick; 
but  for  enemy  it  found  only  the  trim  white  cottage  of  a  French- 
man, planted  beside  a  rippling  stream  amid  laden  orange 
trees  gilded  by  the  setting  sun.  There  had  been  rumors  of 
Mexican  cavalry  ahead,  but  no  cavalry  could  be  seen;22  and 
as  for  irregulars,  both  funds  and  arms  were  lacking,  and  the 
close  wall  of  prickly  pear  five  or  ten  feet  high,  which  ran  on 
each  side  of  the  road  almost  without  a  break  for  nearly  two 
hundred  miles,  would  have  kept  them  off  as  it  did  the  breeze. 
And  so  on  January  4  Taylor  and  the  regulars  entered  Victoria, 
a_  small,  neat  city  at  the  foot  of  wooded  mountains,  which 


360 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO 


Matamoros*' 


PEl  Mosquite 


/"Sta.  Teresa 


S.Fernando  cf  ■ 
Santandertf' 

/ 

^Padilla 


.J 

\ 

% 
\ 

% 

\ 


Quitman  had  occupied  with  some  formality  six  days  before. 
"Victoria  is  taken.  It  was  a  bloodless  victory.  But  where 
is  Victoria?"  said  the  New  York  Herald. 2Z 

Indeed,  Victoria  was  very  much  taken.24    October  13,  when 
ordering  Taylor  to  cut  short  the  armistice,  Marcy  notified 

Patterson  of  this  order,  and 
again  directed  him  to  occupy 
southern  Tamaulipas  as  soon 
as  he  could — before  Decem- 
ber 6  if  possible ;  but  Patter- 
son was  not  able  to  set  out 
until  General  Taylor  gave 
him  definite  instructions,  on 
the  twenty-eighth  of  No- 
vember, to  march  with  the 
two  Illinois  regiments  and 
the  regiment  of  Tennessee 
horse,  about  1500  men,  for 
Victoria.  Further  delays 
occurred  because  transporta- 
tion was  not  promptly  fur- 
nished him,  and  because 
vessels  conveying  supplies 
were  lost;  and  although  a 
detachment  advanced  some 
fifteen  miles  about  the  middle 
of  December,  the  movement 
from  the  point  then  reached 
did  not  begin  until  one  day 
before  Christmas.26 

The  distance  to  be  cov- 
ered was  nearly  210  miles,25 
and  all  found  the  march 
hard.  The  chief  engineer 
said  his  task  was  "to  make  an  impassable  road  practicable." 
Sometimes  it  seemed  to  contain  every  possible  stone.  Difficult 
streams  had  to  be  crossed,  and  once  the  only  feasible  method  was 
to  cut  a  straight  ramp  on  each  of  the  nearly  vertical  banks,  which 
stood  about  one  hundred  feet  high,  and  get  the  wagons  down 
and   up   again   with   ropes  —  a   prodigious   task.     The   usual 


^Victoria 

i 

q  Sta.  Rosa 


Scale  of  Miles 
6    '  lb      SO      8b      4b      6b 


h^ouue    V0ri0D 


VAlamito 


Wm«.Eng.Co..N.Y. 


Tampico 


PATTERSON'S  MARCH  TO  VICTORIA  361 

thorns  were  peculiarly  troublesome,  and  some  of  the  water 
contained  salt.  Sweat  and  dust  almost  hid  the  skin  of  men's 
faces  at  more  than  one  time;  and  not  only  did  soldiers  drop 
far  behind  from  exhaustion,  but  in  some  cases  water  could 
be  given  to  the  faint  only  by  prying  their  jaws  open.  Once 
the  drinking  water  was  so  muddy  it  could  scarcely  run,  we  are 
assured  —  to  say  nothing  of  an  odor  derived  from  dead  horses. 
On  the  very  first  day  the  troops  were  ordered  to  march  without 
breakfast,  and  they  went  hungry  more  than  once  afterwards,  with 
cattle,  hogs,  and  actual  clouds  of  wild  turkeys  plainly  in  sight.26 

Some  of  these  facts  appear  to  reflect  upon  the  commanding 
officers,  and  other  facts  point  the  same  way.  Patterson  had 
an  impressive  person,  somewhat  in  the  style  of  the  English 
squire,  it  was  thought,  and  certain  very  agreeable  qualities 
of  his  Irish  race,  when  he  chose  to  display  them ;  but  although 
Polk  felt  disposed  to  make  him  generalissimo,  he  seems  to  have 
lacked  a  familiar  acquaintance  with  his  profession  as  well  as 
experience  in  practising  it.  He  also  lacked  initiative,  and 
he  lorded  it  over  the  troops,  they  felt,  with  all  the  severity  of  a 
satrap.26 

Pillow,  the  second  in  command,  had  come  to  the  war  like 
many  others  for  his  personal  advantage ;  and  havmg  been  the 
President's  partner  in  a  law  office,  having  contrived  through 
cunning  and  secret  management  at  the  Baltimore  convention 
in  1844  to  secure  Polk's  nomination,  and  being  now  in  confiden- 
tial correspondence  with  the  White  House,  he  felt  specially 
authorized  to  slake  his  intense  ambition.  On  the  score  of 
ill-health  Pillow  had  left  his  command  at  Monterey  for  a  trip 
to  the  United  States;  but,  finding  in  this  expedition  a  chance 
of  becoming  prominent,  he  suddenly  recovered.  No  one  could 
fail  to  see  his  determination  to  be  conspicuous,  and  it  was  not 
commended  by  all.  "Ho  for  the  embryo  hero!  Great  is 
Diana  of  the  Ephesians!"  exclaimed  Captain  Caswell,  a  bril- 
liant officer.  Naturally  Pillow  felt  inclined  to  look  upon 
the  soldiers  as  merely  coal  for  his  furnace,  and  they  in  turn 
generally  detested  him.  In  one  stormy  scene  he  called  upon 
them  to  shoot  him,  if  they  dared,  adding  grandly,  "I'm  not 
afraid  to  die ! "  And  after  that,  when  angered  by  unnecessary 
harshness  on  his  part,  they  obtained  some  comfort  by  growling 
to  one  another,    "He's  some!"     "He  isn't  afraid  to  die"; 


362  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

but  they  remembered  the  scourge  none  the  less,  and  when 
Taylor  came  over  on  a  mule  to  visit  their  camp  the  very  day 
he  and  they  reached  Victoria  (January  4),  looking  as  plain  as 
they  and  perhaps  no  less  dirty,  the  contrast  between  his  demo- 
cratic simplicity  and  the  pomp  and  pomposity  they  had  been 
contemplating  made  them  burst  forth  —  when  they  finally 
realized  that  his  more  impressive  orderly  was  not  the  General  — 
into  an  ecstasy  of  delight  and  admiration.26 

While  these  marches  were  taking  place,  General  Scott, 
leaving  the  coast  on  December  29,  proceeded  to  Camargo 
in  order  to  arrange  matters  amicably  with  Taylor,  if  he  could ; 
but  on  January  3,  finding  it  would  be  impracticable  to  get 
into  touch  with  that  officer,  he  sent  instructions  to  Butler, 
carefully  explaining  why  they  were  given  to  him  directly,  to 
place  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  about  4000  regular 
infantry  under  Worth,  4000  volunteer  infantry,  500  regular 
cavalry,  the  best  500  volunteer  cavalry  and  two  field  batteries 
—  deducting,  however,  from  these  numbers  the  troops  then  at 
Victoria,  except  an  escort  for  Taylor,  all  those  at  Tampico  ex- 
cept about  500  for  a  garrison,  and  one  volunteer  regiment  at 
Matamoros.  Scott  added  that  he  hoped  eight  new  volunteer 
regiments  w\)uld  be  at  the  Brazos  by  the  end  of  January,  and 
that  three  or  four  of  these  would  remain  in  northern  Mexico.27 

At  the  same  time  he  notified  Taylor  of  this  action,  pointing 
out  that  his  inaccessibility  and  the  extreme  pressure  of-time 
had  rendered  necessary  the  orders  given  to  Butler.  (^Taylor 
was  instructed  to  concentrate  in  Tampico  all  the  troops  of 
Patterson,  Quitman  and  Twiggs  except  an  escort  for  himself 
and,  if  necessary,  a  garrison  for  Victoria,  and  return  then  to 
Monterey.  Scott  further  explained  that  on  account  of  the 
yellow  fever  he  could  not  wait  for  the  new  volunteers,  and 
stated  plainly  that,  although  he  greatly  wished  the  Vera  Cruz 
expedition  could  be  aided  by  a  diversion  in  the  north,~Taylor 
would  have  to  act  "for  a  time"  on  a  "strict  defensive."^/ 

These  orders  were  the  inevitable  sequel  of  past  occurrences. 
Taylor  had  suggested  that  it  was  advisable  to  transfer  serious 
operations  to  the  south,  and  that  a  large  body  of  regulars 
would  be  needed  for  a  campaign  there;  the  government 
ordered  the  Vera  Cruz  expedition;  Scott — not  at  all,  however, 
because  he  so  desired  —  was  appointed  to  command  it ;    he 


SCOTT  TAKES  TROOPS  FROM  THE  NORTH       363 

possessed  full  authority  over  all  the  troops  in  the  field  under 
one  condition  proposed  by  himself  —  that  Taylor  must  be 
left  sufficiently  strong  for  defence  —  and,  as  Taylor  admitted, 
this  condition  was  met;  Scott  could  only  obtain  an  adequate 
army  in  season  by  taking  a  large  part  of  it  from  the  field ;  he 
endeavored  to  effect  the  necessary  division  in  a  kind  and  friendly 
manner,  spending  ten  days  in  travel  for  that  purpose,  although 
extremely  pressed  for  time ;  and,  when  Taylor  went  deliberately 
beyond  reach,  he  simply  made  such  use  of  his  authority  as 
duty  required,  taking  for  the  offensive  a  relatively  smaller 
army  —  in  view  of  the  prospect,  recognized  by  Taylor  himself, 
that  Santa  Anna  would  meet  him  at  the  beach  —  than  he  left 
wjih-  that  officer  for  a  strict  defensive.27 

(.Taylor,  however,  was  furious,  fee  alleged  that  Scott  had 
"wormed  himself "  into  the  command  by  promising  to  kill 
Taylor  off  as  a  Presidential  candidate. J  Of  Scott's  New  York 
letter  he  said,  "A  more  contemptible  and  insidious  communi- 
cation was  never  written.  "I  Although  it  was  his  own  suggestion 
that  volunteers  were  unfit  for  the  mainstay  of  an  expedition 
against  Vera  Cruz,  and  that  regulars  for  it  should  be  drawn 
from  the  northern  army,  he  complained  now  that  an  underhand 
"intrigue"  had  stripped  him  of  his  regulars;  and,  not  satisfied 
with  describing  himself  as  outraged  and  degraded  "in  the  most 
discourteous  manner  that  could  be  devised"  by  "Scott,  Marcy 
and  Co."  for  the  purpose  of  accomplishing  his  ruin,  he  charged, 
though  really  not  expecting  an  attack,  that  he  was  in  danger 
of  being  "sacrificed"  on  the  soil  of  Mexico.!  Policy  concurred 
with  fury ;  political  strategy  with  personal  resentment.  QThe 
idea  of  brave  Taylor,  the  People's  Pride,  thrown  to  the  mercttess 
Mexicans  by  partisan  Polk  and  scheming  Scott  was  one  to 
fire  the  masses ;  and  thus  we  see  concocted  a  bit  of  electioneer- 
ing melodrama  that  contributed  powerfully,  and  perhaps 
decisively,  to  bring  about  one  of  the  chief  consequences  of  the 
Mexican  war  —  the  overthrow  of  the  Democratic^narty  and 
the  accession  of  Taylor  to  the  Presidential  chair.27  J 

Scott  now  returned  to  the  Brazos,  where  he-*arrived  on 
January  8,  about  a  week  before  the  date  fixed  by  him  for  the 
assembling  of  his  expedition  off  that  point ;  and  there  he  was 
forced  to  endure  nearly  six  weeks  of  what  he  well  termed 
"cruel   uncertainties."    To   combine  in  haste   the   men   and 


364  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

material  for  such  an  expedition;  to  do  so  when  the  necessary 
elements  had  to  be  drawn  from  distant  and  widely  scattered 
points;  to  do  it  while  the  waterways,  largely  relied  upon  for 
transportation,  were  to  a  considerable  extent  frozen;  and 
to  ,do  it  without  the  telegraph  and  mainly  without  railroads 
—  this  was  a  most  difficult  and  hazardous  undertaking;  and 
accidents,  misunderstandings  and  errors  of  judgment  were 
additional  embarrassments.3? 

(The  prime  need  was  troops)  and  Worth,  acting  with  notable 
energy  —  even  precipitation  —  placed  the  first  of  the  regulars 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  about  three  weeks  after  Scott 
issued  the  orders  to  Butler.  But  here  the  second  need,  that 
of  vessels,  checked  them.  Scott's  requisitions  had  been  timely 
and  ample;  but  there  was  an  active  commercial  demand  for 
ships,  rates  were  high,  and  the  government,  anxious  to  econo- 
mize, did  not  allow  sufficiently  for  delays  and  other  contingen- 
cies.28 A  considerable  number  of  vessels  were  chartered  at 
New  Orleans,  but  a  month  of  heavy  rains,  a  scarcity  of  sailors, 
a  demand  for  higher  wages  from  those  engaged,  a  week  of  fog, 
and  a  series  of  northers,  which  were  usually  only  about  four 
days  apart,  prevented  the  first  of  the  vessels  from  arriving  off 
Brazos  Island  before  February  11,  and  the  storms,  frequently 
very  sudden,  as  well  as  the  loss  of  not  a  few  of  the  indispensable 
lighters  hampered  operations  there.  "This  terrible  coast/' 
wrote  the  General ;  and  for  days  together  ships  would  lie  off 
shore,  pitching  "like  mad"  and  fortunate  if  they  did  no  worse, 
quite  unable  to  communicate  with  the  island.  For  a  week 
and  a  half  no  mails  arrived  from  New  Orleans.  As  the  Rio 
Grande  water  proved  unsuitable  for  the  troops,  extra  casks 
were  ordered  to  be  made  and  filled  at  New  Orleans ;  and  this 
consumed  additional  time.30  -x 

(Minor  affairs,  too,  created  trouble  for  ScoJ#,  and  one  of  these 
deserves  to  be  mentioned.  Care  has  been  taken  to  bring  out. 
the  quality  of  Colonel  Harney,  and  it  only  remains  to  add  that 
for  some  time  his  feelings  toward  Scott  had  been  openly  and 
unreasonably  hostile.  As  he  was  among  the  men  ordered  by 
Butler  to  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  he  proceeded  in  that 
direction;  but  Scott,  who  knew  of  his  excursion  to  the  Rio 
Grande  and  preferred  to  have  a  more  efficient  and  reliable 
man  for  his  chief  cavalry  officer,  and  one  more  disposed  to 


SCOTT  DELAYED  365 

cooperate  heartily  with  the  commander-in-chief,  directed  him 
to  place  at  the  orders  of  Major  Sumner  the  dragoons  that  had 
come  down  with  him,  and  rejoin  those  of  Taylor's  army.  Har- 
ney refused  positively  to  do  so.  Upon  this  Worth  laid  a  formal 
charge  of  disobedience  against  him,  and  a  court  martial  of 
officers,  chosen  —  as  General  Scott  proposed  —  by  Harney 
himself,  sentenced  him  to  be  reprimanded  in  orders.  Harney 
then  wrote  a  submissive  letter  to  Worth ;  and  Scott,  remitting 
the  sentence  of  the  court,  gave  him  the  position  he  coveted.30 

This  was  magnanimous,  and  tended  to  promote  good-will ; 
but  there  is  more  to  tell.  On  learning  of  Scott's  order  that 
Harney  should  return  to  Monterey  Polk,  though  he  insisted 
that  his  own  subordinates  in  the  army  must  be  in  cordial 
sympathy  with  him,  became  very  angry  that  "a  Democrat" 
and  "one  of  General  Jackson's  personal  friends"  should  "be 
sacrificed  to  propitiate  the  personal  and  political  malice  of 
General  Scott,"  and  insisted  upon  countermanding  the  order, 
thereby  violating  the  confidence  promised  that  general  and 
disregarding  the  broad  instructions  issued  to  him  by  the  war 
department.29  However,  the  trouble  with  Harney  was  com- 
paratively but  a  pin-prick.  What  racked  the  General  was  the 
conviction  that  Santa  Anna  must  be  gathering  a  great  army 
to  confront  him  at  Vera  Cruz ;  and  on  February  15,  about  half 
of  the  surf-boats  and  a  small  part  of  the  ordnance  and  ord- 
nance stores  having  been  heard  from,  he  sailed  for  Tampico, 
leaving  Worth  to  complete  the  embarkation  as  rapidly  as  he 
could.30 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  on  the  Rio  Grande  line, 
the  troops  under  Taylor  lay  for  ten  days  at  Victoria,  growing 
more  and  more  languid  under  the  hot  sun ;  and  the  General 
realized  that  his  coming  to  this  remote  place  had  embarrassed 
himself  as  well  as  Scott.  Finally  something  had  to  be  done, 
for  provisions  were  becoming  short,  and  on  January  12  he 
ordered  the  regular  infantry  and  Patterson's  men  to  set  out 
for  Tampico,  supposed  to  lie  about  168  miles  distant  by  the 
road.31  On  the  night  of  the  fourteenth,  a  duplicate  of  Scott's 
despatch  of  January  3  —  the  original  of  which  had  been  inter- 
cepted by  the  enemy  —  arrived,  and  then,  selecting  an  escort 
for  himself,  Taylor  directed  Quitman's  brigade  to  proceed  in 
the  same  direction  as  Patterson's.     The  three  bodies,  which 


366  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

marched  at  intervals  of  twenty-four  hours,  beginning  on  that 
day,  made  an  aggregate  of  4733,  of  whom  the  rank  and  file 
numbered  1400  regulars  and  3000  volunteers.  The  rule  was 
to  sound  reveille  at  three  o'clock  and  set  out  at  dawn  —  the 
regiments  of  each  column  taking  turns  in  leading  it;  and  the 
engineer  company,  usually  known  as  "the  pick  and  shovel 
brigade,"  marched  in  advance  of  all  to  mend  the  road.32 

There  was  need  enough  of  its  work.  The  meaning  of  "Ta- 
maulipas"  is  high  mountains;  and  while  the  blue  of  the  Sierra 
Madre  grew  daily  fainter,  the  principal  range  of  the  state 
rose  constantly  higher  in  front,  until  the  summit  was  crossed, 
and  the  troops  began  to  descend  into  the  tropical  region  of 
the  coast.  Much  of  the  route  was  boggy  or  rocky  or  steep; 
the  drinking-water  often  came  from  stagnant  pools;  and  for 
nearly  three  days  the  only  chance  to  see  human  beings  outside 
of  one's  own  column  was  when,  on  surmounting  a  hilltop,  the 
gleaming  steel  and  white  wagons  of  another  brigade  could 
be  made  out,  one  day's  march  away  —  perhaps  only  six  or 
eight  miles  —  on  another  eminence.32 

But  as  the  troops  approached  their  destination  they  felt 
repaid  for  every  hardship  and  effort.  The  road  became  deep 
sand,  indeed,  but  near  it  spread  a  sunny  and  many-hued  lake 
full  of  emerald  islets,  pirogues  laden  with  odorous  fruits,  and 
myriads  of  noisy  widgeon,  teal  and  other  water-fowl;  while 
on  the  other  hand  the  live-oak,  the  bay-tree,  the  rubber-tree, 
the  banyan,  the  palm,  the  flag-leaved  aloe,  and  many  a  nameless 
tree,  bush  and  vine  made  a  dense  forest,  illumined  with  bril- 
liant orchids  and  more  brilliant  parrots  and  macaws,  each 
of  which  seemed  like  a  year  of  sunsets  epitomized.  A  soft, 
salubrious  breeze  from  the  Gulf  caressed  their  faces ;  and  when, 
surmounting  the  last  hill  on  the  tenth  day  of  their  march, 
they  saw  the  grand,  leisurely  Panuco  rolling  luxuriously  on 
through  fields  and  forests,  a  wilderness  of  spars  and  masts 
filling  the  harbor  of  Tampico,  and  the  American  flag  —  dear 
emblem  of  country,  home  and  kindred  —  waving  proudly 
over  white  walls  and  green  gardens,  a  tear  of  delight  ran  down 
many  a  tanned  cheek.32 

Stationed  mostly  at  some  distance  above  or  below  the  town 
according  to  the  usual  policy  of  the  American  commanders, 
they  now  devoted  themselves  to  drilling  and  counting  the 


SCOTT  AT  TAMPICO  367 

days.  "Shall  we  ever  see  that  big  fandango  in  the  halls  of 
Montezuma?"  they  had  been  asking  for  some  time,  and  to 
wait  four  weeks  on  the  qui  vim  for  Scott  seemed  very  hard. 
February  19,  however,  he  arrived  in  town  looking  very  anxious, 
and,  declining  the  superb  horse  made  ready  for  him,  walked 
unpretentiously  to  his  lodgings.  The  impatience  to  be  off 
was  now  intense,  and  the  General  did  all  in  his  power  to  gratify 
it;  but  he  found  himself  in  a  hornet's  nest.  At  this  time  he 
enjoyed  no  popularity  among  the  officers,  for  he  was  personally 
known  to  very  few.  One  or  two  attempts  to  check  rather 
pushing  young  men  had  been  resented ;  and  now  the  suspicion 
that  he  would  give  regulars  the  post  of  honor  at  Vera  Cruz 
threatened  serious  results.  At  a  recent  banquet  the  toast 
necessarily  offered  to  the  name  of  the  commander-in-chief 
had  been  coldly  received,  and  Worth  had  been  ignored.  Indeed, 
some  of  the  leading  volunteer  officers  were  disposed  to  mutiny 
unless  assured  of  "a  place  in  the  picture."35 

Scott  diplomatically  declared  there  would  be  fighting  enough 
for  all,  but  as  the  tardiness  of  the  transports  threatened  to 
delay  a  part  of  the  troops,  that  assurance  failed  to  give  satis- 
faction;   and  apparently  only  the  arrival  of  an  unexpected 
steamer  or  two  averted  the  danger  of  trouble.     One  officer, 
however  — a  trim,  agile  man  with  a  handsome  face,  quick 
black  eyes,  a  poorly  educated  but  most  ingenious  mind,  a 
ready  tongue,  and  a  conscience  that  gave  him  no  trouble— was 
content.33    For  him  Taylor's  harsh  rule  had  ended ;   and  soon, 
making  the  most  of  his  own  crafty  talents,  the  urgent  recom- 
mendations of  Polk  and  Scott's  determination  to  keep  faith 
with  the  President,34  Pillow  —  for  Pillow  it  was  —  established 
himself  at  headquarters  on  a  basis  of  intimacy  and  importance.35 
Tampico  would  have  been  a  delightful  resting-place  for  a 
while.     The  markets  were  full  of  good  things ;   it  possessed  ex- 
cellent cafes;    and  the  troops  coming  from  Monterey  had 
brought  along  a  theatrical  company;    but  Scott  tarried  there 
only  thirty  hours.     At  New  Orleans  some  information  had  been 
obtained  with  reference  to  the  Lobos  Islands,  which  lay  fifty 
or  sixty  miles  to  the  southeast  of  Tampico  and  seven  or  eight 
from  the  coast,  offering  a  broad,  safe  anchorage;    and  Scott 
had  written  to  Conner  for  additional  facts.     These  proved 
to  be  favorable,  and  such  of  the  new  volunteers  and  freight 


368  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

vessels  as  could  be  reached  in  time  had  been  ordered  to  go 
directly  there,  instead  of  sailing  to  the  Brazos.  Indeed  these 
islands  were  fixed  upon  as  the  general  rendezvous.  Some  of 
the  troops  had  reached  it,  and  word  now  came  to  Scott  that 
an  outbreak  of  smallpox  had  occurred  among  them.37 

He  set  sail  therefore  on  February  20,  and  making  a  swift 
voyage  in  the  midst  of  a  "screaming"  norther,  found  at  the 
rendezvous  the  First  and  the  Second  Pennsylvania,  two  thirds 
of  the  new  Louisiana  regiment,  the  "Palmettoes"  of  South 
Carolina,  and  parts  of  the  New  York  and  Mississippi  regiments.36 
Twiggs  followed  him  when  the  bar  off  Tampico  was  quiet 
enough  to  permit,  and  the  other  troops  did  the  same  as  rapidly 
as  they  could.  Patterson  got  away  on  the  twenty-ninth, 
but  even  on  the  fourth  of  March  Quitman  and  Shields  were 
chafing  beside  the  Panuco,  and  the  latter  at  least  had  no  definite 
notion  when  they  would  be  able  to  sail.  "Days  are  months 
now,"  he  exclaimed ;  but  he  and  many  others  had  still  to  wait. 
Worse  yet,  perhaps,  not  a  few  of  those  who  got  off  were  packed 
in  small  trading  craft,  picked  up  by  good  luck  and  unfit  for  the 
service;  and  the  skeletons  of  ships  rotting  near  the  bar  gave 
them  ample  cause  for  anxiety.  Worth's  troops  meanwhile 
were  embarking  at  the  Brazos;  but  when  he  left  that  quarter 
on  February  25,  six 'companies  of  dragoons  were  still  in  want 
of  transports.37 

Taylor  for  his  part,  escorted  by  a  squadron  of  dragoons  under 
May,  the  Mississippi  regiment  and  two  field  batteries,  left 
Victoria  on  January  16  and  reached  Monterey  in  eight  days. 
His  first  impulse  on  receiving  Scott's  orders  had  been  to  leave 
the  country,  but  he  concluded  not  to  do  so,  and  soon  —  ap- 
parently satisfied  that  he  now  had  an  issue  on  which  to  challenge 
both  Polk  and  Scott 38  —  he  distinctly  informed  his  friend, 
Senator  Crittenden,  that  he  was  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency.39 
I  He  then  shaped  his  plans  accordingly.  The  government 
had  notified  him  quite  plainly  that  it  wished  him  to  hold  no 
territory  beyond  the  vicinity  of  Monterey,  and  Scott  instructed 
him  to  concentrate  there.  What  these  men  wished,  he  believed, 
was  that  he  should  be  effaced  or  play  a  humble  role,  and  he 
was  determined  not  to  accept  their  plan.  He  would  be  as 
prominent  as  he  possibly  could  be.  Though  not  able  to  fight 
the  Mexicans,  he  would  at  least  seem  willing  to  do  so,  and  throw 


TAYLOR'S  POLICY  369 

upon  Scott  and  Polk  all  the  odium  of  his  inactivity.  Hence, 
instead  of  burying  himself  and  his  aspirations  in  Monterey, 
he  advanced  at  the  end  of  the  month  to  Saltillo,  and  a  few  days 
later  took  post,  with  nearly  all  of  the  troops  not  required  on 
the  line  of  communication,  still  farther  toward  the  enemy. 
The  dictates  of  prudence  recognized  by  himself,  the  advice 
and  order  of  his  commanding  officer,  and  the  wishes  and  in- 
structions of  the  government  were  all  disregarded.  He  showed 
himself,  in  fact,  both  unwise  and  insubordinate.39  I 


vol.  i  —  2 


XIX 

SANTA  ANNA  PREPARES  TO  STRIKE 

September,  1846-February,  1847 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  north  of  the  moun- 
tains, the  Americans  at  Saltillo  were  having  a  somewhat 
agitated  experience.  At  the  end  of  December  a  great  cloud 
of  dust,  raised  towards  the  south  by  a  drove  of  Mexican 
horses,  convinced  Worth  he  was  again  in  danger,  and  prep- 
arations were  made  at  once  to  conquer  or  die.  Butler,  who 
succeeded  him  in  command,  and  even  the  more  experienced 
Wool  felt  disturbed  by  rumors  of  impending  attack,  which 
considerate  Mexicans,  anxious  to  entertain  their  American 
visitors,  frequently  set  afloat,  though  some  of  our  officers 
believed  that  Scott's  movement  ensured  them  against  molesta- 
tion.4 

Finally,  the  rather  approved  idea  of  thorough  scouting  pre- 
sented itself;  and  on  January  19  Major  Gaines  of  the  First 
Kentucky  cavalry,  with  Captain  Cassius  M.  Clay,  Lieutenant 
Davidson  and  thirty  or  forty  men,  was  detached  for  this  pur- 
pose by  General  Butler.1  After  making  a  circuitous  journey 
and  meeting  with  only  bland,  inoffensive  Mexicans,  from 
whom  —  naturally  enough  —  no  important  news  could  be 
obtained,  he  found  himself  on  the  twenty-first  at  the  hacienda 
of  La  Encarnacion,  a  point  on  the  main  road  from  San  Luis 
Potosi  to  Saltillo,  and  about  fifty-three  miles  distant  from 
the  latter  place.  Here  quite  unexpectedly  he  lighted  upon 
forty  or  fifty  of  the  Arkansas  cavalry  under  Major  Borland, 
whose  orders  from  Wool  had  been  to  visit  the  hacienda  and 
immediately  return.  If,  however,  Taylor  could  do  as  he  pleased 
about  instructions,  why  should  not  Borland?  And  when 
obliging  Mexicans  told  him  of  a  small  force  lying  at  El  Salado, 
only  thirty-five  or  forty  miles  farther  on,  he  determined  to 
have  the  glory  of  capturing  it,  and  sent  back  to  his  colonel 

370 


CARELESSNESS  OF  TAYLOR'S  OFFICERS  371 

for  reinforcements.  Gaines's  party,  added  to  his  own,  seemed 
adequate,  however,  and  early  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-second 
the  troopers  rode  gayly  forward.4 

Before  long  it  appeared  that  the  distance  was  sixty  miles 
and  the  Mexican  force  mythical  —  besides,  rain  began  to  fall; 
so  the  Americans  returned  to  La  Encarnacion  for  the  night. 
"The  general  and  the  soldier  of  each  side  should  ...  be 
always  expecting  to  fall  into  danger,"  as  Thucydides  wrote 
long  ago,  and  of  course  our  officers  understood  that  in  a  hostile 
country  picket  guards  were  sometimes  deemed  advisable; 
but,  operating  on  the  higher  plane  of  action,  they  felt 
that  a  comfortable  sleep  was  what  all  needed  most,  and 
accordingly  at  daybreak  they  found  themselves  in  the  midst 
of  Minon's  cavalry  brigade  of,  say,  1200  men,  magnified  in 
their  opinion  —  doubtless  by  the  fog  —  to  3000.  The  Mexican 
general  was,  however,  a  most  accomplished  and  elegant  gentle- 
man, and  he  at  once  relieved  their  embarrassment  by  taking 
them  under  his  full  —  indeed,  close  —  protection.4 

Not  aware  of  this  comforting  fact,  Brigadier  General  Lane 
detached  eighteen  men  under  Captain  Heady  of  the  Kentucky 
cavalry,  two  days  later,  to  look  up  their  comrades.  These 
men  found  liquor  at  a  ranch  and  perhaps  —  as  a  letter  from 
Saltillo  stated  — a  fandango,  too.  Firmly  persuaded  that 
joy  should  be  unconfined,  they  "got .drunk,"  and  so  without 
using  up  a  grain  of  powder  they  ascertained  by  ocular  proof 
the  fate  of  the  other  detachments.  Apparently  there  was 
some  ground  for  Wool's  remark  that  the  volunteers,  though 
now  almost  eight  months  old  in  the  service,  could  not  easily 
be  made  to  obey  instructions  on  such  duty.  Indeed,  even 
after  Borland's  mishap  and  in  spite  of  strict  orders,  two  out- 
posts now  went  to  sleep  without  a  picket  or  a  sentry.4 

To  be  sure,  the  men  were  ready  enough  to  fight.  "Why 
we  have  no  more  fear  of  a  Mexican  than  if  they  were  [prairie] 
Wolves,"  wrote  a  soldier.  Wool's  men  felt  particularly  keen. 
On  the  way  from  La  Vaca  to  San  Antonio  they  had  passed 
a  spot  where  about  400  Texans  had  been  massacred  by  Santa 
Anna's  order  in  1836.  A  fire  had  lighted  up  their  faces  that 
meant,  "No  mercy,"  said  one  of  them;  and  exhausted  though 
they  were  after  their  wonderful  march  from  Parras,  they  felt 
very  much  dissatisfied  on  reaching  the  front,  "there  being  no 


372  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

prospect  of  a  fight."  But  the  recent  disasters  had  made  it 
seem  as  if  the  mountains  were  full  of  the  enemy,  and  one  of 
Gaines's  men,  who  contrived  to  escape,  brought  fearful  tales. 
Even  those  Americans  who  did  not  care  to  do  picket  duty 
felt  little  desire  to  wake  up  some  foggy  morning  as  prisoners. 
Signs  of  a  panicky  feeling  could  be  observed,  and  Wool  found 
it  necessary  to  invoke  Taylor's  aid.4 

The  General's  position  in  his  army  was  now  extraordinary. 
To  the  troops,  while  they  gloried  in  his  courage,  his  achieve- 
ments had  seemed  at  the  time  commonplace  enough ;  but 
sentiment  at  home  as  exhibited  in  the  newspapers  —  reacting 
from  painful  anxiety,  indulging  in  the  common  taste  for  exag- 
geration, and  instinctively  demanding  a  national  figure  for 
this  national  crisis  —  had  not  only  done  justice  to  his  great 
qualities,  but,  partly  in  order  to  explain  victories  clearly  marked 
with  errors,  made  him  out  a  genius  and  worker  of  miracles; 
and  all  this  laudation,  read  by  the  army,  created  an  impression 
which  both  duty  and  interest  forbade  the  more  discriminating 
to  impair.4 

The  General,  moreover,  though  nursing  the  mammoth 
conceit  that  he  was  qualified  to  be  President  of  the  United 
States,  was  careful  to  spare  the  self-love  of  all  who  came  in 
contact  with  him ;  and  while  no  one  could  enter  Scott's  presence 
without  feeling  himself  .before  a  superior  man  aware  of  his 
superiority,  probably  most  of  Taylor's  visitors  had  an  agreeable 
sense  of  excelling  him  in  personal  appearance,  dress,  education 
and  talents,  and  enjoyed  also  a  flattering  conviction  of  their 
insight,  because  they  recognized  that  be  possessed  high  merits 
after  all.  How  the  soldiers,  oppressed  by  the  lordliness  of 
many  generals,  adored  his  plainness  we  have  seen.  They  felt 
they  could  bow  down  to  such  a  man  without  losing  self-respect, 
since  the  obeisance  was  due  to  their  own  choice,  not  his  demand ; 
and  when  he  welcomed  one  to  his  unguarded  tent  and  talked 
with  him  about  home  and  friends,  or  shook  a  delinquent  by 
the  two  ears  with  a  kindly  warning  not  to  do  so  again,  he  estab- 
lished a  positive  dominion  over  their  minds  and  hearts.  It 
has  been  said  that  no  woman  loves  a  man  unless  she  can  despise 
him  for  something,  and  the  saying  may  be  extended  to  the  rest 
of  humanity.  Taylor  had  thus  a  double  hold  on  his  troops. 
His  black  body-servant  referred  to  him  as   "De  ole  hoss," 


ARMY  FEELING  TOWARD  TAYLOR  373 

but  would  have  died  for  him ;  and  while  the  army  would  prob- 
ably have  expressed  itself  about  him  as  lightly  as  did  the  street 
urchins  of  Philadelphia : 

"Old  Z  tck's  at  Monterey, 
Bring  out  your  Santa  Anner ; 
For  every  time  we  raise  a  gun, 
Down  goes  a  Mexicanner ; " 

yet  in  reality  he  was  now  enthroned  in  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers 
generally  as  a  father,  a  hero  and  almost  a  fetich.4 

Invoked  by  Wool,  then,  Taylor  —  instead  of  drawing  him 
back,  as  the  government  wished  —  appeared  at  Saltillo  on  the 
first  or  second  of  February  with  about  700  men,  and  proceeded 
to  occupy  the  advanced  position  already  mentioned.  Believ- 
ing, as  we  have  seen,  that  a  lack  of  water  on  the  road  from  San 
Luis  would  prevent  any  strong  body  of  Mexicans  from  coming 
north  at  that  season,  and  hearing  that  a  great  part  of  Santa 
Anna's  troops  had  gone  toward  Vera  Cruz,  he  scouted  alarms ; 
and  in  addition  to  his  other  grounds  for  pushing  forward,  he 
thought  so  doing  would  tend  to  restore  confidence  among  the 
troops  and  the  people  of  Saltillo.  Moreover,  although  he  had 
ridiculed  Scott's  intimation  tha  the  might  be  able  to  manoeuvre 
toward  San  Luis  in  the  early  spring,  he  was  now  planning 
to  do  so.4 

Scrambling  out  of  Saltillo  by  the  southern  route,  which  makes, 
a  short  but  sharp  ascent  as  it  leaves  the  town,  Taylor  found 
himself  on  a  rather  smooth  plateau  elevated  nearly  or  quite 
6000  feet  above  the  sea,  and  after  a  ride  of  about  five  miles 
discovered  on  the  left,  near  the  road,  four  or  five  mean  adobe 
buildings,  headquarters  of  the  Buena  Vista  ranch,  where 
Wool's  command  had  recently  been  in  camp.  The  southern 
outlook  from  this  point  was  desolate  but  noble.  On  both  sides 
rose  high,  barren  mountains.  Those  on  the  west,  formed  of 
many  rather  thin  horizontal  slabs  of  rock,  slightly  concave 
toward  the  sky  and  separated  by  thicker  deposits  of  a  softer 
material  eroded  at  the  edges,  formed  reddish,  flat-topped 
pyramids  like  the  pictured  hanging  gardens  of  Babylon; 
while  those  on  the  other  hand  were  a  true  sierra,  a  line  of 
saw-tooth  peaks  buttressed  with  sharp  spurs.  Descending 
easily  for  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  the  General  came  to  a  narrow 


374  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

place  called  by  Mexicans  La  Angostura  (The  Narrows),  and 
then  traversed  lengthwise  for  a  distance  of  about  three  and  a 
half  miles  the  approximately  north-and-south  valley  of  Buena 
Vista.  At  the  end  of  this  came  the  windy,  dusty  farm  of  La 
Encantada,  where  Butler  had  stationed  Wool  for  a  time; 
and  then  began  the  smiling  valley  of  Agua  Nueva,  which 
broadened  gradually  for  about  seven  miles,  and  ended  at  the 
farm  or  hacienda  of  that  name.  This  lay  near  the  mountain 
on  the  eastern  edge  of  a  wide  plain,  generously  supplied  by 
nature  with  fuel  and  water.4 

Here  Taylor  pitched  his  tent  on  the  fifth,  and  by  the  four- 
teenth substantially  all  the  troops  were  on  the  spot  —  about 
650  camping  with  him  and  some  4000  lying  with  Wool  a  mile 
or  so  away.  The  General  ordered  no  scouting,  and  took  about 
the  same  precautions  against  surprise  that  Gaines  and  Borland 
had  taken.  On  the  ground  that  spies  could  not  be  kept  out, 
he  let  the  Mexicans  come  and  go  with  perfect  freedom.  The 
engineers,  reconnoitring  on  their  own  responsibility,  concluded 
that  the  mountains  were  "passable  in  every  direction"  by 
routes  familiar  to  the  enemy  but  of  course  blind  to  the  invader.2 
Parallel  roads  lay  beyond  the  heights  on  each  side.  Yet  here 
Taylor  decided  that  he  would  meet  the  enemy,  should  they  care 
to  attack  him ; 3  and  he  said  to  the  correspondent  of  the  New 
York  Tribune;  "Let  them  come;  damned  if  they  don't  go 
back  a  good  deal  faster  than  they  came."  In  reality  the  troops 
had  more  reason  than  ever  to  feel  alarmed ;  but  Dagon  was 
again  in  the  midst  of  them,  and  they  stood  like  mountains. 
Taylor  might  be  old  and  slow  and  inefficient,  and  he  might 
know  little  about  the  art  of  war,  but  he  could  stiffen  the  courage 
of  soldiers.  "Every  man  feels  that  the  honor  of  his  country 
is  now  placed  in  his  hands,"  wrote  Lieutenant  Posey  on  the 
nineteenth.4 

This  takes  us  back  to  Santa  Anna,  who  left  the  city  of  Mexico 
for  the  north  on  September  28.  When  his  carriage  had  rolled 
on  for  about  thirty  miles,  he  received  word  that  Monterey 
had  fallen,  and  the  news  occasioned  many  bitter  reflections; 
but  there  were  enough  other  matters  to  divert  his  thoughts. 
He  understood  well  the  superior  strength  of  the  United  States ; 
but  from  Mackenzie's  mission  and  the  conviction  that  war 
expenses  would  be  extremely  unpopular  in  this  country,  he 


SANTA  ANNA'S  PLANS  375 

doubtless  felt  sure  that  we  earnestly  desired  peace.  It  was 
therefore  clear  to  him  that  his  problem  was  to  gain  one  victory. 
This  would  so  discourage  us,  he  seems  to  have  calculated,  that 
he  could  end  the  war  on  fairly  satisfactory  terms.7 

To  gain  this  victory,  it  seemed  only  necessary  to  gather 
large  forces,  bar  the  road  from  the  north  with  fortifications, 
make  no  defence  of  outlying  sections,  worry  the  Americans 
perhaps  with  feints  and  forays,  await  and  repulse  them  should 
they  advance,  and  at  the  end  of  the  winter  season,  should 
they  not,  fall  upon  some  fraction  of  their  army  with  full  power. 
One  difficulty  in  this  programme  was  the  general  hatred  which 
he  must  have  known  the  northern  provinces  entertained  for 
him,  because  his  policy  had  always  sacrificed  their  interests; 
and  he  thought  it  wise  to  despatch  a  proclamation  to  San  Luis 
Potosi,  calling  upon  the  people  to  see  in  him  only  a  Mexican 
soldier  fighting  for  the  common  country.  The  appeal  was 
effectual.  A  committee  met  him  about  a  dozen  miles  from 
the  city,  and  on  October  8  he  entered  a  town  decorated  with 
tapestries  and  pots  of  flowers,  and  resounding  with  salvos  of 
artillery,  peals  of  bells  and  enthusiastic  vivas  from  the  entire 
population.7 

A  number  of  circumstances  occurring  now  and  later  appeared 
favorable.  The  government  engaged  that  he  should  have  an 
adequate  remittance  of  funds  every  month,  and  instructed 
the  heads  of  seven  states  to  supply  his  general  wants.  A 
medal  was  promised  to  all  taking  part  in  the  campaign.  The 
National  Guards,  now  ordered  to  obey  the  central  instead  of 
the  state  authorities,  apparently  came  within  his  reach.  The 
fight  at  Monterey  was  pictured  as  creditable  to  Mexican  arms 
and  costly  to  the  enemy.  Every  life  sacrificed  there  on  the 
altar  of  nationality,  proclaimed  the  government,  called  to 
heaven  for  vengeance,  and  the  outrages  perpetrated  by  the 
insolent  invaders  proved  how  they  would  trample  on  the 
whole  country,  if  they  could.7 

Once  more  our  wicked  administration  and  its  horde  of 
"adventurers"  were  denounced  in  the  good  old  blood-curdling 
style,  and  once  more  the  forays  of  the  savage  Indians  were  laid 
to  our  charge.  Detestable  wretches  like  the  Americans  could 
not  wage  war  long.  Their  beloved  money-bags  were  already 
feeling   pinched.     Volunteers   did    not   flock   to    the   banner. 


376  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Noble  orators  li^e  Webster  were  enlightening  the  better  people. 
The  slavery  question  could  not  fail  to  paralyze  the  country. 
Already  the  elections  had  turned  against  the  administration, 
and  signs  of  a  revolution  could  be  seen.  European  countries 
were  certainly  preparing  to  interfere.  Merely  by  uniting, 
the  Mexicans  could  "tear  from  the  invader's  flag  the  symbol 
of  Texas,"  and  at  last  —  so  it  was  declared  —  union  had 
actually  been  achieved.  On  all  sides  patriotism  had  burst 
into  flame.  The  nation  was  rising.  It  would  take  account 
of  every  injury,  great  or  small,  inflicted  by  the  barbarians 
of  the  north,  and  the  day  of  settlement  would  soon  arrive. 
In  this  fashion  talked  the  government,  the  orators  and  the 
newspapers;  and  many  observers  in  Europe  and  the  United 
States  believed  the  overdue  national  movement  had  now 
begun.7 

But  this  radiant  picture  was  only  paint-deep.  Bon  Simplicio, 
the  satiric  weekly,  announced :  It  is  proposed  that  all  give, 
that  all  lend,  that  all  rise,  that  all  go  to  the  field;  but  "few 
give,  few  lend,  few  get  in  motion,  few  take  up  arms."  The 
states,  restored  to  a  measure  of  sovereignty  by  the  adoption 
of  the  federal  system,  became  conscious  of  their  powers.  Du- 
rango  would  not  help,  because  threatened  by  the  Indians, 
and  even  denounced  the  Hero  of  Tampico.  Michoacan  held 
aloof  because  Ocampo,  her  brilliant  governor,  who  could  voice 
his  opinions  in  five  languages,  hated  Santa  Anna  even  more 
than  he  did  the  Americans.  The  great  state  of  Jalisco  promised 
much  and  did  little;  and  Zacatecas,  which  Santa  Anna  had 
crushed  and  robbed  in  1835  because  it  dared  to  oppose  his 
ambition,5  not  only  withheld  all  aid,  but  attempted  to  form 
a  combination  of  states  against  him.  A  multitude  of  officials 
preferred  the  triumph  of  a  foreign  invader  to  that  of  a  native 
tyrant,  and  their  constituents  endorsed  their  course.7 

The  decree  taking  the  National  Guards  from  state  control 
had  to  be  substantially  qualified.  Members  of  that  organi- 
zation could  not  be  impressed.  The  law  pardoning  —  that  is 
to  say,  authorizing  —  desertion  from  the  regular  army  was 
extended  for  three  months.  A  secret  society  called  The  Red 
Comet,  which  sprang  up  among  the  military  men  at  San  Luis, 
took  for  motto,  "Nobcdy  is  bound  to  obey  one  that  has  no 
right   to    command,"    and    annoyed  the    General  constantly. 


SANTA  ANNA'S  EMBARRASSMENTS  377 

Requena,  one  of  the  best  qualified  officers,  who  entertained 
little  respect  for  the  Liberator's  professional  ability  or  plans, 
made  so  much  trouble  that  he  was  sent  away ;  and  General 
Valencia,  a  member  of  the  Red  Comet  society,  who  had  been 
refused  permission  to  attack  the  Americans  at  Victoria  and 
was  believed  now  to  covet  Santa  Anna's  place,  openly  defied 
the  commander-in-chief  and  left  the  army.7 

Still  more  serious  were  financial  difficulties,  for  the  Executive 
did  not  supply  the  promised  funds.  The  reason  was  obvious. 
"Our  treasury  is  as  poor  in  money  as  it  is  rich  in  obligations," 
explained  the  minister.  Santa  Anna  did  not  spare  the  govern- 
ment, however.  "I  do  not  consider  myself  nor  should  I  be 
considered  by  the  gentlemen  who  compose  the  provisional 
administration  of  the  Country  as  a  mere  General,  commanding 
a  corps  of  the  army,  but  as  the  one  leader  of  the  Nation,  to 
whom  the  direction  of  its  destinies  has  been  entrusted,"  he 
wrote ;  and  in  this  tone  he  conducted  the  financial  correspon- 
dence —  demanding,  reproaching,  protesting,  threatening ;  yet 
the  needful  remittances  did  not  arrive.  Popular  support  was 
equally  unfruitful.  "Santa  Anna  lacks  three  things  —  to 
wit,  money,  money  and  money,"  announced  Don  Simplicio; 
"Very  well,  let  us  have  a  public  meeting.  What  is  the  result? 
Nothing."  But  somehow,  through  remittances  from  the  capital 
and  the  states,  forced  loans,  arbitrary  seizures  and  the  use  of 
his  personal  credit,  the  General  worried  along,  and  built  up  an 
army  of  some  25,000  men.6  Extensive  shops  were  established 
for  the  manufacture  of  clothing  and  the  repair  of  arms;  and 
energetic  measures  were  taken  to  provide  muskets,  ammunition 
and  cannon.7 

Santa  Anna's  operations  were  not,  however,  entirely  sagacious. 
As  was  usual  in  Mexican  armies,  number  outweighed  quality. 
Consisting  mostly  of  impressed  men  and  to  a  considerable 
extent  of  criminals,  the  troops  were  unreliable.  They  were 
drilled  in  no  larger  bodies  than  brigades ;  many  had  no  practice 
in  firing;  and  most  of  them  were  very  imperfectly  disciplined. 
The  artillery  did  no  manoeuvring.  There  was  no  school  for 
officers.  Persons  of  a  notoriously  bad  reputation  as  soldiers 
occupied  high  posts.  Santa  Anna  showed  marked  favoritism 
toward  certain  regiments  and  certain  men.  Never  visiting 
the  drill-ground,  he  could  not  estimate  the  relative  qualities 


378  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

of  the  various  corps,  and  he  was  too  much  engrossed  in  politics 
and  personal  interests  to  concentrate  his  attention  upon  the 
work  in  hand.  All  of  the  generals  who  tried  to  do  their  duty 
gave  too  much  time  to  the  details,  and  studied  the  plans  of 
campaign  too  little.  What  was  hardly  less  important,  Santa 
Anna,  instead  of  instructing  the  troops  regarding  the  national 
issues  at  stake,  talked  .much  about  the  booty  to  be  stripped 
from  the  Americans,  and  in  particular  about  an  alleged  blue 
wagon  containing  their  military  chest.  Still,  the  army  took 
sl^pe,  and  the  General  looked  hopefully  toward  spring.7 
(j$ut  now  came  one  of  those  whirls  of  fortune  that  always 
hover  about  leaders  of  dubious  antecedents.  November  26 
an  influential  newspaper  of  the  capital,  El  Republicano,  copied 
from  the  New  York  Herald  a  letter  of  September  22,  written 
from  Mexico  City,  which  stated  that  Santa  Anna,  acting  in 
collusion  with  the  United  States,  would  abandon  the  invaded 
provinces,  resist  the  enemy  feebly,  satisfy  the  nation  of  its 
impotence,  bring  about  a  peace  agreeable  to  the  United  States, 
and  become  the  dictator  of  Mexico.8  Already  there  had  been 
suspicions,  and  now  they  crystallized  instantly  round  this 
definite  accusation?)  Why  had  the  Americans  allowed  the 
ablest  citizen  of  J\Jgxico  to  pass  through  their  fleet?  Why  had 
Tampico  and  Saltillo  been  evacuated  ?  Why  had  not  the  passes 
of  the  Sierra  Madre  been  fortified?  And  why  had  Valencia 
been  forbidden  to  attack  the  enemy  at  Victoria  ?  The  govern- 
ment denounced  the  story  as  a  scheme  to  create  discord  and 
break  down  the  national  champion.  Santa  Anna  does  not  need 
to  become  a  traitor  in  order  to  be  the  first  Mexican,  it  was 
said.  Had  he  made  such  a  bargain,  the  United  States  would 
have  kept  it  secret  in  order  that  he  might  be  able  to  do  his 
work.  Has  he  not  shed  his  blood  for  the  country?  Has  he 
not  recently  declined  the  supreme  power?  The  defence  was 
plausible,  but  the  facts  looked  more  than  plausible.10 

And  the  situation  had  other  aspects,  too.  As  Governor 
Olaguibel  of  Mexico  state  informed  Santa  Anna,  more  things 
were  said  against  him  than  even  a  long  letter  could  specify. 
San  Luis  was  described  as  changing  under  his  influence  into  a 
new  Capua,  where  he  was  wasting  the  funds  of  the  country 
on  his  vices  —  not  only  gambling,  but  inducing  the  officers  to 
gamble   with  him.     His  political   attitude   was   viewed   with 


SANTA  ANNA  FORCED  TO  MOVE  379 

distrust,  and  familiar  signs  indicating  an  intention  to  overthrow 
the  government  were  believed  to  be  discernible.  Even  the 
correspondent  of  the  London  Times  described  his  policy  as 
"dark  and  tortuous,"  and  the  British  minister  deemed  it  an 
"enigma."  Many  said  his  troops  were  more  dangerous  to 
Mexico  than  to  the  United  States.  The  wide  extent  of  his 
military  jurisdiction  was  described  in  the  press  as  alarming. 
By  January  each  day  brought  fresh  rumors  of  an  approaching 
dictatorship.  Olaguibel's  letter  spoke  the  word  frankly.  Then 
came  news  that  the  troops  at  Mazatlan  had  pronounced  for 
it,  and  Santa  Anna's  repudiation  of  their  course  only  convinced 
the  public  that  he  preferred  to  wait  for  a  time.10 
/The  military  phase  of  the  situation  gave  equal  offence. 
"Where  now,"  it  was  demanded,  "are  those  great  generals 
of  ours,  who  —  covered  with  ribbons  ^and  crosses  from  the 
crown  of  the  head  to  the  sole  of  the  f oot\-  insulted  with  their 
luxuriant  splendor  the  misery  of  the  people?"  "Predictions 
for  1847,"  announced  Don  Simplicio:  "The  officers  of  our 
army  will  be  divided  into  fugacious  and  permanent;"  and 
the  same  journalistic  scorpion  asked  why  the  commander- 
in-chief  did  not,  while  calling  for  money,  "eliminate  the  super- 
fluous, useless,  burdensome,  incapable  and  cowardly."  At 
the  beginning  of  December  Salas  had  promised  with  a  flourish 
that  Santa  Anna  would  "very  soon"  meet  the  odious  Yankee, 
and  before  long  the  people  were  inquiring  why  he  did 
not.  "We  are  invaded,  time  presses,  and  what  has  Santa 
Anna  done?"  demanded  a  pamphleteer;  "Ah,  the  silly  fellow 
is  waiting  for  the  Americans  to  come  and  hunt  him  up."  At 
the  General's  demand,  three  newspapers  were  established  to 
defend  him;  but  the  scorpion  disposed  of  them  all  with  one 
sting:  "Napoleon  answered  his  detractors  with  victories."10 
f  Under  these  attacks  the  army  shivered  with  rage  and  morti- 
neation  from  top  to  bottom.  The  soldiers  deserted  in  astonish- 
ing numbers /\The  officers  and  their  infuriated  commander 
felt  they  must  either  do  something  or  sink  to  perdition  in  a 
burning  lake  of  distrust,  hatred  and  contempt ;  and  therefore 
Santa  Anna  decided  precipitately  to  hurl  himself  against  the 
Americans.9  Scott's  intercepted  letter  of  January  3,  which 
probably  found  its  way  to  the  Mexican  headquarters,  showed 
how  Taylor's  army  had  been  depleted,  and  Taylor's  volunteers, 


380  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

it  was  believed  by  Santa  Anna,  would  hardly  resist  a  single 
onslaught ;  while  their  inferiority  in  numbers,  their  distance 
from  heavy  reinforcements,  their  scattered  condition,  and 
their  isolation  in  the  midst  of  a  hostile  people  were  other  factors 
offsetting  the  great  difficulty  of  crossing  deserts  to  reach  them.10 

January  23  Santa  Anna  ordered  the  mint  of  San  Luis  to  work 
night  and  day  on  ninety-eight  bars  of  silver  forcibly  appro- 
priated by  him.  A  few  days  later,  after  issuing  a  manifesto 
in  self-defence,  he  addressed  the  army  in  eloquent  language, 
pointing  out  the  hardships,  the  plunder  and  the  glory  that 
awaited  it.  On  the  twenty-eighth,  to  the  plaintive  strains 
of  a  popular  air  called  the  Adios,  the  troops  began  to  leave 
the  dust-brown  city.  The  rear  guard  set  out  three  days  later ; 
and ,  on  February  2  headquarters  moved.11  Only  useless 
remnants  of  the  army  stayed  behind ;  but  on  the  other  hand 
a  great  number  of  adventurers  of  both  sexes,  drawn  forward 
by  various  motives  but  especially  by  the  prospect  of  booty, 
accompanied  the  march.15 

For  about  thirty  miles  the  route  lay  through  a  cultivated 
region ;  but  after  it  bade  farewell  to  the  heavy  old  Spanish 
church  that  crowned  the  hill  of  Las  Bocas,  the  country  became 
sterile,  and  between  mountains  now  lumpy,  now  conical, 
usually  rich  in  silver  and  always  poor  in  vegetation,  each 
division  rolled  on  in  a  billowy  cloud  of  dust,  at  one  time  chilled 
with  icy  blasts,  and  at  another  melting  under  an  insupportable 
sun ;  cheered  only  by  the  prickly  cactus,  the  crooked  mesquite 
and  an  occasional  group  of  dwarfish  palms.  Reckless  from 
fatigue  and  unaccustomed  to  such  a  burden,  the  soldiers 
threw  away  thousands  of  sacks  containing  food.15 

To  Matehuala  the  distance  was  about  140  miles,  and  beyond 
that  point  lay  a  broad  flinty  desert.  Here  provisions  and  good 
water  began  to  fail ;  and  many,  though  well  enough  supplied 
with  the  poor  meat  and  water  that  now  composed  the  rations, 
grew  sick  and  weak.12  Weather  of  unusual  severity  set  in. 
For  several  days  a  storm  of  snow  or  chilling  rain  buffeted  the 
struggling  troops;  and  at  night,  destitute  of  all  shelter,  they 
could  only  huddle  and  shiver  at  a  few  small  fires.  Many  died 
from  exposure,  and  a  great  number,  though  expressly  warned 
that  death  would  be  the  punishment,  risked  all  the  chances 
of  deserting.     But  the  army  as  a  whole  pressed  forward,  and 


SANTA  ANNA'S  MARCH  NORTH 


381 


#Agua  Nueva 

•  Cacnero 

La  Encarnacidn 

^EHSalado 


Caforce 


'"%■-, 


on  February  17-21  arrived  at  La  Encarnaci'n,  nearly  200 
miles  from  San  Luis.13  Several  thousand  men  had  been  lost 
from  death,  sickness  or  desertion  on  the  way.  Others  had  been 
detached  at  various  points,  and  Mirun  had  now  placed  himself 
at  Potosi  hacienda  behind  the  mountains  on  Taylor's  left; 
but  on  February  19  the  figures  for  the  army  were  15,142  officers 
and  men14 — in  general  the  strongest 
and  most  determined  that  had  set 
out  — and  a  brilliant  review,  held 
the  next  day,  showed  no  lack  of 
confidence  and  enthusiasm.  A 
triumph  was  considered  certain.15 

(Santa  Anna  had  supposed  that  a 
part  of  the  American  army  occu- 
pied La  Vaqueria,  some  eight  or 
ten  miles  west  of  Taylor's  actual 
position,  and  his  intention  had  been 
to  surprise  it;  but  by  February  11 
he  learned  that  all  had  concentrated 
at  Agua  Nueva}  He  now  had  the 
choice  of  three  routes.  One  was 
the  direct  road  to  that  point;  the 
second  would  have  taken  him  via 
La  Hedionda  to  the  rear  of  Buena 
Vista ;  and  the  third  ran  by  the 
way  of  La  Vaqueria  to  the  north  of 
Agua  Nueva.16  Santa  Anna  desired, 
he  said  later,  to  pursue  one  of  the 
lateral  routes,  and  place  himself 
between  Taylor  and  Saltillo;  but 
both  of  these  routes  were  said  to 
be   circuitous,   difficult  if  not   im 


^Cedral 

•  M_ate;huala 

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Venadtf 


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MEXICO    TO%     %iik 

AGUA  NUEVA f     \\U 


Wm«.Eng.Co.,N.V. 


^Mexico® 


practicable  for  artillery,  and  perhaps 

inadequately  supplied  with  water  and  provisions.     He  decided 

therefore  to  surprise  Agua  Nueva,  believing  that  should  his 

forces  be  seen,  they  would  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  Miiion's 

brigade.17 

That  general  was  ordered  to  proceed  via  La  Hedionda  to  the 
American  rear,  and  a  little  after  noon  on  February  21  —  every 
soldier  having  been  ordered  to  drink  his  fill,  carry  all  the  water 


382 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


he  could,  and  take  rations  for  the  next  two  days  —  Santa 
Anna  advanced.  Agua  Nueva  was  only  some  thirty-five  miles 
away,  and  he  expected  to  overwhelm  it  early  the  next  morning. 
The  march  continued  well  into  the  night.  At  Carnero  Pass, 
five  or  six  miles  from  Taylor,  the  troops  lay  down  by  columns 
as  they  arrived  —  the  cavalry  still  holding  their  reins.     It 


MONTEREY  TO  LA  ENCARNACIOJK 

Approximate  Scale  of  Miles 

I 1 1 1 

0  5        10  20 

z=Carriage  roads 


■z^-----—--$fule paths,  rough  roads 
This  entire  district  is  covered  with  mountains, 
running  in  all  directions 


I  El  Jaral 


Capellanfas 


Buena  Vista  I 


Palomas 


'Molinos 
£de  Arispe^—., 


Palomas 
de  Adentro 


La  Encantada 


La  Vaqueria 


La  Hedionda 


l*S 


Agua  Nuiyai 


Carnero  Pass], 


Sta.Elena 


^■s-'-w 


"XaVaca 


La  Encarnacu 


*X 


Jesus  Maria 


Wmi.Eng.Co.,N.Y. 


was  too  cold  for  sleep,  but  they  rested ;  and  at  six  in  the  morn- 
ing they  rose  in  the  deepest  possible  silence,  and  resumed  their 
march.17 

The  Americans  had  at  last  awakened,  however.  By  February 
19  Santa  Anna  was  expected  "hourly,"  wrote  Lieutenant  Posey, 
and  the  next  day  Major  McCulloch  with  his  party  of  Texan 
scouts  was  despatched  in  the  direction  of  La  Encarnacion, 
while  Brevet  Lieutenant  Colonel  May  with  about  400  dragoons 


TAYLOR  DRAWS  BACK  383 

and  some  field  pieces  proceeded  toward  La  Hedionda.18    The 
latter  saw  a  cloud  of  dust  in  the  direction  of  Potosi,  fell  in  with 
a  Mexican  deserter 19  —  who  said  Minon  was  near  and  Santa 
Anna   at   La   Encarnacion  —  and   reported   at   Agua   Nueva 
before  sunrise,  February  21.     At  first  his  party  were  taken  for 
Mexicans;    and  when  the  alarm  subsided,  it  was  followed  by 
a  solemn  stillness,  amidst  which  groups  of  officers  could  be 
seen  talking  eagerly  in  low  tones  with  mysterious  gestures.22 
/Suddenly  at  about  noon  a  solitary  horseman  on  a  jaded 
steed  came  down  from  the  mountain,  and  made  straight  for 
the  General's  tent,  bringing  word  that  a  great  Mexican  army  had 
been  seen  at  La  Encarnacion.    The  combination  of  this  report 
and  May's  was  understood  to  mean  that  Santa  Anna  intended 
to  turn  Agua  Nueva,  and  before  two  o'clock  the  Americans 
took  flight  — that  is  the  polite  phrase  — for  Buena  Vista.20 
Colonel  Yell  with  his  mounted  Arkansas  regiment  was  left 
behind  to  guard  the  stores,  should  Santa  Anna  permit  this, 
until  they  could  be  removed  ;21  the  Second  Kentucky  and  some 
guns  were  detached  at  La  Encantada  to  support  him ;  and  the 
First  Illinois  under  Colonel  Hardin  was  posted  at  La  Angostura. 
About  midnight  Yell's  pickets  at  Carnero  Pass  were  driven  in. 
Upon  this,  firing  the  buildings  and  the  last  of  the  stores,  and 
abandoning  some  wagons,  the  troops  hurried  off,  lighted  on 
their  way  by  roaring  flames  that  filled  the  air  with  piles  of 
lurid  smoke  and  the  mountains  with  fantastic  shadows;    and 
by  morning  all  except  Hardin's  command  and  the  advanced 
pickets  were  at  Buena  Vista.     Taylor,  meanwhile,  entrusting 
to  Wool  the  disposition  of  the  troops,  marched  with  a  strong 
escort  of  the  three  arms  for  Saltillo,  to  pro^de  at  this  late  day 
for  the  defence  of  that  city  against  Minon.22) 


XX 
BUENA  VISTA 

February,  1847 

(Early  the  next  morning  (February  22)  Santa  Anna,  hurrying 
down  from  Carnero  Pass,  learned  that  Agua  Nueva  had  been 
evacuated,  but  on  arriving  there  he  discovered  signs,  as  he 
justly  believed,  of  a  precipitate  flight.  Mifion,  he  thought, 
was  already  between  Buena  Vista  and  Saltillo,  in  a  position 
to  hinder  the  American  retreat;  the  state  of  the  Mexican 
supplies,  in  his  opinion,  did  not  allow  time  for  strategic  opera- 
tions; and  therefore,  hardly  permitting  the  troops  to  drink,1 
he  dashed  ahead  with  some  2500  horse  and  a  few  light  battalions 
of  infantry,  swept  away  the  American  pickets  at  La  Encantada, 
and  thundered  on  down  the  valley.8 

By  this  time  Wool  knew  the  enemy  were  at  hand ;  the  long 
roll  sounded ;  the  soldiers  leaped  to  their  work ;  the  camp  was 
cleared;)  and  a  section  of  Captain  Washington's  battery 
hurriesKlown  the  slope  toward  La  Angostura.  It  was  a  beau- 
tiful morning;  the  mountains  on  the  east  flung  long  shadows 
across  the  valley;  a  gentle  breeze  languidly  stirred  the  flags. 
What  was  more  to  the  point,  this  was  the  twenty-second  of 
February.  The  bands  struck  up  Hail  Columbia.  The  watch- 
word, "Honor  of  Washington,"  passed  among  the  men;  and 
they  shouted  for  joy  to  see  the  great  cloud  of  dust,  full  of 
galloping  Mexicans,  approach.  None  the  less  they  were  un- 
prepared for  combat.  Had  Santa  Anna  risked  a  daring  charge, 
he  would  probably  have  triumphed  in  short  order.8 

But  he  found  the  American  position  and  the  guns  at  La 
Angostura  impressive.  His  bugler  sounded  "Halt!"  just 
beyond  range ;  and  after  reconnoitring  a  long  time  he  decided 
to  wait  for  infantry.  In  fact  there  seemed  to  be  danger  that 
his  van  might  be  attacked  and  overpowered;    and  hence  at 

384 


THE  MEXICANS   NEAR  BUENA  VISTA  385 

about  eleven  o'clock  he  sent  Dr.  Vanderlinden,  his  chief  medical 
officer,  to  General  Taylor,  who  had  now  returned  from  Saltillo, 
with  a  note  inviting  him,  on  the  ground  that  he  was  now  sur- 
rounded by  more  than  20,000  Mexicans,  to  lay  down  his  arms, 
and  probably  with  secret  instructions  to  amuse  the  American 
commander  as  long  as  possible.2  Very  likely,  as  he  intimated 
later,  he  would  have  been  glad  to  retire  from  what  he  called 
a  Pass  of  Thermopylae,  and  operate  strategically;  but  the 
American  retreat  had  in  effect  lured  him  on,  his  provisions  were 
scant,  and  at  this  point  therefore  the  issue  had  to  be  decided 
at^ence.8 

Avith  good  reason  Santa  Anna  disliked  the  field  ^f  battle 
selected  by  Wool,3  for  it  strongly  favored  the  defence/)  Run- 
ning north  along  the  western  side  of  the  road  there  was^  creek, 
which  had  excavated  near  La  Angostura  an  amazing  network 
of  gullies  with  almost  vertical  banks  twenty  feet  or  so  high, 
that  practically  vetoed  the  passage  of  troops;  and  west  of 
this  obstruction  the  ground  rose  more  and  more  steeply  until 
it  became  a  line  of  high  hills,  parallel  to  the  creek,  which  re- 
sembled a  huge  wave  ready  to  break.  On  the  other  side, 
between  the  road  and  the  sierra,  there  was  a  space  varying 
from  three  quarters  of  a  mile  to  a  mile  in  width,  and  this  was 
roughly  divided  by  two  east-and-west  ravines  — the  more 
northern  of  which  may  be  called  the  long  and  the  more  south- 
ern the  broad  ravine  —  into  three  parts  :  the  north  field,  as  we 
may  name  it,  extending  to  Buena  Vista,  the  middle  field  or  pla- 
teau, and  the  south  field  extending  to  La  Encantada.8 

Of  these  divisions  the  plateau  was  the  most  distinctive. 
Along  the  base  of  the  sierra  there  were  two  or  three  benches, 
presumably  made  of  debris  from  the  mountain;  and  lighter 
debris  had  been  washed  almost  down  to  the  road,  forming  a 
stony  plain  seamed  by  a  number  of  minor  ravines  —  torrents 
during  the  rainy  season  — which  grew  deeper  as  they  pro- 
gressed, until  at  the  western  edge  of  the  plateau  they  descended 
to  the  floor  of  the  valley  as  ragged  gulches,  leaving  between 
them  several  tongues  or  spurs,  extremely  steep  and  about 
forty  or  fifty  feet  high.  The  longest,  highest  and  bluntest 
of  the  spurs,  which  may  be  called  the  first  of  them,  was  at 
La  Angostura;  and  a  space  of  only  some  forty  feet,  through 
which  passed  the  road,  intervened  between  its  point  and  the 

VOL.  I — 2  c 


386  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

network  of  gullies.  The  plateau,  some  400  yards  wide,  north- 
and-south,  at  the  base  of  the  mountains,  had  perhaps  twice 
that  width  at  the  opposite  end,  toward  which  it  very  gradually 
sloped.  Both  of  the  two  main  ravines,  the  long  and  the  broad, 
were  extremely  difficult  for  cavalry  and  still  more  difficult 
for  artillery.  Obviously  in  such  a  spot  large  numbers  —  and 
especially  large  numbers  of  horse  —  lost  a  great  percentage 
of  their  value.8 

The  centre  of  the  American  position  was  the  first  spur,  on 
which  Hardin's  men  threw  up  a  slight  breastwork  during  the 
night,  with  Captain  Washington's  battery  on  the  road  below, 
protected  now  with  a  ditch  and  a  parapet,  that  ran  from  the 
gullies  nearly  to  the  spur;4  and  at  this  point,  or  in  reserve 
just  north  of  it,  Wool  gathered  most  of  the  Americans,  who 
numbered  4759  officers  and  men,  placing  near  the  mountain 
under  Colonel  Marshall  the  Kentucky  and  Arkansas  horse 
and  Major  Gorman's  rifle  battalion  (four  companies)  of  the 
Indiana  foot.5  Over  against  these  forces,  the  principal  body 
of  the  Mexicans  formed  two  lines  with  heavy  reserves  behind 
them  and  cavalry  in  the  rear,  while  Mexican  artillery  was 
planted  on  the  road  and  also  on  the  high  ground  east  of  it; 
and  Minon's  brigade,  the  duty  of  which  was  to  cut  off  the 
American  retreat,  showed  itself  early  in  the  day  at  the  rear  of 
Buena  Vista.6  On  each  side  the  engineers  reconnoitred 
actively,  and  both  Taylor  and  Wool  visited  and  addressed 
the  various  American  corps.8 

Apparently  there  was  an  opportunity  to  outflank  our  left, 
and  without  waiting  for  all  his  tired  troops  to  come  up,  Santa 
Anna  despatched  Ampudia  with  a  considerable  force  of  light 
infantry,  well  supported,  to  seize  a  promising  bench  at  the 
foot  of  the  mountain.  To  defeat  this  movement  the  Ameri- 
cans attempted  to  occupy  the  point  first,  but  they  blundered 
and  failed.  Colonel  Marshall  then  had  a  part  of  his  force 
ascend  a  spur  of  the  mountain  which  joined  near  the  summit 
a  spur  leading  down  to  the  Mexican  position,  hoping  in  this 
way  to  outflank  the  enemy;  but  the  Mexicans,  who  were 
gradually  reinforced,  adopted  the  same  tactics.8 

At  about  three  o'clock  a  shell  from  a  Mexican  howitzer 
planted  on  the  road  gave  the  signal  for  combat ;  and  the  troops 
on  the  mountain  opened  fire,  climbing  higher  and  higher  until 


THE   BUENA  VISTA  BATTLEFIELD 


387 


A  la  Angostura,  Washington'*  Battery  and 

two  companies  1st  Illinois  Vols. 
B  Six  companies  1st  Illinois  Regt. 
C  3rd  Indiana  Ilegt. 

D  2nd  Kentucky  Regt.  and  Sherman's  Battery  {later  position) 
E  2nd  Illinois  Regt.  and  1st  Section  Bragg's  Battery 
F  Snd  Indiana  Regt.  and  three  pieces  Washington's  Battery 
G  Kentucky  Horse  Regt.  and  one  squadron  Snd  Dragoons 
H  Arkansas  Horse  Regt.  and  one  squadron  1st  Dragoons 
K  Dismounted  Cavalry,  etc. 
L  2nd  Kentucky  Regt.,  Bragg's  Artillery  and 

detachment  of  Horse  (early  position) 


H  Snd  Indiana  partly  rallied  hen  after  retreating 

N  Heaviest  Mexican  cannon 

O  Blanco's  Column 

P  Column  to  force  American  left 

Q  Battery 

R  Light  Troops 

S  Reserve 

T  Columns  turning  American  left 

V  Mexican  Battery 

X  Cavalry  from  head  of  Column  %  attacking  Buena  Vista 

Y  Taylor  and  Staff 


388  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

finally  the  Mexicans,  getting  the  better  of  Marshall,  reached 
the  crest.  Meanwhile  Captain  O'Brien,  with  three  of  Wash- 
ington's eight  guns  and  the  Second  Indiana  under  Colonel 
Bowles  for  support,  was  posted  well  forward  on  the  plateau, 
and  a  movement  on  the  left  wing  of  the  Mexican  army  led 
Taylor  to  place  the  Second  Kentucky  under  Colonel  McKee, 
two  guns  under  Bragg  and  a  detachment  of  horse  on  the  oppo- 
site side  of  the  valley ;  but  after  a  time,  concluding  that  Santa 
Anna  would  attempt  nothing  more  that  day,  he  returned  to 
Saltillo,7  escorted  by  the  Mississippi  regiment  and  a  body 
of  the  Second  Dragoons.8 

/At  nightfall  the  roar  of  musketry  on  the  sierra,  answered 
by-the  sharp  crack  of  the  American  rifles,  subsided,  and  Mar- 
shall's troops  were  recalled  to  the  foot  of  the  mountain.  Aside 
from  losing  a  number  of  men,  while  on  our  part  none  were 
seriously  injured,  the  Mexicans  clearly  had  the  best  of  it  so 
far?)  Santa  Anna  delivered  a  stirring  harangue  to  his  troops; 
and  the  enthusiastic  vivas  and  triumphant  music  that  followed 
it,  softened  by  distance,  floated  down  to  the  Americans  on 
the  evening  breeze  in  wondrously  sweet  and  haunting  tones. 
Pleasure  ended,  however,  when  they  died  away.  Though  so 
many  strong  men,  soon  to  fight  for  their  lives,  were  present, 
the  solitude  of  the  desert  seemed  to  reign.  The  night  air 
was  bitterly  cold.  A  drizzling  rain  fell.  Except  at  the  moun- 
tain there  was  no  fuel.  The  tents  of  the  Americans  were  now 
in  the  wagons,  and  the  Mexicans  had  none;  and  long  before 
daybreak  the  troops  on  both  sides  felt  ready  for  anything  that 
would  stop  their  teeth  from  chattering.  /  For  our  men  especially 
it  was  a  dismal  situation,  and  the  reported  statement  of  a 
captured  Mexican  that  Santa  Anna  had  21,000  troops  gave 
Taylor's  army  no  mental  comfort.8) 

Early  the  next  morning,  February  23,  Santa  Anna  had  the 
reveille  sounded  in  his  various  corps  one  after  another,  in 
order  to  give  an  impression  of  great  numbers.  Mass  was  then 
celebrated.  All  his  infantry  and  cavalry  were  drawn  up  in 
one  long  line.  The  bands,  massed  in  front,  rendered  the 
sacred  music  with  grand  effect ;  the  smoke  of  incense  mounted 
to  the  clear,  radiart  sky ;  and  a  body  of  priests  in  splendid  robes 
passed  along  the  line,  bestowing  their  benedictions.19 

The  troops  then  moved  to  their  places  with  deliberation 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUENA  VISTA  389 

and  precision,  for  whether  they  could  shoot  or  not,  Mexican 
soldiers  were  always  able  to  march  and  wheel.  Evolution 
followed  evolution.  Eminence  beyond  eminence  bristled  with 
steel.  All  the  colors  of  the  rainbow  — red,  green,  yellow, 
crimson,  sky-blue,  turkey-blue  —  clothed  the  troops.  Even 
the  horses  appeared  to  be  in  uniform,  for  those  of  a  corps 
were  alike  in  color.  Silken  banners  and  plumes  of  many 
bright  hues  floated  on  the  breeze.  Handsomely  dressed  aides 
dashed  from  point  to  point.  Tremendous  vivas  rolled  in 
mighty  echoes  from  the  mountain.  And  while  Santa  Anna 
thus  built  up  the  morale  of  his  army,  most  of  the  dingy  Ameri- 
cans had  time  enough  —  as  the  quartermasters  were  knocking 
in  the  heads  of  the  cartridge  casks  and  the  sergeants  gruffly 
dealing  out  flints  —  to  view  this  grand  pageant  through  the 
wonderfully  clear  atmosphere,  and  reflect.  Out  of  the  desert, 
as  if  by  magic,  had  come  a  great  and  brilliant  army.  It  was 
not  what  they  had  expected  to  see.  The  mere  breath  of  its 
approach  had  blown  the  Americans  from  Agua  Nueva  like 
dust.  In  comparison  with  its  deliberation  and  confidence  their 
own  hasty  movements  appeared  ridiculous.  The  Mexicans 
had  already  been  successful  at  the  mountain,  and  the  General 
was  plainly  alarmed  about  the  rear.  They  began  to  question 
his  infallibility;  and  many  felt  in  their  hearts  that  religion 
was  on  the  other  side.19 

At  an  early  hour  a  large  part  of  Marshall's  command,  sup- 
ported presently  by  Major  Traill  with  two  companies  of  the 
Second  Illinois  and  Conner's  Texas  company,  reascended  the 
mountain  and,  favored  by  the  nature  of  the  ground,  main- 
tained for  several  hours  a  brisk  fight  with  Ampudia,  who, 
reinforced  with  heavy  infantry,  succeeded  at  last  in  outflanking 
though  not  in  repulsing  the  Americans.  To  aid  his  operations 
in  this  quarter,  perhaps,  by  creating  a  diversion,  Santa  Anna 
ordered  General  Blanco  to  advance  down  the  road  with  a 
heavy  column,  strongly  backed  with  cannon  placed  in  battery 
near  the  mouth  of  the  broad  ravine ;  but  at  every  discharge 
of  Washington's  guns  whole  lines  of  Mexicans  appeared  to 
sink,  and  the  column,  unable  to  deploy,  soon  fled  for  shelter 
to  the  hilly  ground  on  its  right.19 

A  stronger  attack,  however,  was  now  launched.  Pacheco 
and   Lombardini   received   orders   to   advance,   unite   on   the 


390  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

plateau,  and  force  the  American  left;  and  a  strong  battery 
was  planted  on  the  Mexican  right  near  the  head  of  the  broad 
ravine  to  cooperate  with  them.9  Both  infantry  and  horse 
marched  forward  boldly  at  parade  step;  and  the  Americans 
could  but  admire  the  showy  uniforms,  the  arms  which  gleamed 
like  silver,  the  belts  white  with  pipeclay,  and  the  freshly 
polished  brasses.  Pacheco  soon  became  engaged  with  the 
Second  Indiana,  which  —  perhaps  half  a  mile  from  any  support 
except  O'Brien's  three  guns  on  its  right  —  was  the  corps  nearest 
Marshall  and  farthest  forward  on  the  plateau ;  and  after  about 
half  an  hour  of  gallant  fighting  General  Lane,  in  the  hope  of 
both  driving  Pacheco  back  and  relieving  the  Indianians  from 
the  enfilading  fire  of  the  Mexican  artillery,  determined  to  have 
them  and  O'Brien  advance.  The  latter  did  so;  but  Colonel 
Bowles  gave  and  repeated  an  order  to  retreat.  His  retreat 
soon  became  flight,10  and  four  companies  of  Arkansas  mounted 
riflemen  joined  in  the  stampede.19 

O'Brien,  though  he  loaded  with  double  canister,  now  found 
himself  compelled  to  withdraw,  sacrificing  a  4-pounder  —  which 
had  neither  a  sound  man  nor  a  sound  horse  left  —  but  firing 
the  other  pieces  as  he  drew  them  back  with  ropes  (prolonges). 
The  Second  Illinois,  commanded  by  Colonel  Bissell,  a  born 
soldier,  which  was  actively  engaged  on  the  plateau  a  long 
distance  to  O'Brien's  right  and  rear,  was  then  outflanked  by 
Pacheco,  and  it  had  to  retire,  though  in  the  most  orderly  manner, 
toward  the  edge  of  the  plateau.  Marshall's  troops  were  now 
entirely  separated  from  the  rest  of  our  army.  Discovering 
their  exposed  situation  they  hurried  from  the  mountain,  escaped 
with  considerable  difficulty  and  some  loss  from  Ampudia  and 
the  Mexican  cavalry  that  pressed  on  with  him,  and  took  refuge 
at  Buena  Vista,  over  three  miles  from  their  position.  Here, 
not  long  afterwards,  a  part  of  them  helped  other  fugitives  defeat 
a  body  of  lancers  under  Torrejon,  that  attempted  to  raid  their 
asylum  and  the  wagon  train ; n  but  only  a  few  would  return  to 
the  field,  and  some  of  them  rushed  panic-stricken  to  Saltillo, 
crying  out  that  all  was  lost.19 

McKee  and  Bragg  now  made  all  speed  from  the  other  side 
of  the  valley  to  the  plateau.  Blanco  having  been  repulsed, 
four  of  Hardin's  companies  came  from  the  first  spur.  The 
squadron  of  the  First  Dragoons  arrived ;   and  Bragg,  Sherman 


THE   BATTLE   OF  BUENA  VISTA  391 

and  O'Brien,  handling  their  eight  guns  in  a  masterly  style, 
drew  a  line  of  fire  from  the  first  gulch  to  the  long  ravine.  La 
Angostura  and  the  first  spur,  the  double  key  to  the  American 
position,  were  thus  well  defended  ;  bu^our  left  had  been  crushed, 
the  way  to  our  rear  lay  open,  and  in  spite  of  our  incessant  fire 
Ampudia,  Pacheco  and  Lombardini  advanced.  "One  more 
charge!"  cried  the  Mexicans.  Apparently  Santa  Anna  was 
to  triumph.19 

At  this  point,  about  nine  o'clock,  Taylor  and  his  escort 
appeared  most  fortunately  on  the  scene.12  The  General, 
mounted  on  Old  Whitey,  stationed  himself  conspicuously 
on  the  plateau  near  the  first  spur  with  the  dragoons  that  ac- 
companied him;  but  the  Mississippi  men,  to  whom  Colonel 
Bowles  and  a  part  of  his  regiment  now  attached  themselves, 
marched  from  the  road  in  their  duck  trousers  with  red  shirts 
outside  of  them,  swinging  along  with  the  light  step  of  hunters, 
threw  themselves  against  Ampudia  and  the  cavalry  with  him 
in  the  north  field,  repulsed  them  although  greatly  outnumbered,) 
and,  aided  by  the  Third  Indiana,  which  had  been  standing-fti 
reserve  behind  Washington,  and  by  one  of  Bragg's  guns  under 
Lieutenant  Kilburn,  forced  them  back  by  a  withering  fire 
toward  the  mountain.19 

By  this  time  a  strong  Mexican  battery  had  been  moved 
round  the  head  of  the  broad  ravine  by  dint  of  extraordinary 
exertions,  and  planted  near  the  mountain,  where  it  commanded 
the  entire  plateau ;  but  in  spite  of  the  skilful  San  Patricio 
company — American  deserters — who  partly  or  wholly  manned 
it,  the  Pacheco-Lombardini  column  broke  almost  in  the  mid- 
dle under  the  American  fire,  the  larger  part  of  it  advancing 
into  the  north  field  and  reinforcing  Ampudia,  while  the  other 
part  —  bearing  with  it  Santa  Anna,  whose  horse  had  been 
killed  by  a  canister  ball,  and  suffering  terribly  from  our  cannon 
and  the  close  pursuit  of  Hardin,  Bissell  and  McKee  —  shrank 
back  toward  the  broad  ravine.  The  situation  on  the  plateau 
thus  became  easy.  Shelter  from  the  Mexican  artillery  could 
be  found  in  the  minor  ravines ;  bread,  water  and  ammunition 
were  brought  up ;  and  the  wounded  were  removed.  But  there 
was  great  danger  now  that  the  large  Mexican  forces  north  of 
the  long  ravine  would  either  fall  upon  Washington's  rear  or, 
joining  hands  with  Mifion,  capture  the  American  stores  and 


392  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

ammunition  at  Saltillo.  Leaving  O'Brien's  two  guns  and  one 
each  of  their  own  on  the  plateau,  therefore,  Bragg  and  Sher- 
man were  ordered  to  the  north  field.19 

Here,  soon  after  noon,  a  brigade  of  Mexican  cavalry  supported 
by  infantry  pushed  resolutely  forward  to  gain  the  Saltillo  road 
near  the  long  ravine.  In  order  to  find  a  better  position  and 
avoid  the  danger  of  being  enveloped,  the  Mississippians  re- 
tired some  distance ;  but  soon  they  halted,  and  with  the  Indiana 
men,  who  now  rejoined  them,  formed  an  obtuse  angle  opening 
toward  the  mountain.  Upon  this  obstacle  the  Mexican  cavalry, 
drawn  up  in  a  close  column,  rushed  down  at  an  easy  gallop 
in  the  most  beautiful  style,  drawing  small  circles  in  the  air 
with  the  glittering  points  of  their  lances.  These  men,  too,  were 
brilliantly  uniformed,  the  horses  were  lavishly  caparisoned, 
and  all  the  plumes  and  flags  and  pennons  were  fluttering. 
Had  they  maintained  their  impetus,  they  could  have  carried 
all  before  them ;  but  the  attitude  of  the  Americans,  who  made 
no  attempt  to  form  a  square  and  merely  stood  still  with  shoul- 
dered arms,  puzzled  the  Mexican  leader.  He  wondered, 
probably,  what  there  might  be  in  the  ravine  close  by  them, 
and  slackening  speed  he  almost  halted,  about  seventy  yards 
away,  at  the  very  focus  of  their  angle.19 

But  suddenly  the  muskets  and  rifles  were  levelled.  Each 
man  picked  his  target,  and  at  the  word  "Fire!"  —  just  as  the 
Mexican  bugler  sounded  the  charge  —  two  sheets  of  flame 
converged  on  that  splendid  brigade.  The  head  of  it  fell  to 
the  ground,  and  the  rest  were  thrown  into  confusion.  Then 
the  Mississippi  men  leaped  forward,  yelling  wildly,  seized 
horses  by  the  bits,  threw  them  back  on  their  haunches,  and 
finished  many  a  helpless  rider  with  the  18-inch  bowie-knife, 
while  the  Indianians  fired  and  plied  the  bayonet,  and  Sherman, 
coming  up  with  a  howitzer,  blasted  out  wide,  red  gaps.  The 
onslaught  was  irresistible ;  the  whole  brigade  with  its  infantry 
support  recoiled ;   and  the  victors  pressed  on  in  pursuit.19 

A  deafening  thunderstorm  of  rain  and  hail  now  burst  upon 
the  contending  armies,  but  the  battle  in  the  north  field  hardly 
paused.  While  Sherman  accompanied  the  right  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  Indiana  men,  Bragg  and  a  body  of  dragoons  flanked 
their  left ; 13  the  American  artillery  on  the  plateau,  having  little 
to  do  there,  turned  its  attention  upon  the  same  dense  masses ; 


THE   BATTLE  OF  BUENA  VISTA  393 

and  gradually  this  whole  force  of  Mexicans  was  driven  back 
to  the  mountain.  Retiring  then  into  a  recess  of  the  sierra, 
they  became  more  and  more  closely  concentrated,  and  the 
American  fire  more  and  more  destructive;  but  as  the  lancers 
had  been  stabbing  their  wounded  enemies,  no  pity  was  felt 
on  our  side  now.19 

Nothing  but  annihilation  appeared  to  await  the  panic- 
stricken  mass ;  but  precisely  at  this  juncture  —  about  one 
o'clock  —  several  Mexican  officers,  who  had  been  separated 
from  their  troops,  galloped  up  to  Taylor  in  the  desperate  hope 
of  saving  their  lives,  and  asked  in  the  name  of  Santa  Anna 
what  the  American  general  wanted.14  Upon  this  Wool  himself 
rode  with  a  white  flag  toward  the  spot  where  Santa  Anna  was 
supposed  to  be,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of  this  ex- 
traordinary question,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  the  American 
fire  ceased.  As  the  Mexican  guns,  however,  kept  at  work, 
Wool  returned ;  but  during  this  lull  the  troops  imprisoned  in 
the  recess  passed  rapidly  along  the  base  of  the  mountain, 
girdling  it  with  a  belt  of  shining  steel,  toward  the  San  Patricio 
battery.  Their  escape  was  deeply  regretted,  but  at  all  events 
the  north  field  was  now  clear  of  them.19 

From  the  first,  Santa  Anna  had  been  determined  to  gain 
the  American  rear,  doubtless  believing  that  if  taken  in  reverse 
the  volunteers  would  certainly  give  way,  and  he  had  succeeded 
in  completely  outflanking  us;  yet  Ampudia'tf  light  brigade, 
the  heavy  infantry,  Torrejon's  cavalry,  and  the  brilliant  corps 
of  lancers  that  attacked  the  Mississippi  and  Indiana  troops 
had  all  failed.  Upset,  perhaps,  by  this  disappointment,  he 
threw  away  his  chance  of  triumph,  for  he  should  have  cooperated 
with  his  brave  troops  in  the  north  field  by  hurling  upon  the 
American  centre  all  the  forces  that  could  be  gathered  on  the 
south  field  and  the  plateau.15  But  now,  for  a  last  and  crowning 
effort,  he  assembled  these  forces,  placed  them  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Perez,  and  advanced  the  battery  on  his  right 
flank  to  an  elevated  position.19 

Unwittingly  Taylor  played  into  his  hands,  for  now  —  about 
four  o'clock  —  he  ordered  Hardin  to  charge;16  and  the  brave 
colonel,  whose  finely  cut,  virile  face,  jet-black  eye  and  tightly 
closed  lips  told  what  he  was,  advanced  promptly  with  his 
six  companies.     This  movement  brought  him  before  long  into 


394  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

contact  with  the  Mexicans  from  the  recess,  who,  observing 
the  smallness  of  his  command,  rallied  against  him.  Bissell 
and  McKee,  seeing  that  he  was  overmatched,  hastened  to  his 
aid,  and  all  three  pushed  vigorously  forward ;  but  suddenly 
queer  objects  appeared  to  be  moving  along  the  surface  of  the 
plateau  at  their  right,  and  in  another  moment  out  of  the  ground 
rose  a  forest  of  muskets.  This  was  the  corps  of  Perez  emerging 
from  the  broad  ravine.  Hardin,  Bissell  and  McKee  poured 
upon  it  a  hot  fire.  So  did  O'Brien  with  his  two  6-pounders, 
and  Chickamauga  Thomas  with  one  of  Sherman's  pieces.  But 
the  fire  of  the  Mexicans,  one  terrific  blaze  and  roar,  was  this 
time  low  and  true.  The  air  seemed  thick  with  their  bullets. 
Some  of  the  Kentucky  men  dropped  to  the  ground  to  escape 
them.  "Up,  up  and  on!"  cried  McKee,  and  with  frantic 
cheers  they  sprang  again  to  their  work.19 

But  they  fought  in  vain.  The  odds  were  too  great,  and  the 
Americans  too  exhausted.  "Retreat  or  you  are  lost!"  was 
the  order ;  and  the  three  regiments,  enveloped  by  the  left  wing 
of  Perez,  rushed  and  rolled  in  headlong  flight  down  the  second 
gulch  toward  the  road.  Here  the  fearless  Hardin,  defending 
himself  to  the  last  with  a  sabre,  his  only  weapon,  sank  to  the 
ground.  Here  the  son  of  Henry  Clay,  wounded  in  the  thigh, 
refused  to  let  his  men  imperil  their  lives  by  trying  to  carry 
him  farther,  and  bravely  met  his  fate ;  and  here  fell  the  gallant 
McKee,  covered  with  wounds.  Indeed,  all  seemed  to  be 
doomed  alike,  for  lancers  hurried  on  to  close  the  mouth  of  the 
gulch ;  but  suddenly  Washington's  guns  opened  with  spherical 
case  shot,  and  under  this  driving,  hissing  blast  of  iron  the 
Americans  ran  breathless  to  La  Angostura.19 

On  the  plateau,  during  this  catastrophe,  the  right  wing  of 
Perez  bore  down  upon  Taylor's  position  at  the  centre.  Nothing 
formidable  stood  in  its  way  except  O'Brien,  for  Thomas  was 
fully  occupied  about  one  hundred  yards  to  O'Brien's  left  and 
rear.  Understanding  the  crisis  and  ready  to  sacrifice  every- 
thing if  he  could  only  gain  a  little  time,  O'Brien  fired  canister 
till  not  one  of  his  gunners  was  left,  and  the  Mexicans  could 
almost  lay  hands  on  the  pieces,  and  then  just  managed  to 
hobble  away.  The  Mexicans  now  swept  on  at  a  run.  The 
fragments  at  our  centre  were  on  the  point  of  giving  way.  The 
day  seemed  lost.19 


THE  BATTLE  EXTRAORDINARY  395 

But  by  this  time  Bragg  and  Sherman,  lashing  and  spurring 
their  tired  horses,  came  up  from  the  north  field;  and  the 
Indiana  and  Mississippi  regiments,  hurrying  over  the  ridges 
and  ravines  with  trailed  arms,  appeared  on  their  left  some 
distance  away.  Without  support  Bragg  whirled  his  guns 
into  battery  only  a  few  rods  from  the  enemy,  and  Sherman 
followed  his  example,  while  the  infantry  charged  the  Mexican 
flank  and  rear;  and  quickly,  but  none  too  soon,  canister  and 
bullets  told.  Round  followed  round,  and  volley  pursued  volley. 
The  infantry  shook  with  fatigue;  the  men  at  the  cannon, 
grimy  with  powder-stains,  gasped  for  air  as  they  rammed  the 
charges  home ;   but  they  all  kept  at  work.19 

Bravely  fought  the  Mexicans,  too;  but  such  a  staggering 
fire  could  not  be  resisted,  and  soon  the  dark  masses  of  Perez's 
column  reeled  back  in  confusion  to  the  broad  ravine.  It  was 
now  about  five  o'clock.  Our  artillery  continued  to  play  for 
a  while  on  the  San  Patricio  battery,  but  even  Mifion,  who  had 
been  making  feeble  demonstrations  against  Saltillo,  was  by 
this  time  thoroughly  repulsed,17  and  the  roar  of  battle  subsided. 
The  terrible  conflict  was  in  fact  over.  Both  armies  were  too 
exhausted  to  fight  longer,  and  in  the  narrow  valley  day  was 
already  waning. 

"  The  guns  still  roared  at  intervals ;  but  silence  fell  at  last, 
And  on  the  dead  and  dying  came  the  evening  shadows  fast ; 
And  then  above  the  mountains  rose  the  pale  moon's  silver  shield, 
And  patiently  and  pitying  she  looked  upon  the  field. "  19 

It  was  an  extraordinary  battle.  On  the  part  of  the  Americans 
it  began  in  flight  and  ended  in  success.  Marred  by  mistakes 
and  failures,  it  exhibited  even  more  strikingly  both  skill  and 
moral  grandeur.  Taylor  seems  to  have  had  but  little  to  do 
with  directing  it,  and  that  little  seems  to  have  been  poor  work;  l 
but  he  did  more  than  engineer  success  —  he  created  it.  Hud- 
dled rather  than  mounted,  a  great  part  of  the  time,  on  Old 
Whitey,  with  arms  folded  and  one  leg  unconcernedly  thrown 
across  the  pommel  of  his  saddle,  the  conspicuous  target  of  the 
Mexican  artillery  yet  utterly  unmoved  even  when  his  clothes 
were  pierced,  he  was  a  fountain  of  courage  and  energy.18  In 
other  words,  the  victory  of  Buena  Vista  was  due  primarily 
to  Taylor's  prestige,   valor  and  gift  of  inspiring  confidence. 


396  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

Others  contributed  essentially,  however.  Wool,  who  com- 
manded on  our  left,  played  the  role  of  the  fearless  professional 
soldier  that  he  was.  Many  other  officers  and  certain  corps 
exhibited  a  heroism  of  the  noblest  quality.  Our  artillery  was 
beyond  praise  for  both  daring  and  skill.  As  Wool  said  in  his 
report,  the  army  could  not  have  stood  for  "a  single  hour" 
without  it ;  and  the  batteries  served  indispensably,  moreover, 
as  rallying-points  for  the  infantry.  The  lancers,  cantering 
over  the  plain  and  finishing  the  American  wounded,  gave  great 
assistance  by  exasperating  and  warning  our  men;  and  even 
Minon  helped  us,  for  he  made  it  look  extremely  dangerous, 
during  much  of  the  time,  to  set  out  for  Saltillo.19 

(Nor  should  our  foes  be  undervalued.  While  it  was  said 
afterwards  that  a  number  of  the  higher  officers  did  badly,  the 
troops  earned  by  their  wonderful  march,  their  endurance  of 
hunger  and  especially  thirst,  and  their  valiant  fighting  under 
the  terrible  fire  of  the  American  artillery,  a  liberal  mead  of 
praise.  In  fact,  when  due  allowance  is  made  for  the  numbers 
of  their  almost  valueless  cavalry  and  for  the  position,  equip- 
ment, supplies  and  comparative  freshness  of  the  Americans, 
one  finds  the  two  armies  not  very  unevenly  matched,  and  so 
far  as  fighting  was  concerned,  the  engagement  proved  almost 
orperhaps  quite  a  drawn  battle.1^) 

(Then  followed  a  night  almosfas  hard  as  the  day.  In  killed 
and  wounded  Taylor  had  lost  673  officers  and  men,20  and  in  spite 
of  his  personal  influence  1500  or  1800  appear  to  have  quit  the 
field/)  Those  who  remained,  fatigued  not  only  by  their  exer- 
tions but  in  consequence  of  the  rarefied  atmosphere,  found 
themselves  at  the  end  of  their  strength,  both  physical  and 
moral.  Evidently  the  Mexicans  were  not  so  contemptible. 
Only  one  of  our  regiments  had  kept  its  face  always  toward 
the  enemy.  Some  of  the  bravest  leaders  had  fallen.  The 
death  of  so  many  comrades  depressed  all.  In  too  many  cases 
officers  had  lost  confidence  in  their  men,  or  men  in  their  officers. 
Many  home  letters  were  written  that  night,  and  they  were  all 
despondent.  The  howl  of  the  wolf  and  the  creaking  flap 
of  the  buzzard  reached  the  very  souls  of  the  sleepless  men 
shivering  in  the  cold.  Wool  felt  compelled  to  use  the  flat 
of  his  sword  on  some  of  the  officers,  and  even  that  did  not  make 
them  stir.     Officer  after  officer  assured  Taylor  that  no  more 


SANTA  ANNA  RETIRES  397 

fighting  could  be  done,  or  that  it  would  mean  defeat  if  at- 
tempted.24 

Not  for  a  moment,  however,  would  the  General  admit  this. 
He  was  determined  to  hold  the  ground,,  querying  only  whether 
Santa  Anna  would  turn  the  American  position  during  the  night 
or  make  another  frontal  attack  in  the  morning.21  The  Mis- 
sissippi regiment  was  ordered  to  Saltillo,  while  most  of  the 
troops  holding  the  city  were  drawn  to  the  front ;  and  a  detach- 
ment of  the  Kentucky  mounted  volunteers  with  four  heavy 
guns,  marching  that  night  from  Rinconada  Pass,  thirty-five 
miles  distant,  could  be  reckoned  on.  But  the  General  felt 
deeply  mortified  by  the  skulking,  and  wondered  how  many 
men  would  give  him  the  slip  before  morning.24 

(^Still  more  bitter  were  the  reflections  of  Santa  Anna.  His 
passionate  nature  ebbed  and  flowed,  and  a  reverse  always 
depressed  him  extremely.  He  was  tired  out,  and  his  old  wound 
had  begun  to  make  him  trouble.  Probably  not  less  than  1800 
of  his  men  had  been  killed  or  wounded  ;  294  had  been  captured  ; 
and  he  was  probably  not  far  from  the  mark  when  he  said  that 
more  than  4000  had  left  him  during  the  battle.22  He  felt 
that  the  American  position,  defended  by  men  whose  fighting 
compelled  his  admiration,  was  impregnable.)  Mexican  troops 
always  lacked  morale  for  long,  and  especraHy  for  unsuccessful, 
operations ;  and  the  troops  under  his  command  were  now  spent 
in  every  way.  Confidence  in  their  leader  and  in  the  hope  of 
booty  failed  them.  They  remembered  how  they  had  been 
forced  into  the  ranks  and  then  abused.  Surprised  by  an  infantry 
that  seemed  to  recognize  no  defeat,  they  were  dumfounded 
by  an  artillery  that  seemed  to  be  everywhere  at  once  and  al- 
ways blazing.  Hunger,  thirst,  and  cold  tormented  them.24 
/Such  conditions  meant  wholesale  desertion ;  and,  as  a  Mexi- 
can officer  wrote  that  evening,  it  was  a  grave  question  whether 
the  troops,  if  left  overnight  in  their  present  loose  and  scattered 
state,  would  not  disband.23  The  country  would  then  be  with- 
out a  disciplined  army  to  oppose  either  Taylor  or  Scott ;  and 
Santa- Anna  knew  what  his  enemies  would  say  in  that  case. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  should  lead  back  an  organized  force 
bearing  the  recognized  fruits  of  victory,  two  banners  and  three  V 
cannon,  he  could  claim  a  success  even  if  not  a  positive  triumph. 
So,  leaving  behind  the  wounded  that  were  not  within  easy 


398  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO 

reach  or  could  not  well  be  transported,  he  closed  up  his^anks 
not  long  after  nightfall,  and  set  out  for  Agua  Nueva.)  At 
first  the  march  was  like  a  funeral  procession,  except  thafaead 
men  appeared  to  be  celebrating  their  own  obsequies.  Nobody 
spoke;  the  bands  were  silent;  the  groans  of  the  wounded 
and  the  rumble  of  the  artillery  and  wagons  took  the  place  of 
conversation  and  music.  But  before  long  the  slender  crescent 
of  the  moon  sank  behind  the  mountain;  and  then  in  the 
greatest  confusion  the  men  stumbled  and  hurried  along,  eager 
to  find  a  resting  place.24 

Of  this  movement  the  American  outposts  were  not  aware. 
A  Mexican  brigade  kept  fires  burning  along  the  whole  front, 
and  pickets  rode  steadily  to  and  fro  singing  to  themselves 
a  strange,  sad  air.  When  the  first  pale  gleam  was  visible 
above  the  sierra,  our  soldiers  bestirred  themselves  for  another 
battle.  But  as  the  day  began  to  grow,  only  the  backs  of  a 
Mexican  rearguard  could  be  seen.  A  joyous  murmur  ran 
from  group  to  group.  Soon  it  was  confirmed;  it  swelled  to 
a  shout;  hard-featured,  battle-worn  men  became  boys  again; 
and  Taylor  and  Wool  threw  themselves,  with  moist  eyes, 
into  each  other's  arms.24 

About  860  officers  and  9000  men  gathered  round  Santa 
Anna  that  forenoon  at  Agua  Nueva.  Temporary  supplies  of 
food  were  available,25  and  the  troops  were  at  once  reorganized 
by  combining  companies  from  different  corps.  Before  the 
day  was  out  Major  Bliss  arrived  to  propose  an  exchange  of 
prisoners  and  suggest  an  end  of  hostilities.26  To  the  former 
proposition  Santa  Anna  acceded,  but  he  rejected  the  latter; 
and,  ordering  the  eyes  of  the  American  commissioner  to  be 
unbound,  he  exhibited  to  him  an  army  prepared  for  battle. 
In  general  orders  he  stated  that  his  purpose  in  retiring  had 
been  to  draw  Taylor  upon  ground  where  Mexican  cavalry 
could  operate ;  but,  as  the  prospect  of  resuming  the  offensive 
was  extremely  slight,  provisions  were  scanty,  the  dysentery 
had  already  broken  out,  and  the  presence  of  so  many  wounded 
men  —  more  than  700  poor  fellows  in  the  most  wretched  con- 
dition —  seemed  liable  to  produce  other  diseases,  a  council 
of  war  decided  the  next  day  upon  retreat,  and  February  26 
in^fehe  afternoon  the  troops  moved  south.27 
(  Now  came  their  real  defeat.     Like  Napoleon  returning  from 


THE  MEXICAN  RETREAT  399 

Russia,  Santa  Anna  hurried  on  in  advance,  and  owing  to  com- 
plications there  was  actually  no  general-in-chief.  Divisions 
and  corps  marched  and  lived  as  they  could.  Officers  obeyed 
or  disobeyed  as  they  chose.  Dysentery,  typhus  and  all  sorts 
of  minor  distresses  prevailed.  The  condition  of  the  troops 
was  enough  to  make  nature  shudder,  Wrote  an  officer;  and 
the  march  was  "worse  than  three  retreats  from  Matamoros 
put  together."  Probably  not  less  than  3000  men  were  lost 
in  one  way  or  another  on  the  road ;  and  when  the  miserable 
survivors  —  less  than  half  the  number  that  had  left  San  Luis 
full  of  enthusiasm  —  began  to  arrive  in  that  city,  the  sensation 
among  the  people  was  described  by  a  witness  as  "most  pro- 
found." Santa  Anna,  however,  had  already  been  accorded 
triumphal  honors  there.  By  this  time  a  wave  of  jubilation, 
soon  to  break  in  plaudits  on  the  far-distant  shores  of  Tabasco 
River,  was  in  motion)  and  he  took  pains  to  ensure  proper 
testimony  by  having  a  cross  of  honor  decreed  to  every  officer 
distinguished  in  the  battle,  and  by  distributing  twenty-seven 
promotions  in  the  three  highest  grades.27  -. 

/For  Taylor  also  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista  had  a  sequeL) 
Impressed,  very  likely,  by  the  report  of  Bliss,  he  allowed  h*r 
army  to  rest  where  it  was  for  three  days;  but  late  on  the 
twenty-seventh,  having  ascertained  Santa  Anna's  retreat 
through  a  reconnaissance,  he  reoccupied  Agua  Nueva,  where 
he  found  a  number  of  Mexican  wounded,  and  on  March  1 
—  though  his  troops  were  not  yet  fresh  enough  to  pursue 
the  enemy  or  he  did  not  think  it  safe  to  do  so  —  he  pushed 
a  detachment  on  to  La  Encarnacion  with  a  like  result.  Pro- 
visions and  surgical  assistance  were  freely  given  to  the  disabled 
foemen,  but  their  comrades  were  evidently  beyond  reach.29 

Taylor's  rear,  however,  caused  him  rather  serious  trouble. 
The  long  shadow  cast  by  Santa  Anna's  army  had  spread  alarm 
and  confusion  all  over  northeastern  Mexico,  and  the  approach 
of  troops  from  Tula  deepened  it.  Even  the  people  of  Monclova 
and  Parras,  despite  their  promises  to  be  neutral,  took  up  arms. 
The  Americans  were  now  to  be  driven  across  the  Rio  Grande 
and  perhaps  the  Sabine,  it  was  threatened.  Preparations 
for  defence  were  made  at  all  our  chief  posts,  and  for  this  reason 
they  were  hardly  molested;  but  the  lines  of  communication 
could  not  be  maintained,  detachments  en  route  were  menaced 


400  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO 

or  assailed,  and  on  the  day  following  the  battle  Urrea,  a  pol- 
ished ruffian  of  the  distinctive  Spanish-American  type,  broke 
up  a  large  wagon  train  with  signal  atrocity.28  The  rancheros 
cooperated  eagerly  in  this  profitable  work,  and  the  result  of 
the  battle  had  little  effect  upon  them,  for  they  had  seen  the 
Mexican  army  come  and  go  at  will,  and  doubtless  thought  it 
might  appear  again.  Taylor  therefore  proceeded  to  Monterey 
about  the  eighth  of  March,  and  endeavored  to  restore  order. 
On  the  twenty-eighth  he  reported  that  quiet  had  returned; 
but  three  weeks  later,  though  he  believed  that  Urrea  and  his 
regulars  had  withdrawn  beyond  the  Sierra  Madre,  he  admitted 
that  bands  of  robbers  were  still  very  numerous.29 

Nor  was  the  panic  limited  to  this^cegion.  Almost  equal 
alarm  prevailed  in  the  United  States.  r(  The  sympathy  of  every 
human  being  is  elicited,"  wrote  Brooke  at  New  Orleans;  and 
the  government  itself,  hurrying  off  recruits  and  authorizing 
Brooke  to  accept  new  volunteers,  awaited  in  "painful  suspense" 
the  result  of  Santa  Anna's  advance.  The  tidings  of  his  failure, 
exaggerated  of  course  into  news  of  a  brilliant  and  overwhelming 
triumph  won  by  a  general  robbed  of  his  troops,  caused  a  tre- 
mendous rebound.  Polk,  holding  that  only  Taylor's  blundering 
and  violation  of  orders  had  created  the  peril,  and  that  his 
brave  men  had  rescued  him  from  it,  would  not  permit  a 
general  salute  in  the  army;  but  the  nation  saluted,  and  the 
General's  nomination  for  the  Presidency  became  inevitable.29  ) 


NOTES 


vol.  i — 2d  401 


KEY  TO  THE  REFERENCES 

In  most  cases  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  determine  where  the  MS.  sources 
are  preserved.  Despatches  to  or  from  a  military  or  naval  officer,  a  diplo- 
matic or  a  consular  agent  may  be  understood,  if  there  is  no  indication  to 
the  contrary,  to  be  in  the  corresponding  archives  of  the  government  ad- 
dressed. (The  connection  of  the  author  of  a  despatch  may  be  ascertained 
by  looking  up  his  name  in  the  index.)  This  direction  may  seem  vague,  but 
the  officials  at  the  archives  will  be  found  able  to  supply  the  needful  de- 
tails. The  principal  foreign  agents  in  Mexico  were  (U.  S.)  Poinsett, 
Butler,  Ellis,  Thompson,  Shannon,  Slidell,  and  (consuls)  Jones,  Black, 
and  Dimond ;  (England)  Morier,  Ward,  Pakenham,  Ashburnham,  Bank- 
head,  Doyle,  Thornton,  and  (consul)  Giffard ;  (France)  Coch  let,  Martin, 
Deffaudis,  and  Cyprey;  and  (Spain)  Bermudez  de  C.  stro  and  Lozano. 
Mexican  documents  cited  in  the  form  "To  S.  Anna,  Apr.  20"  or  "S.  Anna, 
Mar.  4,"  are  in  the  archives  of  the  War  Dept.  of  Mexico,  National  Palace. 
Many  unofficial  letters  can  readily  be  traced  by  means  of  the  list  of  MS. 
sources.  When  it  has  seemed  desirable,  however,  particularly  at  the  be- 
ginning of  a  chapter,  heavy  figures  referring  to  that  list  have  been  prefixed 
to  the  citation,  and  also  to  many  citations  of  official  documents.  The 
MS.  sources  are  given  in  the  appendix  of  each  volume;  the  printed 
sources  in  the  appendix  of  the  second  volume. 

A  formula  like  "Ho.  60;  30,  1"  means  House  Executive  Document 
no.  60,  of  the  Thirtieth  Congress,  first  session;  and  "Cong.  Globe,  30,  2" 
refers  to  the  Congressional  Glebe,  Thirtieth  Congress,  second  session.  In 
some  cases  it  has  been  found  best  to  cite  a  document  broadly  by  mention- 
ing the  first  page  of  it ;  and  the  same  renark  applies  to  passages  in  other 
publications.  The  year  in  the  date  of  a  cited  document  is  omitted  when 
it  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  events  referred  to  in  the  corresponding  para- 
graph of  the  text.  E.g.  a  document  dated  Oct.  15,  1847,  attached  to  a 
paragraph  dealing  with  Scott's  landing  at  Vera  Cruz  (March,  1847)  or 
capturing  Mexico  City  (Sept.,  1847)  is  cited  as  of  "Oct.  15,"  not  "Oct.  15, 
1847."  This  is  done  to  save  space.  The  abbreviations  are  plain.  "Gov." 
means  governor;  "comte.  gen.,"  comandante  general;  "comte.  mil." 
comandante  militar.  "Gov.  Puebla,"  etc.,  means  governor  of  Puebla,  etc. 
"Diario"  means  the  official  newspaper.  For  fuller  titles  of  books  the  list 
of  sources  may  be  consulted. 
\  The  want  of  definiteness  and  the  lack  of  statistics  in  numerous  cases 

(particularly  Mexican  affairs)  may  be  charged  to  a  dearth  of  trustworthy 
data. 


c 


402 


fi 


NOTES 

PREFACE 

1.  Another  reason  for  the  neglect  of  the  Mexican  War  has  been  its  un- 
popularity. But  for  that,  it  would  no  doubt  have  been  thoroughly  studied 
sooner. 

2.  A  second  reason  for  preparing  this  history  was  that  a  number  of 
important  topics  —  such  as  the  conditions  existing  in  the  two  countries 
just  before  the  war,  the  war  in  American  politics,  our  conduct  and  methods 
in  occupied  territory,  the  finances  of  the  war,  its  foreign  relations,  etc.  — 
had  been  treated  most  superficially  or  not  at  all.  In  the  third  place  it 
was  hoped  to  handle  more  carefully  the  material  previously  used.  The 
bound  volumes  entitled  "Archivo  de  Guerra"  in  the  Archivo  General  y 
Publico  at  Mexico  occupy  some  200  feet  of  shelf  room,  and  the  papers 
examined  in  the  Archivo  de  Guerra  y  Marina,  which  had  to  be  examined 
one  by  one,  would  probably,  if  placed  one  on  another,  make  a  pile  sixty 
feet  high. 

As  will  be  seen  from  the  detailed  account  of  the  MS.  sources  (appendix), 
the  author  did  not  visit  the  archives  of  all  the  Mexican  states  and  cities. 
This  was  because  nothing  further  of  local  value  could  be  hoped  for,  and 
because  the  practice  of  communicating  from  state  to  state  copies  of  im- 
portant documents  made  it  seem  unnecessary  to  continue  in  those  direc- 
tions. The  results  in  Peru  and  Colombia  were  negative,  but  this  fact  had 
a  positive  significance,  for  there  were  reasons  to  look  for  an  active  sym- 
pathy and  correspondence  with  Mexico  in  those  quarters.  The  author 
planned  to  examine  the  Prussian  archives,  but  the  outbreak  of  the  great 
war  prevented  him  from  doing  so.  From  other  trustworthy  sources, 
mostly  unpublished,  he  fully  understood  the  attitude  of  that  government, 
however  (chap.  xxxv).  The  reports  of  the  Prussian  representative  at 
Mexico  cannot  have  been  reliable,  both  because  of  his  personal  character- 
istics and  because  for  several  reasons  he  did  not  stand  within  the  inner 
circle,  and  probably,  since  his  government  felt  scarcely  any  interest  in 
the  war,  they  were  not  full.  Hence  it  is  not  believed  that  anything  of 
material  value  has  been  lost  through  the  impossibility  of  examining  them. 
Of  some  of  the  newspaper  files  only  scattered  portions  were  found.  Many 
newspapers,  as  well  as  many  books  and  pamphlets,  were  read  to  ascertain 
the  general  temper,  social  state,  and  political  conditions  of  the  two  coun- 
tries, and  it  appeared  unnecessary  to  set  down  references  —  which  would 
have  been  almost  innumerable  —  to  such  literature.  The  author  con- 
templated at  one  time  a  critical  discussion  of  the  sources,  but  he  soon 
found  that  this  would  require  too  much  space.  It  would  in  fact  make  a 
volume.  For  additional  information  regarding  the  sources  one  may  con-  N 
suit  an  article  of  the  author's  that  appeared  in  The  Military  Historian  and  / 
Economist,  vol.  i,  no.  1. 

403 


404  NOTES  ON  PREFACE,  PAGES  viii-ix 

3.  The  printed  versions  of  diplomatic  and  military  documents,  when 
substantially  correct,  are  usually  cited  in  the  notes,  because  they  are 
easily  accessible ;  but  so  far  as  possible  they  have  been  collated  with  the 
originals.  On  the  value  of  official  military  reports  the  author  presented 
-some  remarks  in  the  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  xxi,  p.  96.  Gen. 
Worth  said  privately  that  Scott's  report  on  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo 
was  "a  lie  from  beginning  to  end,"  and  in  a  sense  different  from  what  this 
language  would  at  first  sight  appear  to  mean,  it  was  fairly  correct  (chap, 
xxiii,  note  33).  Subordinate  officers  not  infrequently  brought  all  possible 
influence,  both  personal  and  political,  to  bear  upon  the  general  whose 
report  they  knew  would  be  printed.  A  general  naturally  favored  in  his 
report  the  regiment  and  the  officers  with  whom  he  had  been  formerly 
associated.  An  undue  regard  for  rank  was  often  felt.  Taylor  asked  a 
promotion  for  Brig  Gen.  Twiggs  after  the  capture  of  Monterey  though 
Twiggs  had  been  ostensibly  ill  at  the  time  and  had  taken  no  material 
part  in  the  fight.  Captain  (later  General)  Bragg  wrote:  "The  feelings 
succeeding  a  great  victory  caused  many  things  to  be  forgotten  and  for- 
given which  would  sound  badly  in  history,  and  which  will  never  b,e  known 
except  in  private  correspondence"  (210to  Gov.  Hammond,  May  4,  1848). 
An  important  document  issued  by  our  government  was  privately  de- 
scribed by  the  adj.  gen.  as  "full  of  inaccuracies"  (117R.  Jones  to  B.  Mayer, 
Oct.  10,  1848). 

A  special  reason  for  leaving  no  stone  unturned  has  been  the  consideration 
that  the  omission  of  a  significant  fact  is  even  worse  than  a  positive  error, 
since  it  is  equally  misleading  and  less  likely  to  be  discovered.  In  many 
instances  an  apparently  insignificant  document  proved  to  be  the  keystone 
of  an  arch  or  at  least  to  fill  a  serious  gap,  and  the  cumulative  effect  of  a 
number  of  such  documents  frequently  established  a  capital  fact.  Docu- 
ments not  actually  used  often  prove  helpful  by  preventing  the  writer  from 
drawing  inferences  that  look  reasonable  but  are  in  fact  incorrect  (see  the 
last  paragraph  of  the  article  in  the  Military  Historian  cited  above) .  Even 
minutiae  enable  one  to  give  life  and,  so  to  speak,  rotundity  to  events, 
and  to  do  this  is  to  increase  the  fidelity  of  the  narrative.  The  more  in- 
formation the  historian  possesses,  the  better  he  can  criticise  particular 
documents.  In  consequence  of  a  want  of  this  full  acquaintance  with  the 
facts,  documents  relating  to  the  subject  have  previously  been  misunder- 
stood. Still  another  valuable  fruit  of  a  wide  investigation  is  a  higher 
degree  of  confidence  on  the  part  of  both  author  and  reader  that  no  later 
discoveries  will  upset  present  conclusions.  For  Scott's  statement  see 
65gen.  orders  249,  Aug.  6,  1847. 

Naturally  the  author  had  little  occasion  to  use  previous  histories  of  the 
war,  and  indeed  he  took  care  not  to  consult  them  while  writing  this  work. 
No  thorough  attempt  has  been  made  to  point  out  their  errors  and  no 
wish  is  felt  to  criticize  them  in  general ;  but  it  needs  to  be  explained  that 
while  Ripley,  Wilcox,  Furber  and  Roa  Barcena  present  statements  of 
minor  importance,  not  found  elsewhere,  which  the  author  wished  to  use, 
he  has  seldom  felt  at  liberty  to  do  so.  As  is  well  known  those  authors 
were  not  critical  historians.  They  were  also  too  near  the  events.  It  is 
frequently  impossible  to  be  sure  whether  their  statements  rested  upon 
hearsay,  upon  trustworthy  second-hand  information,  or  upon  personal 
knowledge.  Roa  Barcena  spoke  as  a  Mexican.  Wilcox  aimed  to  glorify 
our  officers  and  men ;  and  Ripley  intended  to  exalt  the  unworthy  Pillow 
at  the  expense  of  Scott  (chap,  xxiii,  note  29 ;  and,  for  an  interesting  though 


NOTES  ON  PREFACE,  PAGES  ix-x       405 

not  wholly  correct  review  of  Ripley,  So.  Qtrly.  Rev.,  Jan.,  1851,  149-60). 
Pillow  185wrote  in  reference  to  Ripley's  book,  He  has  torn  Scott  "the 
man  and  the  officer  all  to  pieces."  The  recent  work  by  Rives  contains 
much  that  is  sound  as  well  as  dignified ;  but  his  investigations  came  far 
short  of  the  requirements.  The  present  author  has  frequently  taken 
pains  to  write  in  such  a  way  as  to  correct  errors  without  mentioning 
them,  and  the  reader  may  feel  sure  that  he  has  carefully  considered  all 
statements  not  in  agreement  with  his  own. 

4.  Particular  reasons  why  a  civilian  could  venture  to  prepare  the  his- 
tory of  this  war  were  that  (1)  owing  largely  to  the  smallness  of  the  numbers 
engaged,  the  operations  were  simple;  (2)  the  reports  were  written  for 
non-military  readers ;  and  (3)  a  large  amount  of  good  criticism  was  written 
at  the  time  or  soon  afterwards  —  mostly  in  a  private  way  —  by  competent 
officers  who  were  personally  familiar  with  the  circumstances.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  military  men's  technical  knowledge  does  not  necessarily  enable 
them  to  reach  correct  historical  conclusions.  This  is  proved  by  their 
radical  differences  of  opinion  (e.g.  compare  the  articles  on  Wilcox's  His- 
tory of  the  Mexican  War,  Journal  of  U.  S.  Artillery,  July  and  Oct.,  1892) 
and  their  manifest  errors  of  judgment.  Gen.  U.  S.  Grant  pronounced 
Scott's  strategy  on  Aug.  20,  1847,  faultless  as  a  result  of  the  perfect  work 
of  his  engineer  officers  (Pers.  Mems.,  i,  145) ;  but  the  engineer  from  whose 
report  Scott's  essential  orders  regarding  the  battle  of  Churubusco  resulted 
admitted  privately  that  he  blundered  (xxvi,  notes,  remarks  on  Churubusco). 
The  dicta  of  military  authorities  are  not  often  quoted  by  the  author,  be- 
cause war  cannot  be  made  by  rule  and  it  would  be  necessary  to  consider 
in  each  case  whether  the  dictum  was  applicable. 

A  very  difficult  matter  was  to  decide  how  many  military  details  to  intro- 
duce. There  is  hardly  any  limit  to  the  names  of  officers  and  commands 
and  the  minutiae  of  movements  that  might  have  been  presented.  The 
principle  adopted  was  to  draw  the  line  between  historical  value  and  anti- 
quarian value,  to  include  what  was  needed  to  show  how  the  important 
results  were  brought  about  and  allow  the  curious  reader  to  ascertain  the 
rest  of  the  details  by  looking  up  the  references. 

The  reader  who  has  given  no  study  to  the  subject  may  perhaps  welcome 
a  few  informal  and  obviously  incomplete  remarks  on  the  principles  of  war. 
One  proper  aim  is  the  occupation  of  territory,  and  this  may  possibly  be 
accomplished  without  fighting;  but  essentially  combat  is  presupposed, 
and  the  purpose  is  then  to  destroy  or  in  some  other  way  eliminate  the 
enemy's  military  strength,  so  that  he  will  feel  compelled  to  accept  our 
terms.  Therefore  the  general  should  (1)  make  all  possible  preparations ; 
(2)  take  the  initiative  and  lose  no  time;  (3)  secure  unity  in  plan  and  in 
action ;  (4)  obtain  as  much  information  as  possible  regarding  the  enemy 
and  beware  of  desoising  him;  (5)  embarrass  him  and  break  down  his 
morale,  while  building  up  your  own,  through  rapidity  of  movement,  sur- 
prises, feints,  threats  against  his  communications,  etc.;  (6)  select  for 
objective  a  point  combining,  as  far  as  may  be,  weakness  and  decisiveness 
—  qualities  often  incompatible,  of  course ;  (7)  running  no  avoidable  risk 
of  inadequacy,  concentrate  near  and  move  upon  this  an  overpowering 
force,  while  diverting  the  enemy's  forces  from  it ;  (8)  strike  with  energy 
and  decision ;  and  (9)  if  successful,  pursue  to  the  limit  of  endurance  and 
safety.  In  a  general  way  it  may  be  said  that  an  "indirect"  or  "oblique" 
(i.e.  flank)  attack  is  preferable,  but  obviously  the  actual  conditions  must 
decide  whether  to  adopt  that  method.     In  view  of  these  principles,  strategy 


406  NOTES  ON  PREFACE,   PAGE  xi 

determines  when,  where,  and  with  what  forces  a  battle  shall  be  fought, 
and  tactics  directs  the  battle  itself.  It  follows  that  on  the  defensive  one 
should  protect  one's  communications,  force  the  enemy  to  send  out  detach- 
ments and  rout  or  annoy  these ;  and,  if  such  methods  have  no  saving  effect, 
retire  to  a  position  strong  by  nature,  art,  or  both,  and,  while  defending  it, 
watch  for  opportunities  to  strike.  One  may  consult  on  these  points  and 
on  the  text  to  which  this  note  refers  Clausewitz,  On  War,  book  i,  chap.  7 ; 
Jomini,  Precis,  i,  470-2 ;  Murray,  Reality  of  War,  21,  77 ;  Donat,  Stra- 
tegical Science,  275-6 ;  Henderson,  Science  of  War,  19-20 ;  Griepenkerl, 
Applied  Tactics,  116;  Goltz,  Conduct  of  War,  10-12;  Jour.  Milit.  Serv. 
Instil.,  1908,  p.  31 ;  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  xi,  388. 

5.  As  the  author  was  compelled  to  depart  in  many  cases  from  the  fa- 
miliar method  of  referring  to  the  sources,  he  feels  bound  to  explain  how 
these  were  handled.  All  the  material,  condensed  as  much  as  it  safely 
could  be,  was  marked  in  the  margin  with  Roman  figures,  indicating  to 
what  chapter  each  sentence  or  larger  section  would  belong.  Then  the 
sections  were  copied  into  packets,  each  of  which  contained  all  the  material 
of  a  chapter.  Next  the  material  of  each  packet  was  analyzed  into  topical 
items,  and  the  items  were  numbered  with  Arabic  figures.  In  writing  a 
chapter  the  author  placed  after  each  sentence  (or,  if  the  case  demanded, 
after  each  clause,  phrase  or  word)  the  Arabic  figures  numbering  the  items 
upon  which  it  rested.  These  figures  were  retained  through  the  successive 
revisions  until  the  MS.  was  ready  to  print,  and  were,  used  in  the  re-examina- 
tion of  the  work.  By  this  routine  every  document  was  considered  at  least 
five  times.  Of  course  care  was  taken  at  all  stages  to  ensure  correct  copy- 
ing ;  yet  in  the  final  revision  the  author  went  back,  unless  there  was  a  good 
reason  for  not  doing  so,  to  originals  or  to  trustworthy  copies  from  the 
originals  —  doing  this  not  merely  to  verify  the  references  but  also  to  see, 
in  the  light  of  the  completed  investigation  of  the  subject,  whether  he  had 
omitted  or  misunderstood  anything  of  importance  in  making  notes  and 
condensations.     The  text  and  remarks  as  written  looked  thus : 

"Gen.  Patterson  once  asserted  that  Volunteers  were  no  worse  than 
regulars  578,  but  the  evidence  of  other  officers  83-4  340  385  564  568 
1266  and  of  the  Mexicans  84  87  340  489  582  1236  was  overwhelmingly 
against  him.  Regulars  committed  offences,  but  these  appear  to  have 
been  commonly  mere  pilfering  181  562,  and  to  have  been  chargeable 
mostly  to  fresh  recruits  83  1103.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  the 
Volunteer  troops  often  bore  the  blame  109  for  acts  done  by  soldiers 
dishonorably  discharged  659  981,  deserters  582  601  659  689  945,  team- 
sters and  other  civilian  employees  358  1315  and  the  many  "black  legs" 
377  and  "human  vultures"  1292  who  followed  the  army  365  568  639. 
The  great  difficulty  was  to  identify  the  culprits  1315.  Mexicans  were 
often  afraid  to  testify  against  our  soldiers  1266." 

The  saving  of  space  and  labor  that  resulted  from  the  grouping  of  cita- 
tions can  easily  be  illustrated.  Take  the  case  of  ten  statements  resting 
upon  ten  documents,  which  may  be  represented  by  the  first  ten  letters  of 
the  alphabet.  Were  the  usual  method  followed  the  references  might 
be :  acj,  dfghi,  be,  adeghj,  fij,  bcf,,adeg,  cfh,  i,  bdghj ;  whereas  by  the  group 
method  the  references  would  be  abedefghij  —  in  the  former  case  35,  in  the 
latter  10.  The  higher  cost  of  the  former  method  might  have  enforced  the 
omission  of  all  references  from  the  printed  volumes,  if  indeed  the  increased 
labor  of  writing,  copying,  and  proof-reading  the  references  had  not  de- 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  I,  PAGES  1-6  407 

terred  the  author  —  as  it  might  well  have  done  —  from  completing  his 
task.  As  it  stands,  the  book  probably  represents  (including  the  work  of 
clerical  assistants)  nearly  twenty  years  of  labor  J  After  all,  the  chief 
value  of  citations  is  perhaps  their  effect  upon  the  author.  Few  look  them 
up ;  but,  no  matter  how  conscientious  he  may  be,  the  fact  of  constantly 
giving  such  pledges  of  fidelity  keeps  him  wide-awake  to  the  necessity  of 
accuracy,  and  indeed  compels  him  to  refer  to  his  sources  more  than  he 
might  o  therwise  feel  obliged  to  do. 

I.   MEXICO  AND  THE   MEXICANS 

(To  the  sources  mentioned  below  may  be  added  a  residence  of  more 
than  a  year  in  Mexico,  during  which  the  author  met  people  of  numerous 
categories  and  made  every  possible  effort  to  understand  the  national 
traits.) 

1.  Physical  Mexico.  U.  S.  War  Dept.,  Monograph.  Bureau  of  Amer. 
Republics,  Mexico.  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  "Mexico."  Numerous 
books  of  travel  mentioned  in  note  8. 

2.  Population.  The  census  which  served  as  a  basis  for  the  elections  of 
1841  and  some  later  years  gave  the  population  as  7,016,000  (Dublan, 
Legislaci6n,  v,  152,  gives  the  figures  by  states).  The  American  governor 
of  Jalapa,  Col.  Hughes,  257wrote,  Jan.  28,  1848,  that  according  to  "au- 
thentic Mexican  official  documents"  the  population  was  about  7,500,000, 
of  whom  2,500,000  were  under  seventeen  years  of  age,  500,000  were  over 
sixty,  and  300,000  were  idlers,  beggars,  etc.,  incapable  of  work.  The 
population  of  the  United  States  in  1840  was  17,069,453.  Observador 
Judicial,  1842.  Consideraciones,  5.  Journal  des  Debats,  Sept.  9,  1847. 
26lMemoire.  Macgregor,  Progress,  i,  317.  Ward,  Mexico,  i,  28.  Mora, 
Obras,  i,  54.  Mexico  a  traves,  iii,  19 ;  iv,  p.  vii.  Relaciones,  circular, 
Aug.  9,  1847.  82Decre3,  Dec.  16,  1847.  Diario,  May  4,  1847,  claimed 
8,003,000. 

3.  Racial  divisions  and  characteristics.  Mexico  £  traves,  iii,  18-21. 
Humboldt,  Essai  Polit.,  i,  367,  381,  411-6;  ii,  1-4,  9,  45,  48-52.  52Poin- 
sett,  no.  166,  March  10,  1829.  Mayer,  War,  13,  16.  Commerc.  Review, 
ii,  165-76.  Consideraciones,  5-7.  Garcia,  Conquista,  4,  370-2,  397. 
Thompson,  Recoils.,  7.  Poinsett,  Notes,  161.  13Hervey,  Description 
of  Mexico.  26lMemoire.  Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  166,  174-89. 
Mora,  Obras,  i,  54-6.  Cuevas,  Porvenir,  12-14.  178Davis,  diary. 
1620onner  to  wife,  Mar.  4,  1846.  Diccionario  Universal  (Mexicanos). 
13Morier,  no.  10,  Feb.  10,  1825.     Eco  del  Comercio,  Mar.  22,  1848. 

Technically  the  child  of  a  Spaniard  and  an  Indian  was  a  "mestizo," 
the  child  of  a  Spaniard  and  a  mestizo  was  a  "castizo,"  and  the  child  of  a 
Spaniard  and  a  castizo  was  a  "criollo"  (creole) ;  but  "criollo"  came  to 
include  all  these  classes  and  also  pure  whites  born  in  Mexico.  As  very 
few  Spanish  women  went  to  Mexico,  the  mixture  of  blood  was  practically 
inevitable.  As  is  well  known  the  Spanish  blood  itself  is  a  singular  mixture. 
Hence  the  Mexican  was  naturally  peculiar. 

4.  The  class  divisions.  Otero,  Cuesti6n,  37,  47-51.  13Morier,  no.  12, 
Feb.  10,  1825.  Lerdo  de  Tejada,  Apuntes,  i,  232.  26lMemoire.  Hum- 
boldt, Essai  Polit.,  i,  391-5,  400-1,  429-31 ;  ii,  40.  Poinsett,  Notes,  162. 
Constituent  Cong,  of  Mex.,  Address.  Consideraciones,  18,  19.  Mora, 
Obras,  i,  54-6.  Paredes,  Papers,  136.  52Poinsett,  no.  166.  Mexico  a 
traves,  iii,  18.     Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  188-9. 


408  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  I,   PAGES  7-12 

5.  Church,  army,  civil  service.  Mayer,  War,  20-1,  132.  Otero,  Cuesti6n, 
38-46,  59,  60,  71-3.  Mora,  Obras,  i,  pp.  vii,  xcvii-cxviii,  ccxlvii;  ii,  122-8. 
26lMemoire.  Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  38,  94,  117-28.  Humboldt, 
Polit.  Essay  (London,  1811),  i,  231-2.  Mexico  a  traves,  ii,  896;  iii,  23; 
iv,  149,  447,  639.     Zavala,  Revoluciones,  i,  37.     Macgregor,  Progress,  i, 

.637,  642.  Thompson,  Recoils.,  41,  53,  101-3,  169-74.  52Poinsett,  nos.  2, 
12,  36,  55,  166  (May  28 ;  Aug.  5,  1825 ;  Feb.  18 ;  Aug.  26,  1826 ;  March  10, 
1829).  Consideraciones,  6,  7,  12,  26-30,  37,  39-42.  13Ashburnham, 
Oct.  3,  1837;  July  26,  1838.  Semmes,  Service,  14-5,  21.  llMartin, 
Feb.  1 ;  July  20,  1827 ;  Dec.  25,  1828.  llCochelet,  June  6 ;  Nov.  20, 
1829.  Correspondant,  April  15;  July  15,  1846.  Calder6n,  Life,  i,  337, 
408.  13Hervey,  Description.  Picayune,  April  22,  1843.  Bocanegra, 
Memorias,  i,  b2.  Tornel,  Reseria,  19-21,  84.  llDespatch  to  the  French 
govt.,  about  June,  1823  (anon.).  13Morier,  no.  13,  Feb.  10,  1825.  13Mo- 
rier  and  Ward,  no.  1,  April  10,  1825.  13Ward,  no.  37,  Apr.  29,  1826. 
13Pakenham,  nos.  17,  Jan.  30,  1830 ;  25,  Feb.  26,  1841 ;  77,  Aug.  29,  1842. 
13Bankhead,  nos.  73,  Aug.  29,  1844;  56,  Apr.  29,  1846.  Memoria  de 
.  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec,  1846.  Richmond  Enquirer,  Dec.  30,  1845.  Mo- 
bile Commerc.  Register,  Aug.  9,  1845.  Veracruzano  Libre,  Dec.  27,  1845. 
Revue  de  Paris,  Dec,  1844.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Nov.  7,  1823, 
17,  18.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  75,  77.  Id.,  Estado  Militar,  58.  375Perry 
to  J.  Y.  Mason,  Nov.  16,  1846.  Bulnes,  Grandes  Mentiras,  182.  Rivero, 
Mex.  en  1842,  25,  137-9.  Ward,  Mexico,  i,  307-17,  330-40.  London 
Times,  Nov.  11,  1845. 

According  to  Otero,  an  able  editor  and  statesman,  the  income  of  the 
Church  represented  in  1829  a  capital  of  $127,000,000,  besides  the  build- 
ings,, etc,  used  for  worship  and  for  the  housing  of  ecclesiastics ;  and  prac- 
tically none  of  its  property  was  taxed.  Of  its  wealth,  large  for  any  period 
but  huge  for  that  day,  $18,000,000  were  invested  in  city  and  country  real 
estate ;  and  consequently  there  was  an  army  of  agents  looking  after  Church 
interests  in  all  quarters,  and  a  great  number  of  proprietors  and  financiers 
were  closely  associated  with  the  clericals.  One  may  say,  reported  a  French 
diplomatic  agent,  "that  religion  does  not  exist  [in  Mexico],  for  its  influence 
is  nowhere  felt" ;  and  in  truth,  as  an  ardent  Roman  Catholic  said  in  Le 
Correspondant  of  Paris  in  1846,  that  country  needed  to  be  evangelized 
anew.  Trist :  "The  lazy,  ignorant,  and  stupid  monks,  whose  views  do 
not  extend  beyond  the  round  of  purely  animal  enjoyments,  and  include 
no  esprit  de  corps  save  pecuniary  greed  mixed  with  an  idol  worship  fa- 
naticism" (52no.  18,  Oct.  25,  1847).  Ramirez,  Mexico,  219:  Christianity 
merely  gross  idolatry  here.  The  Mexican  church  stood  naturally  in 
opposition  to  the  government,  for  both  claimed  the  right  of  ecclesiastical 
patronage.  The  influence  of  the  Church  was  lessened  by  Leo  XII,  who 
exhorted  the  Mexicans  to  return  to  Spain  (Mexico  £  traves,  iv,  149). 

350Weber :  "If  the  Mexican  soldier  has  something  to  eat,  he  eats  it;  if 
not,  he  goes  without.  That  is  all."  Diario,  May  20,  1847 :  The  army 
has  been  burdened  with  enough  generals  and  field  officers  for  the  army 
Napoleon  led  against  Russia.  (24,000  officers)  Duflot  de  Mofras, 
Explor.,  i,  20.  ($21,000,000)  52Slidell  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  14,  1846. 
Negrete,  Invasi6n,  iv,  app.,  400.  Eco  del  Comercio,  Mar.  22,  1848. 
llMartin  :  The  army  belongs  to  the  first  who  "gives  it  money  or  promises 
it  plunder"  (Dec.  25,  1828).  13Doyle,  no.  81,  Oct.  30,  1843.  Don  Sim- 
plicio,  July  19,  1846.     Nacional,  Jan.  19,  1848. 

6.  Justice,  education,  the  press.     Zavala,  Revoluciones,  i,  35,  396;    ii, 


NOTES   ON    CHAPTER  I,   PAGES   12-15  409 

393.  Thompson,  Recoils.,  20-4,  147-52.  London  Times,  Jan.  8,  1846. 
13Ward,  no.  58,  confid.,  April  18,  1827.  13Pakenham,  nos.  39,  May  27, 
1836;  5,  Jan.  25,  1841.  13Bankhead,  no.  54,  May  30,  1845.  130'Gor- 
man  to  Pakenham,  Jan.  19,  1835.  Pakenham,  Nov.  23,  1834,  separate  ■ 
no.  8,  March  8,  1835.  56W.  S.  Parrott,  Oct.  11,  1845.  52Jones  June  1 
1837;  nos.  168,  Oct.  30,  1838;  252,  May  5,  1839.  Leclerc  in  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  March  1,  1840,  p.  638.  llFrench  vice-consul,  Mex.,  Aug  19 
1829;  Feb.  3,  1830.  Tornel,  Reseiia,  288.  Consideraciones,  6,  7,  12-4,' 
43,48.  Memoriasde  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Jan.,  1825;  Feb.,  1828;  Jan.,  1831; 
May,  1833;  Dec,  1846.  Memorias,  min.  of  justice,  1833,  1835,'  1845! 
Ward,  Mexico,  i,  337.  52Poinsett,  no.  166.  Constit.  Cong,  of  Mex. 
Address.  Liberal  Moderado,  Aug.  4,  1846.  Mora,  Obras,  i,  pp.  clxxxviii- 
cxcvii.  Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  109-16.  Lavalles,  Etudes,  31-3. 
Villar,  Proyecto.  Calder6n,  Life,  i,  195,  340-2.  Esparza,  Informe! 
Memorias,  min.  of  treas.,  May,  1833;  July,  1845.  Memorias,  min.  of 
pub.  instr.,  Jan.,  1844;  July,  1844;  March,  1845.  Macgregor,  Progress 
i,  637. 

For  a  long  time  after  1821  only  one  slight  attempt  was  made  to  improve 
the  old  judicial  methods,  and  that  was  a  failure.  llVice-consul  of  France 
Aug.  19,  1829 :  "Justice  is  so  venal,  that  with  money  one  could  have  the 
victim  arrested  and  the  criminal  rewarded."  In  1836  the  British  minister 
reported  the  opinion  of  an  able  Mexican  lawyer  that  certain  important 
court  proceedings  were  nothing  but  "a  conspiracy  authorized  and  sup- 
ported by  judicial  formulas,  one  more  illegal  than  another."  Mexican 
minister  of  justice,  1835  :  "On  all  sides  is  heard  a  unanimous  outcry  against 
the  bad  administration  of  justice"  (Memoria).  At  a  public  meeting, 
Aug.  13,  1846,  Pedro  Zubieta  said:  "What  have  been  thus  far  the  judi- 
ciary and  the  magistracy?  A  shameful  market,  in  which  those  august 
names  have  put  Justice  up  at  auction"  (Diario,  Sept.  19).  The  gov.  of 
Michoacan  76wrote,  Nov.  28,  1845 :  I  am  unable  to  prevent  some  judges 
from  favoring  criminals.  Alaman  reported  secretly  to  Congress  in  1830 : 
The  tribunals  ensure  impunity  to  criminals  (Pakenham,  no.  25,  Mar.  25, 
1830).  Ramirez,  Mexico,  225:  Our  magistrates  are  usually  insignificant 
(hombrecitos),  "vigorous  to  persecute,  feeble  to  command,  and  incapable 
of  serving  as  models  of  a  just  and  severe  impartiality."  The  reports  of 
the  American  ministers  and  consuls  were  full  of  similar  complaints.  Once 
when  our  consul  reminded  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  that  it  was  the 
constitutional  duty  of  the  Executive  to  have  the  laws  faithfully  adminis- 
tered, the  latter  replied,  "Yes,  but  it  is  impossible."  In  1838  France 
took  strong  ground  against  the  miscarriages  of  justice  in  the  Mexican 
courts. 

The  Lancastrian  system  of  pupil  helpers  was  tried  in  the  schools ;  but 
it  failed,  for  nobody  understood  it  practically.  The  educational  authori- 
ties gave  ear  to  bright  young  men  who  had  merely  picked  up  a  few  ideas 
on  the  boulevards  of  Europe,  and  wasted  their  time  in  theorizing  and  mak- 
ing projects.  We  have  become,  said  a  thoughtful  writer  in  March,  1848, 
the  most  persistent  of  charlatans,  glad  to  talk  on  any  subject  without 
understanding  it,  and  ready  to  try  all  sorts  of  theories,  which  vanish  like 
smoke  as  soon  as  put  into  practice. 

7.  Industries,  trade,  means  of  communication.  Revista  Economica, 
Dec.  14,  31,  1843.  Macgregor,  Progress,  i,  308,  670,  674.  Ward,  Mexico, 
ii,  3-170.  Mexico  d,  travel,  iii,  18.  London  Times,  Aug.  6;  Nov.  11; 
Dec.  6,  1845.     52Thompson,  no.  4,  July  30,  1842.     13Ward,  nos.  45,  99 


410  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  I,   PAGES   15-28 

(May  20 ;  Aug.  20,  1826).  26lMemoire.  Gazette  d'Etat  de  Prusse,  Nov.  11, 
1823.  Consideraciones,  8-12,  14-8.  Otero,  Cuestion,  31-4,  46,  49,  50, 
97-8.  Pakenham,  nos.  25,  Mar.  25,  1830;  28,  June  11,  1833;  61,  July  8, 
1841 ;  4,  49,  123,  Jan.  6,  June  2/  Dec.  25,  1842 ;  5,  Jan.  24,  1843.  13Ash- 
burnham,  no.  3,  Jan.  31,  1838.  13Bankhead,  nos.  44,  June  29,  1844 ;  6 
Jan.  29,  1845;  8,  Jan.  30,  1846.  261aMemoire.  52Poinsett,  reply  to 
Mexico  state  (with  his  no.  176,  Aug.  7,  1829).  Memorias,  Relaciones, 
Feb.,  1830;   March,  1835;   Dec,  1846.     Memoria,  min.  of  justice,  March, 

1845.  Mayer.  War.  13.  Poinsett,  no.  166,  March  10,  1829.  Constituent 
Cong.,  Address,  1824.  Thompson,  Recoils.,  35.  Journal  des  Debats, 
March  16,  1844;  Feb.  18,  1845;  April  4;  Sept.  9,  1847.  Bocanegra, 
Memorias,  ii,  162-3.  52Dimond,  no.  273,  Nov.  4,  1845.  llMartin, 
Feb.  1,  1827.  Banco  de  Avio,  Informe.  Memoria,  min.  of  interior, 
Jan.,  1838.  Alaman,  Memoria.  Robertson,  Remins.,  88.  76Mora  y 
Villamil,  report  from  superior  board  of  engineer  corps,  Nov.  15,  1845. 
McSherry,  El  Puchero,  147.  Lawton,  Artill.  Officer,  254.  Diario,  July  20- 
5,  1846  (report  on  the  state  of  agriculture). 

The  American  minister  stated  in  1829  that  the  cost  of  producing  crops 
in  Mexico  was  double  that  in  the  United  States  and  the  expense  of  market- 
ing them  fourfold.  Besides,  the  farmers  had  suffered  blow  after  blow 
during  the  revolution  and  the  succeeding  commotions.  The  system  of 
"forced  loans,"  so  familiar  in  Mexico,  consisted  in  assigning  to  corpora- 
tions and  individuals  —  presumably  according  to  their  wealth  —  amounts 
that  they  were  required  to  hand  over  in  exchange  for  promissory  notes, 
which  the  government  did  not  expect  to  pay.  The  prohibition  of  many 
foreign  articles  reduced  the  public  revenues  and  promoted  smuggling. 

8.  Country  and  town:  manners  and  mora1  s.  Thompson,  Recoils.,  39,  40, 
82,  90,  93,  101-2,  115,  125-8,  132,  135,  160,  163,  217.  Calderon,  Life,  i, 
80,  124,  127,  138,  140,  150-1,  162,  165,  175,  273,  314,  336,  340-5,  395 ; 
ii,  126  (Alaman),  137  (village),  237,  247.  Ward,  no.  52,  secret  and  confid., 
Nov.  10,  1825.  52Thompson,  no.  1,  1842.  52Poinsett,  nos.  2,  May  28, 
1825;  94,  July  8,  1827;  166,  Mar.  10,  1829.  52Butler,  July  9,  1834. 
Arroniz,  Manual,  109,  123,  131,  161.  Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  36,  47-8, 
59,  130,  133,  137,  140,  142,  147-9,  151-4,  159,  163-6,  etc.  Decaen,  Mexico, 
22.     Rivera,  Los  Mexicanos  Pintados.     Memorial  Historico,  Jan.  16,  20, 

1846.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  291.  Rivera,  Gobernantes,  ii,  142.  Revue 
Independante,  Apr.  25,  1845.  Revue  de  Paris,  Dec,  1844.  Diario,  Jan.  24, 
1841.  Davis,  Autobiog.,  102.  Mayer,  War,  14.  Bravo  in  Boletin  Oficial, 
Apr.  30,  1846.  Ruxton,  Adventures  (1847),  20,  25,  34-6,  39,  40,  44,  46, 
59.  Robertson,  Remins.,  104-6,  116,  122.  Mason,  Pictures,  i,  17,  19, 
110,  201;  ii,  23,  etc.  Vigneaux,  Voyage,  286.  Orbigny,  Voyage,  413, 
422,  425,  428.  Robertson,  Visit,  ii,  50,  58,  61-2,  147.  Commerc.  Review, 
ii,  165-76.  llCochelet,  Sept.  29,  Nov.  15,  1829.  13Forbes  (Tepic), 
July  2,  1846.  Kendall,  Narrative  (1844),  ii,  145,  317,  335-6.  Tudor, 
Tour,  ii,  266,  328.  Stapp,  Prisoners,  133-4.  Valois,  Le  Mexique,  86-7. 
Delta,  June  12 ;  Nov.  6,  1847.  Sierra,  Evolution,  passim.  218Henshaw 
narrative.  (Apathy)  Pakenham,  no.  15,  Mar.  21,  1834.  Morier  and 
Ward,  no.  6,  Apr.  30,  1825  ("That  extraordinary  Compound  of  Ignorance, 
Suspicion,  and  Fanaticism,  which  now  forms  'the  most  striking  Feature  of 
the  National  Character."  "Alaman  and  Esteva  represented  that  we  were 
dealing  with  Children,  and  must  suit  our  Arguments  to  their  Capacity.") 
Ward,  nos.  20,  60,  July  12;  Nov.  23,  1825.  Zavala,  Revoluciones,  ii, 
152-3,  365.     McSherry,  El  Puchero,  158. 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  II,   PAGES  29-33  411 

A  ministerial  report  submitted  to  Congress  in  Jan.,  1844,  showed  how 
a  Mexican  could  regard  himself  :  "  If  the  present  epoch  begins  to  be  brilliant 
in  Europe,  Mexico  finds  herself  still  more  advanced.  She  has  learned  from 
the  wise  men  of  all  the  world  but  has  contemned  their  errors.  .  .  .  The 
virtues  of  the  Mexican  spring  from  a  heart  not  withered  by  the  pleasures 
of  sense,  a  heart  still  expanding  with  generous  enthusiasm.  His  soul  rises 
to  sublime  regions ;  it  knows  how  to  feel ;  it  knows  how  to  understand ; 
it  knows  the  celestial  origin  of  virtue ;  and  it  appreciates  all  that  itself 
contains  of  spontaneity  and  magnanimity.  .  .  .  This  delicious  country 
breathes  into  our  sentiments  the  suavity  of  its  climate ;  this  ardent  sun 
kindles  the  beautiful  flame  that  makes  men  love  one  another ;  and  amid 
the  sweetness  of  a  natural  world  so  magnificent  and  sublime  the  germ  of 
heroic  merits  is  formed  within  us." 

II.   THE  POLITICAL  EDUCATION  OF   MEXICO 

1.  To  sketch  the  political  development  of  Mexico  is  by  no  means  easy. 
No  scientific  history  of  it  exists,  and  all  those  who  have  written  on  the 
subject  with  first-hand  knowledge  have  been  party  men.  The  best  basis 
is  the  reports  of  the  British  ministers,  for  they  were  men  of  ability  near 
the  heart  of  affairs,  comparatively  without  prejudice,  anpl  anxious  to  give 
a  true  account  of  what  was  taking  place.  With  these  reports  as  a  prima 
facie  standard,  the  author  has  felt  able  to  use  intelligently  the  statements 
of  other  foreign  agents  —  diplomatic  and  consular  —  Mexican  authors, 
the  historical  and  political  writers  of  several  nationalities  and  a  great 
number  of  periodicals. 

For  the  colonial  regime  he  consulted  the  following  sources.  Humboldt, 
Polit.  Essay,  i,  passim.  52Poinsett,  nos.  94  of  1827  ;  166  of  1829.  Cuevas, 
Porvenir,  15.  Ward,  Mexico,  i,  91-120.  Rivero,  Mexico,  24.  26lMe- 
moire.  llSerrurier  to  "the  Duke,"  Apr.  20,  1818.  llVilleveque,  Feb.  3, 
1830.  Mora,  Obras,  i,  pp.  cx-cxiii.  Macgregor,  Progress,  passim.  Tor- 
nel,  Breve  Resefia,  4.  Consideraciones,  50-1.  llMemoire  submitted  to 
the  king  by  a  Spaniard.  Gage,  Voyages,  i,  223.  Amer.  Antiq.  Soc, 
Proceedings,  New  Series,  xxi,  277-83.  Latane,  Diplom.  Rels.,  12-20. 
Diario  de  Mexico,  1810.  Pensador,  1812,  45-6,  49,  51,  53.  Gaceta  del 
Gob.  de  Mex.,  1810.  Priestley,  Jose  de  Galvez,  chaps,  i  and  ii.  Esperanza, 
Mar.  5,  1846.     296Poinsett  to  the  Prest.,  Apr.  26,  1827. 

2.  The  Revolution.  Cuevas,  Porvenir,  15,  17.  Ward,  Mexico,  i,  84, 
96,  100,  116-8,  120,  135,  195-6.  Mexico  a  traves,  ii,  pp.  x-xiii,  507-8, 
525;  iii,  pp.  iv-ix,  30-5,  76,  85-127,  162,  188,  210,  226,  271,  283,  311,  323, 
331,  339,  343,  405,  428,  450,  460,  487,  491-2,  656,  661-85,  735-56;  iv, 
pp.  iv,  vii,  30,  199,  200,  316.  Arrangoiz,  Mexico,  i,  33-5.  Humboldt, 
Polit.  Essay,  i.  26lMemoire.  Tornel,  Resefia,  4-6,  162.  Otero,  Cues- 
tion  Social,  51-2.  Garcia,  Plan.  Iturbide,  Memoires.  Poinsett,  Notes, 
91;  app.,  39.  Zavala,  Revoluciones,  i,  65,  68,  78-9,  86,  104,  111,  272, 
406.  13Ward,  nos.  37,  114  of  1826.  52Poinsett,  no.  166  of  1829.  Con- 
stituent Congress,  Address,  1824.  Alaman,  Mexico,  i-iv.  llMartin, 
Feb.  1,  1827.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  126,  149.  13Morier,  no.  10  of  1825. 
Lerdo  de  Tejada,  Apuntes,  ii,  229-30,  234,  245.  Consideraciones,  43, 
51-2.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  1823,  p.  9.  Arr6fiiz,  Orizaba.  Liceaga, 
Adiciones,  378.  Mora,  Obras,  i,  p.  vii.  Mateos,  Hist.  Pari.,  ii,  222. 
Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  293.  S.  Anna,  Manifiesto,  1823.  Suarez  y 
Navarro,  Alegato.     Id.,  Hist,  de  Mex.  y  del  ...  S.  Anna.     Carrefio, 


412  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  II,   PAGES  34-39 

Jefes,  13.  Sol,  June  15,  24,  1823.  Rivera,  Jalapa,  ii,  107-26.  Gaceta 
del  Gob.  de  Mex.,  1810,  p.  867  (decree  of  the  Inquisition  summoning  Hi- 
dalgo). Rivera,  Gobernantes,  ii,  1-72.  Puga  y  Acal,  Documentos,  20. 
Portrait  of  Iturbide  :   City  Hall,  Mexico. 

3.  Iturbide,  the  Triumvirate,  and  the  Constitution.  13 Ward,  secret  and 
confid.,  July  14,  1825;  no.  114  of  1826.  52Poinsett,  nos.  94  of  1827; 
166  of  1829.  llVilleveque,  Feb.  3,  1830.  llMartin,  Feb.  1,  1827  .13Mo- 
rier,  no.  10  of  1825.  llCipher  despatch  to  French  govt,  about  July,  1823. 
26lMemoire.  Cuevas,  Porvenir,  14,  36,  140-2,  195-206,  211-5,  220-5, 
231-3,  239,  245-51,  261,  277,  318-9,  358-9.  Bocanegra,  Memorias,  i, 
13-4,  18,  31-3,  38-40,  49-57,  61-3,  76-82,  97-9,  111-25,  207,  215,  220-4, 
226,  231,  241,  284-9,  328-9,  370,  374.  Iturbide,  Memoires.  Tornel, 
Resefia,  6-15,  18-22,  28,  37.  Mora,  Obras,  i,  pp.  vii-viii,  xii,  xiv.  Za- 
vala, Revoluciones,  i,  113-23,  152,  173,  176,  211,  214-5,  254-62,  274,  294, 
347;  ii,  294.  Ward,  Mexico,  i,  202-6,  260-82.  Poinsett,  Notes,  71. 
Lerdo  de  Tejada,  Apuntes,  ii,  262.  Negrete,  Mexico,  xiii,  296 ;  xiv,  239. 
Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec,  1846.  Casasus,  Deuda.  Romero 
in  No.  Amer.  Review,  Jan.  1,  1896.  Gutierrez  de  Estrada,  Mexico.  Mata, 
Reflecciones.  Arco  Iris,  Dec.  7,  1847.  Eco  del  Comercio,  Mar.  10,  1848. 
Cosmopolita,  Aug.  22,  1838.  Maza,  C6digo,  263.  Rivera,  Jalapa,  ii,  225, 
228.  Id.,  Gobernantes,  ii,  73-94.  Esperanza,  Mar.  5,  1846.  208MS. 
of  the  man  who  proclaimed  the  empire.  Tornel,  Discurso,  17.  Alaman, 
Mexico,  v.  Constituent  Congress^  Address,  1824.  Otero,  Cuesti6n  Social, 
53-5,  75,  108-9  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  pp.  iv,  vii,  9-21,  26-37,  40-8,  50-9, 
65-111,  115,  198,  200-9,  360.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  160-6,  169,  173,  316. 
F.  J.  P.,  Ligeras  Reflecciones.  Reforma,  Jan.  23,  1846.  Consideraciones, 
46.  Sol,  July  27,  1823.  Mayer,  War,  27-8,  135.  Richtofen,  Zustande, 
21.  Dictamen  of  revol.  committee,  June  12,  1835.  Calderon,  Life,  i, 
336.  Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  294.  Thompson,  Recoils.,  58.  Lacombe, 
Le  Mexique,  31. 

4.  It  has  recently  been  denied  that  our  Constitution  was  imitated,  but 
this  was  stated  by  Poinsett  (no.  166,  March  10,  1829),  Bocanegra  (Mems., 
i,  329),  Tornel  (Resefia,  14),  Otero  (Cuesti6n  Social,  121),  and  26lMemoire ; 
and  the  Congress  itself,  in  an  address  to  the  nation,  said,  "In  all  our  pro- 
ceedings, we  have  taken  for  a  model  the  happy  Republic  of  the  United 
States  of  the  North."  The  Spanish  constitution  of  1812  and  that  of  the 
French  Republic  were  also  in  view.  There  was  a  supreme  court,  but  it 
had  no  power  to  hold  the  balance  between  the  states  and  the  central  gov- 
ernment. 

5.  Victoria's  administration.  Portrait  in  city  hall,  Mexico.  52Poin- 
sett,  nos.  12,  20,  24,  32,  55,  60,  92,  94,  96-7,  99,  105,  107,  110,  114,  153, 
166,  192  (1825-29).  296/d.  to  King,  May  16,  1826.  13Hervey,  Dec.  15, 
1824.  13Morier,  nos.  10,  19,  1825.  13Ward,  nos.  15,  21,  34,  36,  44,  60, 
64  and  most  private  and  confid.  (Sept.  30)  of  1825 ;  32,  77,  85,  99,  107, 
114,  128,  136,  secret  and  most  confid.  (Oct.  If),  and  private  (Oct.  if) 
of  1826;  3,  11,  15,  19,  24,  52,  58  of  1827.  13Pakenham,  nos.  62,  84,  90 
of  1827,  1, 107  of  1828 ;  22,  32,  38  of  1829 ;  17,  30  of  1830 ;  and  to  Vaughan, 
Jan.  13,  1829.  llMartin,  Feb.  1;  Mar.  30;  Apr.  25,  1827;  Aug.  25; 
Dec.  25,  1828.  llCochelet,  Jan.  16,  1830.  llVilleveque,  Feb.  3,  1830. 
llPaper  submitted  to  the  French  Cabinet,  1828.  1  Instructions  of 
Bresson,  1828.  Tornel,  Resefia,  16,  19,  24-5,  28-30,  34,  39,  43,  45-8, 
80,  83,  85,  87,  129-30,  133-4,  163-4,  177-82,  200,  238.  Bocanegra,  Mems., 
i,  lib,  231,  286,  374,  390,  444,  463,  467,  522.     Zavala,  Revoluciones,  i, 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  II,   PAGES  39^3  413 

149,  271,  343,  346-8,  351 ;  ii,  35,  41,  44.     Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  103-4,  116, 

121,  127-9,  131-3,  141,  144-5,  154-67,  170,  172,  193-4,  208-10.  Mora, 
Obras,  i,  pp.  viii-xii,  xiv-xvi.  Calder6n,  Life,  i,  42,  96.  Richtofen, 
Zustande,  22.  Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  290.  F.  J.  P.,  Ligeras  Reflec- 
ciones.  Cuevas,  Porvenir,  268-9,  353,  376,  406,  411-2.  Sierra,  Evolu- 
tion, i,  183.  52Manifiesto  of  Vera  Cruz  legislature,  June,  1827.  Son 
Peores  los  Gachupines.  Ah,  Traidores  Gachupines.  Crimenes  de  Zavala. 
Acta  del  Pronunciamiento.  Revista  Economica,  Dec.  31,  1843.  Cosmo- 
polita,  Feb.  14,  1838.  Anteojo,  Aug.  1,  1835;  and  other  references  in 
chap,  iii  (Poinsett  section).  Dictamen  of  revol.  committee,  June  12,  1835. 
26lMemoire.  Otero,  Cuesti6n  Social,  60,  66.  Poinsett,  Notes,  20. 
Rivera,  Jalapa,  ii,  364. 

The  following  passage  illustrates  the  pamphleteering  of  the  day :  "The 
country  is  threatened;  and  by  whom?  The  Gachupines.  Persons  in 
the  midst  of  us  are  working  for  our  ruin;  and  who?  The  Gachupines. 
Persons  are  laboring  to  sow  discord  among  us ;  and  who  ?  The  Gachu- 
pines. Persons  are  looking  for  hostile  troops  to  reduce  us  to  slavery 
again;  and  who?  The  Gachupines."  The  popular  party,  associated 
with  Masonic  lodges  of  the  York  Rite,  were  commonly  called  Yorkinos, 
and  the  aristocratic  party,  associated  with  the  Scotch  Rite,  Escoceses 
{i.e.  Scotch).  A  particularly  unfortunate  fact  was  that  under  the  Mexican 
constitution  the  arbiter  between  the  nation  and  the  states  was  a  political 
body,  Congress. 

6.  Guerrero's  rise  and  fall.  52Poinsett,  nos.  60  of  1826 ;  105,  151-3, 
155,  157-60  of  1828 ;  166,  173  of  1829,  and  Apr.  3,  15 ;  Sept.  2 ;  Nov.  20 ; 
Dec.  23,  1829.     13Ward,  Nov.  10,  1825.     13Pakenham,  nos.  89,  99,  110, 

122,  132,  143-4,  146,  151,  153  of  1828  ("totally  unfit,"  Aug.  23) ;  2,  4,  8, 
52,  79,  99,  108,  109  of  1829 ;  8,  17,  25  of  1830 ;  62  of  1833 ;  to  Vaughan, 
Jan.  13,  1829.  llMartin,  June  30,  1827 ;  Aug.  25 ;  Sept.  26 ;  Oct.  31 ; 
Dec.  1,  10,  19,  25,  31,  1828;  Jan.  4,  13,  1829.  llCochelet,  June  6;  Oct. 
20 ;  Nov.  29 ;  Dec.  26,  1829.  23lButler  to  Jackson,  June  6,  1834.  52But- 
ler,  Dec.  31,  1829;  Jan.  5;  Mar.  9,  1830.  52Cameron,  Feb.  14,  1831. 
26lM6moire.  52Zavala,  Exposici6n  to  chamber  of  deputies,  Apr.  23, 
1829.  Id.,  Revoluciones,  i,  146;  ii,  47,  57-8,  77,  147,  150-2,  175,  221. 
Gaxiola,  Invasi6n,  156.  Lerdo  de  Tejada,  Apuntes,  ii,  302-6,  336,  396. 
Cuevas,  Porvenir,  285,  383,  413,  458,  475.  Tornel,  Resefia,  34-6,  45-6, 
237,  309-13,  315-8,  323-4,  333-4,  338,  347-9,  383-6,  392,  407,  423-4. 
Bocanegra,  Mems,  i,  375,  473-4,  492,  494;  ii,  7,  10-1,  25,  34,  57-9, 
120,  135,  144,  150-9,  190,  657.  Mexico  a  traves,  ii,  612 ;  iv,  98,  102,  166, 
177-94,  197,  209-12,  215,  217-37,  267.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  177-8. 
Juicio  Imparcial.  El  Pueblo  Pide  Justicia.  F.  J.  P.,  Ligeras  Reflecciones. 
Mora,  Obras,  i,  pp.  xvi-xx.  Bustamante,  Manifiesto,  1830.  Derrota  del 
Sr.  Guerrero.  Mateos,  Hist.  Pari.,  iii,  256,  263.  Memoria  de  .  .  . 
Relaciones,  1830,  11,  13.  Poinsett  in  Commerc.  Review,  July,  1846,  34-9. 
231T.  H.  Ellis,  July  8,  1839.  Anteojo,  Aug.  1,  1835.  52Guerrero  to 
Poinsett,  Nov.  1,  1827.  Hid.,  Address  on  becoming  President.  Rivera, 
Gobernantes,  ii,  164.  Sosa,  Biografias,  429,  1101.  American  Sentinel, 
June  15,  1836.  The  Acordada  was  a  conspicuous  building  at  Mexico 
made  use  of  in  Zavala's  insurrection. 

7.  Bustamante  and  the  change  of  system.  Pakenham,  nos.  88,  108  of 
1829;  5,  17,  24-5,  31,  59,  62,  66-7  of  1830;  8  of  1831 ;  47,  54,  70,  81-3, 
87,  96  of  1832 ;  10,  19,  35,  39,  44,  62,  67,  69,  82-3  of  1833 ;  15,  22-3,  29, 
36,  42,  48,  51,  57,  64  of  1834;  25,  35,  40,  47  of  1835;  24  of  1837.     Poin- 


414  NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  II,   PAGES  44-51 

sett,  no.  12  of  1825.  52Butler,  Jan.  5 ;  Mar.  9 ;  June  29 ;  Aug.  26,  1830 ; 
Feb.  19 ;  Aug.  20 ;  Oct.  5 ;  Dec.  6,  1831 ;  Jan.  10 ;  Feb.  27 ;  Mar.  22 ; 
July  25;  Oct.  7;  Dec.  12,  1832;  Mar.  16;  June  5,  1833;  Mar.  2,  8,  28; 
June  2;  July  1,  9;  Sept.  1;  Oct.  20,  1834;  Feb.  8,  1836.  52Butler  to 
Jackson,  July  22,  1831 ;  June  21 ;  July  18;  Aug.  30,  1832;  Jan.  2,  1833 ; 
Feb.  6 ;  July  9 ;  Dec.  24,  1834 ;  Feb.  26,  1835.  52Ellis,  nos.  2,  3,  1836. 
52Ellis  to  Jackson,  Aug.  26,  1836.  llCochelet,  Nov.  21,  1829.  261M6- 
moire.  13Morier,  no.  10,  1825.  13Ward,  secret  and  confid.,  July  14; 
no.  40,  Sept,  25,  1825.  13Ashburnham,  no.  70,  1838.  52Jones,  no.  71, 
1837.  52W.  S.  Parrott,  no.  15,  1835.  A.  Bustamante  to  Congress, 
May  23,  1832.  C.  M.  Bustamante,  Gobierno,  275.  Mora,  Obras,  i, 
pp.  xx,  xxi,  xliii-xlvi,  xlix,  1,  lvii,  lxi,  lxv,  lxxvi-xc,  cxii-cxxviii,  cxxxix, 
cxcvii,  ccxiv-cclxxxi,  cclxv.  Lerdo  de  Tejada,  Apuntes,  ii,  393,  396-7, 
399,  403,  414,  548.  Crepusculo,  May  8,  16,  1835.  Rivera,  Jalapa,  iii, 
157-75,  195-202,  225-8.  Id.,  Gobernantes,  ii,  151-3,  168-9,  173,  177-8. 
Tornel,  Resena,  25.  Cuevas,  Porvenir,  342.  Zavala,  Revoluciones,  i, 
263;  ii,  254,  269-70,  289,  365,  367,  369.  Zamacois,  Mexico,  xii,  24-5. 
Bocanegra,  Mems.,  ii,  150-3,  157,  159,  190,  208,  329-31,  378-85,  417-8, 
433-9,  445-60,  546-54,  598.  Mexico  a  travel,  iv,  142,  201,  230-1,  235-7, 
240,  246-7,  255,  258,  265,  267,  285-6,  289-93,  295,  298-311,  315-9,  321-7, 
332-53,  355,  357,  359,  362-82,  386-8,  390-1.  Calder6n,  Life,  i,  96;  ii, 
126.  Poinsett  in  Commerc.  Review,  July,  1846,  34-9.  Thompson,  Recoils., 
87-8.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  181-2,  184,  187 ;  ii,  494.  El  Vil  y  Traidor 
S.  Anna.  Juicio  Imparcial.  Impartial,  June  18,  1906.  Bulnes,  Grandes 
Mentiras,  208.  Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  284,  287.  Aviso  a  los  Estados. 
S.  Anna,  proclaim,  June  1,  1834. 

When  Santa  Anna  resumed  the  Presidency  in  May,  1833,  he  painted 
himself  in  an  address  to  Congress  as  the  ideal  patriot  and  saint,  conse- 
crated to  liberty,  enlightenment,  morality,  and  the  Christian  religion, 
"straightforward"  and  "simple"  in  principles,  "mild  and  tolerant"  in 
character.  His  life,  he  assured  the  nation,  was  "entirely  devoted  to  the 
freedom  and  happiness  of  the  people  and  the  preservation  of  the  Federal 
system."  Before  long  his  picture  was  drawn  in  different  colors.  "The 
Vile  and  Traitorous  Santa  Anna  wishes  to  be  Emperor,"  cried  one  pam- 
phleteer. "Depravity  and  ambition  make  up  the  character  of  that 
miserable  Proteus,"  responded  another. 

8.  Centralism.  13Ashburnham,  nos.  51,  52,  58,  64  of  1837 ;  7,  21,  23, 
24,  37,  70,  111  of  1838.  13Pakenham,  nos.  11,  12,  67,  76  of  1839;  21,  40, 
72,  92,  95  of  1840 ;  42,  53,  94,  101,  116  of  1841.  13Pakenham  to  Harvey, 
July  20,  1839.  52W.  D.  Jones,  June  22 ;  July  19 ;  Aug.  29 ;  Sept.  26 ; 
Oct.  7,  17;  Nov.  4,  11;  Dec.  6,  1837;  Apr.  10;  Sept.  5,  8,  22;  Oct.  1, 
30;  Dec.  7  (anarchy),  1838;  Feb.  16,  19;  Mar.  23  (Valencia);  Apr.  20, 
23;  May  11,  1839.  52W.  S.  Parrott,  July  29,  1837.  52Black,  no.  307, 
1840.  52Ellis,  no.  29,  1840.  52Ellis  to  Jackson,  Oct.  15,  1839.  Bo- 
canegra, Mems.,  ii,  807.  Gimenez,  Mems.,  70-3.  Rivero,  Mexico,  75. 
Otero,  Cuesti6n,  62-5.  Robertson,  Visit,  i,  317.  Mexico  a  trav6s,  iv, 
382,  387,  390-2,  395,  397,  399,  404-16,  419,  423,  427,  430-2,  438,  440, 
443-4,  446-8,  451-2,  455-74.  Calder6n,  Life,  i,  349 ;  ii,  187,  223-6,  232, 
246,  250,  254,  274.  El  Que  me  Importa.  Noticia  Extraordinaria.  Re- 
publicano,  Feb.  3,  1847.  London  Times,  Nov.  25,  1841.  Lara,  Revista 
Politica,  1840.  Cosmopolita,  Dec.  28,  1836.  5fGreenhow,  Aug.  12,  1837. 
Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  284.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  185.  Bulnes,  Grandes 
Mentiras,  208. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  II,   PAGES  51-55  415 

"I  do  not  believe,"  wrote  the  British  minister  (no.  116,  Nov.  8,  1841), 
"that  history  affords  an  example  of  the  fate  of  a  Country  being  so  com- 
pletely dependent  upon  the  will  of  one  man"  [as  Mexico's  now  is  upon 
S.  Anna's]. 

9.  Santa  Anna  as  Dictator  and  President.  13Pakenham,  nos.  82  of 
1833;  119  of  1841;  20,  57,  77,  99,  121  of  1842;  13  of  1843.  13Doyle, 
nos.  47,  72,  76,  81  of  1843.  13Bankhead,  nos.  4,  43,  54,  66,  72,  73,  96, 
105,  108,  110  of  1844 ;  1,  20,  50  of  1845 ;  57  of  1846.  23lButler  to  Jack- 
son, Dec.  14,  1835.  52Ellis,  no.  44  of  1841.  52Thompson,  nos.  1,  3  of 
1842  ;  31  of  1843 ;  40  of  1844.  52B.  E.  Green,  April  8 ;  May  16 ;  June  7. 
21;  July  14,  1844.  Green  to  Calhoun,  June  15,  1844  (Ho.  2;  28,  2, 
p.  59).  D.  Green  to  Calhoun,  Oct.  28;  Nov.  12,  29,  1844  (Jameson, 
Calh.  Corr.,  975,  991,  1000).  52Consul  Burroughs  to  Ellis,  Jan.  10,  1837. 
52Consul  Dimond,  no.  200,  1843.  52Shannon,  nos.  3,  4,  5,  1844.  52ld., 
Jan.  9,  1845.  52B.  Mayer,  statement,  Dec.  9,  1842.  C.  M.  Bustamante, 
Gobierno,  1,  11,  22,  65,  94,  106,  247,  287,  289,  298,  322-4,  384.  Gimenez, 
Mems.,  263.  Bocanegra,  Mems.,  ii,  679.  ■  Calder6n,  Life,  i,  337 ;  ii,  195, 
272-4,  392.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Mar.  12,  1845;  Dec,  1846. 
Mem.  de  .  .  .  Hacienda,  Feb.,  1844.  Mem.  de  .  .  .  Justicia,  Jan.,  1844. 
Paredes  [Letters],  Advertencia,  141.  Jones,  Memoranda,  433  (Arista). 
Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  474-80,  484-90,  492-9,  506,  509,  517-30,  532-4,  540, 
547.  Zamacois,  Mexico,  xii,  280-1,  283,  285,  330.  Lowenstern,  Le 
Mexique,  288.     Rivero,  Mexico,  90,  94.     Diario  del  Gobierno,  Jan.  12, 

1845.  Journal  des  Debats,  Sept.  13,  1842 ;  Mar.  16,  1844 ;  Apr.  29,  1845. 
Revue  de  Paris,  Dec,  1844.  Constitutionnel,  Jan.  6,  1844.  Otero,  Cues- 
ti6n,  69-70.  Tornel,  Resefia,  74.  Zavala,  Revoluciones,  i,  151.  23lBut- 
ler  to  Jackson,  June  6,  1834.  llMartin,  Aug.  25,  1828.  llCochelet, 
Feb.  3,  1830.  52Butler,  July  9,  1834.  Alvarez,  Manifiesto,  1845.  Ellis, 
Soul  of  Spain,  37.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  211.  Defensa  del  Gen.  S.  Anna. 
Causa  Criminal.  S.  Anna,  Address,  1846.  Rivera,  Jalapa,  iii,  507,  545, 
612,  647-73.  Lerdo  de  Tejada,  Apuntes,  ii,  502-5,  511.  Texas  Register, 
Mar.  15,  1845  (Eye-witness).  London  Times,  Nov.  15,  1841;  Feb.  13; 
Dec  6,  1845.  Thompson,  Recoils.,  76,  80,  85-6.  Tudor,  Tour,  ii,  164. 
Proceso  de  S.  Anna,  1845.  56W.  S.  Parrott,  Apr.  29,  1845.  (S.  Anna's 
appearance)  N.  Orl.  Commerc.  Bulletin,  July  18,  1836;  52Consul  Cameron, 
Feb.  14,  1831;  Stapp,  Prisoners,  151-2;  Mofras,  Explor.,  i,  14;  Thomp- 
son, Recoils.,  66 ;  Ferry,  Revols.,  253-5 ;  23lEllis  to  family,  July  8,  1839. 

"Genius  of  evil,"  cried  a  pamphleteer  to  Santa  Anna,  "demon  of  avarice 
and  covetousness,  you  are,  like  Attila,  the  scourge  of  God.  Your  power 
has  been,  like  that  of  Satan,  a  power  of  corruption,  of  ruin,  and  of  destruc- 
tion. You  resemble  a  fury  of  hell,  blind,  devastating,  and  bloody.  Amid 
the  horrors  of  civil  war,  amid  lakes  of  blood  and  mountains  of  dead  bod'es, 
you  always  present  yourself  like  a  spectre,  inciting  all  to  devastation, 
slaughter,  and  revenge";  and  such  productions  almost  whitened  the 
pavements. 

10.  Herrera's  administration.  (In  Sept.,  1845,  Herrera  became  Presi- 
dent by  regular  election.)  13Bankhead,  nos.  108  of  1844 ;  °,  17,  30,  70, 
82,  85  of  1845.  56W.  S.  Parrott,  Apr.  29,  1845 ;  May  22,  30 ;  June  10, 
24;  July  12,  15,  26,  30;  Aug.  16,  23,  29;  Sept.  2,  18,  29;  Oct.  11,  1845. 
52Slidell,  no.  4,  Dec.  27,  1845.  52Consul  Campbell,  June  7,  1845.  Me- 
moria de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec,  1846.     Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Dec, 

1846.  Zavala,  Revolutions,  ii,  47.  52Dimond,  June  11 ;  Dec.  14,  1845. 
Siglo  XIX,  Oct.  5,  9  ;  Nov.  15,  22,  30 ;  Dec  6,  9,  1845.     Diario,  Apr.  19 ; 


416  NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  II,   PAGES  55-58 

June  7 ;  Sept.  10,  1845.  Republicano,  Feb.  3,  1847.  Amigo  del  Pueblo, 
Nov.  30,  1845.  London  Times,  Aug.  6;  Oct.  6;  Nov.  11 ;  Dec.  6,  1845; 
Jan.  8,  1846.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  529,  541-5.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas, 
423-4.  Importantes  Recuerdos.  National,  Mar.  18,  1845.  Journal  des 
Debats,  Apr.  29;  Aug.  2,  1845.  Wash.  Union,  Sept.  29,  1845.  Con- 
stituent Congress,  Address,  1824.  Cuatro  Palabras.  Consideraciones, 
43-5.  Voz  del  Pueblo,  Nov.  12,  1845.  Rivera,  Jalapa,  iii,  693-720. 
Baz,  Juarez,  43.     Rivera,  Gobernantes,  ii,  281-4. 

II.  A  thoughtful  Mexican  analyzed  the  situation  in  substance  as  fol- 
lows :  Our  people  as  a  whole  have  forgotten  morality,  sincerity,  patriotism, 
disinterestedness,  and  all  the  other  virtues  that  upbuild  great  nations ; 
only  selfishness,  base  and  ruinous  passions,  hatreds  and  vile  revenges  exist 
among  us,  and  on  all  sides  discords  and  rancors  force  themselves  upon  the 
dullest  eye ;  the  country,  weakened  by  the  parties,  divided  by  incompatible 
interests  and  claims,  has  been  unable  to  obtain  order  and  repose,  because 
interested  persons  have  always  promoted  anarchy  and  disorder  in  every 
possible  way ;  the  liberty  that  the  army  achieved  has  been  used  only  as 
brutal  license ;  and  each  of  us,  regarding  himself  as  a  judge  in  the  land, 
has  felt  entirely  emancipated  from  all  obligations,  and  fully  at  liberty  to 
upset  everything  at  his  will. 

III.  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED   STATES  AND 

MEXICO,    1825-1843 

1.  As  was  mentioned  in  chap,  ii  (p.  30),  the  Spaniards  had  endeavored 
to  keep  foreign  ideas  out  of  Mexico,  and  the  people  of  Protestant  countries 
had  been  studiously  misrepresented  —  even  as  having  tails.  See  Smith, 
Annex,  of  Texas,  419;  23lButler  to  Jackson,  June  23,  1831;  13Paken- 
ham,  nos.  29,  Apr.  26,  1832 ;  2,  Feb.  14,  1835 ;  llCochelet,  Sept.  29,  1829. 
Evidence  without  limit  could  be  cited. 

2.  One  does  not  like  to  write  such  things.  But  (1)  if  the  subject  is  to 
be  understood,  they  must  be  said;  (2)  they  are  not  as  hard  as  things 
alleged  against  the  United  States  by  the  Mexicans;  and  (3)  they  are 
written  of  a  long  past  generation.  On  this  point  we  will  confine  ourselves 
to  Mexican  testimony  and  testimony  from  that  nation  which  was  on  the 
most  intimate  and  friendly  terms  with  Mexico,  had  the  chief  interest 
there,  and  enjoyed  the  lion's  share  of  mercantile  profit.  In  1823  the 
minister  of  the  treasury  said  that  only  in  the  case  of  one  state  could  its 
financial  condition  be  learned  even  approximately  from  the  public  accounts 
(lldespatch  to  French  govt,  about  July,  1823).  Eleven  years  later  the 
head  of  that  department  announced  that  it  was  impossible  to  ascertain 
what  the  legitimate  income  of  the  government  for  the  previous  year  had 
been  (Memoria,  1834).  In  1838  the  man  occupying  that  post  admitted 
officially  that  no  minister  of  the  treasury  since  1822  had  possessed  suffi- 
cient data  to  make  a  satisfactory  report  (Memoria,  July,  1838),  and  the 
British  representative  stated  that  "the  most  vitally  important  matters" 
were  "wholly  left  to  chance"  by  the  government  (13Ashburnham,  no.  37, 
May  24,  1838).  That  the  national  authorities  were  evasive  and  Jesuitical, 
resorting  to  subterfuges,  shifting  their  responsibility  upon  the  legislative 
or  the  judicial  department,  and  referring  matters  repeatedly  to  distant 
local  officials,  is  proved  by  reports  of  British  ministers  from  1825  to  1845 
(e.g.  13Ward,  no.  143,  1826 ;  13Ashburnham,  no.  59,  1837 ;  13Pakenham, 
no.  96,  1841;    13Bankhead,  nos.  5,  12,  1844).     Once  at  least  money  was 


NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  58-59  417 

borrowed  by  hypothecating  a  fund  which  the  government  did  not  possess 
(Trigueros  in  52Mayer,  Dec.  9,  1842).  Mortgaged  revenues  were  spent 
at  will  (52Zavala  to  Deputies,  Apr.  23,  1829 ;  Bankhead,  no.  103,  1844 ; 
see  also  52Mayer,  Dec.  9,  1842).  Definite  arrangements  made  with 
foreign  representatives  were  secretly  circumvented  (Pakenham,  no.  23, 
1837;  Ashburiiham,  no.  15,  1838).  The  Cabinet  showed  itself  capable 
of  breaking  a  direct  promise  and  even  a  definite  contract  (Pakenham, 
nos.  9,  1843;  44,  1839;  Bankhead,  no.  86,  1845).  The  highest  authori- 
ties were  untruthful  in  word,  writing,  and  print  (Pakenham,  sep.  and 
confid.,  Mar.  27,  1828;  Id.,  nos.  32,  1833;  98,  1841;  9,  1843;  Bank- 
head,  nos.  12,  1844 ;  98,  1846.  See  also  Poinsett,  no  24,  1825; ;  and  they 
did  not  scruple  to  utter  injurious  calumnies  against  friendly  nations 
(Pakenham,  no.  98,  1841). 

Changes  of  system  appeared  to  make  little  difference,  for  these  were 
national  characteristics.  The  most  honorable  administration  of  this 
entire  period  broke  a  direct  and  solemn  pledge  given  to  the  French  minister 
(Bankhead,  no.  86,  1845 ;  see  also  56 W.  S.  Parrott,  Sept.  4,  1845) ;  and 
the  best  journal  of  the  country,  El  Siglo  XIX,  told  only  the  truth  when 
it  said,  December  2,  1845,  "All  our  governments  have  been  dishonest," 
adding  that  dishonest  methods  had  been  practiced  "not  only  from  ne- 
cessity but  from  favoritism  and  for  speculative  reasons."  It  should,  of 
course,  be  remembered  that  carelessness  about  truth,  justice  and  honesty 
was  the  shady  side  of  Mexican  amiability,  and  that  other  nations  are  not 
faultless. 

3.  For  an  account  of  Poinsett's  mission  and  very  numerous  citations 
bearing  upon  the  subject  one  may  refer  to  a  paper  by  J.  H.  Smith  in  the 
Proceedings  of  the  Amer.  Antiquarian  Soc,  Apr.,  1914.  52Poinsett, 
Contestation.  Gamboa,  Representation.  Causas  para  Declarar.  (Conces- 
sions, etc.)  Ho.  351 ;  25,  2,  p.  285  (Poinsett).  One  would  suppose  that 
the  prompt  recognition  of  Mexico  by  the  United  States,  our  efforts  to 
induce  Spain  to  recognize  her  (e.g.  Amer.  State  Papers,  2  series,  vol.  vi, 
1006;  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  pp.  118  (McLane),  119  (Van  Ness),  147,  150 
(Forsyth);  77Livingston  to  Montoya,  Oct.  1,  1831),  and  the  "Monroe 
Doctrine"  would  have  earned  us  gratitude.  But  these  were  attributed 
very  generally  to  a  desire  on  the  part  of  this  country  to  monopolize  the 
western  hemisphere  (Diario,  June  17,  18,  1846),  and  were  offset  by  our 
opposition  to  the  cherished  Mexican  scheme  of  driving  the  Spanish  from 
Cuba  and  by  our  proposing  to  have  the  retention  of  Havana  guaranteed 
to  Spain  (see  particularly  Ward,  no.  53,  secret  and  confid.,  May  29,  1826). 
Denunciations  of  Poinsett:  e.g.  Bravo,  Manifiesto,  1828;  Sol,  Jan.  4, 
1830;  26lMemoire;  La  Ruina  de  los  Mexicanos;  Bocanegra,  Mems., 
i,  379,  382,  390;  Pakenham,  no.  152,  1828;  llMartin,  July  26,  1827; 
llCochelet,  Aug.  7,  1829 ;  N.  Orl.  Delta,  July  9,  1847.  Pakenham  (no. 
74,  Aug.  26,  1829)  reported  that  owing  to  Poinsett's  course  and  the  fact 
that  his  government  kept  him  in  Mexico,  the  feeling  toward  the  United 
States  was  one  of  "jealousy,  suspicion,  and  dislike."  The  prevailing 
belief  was  that  the  United  States,  fearing  Mexican  competition,  sent  him 
there  to  paralyze  Mexico  by  exciting  dissension  (Poinsett,  no.  91,  July  8, 
1827;   52state  dept.  to  Butler,  Apr.  1,  1830;  Diario,  Apr.  17,  1847). 

4.  Poinsett  was  attacked  by  the  states  of  Puebla  (Pakenham,  no.  98, 

1829),  Vera  Cruz  (Manifiesto,  1827),  Mexico  (Preamble  and  resolution, 

1829),  and  Queretaro  (Pakenham,  no.  73,  1827).     296Poinsett  to  Pres., 

June  8,  1827.     (Protest)  52Clay  to  Poinsett,  no.  25,  Nov.  19,  1827.     (Fail- 

vol.  i  — 2  E 


418  NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  59-61 

ure,  attitude)  Van  Buren  to  Butler,  Oct.  16,  1829  (P.  S.,  Oct.  17).  (Sinis- 
ter, pointedly)  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  Oct.  16,  1829.  (No  charges)  Van 
B.  to  P.  and  to  B.  (P.  S.,  Oct.  17),  Oct.  16,  1829;  Bocanegra,  Mems.,  ii, 
18-20 ;  77Montoya,  no.  30,  Dec.  10,  1829 ;  296Zavala  to  Poinsett,  June  16, 
1827.  Poinsett  was  secretary  of  war  under  Van  Buren.  So.  Qtrly.  Rev., 
Nov.,  1850,  429.     Nueva  Conspiraci6n. 

5.  52Clay  to  Poinsett,  Mar.  26,  1825 ;  Sept.  24,  1825 ;  Mar.  15,  1827 ; 
Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  Aug.  25,  1829.  23lButler  to  Jackson,  June  23, 
1831.  Poinsett,  no.  12,  Aug.  5,  1825.  (Officials)  52Morfit,  no.  7,  Sept.  6, 
1836 ;  Ho.  35 ;  24,  2,  p.  17.  (Ten  times)  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones, 
Dec,  1846,  p.  76.  (Indians)  13Ashburnham  to  Backhouse,  July  26,  1838. 
(Victoria)  13Ward,  no.  54,  1825.  (Trouble)  Clay,  supra;  135 Jackson, 
several  letters  to  Butler. 

6.  Poinsett's  correspondence  with  Clay,  Van  Buren,  and  Alaman :  Ho. 
42 ;  25,  1,  pp.  19-29.  Amer.  State  Papers :  Foreign  Relations,  vi  (folio 
ed.).  296Notes  in  Poinsett  papers.  Commerc.  Rev.,  July,  1846,  21-4, 
27-42  (Poinsett).  Poinsett,  nos.  12,  1825;  113,  115,  1828;  166,  1829. 
(Urgency)  52Tornel  to  Poinsett,  June  27,  1827.  (Dropping)  77Martinez, 
Nov.  2,  1837;  Poinsett,  no.  .113,  1828;  Adams,  Memoirs,  ix,  377-8; 
52Consul  Taylor,  Nov.  7,  1829.  He  dropped  the  project  of  buying  terri- 
tory because  he  saw  it  would  give  offence.  Treaties  and  Conventions 
(Haswell,  ed.),  661-3,  675.  Ho.  42;  25,  1,  pp.  27-8.  (Reached,  etc.) 
Ho.  351 ;  25,  2,  pp.  40  (Van  Buren  to  Butler) ;  190,  285,  etc.  (Poinsett). 
Ho.  42 ;  25,  1,  pp.  8  (Clay) ;  10  (Van  Buren) ;  38  (Butler,  Dec.  21) ;  46-8. 
(Charged)  Filisola,  Memorias,  ii,  602 ;  Tornel,  Resena,  79,  80 ;  Zavala, 
Revoluciones,  i,  384 ;  Richtofen,  Zustande,  44. 

Before  the  paper  was  placed  in  Poinsett's  hands  he  knew  it  would  reach 
Washington  too  late  (to  Clay,  Apr.  24:  Ho.  42;  25,  1,  p.  28),  and  hence 
it  was  unnecessary,  as  it  would  have  been  dishonorable  and  dangerous,  to 
withhold  it.  (May  10)  Ho.  351 ;  25,  2,  p.  202.  As  the  instructions  to 
buy  territory  were  repeated  in  1829  (note  5)  when  Mexico  was  at  war 
with  Spain,  it  has  been  urged  by  some  Americans  that  we  showed  a  mean 
disposition  to  take  advantage  of  a  neighbor's  difficulties.  But  it  is  rather 
kind  than  otherwise  to  offer  even  a  low  price  for  real  estate  when  the 
owner  is  in  straits  for  cash,  and  Mexico  was  free  to  consult  her  own  in- 
terest about  selling.  The  instructions  of  1829  were,  however,  wholly 
inoperative  at  that  time. 

That  a  people  so  fond  of  indirect  methods  and  so  destitute  of  principle 
in  public  affairs  were  suspicious  of  the  United  States  was  not,  however, 
surprising.  It  was  known  of  course  that  up  to  1819  we  had  claimed  the 
Rio  Grande  boundary.  When  Poinsett  found  that  Victoria  and  Alaman 
intended  to  reassert  the  boundary  pretensions  of  Spain,  he  endeavored  to 
discourage  them  by  replying  that  in  such  a  case  the  old  claim  of  the  United 
States  also  would  be  revived  (to  Clay,  Sept.  20,  1825). 

In  1827  members  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  expressed  the  opinion  in 
debate  that  the  United  States  was  at  least  privy  to  a  recent  insurrection 
in  Texas,  and  a  leading  newspaper  asserted  that  we  had  encouraged  it 
(Poinsett,  no.  74,  1827).  Among  the  attacks  upon  the  unfortunate 
Guerrero  was  the  charge  —  based,  it  was  alleged,  upon  documents  — 
that  he  was  plotting  to  sell  us  territory  in  that  quarter  (Pakenham,  no.  18, 
1831).  Bravo,  after  a  visit  to  this  country,  brought  out  a  pamphlet  in 
1829,  declaring  that  "the  politicians  and  journalists"  of  the  United  States 
were  "at  present  occupied  about  the  dismemberment"  of  Mexico.     The 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  61-33  419 

following  July  Bocanegra,  minister  of  relations,  hearing  of  our  customary 
militia  drills  and  armed  escorts  for  traders  in  the  far  west,  demanded  the 
meaning  of  these  operations,  and  in  spite  of  sensible  reassurances  from 
the  American  minister,  he  felt  so  much  disturbed  as  to  commit  a  real 
offence  against  him  and  the  United  States  by  repeating  his  inquiry  (Ho. 
351 ;  25,  2,  pp.  288,  292).  The  next  year,  when  our  squadron  set  out  for 
a  cruise  in  the  Gulf,  Alaman  represented  this  to  Congress  as  a  threatening 
movement  (Filisola,  Memorias,  ii,  601).  A  pamphlet  issued  at  New  York 
to  point  out  the  value  of  Texas  was  attributed  to  our  government  (Paken- 
ham,  no.  24,  1830),  and  the  Mexican  agent  at  London  endeavored  to 
excite  the  British  cabinet  regarding  the  supposed  peril  of  his  country 
(77Gorostiza,  Apr.  22,  1830).  European  diplomatic  representatives  at 
Mexico  fanned  this  flame.  In  particular  Ward,  the  British  minister,  did 
his  utmost  to  increase  the  alarm  regarding  Texas  (nos.  32,  54,  64,  1825). 
See  W.  R.  Manning  in  Southwest.  Hist.  Qtrly.,  Jan.,  1914.  For  American 
feeling  toward  Mexico  see  chap,  xxxvi,  note  1. 

7.  Treaties  and  Conventions :  note  6.  Treaties  in  Force  (1899),  389- 
90.  52McLane  to  Butler,  Jan.  13,  1834.  52Butler  to  Garcia,  Sept.  6, 
1833.  231/d.,  to  Jackson,  Mar.  7,  1834.  Ho.  42 ;  25,  1,  p.  59  (Living- 
ston). Ho.  351;  25,  2,  pp.  40-53,  556.  77Castillo,  no.  71,  Dec.  7,  1833. 
(Denounced)  77Castillo,  no.  2,  res.,  Jan.  22,  1835.  The  boundary  was 
not  run,  for  the  battle  of  S.  Jacinto  occurred  just  after  the  exchange  of  the 
ratifications. 

8.  Ho.  42;  25,  1,  pp.  17,  21;  33  (Butler);  49  (Van  Buren).  Ho.  351 
25,  2,  pp.  190,  210,  287  (Poinsett) ;  369-70,  410.  Foreign  Rels.,  folio  ed. 
vi,  583-600.  (Treaty)  Ho.  225;  22,  1.  Treaties  and  Conventions  (Has 
well,  ed.),  664-74.  Sen.  Exec.  Journ.,  iii,  568-72,  605-6.  (Dark)  Ward, 
[no.  103],  Sept.  9,  1826.  (Victoria)  Poinsett,  no.  12,  Aug.  5, 1825.  77Mon- 
toya,  no.  25,  Sept.  19,  1829. 

One  of  the  two  objectionable  articles  in  the  treaty  of  1828  concerned 
the  returning  of  fugitive  slaves,  and  has  been  characterized  by  certain 
writers  in  the  United  States  as  a  gross  insult  to  Mexico ;  but  that  country 
had  not  yet  abolished  slavery,  and  her  Cabinet,  which  possessed  a  full 
share  of  pride,  accepted  the  article. 

9.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  178.  77Montoya,  no.  30,  Dec.  10,  1829.  52Van 
Buren  to  Butler,  Oct.  16  (P.  S.,  Oct.  17),  1829.  (Friend)  77Tornel,  no.  3, 
res.,  Mar.  6,  1830;  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  p.  381;  52Butler,  July  9,  1834. 
135Butler,  Notes  on  Texas.  135/d.  to  Jackson,  Jan.  4,  1827.  77Almonte 
to  Mex.  Leg.,  Washington,  July  22,  1834.  (Ignorant)  Ho.  351 ;  25,  2,  p. 
381.  (Careless)  52Ellis,  June  25,  private;  July  16;  Oct.  15,  1836; 
52Forsyth  to  Butler,  Nov.  9,  1835;  to  Ellis,  Jan.  18,  1837.  (Consuls) 
52Wilcocks,  Feb.  15,  1833;  52W.  S.  Parrott,  Oct.  24,  1835.  (Spirits) 
52Butler,  Aug.  26,  1833. 

10.  Poinsett  reached  the  conclusion  that  endeavoring  to  buy  Texan 
territory  would  anger  Mexico  and  lead  her  to  seek  European  support 
(Ho.  351 ;  25,  2,  p.  286),  but  Butler  stimulated  Jackson  to  take  the  matter 
up.  52Butler's  correspondence,  including  letters  to  and  from  Mexican 
officials.  Many  of  these  documents  were  printed  with  substantial  cor- 
rectness in  Ho.  256 ;  24,  1 ;  Ho.  42 ;  25,  1 ;  Ho.  351 ;  25,  2.  296Notes 
from  Butler,  Wilcocks  and  Zavala,  to  Poinsett.  Corresp.  with  Jackson 
in  23lJackson  papers  and  135Butler  papers  (for  deciphering  a  number  of 
the  latter  the  author  is  indebted  to  Dr.  E.  C.  Burnett  of  the  Dept.  of 
Hist.  Research,  Carnegie  Instit.).     77Tornel,  no.  3,  res.,  1830.     77Cas- 


420  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  63-66 

tillo,  no.  8,  res.,  1835.  Sen.  Exec.  Journ.,  iv,  488,  502.  52Ellis,  May  l9 ; 
June  25  ;  July  16 ;  Oct.  15,  1836 ;  to  Jackson,  Aug.  26.  Pakenham,  nos. 
6,  7,  1830;  11,  1836.  Barker  in  Nation,  xcii,  600-1;  in  Amer.  Hist. 
Rev.,  July,  1907,  788-809.  Filisola,  Mems.,  ii,  590,  612.  Adams,  Mems., 
ix,  377-8.  Benton,  View,  ii,  659.  Bankhead,  no.  125,  1845.  Mosquito 
Mex.,  Aug.  4,  1835. 

:  Butler  had  some  excuse  for  basing  hopes  on  Alaman,  for  until  the  war 
with  Spain  ended  Alaman  wished  to  be  on  very  good  terms  with  the  United 
States,  and  later  he  was  in  serious  financial  troubles.  Nothing  in  the 
documents  involves  Jackson  in  Butler's  dishonor.  The  American  secre- 
tary of  state  was  even  less  censurable.  Our  government  expressed  all 
due  regrets  for  Butler's  misconduct  (Ho.  351 ;  25,  2,  pp.  184,  750;  Forsyth 
to  Ellis,  no.  22,  Nov.  16,  1836;  77Castillo,  no.  8,  res.,  1835).  (Recall) 
77Relaciones  to  Castillo,  Oct.  31,  1835;  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  p.  719,  and 
77Castillo,  no.  8,  res.,  1835. 

11.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  11-33.  52Butler,  May  8,  1836.  231Id. 
to  Jackson,  Dec.  14,  1835.  Ellis,  no.  2,  May  19,  1836.  Pakenham,  nos. 
75,  1835;  25,  1836.  Ho.  256;  24,  1,  pp.  3,  29,  30  (Forsyth);  8  (Cas- 
tillo); 10  (Monasterio).  Sen.  1;  25,  2,  pp.  141  (Monasterio);  149 
(Forsyth).  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  pp.  82  (Livingston);  160  (Forsyth);  571-2 
(Tornel,  Monasterio).  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Interior,  Jan.,  1838.  Memoria 
de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Dec,  1846.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  377,  401-3,  512.  Lo- 
wenstern,  Le  Mexique,  78.  Richtofen,  Zustande,  48.  The  state  of 
Mexican  feeling  will  come  up  again. 

12.  The  Gaines  episode.  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  Aug.  25,  1829.  Butler 
to  Jackson,  Sept.  26 ;  Oct.  2,  1833  ;  Feb.  6 ;  Mar.  7,  1834.  231  Jackson 
to  Butler,  Nov.  27,  1833.  58Dickins  to  Cass,  Aug.  20,  1836.  77Castillo, 
Nov.  10,  1835.  39Gaines  to  gov.  Tenn.,  June  28,  1836.  52Burrough, 
nos.  39,  40,  1836.  77Martinez,  no.  10,  res.,  1838.  77Relaciones  to  Mar- 
tinez, Oct.  10,  1838.  77Gorostiza,  Apr.  25,  29;  May  30;  July  12,  24; 
Aug.  18,  19;  Oct.  4,  5,  1836.  Pakenham,  nos.  18,  94,  1836.  Sen.  1; 
24,  2,  pp.  46,  92,  105  (Dickins) ;  60,  85  (Jackson) ;  84  (memo.) ;  32,  44, 
68,  89,  91,  100  (Gorostiza);  133-4  (Macomb).  Sen.  160;  24,  2,  p.  157 
(Forsyth).  Ho.  256;  24,  1,  pp.  3,  28,  29,  31-3,  35,  45  (Forsyth);  6, 
11  (Castillo) ;  15,  21,  23,  25,  27  (Gorostiza) ;  45  (memo.) ;  40,  43,  48,  54 
(Cass  to  Gaines) ;  42,  46-8  (Gaines) ;  55  (Macomb) ;  58  (Many) ;  59 
(Green;  adj.  gen.).  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  pp.  769-806  (Gaines  et  al.) ;  806 
('McCall  and  documents).  Jackson,  Message,  Dec.  5,  1836.  Gorostiza, 
Correspondencia.  Reply  to  Gorostiza:  Lib.  Cong.,  Mss.  Div.,  "Mex. 
War,  Miscellaneous."  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i,  pp.  83  (Carson) ;  104  (Bur- 
nett) ;  164-5,  177,  202  (Henderson) ;  175  (Wharton) ;  156  (Austin) ; 
205  (Catlett).  Brown,  Texas,  ii,  90.  Bocanegra,  Mems.,  ii,  "736-69. 
Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  378.  Calderon,  Life,  ii,  123.  Kohl,  Claims,  24. 
Barker  in  Miss.  Valley  Hist.  Rev.,  i,  1 ;  in  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  July,  1907, 
p.  794  (Jackson  thought  the  Neches  was  a  branch  of  the  Sabine).  N.  Y. 
Ev.  Post,  Aug.  1,  1836.  Wash.  Globe,  Aug.  1,  1836  (Cass).  Richmond 
Enquirer,  Aug.  12,  1836.  Mobile  Commercial  Register,  June  27,  1836. 
Nat.  Intelligencer,  May  5  (Virginian) ;  July  26,  1836.  N.  Orl.  Courier, 
Sept.  27,  1836  (Fulton).  Sen.  189;  24,  2.  (Indorsed)  Monasterio  to 
Gorost.,  Dec.  21,  1836,  in  Gor.,  Correspondencia.  (Erroneously)  Smith, 
Annex,  of  Texas,  22. 

Gorostiza' s  view,  and  no  doubt  that  of  the  Mexicans  generally,  amounted 
practically  to  this  (see  Forsyth  in  Sen.  160;  24,  2,  p.  157) :  the  essential 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  63-66  421 

point  was  to  respect  Mexico's  territory;  by  the  right  of  occupation,  at 
least,  her  territory  extended  to  the  well-known  Sabine  River ;  the  United 
States  forces  were  therefore  bound  under  all  circumstances  to  remain  east 
of  that  stream,  and  should  some  of  our  citizens  be  robbed  and  murdered, 
we  could  call  upon  Mexico  to  pay  compensation  and  protect  the  rest ; 
after  almost  endless  evasions  it  would  appear  that  she  had  no  power  to 
fulfill  her  treaty  obligations,  and  therefore,  since  that  fact  was  known  to 
all  the  world,  she  should  not  be  expected  to  comply  with  our  wishes ;  and 
then,  should  we  please,  we  could  declare  war.  In  other  words,  for  the 
sake,  at  most,  of  a  technicality,  they  would  have  had  us  quietly  see 
irreparable  injuries  done  that  we  could  have  prevented  and  had  known 
Mexico  could  not  prevent,  and  then  do  irreparable  injuries  ourselves  to 
punish  her  for  her  involuntary  helplessness. 

As  for  the  evidence  of  danger  (which  Gaines  was  instructed  to  examine 
carefully),  Gorostiza  declared  it  was  fabricated  in  order  to  excuse  the 
crossing  of  the  boundary  and  get  American  troops  into  Texas  —  thus 
giving  the  rebels  at  least  the  moral  support  of  their  presence  and  infring- 
ing upon  the  rights  of  Mexico  (Pakenham,  no.  94,  1836 ;   Ho.  256 ;  24,  1, 
p.  20;    Gor.,  Correspondencia,  xxvii),  and  he  protested  that  his  country 
was  incapable  of  stirring  up  the  savages  against  our  border  (Sen.  1 ;   24, 
2,  p.  84;    77Gor.  to  Relaciones,  Oct.  4).     But  there  is  not  the  slightest 
sign  that  he  made  the  difficult  and  extended  investigation  requisite  as  a 
basis  for  denying  the  testimony  presented  to  Gaines,  whereas  he  was 
capable  of  asserting,  more  than  a  month  after  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto, 
that  the  news  of  it  was  "entirely  destitute  of  authenticity,"  and  stating 
that  he  had  "reasons  for  believing  it  to  have  been  expressly  forged  in 
Texas"  or  at  least  to  have  been  exaggerated  "to  the  very  confines  of  the 
ridiculous"  (Sen.  1 ;  2 1,  2,  p.  33).     His  contention  was  therefore  valueless, 
and  almost  equally  so  was  that  of  certain  Americans,  against  the  evidence 
of  danger.     One  such  opinion,  however,  is  entitled  to  notice.     It  came 
from  the  governor  of  Louisiana  (Macomb:   Ho.  256;   24,  1,  p.  55).     But 
(1)  the  governor,  who  was  far  from  the  scene,  merely  expressed  a  view 
unsupported  by  evidence ;    (2)  there  may  have  been  good  reasons  why  he 
did  not  wish  to  have  citizens  of  Louisiana  called  out,  as  Gaines  proposed, 
to  do  arduous  and  perhaps  perilous  military  service ;  and  (3)  it  may  have 
seemed  undesirable  to  have  the  American  army,  which  made  a  good  market 
in  the  western  part  of  the  state,  move  to  Nacogdoches  and  obtain  supplies 
there.     Gaines  appears  really  to  have  had  adequate  grounds  for  crossing 
the  Sabine.     A  letter  from  the  Texas  secretary  of  state  to  the  President 
of  Texas  (Tex.  Dipl.  Corr  ,  i,  84),  which  no  one  can  imagine  was  "fabri- 
cated," shows  that  Gaines  insisted  upon  having  the  facts,  and  that  strong 
evidence  was  presented  to  him  (see  also  Bee  in  Sen.  14;    32,  2,  p.  53). 
May  5,  1836,  the  National  Intelligencer  printed  a  letter  dated  April  20,. 
which  stated  that  the  writer  heard,  when  about  six  miles  from  Nacog* 
doches,  that  the  Indians  were  coming,  felt  satisfied  the  news  was  correct, 
and  saw  the  people  fleeing  in  the  utmost  alarm.     It  was  deemed  necessary 
to  divert  some  of  the  few  Texan  troops,  desperately  needed  at  the  front, 
in  order  to  ward  off  the  danger  from  Indians  (Brown,  Texas,  ii,  89,  90). 
The  governor  of  Arkansas  called  out  forces  to  protect  the  frontier  (N.  Orl. 
Courier,  Sept.  27,  1836).     The  other  evidence  cited  above  in  the  references, 
when  taken  together  and  fairly  weighed  in  view  of  the  circumstances,  has 
also  a  very  substantial  value.     The  part  of  it  most  doubted,  probably,  is 
that  referring  to  a  Mexican  agent  engaged  in  rousing  the  Indians  against 


422  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,  PAGES  66-68 

the  whites ;  but  we  have  documentary  proof  that  early  in  1839  Mexicans 
tried  officially  to  do  this,  and  employed  the  very  man  who  was  charged 
with  similar  activities  in  1836  (Sen.  14;  32,  2,  pp.  31-6;  also  47).  See 
also  the  77reply  of  Relaciones  to  Martinez's  despatch  of  Oct.  10,  1838. 
It  should  be  remembered  (1)  that  Gaines,  charged  with  the  defence  of 
the  frontier  against  a  wily,  treacherous  and  savage  foe,  could  not  afford 
to  take  chances ;  and  (2)  that  even  fabricated  evidence,  if  it  possessed  all 
the  marks  of  credibility,  would  have  been  sufficient  ground  for  acting. 

But  after  all  the  real  issue  was  the  good  faith  of  our  government  in 
authorizing  Gaines  (while  requiring  him  to  maintain  our  neutrality)  to 
cross  under  extreme  circumstances  the  Sabine  (Gorostiza  in  Sen.  1 ;  24,  2, 
p.  44 ;  Von  Hoist,  U.  S.,  ii,  584,  note  1) ;  and  this  good  faith  was  clearly 
maintained  at  Washington.  In  the  very  letter  demanding  his  passports 
Gorostiza  admitted  that  Forsyth's  assurances  appeared  to  dispose  of  the 
possibility  that  Gaines's  movement  had  a  bearing  on  the  boundary  ques- 
tion (Sen.  1 ;  24,  2,  p.  104).  It  has  been  felt  that  Forsyth  was  sometimes 
rather  curt  with  him,  but  Gorostiza  was  almost,  if  not  quite,  insulting. 
The  Mexicans  had  some  reason  to  be  suspicious  and  a  full  right  to  be  on 
their  guard,  but  they  went  farther  than  right  and  reason  warranted. 

13.  See  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  pp.  52-63,  for  a  discussion  of  this  sub- 
ject and  references  to  the  sources.  Ethel  Z.  Rather  in  Tex.  State  Hist. 
Assoc.  Qtrly.,  xiii,  155-256.  Sen.  1 ;  25,  2,  pp.  133  (Castillo) ;  135  (For- 
syth) ;  145  (Monasterio) .  52W.  Thompson  to  Bocanegra,  April  25,  1843. 
Pakenham,  no.  64,  1836.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relac,  Jan.,  1838.  Mem. 
de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Jan.,  1844. 

The  situation  of  Texas  after  1836  was  precisely  the  same  as  that  of 
Mexico  from  1821  until  recognized  by  the  mother-country  in  1836,  and 
during  this  period  she  regarded  herself  and  was  regarded  generally,  except 
by  Spain,  as  independent.  Mexicans  refused  to  accept  this  obvious 
analogy  on  the  ground  that  the  Mexican  revolution  was  mainly  the  work 
of  native-born  citizens,  while  most  of  the  Texans  had  been  born  elsewhere. 
But  an  adopted  child  has  all  the  rights  of  a  natural  child.  See  chap,  iv, 
note  1. 

14.  Diplomatic  strife,  1842-3.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  38.  Bocanegra 
to  Webster,  May  12,  31,  1842 :  Ho.  266 ;  27,  2,  pp.  5,  15.  Webster  to 
Thompson,  nos.  9,  11,  1842;  Jan.  31,  1843.  Thompson  to  Webster, 
nos.  3,  4  and  June  2,  1842  ;  Jan.  5  and  no.  15,  1843.  52ld.  to  dipl.  corps, 
July  30,  1842.  35lTyler  to  Webster,  July  10,  1842.  52W.  S.  Parrott, 
private,  July  29,  1837.  52B.  E.  Green,  no.  8,  1844.  13Bocanegra  to 
Doyle,  April  19,  1843 ;  reply,  April  20.  52S.  Anna,  decree,  June  17,  1843. 
52Upshur  to  Thompson,  no.  43,  1843.  52Bocanegra  to  Thompson,  Sept. 
10,  1842.  IBld.,  circular,  May  31,  1842.  Pakenham,  nos.  49,  75,  1842. 
Sen.  341;  28,  1,  p.  71  (Thompson).  Texas  Diplom.  Corresp.,  i;  567 
(Reily) ;  ii,  163  (Eve).  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Jan.,  1844.  Diario, 
Oct.  4,  1842.  Thompson,  Recoils.,  82.  Zavala,  Revols.,  ii,  152-3.  Sen. 
1;  27,  3,  pp.  146,  156  (Thompson) ;  146,  157  (Bocanegra).  Ho.  266;  27, 
2,  pp.  7,  17  (Webster) ;  5,  15,  19  (Bocanegra) ;  21  (Thompson).  Reeves, 
Amer.  Diplom.,  97,  99  (Adams).  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  131.  (Mexican 
threats,  1843)  Ibid.,  42.  Richtofen,  Zustande,  48.  llTo  Deffaudis,  no. 
28,  Apr..  27,  1836.  (The  translations  of  Mexican  documents  published 
by  our  government  are  cited,  unless  there  is  a  particular  reason  for  not 
doing  so.  In  many  cases  they  could  be  better,  but  they  were  for  the 
American  government  and  people  the  official  versions.) 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  69-73  423 

Oct.  4,  1842,  the  official  journal  reprinted  this  from  El  Provisional- 
Who  is  not  aware  of  that  criminal  connivance,  that  stubborn  and  in- 
solent protection,  which  — in  violation  of  righteous  law  and  in  violation 
oi  the  treaties  with  Mexico  —  is  given  by  the  policy  of  North  America 
to  a  Department  filled  with  rebels  from  every  land,  who  are  determined 
to  rum  it  completely  and  to  soil  the  dignity  and  honor  of  a  lawfully  con- 
stituted government?"  Webster  made  the  same  protest  (against  raids) 
to  the  lexans  as  to  the  Mexicans. 

15.  52Thompson,  Jan.  5,   1843.     52ld.  to  Bocanegra,  Dec.  30,  1842 

v°'l  il  27'  3'  EP-  1_93,  Bancroft>  Calif->  iv,  302-29.  285Narvaez  to 
Vanderlhmden,  Dec.  10,  1842.  Richman,  California,  273-4.  Bandini 
California,  136-8.  13Letter  from  S.  Gabriel,  Nov.  11,  1842  Diario 
Jan.  7,  1843.  47Jones,  Aug.  31;  Sept.  1,  1842.  Reeves,  Amer.  Diplo- 
macy, 103-7.  35lLetters  from  J.  Tyler  to  Webster.  Mexico  a  traves 
iv,  493.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Mar.  14,  1843.  Adams,  Memoirs,  xi  346' 
N.  Orl.  Bee,  Jan.  13,  1843.     Memphis  Eagle,  Nov.  5,  1845. 

Jones  sailed  with  the  frigate  United  States  and  the  sloop  of  war  Cyane 
After  leaving  Monterey  he  proceeded  to  Los  Angeles  to  meet  Micheltorena 
and  explain  the  affair.  Almonte,  the  Mexican  minister  at  Washington, 
demanded  that  an  example  should  be  made  of  Jones,  but  he  was  merely 
recalled  —  a  fully  sufficient  punishment.  Indeed,  our  government  com- 
mended his  zeal  (47Jones  to  Bancroft,  Oct.  3,  1845) 

16.  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  p.  576  (Butler). 

17.  Sen.  390;  28,  1,  pp.  6  (Bocanegra;  documents);  9  (Thompson 
with  extract  from  treaty).  52Shannon  to  Rejon,  Sept.  30,  1844  Tyler' 
Message,  Dec.  3,  1844,  in  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  334.  See  also  docu- 
ments cited  with  reference  to  the  Santa  Fe  expedition. 

18.  Ellis,  no.  24,  June  9,  1840.  Forsyth  to  Ellis,  Aug.  21,  1840  52Me- 
monal  of  the  prisoners,  May  25,  1840.  52J.  O.  Jones  to  Ellis,  June  23, 
1840.  52Statements  of  prisoners,  particularly  Graham's  of  May  29  184o' 
52Larkin,  Mar.  22;  April  20,  1840.  52Legare  to  Thompson,  no.  36* 
May  12,  1843.  52Farnham  to  Ellis,  June  23,  1840.  Richman,  California' 
266.  13Palmerston  to  Mexican  minister,  Aug.  11,  1841.  llCaptain  of 
La  Danaide  to  Cyprey,  July  8,  1840.  Royce,  California,  36.  Pakenham, 
nos.  66,  78,  88,  1840;  37,  118  (merely  a  scheme  to  weaken  the  opposing 
faction  m  Cal.),  1841.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Jan.,  1841.  Moore 
Internat.  Arbit.,  3242-3  (a  judicial  review  of  the  case  and  award  of 
damages  to  victims.  One  of  them  received  $38,125).  Pakenham  ob- 
tained a  revocation  of  the  order  of  expulsion  by  demanding  his  passports 
(no.  88). 

19.  45Ranson  to  Eve,  April  28,  1842.  45Bee  to  Roberts,  July  13,  1841 
Kendall,  Narrative,  passim.  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii,  321-3.  Garrison 
Texas,  245-6.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  37.  Sen.  325 ;  27,  2  pp  3  6 
8  (Webster);  19,  29  (Ellis);  33,  100  (Bocanegra);  48,  50  (Falconer \ 
Van  Ness  particularly) ;  94  (Thompson).  Ho.  266;  27,  2,  p.  34  (Thomp- 
son). Pakenham,  no.  15,  1842.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Jan., 
1844.     UTo  Deffaudis,  no.  28,  Apr.  27,  1836. 

20.  Ho.  42;  25,  2,  p.  20,  23  (Alaman).  Poinsett,  June  18,  22,  1825 
Martinez,  no.  7,  1832.  N.  Y.  Herald,  Nov.  11, 1843.  Boston  A tlas,  Jan.  26 
1844.  52Camacho  to  Poinsett,  May  13,  1826.  23lButler  to  Jackson! 
Jan.  2,  1833.  Sen.  1 ;  28,  1,  p.  36.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii,  289.  Ho.  351 ;  25, 
2,  p.  71  (Van  Buren,  Mar.  1).     See  also  chap.  xiv. 

21.  Upshur  to  Thompson,  no.  51,  Oct.  20,  1843.     13S.  Anna,  proclam., 


424  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,  PAGES  73-74 

Oct.  5, 1843.  Sen.  1 ;  28,  2,  p.  21  (Calhoun).  Sen.  1 ;  28, 1,  pp.  30  (Thomp- 
son) ;  31  (decree) ;  34  (Upshur).  Sen.  390;  28,  1,  pp.  16,  18  (Thompson). 
52B.  E.  Green,  April  8,  1844.  52Bocanegra  to  Thompson,  Oct.  20,  1843. 
52Thompson  to  Bocanegra,  Nov.  23,  1843.  52Shannon  to  Rej6n,  Oct.  25, 
1844.  52Rej6n  to  Shannon,  Oct.  11,  1844;  Nov.  22,  1845.  Bankhead, 
nos.  1,  4,  1844.  13Foreign  Office  to  Doyle,  no.  30,  1843  (While  every 
independent  nation  has,  e.g.,  an  abstract  right  to  close  its  ports,  "the  prac- 
tical assertion  on  the  part  of  any  Nation  of  an  extreme  abstract  right  may, 
and  often  does,  involve,  if  not  actual  hostility,  at  least  a  degree  of  un- 
friendliness almost  amounting  to  hostility.")  France  also  protested 
(Green,  supra). 

22.  13Tornel,  order.  Sen.  390;  28,  1,  pp.  3-15.  52Bocanegra  to 
Thompson,  Dec.  22,  1843.  53Almonte,  Feb.  6,  1844.  52Shannon  to 
Rej6n,  Oct.  10,  1844.  Sen.  1 ;  28,  2,  p.  21  (Calhoun).  13Doyle,  nos.  65, 
90  (order  executed  in  Sonora),  1843.     13E.  Barron,  no.  10,  Oct.  19,  1843. 

Another  objection  to  the  modified  order  was  that,  as  the  British  minister 
maintained  in  another  case,  while  the  general  government  itself  might 
with  justice  banish  undesirable  foreigners,  it  had  no  right  to  delegate 
such  a  power  to  distant  subordinates  practically  exempt  from  supervision, 
to  be  exercised  by  them  as  prejudice,  caprice,  and  possibly  avarice  might 
suggest  and  without  giving  the  victim  a  chance  to  defend  himself  or  settle 
his  affairs  (Pakenham,  no.  78,  1840).  Thompson  was  described  by  his 
French  colleague  as  inexperienced  (lino.  108,  1842). 

23.  These  are  too  numerous  to  be  catalogued  here,  but  a  few  can  be 
cited  as  illustrations.  General  Teran  seized  the  schooner  Topaz  and  com- 
pelled her  to  transport  some  of  his  troops.  During  the  voyage  the  Mexican 
officers  and  soldiers  killed  the  master,  and,  returning  to  port,  had  the  crew 
imprisoned  on  the  charge  of  having  done  it.  The  vessel  was  held,  and 
property  on  board  seized  (Moore,  Intern.  Arbit.,  2992).  The  schooner 
Hannah  Elizabeth,  stranded  on  the  Texan  coast,  was  fired  upon  by  a 
Mexican  vessel  of  war,  and  her  crew  and  passengers  were  put  in  jail  (Sen. 
1;  25,  2,  p.  85.  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  p.  167).  The  Mexicans  asserted  that 
the  schooner  was  carrying  contraband  of  war;  but  if  so,  the  Mexican 
officer  did  not  know  this  when  he  opened  fire,  and  anyhow  no  penalty  ex- 
cept the  confiscation  of  the  cargo  could  rightfully  have  been  exacted. 
Our  acting  consul  at  Tabasco  was  arrested  and  publicly  ill-treated,  be- 
cause he  would  not  legalize  documents  intended,  in  his  opinion,  to  defraud 
an  insurance  company  (Sen.  1;  25,  2,  p.  89).  The  brig  Fourth  of  July 
was  sent  to  Vera  Cruz  for  sale  to  the  Mexican  government,  and  before  the 
sale  was  made  officers  and  soldiers  took  possession  of  her,  ran  up  their 
flag,  arrested  the  captain,  and  disregarded  the  protest  of  our  consul  (ibid., 
p.  91).  A  boat-load  of  seamen  from  our  sloop-of-war  Natchez  landed  at 
Vera  Cruz,  became  intoxicated  while  the  midshipman  in  command  of 
them  was  in  conference  with  our  consul,  and,  as  the  result  of  a  quarrel 
with  a  fisherman,  were  severely  handled  by  the  Mexican  guard.  As  they 
were  now  unable  to  manage  the  boat  in  the  rough  sea,  the  midshipman, 
on  the  advice  of  the  consul,  requested  the  captain  of  the  port  to  take 
charge  of  them  over  night.  The  next  morning  the  authorities  would  not 
give  them  up  to  him,  nor  was  our  consul  permitted  to  communicate  with 
them  (ibid.,  p.  93).  Two  Americans  were  arrested,  maltreated  and  im- 
prisoned at  Matamoros  on  the  baseless  suspicion  that  they  intended  to 
visit  Texas,  and  the  premises  of  our  consul  were  forcibly  entered,  searched 
and  robbed  (  bid.,  94;    Ho.  351;    25,  2,  p.  172).     A  lieutenant  of  the 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,  PAGES  74-75  425 

American  revenue  cutter  Jefferson,  going  ashore  at  Tampico  to  see  our 
consul,  was  arrested,  and  his  boat's  crew  were  imprisoned.  For  this 
outrage  the  Mexican  government  removed  the  responsible  officer,  General 
G6mez,  but  soon  afterwards  he  was  given  a  better  post  at  Vera  Cruz,  and 
showed  his  unchastened  spirit  in  the  Natchez  affair  (Sen.  1 ;  25,  2,  p.  98. 
Sen.  160;  24,  2,  p.  70:   Ellis). 

24.  British  complaints  were  almost  numberless :  e.g.  Ward,  no.  77, 
1826;  Pakenham,  nos.  48  of  1827,  119  of  1828,  37  of  1830;  13Ashburn- 
ham,  nos.  16  of  1837  and  74  of  1838  (a  man  persecuted  with  a  "tissue  of 
iniquities"  for  years) ;   Bankhead  to  Bocanegra,  July  4,  1844. 

The  Foreign  Office  distinctly  stated  that  contract  and  treaty  rights 
were  denied  (13Aberdeen  to  Mex.  min.,  Nov.  1,  1843;  to  Pakenham,  no. 
19,  Aug.  15,  1836).  77Dec.  31,  1844,  it  made  this  statement:  "In 
Mexico  British  Subjects  have  been  oppressed,  harassed,  and  maltreated 
without  redress  except  that  which  has  been  extorted  by  unceasing  re- 
monstrance. .  .  .  The  expostulations  of  Great  Britain  .  .  .  have  been 
with  very  few  exceptions  contumeliously  set  at  naught;  and  the  same 
illegal  exactions  which  have  been  the  subject  of  those  expostulations  have 
been  repeated,  while  yet  the  former  grievance  was  unredressed."  The 
British  minister  complained,  e.g.,  that  the  coast  officials  annoyed  his  fellow 
citizens ;  that  frequently  to  their  injury  the  constitution  was  violated  by 
state  authorities;  that  some  of  them  were  persecuted,  imprisoned,  or 
expelled  from  the  country  in  defiance  of  law;  that  money  was  extorted 
from  them  under  threats.  A  loud  52protest  of  American  ship  captains, 
Campeche,  May  26,  1835,  illustrates  well  the  tricks  and  outrages  to  which 
our  commercial  interests  were  subjected.  What  abuse  and  tyranny  our 
citizens  were  liable  to  suffer  in  the  interior  is  shown  by  the  memorial  of 
Augustus  Storrs  and  twenty  others,  Chihuahua,  April  17,  1832,  trans- 
mitted through  C.  W.  Davis,  who  was  described  by  our  secretary  of  state, 
Nov.  24,  1832,  as  a  respectable  citizen  of  the  U.  S.  who  had  long  been 
practising  medicine  at  Chihuahua  (Ho.  351;  25,  2,  p.  87).  (France) 
Coxe,  Review,  69 ;  Barker  in  Texas  Review,  Jan.,  1917 ;  Rives,  U.  S.  and 
Mexico,  i,  433. 

25.  The  international  tribunal  was  established  under  the  Claims  Con- 
vention of  1839,  and  the  national  tribunal  under  the  treaty  of  1848  and 
a  United  States  Act  of  1849.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the  amount 
of  our  claims  was  substantial.  The  total  receipts  of  the  U.  S.  government 
for  the  fiscal  year  ending  with  June,  1845,  were  less  than  $30,000,000.  It 
is  true  that  many  of  the  claims  were  exaggerated,  and  some  of  them  a 
great  deal ;  but  this  does  not  matter,  for  what  the  United  States  asked 
was  an  investigation  of  the  demands,  not  the  payment  of  any  one  at  its 
face.  Still,  as  the  inflation  of  the  claims  has  been  urged  as  an  excuse  for 
inattention  to  them,  a  word  upon  that  point  is  desirable.  The  amounts 
demanded  in  such  cases  are  always  made  as  great  as  possible,  and  in  the 
instance  of  Mexico  there  were  special  grounds  for  exaggeration.  Our 
claimants,  so  far  as  just  in  their  demands,  were  entitled  to  as  high  interest 
as  other  creditors  of  that  government,  and  the  rate  it  had  to  pay  was  very 
large.  In  1832,  for  instance,  this  was  four  per  cent  a  month  (Butler,  no. 
32,  1832),  and  in  1844  two  per  cent  a  month  besides  six  per  cent  for  broker- 
age (Bankhead,  no.  112,  1844).  At  such  rates  longstanding  claims 
mounted  high,  and  when  the  interest  was  scaled  down  to  five  per  cent 
in  the  process  of  adjudication  (Sen.  320;  27,  2,  p.  237),  they  naturally 
seemed  to  have  been  exorbitant.     Indeed,  the  claims  were  entitled  to 


426  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  74-75 

even  a  higher  interest  than  loans,  for  a  good  deal  of  trouble  —  sometimes 
an  extraordinary  deal  —  was  necessary  to  prove  them.  "The  authorities 
here  can  prove  anything,"  reported  even  the  philo-Mexican  Waddy 
Thompson  (no.  4,  1842) ;  and  this  was  only  one  of  numerous  obstacles. 
Probably,  too,  there  was  more  uncertainty  as  to  eventual  payment.  Again, 
if  paid  at  all,  the  claims  were  likely  to  be  settled  in  treasury  notes  of  little 
value.  In  fact,  all  those  accepted  by  the  international  tribunal  already 
mentioned  were  actually  so  payable  (Calhoun  in  Sen.  1 ;  28,  2,  p.  21),  and 
these  notes  were  worth  at  the  time  only  about  thirty  cents  on  the  dollar 
(Thompson,  Recoils.,  223). 

Yet  the  degree  of  inflation  was  much  less  than  has  been  supposed.  The 
most  conspicuous  instance  was  that  of  W.  S.  Parrott,  who  demanded 
$454,504.01  as  principal  (Sen.  320;  27,  2).  Thompson  declared  (52Nov. 
20,  1843)  that  Parrott  was  hardly  entitled  to  two  per  cent  of  what  he 
asked ;  but  on  inquiry  a  very  different  conclusion  is  reached.  Parrott 
was  a  sufficiently  good  man  to  be  employed  as  consul  and  confidential 
diplomatic  agent  by  the  United  States,  yet  for  some  reason  he  was  deeply 
disliked  by  the  Mexican  government,  and  the  courts  seemed  determined 
to  ruin  him  (Moore,  Intern.  Arbit.,  3011).  He  was  therefore  entitled 
to  punitive  damages,  but  none  were  allowed  him.  The  cost  and  annoy- 
ance of  prosecuting  his  case  were  excessive.  All  the  excuses  for  inflation 
mentioned  above  applied  in  his  case.  A  considerable  amount  included 
in  his  claim  had  to  be  thrown  out  on  purely  technical  grounds ;  and  a 
large  part  had  to  be  ignored  because  (in  violation  of  her  agreement)  Mexico 
would  not  let  him  have  certain  specified  papers  that  were  needed  to  prove 
it.  And  yet,  after  all  these  deductions  had  been  made,  our  own  treasury 
paid  him  under  the  treaty  of  1848  the  sum  of  $71,000  as  principal  (Moore, 
1284).  In  many  cases  the  percentage  of  inflation  was  low.  For  example, 
in  the  case  of  claims  aggregating  $595,462  the  tribunal  awarded  $439,393 
after  scaling  the  interest  down  to  five  per  cent  (Ho.  Report  1096 ;  27,  2, 
p.  8).  In  fact  the  awards  were  probably  a  somewhat  uncommonly  high 
percentage  of  the  amount  claimed  in  such  cases.  It  has  commonly  been 
said  (e.g.  Von  Hoist,  U.  S.,  hi,  205)  that  on  the  conclusion  of  the  war  we 
discharged  Mexico  from  all  obligation  on  account  of  our  claims  ($8,491,603) 
yet  bound  ourselves  to  pay  only  $3,250,000,  thus  admitting  that  our  claims 
were  nearly  three  times  too  large  ;  but  the  second  of  these  two  sums  corre- 
sponds to  only  a  part  of  the  first  (Treaty  with  Mexico,  Arts,  xiii-xv  :  Stat. 
at  Large,  ix,  933). 

26.  Iturbide  seized  the  cargo  of  the  Louisa,  and  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment not  only  acknowledged  the  debt  but  paid  a  fraction  of  it  (Ho.  Re- 
port 1056;  25,  2).  The  Mexican  supreme  court  ordered  the  money 
actually  realized  from  the  unlawful  sale  of  the  Cossack  and  her  cargo  to 
be  paid  to  her  master,  but  it  was  not  paid  (ibid.).  The  decree  of  the 
Mexican  supreme  court  of  1821  in  favor  of  this  claim  was  presented  in 
support  of  it  by  the  U.  S.  secretary  of  state,  yet  that  government  alleged 
in  Nov.,  1837,  that  the  claim  had  just  been  "for  the  first  time  brought 
forward"  (ibid.).  Cox  and  Elkins  furnished  supplies  to  General  Herrera 
(Moore,  3430).  Chew  and  Eckford  built  war  vessels  for  Mexico  (Moore, 
3428-9).  Parrott  made  advances  on  a  bill  of  exchange  drawn  by  Herrera 
(Moore,  3429).  Green  supplied  money  to  a  war  vessel  that  put  in  at 
Key  West  in  distress  (Moore,  3425).  A  sum  of  money  on  its  way  to 
Peter  Harmony,  a  New  York  merchant,  from  his  Mexican  consignee,  was 
seized  by  the  government  (Moore,  3044).     Contrary  to  law,  a  forced  loan 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,  PAGES  75-76  427 

was  extorted  from  Ducoing  (Moore,  3409).  Aaron  Leggett  carried  on  an 
extensive  logwood  business  in  Tabasco;  but  the  action  of  Mexicans  in 
seizing  vessels  of  his  for  military  use  entirely  ruined  him  (Moore,  1275), 
and  even  Santa  Anna  admitted  that  his  claim  was  just  (Butler,  Feb.  8, 
1836).  Sixteen  bales  of  wax  were  confiscated  as  of  Spanish  origin,  when 
the  fullest  certificates,  including  that  of  the  Mexican  vice-consul  at  New 
York,  proved  that  it  came  from  Russia  (Poinsett  in  Ho.  351 ;  25,  2,  p.  248). 
Gahagan  was  inhumanly  persecuted  and  for  a  time  rendered  insane,  be- 
cause in  a  perfectly  lawful  and  respectful  manner  he  tried  to  prevent  the 
authorities  from  illegally  appropriating  his  employer's  property  (Moore, 
3240).  Santangelo,  a  naturalized  American,  was  expelled  without  trial 
and  thereby  ruined,  in  direct  violation  of  the  treaty  of  amity  (Moore, 
3333).  A  case  of  which  the  essentials,  at  least,  were  simple  is  also  worthy 
of  mention.  Evidently  to  drive  him  away  and  get  his  property,  Dr. 
Baldwin,  described  by  our  minister  as  "a  gentleman  of  great  respectability 
and  intelligence"  (Ellis,  Nov.  8,  1836),  was  prosecuted  on  the  basis  of 
depositions  which  a  superior  Mexican  court  admitted  were  forgeries,  was 
falsely  charged  with  murdering  a  woman  and  firing  on  a  soldier,  was  put 
into  the  stocks  and  then  imprisoned  while  suffering  from  a  freshly  broken 
leg,  and  in  short  was  persecuted  by  the  local  authorities  for  a  term  of 
years  (Moore,  3235-40).  Other  cases,  though  less  easily  stated,  were 
not  less  clear ;  yet  Mexico  would  give  no  redress.  See  Forsyth's  despatch 
of  May  27,  1837  (Sen.  1 ;  25,  2,  p.  105). 

27.  This  point  was  taken  advantage  of  by  the  clever  Mexicans  to  the 
utmost,  and  it  illustrates  one  of  the  great  embarrassments  encountered  in 
dealing  with  them.  Because  they  had  the  words  "  constitution,"  "  courts," 
and  "law"  they  pretended  to  have  the  realities.  It  was  as  if  they  had 
coined  lead  at  the  mint  and  required  us  to  accept  it  as  silver,  while  it 
passed  among  themselves  for  merely  what  it  was.  See  also  Ashburnham, 
no.  11,  1838.     For  the  character  of  Mexican  courts  see  vol.  i,  12-13. 

28.  The  Mexican  government  demanded  that  Baldwin  (note  26),  for 
example,  should  seek  redress  from  the  very  tribunal  that  had  wronged 
him  (Ellis  in  Sen.  160;  24,  2,  p.  64).  In  1834  Simon  McGillivray,  a 
director  of  the  United  Mexican  Mining  Company,  wrote  thus  to  the 
British  minister:  Even  when  we  obtain  report  after  report  and  decree 
after  decree  against  the  confiscation,  already  effected,  of  our  property, 
"we  never  can  succeed  in  obtaining  the  enforcement  of  such  Decrees, 
because  the  parties  against  whom  they  are  given  are  Mexicans  of  influence 
or  connexion  in  the  place,  and  we,  the  claimants  for  justice,  are  only 
foreigners";  and  three  months  later  the  minister  (no.  61,  1834)  reported 
that  a  letter  from  the  governor  of  the  state  "in  substance  fully  admits" 
this.  Once  when  Baldwin  obtained  a  verdict,  the  judge  would  not  exe- 
cute it,  and  the  Doctor  had  to  flee  for  his  life  (Ellis  in  Sen.  160 ;  24,  2, 
p.  65).  Under  such  circumstances,  to  deny  the  right  of  injured  foreigners, 
especially  the  unpopular  Americans,  to  invoke  the  aid  of  their  govern- 
ments was  plainly  unfair,  and  so  France  and  England  held  as  firmly  as 
did  the  United  States. 

29.  llCanning,  March  25,  1825.  Ho.  266;  27,  2,  p.  321  (Webster). 
This -obligation  grows  out  of  the  benefits  conferred  by  recognition. 

30.  (Early)  Ellis  in  Sen.  160;  24,  2,  p.  68.  (Avoid)  Ho.  351;  25,  2, 
p.  40  (Van  Buren).  (Covered)  23lButler  to  Jackson,  June  23,  1831. 
(Amicable)  Ho.  351 ;  25,  2,  pp.  92  (Livingston) ;  160  (Forsyth).  As  the 
net  result  of  four  years  of  effort  Butler  was  informed  that  full  specifications 


428  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  76-77 

must  be  given ;  yet  no  attention  was  paid  to  a  group  of  cases  thus  made 
out  and  proved  (Ho.  351;  25,  2,  p.  499).  Then  he  was  told  that  the 
claimants  must  come  to  the  treasury  department  in  person,  that  nothing 
would  be  done  until  all  the  American  claims  should  have  been  presented, 
and  that  a  call  from  our  minister  would  not  advance  matters  (ibid.,  501-3). 
Evidently  all  this  was  to  gain  time,  and  it  was  fairly  characterized  by  our 
secretary  of  state  as  a  denial  of  justice  (ibid.,  144).  In  November,  1832, 
a  bearer  of  despatches  from  Butler  to  our  government  was  detained  on 
his  way  to  Vera  Cruz  by  the  governor  of  Perote  castle,  and  was  there 
robbed  of  his  papers,  though  a  passport  from  the  national  government 
established  his  official  character.  The  case  was  both  simple  and  out- 
rageous. Our  minister  insisted  upon  an  investigation ;  but  in  February, 
1834,  he  found  that  (confessedly  "on  account  of  some  trifling  difficulty") 
it  had  been  suspended,  and  in  the  following  April  was  merely  informed,  in 
reply  to  an  inquiry,  that  it  was  again  proceeding  (ibid.,  462,  470,  517,  521). 

31.  Sen.  160 ;  24,  2,  pp.  62,  112,  156  (Ellis).  52Forsyth  to  Ellis,  July  20, 
1836.  52Monasterio  to  Ellis,  Oct.  21;  Nov.  15,  1836.  Pakenham,  no. 
96,  1841.  (Withdrew)  Ellis,  no.  46,  Jan.  12,  1837.  He  gave  the  fort- 
night's notice  on  Nov.  4.  Gorostiza,  Correspondencia.  (Approval)  Sen. 
160;  24,  2,  p.  84  (Monasterio) ;  Sen.  189;  24,  2.  Kohl,  Claims,  18. 
Even  the  philo-Mexican  Thompson  said  that  a  discussion  with  that  gov- 
ernment in  writing  was  as  "endless  as  the  web  of  Penelope"  (Recoils.,  228). 

32.  58Jackson,  Mar.  12,  1823  (he  thought  himself  too  sympathetic 
toward  Mexico  to  be  our  minister  there).  (Agreed)  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  pp. 
581,  601.  Diario,  Feb.  2,  1836.  Messages,  Dec.  5,  1836;  Feb.  6,  1837 
(Richardson,  Messages).  Ho.  139;  24,  2,  p.  1.  Jackson  has  been  said 
by  a  certain  school  of  historians  to  have  used  our  claims  (in  the  February 
Message)  as  a  bludgeon  to  force  Mexico  to  sell  Texas.  But  was  his  temper 
such  that  he  did  not  care  to  assert  American  rights  unless  to  gain  territory  ? 
What  cession  was  he  aiming  at  when  he  enforced  our  claims  against  France  ? 
And  if  Mexico  felt  (as  she  asserted  :  Diario,  supra)  that  baseless  grievances 
of  ours  were  to  be  used  as  a  pretext  for  trouble,  why  did  she  not  make 
haste  and  refute  them?  From  every  sane  point  of  view,  indeed,  the 
charge  looks  absurd.  As  early  as  March,  1833,  Butler  was  urged  to  settle 
the  boundary  negotiation  at  once,  lest  a  step  toward  independence  on  the 
part  of  Texas  should  make  it  impossible  to  obtain  that  territory  by  ar- 
rangement with  Mexico  (Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  21) ;  yet  now,  after 
four  years  have  passed,  and  after  that  province  has  practically  effected 
its  independence,  Jackson  is  accused  of  trying  to  compel  a  cession  of  it 
from  Mexico.  Moreover  he  was  at  this  very  time  rejecting  the  petition 
of  Texas  to  be  annexed  (ibid.,  63).  Besides,  in  April,  1836,  the  envoys  of 
Texas  at  Washington  had  been  instructed  to  enter  a  ''solemn  protest  .  .  . 
against  the  right  of  Mexico  to  sell  or  the  U.  S.  to  purchase  [Texas]"  (Tex. 
Dipl.  Corres.,  i,  76).  Even  more  surprising,  the  charge  is  made  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  anti-slavery  historical  school,  which  denounced  Jackson 
for1  wickedly  conspiring  at  this  precise  juncture  to  help  establish  Texas 
as  an  independent  nation  by  precipitately  recognizing  her.  The  truth 
is  that  while  engaged  in  no  conspiracy,  he  now  favored  the  "recognition 
of  Texas,  and  hence  one  could  not  accept  the  opposite  and  inconsistent 
view  even  were  it  otherwise  possible  to  do  so.  Probably  the  fact  that 
Jackson  had  settled  our  long-standing  claims  against  France  by  adopting 
a  firm  attitude  influenced  him  in  regard  to  Mexico.  (Rupture)  Memoria 
de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Jan.,  1838. 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  78-79  429 

33.  Ho.  Report  281;  24,  2.  Sen.  189;  24,  2.  52Buchanan  to  Slidell, 
no.  1.  Tex.  Dipl.  Corres.,  i,  181-3,  187-92  (Wharton) ;  218-21  (Catlett) ; 
273-4  (Greyson);  284-8  (Hunt).  Ho.  Report  752;  29,  1.  Buchanan, 
Works,  iii,  213,  233,  415. 

34.  Ellis  had  taken  the  legation  papers  to  Washington.  Sen.  1 ;  25,  2, 
pp.  105,  108,  109  (Forsyth).  52Greenhow,  Aug.  12,  1837.  Certain  his- 
torians drawing  their  views  largely  from  the  heated  anti-slavery  writers 
of  that  period  have  been  led  to  misrepresent  our  relations  with  Mexico 
as  much  as  our  conduct  with  reference  to  Texas.  At  this  point  it  has 
been  alleged  that  the  United  States  required  Mexico  to  examine  and  settle 
a  large  number  of  complicated  cases  within  a  week,  which  our  acceptance 
of  the  dilatory  reply  proves  that  we  did  not  require.  Greenhow  was 
merely  directed  to  say  that  [for  the  convenience  of  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment] he  would  remain  seven  days  and  bring  back  any  communication 
it  should  wish  to  make  (56Forsyth  to  Greenhow,  May  27,  1837).  That 
country,  on  the  other  hand,  had  decreed  in  May  that  all  pending  grievances 
of  the  two  nations  might  be  settled  by  arbitration,  but  that  should  the 
United  States  refuse  complete  satisfaction  of  any  demands  Mexico  should 
present,  or  delay  it  beyond  the  time  fixed  under  the  arbitration  treaty, 
commercial  intercourse  with  this  country  should  be  cut  off  and  prepara- 
tions be  made  for  war  (Ho.  Report,  1056;  25,  2,  p.  9;  Dublan,  Legis- 
lacion,  iii,  392).     Sen.  1 ;  25,  2,  p.  Ill  (Cuevas). 

35.  Sen.  1;  25,  2,  pp.  113-27  (Martinez);  30  (Forsyth).  Forsyth  to 
Ellis,  no.  3,  May  3,  1839.  Ho.  Report,  1056 ;  25,  2.  In  respect  to  one 
clear  case,  already  many  years  old,  Martinez  promised  that  "every  exer- 
tion" should  be  made  to  have  it  taken  up  by  the  next  regular  Congress; 
but  when  that  Congress  met,  the  minister  of  relations  did  not  even  men- 
tion it  (ibid.).  Mayer,  War,  343.  Ho.  351;  25,  2,  pp.  758  (Forsyth); 
759  (Greenhow).  Richardson,  Messages,  iii,  377-9.  53Martinez  to 
Forsyth,  Apr.  7,  1838;  reply,  Apr.  21.  77Martinez,  no.  1,  res.,  1837. 
Martinez  coupled  his  proposal  of  arbitration  with  a  demand  that  the 
United  States  should  reaffirm  our  neutrality.  This  was  an  affront,  but 
Forsyth  merely  expressed  surprise. 

36.  The  plan  of  arbitration  was  first  brought  to  the  attention  of  our 
government  during  the  latter  part  of  Dec,  1837.  Ho.  Report,  1056 ;  25, 
2.  Ashburnham,  no.  42,  1838.  (Surprise)  52W7.  D.  Jones,  nos.  132-3, 
1838.  Mexico  proposed  arbitration  to  France  also,  but  met  with  a  re- 
fusal (Mexico  a  travel,  iv,  411).  Later/Martinez  proposed  to  give  the 
arbitration  a  scope  that  would  have  included  Mexican  complaints  regard- 
ing Texas.  To  admit  such  diplomatic  and  political  questions  would 
have  made  the  affair  practically  endless,  and  thus  have  nullified  it  so  far 
as  its  essential  object,  the  adjustment  of  private  claims,  was  concerned; 
and  our  government  properly  refused  to  accept  this  proposition  (Moore, 
Internat.  Arbit.,  1217). 

37.  Ho.  252;  25,  3,  pp.  24  (Martinez),  27.  Ho.  190;  26,  1.  Moore, 
Internat.  Arbit.,  1216-8.  Forsyth  to  Ellis,  no.  3,  May  3,  1839.  To 
save  time,  the  United  States  transported  Martinez's  courier  to  Vera  Cruz, 
but  the  man  spent  about  three  weeks  in  making  the  four-days'  trip  from 
the  port  to  the  capital  (ibid.).  53Forsyth  to  Martinez,  Mar.  16,  1839. 
(Excuse)  Ho.  252 ;  25,  3,  p.  21  (Jones,  Jan.  10) ;  Ho.  Report,  320 ;  25,  3. 
(Disavowed)  Ho.  252 ;   25,  3,  pp.  2,  14. 

38.  Pakenham,  no.  60,  1840.  (Waived)  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones, 
Jan.,    1841.     Moore,  Internat.  Arbit.,   1221-3.      Castillo    and    Leon    de- 


430  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  79-80 

clined  to  take  an  oath  in  the  regular  way,  saying  that  each  had  adminis- 
tered it  to  the  other.  The  United  States  was  represented  by  ex-Senator 
John  Rowan  and  W.  L.  Marcy.  Rowan  was  succeeded  by  H.  M.  Brecken- 
ridge.     52Buchanan  to  Slidell,  no.  1,  1845. 

39.  Ho.  252;  25,  3,  p.  11  (Forsyth).  Ho.  57;  27,  1.  Sen.  320;  27,  2, 
pp.  185  (Webster) ;  22-9,  90,  92,  etc.  Sen.  61 ;  27,  1  (Marcy  and  Rowan, 
May  26,  1841).  Sen.  411;  27,  2  (com.  for.  rels.).  Ho.  269;  27,  2  (Leg- 
gett  case). 

Castillo  and  Le6n  insisted  that  cases  should  come  before  the  board 
only  by  documents  presented  through  one  of  the  governments  —  a  process 
likely  to  consume  much  time.  When  Rowan  withdrew  in  August,  1841, 
and  Marcy  desired  to  proceed  even  under  this  disadvantage,  his  Mexican 
colleagues  gained  a  delay  of  about  six  weeks  by  refusing  to  do  so  (Moore, 
Inter.  Arbit.,  1235.  Sen.  320;  27,  2,  p.  254).  They  falsely  asserted  that 
four  particular  claims,  three  of  which  were  accepted  by  our  commissioners 
and  the  fourth  was  paid  later  by  our  government,  had  been  withdrawn  by 
the  American  minister  at  Mexico,  and  by  thus  holding  them  back  for  some 
two  months  defeated  them  (Sen.  320;  27,  2,  pp.  179,  251-3). 

Under  the  treaty,  that  country  was  positively  bound  to  furnish  the 
evidence  called  for  in  support  of  the  claims,  and  W.  S.  Parrott's  requisition 
was  the  first  or  among  the  first  made  out  and  forwarded.  None  of  his 
papers  came,  however,  for  seven  months,  and  those  received  were  taken 
without  leave  from  the  custody  of  the  board  by  Castillo  and  Leon,  and 
held  back  for  nearly  two  months  more ;  a  part  of  them  had  evidently 
been  mutilated  or  forged;  only  about  one  half  of  the  number  specified 
were  furnished,  though  it  was  known  that  all  were  under  the  control  of 
the  government ;  and  more  than  2000  pages  actually  prepared  for  trans- 
mission seem  to  have  been  withheld  (Sen.  320;  27,  2,  -passim).  Leg- 
gett's  case,  another  of  the  principal  ones,  was  vitally  damaged  by  docu- 
ments afterwards  fully  proved  to  be  spurious  (Moore,  Internat.  Arbit., 
1277-8),  and  as  the  claimant  certainly  would  not  have  presented  them 
against  himself,  they  must  have  come  from  the  Mexican  government. 

Ho.  Report  1096;  27,  2,  p.  22:  "For  the  rest,  the  Committee,  while 
they  abstain  [as  was  proper  in  official  action]  from  imputations  on  the 
commissioners  of  the  Mexican  Republic,  yet  cannot  but  perceive  that  the 
instructions  under  which  those  commissioners  acted,  and  the  course  they 
pursued,  in  the  organization,  proceedings,  and  final  action  of  the  commis- 
sion, were  of  most  questionable  validity,  and  operated  to  the  serious  injury 
of  the  parties  interested."  The  American  commissioners  expressed  the 
belief  that  had  the  board  been  acting  half  the  time  between  Aug.  25  and 
the  day  it  took  up  the  first  case  on  its  merits,  all  the  cases  would  have 
been  "finally  adjusted"  (Sen.  320;  27,  2,  p.  197).  The  claims  left  un- 
decided in  the  umpire's  hands  amounted  to  $1,864,939.56,  and  those 
which  the  board  had  not  time  to  consider  to  $3,336,837.05  (Moore,  In- 
ternat. Arbit.,  1232). 

Mexico  has  been  given  great  credit  for  sending  many  original  documents 
on  a  hazardous  journey;  but,  had  they  been  lost,  the  claimants  would 
have  suffered  and  she  would  have  profited.  She  had  time  enough  and 
clerks  enough  to  make  this  risk  unnecessary.  Also  Mexico  has  been  given 
great  credit  for  accepting  certain  indisputable  claims  growing  out  of  her 
revolutionary  war,  which  pro-Mexican  Americans  have  declared  it  was 
outrageous  to  present;  but  as  she  had  formally  recognized  in  1824  all 
debts  of  the  revolutionists,  there  was  no  escape.     Numerous  claims  failed 


NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  80-81  431 

to  be  considered  because  presented  too  late,  but  this  was  doubtless  mainly 
or  wholly  due  to  the  attitude  of  the  Mexican  commissioners,  which  made 
it  appear  more  than  doubtful  for  a  long  time  whether  it  would  be  worth 
while  to  incur  the  trouble  and  expense  of  making  up  the  cases.  In  fact 
the  notice  of  the  state  dept.  (Washington  Globe,  Apr.  16,  1840)  that  the 
commission  would  meet  was  falsified  by  the  non-appearance  of  Castillo 
and  Le6n  in  time  (Sen.  320 ;  27,  2,  p.  23).  Much  time  and  expense  were 
needed  to  get  papers  from  Mexico,  etc.  The  Mexican  commissioners  took 
the  unreasonable  ground  that  all  undecided  claims,  considered  by  the 
board,  were  extinguished  (Sen.  411;  27,  2,  p.  3). 

40.  Moore,  Internat.  Arbit.,  1232,  1245.  Ho.  Report  752;  29,  1. 
Pakenham,  nos.  49,  97,  1842.  Ho.  144;  28,  2,  p.  20  (Green).  Besides 
the  twenty  instalments  a  preliminary  payment,  covering  the  interest 
that  would  be  due,  April  30,  1843,  on  the  awards,  was  to  be  made  on  that 
date  (Moore,  Internat.  Arbit.,  1246). 

A  forced  loan  was  ordered  for  the  payment  of  the  interest  and  principal 
of  the  awards  (Voss  in  Ho.  133 ;  29,  1,  p.  7.  Sen.  85 ;  29,  1 ;  Negrete, 
Invasion,  iv,  327) ;  and  the  goods  of  all  who  would  not  or  could  not  meet 
their  assessments  were  confiscated  and  sold  amid  the  lamentations  of  the 
owners  and  general  curses  against  the  United  States  (Bustamante,  Go- 
bierno,  130).  Nearly  all  the  proceeds  of  the  forced  loan  were,  however, 
used  for  other  purposes  (Green  in  Ho.  19;  28,  2,  p.  32).  Our  agent  was 
finally  given  drafts  for  the  next  instalments  after  the  third,  and  supposing 
these  would  be  cashed,  he  receipted  for  them  in  full  (Buchanan,  Nov.  19 
in  Ho.  133 ;  29,  1,  p.  3) ;  but  the  government  stopped  all  such  payments 
(B.  E.  Green,  Dec.  17,  1844)  and  refused  to  give  up  the  receipts  (Ho.  133 ; 
29,  1,  p.  11).  In  short,  it  pursued  a  course  that  was  not  only  dishonorable 
but  positively  fraudulent.  To  make  all  this  the  more  exasperating,  the 
nation  was  permitting  Santa  Anna  to  expend  great  amounts. 

In  the  treaty  of  January,  1843,  Mexico  promised  to  make  a  new  con- 
vention providing  for  the  settlement  of  all  our  outstanding  claims,  includ- 
ing those  not  adjudicated  by  the  joint  commission.  Delay  and  evasion 
followed,  of  course;  but  in  October  of  that  year  the  British  minister 
severed  diplomatic  relations  with  Mexico,  and  in  November,  1843,  prob- 
ably in  order  to  be  on  good  terms  with  us  in  case  of  a  war  with  England, 
she  signed  the  proposed  convention  (Doyle,  no.  79,  1843).  The  United 
States  accepted  the  plan  of  a  joint  commission,  as  Mexico  desired,  but 
required  that  it  should  meet  at  Washington.  This  appears  to  have  been 
just.  The  claimants  were  all  Americans,  were  numerous,  had  a  great 
number  of  papers  which  it  was  not  advisable  to  take  abroad  by  sea,  and 
could  not,  without  much  inconvenience  and  loss,  expatriate  themselves 
for  an  indefinite  period.  Another  objection  was  even  more  serious,  per- 
haps. Pakenham  (no.  14,  1842)  wrote  emphatically  to  his  government 
that  a  commission  of  this  kind  should  not  sit  at  Mexico,  because  the 
pressure  of  public  sentiment  would  not  allow  the  Mexican  members  to 
act  properly  on  the  claims  of  aliens,  and  because  the  foreign  ministers, 
from  whom  the  actual  umpire  would  almost  necessarily  be  selected,  were 
more  or  less  entangled  in  similar  cases,  and  therefore  would  not  be  thought 
impartial. 

To  provide,  as  Mexico  demanded,  for  the  arbitration  of  private  Mexican 
grievances,  which  that  government  admitted  unofficially  did  not  exist, 
would  have  been  to  cast  a  gratuituous  aspersion  upon  ourselves ;  and  to 
allow  the  presentation  of  a  national  claim  on  account  of  Texas  (which 


432  NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  III,   PAGES  81-82 

also  was  demanded),  besides  enabling  Mexico  to  nullify  through  her  pre- 
tensions and  endless  declamations  the  essential  purpose  'of  the  treaty, 
would  have  been  to  question  the  good  faith  of  our  official  declarations  of 
neutrality,  and  make  it  possible  for  a  subject  of  some  foreign  power  — 
the  umpire  —  to  impose  upon  us  an  immense  indemnity,  which  would 
also  have  been  a  monumental  impeachment  of  our  honor.  No  sovereign 
state  would  place  itself  in  so  dangerous  and  ridiculous  a  position.  Ac- 
cordingly the  Senate  of  the  United  States  eliminated  these  features  of  the 
agreement  signed  by  Minister  Thompson.  The  justice  of  its  action 
Mexico  did  not  undertake  seriously  to  deny,  and  she  promised  immediate 
attention  to  the  subject;  but  once  more  she  resorted  to  dilatory  tactics, 
and  thus  her  promise  of  January,  1843,  one  important  consideration  for 
granting  a  delay  in  the  payment  of  our  awards,  was  evaded. 

One  difficulty  needs  to  be  faced  here.  The  United  States  defended 
itself  for  certain  breaches  of  neutrality  on  the  part  of  American  citizens 
during  the  revolutionary  war  of  Texas  on  the  ground  that  they  could 
not  legally  be  prevented;  why  then  could  not  Mexico  plead  the  legal 
impossibility  of  preventing  local  authorities  and  citizens  from  committing 
outrages  against  Americans?  In  reply  it  may  be  said  (1)  that  there  was 
no  analogy  between  the  two  cases.  While  our  government  may  have 
asked  that  such  outrages  be  prevented,  its  real  demand  was  that  compensa- 
tion be  paid ;  our  breaches  of  neutrality  were  political  offences,  and  there- 
fore called  for  different  treatment  than  the  civil  grievances  on  which  these 
claims  were  based ;  the  former  could  not  be  proved  (Smith,  Annex,  of 
Texas,  pp.  23-24) ,  while  the  latter  could  be;  and  the  former,  unlike  the 
latter,  could  not  properly  be  redressed  by  the  payment  of  a  definite  amount 
of  money.  (2)  We  have  abundant  reason  to  believe  that  if  Mexico  had 
been  able  and  had  desired  to  present  a  bill  for  damages  on  account  of  such 
breaches  of  neutrality,  it  would  have  been  examined  fairly  and  promptly 
by  the  American  government.  As  a  single  illustration  of  the  ability  of 
Mexico  to  pay  our  claims,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  in  1844  Santa  Anna 
and  the  Lizardi  banking  house,  in  combination,  robbed  the  treasury  of 
about  $1,200,000  (Mofras,  Explor.,  i,  65). 

IV.   RELATIONS  BETWEEN   THE   UNITED   STATES  AND 
MEXICO,    1843-1846 

1.  See  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  text,  notes,  and  index,  particularly 
pp.  68,  74,  78,  85-7,  94,  99,  194-5,  199,  210,  273,  288-95,  409-31,  464. 
Webster :  ibid.,  194.  See  remarks  in  chap,  iii,  note  13.  137Donelson 
to  Calhoun,  Jan.  8,  1848.  77Doyle,  British  charge,  to  Bocanegra,  April  20, 
1843  :  "The  undersigned  must  remind  His  Excellency  that  Texas  has  been 
recognized  as  an  independent  nation  by  the  Government  of  Her  Majesty, 
and  that  treaties  have  been  negotiated  with  that  Republic  as  independent." 
77Cyprey,  the  French  minister,  to  Bocanegra,  April  20,  1843:  "The 
Mexican  Cabinet  has  doubtless  overlooked  the  fact  that  with  respect  to 
France  and  most  of  the  states  of  Europe  Texas  is  absolutely  in  the  same 
position  as  that  in  which  Mexico  was  before  her  independence  had  been 
recognized  by  Spain." 

As  early  as  18  >9  Gorostiza  admitted  privately  that  Mexico  had  lost 
Texas  (HE.  de  Lisle,  June  21) ;  and  in  1840  the  French  government 
notified  Mexico  that  its  recognition  of  Texas  was  merely  the  acceptance 
of  a  fait  accompli  (llto  Cyprey,  no.  4,  May  6).     Webster,  Writings,  ix, 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  IV,   PAGES  82-86  433 

158:  "Nothing  can  exceed,  I  have  always  thought,  the  obstinacy  and 
senselessness  manifested  by  Mexico  in  refusing  for  so  many  years  to  ac- 
knowledge the  independence  of  Texas";  xiii,  351:  Our  annexing  Texas 
gave  Mexico  no  just  ground  of  complaint  (Sept.  29,  1847).  In  his  Me- 
moria  of  Jan.,  1849,  the  Mexican  minister  of  relaciones  called  the  refusal 
of  Mexico  to  recognize  the  annexation  of  Texas  a  caprice  or  whim  ycapricho). 
(Never)  See  note  5.     137Gallatin  to  Calhoun,  Mar.  3,  1848. 

2.  Sen.  1;  28,  1,  pp.  25  (Bocanegra) ;  27  (Thompson);  34  (Upshur). 

3.  Sen.  1;  28,  1,  pp.  38,  42  (Almonte);  41,  45  (Upshur).  53Memo.  of 
conference  between  Upshur  and  Almonte.  53Almonte  to  Upshur,  Apr.  22, 
1844.     Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  194. 

4.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  199,  288.  Sen.  341;  28,  1,  p.  53  (Cal- 
houn). 

5.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  289-295.  77Relaciones  to  Almonte,  May  30, 
1844.  According  to  Santa  Anna's  published  account  of  the  interview, 
which  doubtless  misrepresented  the  bearer  of  despatches,  Thompson  said 
the  assent  of  Mexico  was  an  essential  preliminary  to  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  and  plainly  recognized  her  ownership  of  the  province,  and  the 
President  replied  that  the  right  of  subjugating  it  would  be  transmitted 
to  posterity,  and  assent  would  never  be  given  to  its  absorption  in  the 
United  States.  In  reply  to  Bocanegra's  assertion  that  the  United  States 
had  now  recognized  Mexico's  claim  to  Texas  Calhoun  sent  word  to  the 
Mexican  government  that  we  recognized  no  such  claim,  but  held  that 
Texas  was  an  independent  nation  both  in  fact  and  in  right  (Ho.  2 ;  28, 
2,  p.  23).  In  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii,  692,  is  a  statement,  apparently  based  on 
good  authority,  that  Mexico  consented  to  cede  Texas  for  $15,000,000; 
but  internal  evidence  and  many  facts  are  decidedly  against  it,  and  the 
author  has  not  found  the  slightest  evidence  in  its  support.  It  was  made 
forty  years  after  the  event,  and  probably  was  due  to  a  misunderstanding 
or  defective  recollection. 

Out  of  this  affair  grew  a  diplomatic  tilting-match  (Ho.  2 ;  28,  2).  Boca- 
negra, though  personally  agreeable  and  officially  painstaking,  dignified 
and  courteous  (Thompson,  Recoils.,  82)  was  not  a  great  logician;  and 
the  son  of  Duff  Green  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an  intellectual  giant. 
Still,  certain  points  emerged  from  the  discussion.  The  Mexican  rlanted 
himself  on  the  technical  theory  of  ownership,  accused  the  Texans  of  steal- 
ing the  territory  which  they  had  been  graciously  permitted  to  occupy, 
and  charged  the  United  States  in  the  usual  manner  with  violating  treaties 
and  international  law.  Green,  on  the  other  hand,  relied  u  on  facts :  the 
fact  of  actual  Texan  independence,  the  fact  that  Mexico  herself  owed  her 
existence  to  a  revolution,  and  the  fact  that  she  had  regarded  herself  as 
independent  and  had  been  so  regarded  by  other  nations  long  before  the 
mother-country  would  recognize  her.  But  the  correspondence  as  a  whole 
was  indecisive,  disagreeable,  and  exasperating. 

6.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  273-9,  365-7. 

7.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  416-7.  Shannon  and  Rej6n :  Sen.  1 ;  28, 
2,  p.  47 ;  Ho.  19 ;  28,  2.  52Rejon  to  Shannon,  Nov.  21,  1844.  Buchanan 
to  Shannon,  no.  10,  1845.  13Bankhead,  no.  67,  1844.  Von  Hoist,  U.  S., 
ii,  685.  Jameson,  Calhoun  Correspondence,  662.  Tyler,  Message,  Dec. 
18,  1844  (Richardson).  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  Dec.  18,  1844.  (Rej6n)  Sosa, 
Biograffas ;  52B.  E.  Greene,  no.  17,  1844.  N.  Y.  Herald,  Dec.  16,  1844. 
Nat.  Intelligencer,  Dec.  20,  1844.  Democ.  Review,  Feb.,  1847,  99,  100. 
Richtofen,  ^ustande,  54-6.     Rej6n,  Justificaci6n. 

vol.  i  —  2  p 


434  NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  IV,   PAGES  87-88 

A  recent  Mexican  author  has  said  that  "perfidy,"  which  the  Mexicans 
loved  to  charge  against  the  United  States  at  this  period,  was  made  im- 
possible by  the  publicity  of  our  diplomatic  affairs  (Bulnes,  Mentiras,  167) . 
It  should  be  remembered  that  we  had  a  perfect  right  to  seek,  in  the  way 
we  had  sought,  to  acquire  Texas  —  i.e.  by  purchase. 

8.  Sen.  1;  29,  1,  pp.  38  (Almonte) ;  39  (Buchanan).  Smith,  Annex,  of 
Texas,  420-3.  Shannon,  no.  10,  Apr.  6,  1845.  Bankhead,  nos.  30,  38, 
1845.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  388.  O  Se  Hace  la  Guerra.  Diario, 
May  12.     Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec,  1846. 

"Is  it  possible,"  exclaimed  La  Voz  del  Pueblo  of  March  26,  "that  Mexico 
is  a  nation  of  slaves,  a  wandering  tribe,  to  be  the  prey  of  other  nations? 
Eleven  years  of  war  [to  gain  our  independence],  all  the  victims  executed, 
all  the  costly  sacrifices  made,  —  have  these  been  in  vain  ?  War  and  only 
war  can  save  us"  —  "war  without  quarter,"  "extermination  and  death." 
For  other  references  and  quotations  see  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  425-7. 
52Dimond,  nos.  244-5,  249,  etc.,  1845.  Min.  of  treasury  to  Deputies, 
Apr.  19,  1845  (Diario,  Apr.  20).     56W.  S.  Parrott,  Apr.  26. 

9.  Amigo  del  Pueblo,  July  17,  1845.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  427. 
Diario,  July  17,  23,  25,  31 ;  Aug.  11 ;  Oct.  11.  Siglo  XIX,  Aug.  1.  52Di- 
mond,  nos.  245,  249,  etc.,  1845.  Journal  des  Debats,  Sept.  20.  56W.  S. 
Parrott,  July  12,  15,  22,  30 ;  Aug.  16.  Patriota  Mex.,  Nov.  14.  52Shan- 
non,  no.  3,  1844.  St.  Louis  Republican,  Aug.  18,  1845.  Wash.  Union, 
Aug.  1,  14;  Sept.  29.  297Buchanan  to  McLane,  priv.  and  pers.,  Sept.  13. 
77Relaciones  to  mins.,  July  30.  52Campbell,  Havana,  Aug.  14.  76Guerra, 
circular,  July  16.  Bankhead,  no.  38,  1845.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal, 
i,  43-5. 

July  30,  1845,  the  Mexican  minister  of  relations  wrote  to  the  Mexican 
minister  at  Paris:  "Mexico  has  been  left  no  choice  except  to  fight  the 
United  States";  "The  campaign  will  soon  begin"  ;  14,000  troops  are  en 
route;  6000  will  soon  be  organized  to  join  them  (77Cuevas  to  Garro,  res.). 

10.  Siglo  XIX,  July  27.  Picayune,  Sept.  23.  St.  Louis  Reveille,  Sept. 
14.  52Black,  no.  341,  1845.  56W.  S.  Parrott,  July  22,  30.  Dimond, 
nos.  249,  257,  1845.  Diario,  July  31.  297Polk  to  Buchanan,  private, 
Aug.  7. 

Spanish- American  subtlety  was  not  the  only  subtlety  at  work.  Aug.  1, 
1845,  the  Mexican  agent  at  London  reported :  I  have  told  Aberdeen  that 
war  is  inevitable ;  he  suggests  that  we  merely  suspend  relations  with  the 
U.  S.,  since  a  declaration  of  war  would  lawfully  befollowed  by  the  occupa- 
tion of  California,  the  bombardment  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  a  blockade 
(77Murphy,  no.  9) .  The  view  that  no  declaration  of  war  was  necessary  and 
that  an  attack  might  be  made  at  once  on  Texas  was  well  understood  in  the 
United  States,  as  the  preceding  citations  show.  As  early  as  Aug.  5  the 
Mexican  commander  at  Matamoros  52proclaimed :  "Comrades,  the  mo- 
ment has  arrived  to  present  ourselves  on  the  field  of  honor." 

11.  108Wikoff  to  Bancroft,  May  10,  1845.  52Buchanan  to  Parrott, 
Mar.  28,  1845. 

In  one  respect  this  was  an  unfortunate  appointment,  for  the  Mexican 
authorities  hated  Parrott;  but  Buchanan,  who  probably  was  not  aware 
of  that  fact,  regarded  him  as  "a  discreet  man,  well  acquainted  with  public 
affairs,"  and  entitled  to  the  confidence  of  the  President  (52to  Black, 
Sept.  17).  He  was  familiar  with  Spanish,  had  an  intimate  acquaintance 
with  Mexican  politics  and  politiciars,  and  was  available.  It  is  highly 
improbable  that  any  one  else  combined  these  necessary  qualifications ; 


NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  IV,   PAGES  88-94  435 

and,  as  his  errand  called  for  no  public  recognition  and  was  mainly  to  be 
executed  indirectly,  prejudice  was  likely  to  be  disarmed.  162Bancroft 
to  Conner,  Nov.  20,  1845.     162/d.  to  Latimer,  Nov.  7,  10. 

12.  56 W.  S.  Parrott,  June  24;  Sept.  6.  His  quoted  words,  added  to 
other  declarations  of  a  similar  character,  dispose  completely  of  the  asser- 
tion, often  found  in  Mexican  and  American  writings,  that  we  offered  to 
pay  for  Texas  and  thus  admitted  that  we  had  wickedly  annexed  it.  Baldly 
and  as  of  right,  Mexico's  claim  could  not  be  recognized  by  this  nation ; 
but  in  a  spirit  of  good-will,  under  cover  of  paying  for  a  satisfactory  line, 
we  were  disposed  to  soothe  her  feelings  with  a  gift. 

13.  Tyler,  Tyler,  iii,  174  (Green).  Slidell,  Dec.  17.  Shannon,  no.  8, 
1845.  Dimond,  nos.  256,  259,  266,  1845.  56W.  S.  Parrott,  Aug.  16 
(Herrera  has  said,  "If  a  Minister  from  the  United  States  should  arrive, 
he  would  be  well  received"),  26,  29.  (Black,  Aug.  23)  Polk,  Diary,  Sept.  16. 
108Kemble  to  Bancroft,  Sept.  3 :  letters  from  men  in  daily  intercourse 
with  Herrera,  Almonte,  and  the  minister  of  relations  say  the  government 
desires  peace;  and  one  says:  "We  know  from  good  authority  that  if  a 
Minister  were  sent  from  the  United  States  he  would  be  well  received" 
(note  the  word  "Minister"). 

14.  Richmond  Enquirer,  Dec.  9.  Buchanan  to  Larkin,  Oct.  17,  1845; 
to  Slidell,  Nov.  10.  Dix  in  Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  app.,  176.  See  also  pp. 
136-7. 

15.  Garcia,  Juarez,  9,  12.  52W.  D.  Jones,  Sept.  22,  1838.  (Estrada) 
Valencia,  proclaim,  Oct.  22,  1840,  in  Papeles  Varios.  London  Times, 
Mar.  13,  1845.  Picayune,  Dec.  30,  1844;  Jan.  25,  1846.  McLane, 
March  3,  1845  (Curtis,  Buchanan,  i,  583).  Feb.  28,  1846,  the  British 
Foreign  Office  transmitted  to  Bankhead  a  letter  (delivered  to  it  by  the 
Spanish  minister  by  order  of  his  court)  which  pointed  toward  the  establish- 
ment of  monarchy  in  Mexico  under  a  Spanish  prince. 

16.  (Believed)  297Buchanan  to  McLane,  priv.  and  pers.,  Sept.  13,  1845 

17.  Polk,  Diary,  Sept.  16,  17,  1845.  (Caused)  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  12 
(Buchanan).     Slidell  had  been  born  and  educated  at  the  north. 

18.  Bankhead,  nos.  94,  101,  104,  1845.  The  British  government  cen- 
sured Bankhead  for  going  so  far  in  efforts  to  restore  harmony  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico  (13to  Bankhead,  no.  36,  1845.  77Murphy, 
no.  2,  1846).  13Pefia  to  Bankhead,  Oct.  15.  Mexico  a  trav6s,  iv,  545. 
Pefia  only  said  that  Mexico  would  be  "inclined"  to  hear  the  United  States, 
but  of  course  he  would  not,  on  the  ground  of  a  passing  mood,  have  ex- 
pected two  British  ministers  to  act  for  his  nation. 

19.  Bankhead,  nos.  101,  104.  Id.  to  Pakenham,  Oct.  16.  Richardson, 
Messages,  iv,  437-43.     That  Mexico  knew  our  claims  counted  among  the 

differences"  is  proved  by  the  letter  of  Cuevas  to  Forsyth,  July  29,  1837 
(Sen.  1;  25,  2,  p.  Ill):  The  President  is  anxious  for  "that  final  and 
equitable  adjustment  [of  the  claims]  which  is  to  terminate  the  existing 
difficulties  between  the  two  Governments." 

20.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  12  (Buchanan);  13,  14,  17  (Black).  Peiia  to 
Black,  Oct.  14  in  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  1846.  Diario,  Nov.  6. 
34lBlack,  memorial,  Dec.  20,  1847.     Sen.  12;  30,  1. 

21.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  12  (Buchanan).  Ho.  Report  752;  29,  1.  Monitor 
Re-pub.,  Aug.  1,  1846  (Herrera  had  been  determined  to  settle  with  the 
United  States). 

22.  Sen.  325;  27,  2,  p.  64.  Sen.  337;  29,  1,  p.  10.  As  to  Slidell's 
title,  cf .  together  Buchanan  to  Parrott,  Mar.  28 ;  Id.  to  Black,  Sept.  17 ; 


433  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  IV,   PAGES  94-96 

Peiia  to  council  of  state ;    and  report  of  council  of  state.      Polk,  Diary, 
Nov.  6,  9,  10. 

In  Tyler,  Tyler,  iii,  174,  may  be  found  a  statement  from  B.  E.  Green 
to  the  eifect  that  Herrera  sent  word  to  him  that  a  minister  of  the  usual 
sort  could  not  be  received,  and  that  he  transmitted  this  message  to  Polk. 
But  (1),  if  such  was  Herrera's  attitude,  why  was  it  not  made  clear  to 
Black,  who  had  been  expressly  commissioned  to  ascertain  whether  a 
minister  would  be  received;  (2)  Green,  as  a  member  of  the  Calhoun 
faction,  and  perhaps  as  an  official  who  had  lost  a  good  post  in  our  lega- 
tion at  Mexico,  was  not  favorable  to  Polk,  and  a  statement  made  by  a 
prejudiced  person  from  memory  forty-four  years  after  the  event,  regard- 
ing a  delicate  matter  in  which  precision  is  essential,  cannot  be  considered 
at  all  authoritative.  (3)  This  statement  is  out  of  harmony  with  a  number 
of  material  facts.  256Marcy  to  Wetmore,  Feb.  1,  1846 :  Slidell  was  sent 
"on  an  express  agreement  that  a  minister  would  be  received." 

23.  52McLane,  no.  8,  Sept.  26,  1845.  108Kemble  to  Bancroft,  Sept.  3, 
1845.  Dimond,  no.  269,  1845.  Times,  Oct.  14.  (Impatience)  Ho.  60; 
30,  1,  p.  17  (Black).  '  Polk,  Diary,  Nov.  10. 

24.  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  Nov.  10 ;  Dec.  17.  Veracruzano  Libre,  Nov.  30. 
52Comte.  princ.  to  Dimond,  Nov.  30.  Slidell,  Nov.  30;  Dec.  17.  Ho. 
60 ;  30,  1,  p.  22  (Black).  (Fleet)  Conner  to  Dimond,  Oct.  23,  1845  (Wash. 
Union,  Dec.  1,  1847).  Conner  felt  so  sure  of  the  conciliatory  spirit  of  his 
government  that  he  withdrew  without  waiting  for  orders.  California 
was  well  known  to  be  in  a  chronic  state  of  rebellion  (chap,  xvi),  which 
Mexico  had  not  the  power  to  subdue,  and  therefore  it  was  natural  for  one 
who  knew  very  little  about  the  Mexicans  to  suppose  they  would  be  willing 
to  take  a  price  for  the  practically  worthless  claim  to  that  territory. 

The  view  that  Polk  explicitly  instructed  Slidell  to  give  up  the  plan  to 
buy  California  rather  than  allow  that  plan  to  stand  in  the  way  of  regaining 
amicable  relations  with  Mexico  does  not  seem  to  be  correct  (Kelsey, 
Consulate,  62,  note  5).  But  Buchanan's  letter  of  Dec.  17  to  Slidell  lays 
stress  upon  his  "two  last  alternatives,"  which  were  to  purchase  northern 
California,  including  (a)  the  Bay  of  San  Francisco  or  (6)  Monterey  also ; 
yet  he  instructs  Slidell  to  drop  this  matter,  if  pressing  it  would  endanger 
success  in  endeavoring  to  obtain  the  Rio  Grande  boundary  or  a  line  in- 
cluding all  of  New  Mexico.  Now  such  a  settlement  of  the  Texas-New 
Mexico  boundary  would  have  involved  a  restoration  of  amicable  relations 
with  Mexico.  The  two  matters  (boundary  and  relations)  were  inex- 
tricably interwoven  both  in  fact  and  logically.  Hence  in  effect  Buch'  nan 
instructed  Slidell  to  drop  the  plan  of  purchasing  California  if  pressing  it 
would  be  liable  to  prevent  the  restoration  of  amicable  relations  with 
Mexico.  Rives  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  69,  note  2)  takes  a  different  view, 
but  seems  to  have  erred  in  more  particulars  than  one. 

25.  See  pp.  55-6.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  423-31.  52Slidell,  Dec.  17, 
27.  Amigo  del  Pueblo,  Nov.  1:  "It  is  hardly  possible  to  believe  such 
perfidy,  such  baseness  and  such  audacity  .  .  .  treason  more  horrible  has 
never  been  seen."  Patriota  Mexicano,  Nov.  18:  "To  listen  to  talk  of 
peace  from  these  men  [the  Americans]  is  to  take  the  road  to  perdition, 
death,  ignominy."  Voz  del  Pueblo,  Dec.  3:  "The  treason  has  been  dis- 
covered. .  .  .     We  no  longer  own  the  very  ground  on  which  we  walk." 

26.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  22  (Black).  Slidell,  Dec.  29,  1845.  Bankhead, 
no.  127,  1845.  Mexico  £  traves,  iv,  545.  Roa  Barcena,  Recuerdos,  19. 
Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  212.     Black,  Dec.  18. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  IV,   PAGES  96-97  437 

One  of  Pefia's  minor  points  was  that  it  did  not  appear  from  Slidell's 
credentials  that  he  had  been  confirmed  by  the  Senate ;  and  in  fact,  since 
the  American  Congress  had  not  been  in  session  at  the  time  of  his  appoint- 
ment, he  had  not  been.  This  was  not  only  to  inquire  into  our  domestic 
affairs,  but  to  hold  that  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  could  not 
appoint  a  diplomatic  agent  during  a  recess  of  the  Senate.  Shannon's 
letter  of  credence  had  said  nothing  regarding  his  confirmation,  and  Murphy 
had  acted  as  our  charge  in  Texas  for  about  nine  months  before  his  name 
went  to  the  Senate.  Another  point  was  that  Slidell's  letter  of  credence 
did  not  expressly  state  that  he  had  full  powers  for  the  business  in  hand ; 
but  it  was  practically  absurd,  after  the  United  States  had  taken  so  much 
trouble  and  shown  its  good  faith  by  withdrawing  our  fleet,  to  suppose 
that  we  would  send  an  agent  to  Mexico  without  giving  him  the  authority 
to  do  what  we  were  evidently  so  anxious  to  bring  about.  When  this 
complaint  was  brought  to  his  attention,  Slidell  replied  that  his  credentials 
described  him  as  minister  plenipotentiary  and  envoy  extraordinary,  and 
also  that  it  was  not  usual  to  exhibit  one's  full  powers  at  so  early  a  stage 
in  such  negotiations,  adding  that  he  would  have  done  so,  however,  had 
any  desire  to  see  them  been  suggested.  Buchanan  was  doubtless  right 
in  calling  the  objection  a  quibble;  and  one  cannot  suppose  that  under 
different  circumstances  it  would  have  been  presented.  The  council  of 
state  rejected  Pena's  objections  in  both  of  these  cases.  ' 

27.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  31,  58  (Pefia) ;  28  (Black).  52Slidell,  Dec. 
17. 

28.  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  58  (Pefia).  77Relaciones,  circular  to  gov«.,  Dec.  11. 
Comunicaci6n  circular.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec,  1848.  Sen. 
337 ;  29,  1,  pp.  21,  24,  25,  28,  32  (Slidell) ;  22  (Black) ;  25,  30  (Pefia). 
Slidell,  Dec.  17. 

Even  the  unfriendly  Mexican  correspondent  of  the  London  Times  wrote, 
"For  once"  the  United  States  is  right,  for  the  documents  prove  that  Mexico 
made  no  ad  hoc  condition  (Times,  Mar.  13,  1846).  The  matter  can  be 
viewed  in  another  light  also.  Pefia  agreed  to  receive  a  "comisionado" ; 
later  he  said  he  had  agreed  to  receive  a  " comisionado  ad  hoc."  If  the 
words  uad  hoc"  added  anything,  they  indicated  a  difference  between  his 
earlier  and  his  later  positions  ;  if  not,  why  were  they  used  ?  Many  Amer- 
icans, doubtless  without  perceiving  what  the  significance  of  the  act  would 
have  been,  have  insisted  that  the  United  States  ought  to  have  humored 
poor  little  Mexico  by  sending  an  envoy  ad  hoc.  Aside  from  the  weightier 
objection  to  so  doing,  such  a  concession  would  probably  have  led  to  further 
demands  (see  note  34).  Pefia,  instead  of  recognizing  our  magnanimity 
in  taking  the  first  step  to  heal  a  breach  caused  by  Mexico,  described  our 
overture  as  "a  tacit  but  clear  and  strong  confession  of  the  rights  of  Mexico1 
[and]  of  the  wrongs  done  to  her"  (77circular,  Dec.  11).  Gallatin  stated 
that  treaties  of  peace  were  always  negotiated  by  special  commissioners, 
but  this  was  incorrect  (see  e.g.  Jenkinson,  Collection,  iii,  355). 

29.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  1846.  The  council  of  state  said : 
From  the  language  in  which  the  ministry  "explains  the  condition  of  re- 
ceiving the  proposed  envoy  {enviado\  we  cannot  draw  a  satisfactory  reason 
for  not  receiving  Mr.  Slidell."  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  28-49,  56.  Bankhead, 
no.  127,  1845. 

In  his  manifesto  of  July  26,  1846  (Diario,  July  30),  Paredes  mentioned, 
as  third  among  the  causes  of  the  war,  the'  attempt  of  the  United  States 
to  induce  Mexico  to  receive  a  resident  minister,  so  as  to  restore  friendly 


438  NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  IV,   PAGES  98-100 

relations  without   first   making  amends  for  the   offence    [annexation   of 
Texas]  that  had  broken  off  official  intercourse. 

30.  Webster,  Writings,  iv,  32.  R.  C.  Winthrop,  another  leading  Whig, 
took  the  same  ground  {Union,  Mar.  20,  1847).  (Awkward)  Calhoun  in 
Benton's  Abr.  Debates,  xvi,  99. 

31.  Revolution  of  Paredes.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec,  1846 
(including  documents).  Contestaciones  (between  Paredes,  Arista,  and 
the  government,  1845).  Carreno,  Je'es,  clxiii-clxxvii.  Patriota  Mex., 
Dec.  23,  1845.  Ramirez,  Mexico,  80-124.  77Relaciones,  circular,  Jan.  3, 
1846.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  546-56.  56Mexican  corr.  of  London  Times 
to  W.  S.  Parrott,  Nov.  19 ;  Dec.  18.  76Guerra,  circular,  Jan  5.  Dimond, 
nos.  279,  302,  1845.  Aguila  del  Norte,  Feb.  11;  Mar.  18,  1846.  Rivera, 
Gobernantes,  ii,  281-5,  287-8.  Gimenez,  Mems.,  91.  285Tornel  to 
Paredes,  Nov.  19,  1845.  Bankhead,  nos.  94,  97,  116,  119,  120,  124,  1845; 
2,  1846.  Tributo  a  la  Verdad.  56W.  S.  Parrott,  Aug.  16,  29 ;  Sept.  29, 
1845.  Black,  June  10;  Sept.  2,  1845.  Picayune,  Jan.  24,  1846.  Por- 
trait of  Herrera :  city  hall,  Mexico.  London  Times,  Feb.  10 ;  Mar.  2, 
20,  1846.  Monitor  Constit.,  Jan.  1,  16,  1846.  Slidell,  Dec.  27,  1845; 
Jan.  14;  Feb.  6,  1846.     Memorial  Historico,  Jan.  14,  1846. 

The  condition  of  Mexico  on  the  eve  of  this  revolution  was  well  described 
by  the  Revista  Economica  y  Comer -cial:  "The  country  wavers,  goes  back- 
ward, loses  courage,  and  loses  hope,  because  all  the  systems  of  government 
that  it  has  tried,  one  by  one,  have  failed  to  give  the  fruits  promised  by 
their  authors,  and,  worn  out  and  exhausted  by  so  many  and  varied  medi- 
cines that  have  been  applied  in  vain,  it  desires  only  order,  peace,  and  some 
degree  of  security.  Our  men  of  merit,  education,  and  patriotism  are 
silent,  live  in  retirement  and  sadness  in  their  houses,  occupied  solely  with 
private  affairs  ...  we  have  become  a  nation  of  soldiers,  officials,  lawyers, 
clergymen,  and  smugglers,  where  the  number  who  produce  bears  a  miserable 
proportion  to  the  number  of  those  who  live  by  the  labor  and  sweat  of  the 
producers,  and  where  the  continual  political  changes,  the  disorders,  the 
bad  administration  of  justice,  and  the  bad  commercial  and  financial  system 
offer  more  or  less  sustenance  to  those  who  produce  nothing,  always  at  the 
expense  of  the  toilers  and  their  allies,  the  merchants."  The  political 
situation  was  thus  explained  by  El  Siglo  XIX :  "When  a  long  series  of 
civil  dissensions,  of  frauds  upon  the  public,  of  treasons  against  the  parties, 
of  perjuries  to  principles,  have  mixed  up  men  and  things,  blotted  out  the 
line  between  political  groups,  and  confused  all  ideas,  politics  must  become 
a  genuine  chaos.  Mexico  is  in  precisely  that  condition."  When  charged 
with  upsetting  public  order  Paredes  replied,  "None  existed"  (Esperanza, 
Jan.  8,  1846).  As  late  as  Aug.  6,  1846,  Texas  was  called  upon,  like  the 
other  political  divisions  of  the  country,  to  elect  members  of  Congress. 

32.  (Scheme)  52Black,  Dec.  30,  1845 ;  52Slidell,  Dec.  27 ;  297McLane 
to  Polk,  private,  Jan.  17,  1846;  Memorial  Historico,  Jan.  26,  and  the 
Mexican  press  generally.  Slidell  saw  grounds  for  hope :  the  delay  in 
furnishing  him  an  escort ;  a  possibility  that  Paredes  might  hold  that 
Herrera  had  committed  Mexico;  the  improbability  that  money  to  pay 
the  troops  could  be  borrowed  while  war  seemed  likely  (hence  he  sent  a 
hint  to  the  government  that  money  could  be  obtained  by  accepting  a 
boundary  satisfactory  to  the  United  States) ;  Castillo,  with  whom  he 
had  talked  a  number  of  times  before  he  became  minister  of  relations,  was 
intelligent  and  averse  to  a  war  with  the  United  States.  Buchanan  to 
Slidell,  Jan.  20,  28 ;   Mar.  12. 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  V,   PAGES   100-103  439 

33.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  63  (Slidell).  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  1846. 
The  council  said  that  Slidell  could  not  be  received  on  any  footing,  unless 
Taylor  (now  at  Corpus  Christi)  should  retire.  "The  limiting  of  the  mis- 
sion of  the  comisionado  to  the  sole  question  of  Texas,"  it  remarked,  "was 
a  tacit  condition  (una  condition  lacita)."  This  admitted  once  more  that 
the  condition  was  not  stated.  The  council  admitted  also  that  comisio- 
nado was  not  the  proper  term  for  an  envoy  ad  hoc,  which  refutes  again 
the  contention  of  a  certain  American  school  that  Mexico  explicitly  required 
us  to  send  a  "commissioner"  instead  of  a  minister.  Castillo's  reply  to 
Slidell  (Mar.  12)  said :  Mexico  cannot  have  agreed  to  receive  a  regular 
minister,  for  it  would  have  been  imprudent  to  do  that;  by  fraud  and 
violence  the  fair  province  of  Texas  has  been  stolen ;  and  now,  after  robbing 
and  outraging  Mexico,  your  country  seeks  to  obtain  a  pretext  for  war  by 
demanding  of  us  the  impossible  humiliation  of  receiving  you  (Ho.  60 ;  30, 
1,  p.  67).  At  this  time  Castillo  did  not  know  that  Taylor  was  advancing 
toward  the  Rio  Grande  (Diario,  Mar.  15,  1846).  166Slidell  to  Conner, 
Feb.  7 ;  Mar.  15. 

34.  Mar.  17  Slidell  answered  Castillo  at  some  length  (Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
p.  72),  vindicating  the  course  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  Texas. 
All  the  threats  of  war,  he  pointed  out,  have  come  from  Mexico ;  to  sup- 
pose that  the  present  Mexican  administration  in  particular  does  not  intend 
to  fight,  would  be  to  accuse  it  of  declaring,  in  order  to  overthrow  Herrera, 
what  it  did  not  mean ;  so  far  as  words  can  produce  war  it  already  exists 
by  the  act  of  Mexico,  and  is  the  United  States  to  remain  entirely  passive, 
taking  no  precautions,  till  your  army  "shall  be  prepared  to  strike,  with 
due  effect,  the  threatened  blow?"  Slidell  at  the  same  time  requested 
his  passports.  Castillo  to  Slidell,  March  21  (Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones, 
1846)  declared  the  discussion  closed  and  transmitted  passports.  April  23 
Paredes  said  in  a  manifesto  that  he  rejected  Slidell  because  "the  dignity 
of  the  nation  resented  this  new  insult"  (Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  559).  In 
view  of  the  grounds  on  which  his  revolution  had  been  launched  (73Ber- 
mudez  de  Castro,  no.  200,  res.,  1846)  he  could  not  have  received  Slidell 
without  grave  danger  to  himself  (Black,  May  26,  1846;  Slidell,  no.  11). 
See  chap,  viii,  note  24.  Slidell  sailed  from  Vera  Cruz  on  March  31,  but 
at  Polk's  request  he  retained  his  commission  and  held  himself  in  readiness 
to  go  to  Mexico  again  for  about  a  year  (Moore,  Buchanan,  vii,  211 ;  52Sli- 
dell,  no.  14,  1847). 

V.   THE   MEXICAN  ATTITUDE  ON   THE   EVE  OF  WAR 

1.  Mexican  feeling.  (Subjugate)  52Consul  Black,  no.  349,  Oct.  9,  1845; 
47Wood  to  Bancroft,  June  4,  1846.  52Slidell,  nos.  3,  10.  52Consul 
McCall,  Tampico,  no.  65,  Sept.  26,  1845.  (All  of  Mexico)  52Shannon, 
no.  3,  Oct.  28,  1844.  (Threat)  Diario,  Mar.  25,  1845;  77Relaciones, 
circular,  Nov.  27,  1846 ;  So.  Qtrly.  Rev.,  Apr.,  1849,  97,  102 ;  Thompson, 
Recoils.,  238 ;  London  Spectator,  Sept.  26,  1846.  (Hinder)  52Manifiesto 
of  Vera  Cruz  legislature,  [June,  1827];  Poinsett's  reply;  52Poinsett's 
reply  to  Mex.  state  legisl.,  Aug.,  1829;  Shannon,  no.  3;  La  Ruina  de 
los  Mexicanos.  (Indians)  Mosquito  Mexicano,  Aug.  4,  1835 ;  75gov.  Du- 
rango,  Apr.  27,  1846.  (Privileged  classes)  J.  H.  Smith  in  Proceeds. 
Amer.  Antiq.  Soc,  Apr.,  1914,  and  the  citations  there  given.  (Siglo  XIX) 
56W.  S.  Parrott,  June  29,  1845.  (Politicians)  Green,  nos.  8,  103,  1844 ; 
Calhoun  Corresp.,  975;   Shannon,  no.  3,  1844,  and  the  Mexican  press. 


440  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  V,   PAGES   104-106 

The  following  citations,  which  might  be  indefinitely  extended,  bear 
upon  various  aspects  of  the  subject.  Pakenham,  nos.  74  of  1828;  74  of 
1829.  Bankhead,  nos.  38,  1845 ;  28,  58,  1846.  345Ellis,  Sept.  20,  1839. 
Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  1846.  Voz  del  Pueblo,  Mar.  29;  May  3, 
1845.     Amigo  del  Pueblo,  June  26;    Oct.  9,  1845.     Orizaveno,  Mar.  30, 

1845.  Patriota  Mex.,  Nov.  14,  1845.  Monitor  Repub.,  Jan.  28,  1847. 
Reflexiones  sobre  la  Memoria.  Comunicaci6n  circular  que.  77Almonte, 
no.  130,  priv.,  1844.  77Arrangoiz,  no.  50,  res.,  1845.  Decree  of  Mex. 
Cong.,  June  4,  1845  (broadside).  56W.  S.  Parrott,  June  29;  July  5,  1845. 
108Kemble  to  Bancroft,  Sept.  3,  184  5. 

2.  (Danger)  76  Gov.  Ibarra  of  Puebla,  Sept.  5,  1846;  Diario,  Apr.  17, 
1846;  77Relaciones,  circular,  Nov.  27,  1846;  law  of  June  4,  1845,  in 
Dublan,  Legislacion,  v,  19;  Monitor  Re-pub.,  May  15,  1847;  London 
Spectator,  Sept.  26,  etc.,  1846.  C.  M.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernrl,  i,  45. 
Castillo  ;  council  of  state  (chap.  iv).     (Paredes)  Bankhead,  no.  28,  Feb.  27, 

1846.  (Chief)  Shannon,  no.  3,  1844;  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  iv,  app.,  182; 
Diario,  Mar.  25,  1845 ;  Mar.  25 ;  Sept.  26 ;  Dec.  6,  1846 ;  80'egislat.  of 
Mex.  state,  address,  Apr.  26,  1847 ;  Patriota  Mex.,  Nov.  14,  1845 ;  77Ar- 
rang6iz,  no.  50,  res.,  Mar.  13,  1845;  Sigh  XIX,  Nov.  30,  1845. 
(Clamored)  Amigo  del  Pueblo,  Oct.  9,  1845;  Voz  del  Pueblo,  Mar.  29, 
1845.     (Superiority)  Tornel,  Tejas,  95 ;   Monitor  Repub.,  May  12,  1846. 

3.  (Abject)  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corresp.,  993.  77Almonte,  June  19, 
priv.;  Sept.  20,  1844;  Mar.  17,  priv.,  1845.  (Panic)  Amer.  Review, 
Sept.,  1845,  222. 

4.  To  precisely  what  extent  European  journals  were  read  in  Mexico 
cannot  be  determined ;  but  it  seems  probable  that  few  important  expres- 
sions escaped  notice  there,  and  certainly  the  leading  journals  were  quoted 
freely. 

5.  (Differences)  77Almonte,  June  19,  priv.,  1844;  77Relaciones,  cir- 
cular, Nov.  27,  1846 ;  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corresp.,  994 ;  Constitutionnel, 
May  12 ;  Aug.  5,  1845.     Times,  Apr.  15,  1845.     Diario,  Apr.  3,  1845. 

6.  Times,  Apr.  15,  1845.  Negrete,  Mexico,  xxi,  130.  13Elliot,  July  3, 
1845.  Gorostiza,  Dictamen.  Reflexiones  sobre  la  Memoria.  Federaci6n 
y  Tejas.  T  rnel,  Tejas,  95-7.  (Elliot  in  Mex.)  Smith,  Annex,  of 
Texas,  411-3.     77Deffa  dis,  July  29,  1835. 

7.  Britannia,  Feb.  15,  1845.  (1812)  Negrete,  Mexico,  xxi,  130. 
13Pakenham  to  Harvey,  July  20,  1839.  Times,  Apr.  5,  1845.  77Ar- 
rang6iz,  no.  65,  res.,  Apr.  23,  1845. 

8.  345Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  May  26,  1846  (Swarms  of  the  best  ir- 
regular cavalry  that  I  have  ever  seen).  Watson,  Tayloe,  113-4  (The 
British,  Spanish,  and  Prussian  ministers  at  Washington  agreed  that  Scott 
would  be  beaten;  Calder6n  spoke  as  quoted  in  the  text).  (Generals) 
Wash.  Union,  Dec.  18,  1846.     Elliot,  note  6.     Times,  July  5,  1845. 

Napoleon  said,  "The  first  quality  of  a  soldier  is  constancy  in  enduring 
fatigue  and  hardship"  (Maxims,  47).  In  this  quality  the  Mexicans 
excelled. 

9.  Requena  in  Monitor  Repub.,  Mar.  9,  1846.  Negrete,  Mexico,  xxi, 
131.  (Boasted)  52 W.  S.  Parrott,  Dec.  14,  1835.  Memoria  de  .  .  . 
Relaciones,  Jan.,  1849.  Boletin  Oficial,  Apr.  15,  1845.  Apuntes,  168. 
Thompson,  Recoils.,  170-1.  (Self-confidence)  M~fras,  Explor.,  i,  70. 
76Min.  war,  circular,  Nov.  11.  (Ensure)  Diario,  Sept.  25,  1845.  (Voz 
del  P.)     Federaci6n  y  Tejas. 

10.  (Texas)  Tornel,  Tejas,  95-7 ;    13Bankhead,  no.  125,  Dec.  30,  1845. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  V,  PAGES  107-113  441 

77Almonte,  no.  72,  priv.,  June  19;  Sept.  20,  1844;  instructions  to  G.  de 
la  Vega,  Apr.  10,  1844.  13Pakenham,  no.  22,  Apr.  14,  1844.  Elliot, 
note  6.  (Urged)  Negrete,  Mexico,  xxi,  131-2.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Re- 
laciones,  Jan.,  1849. 

11.  Requena  in  Monitor  Repub.,  Mar.  9,  1846.     London  Times,  June  11, 

1846.  345Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  May  26,  1846.  Britannia,  June  10, 
1844.  169Rives  to  Crittenden,  Feb.  8,  1847.  137Clemson  to  Calhoun, 
Mar.  28,  1847.     Elliot,  note  6. 

12.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Jan.,  1849.  77Cuevas,  no.  67,  1836. 
(Herald)  Diario,  June  4,  1845.  (Globe)  Charleston  Mercury,  Sept.  8,  1845. 
Some  of  the  documents  quoted  above  are  later  than  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  but  the  opinions  must  have  existed  before. 

13.  (Defensive)  Requena,  note  11.     77Arrang6iz,  no.  129,  res.,  Nov.  29, 

1844.  Times,  Apr.  5,  1845.  Britannia,  June  10,  1844.  Times  in  Diario 
of  June  8,  1845. 

14.  Herald,  May  3,  1845.     77Arrang6iz,  note  13 ;   no.  101,  res.,  July  8, 

1845.  (Tornel)  47\Vood  to  Bancroft,  July  4,  1846.  (Own)  Nat.  Intelli- 
gencer, Sept.  5 ;  Savannah  Republican,  Aug.  25 ;  N.  Y.  Herald,  Aug.  30, 
1845.     Times  of  Apr.  5,  1845,  in  Diario  of  June  8. 

15.  Standard,  Aug.  12,  1845.  13Pakenham,  no.  22,  Apr.  14,  1844. 
(Fig  red)  Bulnes,  Grandes  Mentiras,  150. 

16.  (Endured)  73Bermiidez  de  Castro,  no.  532,  res.,  Sept.  24,  1846; 
77circular,  Nov.  27,  1846.  (Credit)  London  Times,  Apr.  15,  1845;  and 
chap,  xxxiii.  77Arrang6iz,  no.  36,  res.,  May  23,  1844.  Constitutionnel, 
Aug.  15,  1845. 

17.  Benefits.  77Cuevas,  no.  67,  July  13,  1836.  Diario,  Mar.  25,  1845. 
52Green,  Apr.  8,  1844.  Reflexiones  sobre  la  Memoria.  Times,  Apr.  15, 
1845.  52Shannon,  no.  3,  Oct.  28,  1844.  56W.  S.  Parrott,  July  5,  1845. 
Siglo  XIX,  Aug.  1,  1845.  (Baptize)  La  Verdad  Desnuda.  (Blockade) 
52Thompson,  Oct.  3,  1843;  Macedonian,  Mar.  28,  1845;  13Doyle,  no.  79, 
Oct.  30,  1843.  (Voz  del  P.)  Federaci6n  y  Tejas.  (Crisis)  Reflexiones 
sobre  la  Memoria. 

18.  Central  and  South  America.  J.  M.  L.  Mora,  pamphlet,  1834. 
Diario,  Sept.  25,  1846.  (Press)  chap,  vi,  note  13.  77Cuevas,  no.  67, 
July  13,  1836.  77Mex.  min.,  Lima,  no.  23,  Aug.  15,  1837.  (Dorsey) 
Savannah  Republican,  Aug.  25,  1842.  Adams,  Mems.,  xi,  340,  367. 
Imparcial,  June  13,  1844.  Aurora  de  la  lAbertad,  Apr.  6,  1845.  Re- 
laciones, circular,  Nov.  27,  1846.     80Legisl.  of  Mex.  state,  address,  Apr.  26, 

1847.  76Gov.  Ibarra,  Sept.  5,  1846.  312Basadre  to  S.  Anna,  Apr.  9, 
1847.     Roa  Barcena,  Reeuerdos,  243,  note. 

19.  Diario,  Apr.  3,  1845.  Mail,  Aug.  30  in  Diario,  Nov.  1.  London 
Times,  Sept.  10,  1845  (War  is  "clearly  the  duty"  of  Mexico).  Journal 
des  Debats,  Sept.  24,  1845.     (The  European  outlook)  Chap  xxxv. 

20.  (Jealousy)  Mayer,  War,  82;  Amer.  Review,  Jan.,  1846.  (Policy) 
J.  H.  Smith  in  Proceeds.  Am.  Antiq.  Soc,  Apr.,  1914.  Correspondant, 
Jan.  1,  1846.     London  Times,  Jan.  1,  1846. 

21.  (Cotton)  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  89,  90.  (Checked)  Ibid.,  382, 
389 ;  Tornel,  Tejas,  97 ;  London  Standard,  May  2,  1845 ;  Times,  Sept.  9 ; 
Dec.  15,  1845;  Jan.  1,  1846.  (Guizot)  Niles,  Mar.  14,  1846,  pp.  25-6. 
(Journal  des  Debats)  National,  Dec.  27,  1845. 

22.  (Texas)  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  chap,  xviii.  Id.  in  Mass.  Hist. 
Soc.  Proceeds.,  June,  1914.  Morning  Herald,  Mar.  27,  1845,  in  Diario, 
June  4.     Times,  Dec.  15,  1845. 


442  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER   V,   PAGES   113-116 

23.  Times,  Aug.  6;  Sept.  9,  1845.  (It  was  the  Mexico  correspondent 
of  the  Times  who  spoke,  but  evidently  the  editor  allowed  him  to  be  heard.) 
Standard,  May  2,  1845.  Journal  of  Commerce,  Sept.  6,  1845.  Journal 
des  Debats,  Feb.  4 ;  Sept.  24,  1845.  Constitutional,  May  12,  1845.  Moni- 
tor Constit.,  supplmt.,  Dec.  21,  1844.     Aurora  de  la  Libertad,  Apr.  6,  1845. 

24.  Journal  des  Debats,  Sept.  24,  1845.  13Pakenham,  no.  22,  Apr.  14, 
1844.     (Blockade)  13Bankhead,  no.  162,  Oct.  30,  1846. 

25.  (Fear)  Boletin  Oficial,  Apr.  15,  1845.  (Guarantee)  13Bankhead, 
no.  117,  Nov.  29,  1845. 

26.  13Bankhead,  nos.  113,  Nov.  29,  1845;  125,  Dec.  30,  1845;  14, 
Jan.  30,  1846 ;  28,  Feb.  27,  1846 ;  52McLane,  nos.  8,  Sept.  26,  1845 ;  55, 
June  18,  1846;  52Shannon,  no.  9,  Mar.  27,  1845;  52Slidell,  Jan.  14; 
Feb.  6,  1846;  Correspondant,  May  1,  1846;  Times,  Mar.  13,  1846;  Ho. 
2;  29,  1,  pp.  139-92;  52J.  Parrott,  June  4,  1846.  52Dimond,  no.  332, 
Apr.  22,  1846 :  The  Mexican  thermometer  for  peace  or  war  is  governed 
by  the  prospects  of  war  between  us  and  England.  The  contemptuous 
and  abusive  tone  of  the  British  journals  with  reference  to  the  United 
States  encouraged  Mexico.  Our  minister  at  London  reported  that  the 
British  press  as  a  whole  represented  that  the  United  States  could  not 
wage  war  successfully  against  Mexico  (297McLane  to  Polk,  received, 
June  21,  1846).  77Murphy,  no.  9,  Aug.  1,  1845  (Aberdeen  would  like  to 
see,  etc.). 

27.  52Slidell,  Jan.  14,  1846.  Times,  Mar.  13,  1846.  52McLane,  no. 
55,  June  18,  1846.  (Hoped)  13Bankhead,  no.  31,  Mar.  10,  1846 ;  Tornel, 
Tejas,  97. 

28.  Diario,  Mar.  25,  1845.  (Enthusiasm,  veil)  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Re- 
laciones,  Jan.,  1849.  77Almonte,  no.  72,  priv.,  June  19,  1844.  Monitor 
Constit.,  supplmt.,  Dec.  21,  1844.  Almonte  (who,  as  recently  minister  to 
the  United  States,  had  great  influence  on  the  question  of  peace  or  war) 
held  that  Mexico  ought  to  fight  and  protract  the  war  as  long  as  possible 
in  order  to  make  us  so  tired  of  it  that  we  should  never  repeat  the  experi- 
ment (13Pakenham,  no.  119,  Sept.  28,  1846).  Espectador,  Apr.  25,  1846 
("We  are  profoundly  convinced  of  the  triumph  of  the  Mexican  arms"). 
Reforma,  Mar.  9,  1846.  13Bankhead,  nos.  130,  Sept.  7,  1846  ("They 
cannot  be  convinced"  of  their  inability  to  fight  the  U.  S.) ;  151,  Oct.  10, 
1846  (The  cry  of  the  government  is,  "a  levy  of  40,000  men  and  make 
terms  only  on  the  other  side  of  the  Nueces").  (Prussian)  256Memo. 
(Historians)  Roa  Barcena,  Recuerdos,  19-20;  Balbontm,  Estado  Militar, 
58.  Ramirez,  Mexico,  235.  S.  Anna,  proclaim,  Sept.  16,  1847,  in  Monitor 
Repub.,  Oct.  2,  1847.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Jan.,  1849.  Kenly, 
Md.  Volunteer,  57 :  After  a  long  stay  in  Mexico  I  believe  the  sentiment 
of  the  people  was  "unanimous  for  war."  Franklin  Pierce,  speech,  Jan.  27, 
1848 :  After  conversing  with  the  most  intelligent  men  in  Mexico  I  was 
satisfied  that  the  war  was  unavoidable  (N.  Y.  Herald,  Feb.  5,  1848). 
Other  documents,  too  numerous  to  be  cited,  assisted  the  author  in  reaching 
his  conclusions.  This  condition  of  the  Mexican  mind  helps  to  explain  the 
rejection  of  Slidell.     See  also  chap,  ix,  pp.  221-2. 

VI.   THE  AMERICAN  ATTITUDE  ON  THE   EVE  OF  WAR 

1.  Buchanan  in  Cong.  Globe,  28,  1,  app.,  723.  For  public  sentiment 
regarding  the  Santa  Fe  prisoners  see  the  New  Orleans  papers  of  March, 
1842  {e.g.  Com.  Bulletin,  Mar.  18),  and  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  31-2. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VI,  PAGES  117-123  443 

52Consul  Dimond,  Jan.  20,  1843.  (Sentmanat)  52Consul  Porter,  July  20, 
1844.  Sentmanat's  party  included  several  Americans.  (Reptiles)  77Clip- 
ping  from  New  Orleans  Bee.  State  Sentinel,  Sept.  27,  1845.  (American 
prisoners)  N.  Orl.  Comm.  Bull,  Mar.  18,  1844.  Ark.  Hist.  Comm., 
Bulletin  no.  6,  p.  182. 

2.  The  statements  regarding  American  feeling  appear  to  be  self-evident. 
In  the  daily  press  the  author  has  found  abundant  proof  of  them,  but  it 
would  require  a  great  deal  of  space  to  prove  inductively  the  state  of  public 
sentiment.     42Delegates,  Feb.  12,  1847. 

3.  These  statements  also  are  presented  as  conclusions  based  upon  an 
extended  examination  of  the  daily  press  (see  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  472), 
speeches  in  Congress,  etc.  For  example,  the  remarks  made  in  Congress 
with  reference  to  Jackson's  request  for  authority  to  adopt  forcible  measures 
(p.  77  of  this  volume)  contained  many  kind  references  to  Mexico.  This 
feeling  persisted.  In  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  Dec.  9,  1845,  its  Washing- 
ton correspondent  stated  that  he  found  the  Democrats  of  both  houses  of 
Congress  sincerely  desired  the  friendship  and  confidence  of  that  country. 
Id.,  Oct.  17,  1845.  Note  the  first  page  of  chap,  xxxvi.  For  anti-slavery 
accusations :  J.  Q.  Adams  in  Boston  Atlas,  Oct.  17,  1842  (Smith,  Annex, 
of  Texas,  131).  For  the  use  of  money  to  influence  the  American  press: 
ibid.,  184. 

4.  (Forbearance)  N.  Orl.  Bee,  Feb.  19,  1846 ;  Picayune,  May  5,  1846 ; 
Guard,  May  15,  1846;  N.  Orl.  Comm.  Bull,  Mar.  16,  1846,  and  infra. 
52Van  Buren  to  Butler,  Oct.  16,  1829.  13Count  E.  de  Lillers  to  Gutierrez 
[Mar.,  1830].  (Jackson)  Chap,  iii,  p.  77.  (Imbecility)  Picayune,  June  23, 
1842. 

5.  Picayune,  Apr.  6,  1842.  (Webster)  Sen.  320 ;  27,  2,  p.  205.  Sen. 
411 ;  27,  2.     (Less  willing)  Chap,  iii,  p.  80.     Jeff.  Repub.,  Aug.  7,  1845. 

6.  Republican,  Feb.  2,  1846.  Picayune,  Jan.  28,  1846.  Delta,  Jan.  21, 
1846.     Mo.  Reporter,  Apr.  18,  1846.     Comm.  Bulletin,  Mar.  16,  1846. 

7.  Mex.  consul,  no.  79,  Apr.  1,  1842.  (Justly)  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas, 
"England"  in  index.  (Influence)  Ibid.,  72,  136,  1£3;  56W.  S.  Parrott, 
June  4,  1846  ("Mexico  may  be  said  to  be  completely  in  the  hands  of  Eng- 
land").    Commonwealth,  Feb.  23,  1846.     Times,  Nov.  21,  1845. 

8.  Natchez  Courier  and  Journal,  Apr.  14,  1846.  Courrier  des  E.  U.  in 
Memphis  Enquirer,  Feb.  24,  1846.  E.g.  Picayune,  Feb.  5,  1846.  Cong. 
Globe,  29,  1,  p.  256  (Hannegan). 

9.  Delta,  Mar.  27 :  the  pending  difficulties  must  be  settled  effectually. 
La.  Courier,  Mar.  6:  "The  time  has  arrived  when  the  U.  S.  must  decide 
to  act  firmly  and  put  an  end  to  the  uncertainty  of  our  relations  with 
Mexico."  Picayune,  Jan.  24  :  "While  our  relations  remain  in  this  miser- 
able condition,  our  territory  is  liable  to  sudden  invasion  and  our  citizens 
to  arbitrary  exactions  ...  the  intrigues  of  trans-Atlantic  states  demand 
to  be  counteracted,  and  the  hostile  purposes  of  Mexico  need  to  be  met 
with  peremptory  measures."  St.  Louis  Reporter,  Jan.  31:  "Delay  on 
our  part  to  bring  to  a  positive  settlement  all  existing  difficulties  with 
Mexico  would  be  mere  madness  and  folly."  Picayune,  May  5  :  "There  is 
no  proposition  in  mathematics  more  absolutely  demonstrable  than  the 
impossibility  of  having  a  good  understanding  with  Mexico  before  giving 
her  a  sound  drubbing."  (Designs)  Id.,  Dec.  30,  1845;  Feb.  5,  1846. 
52Consul  Campbell,  Jan.  7,  1846. 

10.  (Abolitionists)  N.  Orl.  Comm.  Bulletin,  Mar.  18,  1842.  (Calhoun) 
Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  209,  211,  213-6.     Calhoun's  remark  was  given 


444  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VI,  PAGES   123-125 

to  the  author  by  Judge  Martin  of  South  Carolina,  to  whom  it  was~made 
in  the  spring  of  1847,  and  is  fully  in  line  with  Calhoun's  action.  (Missis- 
sippi) The  author  thinks  he  has  heard  Dr.  Wm.  E.  Dodd  of  the  University 
of  Chicago  express  such  an  opinion. 

11.  E.g.  Ills.  State  Register,  Dec.  27,  1844:  "If  war  shall  ensue,  let  it 
not  close  until  the  empire  of  Mexico"  is  added  to  the  Union;  Baker  of 
Illinois  in  House,  Jan.  29,  1846 :  "  We  must  have  California,  and  perhaps 
all  Mexico"  (Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  p.  279).  Besides  this  feeling  there  was 
a  general  territorial  ambition,  which  looked  in  an  indefinite  way  to  a 
rather  distant  future  and  a  peaceful,  natural  extension. 

12.  American  Review,  Sept.,  1845,  227.  No  Burr  was  needed,  however, 
to  plant  these  seeds. 

13.  (Consul)  13Salkeld  to  Crawford,  Feb.  25,  1830.  (1835)  Journal 
des  Debats,  May  25,  1848.  13Elliot  to  Pakenham,  Apr.  14,  1843.  (News 
and  Tribune)  Nashville  Union,  Aug.  5,  1845.  Plebeian,  Mar.  1,  1845: 
"The  whole  world  cannot  resist  our  onward  march,  until  our  proud  flag 
waves  over  every  inch  of  territory  on  the  continent  of  North  America." 
253Sanders  to  McLean,  Dec.  29,  1846:  "The  people  if  not  wicked  are 
rapacious  and  Anglo-Saxon-like  prefer  conquest  to  principle."  The 
Oregon  discussion  revealed  clearly  the  thirst  for  territory  (Cong.  Globe, 
29,  1,  app.,  e.g.  Smith,  Hunter,  Pollock,  Rockwell,  Toombs,  pp.  104,  89, 
120,  129,  133.  W.  H.  Seward,  Mar.  31,  1846:  "The  popular  passion  for 
territorial  aggrandizement  is  irresistible"  (Works,  iii,  409).  N.  Y.  Herald, 
June  15,  1844.     Livermore,  War,  12. 

14.  Herald,  Aug.  30,  1845.  (Illinois)  Everett,  Recoils.,  194.  W.  E. 
Dodd  in  Ills.  State  Hist.  Soc.  Trans.,  1912,  p.  17.  Indiana  State  Sentinel, 
1845,  passim.  (Debt)  Green,  Repudiation,  13.  American  Review,  Sept., 
1845,  p.  227.  (Calhoun)  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corresp.,  692.  Lyell,  Second 
Visit,  ii,  257.  Livermore,  War,  6,  8,  10.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  49. 
(Powerful)  New  Englander,  v,  318-9;  206J.  Graham  to  Gov.  G.,  Jan.  4, 
1846. 

15.  Herald,  Aug.  30,  1845.  News  in  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Sept.  4,  1845. 
Journ.  of  Comm.,  May  21,  1845.  Gen.  Worth  wrote  in  the  autumn  of 
1845 :  "Our  people  will  not  rest  satisfied  without  a  war  with  some  power" 
(N.  Y.  Times,  July  16,  1916).  Claiborne  (Quitman,  i,  310) :  the  people 
"demanded  war  and  were  determined  to  have  it."  For  information  re- 
garding the  state  of  mind  prevailing  in  western  Tennessee  and  the  adjacent 
regions  the  author  is  greatly  indebted  to  Gov.  James  D.  Porter  of  Nash- 
ville, who  was  a  young  man  at  the  time  of  the  Mexican  war.  The  fact 
that  hunting  occupied  the  place  of  work  had  no  little  influence.  (Hunting) 
Rose,  McCulloch,  29. 

16.  Comm.  Bulletin,  Mar.  17,  1842.  (Wealth)  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas, 
49.  (Willing)  Tribune,  May  11,  1845.  2101.  E.  Holmes  to  Hammond, 
May  10,  1846  (The  Westerners  want  to  despoil  the  churches  and  planta- 
tions). (Letter)  Globe,  Aug.  25,  1845.  News  in  Mobile  Herald  and 
Tribune,  Sept.  7,  1845.  The  Whigs  were  of  course  inclined  on  partisan 
grounds  to  denounce  the  Democratic  party  and  the  administration  for 
every  sign  of  hostility  to  Mexico,  and  to  maintain  that  if  the  Texas  policy 
of  their  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  Henry  Clay,  had  been  followed 
there  would  have  been  no  danger  of  war.  Indeed,  it  would  seem  at  first 
sight  as  if  they  could  have  found  no  logical  escape  from  this  position. 
But  they  were  able  to  say,  particularly  in  the  south:  We  opposed  im- 
mediate annexation ;  we  predicted  that  it  would  cause  trouble  with  Mexico ; 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VI,   PAGES   125-128  445 

but  the  country  voted  that  way,  and  now  as  patriotic  Americans  we  accept 
the  consequences.  Sentiment  in  favor  of  fighting  Mexico  was  by  no  means 
confined  to  the  Democrats. 

17.  (" Slaves")  N.  Qrl.  Comm.  Bulletin  in  Savannah  Republican,  Aug.  15, 
1845.  The  popular  American  idea  of  a  Mexican  was  a  fat  face,  a  double 
chin,  a  muddy  complexion,  a  bloated  body,  coarse  appetites,  a  crude  or- 
ganization generally,  and  no  brains  to  speak  of  above  the  ears  —  only 
enough  to  talk  with.  Spanish  rule  and  the  mixture  of  Indian  blood  had 
tended  naturally  to  produce  something  of  this  sort,  but  finer  types  were 
very  numerous  and  sometimes  brilliant.  (Soldiery)  N.  Y.  Tribune,  May  11, 
1845;  354Welles  papers.  (Picture)  Comm.  Bulletin,  Mar.  17,  1842. 
"Who's  for  Mexico?"  ran  Colonel  Dakin's  advertisement  in  the  New 
Orleans  Tropic;  "All  who  may  feel  disposed  to  make  a  pleasant  excursion 
to  the  Frontiers  of  Mexico  (and  perhaps  to  explore  some  parts  of  that  coun- 
try) will  find  all  the  means  and  facilities  requisite  by  enrolling  themselves 
in  the  Regiment  of  Louisiana  Volunteers"  (Phila.  No.  American,  Aug.  27, 
1845). 

18.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Sept.  4.  Picayune,  Aug.  27.  Enquirer,  Aug.  10. 
Union,  Aug.  21,  1845;  Feb.  10,  1847.  Reveille,  Aug.  28.  ("Go")  Pica- 
yune, Aug.  17.     297Buchanan  to  McLane,  Sept.  13. 

19.  (News)  Mobile  Herald  and  Tribune,  Sept.  7 ;  Oct.  22,  1845.  Less 
was  said  for  a  time,  but  probably  no  less  was  felt.  Of  course  the  New 
Englanders  did  not  share  the  sentiment  very  fully.  The  South  Atlantic 
states  —  influenced  by  Calhoun  and,  as  Poinsett  admitted  (192to  Lewis, 
Jan.  5,  1846),  by  the  dread  of  privateers  —  did  not  feel  sure  that  the  stake 
was  worth  the  risk.  But  the  total  sentiment  in  favor  of  war  with  Mexico 
was  tremendous.  Calhoun  himself  recognized  that  the  country  stood 
that  way  (Jameson,  Cal.  Corresp.,  704  to  T.  G.  C).  Correspondent, 
Apr.  15,  1846.  Enquirer,  Jan.  20,  1846.  Mo.  Reporter,  Apr.  18,  1846. 
210Hammond  to  Simms,  Mar.  21,  1847. 

20.  (Glory)  345Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  Mar.  9,  1848.  (Power)  Jame- 
son, Calhoun  Corresp.,  728.  (Oregon)  Pendleton,  Stephens,  76.  (Re- 
elected) Johnston  and  Browne,  Stephens,  200.  (Bancroft)  Schouler,  U.  S., 
iv,  498 ;  Howe,  Bancroft,  i,  288,  2$0.  The  subject  of  California  will  be 
discussed  fully  in  chap,  xvi,  but  in  order  to  allay  prejudice  it  is  touched 
upon  here. 

21.  See  "Office-seekers"  in  index  of  Polk's  Diary. 

22.  Anson  Jones,  the  last  President  of  the  Texas  republic,  asserted  in 
his  book  that  Polk  was  " pre-determined  to  have  a  war"  with  Mexico  (p. 
46).  As  evidence  he  maintained  that  Donelson,  the  United  States  minister 
in  Texas,  under  the  pretext  of  defending  Texas  against  an  unreal  danger 
of  invasion,  brought  into  that  country  American  troops  in  order  to  ensure 
a  collision  with  Mexico ;  but  (1)  Donelson  fully  believed  that  Texas  was 
in  danger  of  invasion,  and  (2)  there  were  ample  grounds  for  th^t  opinion 
(Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  449).  Moreover  Donelson,  instead  of  hurrying 
our  troops  into  Texas,  was  very  anxious  that  none  should  cross  her  frontier 
until  after  her  full  acceptance  of  annexation,  which  could  not  occur  before 
July  4,  1845  (ibid.,  446,  448,  456) ;  and  we  have  seen  how  threatening 
were  the  language  and  movements  of  Mexico  at  that  stage.  As  Texas 
became  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  part  of  the  United  States  on  accept- 
ing our  proposition,  the  duty  to  protect  her  people  was  then  clear. 

Jones  also  asserted  that  agents  of  Polk  urged  him  to  send  the  Texas 
militia  against  Mexico  in  the  spring  of  1845  in  order  to  bring  about  a  war ; 


446  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VI,   PAGE  128 

but  this  is  misleading  (Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  446-8).  The  confidential 
orders  given  to  Conner  and  Stockton  of  the  navy  and  the  correspondence 
between  the  state  department  and  Donelson  prove  that  Polk's  adminis- 
tration had  not  the  least  intention  of  adopting  at  this  time  an  aggressive 
course  toward  Mexico. 

Finally,  Jones  stated  that  he  received  clear  proof  of  his  charge  from 
Texan  agents  at  Washington.  He  admitted,  however,  that  (although 
he  does  not  appear  to  have  lost  any  other  important  documents)  he  had 
mislaid  their  reports ;  and  his  assertion  is  inconsistent  with  known  facts. 
For  example,  he  said  (p.  491)  that  Lee,  one  of  these  agents,  reported  about 
September  13  that  he  found  Polk,  Marcy,  Walker  and  Ritchie  "excessively 
angry"  with  Jones  for  not  consenting,  months  before,  to  an  attack  upon 
Mexico ;  but  Lee  did  in  fact  report,  September  6  and  8,  that  he  was  re- 
ceived "cordially"  by  Polk,  Walker  and  Ritchie,  and  that  Polk  sent  his 
"sincere  regard"  to  Jones  (Jones,  Memoranda,  485,  490;  Tex.  Dipl. 
Corres.,  ii,  398).  Again,  according  to  Jones  another  Texan  agent  informed 
him  "of  the  deep  anxiety  expressed  by  Polk  for  a  war  with  Mexico." 
Now  of  course  Polk  may  have  said  that  a  war  was  needed  to  redress  Amer- 
ican wrongs,  but  to  suppose  that  a  man  who  kept  his  own  counsel  so  closely 
would  have  confessed  to  this  comparative  stranger  a  dishonorable  inten- 
tion concealed  from  everybody  else,  and  would  have  done  so  knowing 
that  in  reality  he  and  Jones  were  at  swords'  points  on  a  vital  matter, 
annexation,  is  incredible.  When  Jones  wrote  his  book  he  was  a  ruined 
man  in  consequence  of  the  general  and  well-founded  belief  that  he  had 
tried  to  prevent  the  incorporation  of  Texas  in  the  United  States,  and  he 
was  very  bitter  against  Polk.  Not  long  afterward  he  committed  suicide. 
His  book,  apparently  prepared  as  a  defence  of  himself,  is  often  untrust- 
worthy ;  and  how  clear-headed  he  was  at  the  time  of  writing  it  is  shown 
by  his  assertion  that  Texas  was  in  undisputed  possession  of  the  territory 
to  the  Rio  Grande,  yet  that  by  advancing  to  that  stream  Taylor  "pro- 
duced the  Mexican  war"  (p.  68). 

Ashbel  Smith,  in  general  a  much  better  witness,  stated  that  agents  of 
Polk  endeavored  to  have  the  militia  sent  against  Mexico  so  as  to  bring 
on  a  war  (Remins.,  66-7) ;  but  as  he  was  in  Europe  at  the  time  he  had  no 
personal  knowledge  regarding  the  matter,  and  he  also  was  opposed  to 
annexation. 

Evidence  of  Polk's  alleged  desire  to  provoke  a  war  may  be  seen  by  some 
in  the  language  of  the  Union,  his  organ  at  Washington,  which  declared 
blatantly  that  the  Rio  Grande  was  the  boundary  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  Mexico  would  invite  ruin,  should  her  troops  cross  it  (May  1 ; 
September  11,  13,  1845,  etc.).  But  (1)  the  government  had  reason  to 
believe  that  we  had  been  too  mild  toward  Mexico,  and  may  have  wished 
to  suggest  to  her  the  danger  of  being  rash ;  (2)  the  purpose  may  have  been 
to  satisfy  the  many  Americans  who  complained  that  our  national  authori- 
ties lacked  spirit;  (3)  as  Polk  was  officially  offering  Mexico  the  olive 
branch  at  this  time,  the  bellicose  utterances  of  the  Union,  which  was  not 
recognized  by  the  administration  as  its  organ,  could  not  have  been  re- 
garded by  the  Mexican  government  as  evidence  that  he  desired  a  war, 
but  only  at  most  as  a  suggestion  of  what  might  follow  should  the  olive 
branch  be  rejected.  From  this  point  of  view  they  would  seem  to  have 
tended  toward  peace  rather  than  war  (cf .  his  policy  of  having  Taylor  and 
Conner  assume  bold  attitudes  —  chap,  vii,  p.  152). 

23.  The  author's  estimate  of  Polk  is  based  upon  a  study  of  his  conduct 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  VI,   PAGES   128-133  447 

and  all  the  documents  relating  to  him.  One  may  consult  to  advantage 
the  Welles  papers ;  Schouler,  Hist.  Briefs,  124,  129,  132 ;  Poore,  Perley's 
Remins.,  i,  328-9;  Howe,  Bancroft,  i,  294;  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  228; 
Jenkins,  Polk,  330;  McLaughlin,  Introd.  to  Polk's  Diary;  Meigs,  Inger- 
soll,  273-4;  Id.,  Benton,  382;  Reeves  on  Polk's  Diary  in  Polit.  Science 
Review,  1911,  288.  297H.  M.  Field  to  Mrs.  Polk,  Mar.  30,  1889  (Ban- 
croft told  me  yesterday  that  Polk  was  abler  than  any  member  of  his 
Cabinet).  Benton,  View,  ii,  680.  (Toombs)  Phillips,  Toombs,  37. 
Though  Polk  seems  personally  destitute  of  humor,  he  had  known  how  to 
make  an  effective  use  of  it  on  the  stump.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
he  had  served  fourteen  years  in  the  national  House  and  been  Speaker 
twice.  (Fidelity)  Polk,  Diary,  Aug.  14,  1848  (I  had  not  been  three  miles 
from  the  White  House  since  July,  1847). 

24.  (Discussions)  E.g.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  p.  264,  note  (Benton). 
35lWebster  to  son,  Mar.  11,  1845.  (Writhings)  The  reference  is  to 
Polk's  anxious  and  unfriendly  expressions  about  Scott  and  Taylor,  which 
grew  largely  out  of  political  considerations.     See  chap,  ix,  pp.  199-200. 

25.  297Polk  to  Haywood,  Aug.  9,  1845,  confid.  297Buchanan  to 
McLane,  Sept.  13,  1845. 

26.  48To  Conner,  Mar.  29;  July  11;  Aug.  16.  48To  Sloat,  Mar.  21; 
June  24.  48To  Id.,  Aug.  30  (orders  to  "preserve  peace  if  possible"). 
The  despatch  of  June  24  to  Sloat  said  further :  You  and  every  part  of 
your  squadron  "should  be  assiduously  careful  to  avoid  any  act  which 
could  be  construed  as  an  act  of  aggression."  Dec.  5,  1845,  Sloat  was 
notified  that  "our  relations  with  Mexico  are  becoming  more  friendly." 
The  instructions  to  Sloat  about  occupying  San  Francisco  were  made 
contingent  on  Mexican  action,  indicating  that  an  American  declaration 
of  war  was  not  even  contemplated.  52To  Donelson,  June  3.  (Fremont) 
Benton,  View,  ii,  579.  Mrs.  Fremont,  with  the  approval  of  her  father, 
Senator  Benton,  held  back  the  order  (ibid.).  Richardson,  Messages,  iv, 
427-8.  The  Washington  correspondent  of  the  N.  Y.  Sun  wrote:  "It  is 
the  opinion  of  those  best  qualified  to  judge,  though  not  my  own,  that  the 
President  did  not  seek  or  wish  the  war  with  Mexico"  (Sun,  June  4,  1846). 

27.  Republican,  Aug.  19.  Picayune,  Aug.  27.  Globe,  Aug.  25.  Courier 
in  Picayune,  Aug.  27. 

28.  (Scale)  Polk,  Diary,  Sept.  30,  1845.  Sen.  1 ;  29,  1,  pp.  209  (Scott) ; 
649  (Bancroft).  Howe,  Bancroft,  i,  289.  (Navy  unprepared)  Conner, 
Home  Squadron,  9-10. 

29.  56W.  S.  Parrott  to  Buchanan,  June  29,  1845.  The  correspondence 
between  Buchanan  and  Slidell  contains,  to  be  sure,  expressions  indicating 
a  design  to  influence  public  opinion  in  the  United  States.  January  20, 
1846,  the  minister  was  directed  to  conduct  himself  "with  such  wisdom 
and  firmness  in  the  crisis"  that  the  voice  of  the  American  people  would 
be  "unanimous  in  favor  of  redressing  the  wrongs  of  our  much  injured 
and  long  suffering  claimants"  (Buchanan,  no.  5).  But  as  Herrera  had 
now  refused  to  receive  Slidell  and  a  peaceful  settlement  had  become  ex- 
tremely improbable,  this  was  obviously  a  wise  and  proper  injunction,  and 
by  no  means  implied  that  a  rupture  had  been  desired.  No  one  who  goes 
open-mindedly  through  the  documents  can  accept  the  fine-spun  theory 
that  Polk  knew  Slidell  would  not  be  received,  and  sent  him  in  order  to 
make  a  show  of  pacific  intentions  and  obtain  a  pretext  for  war.  He  al- 
ready had  better  grounds  for  war ;  and  had  he  been  determined  to  fight, 
he  would  have  been  extremely  foolish  to  offer  his  intended  victim  an  oppor- 


448  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VI,   PAGES   134-138 

tunity  to  restore  friendly  relations,  for  undeniably  it  was  quite  possible 
—  from  the  American  point  of  view,  considering  the  comparative  weak- 
ness of  Mexico,  far  more  than  possible  —  that  she  would  seize  upon  it. 
Polk,  Diary,  Mar.  28-30 ;  Apr.  3.  American  (Whig)  Review,  1847,  p.  325. 
Slidell,  no.  13,  Apr.  2.     Id.,  Apr.  9  (Curtis,  Buchanan,  i,  599). 

30.  Examiner,  June  13.  Ho.  158;  28,  2,  p.  3  (Upshur).  13Ashburn- 
ham  to  Backhouse,  July  6,  1838.  Santangelo,  Address,  31 :  "Have  a 
number  of  American  citizens  been  unjustly  injured  by  Mexico  in  their 
persons  and  property,  or  not?  Have  our  government  and  nation  been 
gratuitously  outraged  by  Mexico,  or  not?" 

31.  Slidell,  Mar.  18  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  66).  52Dimond,  no.  265,  Oct.  1, 
1845.  .  British  minister  in  Siglo  XIX,  Sept.  24,  1845. 

32.  Times,  Jan.  8,  15.  Picayune,  Dec.  30,  1845.  Buchanan  to  Slidell, 
no.  7,  Mar.  12,  1847  (Information  received  from  various  quarters  that 
several  European  powers  may  be -aiming  to  establish  monarchy  in  Mexico). 
Dec.  1,  1847,  Olozaga  showed  in  the  Spanish  Cortes  a  statement  of  large 
sums  spent  by  Spain  in  1846  to  place  a  Spanish  prince  on  the  throne  of 
Mexico  (Dix,  Speeches,  i,  214,  note).     See  also  chap,  x,  note  21. 

33.  Vattel,  Law  of  Nations  (Chitty),  book  ii,  chap,  iv,  sees.  49-51. 

34.  American  trade  with  Mexico  declined  from  $9,029,221  in  1835  to 
$1,152,331  in  1845  (Niles,  Oct.  17,  1846,  p.  104).     (Contrary)  52Buchanan 

*to  Slidell,  Nov.  10,  1845.  The  protest  of  the  Mexican  minister  at  Wash- 
ington against  the  annexation  of  Texas  asserted  the  right  of  his  country 
to  recover  Texas  at  any  time  and  by  all  the  means  in  her  power  (Cong. 
Globe,  30,  1,  334). 

35.  (Oregon)  London  Times,  Sept.  30,  1847.     Polk,  Diary,  Apr.  22,  1846. 

• 

VII.   THE  PRELIMINARIES  OF  THE   CONFLICT 

1.  The  claims  did  much  to  embitter  feeling  in  both  countries,  were  one 
reason  for  Mexico's  breaking  off  and  refusing  to  resume  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, and  brought  Polk  to  the  point  of  resolving  to  recommend  forcible 
action  to  Congress  (p.  181).  The  series  of  diplomatic  clashes  led  to  the 
danger  of  a  Mexican  attack  and  hence  to  Taylor's  advance;  and  his 
movement,  besides  exciting  further  displeasure  in  Mexico,  offered  her  a 
convenient  and  promising  opportunity  to  strike. 

2.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  445,  449.  56Wickliffe,  private,  May  21, 
1845.  63Marcy  to  Taylor,  confid.,  May  28,  1845.  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  79, 
804.  Donelson,  June  4,  1845,  in  Sen.  1;  29,  1,  p.  66.  297Polk  to 
Dallas,  confid.,  Aug.  23,  1845. 

3.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  388.  52J.  Y.  Mason  to  Donelson,  Aug.  7, 
1845. 

4.  M.  B.  de  Arispe  in  Niles,  Aug.  17,  1816.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  130 
(Cardenas);  140"  (Ampudia) ;  430  (Taylor,  no.  93).  Cong.  Globe,  30,  1, 
p.  911  (Stephens).  245Bliss  to  Lamar,  Oct.  15,  1846.  52Buchanan  to 
Slidell,  Nov.  10,  1845.  Wilson,  Slave  Power,  ii,  8.  Z.  T.  Fulmore  in 
Tex.  State  Hist.  Assoc.  Qtrly.,  v,  28.  T.  M.  Marshall,  ibid.,  xiv,  277. 
I.  J.  Cox,  ibid.,  vi,  81.  Aguila  del  Norte,  Mar.  11,  1846.  Nat.  Intelli- 
gencer, Nov.  5,  1845 ;  Dec.  12,  1846.  Ho.  Report  70 ;  29,  2.  Kennedy, 
Texas,  ii,  30.  Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  200.  Fisher,  Memorials.  Bol- 
ton, Texas,  1.  Bancroft,  No.  Mex.  States,  i,  375,  604.  Garrison,  Ex- 
tension, 100,  103-7.  Tex.  Dipl.  Corres.,  i,  257  (Irion).  52Consul  Belt, 
July  5,  1844.     Jones,  Memoranda,  299  (Hockley).     Sen.  18;    30,  1,  p.  8 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES   138-139  449 

(Marcy).  Garrison,  Texas,  262.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  375-6.  Sen.  1; 
29,  1,  p.  90  (Donelson).  35lStorrs  to  Webster,  Oct.  23,  1847.  52Woll, 
proclam.,  June  20,  1844.  Boston  Advertiser,  July  13,  1843.  64Ayunt. 
of  Matamoros  to  Taylor,  June  10,  1846.  82Gov.  Tamaul.  to  govs.,  Nov.  27, 
1846.     South.  Hist.  Assoc.  Pubs.,  v,  351. 

The  mere  assertion  of  a  boundary  by  Texas  proved  nothing.  She 
claimed  Santa  Fe,  but  the  U.  S.  did  not  regard  the  claim  as  valid  (52Bu- 
cha  ian  to  Slidell,  Nov.  10,  1845).  Her  jurisdiction  was  not  established 
far  beyond  the  Nueces.  Santa  Anna,  while  a  prisoner  in  her  hands,  made 
a  convention  with  her  which  appeared  to  recognize  her  claim,  and  the  fact 
that  he  was  under  duress  did  not  signify;  but  he  did  not  possess  Presi- 
dential powers  at  that  time;  Texas  broke  the  agreement,  and  Mexico 
repudiated  it.  England  appeared  to  countenance  the  claim  of  Texas  by 
negotiating  with  her  about  the  Beales  grant,  which  lay  in  the  disputed 
region  (Wash.  Union,  Feb.  25,  1847),  but  this  was  not  at  all  decisive. 
Trist's  view  that  any  previously  existing  boundary  had  been  obliterated 
by  the  war  does  not  seem  to  have  been  attacked  by  the  Mexican  peace 
commissioners  (Sen.  52;  30,  1,  p.  214).  Roa  Barcena  argues  that  if 
there  was  no  boundary  in  Apr.,  1846,  the  United  States  could  not  assert 
that  its  territory  had  been  invaded.  This  is  a  typically  Mexican  style  of 
argument,  apparently  decisive  but  not  sound.  The  reply  is  that  while 
no  established  boundary  existed,  there  was  a  claimed  boundary,  and  that 
a  serious  claim  entitles  one  to  act  and  speak  provisionally  very  much  as 
if  it  had  been  established,  Trist  made  another  point:  If  Mexico  does 
not  consider  the  wide  and  swift  Bravo  a  safe  boundary,  how  could  Texas 
feel  satisfied  with  the  little  Nueces?  The  fact  that  the  terms  of  annexa- 
tion specified  "the  territory  rightfully  belonging  to  Texas"  was  often 
cited  as  evidence  that  we  knew  the  Nueces-Rio  Grande  region  did  not. 
This  was  a  mistake.  The  expression  only  meant  that  we  were  not  ready 
to  endorse  all  the  territorial  claims  of  Texas  without  investigating  them. 
The  most  doubted  of  her  claims  had  nothing  to  do  with  that  region ;  it 
related  to  a  part  of  New  Mexico. 

5.  Clay,  Works,  v,  213.  Amer.  State  Papers :  For.  Rels.,  ii,  662 ;  iv, 
424,  430,  468-78.  Cong.  Globe,  25,  2,  app.,  555  (Preston) ;  29,  1,  p.  817 
(Adams).  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  483.  Woodbury,  Writings,  i,  361. 
Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  3,  1844  (Walker).  Treaties  in  Force,  593.  Buchanan 
to  Slidell,  Nov.  10,  1845.  Forum,  July,  1901  (Boutwell).  Ficklen  in 
So.  Hist.  Assoc.  Pubs.,  Sept.,  1901.  Sato,  Land  Question.  Wash.  Union, 
Apr.  27,  1846.  297Polk  to  Houston,  June  6,  1845 ;  to  Donelson,  June  15, 
1845.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  ii,  14.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  479  (Texas 
as  a  part  of  old  Louisiana).  Ho.  Report,  752;  29,  1.  52Donelson  to 
Mayfield,  July  11,  1845.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  140-4,  457-8.  Chase, 
Polk  Admin.,  128.  Polk  assured  Houston  that  he  need  feel  no  appre- 
hensions regarding  the  Texas  boundary  in  the  event  of  annexation.  It 
may  be  said  that  Polk  was  inconsistent  in  offering  to  negotiate  about 
the  boundary;  but  people  negotiate  about  claims  they  believe  in  and 
even  about  property  they  clearly  own.  He  had  in  mind  of  course  to  hold 
the  Rio  Grande  boundary  by  satisfying  Mexico. 

The  aim  in  this  paragraph  is  to  bring  out  the  essential  (for  the  present 
purpose)  points  of  a  matter  that  it  would  require  a  long  article  to  discuss 
fully,  and  many  things  have  to  be  left  unsaid.  Personally  the  author 
regards  the  American  claim  and  all  conclusions  based  upon  it  as  unsound. 
His  aim  is  to  show  how  the  matter  appeared  to  Polk.  The  author  is  in- 
vol.  i  — 2  g 


450  NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES   139-140 

debted  to  Dr.  E.  C.  Barker  and  Dr.  I.  J.  Cox  for  assistance  in  reference 
to  this  statement ;  but  no  responsibility  rests  on  them. 

6.  Sen.  1;  29,  1,  pp.  236  (Totten) ;  193  (Marcy) ;  208  (Scott).  Sen. 
378;  29,  1,  p.  44  (Cooper).  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  81  (Bancroft).  Wash. 
Globe,  Sept.  4,  1845.  Journal  Milit.  Serv.  Instil.,  xvii  (Van  Deusen). 
Ballentine,  Eng.  Soldier,  i,  32,  36-7,  57.  Stevens,  Campaigns,  12-3. 
Commercial  Review,  Dec,  1846,  429  (Poinsett).  Capt.  Willing  in  Prof. 
Memoirs  of  Corps  of  Engineers.  Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  534^5  (Yell  et  al.). 
Ho.  38;  30,  2  (strength  of  the  regular  army,  Jan.  1,  1846:  7194).  Ho. 
24;  31,  1 :  on  Texas  frontier,  May,  3554  (regulars  "present  and  absent"). 
6lMaynardier,  June  15,  1846.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  47-8.  Sen.  1;  29,  2, 
p.  53  (Marcy  :  May  13,  1846,  the  entire  military  force  was  not  over  7640). 
In  Nov.,  1845,  the  army  occupied  thirty-seven  posts. 

Each  regiment  comprised  ten  companies,  but  for  economy  the  army 
had  virtually  been  skeletonized  in  1842.  After  that  time  a  company  of 
infantry  and  "artillery"  included  theoretically  forty-two  privates,  a 
company  of  field  artillery  sixty-four  (Journ.  Milit.  Serv.  Inst,  of  U.  S., 
iii,  415),  and  a  company  of  cavalry  fifty;  but  the  numbers  always  ran 
ten  or  twenty  per  cent  below  what  the  law  allowed  (Sen.  1 ;  29,  1,  p.  193). 
One  or  more  "grenadier"  companies  (tall  men)  formed  the  right  of  the 
infantry  regiment,  and  it  had  also  one  or  more  "light"  companies  (180C. 
F.  Smith,  Sept.  30,  1846;  J.  D.  Toll  in  Mich.  Pioneer  Soc.  Colls.,  vii, 
112). 

Most  of  the  infantry  carried  flintlock  muskets,  which  could  not  be 
relied  on  for  more  than  a  hundred  yards.  Scott  preferred  that  arm  be- 
cause it  had  been  thoroughly  tested  (Rowland,  Register,  407)  and  perhaps 
also  because  flints  could  be  obtained  more  readily  and  surely  than  could 
percussion  caps.  Some  38,000  smooth-bore  muskets  and  10,000  rifles 
(calibre  54)  were  issued  during  the  war.  There  seem  to  have  been  several 
models  of  muzzle-loading  rifles :  Harper's  Ferry  (1814),  model  of  1819, 
model  of  1840  or  1842 ;  and  some  of  Hall's  breech-loading  rifles  were 
used  (Sen.  54;  30,  1,  particularly  table  C).  The  First  Mississippi  had 
Whitney  rifles  (Rowland,  Register,  407).  The  rifles  were  much  more 
effective  but  much  slower  in  operation  than  the  muskets.  Some  400,000 
flints  and  950,000  percussion  caps  were  issued.  Regarding  arms,  etc., 
one  may  consult  Talcott,  June  10  (Sen.  54;  30,  1) ;  39Maynardier  to  gov. 
Tenn.,  Sept.  28,  1847;  39Marcy  to  Id.,  Sept.  27;  Ho.  2;  29,  1,  pp.  402, 
418,  425 ;  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  p.  162 ;  Ho.  41 ;  29,  2  (Talcott's  report) ;  Sen. 
1 ;  30,  1,  p.  683 ;  Norton,  Amer.  Breech-Loading  Small  Arms ;  and  visit 
the  National  Museum  (Washington),  and  the  museums  at  West  Point, 
Colt's  factory  (Hartford),  and  U.  S.  Cartridge  Co.  (Lowell). 

Our  dragoons,  who  were  "light  cavalry,"  were  armed  with  musketoons 
which  were  carried  on  sling  belts  except  on  the  march,  sabres  of  the  Prus- 
sian dragoon  style  and  horse  pistols.  The  Mounted  Rifles  had  percussion 
rifles  and  Colt's  army  revolvers  but  no  sabres.  The  cavalry  had  sabres, 
rifle  carbines,  and  Colt's  navy  revolvers  (Brackett,  U.  S.  Cav.,  160). 
Some  "pepper-box"  revolvers  were  used  (Arnold,  Jackson,  113).  The 
regular  cartridge  (very  carefully  made)  consisted  of  powder,  a  bullet,  and 
three  buckshot  (148Chamberlain,  recoils.). 

The  field  batteries  were  Companies  K  (Taylor)  of  the  First  regiment, 
A  (Duncan)  of  the  Second,  C  (Ringgold)  of  the  Third,  and  B  (Washington) 
of  the  Fourth.  E  (Bragg)  of  the  Third  actually  served  as  light  artillery 
though  not  officially  recognized  as  such  until  June,  1847.     Each  of  these 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES   140-141  451 

companies  had  four  or  six  bronze  pieces,  which  included  two  or  more 
6-pounders  and  usually  one  or  two  12-pound  howitzers.  See  particularly 
6lMaynardier's  statement,  June  15,  1846,  several  letters  in  the  Duncan 
papers,  and  Journ.  Milit.  Serv.  Instit.,  iii,  415.  In  1839  Capt.  Robert 
Anderson  translated  the  French  "System  of  Light  Artillery."  By  1842 
a  long  course  of  experimenting  gave  us  suitable  bronze  for  guns  (Sen.  1, 
30,  1,  p.  679).  That  year  the  commander-in-chief  ordered  a  regular 
course  of  practice  with  field  artillery,  and  a  liberal  allowance  of  ammunition 
was  made  (ibid.,  680).  This  branch  of  the  service  was  also  greatly  im- 
proved by  sending  three  ordnance  officers  abroad  to  study  the  subject. 
Each  head  of  a  battery  was  chosen  for  his  special  fitness,  and  Ringgold 
in  particular  devoted  himself  to  developing  the  arm  with  remarkable 
intelligence  and  zeal  (Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  105 ;  Niles,  May  30,  1846, 
p.  201 ;  259Ridgely  to  cits.,  July  24,  1846;  Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  679;  Wynne, 
Ringgold;  Benet,  Ordnance  Reports,  ii,  158). 

By  permission  of  the  French  government,  Capt.  A.  J.  Swift  was  sent  to 
Metz  soon  after  the  war  with  Mexico  began  to  qualify  himself  to  com- 
mand and  instruct  an  engineer  company.  The  corps  included  Swift  (who 
died  before  seeing  service),  G.  W.  Smith,  and  G.  B.  McClellan  as  officers, 
10  sergeants,  10  corporals,  39  artificers,  39  second  class  privates,  and  two 
musicians  (Engineer  School,  U.  S.  Army,  Occas.  Papers  no.  16).  The 
American  infantry  drill  did  not  differ  materially  from  that  of  the  British 
army  (Ballentine).  Our  army  was  not  fully  equal  to  the  best  European 
troops  (Poinsett).  There  had  been  few  opportunities  to  work  the  three 
arms  together.  A  serious  defect  of  the  army  was  the  lack  of  an  intelli- 
gence department. 

The  privates  wore  cloth  fatigue  caps,  jackets  and  trousers,  all  of  blue ; 
and  the  officers  wore  the  same,  except  that  at  first  they  had  single-breasted 
frock  coats  (128Brackett,  diary.  Id.,  Lane's  Brigade,  250.  Ramsey, 
Other  Side,  424).  Later,  officers  frequently  had  jackets  like  the  men's, 
but  differently  trimmed.  Further  remarks  on  our  army  may  be  found  in 
chap,  xxxvi. 

7.  Taylor.  Fry  and  Conrad,  Taylor,  passim.  French,  Two  Wars,  84. 
224Hitchcock  to  brother,  Aug.  10,  1845.  Howard,  Taylor,  passim. 
Robinson,  Organization,  ii,  6.  147Chamberlain,  diary.  332Tennery, 
diary.  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  382-3.  Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  198,  203. 
Meade,  Letters,  i,  26.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  253-4.  Poore,  Perley's 
Remins.,  i,  354.  280Nunelee,  diary.  Frost,  Taylor,  277.  139W.  B.  to 
D.  Campbell,  Apr.  25,  1847.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  100,  139.  Donnavan, 
Adventures,  21.  180Pillow  to  wife,  Aug.  8,  1846.  Wash.  Union,  Aug.  24, 
1846.  Am.  Hist.  Review,  Apr.,  1919,  446,  455-6,  462  (Marcy's  diary). 
And  all  of  Taylor's  correspondence. 

8.  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  381-2,  386,  408.  Journ.  Milit.  Serv.  Instit.,  xiv, 
444.  224Williams  to  Hitchcock,  Nov.  8,  1848.  Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years, 
147.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  131.  Mrs.  W.  R.  Stauffer  of  New  Orleans, 
granddaughter  of  Gen.  Taylor,  to  whom  the  author  is  indebted  for  docu- 
ments and  information,  told  him  that  the  family  name  for  Bliss  was  "Per- 
fect Bliss."  His  precise  title  was  Assistant  Adj.  Gen.,  of  course.  It  is 
instructive  to  compare  Taylor's  autograph  letters  with  the  official  reports 
credited  to  him. 

9.  63Marcy  to  Taylor,  confid.,  May  28.  Sen.  1 ;  29, 1,  pp.  57,  107  (Donel- 
son).  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  81  (Bancroft) ;  800-2,  806  (Taylor) ;  804  (Donel- 
son).     Sen.  18;    30,  1,  pp.  6  (Donelson) ;    3  (Taylor);    8,  9  (Marcy). 


452         NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES   141-143 

S  n.  337;  29  l,  pp.  73-5.  Sen.  378;  29,  1,  p.  44  (Cooper).  Journ. 
Milit.  Serv.  InstiL,  1882,  p.  399.  Autograph,  Dec,  1911  (Taylor).  Wash. 
Union,  June  25,  1847.  Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  193.  So.  Qtrly.  Rev., 
Apr.,  1846,  pp.  440-3.  Hist.  Mag.,  Jan.,  1870,  19.  Mexico  had  an 
outpost  customhouse  at  Point  Isabel,  just  north  of  the  Rio  Grande.  Pare- 
des  charged  that  a  Mexican  reconnoitring  party  was  disarmed  at  Laredo, 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Rio  Grande.  We  have  no  other  evidence  of  such 
an  affair.  Taylor  instructed  Maj.  Hays,  commanding  Texas  Rangers  at 
S.  Antonio,  to  send  word  of  any  Mexican  movements  in  the  vicinity  of 
Laredo,  "with  strict  injunctions,  however,  to  molest  no  Mexican  estab- 
lishments" (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  107),  and  the  orders  to  occupy  Laredo  were 
not  given  until  Oct.  15,  1846  (245Bliss  to  Lamar).  Possibly  a  threaten- 
ing Mexican  party  may  have  been  disarmed  as  a  measure  of  precaution, 
but  the  bare  statement  of  Paredes  cannot  be  accepted  as  proof. 

10.  Taylor,  gen.  orders,  1.  Henshaw  narrative.  So.  Qtrly.  Review, 
Apr.,  1846,  pp.  442-4.  66Sanders  to  Taylor,  Feb.  15,  1846.  197Gaines 
to  R.  Jones,  Sept.  10.  N.  Orl.  Tropic,  Oct.  16.  42Gov.  Va.  to  gen. 
assembly,  Dec.  7,  1846.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  173.  224Hitchcock 
to  brother,  Feb.  10,  1846.  13Elliot,  no.  21,  1845.  13Kennedy,  no.  22, 
1845.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  98,  100,  102-3,  802  (Taylor).  Richmond 
Enquirer,  Sept.  13,  1845.  52J.  Y.  Mason  to  Donelson,  Aug.  7.  33lTay- 
lor  to  Conner,  July  16.  Mayer,  War,  91-2.  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Sept.  12. 
French,  Two  Wars,  34.  J.  Davis  in  Cong.  Globe,  31,  1,  app.,  1034-41. 
Polk,  Messages,  May  11;  Dec.  8,  1846  (Richardson,  Messages).  Hitch- 
cock, Fifty  Years,  194.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  26.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  64. 
Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  17,  32.     Sen.  378;   29,  1,  p.  45. 

The  Texans  were  kept  at  that  point  as  scouts.  Corpus  Christi  had 
been  held  by  Texas  during  her  revolutionary  contest  with  Mexico 
(Tropic,  Oct.  25,  1845).  The  other  two  companies  of  the  Fourth  Infantry 
were  ordered  from  Fort  Scott  to  Taylor,  and  Bragg's  artillery  came  from 
Charleston  harbor.  The  New  Orleans  artillery  companies  were  called  out 
without  authority  by  Gaines,  who  commanded  the  military  dept.  of  the 
west.  They  remained  with  Taylor  the  three  months  for  which  they  en- 
gaged (Sen.  378;  29,  1,  p.  3).  Taylor  planned  to  go  on  to  S.  Patricio, 
now  a  name  rather  than  a  place,  25  miles  up  the  Nueces  —  a  plan  like 
that  which  he  soon  executed  on  the  Rio  Grande.  Lieut.  Col.  E.  A.  Hitch- 
cock, who  had  taught  at  West  Point  and  now  commanded  the  Third  In- 
fantry, pointed  out  that,  should  he  do  so,  his  base  would  be  a  fine  mark  for 
attack.  Taylor  would  not  see  the  point  but  he  gave  up  the  plan.  (For 
this  episode  see:  224Hitchcock  to  brother,  Feb.  10,  1846;  Id.,  Fifty 
Years,  48,  196;  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  71-2;  Meade,  Letters,  i,  29.)  He 
thought  of  Pt.  Isabel  also;  but,  having  so  small  a  force,  no  engineers, 
and  little  artillery  (at  first  none),  he  deemed  it  unsafe  to  go  there  (Ho.  60 ; 
30,  1,  p.  107). 

11.  London  Times,  May  14,  1846.  (Knew)  Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years, 
195;  So.  Qtrly.  Rev.,  Apr.,  1846,  p.  443;  Mayer,  War,  91.  (Accepted) 
52J.  Y.  Mason  to  Donelson,  Aug.  7,  1845.  256Marcy  to  Wetmore,  May  10, 
1846  (private):  A  "liberal  confidence"  was  reposed  in  Taylor;  "His 
positions  in  Texas  were  left  very  much  to  his  own  judgment  except  they 
we^-e  to  be  taken  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  del  Norte." 

12.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  38-9.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  110.  Wilhelm, 
Eighth  Inf.,  i,  257.  J.  Davis,  in  Cong.  Globe,  31,  1,  app.,  1034-41.  N.  Y. 
Tribune,  Sept,  12,  1845. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES  143-145         453 

13.  65Taylor,  gen. 'orders,  2.  61Id.  to  adj.  gen.,  Feb.  3,  1846,  and 
Scott's  comments.  61  Adj.  gen.  to  Taylor,  Jan.  5,  1846.  So.  Qtrly.  Rev., 
Apr.,  1846,  pp   440-57  [probably  from  Bragg].     Nat.  Intelligencer,  Nov.  20, 

1845.  13Elliot,  nos.  3,  14,  1846.  218Henshaw  narrative.  136Butter- 
field,  recoils.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  93,  96.  224Hitchcock  to  brother, 
Aug.  10,  1845 ;  Feb.  10,  1846.  Mobile  Commercial  Register,  Aug.  23,  1845. 
Autograph,  Jan.-Feb.,  1912  (Taylor).  364Worth  to  S.,  Oct.  24;  Nov.  — , 
20,  1845;  to  daughter,  Nov.  3.  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Aug.  1,  1847, 
388-90.  Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  198,  203,  215.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  31, 
37.  13Letter  from  Corp.  Chr.,  Nov.  29  (sent  by  Elliot).  185Duncan  to 
Bliss,  Jan.  5,  1846 ;  to  court  of  inquiry,  Jan.  7.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches, 
45.  213Hatch  to  sister,  Oct.  28,  etc.  The  conditions  were  probably 
tolerable  until  November. 

14.  W  >rth  to  S.,  Dec.  20,  1845;  Jan.  1 ;  Mar.  4,  1846.  Meade,  Letters, 
i,  87.     Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  204,  206.     60Worth  to  Taylor,  Mar.  8, 

1846,  and  Scott's  comments.  60Churchill  to  Scott,  Mar.  2.  69Twiggs 
to  Bliss,  Feb.  18.  69Worth  to  Taylor,  Feb.  24.  66Mansfield  to  Totten, 
Apr.  2.  Polk,  Diary,  Mar.  11,  1846.  (Concluded)  224Hitchcock  to 
brother,  Feb.  10,  1846. 

15.  63Marcy  to  Taylor,  Aug.  23.  (No  declaration)  297Polk  to  Dallas, 
Aug.  23;    52J.  Y.  Mason  to  Donelson,  Aug.  7,  1845. 

July  30  Marcy  63instructed  Taylor  to  place  some  forces  south  of  the 
Nueces,  but  Taylor  had  anticipated  the  order.  The  government  was  ac- 
cused of  issuing  vague  orders  with  the  hope  that  the  General  would  assume 
the  responsibility  of  going  to  the  Rio  Grande ;  but  it  does  not  seem  to 
have  shrunk  from  taking  a  stand  when  it  had  the  requisite  information. 
Mexico  did  not  in  fact  have  all  the  "posts"  north  of  the  Rio  Grande  that 
Marcy  seems  to  have  supposed  were  there,  but  besides  the  customs  men 
at  Pt.  Isabel,  there  seem  to  have  been  troops  at  Laredo  and  soldiers  from 
Matimoros  crossed  the  river.  Aug.  30  Marcy  ordered  Taylor  to  drive 
the  Mexicans  beyond  the  Rio  Grande,  should  they  invade  Texas  (Ho.  60 ; 
30,  1,  p.  88).  This  was  proper,  for  such  an  invasion  would  have  seemed 
to  mean  war ;  but  the  order  showed  a  want  of  prudence  (Upton,  Mil. 
Policy,  197)  because  (1)  Taylor  was  expected  to  draw  reinforcements 
from  the  states,  which  could  not  have  provided  them  in  time  to  save  him 
from  the  sudden  attack  of  an  overpowering  Mexican  army,  and  (2)  he 
was  authorized  to  cross  the  river  with  militia,  who  could  not  legally  be 
taken  beyond  the  border.  Oct.  4  Taylor  wrote  that  under  his  instruc- 
tions he  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  go  to  the  Rio  Grande.  Oct.  16  Marcy 
directed  him  to  place  his  winter  quarters  (which  implied  that  no  aggressive 
plans  were  in  mind)  as  near  the  Rio  Grande  as  prudence  and  convenience 
would  permit  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  89).  This  was  judicious,  for  (as  Marcy 
pointed  out)  the  troops  might  have  to  repel  Mexican  or  Indian  incursions, 
and,  at  a  season  when  they  would  be  somewhat  unprepared  to  move 
quickly,  it  was  particularly  desirable  to  have  them  as  near  as  possible  to 
the  scene  of  action. 

16.  Polk,  Diary,  Jan.  13,  1846.  The  despatches  were  Slidell's  Dec.  17 
(with  copy  of  El  Sigh  XIX  containing  the  council's  report)  and  Black's 
Dec.  18,  which  indicated  that  the  administration  and  the  council  of  state 
had  decided  against  Slidell.  Polk,  Message,  Dec.  8,  1846.  Cong.  Globe, 
30,  1,  aop.,  240-1.     63Marcy  to  Taylor,  Jan.  13. 

17.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  103,  108,  111,  116-21  (Taylor);  649,  651-2 
(Cross).     W.  P.  Johnston,  Johnston,  131.     Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  207. 


454  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES   146-148 

224/d.  to  brother,  Feb.  10,  1846.  Henry,  Camp.'  Sketches,  52.  65Tay- 
lor,  gen.  orders,  13,  20,  26,  30.  69Sibley,  Feb.  21.  69Hunt  of  the  Por- 
poise, Mar.  11.  69Mansfield  to  Taylor,  Mar.  6.  76Mejia,  Mar.  14.  The 
soldiers  were  accompanied  by  about  an  equal  number  of  quadrupeds. 

18.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  90,  92  (Marcy) ;  117,  120-4,  127  (Taylor);  651 
(Cross).     Diario,  Mar.  30;   Apr.  10.     C.  Christi  Gazette,  Mar.  12. 

19.  The  march.  Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  i,  401-4.  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  53-65.  Smith,  To  Mexico,  22-9.  French,  Two  Wars,  37,  41-5. 
Henshaw  narrative.  69Twiggs  to  Bliss,  Mar.  15,  1846.  Grant,  Mems.,  i, 
69.     Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  211. 

20.  Picayune,  Apr.  7,  1846.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  123  (Taylor);  127 
(Mejfa).  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  33.  Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  i,  404-6. 
Diario,  Apr.  24.  69Alba  to  Taylor,  Mar.  12.  Henshaw  narrative.  Smith, 
To  Mexico,  29-31.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  87-8.  69Statement  of  Italian. 
And  from  76 the  following.  To  Mejia,  Mar.  1  (Mejia  was  forbidden  to 
take  the  aggressive  because  the  govt,  wished  first  to  gather  enough  troops 
to  strike  a  decisive  blow:  76to  Vega,  Mar.  1).  Mejia,  Jan.  18;  Feb.  16; 
Mar.  4,  6,  14,  17,  18.  Canales,  Feb.  28.  Mejia  to  Vega,  Feb.  16.  .  C. 
Bravo  to  Mejia,  Mar.  13 ;  reply,  Mar.  17.  To  Vega,  Mar.  1.  Mex. 
officer  (spy),  Feb.  18.  Mejia  to  Parrodi,  Mar.  6;  to  Canales,  Feb.  16. 
Ampudia,  Mar.  28. 

21.  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  34-7.  Henshaw  narrative.  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
pp.  123,  125,  129,  132  (Taylor) ;  130  (Cardenas).  224Hitchcock,  diary, 
Mar.  25.  66Mansfield  to  Totten,  Mar.  25;  Apr.  23.  Taylor,  Letters 
(Bixby),  173.  Sen.  1;  29,  2,  p.  46  (Marcy).  69Statement  of  Italian. 
Picayune,  Apr.  7;  May  1.  Apuntes,  32.  Niles,  Apr.  18,  p.  112.  Hitch- 
cock, Fifty  Years,  211-7.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  59,  100.  Nebel  and  Kendall, 
1.  Smith,  To  Mexico,  32-4.  163Taylor  to  Conner,  Apr.  3.  Robertson, 
Remins.,  July  7.  Monitor  Repub.,  Apr.  17.  Diario,  Mar.  15.  76Mejia, 
Mar.  21,  28.     76To  Mejia,  Mar.  21 ;  Apr.  3. 

On  his  way  to  Point  Isabel  Taylor  was  presented  with  a  formal  protest 
against  his  advance  by  J.  Cardenas,  prefect  of  northern  TamaiJipas. 
On  the  approach  of  his  transports  the  captain  of  the  port,  by  Mejia's 
orders,  set  fire  to  the  customhouse  and  the  few  poor  thatched  cottages  of 
the  hamlet,  and  fled  with  the  officials.  Mar.  31  Taylor  had  present 
opposite  Matamoros  and  at  Point  Isabel  248  officers,  3001  rank  and  file 
(62R.  Jones  to  Cass,  Jan.  21,  1848). 

22.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  132-3,  145,  1202  (to  Mejia,  Mar.  28),  1203  (Tay- 
lor);  134  (minutes);  1203  (Mejia).  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  38-9,  45. 
61Id.  to  adj.  gen.,  Mar.  29.  66Mansfield  to  Totten,  Apr.  2,  23.  285Mejfa 
to  Paredes,  Apr.  3.  76ld.  to  Guerra,  Mar.  28.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  120. 
Smith,  To  Mexico,  34.  118Berlandier,  diary.  118ld.,  memo.  Meade, 
Letters,  i,  59. 

Taylor,  a  few  minutes  after  his  arrival,  deputed  Worth  to  reach  an 
understanding  with  Mejia.  This  proved  impossible.  Worth  demanded 
permission  to  confer  with  the  American  consul  residing  at  Matamoros, 
but  was  not  permitted  to  do  so.  He  notified  the  Mexicans  that  crossing 
the  river  in  armed  force  would  be  viewed  as  an  act  of  war.  Taylor's 
field-work  was  called  Fort  Texas  or  sometimes  Fort  Taylor  at  first.  Tay- 
lor offered  to  let  the  people  of  Matamoros  continue  to  use  their  port  on 
Brazos  Island,  which  was  north  of  the  Rio  Grande.  76 Jan.  6  he  had  pro- 
posed to  the  Mexicans  to  agree  on  measures  to  prevent  "exasperation  on 
either  side." 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES   148-150  455 

23.  See  p.  117.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  133,  138-9,  142,  145  (Taylor) ;  140, 
144  (Ampudia).  (Leave  town)  52Consul  Schatzel,  July  18.  Niles, 
May  2,  p.  132.  Monitor  Repub,,  Jan.  28,  1847.  Diario,  Apr.  5,  8,  25. 
283Gen.  orders,  army  of  the  north,  Feb.  18;  Apr.  3,  14.  Ampudia,  To 
Fellow-Cits,  (and  docs.).  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  154,  157,  160.  52Black 
to  Castillo,  May  1,  9.  52Castillo  to  Black,  May  5.  69Report  from  spy. 
And  from  76  the  following.  Mejia,  Feb.  4 ;  Mar.  17,  18 ;  Apr.  2.  Id. 
to  Ampudia,  Apr.  5.  To  Ampudia,  Feb.  18 ;  Mar.  28 ;  Apr.  4.  Ampudia, 
Mar.  28;  Apr.  9,  11,  13,  14.  Id.  to  gov.  Tamaulipas,  Apr.  12.  Id.  to 
Schatzell,  Apr.  11  (order  of  expulsion;  any  American  crossing  the  river 
to  be  shot).     Id.  to  Mejia,  Mar.  30.     Id.  to  Arista,  Apr.  14. 

Ampudia  was  thoroughly  Mexican  in  demanding  that  he  should  have 
all  the  advantages  and  Taylor  all  the  disadvantages  of  the  quasi  state  of 
war  that  he  insisted  upon,  in  protesting  against  Taylor's  action  as  a  declara- 
tion of  blockade,  which  it  did  not  pretend  to  be,  and  in  ordering  Taylor 
to  go  beyond  the  Nueces,  which  he  knew  was  regarded  by  many  Americans 
(though  by  no  Mexican)  as  the  boundary  of  Mexico.  In  two  additional 
ways  he  indicated  that  in  his  view  a  state  of  war  existed  (Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
pp.  144,  147).  The  American  consul,  seventy  years  old,  had  to  set  out 
on  foot  and  spend  the  first  night  in  a  field  during  a  norther  (Republica  de 
Rio  Grande,  June  6). 

24.  (Ampudia's  orders)  73Bermudez  de  Castro,  no.  218,  res.,  Mar.  29. 
Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  545.  Slidell,  Jan.  14.  Ramirez,  Mexico,  79.  285Me- 
jia  to  Paredes,  Apr.  3.  Carrerio,  Jefes,  ccii,  141  (Ampudia  was  a  Cuban 
by  birth).  199Arista  to  Paredes,  Dec.  15,  1845.  13Bankhead,  no.  56, 
1846.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  61.  (Aim)  Bustamante,  N.  Bernal,  i,  113. 
Apuntes,  34-5.  And  from  76  the  following.  (A.'s  plans)  Ampudia,  Mar. 
28.  Id,  to  Arista,  Apr.  14.  To  Ampudia,  Feb.  18.  To  Arista,  Feb.  10 ; 
Apr.  4,  20,  22.  Arista,  Apr.  12,  29.  Parrodi,  Apr.  29.  Ampudia,  Apr.  13, 
14.     Id.,  proclaim,  Apr.  18.     Arista  to  Ampudia,  Apr.  10. 

According  to  Bermudez  de  Castro,  the  Spanish  minister,  the  opposition 
writers  at  Mexico  expressed  surprise  because,  after  ordering  Ampudia  to 
attack  the  Americans,  the  government  stated  it  had  not  committed  and 
would  not  commit  an  act  of  aggression  against  the  United  States.  Mar.  7 
Ampudia  ordered  Mejia  to  attack  the  Americans,  but  not  to  risk  a  de- 
cisive action  (76Mejia,  Mar.  17).  The  evidence  that  Ampudia  had  been 
ordered  to  attack  Taylor  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  he  tried  to  do  so 
even  after  he  knew  he  had  been  superseded. 

25.  (Orders)  76Tornel  to  Arista,  Apr.  4 ;  76Arista  to  Guerra,  Apr.  26 ; 
May  7 ;  Washington  Union,  Aug.  27 ;  Bankhead,  no.  90,  1846.  76Arista 
to  Torrej6n,  Apr.  24.  Ho.~60;  30,  1,  pp.  132,  140,  1205  (Taylor);  290 
(Thornton);  291  (Hardie) ;  1204  (Arista).  76Testimony  in  the  court- 
martial  of  Arista  (Jauregui,  Torrejon,  Carrasco,  Canales,  Mendoza). 
Smith,  To  Mexico,  39-42.  Spirit  of  the  Times,  May  23.  Campafia 
contra,  4.  69Court  of  Inquiry  on  Hardee,  May  26.  Wash.  Union, 
May  9.  Niles,  May  16,  pp.  165,  176.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  147.  65Tay- 
lor,  gen.  orders  74.     169/d.  to  Crittenden,  Sept.  1. 

Taylor  had  called  repeatedly  for  reinforcements  to  the  regular  army 
(Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  102,  114,  132).  Up  to  May  8  he  received  56  recruits 
(ibid.,  142).  The  conciliatory  policy  of  the  Americans  made  it  impossible 
to  take  military  precautions  against  spies,  and  Thornton  was  doubtless 
betrayed.  He  did  his  best.  Taylor,  with  a  view  to  the  vigorous  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war,  called  on  Texas  for  two  regiments  of  infantry  and  two  of 


456  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES   150-152 

horse,  and  on  Louisiana  for  two  of  infantry.  The  order,  to  attack  Ta  ylor 
was  doubtless  recommended  by  Tornel,  the  minister  of  war,  who  hated 
the  United  States;  but  perhaps  he  had  a  particular  motive.  He  had 
been  at  work  for  8.  Anna  when  Paredes  seized  the  Presidency,  and  he 
knew  that  it  would  cripple  Paredes  (thus  opening  the  way  for  S.  Anna) 
to  provide  funds  and  send  troops  from  Mexico  City  for  a  war  with  the 
United  States  (52Black,  May  26;   Dimond,  Jan.  15). 

26.  Boston  Atlas,  a  strong  Whig  journal,  said,  Dec.  11,  1846 :  "There  is 
no  doubt  that  the  conduct  of  that  government  [Mexico]  towards  us  has 
been  such  as  might  have  justified  the  extreme  resort  to  war."  Polk, 
Diary,  Apr.  21,  25,  28 ;  May  3,  5-9. 

27.  C.  J.  Ingersoll,  chrmn.  Ho.  com.  for.  affairs  (Cong.  Globe,  29,  2, 
app.,  128)  :  I  urged  Polk  to  anticipate  invasion  by  crossing  the  Rio  Grande, 
but  he  would  not.  (Reasons)  So.  Qtrhj.  Rev.,  Nov.,  1850,  434-5.  33lTay- 
lor  to  Conner,  Apr.  3.  (Effect)  60Lieut.  Irons,  Apr.  20 ;  76Arista,  Apr. 
27;  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  120.  (Flimsily)  312Mejia  to  Arista,  Oct.  6, 
1845 ;   76Requena  in  trial  of  Arista. 

28.  Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  p.  498;  30,  1,  app.,  64.  Polk,  Message,  Dec.  8, 
1846  (Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  484).  (Marcy)  Sen.  1;  29,  1,  p.  194. 
52Buchanan  to  Trist,  Oct.  25,  1847.  Jan.  27,  1847,  a  bill  establishing 
post-routes  south  of  the  Nueces  passed  the  Senate  unanimously  {Cong. 
Globe,  29,  1,  p.  251).  (Six  months)  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Sept.  4,  1846. 
(People)  Mo.  Re-prrtrr,  Jan.  6,  1846.  It  is  true  that  no  right  to  gp  to  the 
Rio  Grande  was  explicitly  asserted;  but  as  everybody  held  that  either 
that  stream  or  the  Nueces  was  the  boundary,  a  claim  extending  beyond 
the  latter  extended  practically  to  the  former.  See  Lumpkin's  speech 
(Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  836).  More  than  a  month  before  Taylor  left  Corpus 
Christi  the  House  voted  down  a  motion  to  ask  the  President  whether  he 
had  ordered  our  forces  to  move  against  Mexico,  and  thus  beqfcme  accom- 
plices of  Polk  (Von  Hoist,  hi,  214-5).  The  order  of  Jan.  13  soon  became 
known  to  Congress  and  the  public  (Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  p.  279).  Feb.  3 
Ashmun  of  Massachusetts  offered  a  resolution  calling  upon  the  President 
for  information  regarding  the  matter  (ibid.,  280).  Mar.  23  Brinkerhoff 
stated  in  the  House  that  Taylor's  army  must  be  supposed  to  be  appro-  ch- 
ing  or  already  upon  the  Rio  Grande;  yet  no  one  in  Congress  protested 
(29  1,  534).  Mar.  26,  1846,  while  discussing  an  appropriation  bill, 
Mcllvaine  of  Penn.  said  that  in  sending  troops  to  the  Rio  Grande  Polk 
had  been  "invading  Mexico"  (ibid.,  558);  yet,  though  he  made  a  most 
urgent  appeal  to  the  opponents  of  slavery  —  in  behoof  of  which  he  inti- 
mated the  step  had  been  taken  —  and  there  were  other  objections  to  the 
bill,  it  passed  the  House  by  111  to  38  (ibid.,  573-4).  Note  also  the  vote 
on  Delano's  motion  (chap,  ix,  note  4).  See  chap,  xxxiv,  note  16,  and  the 
corresponding  text. 

29.  (1794)  Ho.  Report  752;  29,  1,  p.  44;  C.  J.  Ingersoll  in  Cong.  Globe, 
29,  2,  app.,  129 ;  Chase,  Polk  Admin.,  131-2 ;  Schouler,  U.  S.,  i,  296-7. 
(Fla.)  Moore,  Amer.  Diplom.,  163 ;  H.  Adams,  U.  S.  v,  310-4,  318.  Ben- 
ton, A1  r.  Deb.,  xvi,  77  (Pearce).  (Hilliard)  Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  p.  148. 
(Adams)  Ibid.,  p.  127. 

30.  (Weakened)  Wash.  Union,  Jan.  11,  1848  (Re^  erdy  Johnson  in 
Senate) ;  256Marcy  to  Wetmore.  May  10,  1846;  Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  app., 
934 ;  30,  1,  app.,  65.  (Wise)  52Buchanan  to  Slidell,  Jan.  20,  1846.  (Argu- 
ment) *f  W.  S.  Parrott,  Aug.  5,  1845 ;  Slidell,  Feb.  17,  1846 ;  364Worth 
to  S.,  Oct.  2,  1845;  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  107  (Taylor,  Oct.  4) ;  Niles,  July  18, 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGES   152-154         457 

1846,  pp.  313-4;  Polk,  Diary,  Sept.  1,  1845;  108Mayer  to  Bancroft, 
May  22,  1846;  London  Times,  May  30,  1846  (Wash,  corr.) ;  Calhoun  in 
Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  p.  499  (Those  in  power  were  confident  that  the  march 
to  the  Rio  Grande  would  not  bring  on  war) ;  M.  Brown  in  Cong.  Globe, 
29,  2,  app.,  356  (Polk  determined  to  convince  the  Mexicans  by  hostile 
demonstrations  that  they  must  settle  promptly) ;  Hilliard  denounced 
Polk  in  the  House  for  using  a  display  of  force  to  intimidate  Mexico  (Cong. 
Globe,  30,  1,  p.  566),  and  Calhoun  felt  somewhat  the  same  (ibid.,  497); 
Boston  Atlas,  May  15,  16,  1846  (Wash,  corr.);  Howe,  Bancroft,  i,  282; 
345Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  May  26,  1846;  108Bradford  to  Bancroft, 
Aug.  17,  1845;  Coxe,  Review,  38.  Public  men  who  talked  with  Polk 
probably  knew  more  about  his  views  than  anti-slavery  agitators  who  did 
not.  Calhoun  and  Brown  were  criticising,  not  defending,  Polk.  162Ban- 
croft  to  Conner,  Jan.  17,  1846.  Wash.  Union,  Oct.  15,  1847.  (Conceded) 
Boston  Atlas,  May  15,  16,  20,  1846.  See  also  chap,  vi,  note  22,  last  para- 
graph. 

31.  Wash.  Union,  Oct.  15,  1847.  256Paper  indorsed  "Projet  —  Genl. 
Scott."  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  486.  (Sabine)  76Mora,  Nov.  15,  1845. 
(Prevented)  8lArista  to  troops,  July  31,  1845 ;  IBld.  to  Parrodi,  Dec.  22. 
Addressing  the  nation  in  denunciation  of  the  revolution  of  Paredes,  Dec, 
1845,  the  Mexican  Chamber  of  Deputies  stated  that  only  his  attitude  had 
prevented  war  upon  the  United  States  that  year.  77Almonte,  Sept.  20, 
1844.  (Mobile)  66Sanders  to  Taylor,  Feb.  15,  1846;  Elliot,  chap,  v, 
note  6;  Nat.  Intelligencer,  May  29,  1845;  Sept.  10,  1846.  (180)  Stevens, 
Campaigns,  18.  52Dimond,  no.  257,  1845.  W.  S.  Parrott,  July  22,  1845. 
297Polk  to  Dallas,  Aug.  23,  1845.  (Accentuate)  256Marcy  to  Wetmore, 
Aug.  12,  1845;  Jan.  21,  1846  (Our  relations  with  Mexico  "have  worsened 
by  the  change  which  has  undoubtedly  taken  place  in  that  country"). 
76Mejia  to  Canales,  Feb.  16,  1846;  to  Guerra,  Mar.  17.  Art.  1,  sec.  10 
of  our  Constitution  and  the  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1795,  show  that  not  only  in- 
vasion but  danger  of  invasion  authorized  military  measures.  Authoriza- 
tion implied  a  corresponding  duty.  To  neglect  this  duty  and  throw  the 
matter  into  Congress,  where  partisan  complications  and  ignorance  regard- 
ing the  region  and  the  circumstances  prevailed,  would  have  caused  the 
delay  which  the  Constitution  aimed  to  prevent.  Note  also  Cong.  Globe, 
29,  2,  app.,  209-10,  col.  1  (action  of  com.  for.  rels.).  Again,  had  Texas 
been  independent  in  Jan.,  1846,  no  one  would  have  censured  her  for  send- 
ing troops  to  the  Rio  Grande ;  and  the  United  States  succeeded  to  all  her 
rights.  This  right  was  independent  of  our  claim  to  the  intermediate 
region  (Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  app.,  425-6). 

32.  Picayune,  Dec.  12,  1846.  (Confessed)  218Henshaw  narrative. 
13Giffard  to  Bankhead,  May  13,  1846.     Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  106. 

33.  297Scott,  memo.,  undated. 

34.  Von  Hoist,  U.  S.,  hi,  245,  note.  Autograph,  Jan.-Feb.,  1912  (Tay- 
lor, Apr.  7).  The  proof  that  Mexico  claimed  still  to  the  Sabine  is  volu- 
minous:  e.g.  Paredes,  proclamation,  Mar.  21,  1846  (Mexico  "does  not 
acknowledge  the  right  of  the  American  flag  on  the  soil  of  Texas,  and  she 
will  defend  her  invaded  territory") ;  76Gen.  Mora,  Nov.  15,  1845  ("the 
contest  in  which  the  Republic  is  engaged  with  the  United  States  for  the 
possession  of  the  territory  of  Texas");  Diarxo,  Mar.  25;  Sept.  18,  26 
(the  Sabine  "is  the  boundary"),  1846;  Monitor  Repub.,  June  28,  1847 
(Mexico  "neither  recognizes  nor  has  recognized  any  boundary  except  the 
Sabine");    Pefia,   Comunicaci6n    circular,   Dec.   11,    1845   (indicates   re- 


458  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGE   155 

peatedly  that  the  object  of  the  war  would  be  the  recovery  of  Texas) ; 
Otero,  Comunicaci6n  (After  Herrera's  fall  "reconquest  [of  Texas]  again 
became  our  policy");  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Jan.,  1849.  Wash. 
Union,  Nov.  10,  1847.  (Probably)  69Alba  to  Taylor,  Mar.  6,  1846; 
76Mejia,  Jan.  21 ;  Mar.  28 ;  76Mora,  May  4 ;  Bankhead,  no.  47,  1846 : 
note  Mejfa's  action  in  Feb.  and  March,  1846,  supra;  and  Ampudia's 
orders  to  him  before  Taylor  left  Corpus  Christi  (note  24).  (Notice) 
76Relaciones  to  ministers  at  London  and  Paris,  July  30,  1845.  Benton 
in  Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  p.  497  (the  causes  of  the  war  existed  before  Taylor 
advanced,  and  his  advance  resulted  from  them).  See  also  the  next  note. 
35.  Otero,  Comunicaci6n.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  iii,  app.,  486,  490. 
Monitor  Repub.,  Oct.  29,  1847.  (Arista)  Suarez  y  Navarro,  Alegato,  48. 
Polk,  Message,  Dec.  8,  1846  (Richardson,  Messages).  Paredes  to 
Arista,  Apr.  18  (captured  in  A.'s  baggage,  May  9,  1846)  in  Wash.  Union, 
Aug.  27,  1847,  and  in  Tex.  Democrat,  Nov.  11,  1846.  The  reader  will  not 
fail  to  note  the  decisive  bearing  of  the  letter  of  Apr.  18  on  the  question 
discussed  in  the  preceding  paragraph. 

.  36.  Vattel,  Law  of  Nations,  352.  If  any  substantial  arguments  against 
Polk's  course  existed,  Calhoun,  Webster  or  the  American  (Whig)  Review 
should  have  been  able  to  find  them.  Calhoun  (Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  p.  500) 
said  Polk  should  have  refrained  from  sending  Taylor  to  the  Rio  Grande 
and  have  referred  to  Congress  or  the  Senate  the  question  of  the  boundary. 
But  (1)  he  forgot  that  as  to  the  boundary  near  the  east  (the  only  part  of 
it  now  under  consideration)  our  government  stood  committed ;  (2)  he 
did  not  seem  to  know  whether  Congress  or  the  Senate  was  the  proper 
authority  on  the  subject ;  (3)  he  refuted  his  criticism  by  saying  that  Polk 
should  have  referred  the  question  on  finding  he  could  not  settle  it  by 
negotiation ;  and  Polk,  instead  of  having  found  he  could  not  do  so,  had 
Taylor  advance  with  the  hope  of  thus  inducing  Mexico  to  negotiate; 
(4)  Calhoun  had  thought  it  right  in  1844  to  place  our  military  forces 
virtually  at  the  orders  of  Texas  for  defensive  uses  (Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas, 
367),  and  she  would  very  likely  have  sent  them  to  that  river  (see  Wash. 
Union,  Feb.  22,  1847) ;  (5)  reference  of  the  question  to  Congress  would 
almost  certainly  have  caused  long  delay  and  paralyzed  the  Executive, 
for  about  fifteen  unsuccessful  attempts  were  made  in  the  business  of 
annexing  Texas  to  determine  the  boundary,  and  after  the  war  that  subject 
vexed  Congress  for  nearly  two  years.  (See  also  the  text.)  Calhoun's 
fundamental  objection  against  the  President's  policy,  however,  was  that 
Polk  should  have  let  the  Mexican  difficulties  alone  until  after  settling  the 
Oregon  question  (Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  p.  498).  But  (1)  it  was  not  certain 
that  the  Oregon  question  could  be  settled  amicably ;  at  one  time,  as  we 
have  noted,  Polk  believed  it  could  not  be ;  and  therefore  it  may  well  have 
seemed  prudent  to  get  rid  of  a  smaller  but  annoying  affair  before  the  greater 
one  should  reach  a  crisis ;  (2)  other  important  reasons  for  settling  with 
Mexico  have  been  given  on  pp.  118,  120-2,  134-7. 

Webster,  after  thinking  on  the  subject  for  more  than  half  a  year,  took 
it  up  in  a  long  speech  at  Philadelphia  (Writings,  iv),  and  said  :  Polk  ordered 
the  occupation  of  territory  to  which  we  had  "no  ascertained  title"  (p.  26). 

*[But  a  serious  claim  may  be  an  adequate  basis  for  pacific  joint  occupation.] 
Polk  viewed  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  boundary  [being  committed  to  that 
position],  and  "intended  to  extinguish  the  Mexican  title  by  force"  (p.  27). 
[Polk  desired  to  extinguish  it  through  negotiation,  and  had  not  aban- 
doned the  effort  to  do  so  when  he  ordered  Taylor  to  advance.     Mexican 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGE  155  459 

jurisdiction  was  not  to  be  attacked.  There  were  other  grounds  than  that 
alleged  by  Webster  for  the  instructions  given  to  our  general.]  Taylor 
was  ordered  to  treat  every  Mexican  assertion  of  title  as  an  act  of  hos- 
tility (p.  29).  [By  no  means.  Taylor  was  ordered  not  to  molest  the 
Mexican  posts.]  Why  did  not  Polk  consult  Congress  before  ordering 
Taylor  to  the  Rio  Grande  (p.  29)  ?  [The  matter  could  not  be  laid  in 
definite  shape  before  Congress  until  the  fate  of  Slidell's  mission  should 
have  been  decided.  Polk's  diary  shows  that  he  desired  to  present  the 
matter  to  Congress  as  promptly  as  he  could.]  Only  "self-defence"  could 
justify  sending  troops  into  a  territory  claimed  and  occupied  by  a  power 
with  which  at  that  time  no  war  existed  (p.  29).  [This  can  hardly  be 
admitted.  We  claimed  the  territory;  Mexico  was  believed  to  have 
troops  there ;  it  was  only  fair  to  place  ourselves  on  an  equality  with  her.] 
And  "there  was,  I  think,  no  case  of  such  necessity  for  self-defence"  (p.  30). 
[Webster  admits  that  for  self-defence  (i.e.  defence  of  the  Texans,  now  vir- 
tually American  citizens)  we  had  a  right  to  send  the  troops,  and  it  is 
believed  that  the  necessity  of  such  defence  has  been  established  in  the 
text.]  Taylor's  letters  prove  that  there  was  no  danger  of  a  Mexican 
invasion  (p.  30).  [Taylor's  outlook  extended,  and  his  letters  had  refer- 
ence only,  to  the  immediate  frontier,  and  even  to  little  of  that  except 
Matamoros.  He  could  furnish  no  opinion  regarding  the  intentions  of 
the  Mexican  government.  Of  the  orders  actually  given  to  the  Mexican 
generals  he  was  in  total  ignorance  until  after  May  9,  1846.  The  outlook 
of  the  authorities  at  Washington  was  broader  and  clearer  than  his,  and 
as  the  text  shows  they  were  warned  officially  that  Mexico  was  liable  to 
make  secret  preparations  and  a  sudden  invasion.]  "Ordering  the  army 
to  the  Rio  Grande  was  a  step  naturally,  if  not  necessarily,  tending  to 
provoke  hostilities"  (p.  31).  [Of  course  the  assertion  of  a  claim  denied 
by  another  power  tends  naturally  in  the  direction  of  hostilities,  but  no 
nation  can  for  that  reason  forbear  to  assert  its  claims.  Webster's  sug- 
gestion that  sending  the  troops  did  not  necessarily  produce  hostilities  is 
noteworthy.]  If  the  President  can  declare  war,  what  becomes  of  the 
Constitution,  which  gives  that  power  to  Congress  (p.  32)?  [The  Presi- 
dent may  take  steps  logically  leading  to  war ;  but  in  this  case  there  was 
reason  to  believe  that  Taylor's  advance  might  tend  toward  peace.]  Was 
it  Polk's  object  to  force  Mexico  to  treat?  If  so,  it  was  an  "idle  hope" 
(p.  32).  [Here  Webster  seems  to  admit  that  such  might  have  been  Polk's 
intention.  The  fact  that  Polk  failed  does  not  prove  that  such  was  not 
his  design.  Webster  failed  to  acquire  northern  California,  but  he  cer- 
tainly attempted  to  do  so.]  It  will  be  said  that  Polk's  course  was  sanc- 
tioned by  "the  act  of  May  11th,"  1846  (the  virtual  declaration  of  war 
against  Mexico,  the  preamble  of  which  stated  that  Mexico  had  brought 
on  the  war),  but  neither  a  preamble  nor  an  act  of  Congress  can  "create  a 
fact"  (p.  32).  [But  a  preamble  can  state  an  opinion;  and  Congress  thus 
expressed  an  opinion  justifying  the  President's  course.]  "I  hardly  sup- 
pose" Congress  by  that  act  "meant  more  than  to  enable  the  President 
to  defend  the  country,  to  the  extent  of  the  limit  claimed  by  him"  (p.  32). 
[He  claimed  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  limit ;  and  if  Congress  believed  the 
country  was  to  be  defended  to  that  river,  it  believed  the  country  extended 
to  it,  and  consequently  that  Polk  had  a  right  to  send  troops  thus  far.] 

The  most  plausible  criticisms  made  by  the  American  (Whig)  Review 
(July,  1846)  Were  the  following :  Buchanan  informed  Slidell  that  the 
army  had  been  ordered  to  advance  in  view  of  his  probable  rejection,  and 


460  NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  VII,   PAGE   155 

hence  Taylor's  advance  was  not,  as  Polk  asserted,  due  to  the  urgent 
necessity  of  defending  Texas.  [But  the  probable  rejection  of  Slidell 
meant  probable  fighting  of  a  more  or  less  serious  nature  north  of  the  Rio 
Grande.]  Attempts  were  made  from  time  to  time,  by  throwing  out 
hints,  to  induce  Taylor  to  advance  on  his  own  responsibility  to  the  Rio 
Grande  [note  15],  As  he  did  not,  Slidell  was  sent  to  precipitate  the  issue. 
[There  is  no  evidence  in  support  of  this  theory  and  much  evidence  against 
it,  as  we  have  seen.]  As  Slidell  failed  to  do  so,  Taylor  was  positively 
ordered  to  the  Rio  Grande.  [January  13  there  was  every  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  Slidell  would  be  rejected,  and  that  thus  an  issue  would  be  pre- 
cipitated. December  20  Pefia  y  Pefia  wrote  to  Slidell  that  unless  the 
pending  difficulties  were  settled  by  negotiation  there  must  be  war.] 

In  January,  1847,  the  Review  repeated  Webster's  argument  that  Taylor 
reported  no  danger  of  invasion.  [Note  the  comment  made  above.]  Octo- 
ber 16,  Marcy  wrote  to  Taylor  that  no  serious  danger  from  Mexico  was 
feared,  yet  gave  him  authority  to  advance  to  the  river.  [A  foray  would 
not  be  considered  a  serious  military  operation,  but  it  was  necessary  to 
guard  against  forays.]  On  January  13,  Polk  had  no  reason  to  expect 
that  Paredes  intended  to  open  hostilities.  [He  had  grave  reasons  for 
expecting  hostilities.  See  p.  100.]  He  had  Slidell's  despatch  of  December 
17,  which  intimated  that  it  might  be  more  possible  to  negotiate  with 
Paredes  than  with,  Herrera.  [Slidell  only  said  that  he  might  have  greater 
chances  of  accomplishing  something  with  a  less  friendly  but  more  efficient 
government.]  Besides,  it  was  known  that  war  would  have  to  proceed 
from  the  Congress,  not  from  the  President  of  Mexico.  [Holding  that 
Texas  was  a  part  of  Mexico  and  the  presence  of  American  troops  there 
an  invasion,  Paredes  took  the  ground  that  attacking  us  would  not  be 
making  war,  but  merely  defending  the  country  as  it  was  his  duty  to  do. 
(See  his  manifesto  of  April  23,  1846.)  Consequently  no  action  by  Con- 
gress was  necessary.]  Polk  says  the  Mexicans  did  not  place  their  hos- 
tilities on  the  ground  of  our  occupying  non-Texan  territory,  but  they  did 
do  so.  [Certain  Mexicans  took  this  ground  for  the  purpose  of  embarrass- 
ing the  Americans,  among  whom  there  was  known  to  be  a  difference  of 
opinion  on  this  point ;  but  the  national  Mexican  authorities  regarded  as 
our  essential  offence  the  presence  of  our  troops  on  Texan  soil :  note  34.] 

In  February,  1847,  the  Review  said  that  on  January  13,  1846,  Polk  did 
not  know  Slidell  would  be  rejected.  [Polk  carefully  avoided  stating 
that  at  that  date  Slidell's  rejection  was  certain.  He  spoke  of  it  as  "highly 
probable,"  which  was  rather  less  than  could  have  been  said.]  April  6, 
Taylor  referred  to  the  Mexicans  of  Matamor^s  as  "the  enemy."  [As  the 
word  occurred  in  a  report  to  our  government  it  did  no  harm,  even  if  not 
well  chosen;  but  at  that  date  Taylor  had  been  given  by  the  Mexicans 
sufficient  ground  for  using  it.]  Taylor  pointed  guns  at  Matamorrs  for 
the  purpose  of  stinging  the  Mexicans  into  hostility.  [See  p.  151.]  The 
intention  of  the  American  government  was  to  manage  things  so  as  to 
make  Taylor  the  scapegoat  if  matters  should  go  ill,  and  take  the  credit 
if  they  should  go  well.  [The  orders  of  the  war  department  were  prob- 
ably as  definite  as  they  could  safely  be  made.  See  p.  142.]  Polk  ordered 
Taylor  to  advance  because  he  did  not  believe  the  failure  of  Slidell  would 
be  a  pretext  for  war  that  Congress  would  accept.  [This  does  not  agree 
with  the  charge  made  by  Polk's  enemies  (e.g.  supra)  that  he  sent  Slidell 
in  order  to  have  him  rejected  and  thus  bring  about  a  war.  It  is  also 
wide  of  the  mark.     In  Polk's  mind  the  essential  ground  for  action  was 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   156-157         461 

not  the  rejection  of  Slidell  but  our  grievances,  and  his  diary  shows  that 
he  believed  this  ground  would  be  accepted  by  Congress,  or  at  least  believed 
so  to  such  an  extent  as  to  decide  upon  raising  the  issue  squarely.] 

In  October,  1847,  the  Review  stated  the  policy  which  it  said  Polk  should 
have  adopted :  to  issue  a  statement  that  we  would  defend  Texas,  that 
Mexico  must  pay  the  claims  of  our  citizens,  and  that  we  desired  no  Mexican 
territory;  next,  to  take  a  defensive  position  in  Texas,  perhaps  occupy 
a  Pacific  port  as  security  for  our  claims,  and  then  await  developments. 
[As  a  military  programme  this  plan  of  standing  on  the  defensive  was 
seriously  considered  by  the  government  and,  as  we  shall  see,  was  con- 
demned for  both  political  and  military  reasons.  To  say  we  desired  no 
Mexican  territory  would  have  been  meaningless  unless  we  pledged  our- 
selves to  take  none,  and  to  issue  such  a  promise  on  the  eve  of  a  war  the 
course  of  which  could  not  be  predicted,  and  especially  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  Mexico  could  pay  no  large  indemnity  except  with  territory,  would 
certainly  have  been  imprudent,  and  the  Review's  proposition  to  seize  a 
port  as  security  for  our  claims  suggests  as  much.  This  proposition,  by 
the  way,  was  less  j  r  stifiable  than  going  to  the  Rio  Grande,  for  we  had  a 
claim  to  the  intermediate  territory  and  no  claim  to  a  Mexican  port.  To 
take  a  defensive  attitude  in  Texas  signified  either  going  to  the  Rio  Grande 
in  order  to  obtain  a  good  strategic  position,  or  maintaining  at  great  ex- 
pense for  an  indefinite  period  an  army  large  enough  to  guarantee  the  Texans 
against  attack  at  any  and  every  point.  The  first  of  these  plans  was  the 
one  adopted  by  Polk ;  the  second,  on  account  of  the  expense,  would  have 
been  unjust  to  our  own  people,  and  in  the  end  would  have  compelled  us 
to  increase  our  demands  for  indemnity  against  Mexico.  Moreover,  there 
were  strong  objections  to  waiting  (p.  136) ;  and,  had  Mexico  simply  adhered 
to  the  policy  of  passive  resistance,  all  our  trouble  and  expense  would  have 
brought  us  no  nearer  a  settlement.  Still  other  objections  to  the  plan  of 
the  Review  could  be  offered.] 

VIII.   PALO   ALTO,    RESACA   DE   LA   PALMA 

1.  The  account  of  the  Mexican  army  is  based  upon  Memorias  de  .  .  . 
Guerra,  1844;  Mar.,  1845;  Dec,  1846;  152Claiborne,  Mems. ;  Diario, 
May  30,  1845;  Balbontin,  Estado  Militar;  Paz,  Invasi6n;  5Anaya, 
Memoria;  Pefia,  Comunicaci6n  circular;  Siglo  XIX,  Aug.  19,  21,  1845; 
S.  Miguel,  Repub.  Mex.,  133-4,  136;  Wash.  Globe,  Oct.  15,  1845;  Molina, 
recoils.;  Hist.  Mag.,  Feb.,  1870  (Deas) ;  Zirckel,  Tagebuch,  13,  111; 
Semmes,  Service,  441,  note ;  75Memorias  drawn  up  by  war  dept.  chiefs, 
Nov.,  1847 ;  8lSeminario  Polit.  del  Gob.  de  N.  Leon;  Moore,  Scott's  Camp., 
19 ;  76Report  of  superior  engineer  board,  Nov.  15,  1845 ;  Balbontin,  In- 
vasion, 77-8 ;  Monitor  Repub.,  Nov.  30,  1847  ;  148Chamberlain,  recoil*.  ; 
69  eport  of  spy,  Apr.  5,  1846;  N.  Orl.  Commerc.  Bulletin,  May  21,  1846; 
76Carrera,  report  on  artillery,  Dec,  1847 ;  76reports  of  the  powder  mills 
at  Zacatecas  and  Santa  Fc  • 

Dec,  1843,  a  special  school  of  application  for  artillery  and  engineer 
officers  was  decreed,  but  lack  of  money  prevented  its  establishment.  There 
was  a  normal  school,  intended  to  convey  the  rudiments  of  military  knowl- 
edge to  the  privates  through  the  corporals  and  sergeants,  but  it  signified 
little  or  nothing.  Attached  to  the  engineer  corps  was  a  body  of  sappers, 
miners,  and  pontoniers ;  but,  owing  to  lack  of  funds  to  equip  it  with,  it 
served  as  infantry.     The  poorest  cannon,  especially  at  first,  were  kept  at 


462         NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   157-159 

the  fortresses.  What  horses  could  be  had  for  artillery  service  were  too 
light  and  frisky.  Paredes  reorganized  this  arm,  and  assigned  to  it  about 
250  officers,  5000  privates,  and  200  clerks  and  workmen.  The  bronze 
cannon  manufactured  in  Mexico  during  1846-47  were  not  satisfactory, 
and  the  grape-shot  was  so  poorly  made  that  its  range  was  considerably 
reduced.  The  importance  of  artillery  had  never  been  appreciated  in 
that  country.  There  was  a  good  arsenal  at  Mexico,  and  there  were  old- 
fashioned  powder-mills  at  Santa  Fe  (near  that  city)  and  Zacatecas.  The 
latter  blew  up  early  in  1845,  and,  though  repaired,  worked  at  a  disadvan- 
tage. Mexican  powder  was  usually  of  an  inferior  quality.  The  Active 
corps  contained  fewer  men  than  the  Permanent.  The  infantry  musket 
carried  an  ounce  ball ;  and  the  escopeta  bullet  was  even  heavier  and  went 
farther.  In  both  cases  the  very  liberal  charge  of  powder  increased  the 
normal  range.  Many  of  the  escopetas  were  merely  sawed-off  muskets. 
The  shaft  of  the  lance  was  usually  about  six  feet  long  and  the  head  about 
one  foot.  The  Line  infantry  included  light  companies  (cazadores),  which 
sometimes  had  rifles  and  sometimes  deserved  to  be  called  sharpshooters. 
There  were  mounted  cazadores  also. 

Each  cavalry  regiment  consisted  of  four  squadrons,  and  each  infantry 
regiment  included  two  battalions,  one  commanded  by  the  lieutenant 
colonel,  and  the  other  by  the  major  (comandante  de  batallon).  There  were 
mounted  corps  called  hussars,  etc.,  but  the  difference  of  name  signified 
little  or  nothing,  practically.  Owing  to  the  smallness  of  the  horses,  the 
cavalry  had  not  much  shock-value.  There  were  635  cannon  on  hand  at 
the  end  of  1845,  25,789  muskets,  8155  swords,  100,000  artillery  projectiles, 
and  more  than  400,000  bullets.  Tornel  imported  104  new  cannon  early 
in  1846.  Differences  of  caliber  interfered  greatly  with  the  usefulness  of 
the  muskets.  March  9,  1846,  the  departments  were  urged  to  complete 
their  legal  quotas  of  troops  as  soon  as  possible. 

2.  On  the  first  day  when  volunteers  were  to  enlist  only  eleven  came 
forward  at  Mexico. 

3.  The  figures  are  based  upon  the  76official  return  of  April  17  supple- 
mented by  a  large  number  of  Mexican  and  American  statements.  Most 
of  the  latter  were  exaggerated.  The  Americans  were  doubtless  misled 
often  by  the  statements  of  prisoners,  who  wished  to  please  their  captors. 
"The  information  obtained  from  prisoners  ought  to  be  estimated  at  its 
proper  value"  (Napoleon,  Maxims,  53).  Mejla,  the  regular  commander 
of  the  first  brigade,  gave  way  temporarily  to  Garcia  on  account  of  ill 
health. 

4.  69Reports  of  spies.  Reptiblica  de  Rio  Grande,  June  27.  118Ber- 
landier,  memo.,  undated.  66Mansfield  to  Totten,  May  4.  217Henshaw 
papers.  76Testimony  at  the  trial  of  Arista.  76Mejfa,  Feb.  28 ;  Mar.  18. 
76Commander  of  zapadores,  Apr.  8.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  68,  70. 
Mexico  a  travel,  iv,  561.     Campana  contra,  4. 

5.  Monitor  Repub.,  Mar.  17.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  113,  117.  Revue 
des  Deux  Mondes,  Aug.  1,  1847,  388-93.  13Elliot,  nos.  12,  14,  etc.,  1846. 
66Mansfield  to  Totten,  Apr.  2,  23.  61  Worth  to  Taylor,  Apr.  2.  6lScott 
to  Marcy,  May  7.  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  42.  65Marcy,  gen.  orders  5. 
Sen.  230;  29,  1.  224Hitchcock,  diary.  62Twiggs  to  Davis,  May  4. 
The  principal  causes  of  the  absenteeism  were  assignment  to  higher  duties 
elsewhere  and  the  impossibility  (owing  to  the  lack  of  a  retired  list)  of  re- 
placing invalided  or  superannuated  officers.  Locomotor,  Mar.  27.  Cam- 
pana contra,  4.     Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  129-30.     Upton,  Mil.  Policy. 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   159-161         463 

206.  285Mejia  to  Paredes,  Apr.  3.  76Comte.  of  Zapadores,  Apr.  8. 
76Mejia,  Mar.  14,  28;  Apr.  2.  76ld.  to  Arista,  Apr.  30.  76Ampudia 
to  Arista,  Apr.  30. 

6.  66Sanders  to  Totten,  Apr.  10  (Ft.  B.  badly  placed).  185/d.  to  Dun- 
can, Apr.  27.  69Requena  to  Arista,  Apr.  30  (might  have  enfiladed). 
Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  217.  Republica  de  Rio  Grande,  June  27.  Pica- 
yune, May  10.  118Berlandier,  memo.  (Groves)  Ampudia,  Address 
(1846).  52Wickliffe  to  Buchanan,  May  21,  1845.  Giddings,  Camp.,  36 
Niles,  May  16,  p.  165;  23,  p.  179.  Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  42.  Polk,  Diary, 
Apr.  1,  1847.  218Henshaw  narrative.  Apuntes,  35.  66Sanders  to  Tay- 
lor, May  2.  Wash.  Union,  May  9 ;  June  6.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  59-60. 
Journal  U.  S.  ArtilL,  July,  1892,  p.  293.  132King  to  Buchanan,  June  1 
69Spy  to  Taylor,  Apr.  11. 

Taylor's  army  lay  on  the  Pt.  Isabel  road,  which  connected  here  with 
the  principal  Matamoros  ferry  (Paso  Real).  Fort  Brown  was  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  from  the  site  of  the  present  fort.  The  line  of  the  fort  at 
Pt.  Isabel  enclosed  about  fifty  acres,  and  could  not  be  properly  fortified 
with  the  means  at  hand  in  the  time  allowed.  May  2  the  works  were  far 
from  complete.  Some  at  least  of  the  disadvantages  of  his  position  were 
pointed  out  to  Taylor,  but  he  seemed  to  feel  no  concern.  Marcy  was  sur- 
prised that  the  Mexicans  did  not  cross  the  Rio  Grande  near  its  mouth 
and  capture  Pt.  Isabel.  The  explanation  probably  was  that  they  believed 
the  plan  they  acted  upon  was  better. 

7.  217Henshaw  papers.  6lCrossman  to  .  .  .  Apr.  23.  66Mansfield 
to  Totten,  Apr.  23.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  133,  138,  142,  288  (Taylor).  Spirit 
of  the  Times,  May  23.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  66  (the  murder  of  Cross  caused 
intense  resentment).  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  561.  Campana  contra,  4. 
69Walker  to  Taylor,  May  2.  Walker  was  absent  on  service  when  the  men 
were  surprised.     52Consul  Chase,  Tampico,  May  1.     National,  June  18 

8.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  133,  302  (Taylor).  (West  Pointers)  224Bliss  to 
Hitchcock,  June  7.  76Mejia,  Apr.  9. '  76ld.  to  Arista,  Apr.  30.  76Am- 
pudia,  Mar.  28.  Tropic,  May  7  (proclam.  of  Ampudia).  Ballentine, 
Eng.  Soldier,  i,  57-9.  Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  39,  40.  (Promises,  etc.)  69Arista, 
"Advice,"  Apr.  20.  69Report  of  spy,  Apr.  5.  Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  i, 
408.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  53.  London  Times,  June  8.  Ho.  194;  29,  1 
(Jones,  May  5).  Spirit  of  the  Times,  May  16.  Esperanza,  Apr.  18. 
Bustamante,  N.  Bernal,  ii,  11.  69Mier  y  Teran  to  Mejia,  May  4.  Taylor 
gave  orders  to  shoot  soldiers  attempting  to  cross  the  river.  Later,  British 
deserters  were  not  accepted. 

9.  76Arista,  May  1,  7.  So.  Advocate,  June  10,  1846.  76Ampudia  to 
Arista,  Apr.  30.  76Parrodi,  Apr.  8.  69 Arista,  "Advice,"  Apr.  20.  76Me- 
jia,  proclam.,  Mar.  18.  (Lasted)  Donnavan,  Adventures,  102.  76Comte. 
gen.  S.  L.  Potosi,  proclam.,  Mar.  27.  76Comte.  gen.  Zacatecas  to  troops, 
Apr.  1.  The  Mexican  press  teemed  with  the  ideas  here  suggested.  To 
an  Indian  anything  as  foreign  as  a  neighboring  estate  seemed  dreadful. 
76Ampudia,  Mar.  28.  Apuntes,  33.  (Despised)  162Conner  to  wife, 
May  9;  Henshaw  narrative;  Niles,  May  16,  p.  165;  Sept.  12,  p.  22. 
(Hardee)  224Bliss  to  Hitchcock,  June  7.  Ampudia's  troops  had  mu- 
tinied on  the  way,  but  an  appeal  to  their  patriotism  had  brought  them 
round.  There  had  been,  as  was  usual,  a  good  deal  of  desertion;  but  to 
a  certain  extent  those  who  stood  by  the  colors  were  for  this  reason  above 
the  average  (76Ampudia,  Mar.  10,  11,  12).  Taylor's  method  —  uniformly 
despising  the  enemy  and  teaching  his  troops  to  do  so  —  was  contrary  to 


464        NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   161-164 

the  practice  of  Caesar,  Napoleon  and  the  Duke  of  Wellington  (Napol., 
Maxims,  49,  note). 

10.  (Obvious)  Henshaw  narrative.  63Marcy,  Jan.  13.  69Friend, 
[Apr.  11].  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  138,  140,  142  (Taylor).  65Taylor,  gen. 
orders  45.  (Seven)  69McCall,  report,  Apr.  30.  May  3  Taylor  reported 
that  his  lack  of  light  troops  had  helped  to  keep  him  in  ignorance  of  the 
enemy's  movements  as  if  that  lack  had  been  due  to  some  one  else.  He  did 
not  call  on  Texas  for  troops  until  Apr.  26.  Ripley  (War  with  Mexico,  i, 
133)  says  he  did  not  call  in  February  because  such  troops  could  serve  only 
three  months.  But  had  a  call  been  issued  then,  the  troops  would  prob- 
ably not  have  begun  to  serve  for  a  month  or  two ;  and  later  he  could  have 
called  for  a  second  small  body. 

11.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  561.  76Arista,  Apr.  27;  May  1.  76/d.  to 
Ampudia,  May  5.  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Aug.  1,  1847,  394-6.  Re- 
publicano,  June  5.  Campafia  contra.  76Arista  to  Mejia,  May  1,  2. 
76Mejia  to  Arista,  May  1,  3.  69Diary  captured  in  Arista's  papers. 
76Plana  mayor  diary.  Apuntes,  35-7.  Bustamante,  N.  Bernal,  ii,  16. 
76Testimony  at  trial  of  Arista.  People  in  the  United  States  could  not 
believe  Taylor  would  permit  the  enemy  to  get  between  him  and  his  base 
(e.g.  Mobile  Herald  and  Tribune,  May  3).  At  first  Arista  left  only  1007 
men  at  Matamoros,  but,  becoming  anxious  about  the  town,  he  sent  back 
the  Morelia  battalion. 

12.  Henshaw  narrative.  Mansfield,  Mex.  War,  35.  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
p.  288  (Taylor).  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  175.  Picayune,  May  12. 
Nebel  and  Kendall,  1.  Niles,  May  23,  p.  178.  Ho.  1;  30,  2,  p.  1161 
(Conner).  62Twiggs  to  Davis,  May  4.  (Lowd,  etc.)  Meade,  Letters, 
i,  74-5.  Appleton's  Biog.  Diet.  (art.  by  J.  Davis  on  Taylor).  Auto- 
graph, May- June,  1912  (Taylor).  Smith,  To  Mexico,  44.  Fry  and  Con- 
rad, Taylor,  109-10.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  86.  76Diary  of  plana 
mayor.     76To  Arista,  May  15. 

Mejia  notified  Arista  that  Taylor  was  preparing  to  move,  but  the  news 
arrived  so  late  that  the  guns  of  Matamoros  did  not  open  fire  upon  him. 
Arista  pursued  the  Americans  but  could  not  overtake  them ;  and  a  body 
of  dragoons  that  he  ordered  on  was  equally  unsuccessful.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  May  3  the  boom  of  heavy  guns  in  the  direction  of  Fort  Brown 
(Grant,  Mems.,  i,  92;  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  88)  alarmed  Taylor,  and 
he  gave  orders  to  set  out  at  one  o'clock  (Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  88; 
Smith,  To  Mexico,  44),  which  showed  that  he  felt  no  great  confidence  in 
its  defensibility  even  then ;  but  he  desired  to  strengthen  the  base  and  to 
receive  some  ordnance  and  reinforcements  that  he  then  expected  (Ho. 
60;  30,  1,  p.  288),  and  hence  sent  Capt.  Walker  with  a  small  party  to 
communicate  with  Brown  (Henshaw  narrative).  This  was  a  hard  task; 
but  after  some  fighting,  Walker  reached  the  fort,  stated  that  Taylor  would 
return  as  soon  as  possible,  obtained  a  reassuring  report  (Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
p.  293),  and  with  great  difficulty  made  his  way  back  (Henshaw  papers ; 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  289,  293).  May  1  Pt.  Isabel  had  a  force,  including 
civilians  who  took  up  arms,  of  400-500  (Niles,  May  16,  p.  165;  23,  p.  179  ; 
Picayune,  May  10;   Wash.  Union,  May  9). 

13.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  74-8,  93.  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  56,  58.  Journ. 
Mil.  Serv.  Instit.,  xli,  94.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  288,  292-4  (Taylor);  527 
(spec,  orders  60).  Autograph,  May- June,  1912  (Taylor).  Nebel  and 
Kendall,  2.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  167-8.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  88-9. 
(Leaving  train,  etc.)  224Larnard  to  Hitchcock,  June  13.     Wash.   Union, 


NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   164-169         465 

May  9,  29,  30.  Niles,  May  16,  p!  162.  62Twiggs  to  Davis,  May  4. 
French,  Two  Wars,  49.  Some  of  the  officers  were  anxious  to  wait  for  larger 
reinforcements  (185L.  C.  to  Duncan,  Nov.  21),  but  Taylor  feared  Fort 
Brown  was  getting  short  of  ammunition. 

14.  The  battle  of  Palo  Alto.  Sen.  388;  29,  1  (Taylor  and  officers). 
65Taylor,  gen.  orders  58.  Id.,  Letters  (Bixby),  1.  Campafia  contra. 
Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  561-3,  566.  224Bliss  to  Hitchcock,  July  23.  61  Arthur 
to  brother,  May  10.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  79,  80.  13Pakenham,  no.  54, 
1846.  McCall,  Letters,  449-54.  224Larnard  to  Hitchcock,  June  13. 
Eyewitness,  Complete  History,  23.  210Alvord  to  Hammond,  May  22. 
Wash.  Union,  May  30.  Map  in  Map  Div.,  Lib.  of  Cong.  Nat.  Intelli- 
gencer, May  11,  18 ;  Sept.  3,  10.  N.  Y.  Journ.  of  Commerce,  Feb.  24,  1847. 
Diario,  May  29.  Tex.  Democrat,  June  24.  Spirit  of  the  Times,  May  30. 
Portrait  of  Arista,  city  hall,  Mex.  350Weber,  recoils.  213Hatch,  letters. 
Picayune,  Aug.  1,  1845 ;  Sept.  24,  1846.  Delta,  May  24.  118Berlandier, 
diary  and  map.  185Duncan  to  adj.  gen.,  June  19.  185Marcy  to  Duncan, 
July  27.  Nebel  and  Kendall,  2-3.  Smith,  To  Mexico,  45,  47-9.  Fallo 
Definitivo  del  Supremo  Tribunal  [re  Arista's  conduct].  Sedgwick,  Corresp., 
i,  16.  Niles,  June  6,  pp.  215-16;  Oct.  24,  p.  122.  Frost,  Taylor,  81. 
Hist .  Mag.,  Feb.,  1870, 101-2.  Haskin,  First  Artill.,  80.  Journ.  Milit.  Serv. 
Instit,  xli,  96.  Ampudia  ante  ...  la  Opini6n  Publica.  (Stepped  aside) 
Grant,  Mems.,  95.  Sen.  378;  29,  1,  p.  57.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  214. 
Esperanza,  May  23.  Monitor  Repub.,  June  2.  Autograph,  May- June, 
1912  (Taylor).  Ampudia  to  Fellow-cits.  285Arista  to  Paredes,  May  14. 
285Segura  to  Escudero,  June  4.  Ramsey,  Other  Side,  39,  note,  48. 
(Losses)  Ho.  24;  31,  1.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  295,  393  (Taylor);  392 
(Marcy);  1102  (Mcintosh);  403.  185Duncan  to  Belknap,  May  12. 
French,  Two  Wars,  49,  50.  364Worth  to  S.,  June  13.  Donnavan,  Ad- 
ventures, 102.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  90-3,  95.  Roa  Barcena,  Re- 
cuerdos,  36,  39.  Sumaria  mandada  formar  .  .  .  J.  L.  Uraga.  Negrete, 
Invasi6n,  ii,  233.  Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  i,  414-9.  Apuntes,  38-41. 
So.  Qtrly.  Rev.,  Nov.,  1850,  p.  446.  And  from  76  the  following.  Testi- 
mony at  the  court-martial  of  Arista.  To  Arista,  May  17.  Arista,  May  7,  - 
8,  13,  1846;  July  12,  1847.  Ampudia,  May  14.  Requena  to  Arista, 
May  8.  Vazquez  to  sister,  May  25.  Arista  to  Ampudia,  May  5;  to 
Parrodi,  May  9.     Ampudia  to  Arista,  May  11.     Plana  mayor  diary. 

Remarks.  When  first  seen,  the  Mexicans  were  probably  two  or  three 
miles  from  the  Palo  Alto  pond,  but  they  advanced  until  about  a  mile  and 
a  half  from  that  point.  Both  lines  of  battle  were  too  long.  The  batteries 
on  both  sides  used  solid  shot  mostly.  On  the  placing  of  our  gunners  in 
advance  of  the  troops,  see  Napoleon,  Maxims,  45.  The  Mexican  gunners 
fired  mostly  at  the  American  artillery,  but  the  American  gunners  mostly 
at  the  Mexican  infantry.  It  was  said  that  not  more  than  a  dozen  Mexicans 
were  killed  with  bullets.  Many  of  the  Americans  were  ordered  to  sit 
down  or  lie  down  (particularly  the  Eighth  Infantry) ;  and  as  most  of  the 
Mexican  tolls  approached  at  a  ricochet  it  was  not  very  difficult  to  dodge 
them.  Whatever  the  Americans  accomplished  was  almost  wholly  due 
to  their  cannon.  Not  only  the  excellence  of  the  ammunition  and  the 
accurate  fire,  but  the  boldness  and  rapidity  of  the  manoeuvres  astonished 
the  Mexicans.  It  is  not  known  why  Taylor  decided  to  rely  on  artillery, 
to  which  (it  was  stated)  he  had  referred  contemptuously  on  the  morning 
of  the  battle  as  mere  "gun  wagons";  but  presumably,  as  the  field  was 
peculiarly  well  suited  for  that  arm,  Ringgold  and  Duncan,  supported  by 
vor..  i    -2  H 


466        NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   169-176 

Bliss,  urged  him  to  let  it  have  a  chance.  The  American  officers,  though 
they  had  not  over-much  confidence  in  Taylor,  felt  a  great  deal  in  one 
another,  and  so  had  a  vast  advantage  over  the  Mexicans  (Mexico  a  traves, 
iv,  566).  Ringgold  was  mortally  wounded,  but  would  not  let  his  men 
leave  their  work  to  care  for  him.  During  the  intermission  the  Americans 
removed  their  wounded,  replenished  caissons,  and  made  repairs.  Commo- 
dore Conner,  hearing  Taylor  was  likely  to  be  attacked,  sailed  for  that 
quarter,  and  on  May  8  and  9  landed  500  seamen  and  marines  at  Point 
Isabel  (166Conner  Letter-book.  See  also  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  60.). 
The  chief  Mexican  surgeon  and  a  number  of  assistants  made  an  early 
and  rapid  retreat.  The  Mexican  loss  was  estimated  by  Taylor  as  200 
killed  and  400  wounded;    by  Arista  as  252  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 

15.  (May  8  indecisive)  224Larnard  to  Hitchcock,  June  13 ;  Giffard  to 
Pakenham,  May  28 ;  McCall,  Letters,  454 ;  Meade,  Letters,  i,  80 ;  Wil- 
helm,  Eighth  Inf.,  i,  416-7.  Sen.  388;  29,  1.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby), 
1.  (Consulted)  Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  i,  418;  Stevens,  Campaigns,  20; 
Sedgwick,  Corresp.,  i,  16;  Journ.  Milit.  Serv.  Instil.,  xli,  98;  185L.  C. 
to  Duncan,  Nov.  24;  Article  by  J.  Davis  on  Taylor  in  Appleton's  Biog. 
Diet.  Accounts  of  this  conference  differ  so  much  that  little  can  be  said 
of  it.  Some  of  the  officers  were  for  entrenching  and  awaiting  reinforce- 
ments. It  was  known  that  Conner's  fleet  had  arrived  (note  14).  (De- 
fend) Taylor,  supra;  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  94;  map  of  P.  Alto  in 
Map  Div.,  Lib.  of  Cong.  Churchill's  18-pounders  and  two  12-pounders 
taken  from  the  baggage  were  left  here.  The  wounded  were  sent  to  Pt. 
Isabel.  Rives  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  153)  states  that  Taylor  marched 
early  May  9  to  Resaca  de  la  Palma  and  parked  the  train  there,  but  this 
is  incorrect  (Taylor  in  Sen.  388;  29,  1,  p.  6;  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  94; 
369map  of  Palo  Alto;  Ripley,  War  with  Mexico,  i,  124;  etc.).  The 
point  is  important  because  troops  were  left  with  the  train  to  protect  the 
wagons  —  not  as  a  rear  guard  (Rives).  Rives  (p.  154)  states  incorrectly 
that  the  Eighth  Infantry  was  left  with  the  train. 

16.  The  battle  of  May  9.  Sen.  388;  29,  1  (Taylor  and  officers).  Apun- 
tes,  42-7.  Suarez  y  Navarro,  Alegato.  Campafia  contra.  Negrete, 
Invasi6n,  ii,  230,  233.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  295,  393,  396,  403  (Taylor); 
392,  395  (Marcy);  1104  (Mcintosh).  69Canales  to  Arista,  May  9. 
13Giffard  to  Bankhead,  May  13.  Henshaw  narrative.  147Chamberlain, 
diary.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  1.  210Alvord  to  Hammond,  May  22. 
210Hammond  to  Simms,  Apr.  1,  1847.  213Hatch,  letters.  Wash.  Union, 
July  25,  1846.  369Map  of  P.  Alto.  Spirit  of  the  Times,  May  30 ;  June  20. 
Picayune,  May  19;  June  3.  Berlandier,  diary  and  map.  Nebel  and 
Kendall,  3-4.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  564,  566.  Fallo  Definitivo  del  Su- 
premo Tribunal,  19.  Sen.  4;  29,  2.  Ho.  1;  30,  2,  p.  1162.  Claiborne, 
Quitman,  i,  253.     Journ.  Mil.  Serv.  Instit.,  xvii  (Van  Deusen) ;    xli,  98. 

370Taylor  to ,  June  18.     Taylor,   Letters  (Bixby),  175.     Ampudia 

ante  ...  la  Opin.  Pub.  (Uraga).  McCall,  Letters,  455.  Sen.  378;  29, 
1,  p.  57  (Bliss).  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  93,  96-8.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  81-2,  149. 
72Reales  Ordenes,  Serie  de  Gobernaci6n,  leg.  43.  Appleton's  Biog.  Diet, 
(art.  by  J.  Davis  on  Taylor).  (Losses)  Ho.  24;  31,  1.  285Arista  to 
Paredes,  May  9,  14.  French,  Two  Wars,  51-4.  Autograph,  May- June, 
1912  (Taylor).  210Bragg  to  Hammond,  Dec.  20,  1847.  Ampudia  to 
Fellow-cits.  285Segura  to  Escudero,  June  4.  Smith,  To  Mexico,  49-52. 
185Duncan  to  Belknap,  May  10.  Eyewitness,  Complete  Hist.,  25-6. 
Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  i,  422-3.     Niles,  June  6,  pp.  211-7 ;  July  4,  p.  277 ; 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   169-176         467 

Sept,  26,  p.  57.  224Larnard  to  Hitchcock,  June  13.  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  96-9.  6lArthur  to  brother.  Puritano  Mex.,  May  26.  224Bliss 
to  Hitchcock,  June  7.  6lPatton  to  Polk,  July  18,  and  enclosure.  Mexico 
a  traves,  iv,  564,  566.  Roa  Barcena,  Recuerdos,  48.  The  verse  is  by 
Jose  de  Saltillo,  trans,  by  C.  F.  Hoffman.  And  from  76  the  following. 
Arista,  May  9,  10,  13,  1846 ;  July  12,  1847.  Id.  to  Mateos,  May  31 ; 
to  Parrodi,  May  13;  to  Taylor,  May  10.  Carrera,  May  25.  Requena 
to  Arista,  May  10.  Testimony  at  the  court-martial  of  Arista.  R.  Vaz- 
quez to  sister,  May  25.  Plana  mayor  diary.  Ampudia  to  Arista,  May  11, 
14.     Canales  to  Tornel,  May  10. 

Remarks.  It  would  be  unsafe  to  give  fuller  information  than  that  of 
the  text  with  reference  to  the  positions  of  the  Mexican  corps.  All  the 
accounts  are  unsatisfactory.  Owing  to  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the 
irregular  shifting  of  the  troops,  this  was  natural.  The  Mexican  leaders 
thought  their  position  would  ensure  victory.  Horses  were  unsaddled 
and  mules  relieved  of  their  packs.  The  chief  danger  to  Ridgely's  battery' 
was  from  Mexicans  ambushed  —  as  Taylor  had  reason  to  suppose  they 
would  be  —  on  both  sides  of  the  road.  May,  very  tall  and  straight,  with 
long  black  hair  and  a  black  beard  that  reached  to  his  waist,  became  a' 
newspaper  hero,  and  for  reasons  that  are  rather  hard  to  understand, 
was  promoted  several  times  during  the  war ;  but  he  seems  clearly  to 
have  been  essentially  a  cowardly  sham.  In  this  fight  he  seized  a  cannon,- 
but  only  the  infantry  prevented  the  enemy  from  recapturing  it.  He 
claimed  the  credit  of  making  Gen.  Vega  his  prisoner,  but  the  real  captor 
was  a  bugler.  By  his  own  account,  he  could  rally  only  six  of  his  men 
after  running  through  the  batteries.  The  horses  appear  to  have  "run 
away"  with  the  men.  Taylor's  report  laid  stress  upon  what  occurred 
at  the  road,  and  he  does  not  seem  to  have  known  —  at  that  time,  to  say 
the  least  —  what  mainly  caused  the  sudden  collapse  of  the  enemy;  but 
an  abundance  of  Mexican  evidence,  partly  given  under  oath,  makes  the 
matter  clear.  See  also  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  98.  After  Americans' 
were  seen  at  the  placeta  Arista's  secretary  went  to  where  the  road  crossed 
the  resaca,  and  found  May's  dragoons  there.  This  fixes  the  order  of 
events.  Duncan's  battery  did  nothing  during  the  battle,  for  Ridgely1 
had  the  only  opportunity  to  use  artillery  without  injuring  Americans. 
Duncan  and  Kerr  followed  the  Mexicans  at  some  distance ;  the  Third 
Infantry  cooperated ;  and  so  did  the  Artillery  Battalion,  after  it  reached 
the  scene ;  but  the  Mexicans  were  not  aware  of  any  real  pursuit.  Fort 
Brown  fired  on  the  throngs  of  fugitives,  but  no  sally  was  made.  One 
might  imagine  the  garrison  feared  the  guns  of  Matamoros;  but  they: 
watched  the  Mexican  fugitives  from  the  parapet.  Mejia's  ammunition 
had  been  almost  used  up.  Paredes  informed  Congress,  June  6,  that  after 
May  9  Arista  had  4000  regulars  (Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec.,' 
1846).  May  13  Arista  gave  the  number  as  3758  "men."  Arista's  chief 
of  staff  estimated  the  captured,  drowned,  and  dispersed  as  500.  Arista 
informed  Parrodi,  May  13,  that  the  total  number  of  men,  including  the 
wounded,  taken  by  Taylor  was  less  than  200,  and  this  seems  to  have  been 
true.  May  11  prisoners  were  exchanged.  Arista  reported  the  number 
in  American  hands  as  144,  including  the  wounded. 

17.  When  Taylor  set  out  for  Point  Isabel,  though  he  described  the  fort 
as  "in  a  good  state  of  defense,"  one  side  was  still  open,  and  the  draw- 
bridge and  interior  defences  had  not  been  begun  (66Mansfield  to  Totten, 
June  23;    diary  in  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Sept.  3);    and  not  before  the  night 


468  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  VIII,  PAGE  176 

of  the  third  was  the  position  considered  by  its  defenders  even  comparatively 
secure.  The  fort  had  six  bastion  fronts,  which  made  a  perimeter  of  8C0 
yards,  a  strongly  designed  wall  of  earth  9|  feet  high  from  the  natural 
ground,  a  parapet  15  feet  thick,  a  ditch  about  8  feet  deep  and  from  15  to 
22  feet  wide,  a  gate  and  a  drawbridge  (mostly  from  66Mansfield  to  Tot- 
ten,  Apr.  23).  For  about  4  feet  from  the  base  the  inside  of  the  wall  was 
fortified  with  a  sort  of  basket  work  of  willow  twigs.  The  magazine  was 
made  of  pork  barrels  filled  with  sand,  seven  tiers  thick  and  four  tiers  high, 
with  a  timber  roof  covered  with  10  or  12  feet  of  sand.  The  lort  was  a 
"child  of  circumstance,"  admitted  Engineer  Mansfield  (GGsupra),  and  in 
addition  to  the  faults  of  position  already  mentioned,  the  ground  was 
irregular  and  the  defence  was  made  difficult  by  the  extent  of  the  walls, 
for  as  considerable  portions  were  allowed  to  remain  covered  with  thick 
chaparral  (66Mansfield,  supra),  its  area  was  evidently  too  large  for  the 
500  men  which  it  had  been  intended  to  cover ;  but  it  was  after  all  a  strong 
work,  and  in  comparison  with  it  Mansfield  regarded  the  Mexican  forts 
as  "trifling"  (66to  Totten,  May  4).  Near  the  end  of  April  the  four 
18-pounders  were  removed  from  the  battery  to  a  bastion  of  the  fort  look- 
ing toward  Matamoras,  where  they  were  protected  with  merlons  faced 
with  sand-bags,  and  so  attack  as  well  as  defence  was  provided  for;  but 
there  were  only  150  rounds  of  ammunition  for  each  of  these  guns.  For 
this  note  :  Henshaw  narrative  and  papers ;  66Mansfield  to  Totten,  Apr. 
23;  May  4;  June  23;  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  39,  45,  53;  Mobile  Herald 
and  Tribune,  May  6 ;  Journal  of  U.  S.  Artil,  July,  1892,  p.  293 ;  Taylor 
in  Autograph,  May- June,  1912 ;  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Sept.  3 ;  Robinson, 
Organization,  ii,  49;  Niles,  June  13,  p.  230;  McCall,  Letters,  441,  443; 
(300  wagons)  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  651  (Cross). 

18.  Sen.  388;  29,  1,  pp.  31,  35  (Hawkins) ;  35  (Arista) ;  36  (Mansfield). 
Fry  and  Conrad,  Taylor,  109.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  175.  Apuntes, 
37-8.  Henshaw  narrative  and  papers.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  288,  296 
(Taylor);  293  (Brown).  Campafia  contra.  Picayune,  May  19,  21; 
Aug.  28.  .  69Diary  captured  with  Arista's  papers.  69Ampudia  to  Arista, 
May  5-6.  69Canales  to  Arista,  May  5,  7.  Mexico  £  traves,  iv,  561. 
(Losses)  Ho.  24 ;  31,  1.  66Mansfield  to  Totten,  May  4 ;  June  23.  13Gif- 
fard  to  Pakenham,  May  28.  76Ampudia  to  Arista,  May  11.  76Mejia, 
May  4,  14.  76Mier  y  Teran  to  Mejia,  May  3,  4,  5,  7  ;  to  Pequena,  May  4. 
76Testimony  given  at  the  court-martial  of  Arista.  76Arista,  May  7. 
7GId.  to  Ampudia,  May  5.  76Mejfa  to  Arista,  May  3.  Nat.  Intelligencer, 
Sept.  3.  76Requena  to  Arista,  May  5.  N.  Orl.  Commerc.  Bulletin, 
May  18.  364Worth  to  S.,  July  25.  Johnson,  Thomas,  23.  76Canales, 
May  5.     76Diary,  Apr.  30-May  6: 

Remarks.  May  6  the  fort  was  summoned,  with  an  intimation  that 
no  quarter  would  be  given,  should  the  garrison  hold  out  longer  (Henshaw). 
Brown  was  mortally  wounded  by  a  bomb-shell.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Captain  Hawkins.  In  all  one  man  was  killed;  nine  officers  and  men 
wounded  (Ho.  24;  31,  1).  An  attempt  was  made  to  burn  Matamoros, 
but  the  balls  could  not  be  heated  sufficient^  (Ho.  P0;  ?0,  1,  p.  293). 
Perhaps  a  general  more  farseeine  than  Taylor  would  have  provided  a 
furnace.  Ampudia  had  about  830  men  at  first  and  later  drew  others 
from  the  city.  When  Arista  called  him  to  Palo  Alto  on  May  8,  a  small 
force  remained  behind  to  continue  the  siege.  Bipley  (War  with  Mexico, 
i,  140)  says  that  Arista  should  have  reduced  the  fort.  But  Arista  judged 
rightly  that,  if  he  should  defeat  Taylor,  the  fort  would  have  to  fall,  and 


NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   176-179         469 

therefore  it  would  be  unwise  to  risk  heavy  losses ;    and  probably  he  did 
not  wish  Ampudia  to  have  the  glory  of  capturing  it. 

19.  13Giffard  to  Bankhead,  May  13;  to  Pakenham,  May  28.  118Ber- 
landier  to  Arista,  undated  draft.  Sen.  1;  29,  2,  p.  46  (Marcy,  report). 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  297  (Taylor).  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  3.  (Bridge, 
plank,  etc.)  Meade,  Letters,  i,  101-2.  Apuntes,  46.  69Sanders  to  Tay- 
lor, May  10  ("the  scows  and  flats  of  the  Quarter-Masters  Dept.  would 
give  us  the  means  of  crossing  the  river  at  once")-  Niles,  May  30,  p.  202. 
N.  Orl.  Commerc.  Bulletin,  May  18.  Nat.  Intell.,  May  18.  165Conner 
to  Bancroft,  May  28 ;  to  Aulick,  May  18.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  132. 
166Wilson  to  Conner,  May  15.  166Bliss  to  Wilson,  May  14.  Ho.  1; 
30,  2,  pp.  1161-2  (Conner).  Parkers  Recoils.,  56.  (Steamers)  Ho.  60; 
30,  1,  p.  522;  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  115  (the  Neva  at  Matamoros 
May  24) ;  Niles,  May  30,  p.  203 ;  166Munroe  to  Conner,  May  9 ;  N.  Y. 
Herald,  June  11.  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  59.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  297,  300 
(Taylor).  Wash.  Union,  May  18,  30;  June  17.  N.  Y.  Herald,  June  10. 
364Worth  to  S.,  June  1.  166Wilson  to  Conner,  May  15.  166Bliss  to 
Munroe,  May  9.  166Sanders  to  Bliss,  May  16.  166Bliss  to  Wilson, 
May  14.     Giddings,  Camp.,  36. 

There  was  additional  help  at  hand.  69May  10  Captain  Sanders,  the 
engineer  officer  at  Point  Isabel,  conferred  with  Conner  about  crossing 
the  river,  and  Conner  said  he  was  "perfectly  ready  and  willing  to  go  into 
the  river  and  proceed  up  as  far  as  Burita,"  where  he  would  place  all  his 
men  and  boats  at  Taylor's  disposal.  (In  fact  Conner  did  assist  in  the 
Burrita  expedition  actually  executed.)  This  was  reported  to  Taylor  at 
once.     Matamoros  had  no  defences  except  toward  the  river. 

20.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  297  (Taylor);  1206  (Arista).  Taylor,  Letters 
(Bixby),  3.  Campafia  contra.  69 Arista  to  Taylor,  May  10.  76Parrodi, 
May  22.  76Plana  mayor  diary.  13Giffard  to  Pakenham,  May  28. 
6lSpanish  letter  to  Taylor,  undated.  285Ampudia  to  Paredes,  May  14. 
76Arista,  May  13,  16.  (Duty)  Jomini,  Precis,  i,  475;  Wagner,  Strategy, 
45;  Henderson,  Science  of  War,  42.  Apuntes,  47.  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  107.  76Testimony  at  court-martial  of  Arista.  Fallo  Defini- 
tivo  (Arista  was  entirely  exonerated,  and  at  a  later  day  he  became  Presi- 
dent). 

21.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  298  (Taylor).  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  3.  Apun- 
tes, 47-51.  Camparia  contra.  76Arista,  May  16,  18,  29;  June  4.  76Pre- 
fect  of  No.  Tamaulipas  to  gov.,  May  29.  76Plana  mayor  diary.  285Tor- 
rej6n  to  Paredes,  June  3.  76To  Arista,  May  27;  June  9.  76Parrodi, 
May  22-3,  31.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  219.  76Testimony  at  the  court- 
martial  of  Arista.  76Ampudia,  Sept.  9.  224Bliss  to  Hitchcock,  June  7. 
Fallo  Definitivo.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  85,  95.  76Gen.  orders,  June  15, 
1848.  Arista  had  a  choice  between  two  routes  —  one  through  a  settled 
region,  the  other  through  a  desert  —  and  for  strategic  reasons  chose  the 
latter. 

22.  65Taylor,  gen.  orders,  59-61,  78-9,  83.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  297, 
300-1  (Taylor).  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  3,  175.  Wilhelm,  Eighth 
Inf.,  i,  425-6.  Reid,  Scouting  Expeds.,  43.  66Mansfield  to  Totten, 
June  23.  370Taylor  to  .  .  .  June  18.  Henshaw  papers.  Smith,  To 
Mexico,  52-4.  76Parrodi,  May  31.  Murray,  Reality,  75.  69Garland 
to  .  .  .  May  24.  Henry,  Camp  Sketches,  106-9,  113.  Meade,  Letters 
i,  88.  As  Roa  Barcena  says  (Recuerdos,  40),  the  Americans  were  physically 
stronger  than  the  Mexicans,  had  better  arms,  cannon,  artillery  horses,  and 


470         NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  VIII,   PAGES   179-181 

ammunition,  plenty  of  food,  ample  and  well-served  ambulances,  were 
quicker  and  more  forceful  in  their  movements,  and  were  more  obedient ; 
and  the  officers  had  more  confidence  in  one  another.  They  were  also 
cooler  and  more  intelligent,  and  had  greater  reserves  of  will-power,  and 
the  men  felt  more  confidence  in  their  superiors. 

23.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  98,  101.  Metrop.  Mag.,  Dec,  1907  (Hamilton, 
July  29,  1846).  139Campbell  to  Martin,  July  29;  (nine  tenths)  to  D. 
Campbell,  Aug.  9.  Polk,  Diary,  Apr.  1,  1847.  224Larnard  to  Hitch- 
cock, June  13.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  283.  224Bliss  to  Hitchcock,  June  7. 
Schouler,  U.  S.,  v,  248.  Weed,  Autobiography,  571-2.  Albany  Evening 
Journal,  June  18.     Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  389. 

Larnard,  an  excellent  officer,  wrote  to  Hitchcock  that  Taylor  did  not 
give  an  order  to  the  artillery  on  May  8  nor  a  material  order  to  any  one, 
and  that  he  was  no  more  responsible  for  winning  the  two  battles  than  a 
rock  rolling  down  a  hill  for  crushing  what  is  before  it.  This  was  intended, 
no  doubt,  to  be  taken  with  a  grain  of  salt.  The  editor  of  N ties'  Register 
said :  Owing  to  an  error  in  estimating  the  capacities  of  the  enemy,  the 
army  under  Gen.  Taylor  made  a  narrow  escape  from  almost  utter  annihila- 
tion (July  18,  p.  309) ;  and,  considering  the  ardor  of  the  Mexicans  as 
well  as  the  embarrassment  caused  by  the  American  wagons,  one  must 
believe  that  had  the  General  carried  out  the  plan  which  he  seems  to  have 
formed,  the  results  would  have  been  unfortunate.  See  Semmes,  Service, 
70.  Meade  (Letters,  i,  99)  remarked  that  Taylor's  neglect  of  precautions 
probably  helped  induce  the  Mexicans  to  fight.  This  was  not  true,  for 
Arista's  orders  were  express  ;  but,  even  had  it  been  so,  one  could  not  excuse 
a  general  for  really  (not  seemingly,  as  a  ruse)  neglecting  precautions  and 
preparations  demanded  by  the  circumstances.  "  Boldness  is  the  acme  of 
wisdom"  in  war,  the  German  general  staff  has  said  (Donat,  Russo-Japa- 
nese War,  255) ;  but  the  distinction  between  boldness  and  rashness  is 
real  and  vital.  No  doubt  graduates  of  West  Point  felt  a  prejudice  against 
men  of  antecedents  like  Taylor's,  but  they  showed  in  the  course  of  the 
war  a  willingness  to  recognize  merit.  The  popular  enthusiasm  over 
Taylor's  "victories"  was  the  greater  because  he  had  been  supposed  to 
be  in  extreme  peril. 

24.  52J.  Parrott,  June  4.  Bankhead,  nos.  71,  90,  1846.  285Vega  to 
Paredes,  Apr.  3.  76Tornel  to  Arista,  May  27.  The  London  Times, 
Feb.  24,  1847,  quoted  the  Journal  des  Debats  as  saying  in  effect  that  the 
Mexican  War  prevented  the  establishment  of  a  monarchy  in  Mexico. 
Paredes  had  no  doubt  been  encouraged  by  the  reports  of  Mejia  regarding 
the  state  of  things  at  Corpus  Christi,  and  very  likely  these  reports  helped 
decide  him  to  reject  Slidell. 

IX.    THE   UNITED   STATES   MEETS   THE   CRISIS 

1.  Our  policy  did  not  permit  us  to  accept  a  European  arbitrator,  and 
an  arbitrator  from  Central  or  South  America  would  not  have  been  thought 
impartial. 

2.  Polk's  Message  was  based  upon  the  view  that  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rio  Grande  belonged  to  the  United  States  (p.  139),  and  this  was  said  by 
some  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  idea  (involved  in  the  resolutions  annexing 
Texas  and  in  Slidell's  mission)  that  the  boundary  was  an  open  question. 
But  Polk's  language  amounted  only  to  an  assertionjyf  the  American  daim  ; 
and  a  claim,  however  just,  may  be  a  subject  of  negotiation.     His  expres- 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  IX,   PAGES   181-184  471 

sion  (taken  from  the  Washington  Union  of  May  9),  "shed  American  blood 
upon  the  American  soil,"  though  denounced  as  a  falsehood,  was  merely 
another  assertion  of  the  same  claim,  and  was  entirely  in  accord  with  the 
language  of  Madison,  Jefferson,  Monroe,  Pinckney,  and  J.  Q.  Adams. 
A  claimant,  convinced  that  his  cause  is  just,  declares  roundly,  "This  is 
mine,"  even  though  aware  that  his  contention  is  disputed.  A  more  con- 
servative statement  would  have  been  :  Mexico  has  invaded  a  region  that 
I  hold  to  be  ours,  and  shed  American  blood  on  what  I  regard  as  Amer- 
ican soil ;  but  Polk  seems  to  have  felt  no  doubts,  and  in  a  trumpet-call 
to  arms  qualifications  would  have  appeared  out  of  place. 

3.  Benton,  however,  reported  the  House  bill,  which  did  not  divide  the 
subject. 

4.  Incidents  preceding  and  attending  the  -passage  of  the  war  bill  {May  13). 
Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  388-92,  437-43.  Benton,  View,  ii,  679.  Polk, 
Diary,  Apr.  18,  21,  25,  28;  May  3,  5,  8,  9-13,  1846.  260Extracts  from 
National  Intelligencer.  315Winthrop  to  Schouler,  Mar.  20,  1848.  Web- 
ster, Writings,  iv,  138.  260Winthrop,  The  Mex.  War  Bill.  210Holmes 
to  Hammond,  May  10,  1846.  354Welles  papers.  Proceedings  of  Senate 
and  House  in  Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  p.  257,  and  May  11-13;  app./912; 
Feb.  24,  1847  (Calhoun).  Boston  Courier,  May  14.  Boston  Atlas,  May 
15.  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Dec.  9,  1847.  Calhoun  to  A.  P.  C,  May  14;  to 
J.  E.  C,  May  29,  1846 :  Jameson,  C.  Corresp.,  690,  692.  Benton,  Abr. 
Debates,  xvi,  99.  345Dix  to  Van  Buren,  May  16,  1846.  Wash.  Union, 
May  15,  1846;  Jan.  2,  1848.  Greeley,  Am.  Conflict,  i,  187.  Foster, 
Am.  Diplom.,  315.  Johnston  and  Browne,  Stephens,  203.  Nat.  Intelli- 
gencer, Dec.  27,  1847.  Winthrop,  Speeches,  i,  573.  Pub.  Ledger,  Dec.  4, 
1846.  132Buchanan,  memo.  Certain  incidents  {Cong.  Globe,  30,  1, 
app.,  231)  emphasize  the  fact  that  a  regular  war  was  contemplated  by 
Congress.  E.g.  Holmes  moved  that  the  war  bill  should  apply  southwest 
of  the  Nueces  only  for  the  withdrawal  or  rescue  of  our  army ;  voted  down 
by  8  —  122.     See  also  notes  9  and  10. 

5.  Benton  states  that  Polk  relied  for  peace  upon  the  project  of  replac- 
ing Paredes  with  Santa  Anna,  which  will  be  mentioned  later  in  this  chapter 
(View,  ii,  680).  He  also  charges  {ibid.)  that  the  administration  —  par- 
ticularly Walker  —  was  influenced  by  a  wish  to  bring  about  the  payment 
of  American  claims  and  make  good  certain  speculations  in  Texas  lands ; 
but  it  was  proper  that  the  claims  should  be  paid,  and  there  is  no  proof  of 
the  second  point. 

6.  Benton  hesitated,  and  May  11  Polk  counted  on  his  opposition  (Diary). 
In  the  debates  on  the  annexation  of  Texas  the  Senator  had  denied  that 
her  territory  extended  to  the  Rio  Grande  (Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  264, 
note),  and  he  did  not  approve  of  Taylor's  going  there.  Besides,  he  de- 
sired to  see  the  Oregon  issue  settled  before  coming  to  an  issue  with  Mexico. 
Possibly  Calhoun's  anxiety  to  prevent  or  defer  war  helped  to  drive  Benton 
to  the  opposite  side  (354Welles  papers;   Polk,  Diary,  May  3,  11,  1846). 

7.  One  may  also  view  the  matter  at  a  slightly  different  angle.  It  was 
possible  for  Mexico,  on  learning  that  General  Taylor  had  advanced  peace- 
ably to  the  Rio  Grande,  to  say,  Very  well,  he  may  occupy  the  disputed 
district  jointly  with  us  for  the  present.  England  and  the  United  States 
maintained  a  peaceable  joint  occupation  of  Oregon  for  years.  Taylor's 
advancing,  therefore,  did  not  per  se  and  necessarily  create  a  state  of  war. 
Now  the  United  States  did  nothing  else  that  could  fairly  be  termed 
aggressive ;  but  Mexico,  by  attacking  American  troops  engaged  in  peace- 


472  NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  IX,   PAGES   184-187 

ful  reconnoitring,  destroyed  the  state  of  potential  harmony,  and  conse- 
quently the  state  of  war  that  ensued  existed  by  her  act.  C.  J.  Ingersoll 
stated  later  {Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  app.,  125)  that  the  language  of  the  preamble 
was  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  conciliating,  not  offending,  the  Whigs ;  and 
one  can  see  that  it  might  seem  likely  to  be  easier  for  them  to  accept  the 
war  as  an  accomplished  fact  than  to  vote  for  a  declaration. 

8.  From  what  is  known  of  Calhoun's  designs  (Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas, 
209-216)  this  statement  seems  reasonable,  and  it  is  supported  by  positive 

evidence  (chap,  vi,  note  10).     232Calhoun  to  ,  Nov.  7,  1846:    The 

triumph  of  abolitionism  at  the  north  would  cause  disunion,  for  the  southern 
people  are  determined  to  defend  their  rights. 

9.  To  justify  Calhoun's  theory  the  Constitution  should  have  been  made 
to  read:  "Congress  shall  have  power  to  declare  war,  and  without  such  a 
declaration  the  United  States  shall  never  be  at  war,"  which  would  have 
been  manifestly  ridiculous ;  and  the  provision  in  article  i,  sect.  10,  that  a 
state,  when  in  imminent  danger,  might  begin  war,  should  have  been  can- 
celled. Doubtless  for  partisan  reasons,  Webster  (Curtis,  Webster,  ii, 
301)  took  the  same  position  as  Calhoun,  saying  that  Congress  could  not 
"create  a  fact"  — i.e.  could  not  state  that  war  existed  before  it  had  de- 
clared war.  Von  Hoist  on  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  face  the  tolerably 
evident  certainty  that  we  had  a  legal  war  with  Mexico,  says  (United 
States,  iii,  253)  that  Congress  made  Polk's  lie  [that  war  existed]  into  a 
fact !  Many  members  of  Congress  had  too  little  confidence  (Calhoun  to 
Thompson  :  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  i,  314)  in  their  knowledge  of  the  situation 
to  feel  positive  as  to  the  full  justice  of  the  American  cause,  but  this  did 
not  affect  the  validity  of  their  action.  Particularly  noticeable  was  the 
rejection  (27  to  97)  of  Delano's  proposition  that  nothing  in  the  war  bill 
should  be  construed  as  approving  of  the  President's  conduct  in  taking 
armed  possession  of  the  intermediate  region.  Thus  a  much  discussed 
question  was  formally  raised  and  formally  decided.  132King  to  Buchanan, 
June  1. 

10.  Discussion  of  the  proceedings.  (Feeling)  354Welles  papers.  (As- 
sured) Polk,  Diary,  May  11,  1846.  (Congressmen)  Meigs,  Benton,  360; 
Benton,  View,  ii,  680.  Tribune,  May  15.  Journal  of  Commerce,  July  1, 
1847.  Weekly  Herald,  May  16,  1846.  (Dissensions)  Boston  Atlas, 
May  18,  1846;  Jameson,  Calh.  Corresp.,  1038  (Harris);  Polk,  Diary, 
Apr.  30 ;  345Polk  to  Van  Buren,  Jan.  4 ;  Feb.  22,  25,  1845 ;  345Wright 
to  V.  B.,  Jan.  17,  1845;  345Butler  to  Polk,  Feb.  27,  1845;  345V.  B.  to 
Polk,  Feb.  27,  1845 ;  345S.  T.  Van  Buren  to  M.  V.  B.,  Mar.  2,  3,  4,  1845 ; 
297Cave  Johnson  to  Polk,  June  13,  1844 ;  and  see  chap,  xxxiv.  (Offices) 
Polk,  Diary,  May  10;  June  22,  1846,  and  passim.  210Holmes  to  Ham- 
mond, May  10,  1846.  L-lor,  Cyclop.,  iii,  1105.  (Whig  vote)  260Win- 
throp,  Mex.  War  Bill,  108;  Nat.  Intelligencer,  May  16,  1846;  N.  Y. 
Journal  of  Comm.,  Dec.  11,  1847;  Wheeler,  Hist,  of  Cong.,  i,  411;  Von 
Hoist,  U.  S.,  iii,  251.  Calhoun  to  Clemson,  Jan.  29,  1846;  to  A.  P.  C, 
May  14;  to  J.  E.  C,  May  29;  to  Clemson,  July  11 ;  to  J.  E.  C,  July  29, 
in  Calhoun  Corres.,  679,  691,  693-4,  700-1 ;  elso  707.  345Welles  to  Van 
Buren,  July  28,  1846.  Polk,  Diary,  Apr.  18,  21,  1846.  Calhoun  in  Sen., 
Feb.  24,  1847:  Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  p.  501.  Hunt,  Calhoun,  279.  Niles, 
May  16,  1846,  p.  162.  (Endorsed,  etc.)  Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  p.  802  (Crit- 
tenden). Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  arp.,  367  (Stanton).  Johnston  and  Browne, 
Stephens,  210.  132King  to  Buchanan,  June  1,  1846.  Pierce,  Sumner, 
iii,  108,  139.     132Buchanan,   memo.     Holmes  of  New  York  proposed  in 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  IX,   PAGES   187-190  473 

the  House,  May  11,  that  sect,  one  of  the  war  bill  should  not  apply  south- 
west of  the  Nueces  except  for  the  rescue  of  our  army.  This  was  rejected 
by  8  —  122.  May  12  Senator  Crittenden,  one  of  the  foremost  Whigs, 
proposed  to  substitute  in  the  war  bill  the  words  "for  the  purpose  of  re- 
pelling the  invasion"  in  place  of  the  words  "prosecute  said  war,  etc." 
This  recognized  the  territory  as  American.  His  proposal  was  supported 
by  twenty  senators  {Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  p.  803). 

11.  Livermore,  for  example,  argued  in  this  way  (War,  15) :  Texas  was 
annexed  for  the  protection  of  Southern  institutions ;  the  war  with  Mexico 
resulted  from  the  annexation  .of  Texas ;  therefore  the  war  with  Mexico 
was  due  to  the  slaveholders'  interest  in  slavery.  But  both  of  his  premises 
need  qualification ;  and  the  conclusion,  so  far  as  it  suggests  that  the  war 
was  the  necessary  and  designed  consequence  of  the  slaveholders'  action 
in  the  Texas  matter,  does  not  follow.  The  abolitionists  were  enthusiastic, 
earnest,  and  on  the  outside  of  things.  Hence  they  were  naturally  and 
almost  unavoidably  over-suspicious.  Von  Hoist  (U.  S.,  hi,  302)  says 
that  the  radical  wing  of  the  southern  Democratic  party  openly  avowed 
that  the  war  with  Mexico  was  a  southern  war ;  but  was  not  Calhoun  the 
leader  and  prophet  of  that  wing?  A  few  public  men,  the  Charleston 
Patriot  and  Courier,  and  the  Federal  Union  of  Alabama  looked  upon  the 
war  as  for  the  interest  of  the  South;  but  it  does  not  appear  that  they 
had  any  appreciable  influence  in  bringing  it  about. 

12.  The  occasion  of  the  war  was  Taylor's  going  to  the  Rio  Grande; 
but  see  chap,  vii,  p.  154. 

13.  Apparently  one  might  say  that  —  since  Polk  intended  to  recom- 
mend redress  of  our  grievances  —  war  was  sure,  without  reference  to  the 
annexation  of  Texas,  to  come.  But  we  are  tracing  the  cause  of  an  actual, 
not  of  a  possible,  war;  and  the  President's  recommendation  might  not 
have  proved  effectual.  Benton  (View,  ii,  679)  said  that  without  the 
clash  of  arms  it  would  have  been  difficult,  perhaps  impossible,  to  bring 
about  war.  Calhoun  (Sen.,  Feb.  24,  1847 :  note  10)  said  it  could  not 
have  been  done.     This  opinion,  however,  was  biased. 

14.  The  cause  of  the  var.     Polk,  Diary,  Dec.  19,  23,  1846;   Jan.  5,  23, 

1847.  Webster,  Private  Corresp.,  ii,  283.     370Taylor  to  Davis,  Apr.  18, 

1848.  32Buchanan  to  Shields,  April  23,  1847.  (Bulwark)  Smith,  Annex, 
of  Texas,  132,  134-5,  204-8.  (Unsuitable)  132Donelson  to  Buchanan, 
May  15,  1847.  No.  Amer.,  Feb.  10,  1847;  Thompson  in  Wash.  Union, 
Oct.  25,  1847,  and  Greenville  (S.  C.)  Mountaineer,  Oct.  21.  Bourne, 
Essays,  227,  235.  Charleston  Mercury,  Dec.  30,  1847  (long  argument 
against  annexing  Mexican  territory).  W.  Thompson  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  18, 
1847  in  Jameson,  Calhoun  Correspondence,  1149  (slavery  will  not  exist 
in  Mexico).  137Fisher  to  Calhoun,  Aug.  22,  1847.  137J.  A.  Campbell 
to  Calhoun,  Mar.  1,  1848.  (Aiken)  Boston  Courier,  Dec.  2,  1847;  Mar.  9, 
1848.  132King  to  Buchanan,  June  11,  1847.  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Nov.  26, 
1847.  157Lamar  to  Cobb,  June  24,  1846.  (Toombs)  Cong.  Globe,  29,  1, 
app.,  133.  So.  Qtrly.  Rev.,  Nov.,  1850,  427-34.  (Benton)  Abr.  Deb., 
xvi,  87;  Benton,  View,  ii,  678.  (Clay)  Schurz,  Clay,  ii,  290.  (Win- 
throp)  Wash.  Union,  Sept.  30,  1846;  Oct.  25,  1847;  Winthrop,  Win- 
throp,  59.  (Douglas)  Cufts,  Questions,  154.  (Johnson)  Brown,  Cong. 
Globe,  29,  2,  app.,  354.  (Van  B.)  Wilson,  Eise  and  Fall,  ii,  9;  Smith, 
Annex,  of  Texas,  243.  Amer.  Historical  Association  Rep.,  1911,  ii, 
95  (Glenn).  (Organs)  Mr.  Winthrop's  Vote.  (Sumner)  Sumner, 
report,  30.     (Report)  Wash.   Union,  Feb.  25,  1847.     (Agree)  Winthrop 


474  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  IX,   PAGES   190-193 

in  Wash.  Union,  Sept,  30,  1846.  (Paredes)  Diario,  July  30,  1846.  (Al- 
monte) N.  Y.  Sun,  Nov.  26,  1846  (Caractacus) ;  Monitor  Repub.,  May  9, 
1847.  Gordon,  Aberdeen,  183.  Mofras,  Expedition,  8.  Polk,  Message, 
May  11,  1846  (Richardson).  Cole,  Whig  Party,  121.  See  also  the  con- 
clusion of  chap.  v. 

At  the  end  of  March  Paredes  said:  "Peace  is  not  compatible  with 
the  maintenance  of  the  rights  and  independence  of  the  nation"  (Roa  Bar- 
cena,  Recuerdos,  22). 

15.  The  dates  are  those  of  approval. 

16.  The  action  of  Congress  was  promulgated  by  the  adj.  gen.  in  65gen. 
orders  14,  18,  21,  34.  See  an  article  on  the  engineer  company  by  Captain 
Willing,  published  by  the  U.  S.  engineer  school,  Washington  Barracks. 
See  also  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  ix,  9-13,  17,  20;  Upton,  Milit.  Pol.,  204; 
Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  603-4. 

17.  Polk,  Diary,  May  13,  1846.  Wash.  Union,  May  21.  65Gen. 
orders  12.  59Circular.  With  the  freedom  that  has  commonly  marked 
authors  dealing  with  the  unpopular  Polk  Von  Hoist  says  (U.  S.,  hi,  339) 
that  his  profession  of  seeking  only  a  peace  was  a  " falsehood."  But  Polk 
meant  of  course  a  peace  satisfactory  to  the  American  government,  for 
a  peace  satisfactory  to  Mexico  would  not  have  had  to  be  "conquered," 
and  this  implied  in  general  about  the  terms  that  we  actually  imposed. 

18.  "Germanicus"  stated  in  the  N.  Y.  Commercial  Advertiser  that  in 
the  Florida  war  the  ratio  of  expense  between  regulars  and  militia  was  1 
to  6;  of  efficiency,  1  to  0  (Nat.  Intell,  Nov.  7,  1846).  Of  course  the 
volunteers,  who  wished  and  expected  to  fight,  were  in  general  better  than 
the  militia,  who  wished  and  expected  to  remain  at  home.  Had  the  regular 
army  been  increased  to  50,000  privates  (giving,  say,  30,000  in  the  field), 
there  would  no  doubt  have  been  a  great  saving  of  time,  blood  and  treasure 
(Stevens,  Campaigns,  14).  Taylor's  position  gave  him  a  special  responsi- 
bility. He  should  have  pointed  out  the  disadvantages  of  the  volunteer 
system,  recommended  enlisting  such  troops  (if  at  all)  for  the  duration 
of  the  war,  and  continued  to  demand  regulars. 

19.  The  military  measures.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  141.  65Gen.  orders  57, 
Dec.  22,  1846.  Upton,  Mil.  Pol.,  195,  202,  204  (sequel  showed).  (1838) 
R.  Johnson  in  Sen.,  Jan.  11,  1848  (Wash.  Union,  Jan.  12).  Nat.  In- 
telligencer, Nov.  7,  1846.  (Cowardly,  etc.)  354Welles  papers.  63Marcy 
to  Wright,  June  3,  1846.  63Circ.  letter,  May  19,  1846.  Webster,  Letters, 
346.  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  pp.  46-7.  Wash.  Union,  June  25,  1846.  (Stimu- 
lated) Sen.  4;  29,  2,  p.  53.  Johnson,  Douglas,  114.  Polk,  Diary,  June  20, 
22,  1846.  (Vacancies)  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  513-7.  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
p.  554  (Jesup).     (Might  have  been)  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  75. 

The  authorized  maximum  of  the  army  was  16,998  officers  and  men 
(Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  p.  53).  The  volunteer  service  was  more  attractive  than 
the  regular  because  it  was  easier  to  get  rank  there  and  the  discipline  was 
less  severe ;  and  something  to  offset  this  difference  was  needed. 

20.  Many  of  the  volunteer  regiments  were  in  fact,  owing  to  the  apprecia- 
tion of  a  West  Point  education  shown  by  some  of  the  states,  commanded 
by  trained  men  (Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  127). 

21.  For  numerous  details  on  the  subject  of  this  paragraph  see  an  article 
by  the  author  in  The  Military  Historian  and  Economist,  Jan.,  1917,  p.  30, 
note  12. 

22.  The  executive  staff  of  the  war  dept.  consisted  of  Bvt,  Brig.  Gen. 
R.  Jones,  adj.  gen. ;    Lieut.  Col.  George  Talcott,  head  of  the  ordnance 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  IX,   PAGES   193-195  475 

bureau;  Maj.  Gen.  T.  S.  Jesup,  quartermaster  gen. ;  Brig.  Gen.  N.  Tow- 
son,  paymaster  gen. ;  Dr.  T.  Lawson,  surgeon  gen. ;  Bvt.  Brig.  Gen.  G. 
Gibson,  commissary  gen.  of  subsistence  ;  Col.  J.  G.  Totten,  chief  engineer ; 
Col.  J.  J.  Abert,  chief  topog.  engineer  (Ho.  143;  29,  1.  Ho.  60;  30,  1. 
p.  547). 

23.  The  following  remark  from  J.  D.  McPherson  (in  "General  Grant's 
Political  Myth"),  who  was  close  to  Marcy  in  the  war  dept.,  seems  worth 
quoting:  "His  massive  intellect,  his  calm  wisdom,  his  uncalculating  in- 
tegrity, the  justness  of  all  his  purposes,  the  purity  of  his  private  life,  and 
the  goodness  of  his  heart  inspired  me  with  admiration  and  reverence." 
Marcy  loved  books,  too.  Still  he  was,  as  Welles  said,  a  keen,  wary  and 
adroit  politician,  well  taught  by  a  wide  experience  and  fully  acquainted 
with  human  nature  of  the  sort  with  which  he  had  to  deal.  He  had  faltered 
at  one  juncture  in  his  devotion  to  orthodox  Democratic  principles,  and 
probably  felt  that  he  could  never  regain  the  position  thus  lost. 

24.  Raising  and  forwarding  Volunteers.  60Marcy  to  Giles,  May  19, 
1846.  For  the  corresp.  with  govs.,  May  15-19,  see  60,  61,  63.  63Marcy 
to  govs,  of  Ala.,  etc.,  June  5.  63/d.  to  Wright,  June  3.  65Gen.  orders 
15,  Wash.,  May  29.  Marcy,  report,  Dec.  5,  in  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2.  6lMemo., 
May  18.  Polk  (insists  upon  energy),  Diary,  May  19  ;  June  23-4 ;  Sept.  22, 
24.  (Marcy)  Poore,  Perley's  Remins.,  i,  333 ;  Wise,  Seven  Decades,  235. 
(Multitudes)  63Marcy  to  govs.,  May  19.  354Welles  papers.  (Motives) 
Trans.  Ills.  State  Hist.  Soc,  1904,  p.  283 ;  1905,  pp.  194-6 ;  1906,  174-5 ; 
Robertson,  Remins.,  59,  62-7;  146Caswell,  diary,  Jan.  26,  1847;  Lydl, 
Second  Visit,  ii,  257 ;  139Campbell  to  D.  C,  Nov.  9,  1846 ;  Carleton  at 
mtg.  of  Mex.  veterans;  Prickett  in  Madison  Record,  1850;  Jamieson, 
Campaign,  73,  78.  (High)  Public  Ledger,  May  18,  1846.  Quitman  in 
Cong.  Globe,  35,  1,  p.  970.  Lyell,  Second  Visit,  ii,  343-5.  N.  Y.  Herald, 
June  20,  1846.  (Song)  N.  Y.  Globe,  June  1,  1846.  Cameron  in  Cong. 
Globe,  29,  1,  p.  826.  149L'Hommedieu  to  Chase,  May  20,  1846.  Wash. 
Union,  May  27 ;  June  12,  1846.  Ohio  Arch,  and  Hist.  Qtrly.,  1912,  p. 
280.  Ills.  State  Hist.  Lib.  Pubs.,  ix,  38.  Ark.  Hist.  Commission,  Bulletin 
no.  6,  p.  181.  Perry,  Indiana,  4-13,  17.  I.  Smith,  Remins.,  5.  239Kem- 
per  to  daughter,  May  30.  St.  Louis  weekly  Reveille,  May  10.  Everett, 
Recoils.,  194-9.  McCormack,  Koerner,  i,  495-7.  Wallace,  *Autob.,  114. 
Dayis,  Autob.,  94-5.  Iowa  adj.  gen.,  Roster,  vi,  788-9.  Quisenberry, 
Taylor,  22.  216Heiman,  Services.  Ex-gov.  Porter  of  Tenn.  to  the 
author.  Memphis  Eagle,  May  15.  Niles,  June  13,  p.  227  ;  July  4,  p.  288  ; 
July  18,  p.  313.  Scharf,  St.  Louis,  i,  362-8.  206Graham,  Message, 
Nov.  17.  14Fair  to  Martin,  June  4.  14Martin  to  Marcy,  May  31. 
6lBullock  to  war  dept.,  May  8.  14Placard,  May  7.  29Brown  to  Duf- 
field,  May  11;  to  Marcy,  June  3.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  223-4,  228. 
63Marcy  to  Brown,  June  16.  225Cooke  to  Holt,  May  17.  (The  drums) 
Poem  by  W.  R.  Benjamin,  by  permission.  Polk,  Diary,  May  26. 
189Evans,  letter.  HOBarbour,  diary.  Bishop,  Journal,  passim.  For 
additional  details  see  The  Military  Historian  and  Economist,  Jan.,  1917, 
p.  32,  note  14. 

As  was  natural,  many  complications  arose  in  preparing  the  regiments 
for  the  field.  The  volunteers  themselves,  as  a  rule,  did  not  know  what 
they  needed  nor  even  what  they  wanted.  They  were  ignorant  and  help- 
less regarding  all  military  matters.  Such  officers  as  understood  the  busi- 
ness were  compelled  to  work  almost  night  and  day.  Everything  had  to 
be  provided,  and  many  of  the  things  had  to  be  made ;   and  the  men  were 


476  NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  IX,   PAGES   195-200 

usually  ahead  of  the  supplies.  Two  Tennessee  regiments  were  able  to 
move  south  about  June  1,  but  it  was  not  until  about  July  23  that  the  last 
Illinois  regiments  advanced  in  that  direction. 

25.  To  Brazos  Island.  300Prickett,  letter,  July  30.  Robertson, 
Remins.,  June  11,  17,  23.  332Tennery,  diary,  Aug.  13.  Houstoun, 
Texas  (1845),  68,  91-2,  147,  255-6.  OswandeJ,  Notes,  31,  38,  44-8. 
190Ewing,  diary,  July  12,  19,  21.  Perry,  Indiana,  83.  Everett,  Recoils., 
197-8.  274Neeld,  letter.  French,  Two  Wars,  33.  272Memoir  of  Gen. 
Morgan.  HOBarbour,  diary,  July  23.  Bishop,  Journal.  193Foster  to 
mother,  June  16. 

"Brazos  Island"  is  the  name  on  the  U.  S.  Coast  Survey  map.  Gens. 
Butler,  Marshall,  Quitman,  Pillow  and  Shields  left  New  Orleans  on  the 
steamer  New  York,  and  arrived  at  the  island  Aug.  4  (Claiborne,  Quitman, 
i,  239).  The  strait  between  Brazos  Id.,  and  Padre  Id.  on  the  north  was 
called  the  Brazos  de  Santiago  (Giddings,  Sketches,  27).  Gaines's  pro- 
ceedings led  to  great  expense,  and  embarrassed  the  government  very  much. 
He  kept  on  even  after  he  knew  of  Taylor's  victories,  and  the  total  number 
called  out  by  him  perhaps  exceeded  12,000.  For  most  of  these  forces 
there  was  no  place  under  the  law  of  May  13,  and  the  government  did  not 
regard  them  as  necessary.  A  few  who  had  actually  left  their  states  were 
accepted  for  three  months  under  a  law  of  1795;  but  the  requisitions  were 
countermanded,  Gaines  was  peremptorily  ordered  (May  28)  to  suspend 
his  operations  in  this  regard,  was  relieved  of  his  command,  and  was  placed 
before  a  court  of  inquiry.  His  intentions  were  unquestionably  good,  and 
hence  the  court  recommended  that  no  further  action  should  be  taken. 
The  best  information  on  this  subject  is  given  in  the  record  of  the  court 
(68judge  advocate  general's  office)  and  in  65gen.  orders  no.  39,  Washing- 
ton, Aug.  20,  1846,  which  presents  the  facts,  the  conclusions  of  the  court, 
and  the  remarks  of  the  President  thereon.  See  also  Polk,  Diary,  June  5, 
20 ;  Aug.  15.  63Marcy  to  govs.,  June  5,  1846.  69/d.  to  Gaines,  May  28. 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  308.  Docs,  in  Sen.  378;  29,  1,  pp.  50-81.  Gaines  to 
Marcy,  June  7  :  Sen.  402  ;  29,  1.  Sen.  415 ;  29,  1.  65Gen.  orders  (Wash.) 
16,  23.  63Marcy  to  Taylor,  May  23.  Wash.  Union,  June  9.  Sen. 
proceeds.,  June  24.  Gaines  was  succeeded  by  General  Brooke.  The 
headquarters  of  this  military  dept.  were  at  New  Orleans. 

26.  Scott,  a  Whig,  testified  that  Polk  was  "in  great  alarm"  (Coleman, 
Crittenden,  i,  244).  256Marcy  privately  called  the  state  of  things  "ad- 
verse" (to  Wetm^re).  Holmes  of  South  Carolina  said  the  administration 
was  prostrated  (210to  Hammond,  May  10).  Charleston  Mercury,  May  19  : 
At  the  first  symptom  of  actual  fighting  our  government  is  taken  all  aback. 
Had  Polk  sent  Taylor  to  the  Rio  Grande  to  bring  on  a  war,  he  would  have 
been  rejoicing. 

27.  Polk,  whose  principal  interview  with  Scott  occurred  on  May  14, 
did  not  at  that  time  believe  that  20,000  volunteers  would  be  needed 
(Diary). 

28.  Scott's  information  about  the  region  was  derived  from  Anthony 
Butler,  formerly  our  minister  to  Mexico,  and  Gen.  J.  T.  Mason  (Scott 
in  Sen.  378 ;  29,  1,  p.  11),  both  of  whom  had  been  on  the  ground,  and  it 
led  him  to  think  the  inactive  season  somewhat  longer  than  it  really  was. 
Although  Taylor  with  competent  engineers  had  been  for  about  seven 
months,  while  at  Corpus  Christi,  in  touch  with  a  stream  of  traders  and 
other  persons  from  Matamorrs,  and  might  have  sent  out  spies  and  recon- 
noitring parties,  and  had  been  on  the  river  nearly  two  months,  he  does 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  IX,   PAGES   195-200  477 

not  seem  to  have  supplied,  despite  urgent  requests  from  the  war  dept. 
(e.g.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  87,  88,  90,  91,  92),  any  adequate  ideas  about  con- 
ducting a  campaign  in  that  quarter  or  even  to  have  formed  any  for  himself. 
Marcy,  May  28,  1846  (ibid.,  282),  said,  "I  wish  to  be  favored  with  your 
views  as  to  what  should  be  the  future  operations  of  the  army  on  the  Bio 
Grande."  In  submitting  such  views  the  General  would  have  had  to  pre- 
sent information  regarding  topographical  and  other  conditions,  about 
which  he  seems  to  have  left  the  government  in  the  dark. 

29.  One  should  not  be  in  haste  to  condemn  the  administration  and  the 
Democratic  politicians,  for  ours  is  a  party  system  and  Scott  was  in  politics 
He  should  have  realized  that,  standing  at  the  head  of  the  army,  he  was 
bound  to  serve  the  country  as  a  whole,  and  should  have  refrained  from 
seeking  party  honors  that  evidently  might  (as  they  now  did)  interfere 
with  the  fulfilment  of  that  prime  duty. 

30.  The  question  of  generaUin-chief .  (It  is  believed  that  later  events 
render  a  somewhat  full  treatment  of  this  topic  desirable.)  19lFairfield  to 
wife,  Apr.  14.  Stanwood,  Presidency,  195.  (Politics)  13Pakenham, 
no.  74,  June  13.  253Peters  to  McLean,  June  26.  Gaines,  Sept.  10,  1845 
in  Sen.  378;  29,  1,  p.  38.  So.  Advocate,  Apr.  3  (Sanderson).  Gaines, 
June  7  in  Sen.  402;  29,  1.  (Scott's  personality)  Scott,  Mems.,  passim; 
F.  Lee,  Lee,  49;  354Welles  papers;  252Mackall,  Dec.  29,  1847;  Mag. 
of  Amer.  Hist.,  xiv,  562  (Scammon,  one  of  Scott's  aides,  here  says  that 
he  never  knew  a  man  of  the  world  less  given  to  vanity  than  Scott) ;  Mass. 
Hist.  Soc.  Proceeds.,  1st  ser.,  ix,  234-9;  Sedgwick,  Corresp.,  i,  182; 
C:>rwin  to  Fellett,  Mar.  13,  1845,  in  Ohio  Hist,  and  Phil.  Soc.  Publics., 
July-Sept.,  1914;  Semmes,  Service,  280-1 ;  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  41,  139; 
Grone,  Briefe,  80;  Keyes,  Fifty  Years,  1-82;  335Trist  on  Scott.  Sen. 
378;  29,  1,  pp.  2-4.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  448.  Wash.  Union, 
May  18.  Scott-Marcy  correspondence  in  Sen.  378;  29,  1,  pp.  4-18; 
and  in  256.  60Scott,  memoranda  for  gen.  staff.  Coleman,  Crittenden, 
i,  243-4.  Polk,  Diary,  Mar.  28  ;  May  13,  14,  19,  21-3,  25-6,  1846 ;  Apr.  1, 
1847.  Niles,  June  6,  1846,  p.  214.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Aug.  29.  Grant, 
Mems.,  i,  119.  N.  Orl.  Commerc.  Bulletin,  June  18.  Watson,  Taylor, 
121.  Boston  Atlas,  June  12.  N.  Y.  Herald,  June  13.  Welles  papers. 
N.  Orl.  Picayune,  June  17.  253Reed  to  McLean,  Oct.  26.  Boston 
Courier,  June  15.  139W.  B.  Campbell  to  D.  C,  July  3,  1846.  256Marcy 
to  Wetmore,  April  22,  1847. 

La  Bruyere  said,  "There  is  in  some  men  a  certain  mediocrity  of  mind 
that  helps  to  make  them  wise."  This  was  not  at  all  true  of  Scott.  *  It  was 
characteristic  of  him  that  he  blamed  Marcy  for  only  a  want  of  candor 
and  nerve,  regarding  him  as  merely  the  instrument  of  the  party  (Coleman, 
Crittenden,  i,  244-6). 

Rives  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  204)  remarks  that  the  private  note  of  Scott 
(addressed  to  Senator  Archer)  "was  enough  to  rouse  the  meekest  of  Presi- 
dents." But  (1)  the  note  charged  only  what  was  charged  commonly  — 
that  the  administration  was  making  its  appointments  in  a  partisan,  political 
way;  (2)  it  was  private  ;  and  (3)  Scott  had  a  legitimate  reason  for  writing 
it  —  to  explain  why  he  did  not  intend  to  recommend  men  for  commissions, 
as  Archer  probably  expected  him  to  do.  In  taking  cognizance  of  a  private 
note  Polk  acted  as  an  eavesdropper,  and  he  should  have  recalled  the  say- 
ing, "Eavesdroppers  never  hear  anything  good  of  themselves."  Bives 
says  also  (ii,  413)  that  "for  more  than  fourteen  months  before  war  was 
actually  declared  it  was  evident  to  every  observer  that  war  was  highly 


478  NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  IX,   PAGES  200-202 

probable,  but  Scott  made  no  plans,  collected  no  information,  and  did 
nothing  to  prepare  for  the  coming  strain  upon  the  head-quarters  organiza- 
tion of  the  army."  But  (1)  war  was  not  deemed  highly  probable,  as 
Rives  states,  by  the  President,  the  Cabinet,  Congress,  Wall  Street,  Taylor 
or  competent  observers  in  general  (see  p.  133,  etc.) ;  (2)  it  is  a  rather  bold 
assertion  that  Scott  "did  nothing  to  prepare,"  etc.,  and  the  present  author, 
who  intended  to  examine  every  war  dept.  paper  relating  to  the  subject, 
saw  no  proof  of  it;  (3)  as  Rives  states  (ii,  582),  the  army  had  no  intelli- 
gence bureau,  and  Scott  possessed  no  authority  to  establish  one ;  (4)  to 
collect  reliable  data  regarding  Mexico  and  our  frontier  even  inform  all  y 
would  have  cost  a  great  deal,  and  the  government  was  so  economical  that 
it  would  not  provide  even  a  pontoon  train  that  was  asked  for  (see  p.  177) ; 
(5)  before  Jan.  13,  1846,  Scott  had  studied  the  frontier  and  planned  for 
Taylor's  advance  to  the  Rio  Grande  (p.  153) ;  (6)  May  14  he  was  ready 
with  plans  so  elaborate  and  far-reaching  that  Polk  thought  him  "scientific 
and  visionary,"  and  the  next  day  he  issued  orders  to  the  chiefs  of  the  gen- 
eral staff  (p.  199).     Such  plans  and  orders  implied  knowledge. 

31.  May  30,  Taylor  was  brevetted  major  general  and  assigned  to  duty 
with  that  rank  (Ho.  119;  29,  2,  p.  12.     Also  Ho.  60;   30,  1,  p.  283). 

32.  Anti-slavery  theorizers  represented  (see  Lalor,  Cyclopaedia,  iii, 
1091)  that  Polk  brought  the  Oregon  issue  to  the  verge  of  war  so  that 
Mexico  should  dare  —  with  the  expectation  of  having  England  for  an 
ally  —  to  fight  us,  and  when  hostilities  had  begun,  made  peace  with  Eng- 
land at  a  sacrifice  of  our  claim ;  but  this  view  has  little  or  nothing  except 
its  ingenuity  for  support,  and  has  a  great  number  of  facts  against  it. 

33.  The  Oregon  affair.  206J.  Graham  to  Gov.  G.,  Jan.  4,  1846.  Dr. 
Bacon  :   "The  ascendancy  of  the  West  is  a  fact"  (New  Englander,  v,  319). 

(Cass)    1 to  Allen,   Sept,    1,    1846.     210Hammond,   diary,   Feb.    19. 

Jameson,  Calhoun  Corresp.,  653,  697-8.  Polk,  Diary,  Oct.  21-3,  1845; 
Feb.  24-5;  Apr.  18;  June  3,  1846.  Lodge,  Webster,  260.  256Marcy 
to  Wetmore,  Apr.  30,  1845.  Johnson,  Douglas,  105.  (Cabinet)  354Welles 
papers.  A.  Smith,  Remins.,  41.  Garrison,  Extension,  170.  Polit.  Sci. 
Qtrly.,  xxvi,  443-61  (Schuyler).  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  xvi,  298-9  (Schafer). 
Reeves,  Amer.  Diplom.,  243-64.  London  Times,  Jan.  26,  1846.  Hume 
in  Ho.  Commons,  Jan.  23. 

34.  For  Santa  Anna's  banishment  see  vol.  i,  p.  53.  In  May  it  was 
believed  at  Mexico  that  Santa  Anna's  return  would  mean  peace  (56 W.  S. 
Parrott,  June  4,  9) ;  and  as  late  as  July  31  and  August  12  166Pommares, 
a  secret  agent  of  Conner  at  Vera  Cruz,  said  that  such  was  the  prevalent 
opinion  there. 

35.  Atocha,  Statement.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  June  10,  1845.  13Bank- 
head,  no.  41,  1846.  73Bermudez  de  Castro,  no.  444,  res.,  1847.  Monitor 
Repub.,  Feb.  16,  1847. 

36.  Apparently  Conner  was  to  obey  this  order  or  not  as  the  circumstances 
of  the  moment  should  render  expedient.  Consul  Campbell  of  Havana 
was  directed  in  June  to  write  often  to  Conner  and  express  his  opinion  on 
the  propriety  of  allowing  Santa  Anna  to  enter  Mexico  (166to  Conner, 
July  9) ;  at  the  time  Santa  Anna  sailed  for  Vera  Cruz  Campbell  wrote 
(166Aug.  7)  to  Conner  arguing  that  he  should  be  permitted  to  land ;  and 
Conner,  in  a  162letter  to  his  wife  (Aug.  19),  explained  why  he  had  thought 
it  best  to  let  him  pass.  The  Journal  des  Debats  (Oct.  6,  1846)  believed 
that  the  American  government  had  reason  to  count  upon  Santa  Anna's 
intentions  though  not  upon  his  word;    this  was  no  doubt  Polk's  view. 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  202-204  479 

Those  who,  in  the  usual  fashion,  have  charged  that  Polk's  Message  of 
Dec.  8,  1846,  lied  about  his  relations  with  Santa  Anna  have  failed  to  ob- 
serve that  it  referred  exclusively  to  the  events  preceding  the  order  of 
May  13  to  Conner  (Richardson,  iv,  491-2).  Before  Mackenzie  was  sent 
to  Havana  stronger  and  more  definite  information  to  the  effect  that  Santa 
Anna  was  likely  to  regain  power  was  received  —  particularly  from  Consul 
Black  (Sen.  1;   29,  2,  p.  34). 

37.  The  United  States  appears  (Consul  Campbell,  May  25,  1846)  to 
have  sent  an  earlier  agent,  who  passed  at  Havana  by  the  name  of  Brown, 
and  was  commonly  said  there  to  have  brought  proposals  to  Santa  Anna. 
Mackenzie's  ostensible  mission  —  real  enough,  too,  probably  —  was  to 
ascertain  whether  privateers  had  been  commissioned  in  Cuba  (Polk,  Diary, 
Jan.  8,  1848).  He  spoke  Spanish  fluently.  Santa  Anna  took  care  to  put 
out  an  explanation  of  Mackenzie's  visit. 

38.  The  negotiation  with  Santa  Anna.  Polk,  Message,  Dec.  8  (Richard- 
son, iv.  492) .  London  Times,  Oct.  6, 1845 ;  Jan.  31 ;  July  6, 1846.  Semmes, 
Service,  117-8.  52Dimond,  nos.  324-6,  329,  1846.  52Campbell,  June  9, 
1846;  April  9,  1847.  166Campbell  to  Conner,  May  10.  Von  Hoist, 
U.  S.,  iii,  282-3.  52Slidell,  Mar.  18;  April  2.  166Dimond  to  Conner, 
Sept,  14,  1845.  166Pommares  to  Conner,  July  2;  Aug.  12.  Chase, 
Polk  Admin .,  1 63 .  Monitor  Repub . ,  Feb .  20,  1 846 .  Wash .  Union,  June  2 1 , 
1847.  Scribner's  Monthly,  xvii,  299.  Constitutional,  Sept.  20,  1846. 
73Bermudez  de  Castro,  no.  441,  1847.  Polk,  Diary,  Feb.  13,  14,  16, 
1846;  Jan.  8,  1848.  Id.  to  Ho.  Repres.,  Jan.  12,  1848  (Richardson). 
46Bancroft  to  Conner,  May  13,  1846.  297Mackenzie  to  Buchanan, 
July  7,  11;  Aug.  15,  1846.  335/d.  to  Trist,  Jan.  2;  June  8;  Aug.  17, 
1846.  Courrier  des  Etats  Unis,  Aug.  11,  1846.  (Conspicuous)  Benton, 
View,  ii,  680.  Journ.  Milit.  Serv.  Instil.,  xli,  105.  Meade,  Letters,  i, 
116. 

Polk  stated  in  his  diary,  Jan.  8,  1848,  that  Mackenzie  "  wholly  exceeded 
his  authority"  by  writing  out  his  recollection  of  the  conversation  with 
Polk  and  giving  this  to  S.  Anna  as  a  message  from  the  President.  Mac- 
kenzie's report  reached  Washington  Aug.  3,  and  was  immediately  followed 
up  by  Polk  with  a  request  for  two  million  dollars  to  facilitate  a  settlement 
with  Mexico  (chap,  xxvii). 

X.    THE   LEADERS   ADVANCE 

1.  Comanches  were  making  raids  near  Reynosa  (69 Worth  to  Bliss, 
July  28),  and  the  freebooter  and  cut-throat,  Canales,  was  living  on  the 
country  not  far  away  with  a  band  that  he  said  consisted  of  more  than 
600  mounted  men  (June  16). 

2.  Taylor  to  daughter,  June  9,  in  Autograph,  July-Aug.,  1912.  Nat. 
Intelligencer,  Sept.  16,  1848.  76Berlandier  to  Mejia,  June  9,  1846.  (Rey- 
nosa) Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  299,  305,  306,  397,  522-3,  550;  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  117;  76Mejia,  June  20;  Smith,  To  Mexico,  57;  Henshaw 
narrative ;  Meade,  Letters,  i,  98 ;  76Spanish  consul,  Matamoros,  June  7, 
1846;  76Canales,  May  20;  June  4,  7,  16,  1846.  (McCulloch)  Reid, 
Scouting  Expeds.,  43 ;  Picayune,  June  24 ;  Aug.  15 ;  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p. 
551.  139Campbell  to  D.  C,  July  3  ;  Aug.  9.  224Larnard  to  Hitchcock, 
June  13.     Weed,  Autobiog.,  573.     Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  4,  6-10,  13- 

15,  17-20,  31.     370/d.  to ,  June  18  (draft) :   The  war  dept.  has  been 

"mean  and  contemptable  to  the  last  degree."     375/d.  to  E.  G.  W.  Butler, 


480  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  204-206 

July  1 :  Madigan,  catalogue  no.  2,  1914.  (Disliked)  Meade,  Letters,  i, 
103.  Scott,  May  18  in  Sen.  378;  29,  1,  p.  17.  This  letter  was  acknowl- 
edged by  Taylor  July  2  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  329).  He  wrote  the  substance 
of  it  to  Dr.  Wood  on  June  12  (Bixby).  By  May  28  U.  S.  newspapers 
stating  that  30,000  volunteers  were  coming  reached  the  Rio  Grande 
(Meade,  Letters,  i,  95).  "Licking"  so  many  volunteers  into  shape  in- 
volved an  immense  amount  of  work,  but  Taylor  did  not  have  to  do  this 
personally. 

3.  The  laws  recognized  only  the  regulars,  the  militia  (who  could  be 
required  to  serve  but  three  months  :  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  282)  and  the  twelve- 
months volunteers.  The  six-months  men,  therefore,  had  to  join  one  of 
the  other  classes  or  be  discharged.  Marcy  enforced  this  plain  legal  re- 
quirement and  was  roundly  abused  for  so  doing.  For  the  case  of  the 
Louisiana  men  see  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  307,  309,  311,  315-20;  Taylor, 
Letters  (Bixby),  176-7;  La.  Courier,  Aug.  6;  gen.  orders  61  (Niles,  Aug. 
15) ;  N.  Orl.  Bee,  Aug.  3.  For  the  St.  Louis  men  see  Scharf,  St.  Louis,  i, 
377. 

One  has  to  be  extremely  careful  here  about  making  assertions  regarding 
dates  and  numbers.  Affairs  were  in  such  confusion  that  even  headquarters 
would  seem  to  have  been  to  a  considerable  extent  in  the  dark.  Marcy, 
June  8,  did  not  know  how  many  troops  Taylor  had  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  323), 
and  the  statements  that  one  finds  are  nearly  always  wanting  in  precision 
or  completeness.  The  facts  given  in  the  text  are  believed,  however,  to 
be  adequate  for  the  history  of  the  operations.  One  may  refer  also  to : 
Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  13;  Matamoros  News,  July  8;  76Parrodi, 
July  8;   Hamer  in  Wash.  Union,  Aug.  18;   and  Ho.  60;   30,  1,  p.  547. 

The  facts  about  the  Texan  troops  are  particularly  confused,  but  it  is 
plain  that  while  unexpectedly  late  —  none  arriving  until  on  or  about 
June  10  —  a  regiment  of  foot,  under  Albert  Sydney  Johnston,  and  two 
regiments  of  horse  finally  appeared  in  response  to  Taylor's  call  for  four 
regiments.  Henderson,  who  commanded  these  men,  claimed  the  rank  of 
a  major  general,  and  —  apparently  because  mounted  men  were  particu- 
larly needed  —  his  claim  was  allowed.  See  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  299,  307, 
321-2;  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  118;  Rose,  McCulloch,  69;  Henshaw 
narrative;  Johnston,  Johnston,  133;  Meade,  Letters,  i,  104.  Scott  (Ho. 
60 ;  30,  1,  p.  325)  supposed  that  Taylor  would  receive  about  16,280  twelve- 
months volunteers  and  enough  recruits  for  the  regular  regiments  to  make 
his  aggregate  23,070,  besides  the  three-months  and  six-months  men  who 
would  engage  for  a  longer  term.  June  14  Meade  (Letters,  i,  105)  thought 
Taylor  had  10,000  men.  By  July  30  substantially  all  the  twelve-months 
foot  intended  for  Taylor,  except  those  from  Illinois  and  Missouri,  had 
arrived  (Ho.  60;   30,  1,  p.  401). 

4.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  114-5.  224Bliss  to  Hitchcock,  June  7.  Robert- 
son, Remins.,  76.  139Campbell  to  D.  C,  July  3.  308Shields  to  R.  J. 
Walker,  Aug.  3.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  301,  305,  307,  315,  320-1,  329,  550 
(Taylor).  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  176-7.  Marcy,  report,  Dec.  5,  1846 
in  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  p.  46.  Nearly  1000  Louisiana  vols,  arrived  at  Brazos 
Id.  or  Pt.  Isabel  on  May  13  (Conner  in  Ho.  1 ;  30,  2,  p.  1162). 

5.  Later  (Sen.  1 ;   30,  1,  p.  546)  Boca  Chica  was  bridged. 

6.  Camp  Lomita,  a  hill  of  about  eight  acres  in  extent,  was  five  miles  by 
water  above  Burrita ;  and  above  that  lay  Camp  Patterson.  Camp  Palo 
Alto  was  on  elevated  ground  near  what  was  called  Arista's  Crossing. 
There  was  also  a  Camp  Lane.     Few  troops  were  quartered  at  Matamoros. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  206-208  481 

It  is  hard  to  understand  why  the  well-behaved  regulars  were  not  permitted 
to  occupy  the  many  vacant  houses  there  {Picayune,  July  9,  14,  1846). 
This  town,  which  looked  attractive  from  the  opposite  side  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  dated  from  1820.  It  had  prospered  for  a  time,  but  had  been 
greatly  injured  by  a  hurricane  in  1844,  and  was  now  falling  to  pieces 
(Meade,  Letters,  i,  86;  "Matamoros"  in  Diccionario  Univ.;  60lrons, 
April  20 ;  Republica  de  Rio  Grande,  June  27 ;  Robertson,  Remins.,  104-6  ; 
217Henshaw  papers;  London  Times,  Oct.  16,  1844;  Smith,  Remins., 
34-5). 

7.  The  camps  and  soldier  life.  Picayune,  Apr.  7;  May  30;  June  14, 
24;  July  9,  26.  Perry,  Indiana,  84-5,  87,  97,  100-2.  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
p.  697  (Thomas).  Brackett,  Lane's  Brigade,  18,  22,  33.  Robertson, 
Remins.,  76-97.  Giddings,  Sketches,  27,  36-40.  254McClellan  to  sister, 
Oct.  8.  274Neeld,  letter.  139Campbell  to  D.  C.,  July  11,  19,  29,  31; 
Aug.  9.  280Nunelee,  diary,  July  5;  Dec.  10.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  59 
(nine  feet  of  water  on  Brazos  bar;  six  feet  to  Pt.  Isabel).  218Henshaw 
narrative.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  571  (Jesup).  332Tennery,  diary,  Aug.  12; 
Sept.  18.  190Ewing,  diary,  July  21-Aug.  17.  Wash.  Union,  June  10; 
Aug.  3,  18;  Sept.  1  (letters).  322W.  B.  Smith,  diary.  Special  orders 
71  in  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  528.  Reid,  Scouting  Expeditions,  20.  I.  Smith, 
Remins.,  9,  25,  34.  Matamoros  News,  July  8.  69Shields,  Aug.  28. 
Niles,  July  4,  p.  288 ;  Sept.  12,  pp.  21,  22.  (Funds)  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp. 
560-1.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  176.  6lCarlin  to  Polk,  May  19.  Henry, 
Sketches,  121.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Aug.  3.  Sedgwick,  Corresp.,  i,  4. 
69Miller  to  sister.  291C.  Cushing  to  Pierce,  May  4,  1847.  Bishop, 
Journal.     Allen,  Pencillings,  25. 

8.  In  the  N.  Y.  Sun  of  Dec.  12,  1915,  Major  William  Wallace  showed 
why  time  is  needed  to  make  a  soldier. 

9.  Hamer  was,  however,  a  man  of  strength  and  sound  judgment,  and 
for  this  reason  proved  very  useful  to  the  volunteers. 

10.  252Lieut.  Mackall  wrote  with  reference  to  this  matter,  "I  am  deter- 
mined, with  God's  aid,  to  do  my  duty  cheerfully  and  show  no  sign  of  im- 
patience." The  letters  and  diaries  of  6Robert  Anderson  and  others  give 
us  reason  to  believe  that  such  a  spirit  was  not  uncommon  among  the 
regular  officers. 

11.  Morale  of  the  army.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  7,  23,  42.  Ewing, 
diary,  Aug.  17;  Sept.  7.  "A  Soldier's  Honor,"  22-3.  Meade,  Letters 
i,  91,  102-3,  108-10,  115-6,  etc.  (Brawls,  etc.)  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches, 
124,  128,  137.  W.  B.  Smith,  diary,  Aug.  13.  Ewing,  diary,  Sept.  7. 
Niles,  Sept.  19,  p.  40.  (Months)  69  Bankhead,  Apr.  7.  St.  Louis  Repub- 
lican, Aug.  5.  Vedette,  ix,  no.  1  (officer,  Aug.  22).  lWoll  to  Allen, 
July  2.  Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  i,  425.  139Campbell  to  D.  C,  July  3; 
Aug.  28 ;  Nov.  9 ;  Dec.  7.  Lawton,  Artillery  Off.,  276.  Jamieson,  Cam- 
paign, 71.  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  392.  148Chamberlain,  recoils.  224Bliss  to 
Hitchcock,  July  23  (cf.  139Campbell  to  D.  C,  Aug.  9).  252Mackall, 
A.ug.  4.  218Henshaw  narrative.  13Giffard  to  Bankhead,  June  9.  The 
fundamental  idea  of  military  discipline  is  that  each  man  is  a  factor  in  a 
great  organization,  and  must  do  his  part  in  cooperation  with  all  the  rest. 
Time  is  necessary  to  bring  a  man  to  this  point  of  view.  More  will  be  said 
about  the  morale  of  the  troops  in  chap.  xxxi. 

12.  Taylor  attempted  to  defend  himself  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  558)  by  cit- 
ing his  letter  of  April  26  to  the  department,  in  which  he  said  that  he  trusted 
it  would  "give  the  necessary  orders  to  the  staff  department  for  the  supply  " 

VOL.   I  —  2  I 


482  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  208-209 

of  the  new  troops  from  Louisiana  and  Texas ;  but  this  was  by  no  means 
what  he  was  bound  to  do  in  the  premises  (see  note  13) ;  and,  in  particular, 
river  steamboats  of  an  unknown  description  and  number  not  only  did  not 
come  under  the  head  of  army  supplies,  but  were  almost  certainly  not  even 
in  his  own  mind  when  he  wrote  that  letter. 

13.  The  question  of  boats.  (View)  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  329-32  (Taylor) ; 
Taylor  to  Butler,  July  1,  1846  in  375Madigan,  catalogue  no.  2,  1914. 
(Rules)  61  Adj.  gen.  to  Kearny,  May  14;  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  560,  751 
(Jesup).  Dec.  26,  1913,  the  chief  clerk  of  the  quartermaster  general's 
office,  Washington,  stated  to  the  author  (for  publication)  that  under  the 
regulations  in  force  in  1846  Taylor  was  bound  to  specify  the  kind  and 
amount  of  supplies  that  he  wanted.  (Knew)  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  685  (Whit- 
ing, Nov.  30).  (Assuming)  Taylor  to  Butler,  July  1,  supra.  (Depended) 
Ibid.  (Useless)  Ibid. ;  Taylor  in  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  547.  (Denunciations) 
Taylor  in  Ho.  60;   30,  1,  pp.  547-8,  558,  etc. 

Marcy  to  Taylor,  June  8,  1846:  You  are  expected  to  "push  your  ad- 
vantages to  the  utmost  extent  it  can  be  done  with  the  means  at  your 
command"  (Ho.  60;   30,  1,  p.  325). 

As  late  as  May  24  Taylor  knew  little  about  the  depth  of  the  river.  It 
was  then  being  studied  (Thomas  in  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  654).  May  18  he 
called  for  only  one  steamboat  (ibid.,  653),  and  May  28  for  only  three  more 
(ibid.,  656).  By  August  11  about  twenty  were  said  to  be  on  the  river. 
The  documents  appear  to  show  that  the  quartermaster's  department, 
notwithstanding  Taylor's  complaints  against  it,  did  about  all  in  this 
matter  that  could  reasonably  have  been  expected  under  the  circumstances 
(ibid.,  549,  763).  It  was  difficult  to  find  light-draught  boats  that  were 
strong  enough  to  risk  a  voyage  across  the  Gulf.  It  should  be  borne  in 
mind  here  and  elsewhere  that  the  war  bill  of  May  13  threw  suddenly 
upon  the  war  department  a  very  extensive  and  complicated  business, 
such  as  it  requires  years  to  build  up  in  civil  life.  Many  of  Jesup's  sub- 
ordinates were  doubtless  old,  lazy  or  fond  of  "red  tape";  others  lacked 
the  necessary  capacity;  still  others  were  political  henchmen;  but  they 
seem  in  general  to  have  been  willing.  Taylor  said  he  did  not  like  the 
plan  of  campaign  (to  Butler,  July  1,  supra),  but  had  not  been  willing  to 
obtrude  his  ideas  upon  the  government.  On  this  point  consult  note  28  of 
chapter  ix. 

When  Taylor  found  himself  in  trouble  about  boats,  he  undertook  to 
cover  his  lack  of  foresight  by  denouncing  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  547-8,  558, 
etc.)  the  government  for  sending  a  flood  of  volunteers  without  supplying 
the  means  of  transportation.  But  evidently,  in  the  first  place,  if  Taylor, 
who  had  been  near  the  Rio  Grande  for  about  seven  months  and  then  upon 
it  for  nearly  two,  did  not  feel  sure  as  late  as  May  21  whether  it  could  be 
made  to  serve  (ibid.,  300),  Jesup,  who  possessed  no  definite  and  reliable 
information  on  the  subject  of  the  river  (ibid.,  560)  could  not  very  well 
know  whether  Taylor  could  and  would  use  it,  how  many  boats  he  would 
need,  and  how  much  water  they  should  draw.  In  the  second  place,  if 
the  General  had  provided  transportation  for  his  regulars  and  the  men  he 
called  out  on  April  26,  he  would  have  been  able  to  establish  the  depot, 
leave  about  1000  men  to  guard  it,  and  advance  with  as  many  troops 
(some  6000)  as  he  planned  to  throw  forward  at  first  (Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
p.  330  (Taylor),  561  (Jesup) ;   Madigan,  cat.  no.  2,  1914  (Taylor,  July  1) ; 

Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby)  40,  44 ;    ZIOld.  to ,  draft,  June  18 ;   Smith. 

Remins.,    14).     Thirdly,    even  if  a  flood    of  twelve-months    volunteers 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  209-211  483 

came,  those  he  did  not  require  for  the  forward  movement  could  have 
been  left  at  healthy  camps  in  the  rear,  as  he  himself  pointed  out  (Ho.  60 ; 
30,.  1,  p.  330),  to  drill  and  prepare.  Fourthly,  instead  of  complaining 
that  a  lack  of  boats  prevented  his  advancing  (ibid.,  305,  307),  he  might 
—  for  aught  that  we  know  —  have  pushed  forward  his  regulars  promptly 
by  land,  having  for  this  operation  a  month  of  good  weather  and  a  wagon 
train  ample  for  twice  that  number  of  men  (ibid.,  560,  651).  And,  finally, 
it  is  worth  mention  that  Scott's  letter  of  May  18  was  probably  as  early 
an  official  notification  of  the  coming  volunteer  forces  as  could  prudently 
have  been  given.  Rives  observes  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  252),  "  Taylor 
was  thus  obviously  disabled  for  some  time  [by  the  sickness  of  the  volun- 
teers resulting  from  the  rainy  season]  from  making  any  extensive  forward 
movement."  But  (1)  Taylor  had  a  month  of  good  weather  after  the 
capture  of  Matamoros ;  (2)  the  regulars  were  not  sickly,  and  might  have 
been  pushed  forward  with  little  delay;  (3)  the  sickness  near  and  below 
Matamoros  was  not  such  as  to  prevent  him  from  completing  his  expedi- 
tionary force  with  volunteers ;  (4)  the  boats,  which  began  to  arrive  about 
the  first  of  July,  would  have  enabled  the  necessary  number  of  volunteers 
to  move  promptly ;  (5)  and  even  the  severe  sickliness  at  Camargo  did  not 
prevent  advancing  with  fair  promptness  after  Taylor  had  decided  to  move. 
Of  course  it  must  be  remembered  that  Taylor  had  much  to  think  about, 
and  lacked  experience. 

14.  There  was  also  a  notable  want  of  order  and  energy,  said  Worth,  in 
the  control  of  the  steamboats  (69to  Bliss,  July  27). 

15.  By  August  4  substantially  all  of  the  regulars  except  the  cavalry 
and  two  or  three  batteries  set  out.  June  16,  the  adj.  gen.  (Ho.  60;  30, 
1,  p.  454)  estimated  that  Taylor  would  have  under  his  immediate  com- 
mand about  11,840  twelve-months  volunteers  and  would  soon  receive 
nearly  800  regulars.  This  left  out  of  account  a  regiment  and  a  half  from 
Texas  and  some  other  small  corps.  Taylor  may,  then,  have  had  at  about 
this  time  (not  allowing  for  discharges)  15,500  men.  An  account  printed 
in  the  Cincinnati  Chronicle  of  Sept.  6  gave  him  15,810.  Lieut.  Col.  Clarke, 
Eighth  Infantry,  remained  in  command  at  Matamoros,  and  Major  Gard- 
ner, Fourth  Artillery,  at  Point  Isabel  and  Brazos  Island  (Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
p.  533).  The  rank  of  these  officers  indicates  that  but  few  soldiers  were  left 
behind,  and  at  Reynosa  and  Mier  there  were  only  detachments.  During 
July  Capt.  Gillespie  with  a  company  of  Texas  Rangers  marched  from  San 
Antonio  and  passed  through  Laredo,  Guerrero  and  Mier,  finding  the 
people  quiet  in  those  towns  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  402). 

16.  Occupation  of  Camargo,  etc.  The  distance  from  the  Gulf  to  Camargo 
by  water  was  also  called  450  miles  (Smith,  To  Mexico,  92).  Ho.  60;  30, 
1,  p.  690-1  (Hunt).  (Mishaps)  76Letter  from  Matamoros,  July  13; 
Whiting,  Aug.  3  in  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  675;  Gaceta  de  Ciudad  Victoria, 
July  21 ;  Matamoros  Reveille,  June  24  ("The  channel  [of  the  river]  shifts 
and  fills  with  incredible  rapidity");  Niles,  July  18,  p.  310;  Aug.  1,  p. 
341.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  300,  336-8,  397-402,  408.  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  120,  123,  125,  132-151.  69Smith  to  Bliss,  July  8.  Donnavan, 
Adventures.  180Pillow  to  wife,  Aug.  8.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  106-7,  118. 
Henshaw  narrative.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  239.  Robertson,  Remins., 
107-9.  Brackett,  Lane's  Brig.,  23-4.  Tilden,  Notes,  10.  69Miles  to 
Bliss,  July  8,  14.  (Alcalde)  Encarnacion  Prisoners,  25.  76Comte.  gen., 
Saltillo,  July  20.  76Mejia,  July  19.  Picayune,  July  26;  Aug.  1,  6,  9, 
14,    15.     Wilhelm,   Eighth  Infantry,   ii,   279.     Taylor,   Letters    (Bixby), 


484  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  211-214 

25,  30,  39,  40.  65ld.,  gen.  orders  93,  July  30.  Ewing,  diary,  Aug.  20- 
31,  1846.  76Garcia  to  Parrodi,  Aug.  10.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  104. 
267Memo.  [apparently  from  Maj.  Smith].  Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  61-4. 
French,  Two  Wars,  59.  Niles,  Sept.  5,  p.  1 ;  19,  p.  56.  Sanders,  June  5 
in  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  55i.  (Mier)  69 Vinton  to  Lee,  Aug.  1;  Smith,  To 
Mexico,  66;  Green,  Journal,  82. 

17.  At  Camargo.  99Gov.  Tamaul.  to  Tampico  ayunt.,  July  23.  80Gov. 
N.  Le6n,  July  2,  1846.  Picayune,  Aug.  1,  6,  9,  14,  15 ;  Sept.  12.  Smith, 
Remins.,  35.  Sanders,  June  5  in  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  551.  McClellan, 
diary.  Henshaw  narrative.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  119,  121.  Ewing,  diary, 
Aug.  31-Sept.  19.  Robertson,  Remins.,  109-11.  Wash.  Union,  Sept.  14; 
Oct.  5.  Bishop,  Journal.  185Worth  to  Duncan,  July  30.  (Worth) 
Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  ii,  278;  Special  orders  72  in  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  529; 
61 W.  to  adj.  gen.,  May  9;  6lMarcy  to  W.,  May  11.  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  121,  152-4.  Giddings,  Sketches,  83.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby), 
42,176.  Trans.  Ills.  State  Hist.  Soc,  1906,  pp.  176-7.  Vedette,  ix,  no.  10. 
Tennery,  diary,  Oct.  28.  139Campbell  to  D.  C,  Aug.  28.  Nashville 
Union,  Oct.  17.  Niles,  Sept.  12,  p.  23 ;  Jan.  2,  1847,  p.  286.  mPillow 
to  wife,  Sept.  6;  Dec.  24.  Sedgwick,  Corres.,  i,  13,  30.  169Taylor  to 
Crittenden,  Sept.  1,  1846.     (Mier)  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  1180  (Taylor). 

Camargo  was  the  proper  place  for  Taylor's  depot,  but  no  Americans 
were  needed  there  except  the  quartermaster's  force  and  a  guard  of  regulars. 
For  these  there  was  sufficient  elevated  ground.  The  regulars  occupied 
this  ground  (Picayune,  Aug.  15),  and  suffered  comparatively  little;  but 
we  know  enough  of  the  conditions  existing  at  Camargo  to  pronounce  the 
place  unfit  for  the  number  of  men  encamped  there. 

18.  May  9  Paredes  decided  that  all  the  American  consuls  should  cease 
to  exercise  their  functions,  and  four  days  later  orders  were  issued  that 
wherever  a  U.  S.  war  vessel  should  appear,  the  Americans  should  embark 
or  go  twenty  leagues  into  the  interior.  Mexican  consuls  in  the  United 
States  were  soon  directed  to  close  their  offices.  52B.  E.  Green,  Apr.  25, 
1844 :  Tornel  "hates  us  with  a  most  envenomed  spite."  52Ellis,  Sept.  20, 
1839 :  Tornel  shows  a  bitter  and  unrelenting  hostility  toward  the  United 
States. 

19.  Feb.  4,  1846,  El  Tiempo,  the  favorite  journal  of  Paredes,  had  said : 
"We  are  not  a  people  of  traders  and  adventurers,  the  scum  and  dregs  of 
all  countries,  whose  only  mission  is  to  rob  the  Indians  of  their  land  and 
then  seize  the  fertile  regions  opened  to  civilization  by  the  Spanish  race." 
June  13  La  Esyeranza,  of  Tampico,  close  to  the  field  of  war,  printed  the 
Address  of  a  Patriotic  Junta  [Committee]  to  raise  funds  for  the  campaign, 
which  used  the  following  language  about  the  Americans:  "People  with- 
out morality,  composed  of  the  scum  of  all  nations ;  people  without  honesty, 
who  count  their  bankruptcies  by  the  numberless  number  of  their  enter- 
prises ;  people  without  religion,  who  tolerate  all  beliefs  and  mock  at  the 
most  sacred  things ;  people  for  whom  probity  is  not  a  virtue,  who  value 
money  and  know  nothing  of  glory,  a  monstrous  collection  of  the  most 
heterogeneous  elements  united  by  the  double  bond  of  crime  and  fear,  etc' 

20.  Paredes,  Mexico  and  the  war.  (Paredes'  appearance)  Portrait 
City  Hall,  Mexico ;  Aguila  del  Norte,  Mar.  18.  London  Times,  Mar.  13 
1846.  Bankhead,  nos.  13,  45,  72,  92,  100,  1846.  52Slidell,  Feb.  6,  17 
Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  567-8.  Dublan,  Legislaci6n,  v,  134-6.  Apuntes,  68 
Diario,  May  18;  June  2,  7,  12,  17,  26-30;  July  2,  4,  6,  21,  23,  25,  26,  28 
30.     Memoria   de  .  .  .  Relaciones,    1846.     Bustamante,    Nuevo   Bernal 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  214-218  485 

ii,  58.  52Black,  no.  379,  July  4.  Monitor  Repub.,  June  1,  4,  30,  1846. 
Impartial,  July  15,  1846.  Indicador,  June  4;  July  24,  1846.  Esperanza, 
May  30,  1846.  Pregonero,  June  18,  1846.  84S.  L.  Potosi  assembly, 
procl.,  May  22,  1846.  Wash.  Union,  June  18,  1846.  Balbontfn,  Estado 
Militar.  13Foreign  Office  to  Bankhead,  June  1,  1846.  76Parrodi, 
June  8,  1846. 

21.  Mar.  31,  1846  (no.  8),  the  British  Foreign  Office  wrote  to  Bankhead, 
the  minister  at  Mexico,  that  according  to  the  British  minister  at  Madrid 
the  project  of  setting  up  a  monarch  in  Mexico  was  entertained  in  Spain. 
See  also  chap,  iv,  note  15  and  chap,  vi,  note  32. 

22.  The  political  situation  of  Paredes.  52Slidell,  Jan.  14 ;  Feb.  6,  17 ; 
Mar.  1,  18,  27;  Apr.  2,  1846.  13Bankhead,  nos.  12,  15,  22,  27,  34,  45, 
49,  57,  62,  63,  80,  92,  98,  111,  1846.  Conner,  Mar.  2  in  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
p.  121.  Dublan,  Legislaci6n,  v,  134-6.  Diario,  April  19;  May  4,  13; 
June  7,  28,  1846.  Tributo  &  la  Verdad.  52Black,  June  1 ;  July  29 ; 
Aug.  12.  London  Times,  Mar.  13;  Apr.  11;  Aug.  7;  Sept.  5,  9;  Oct.  7. 
Gov.  Durango  to  Dur.  cong.,  Nov.  8,  1846  (pamphlet).  47Wood  to 
Bancroft,  June  4.  Bermudez  de  Castro,  no.  316,  res.,  Aug.  28,  1846. 
76Acta,  Mazatlan,  May  7,  1846.  52Dimond,  no.  317,  Feb.  2,  1846. 
Paredes,  Papers  (Garcia,  ed.),  43,  46.  Mexico  &  traves,  iv,  556,  558. 
75Gov.  Jalisco,  Feb.  24,  1846.  75Circular,  Apr.  18,  1846.  Monitor 
Constit.,  Jan.  9,  1846.  Boletin  de  Noticias,  June  1,  1846.  Monitor  Repub., 
May  23 ;  June  6,  7,  9,  22 ;  July  5,  14,  1846.  Republicano,  June  27,  1846. 
80Gov.  Jalisco,  decree,  May  25,  1846.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii, 
15.  76Paredes,  manifiesto,  Mar.  21.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Dec, 
1846.  76Comte.  gen.  Mex  ,  Aug.  2,  1846.  Niles,  June  6,  p.  211 ;  June  20, 
p.  242.  80Gov.  Mex.,  April  20,  1846.  Lerdo  de  Tejada,  Apuntes,  ii, 
524,  530,  531,  536.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  215.-  13Forbes  to  Bankhead, 
July  2,  1846. 

A  pamphlet  said,  "jA  las  armas,  Mexicanos  !  People,  a  horrible  treason, 
an  infamous  treason  threatens  our  independence,  our  adored  independence, 
for  which  our  fathers  gave  their  lives  "  ;  Paredes  and  his  coterie  of  wretches 
are  aiming  to  hand  us  over,  manacled,  to  the  foreigners;  "this  is  a  fact, 
Mexicans;  read,  read  that  newspaper,  protected  by  the  government, 
called  El  Tiempo." 

23.  E.g.  El  Telegrafo  said  in  capitals  on  March  31:  "Many  a  nation 
would  like  to  take  by  the  hand"  one  of  the  heroes  who  helped  to  establish 
it,  and  "the  silence  of  the  majestic  tomb  replies,  'He  no  longer  lives'; 
but  Santa  Anna  does  live,  and  his  voice  proclaims,  '  Mexico  shall  be  great, 
free  and  happy.'" 

24.  A  revolt  in  favor  of  Santa  Anna  occurred  at  Mazatlan  on  May  7, 
but  it  was  not  an  integral  part  of  the  movement. 

25.  Paredes  was  imprisoned  in  the  fortress  of  Ulua,  transferred  to 
Perote  castle,  and  early  in  October  permitted  to  leave  the  country.  In 
this  revolution  Tornel  miscalculated  and  stood  out  against  Santa  Anna. 
The  Puebla  garrison  also  was  hostile  at  first.  The  title  of  Salas  was, 
"Most  Excellent  Senor,  General-in-Chief  of  the  Liberating  Republican 
Army  exercising  the  Supreme  Executive  Power." 

26.  The  downfall  of  Paredes.  London  Times,  Aug.  6,  1845 ;  Feb.  10 ; 
May  13;  Oct.  7,  1846.  W.  S.  Parrott,  June  4.  52Campbell,  Apr.  8, 
1845.  Slidell,  Mar.  27,  1846.  Impartial,  June  18,  1906.  Dimond, 
nos.  324-7,  329,  331,  Mar.  18,  22,  31 ;  Apr.  1,  5,  17,  1846.  Santa  Anna's 
"Plan,"  etc.,  in  Sen.  1;    29,  2,  pp.  34-6.     Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  215-7. 


486  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  218-219 

Suarez  y  Navarro,  Causas,  82.  Mora,  Papeles  Ined.,  59.  Bankhead, 
nos.  57,  78,  88,  100,  110,  111,  149,  1846.  13Giffard,  April  1;  Aug.  1. 
Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec,  1846  (and  documents).  Gimenez, 
Memorias,  92.  Acta,  Guadalajara,  May  22,  1846  (pamphlet).  Mexico 
d,  traves,  iv,  555,  569-76.  Picayune,  April  21.  Diario,  May  4;  July  31 ; 
Aug.  1-9,  26.     285Montoya  to  Paredes,  April  1.     285Parrodi  to  Paredes, 

July   25.     182Almonte   to  ,    May   13.     Monitor  Repub.,   June   22; 

Aug.  4.  52Black,  Apr.  26 ;  May  21 ;  July  29 ;  Aug.  6,  22,  27 ;  Sept.  17 ; 
Oct.  8.  Plan  Salvador,  Feb.  11,  1847.  47Conner,  July  16,  28;  Aug.  12, 
1846.  166Pommares  to  Conner,  July  31.  Monitor  Repub.,  Aug.  4. 
73Bermudez  de  Castro,  no.  316,  res.,  Aug.  28,  1846.  Lerdo  de  Tejada, 
Apuntes,  ii,  531-5.  Memoria  .  .  .  de  Guerra,  Dec,  1846.  Dublan, 
Legislaci6n,  v,  146,  155.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii,  63,  67-74. 
94Circular  of  Hacienda,  Aug.  15.  Also  from  76  the  following.  Letter 
to  Guerra,  Acapulco,  Apr.  15.  To  Garay  and  Falcon,  April  7.  To 
Bravo,  April  13.  Rea,  June  5.  Comte.  gen.  Oaxaca,  June  15.  Yafiez, 
Aug.  31.  Id.  to  troops,  May  20.  Id.,  address,  June  7.  Id.,  proclaim, 
July  16.  Acta,  Mazatlan,  May  7.  Acta,  Tepic,  May  12.  Yaiiez  to 
Reyes,  May  22.  To  Morales,  Aug.  7.  To  Parrodi,  July  31.  Acta, 
Coatepec,  July  20.  Comte.  gen.  V.  Cruz,  July  1,  9,  21.  Rebolledo  to 
Echagaray,  July  20.  Paredes,  Sept.  12.  To  comte.  gen.  Vera  Cruz, 
Sept.  18.  Acta,  Jalapa,  Aug.  2.  Salas  to  Mora,  Aug.  4.  To  Paredes, 
Aug.  4.  Agreement,  Aug.  6.  Salas,  proclam.,  Aug.  6.  Circulars,  July  27 ; 
Aug.  3,  4,  6,  7,  9,  15,  17.  The  Guerra  archives  contain  a  great  number 
of  documents  relating  to  internal  troubles  at  this  time.  For  the  Organic 
Bases  see  chap,  ii,  p.  52. 

27.  The  captain  general  of  Cuba  had  been  ordered  —  evidently  in  the 
interest  of  the  Mexican  monarchical  party  —  to  prevent  Santa  Anna  from 
returning  to  Mexico,  but  was  friendly  to  him,  and  gave  him  a  passport 
on  the  grounds  that  he  could  not  be  prevented  from  going,  that  an  attempt 
to  hold  him  (contrary  to  the  rules  of  neutrality  and  hospitality)  might  be 
made  an  excuse  for  misusing  the  Spanish  residing  in  that  country,  and 
that,  even  should  the  monarchical  plan  be  carried  out,  its  results  would 
probably  not  be  stable  (72Reales  Ordenes,  Serie  de  Gobernacion,  legajo 
43).  He  went  in  a  hired  vessel  called  the  Arab,  under  British  colors. 
Near  Vera  Cruz  the  Arab  was  hailed  by  the  U.  S.  sloop-of-war  St.  Mary's 
and  boarded,  but  was  permitted  to  proceed  (S.  Anna,  Apelaci6n,  17; 
Semmes,  Service,  118;  Taylor,  Broad  Pennant,  254-5).  Conner  stated 
that  the  Arab  was  not  boarded,  but  apparently  he  wrote  this  before  re- 
ceiving a  report  from  the  St.  Mary's.  The  city  of  Vera  Cruz  had  not 
declared  for  Santa  Anna,  and  did  not  do  so  for  some  time.  In  fact  the 
city  government  appeared  so  unsympathetic  that  an  effort  was  immediately 
made  to  overthrow  it.  Santa  Anna  was  accompanied  by  Almonte,  Rej6n 
and  other  partisans.  See  Courrier  des  Etats  Unis,  Aug.  22 ;  313Letters 
in  Saunders  papers;  297Mackenzie,  July  11;  166Campbell  to  Conner, 
Aug.  7;  166Conner,  Aug.  17;  ("Flower")  Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  392-3; 
76comte.  gen.  V.  Cruz,  Aug.  16,  22 ;  Tributo  a  la  Verdad ;  Semmes, 
Service,  118-9;  lOOLandero  and  Perez,  July  31;  Bankhead,  nos.  121, 
122,  Aug.  29 ;  47Conner,  Aug.  16 ;  Diario,  Aug.  28 ;  Memoria  de  .  .  . 
Guerra,  Dec,  1846. 

28.  Santa  Anna  till  he  reaches  El  Encero.  Ruxton,  Adventures  (1849 
ed.),  17,  18,  20,  47.  76Comte.  gen.  V.  Cruz,  Aug.  14,  16,  22.  Encarnacion 
Prisoners,  45.     Stapp,  Prisoners,  89,  90,  95.     Calder6n,  Life,  i,  48-50; 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  220-221  487 

ii,  121.  S.  Anna,  Apelacion,  16-8.  Kendall,  Narrative,  ii,  364.  Am. 
Sentinel,  June  15,  1836.  297Mackenzie,  July  11.  76S.  Anna,  Aug.  16. 
Rivera,  Gobernantes,  ii,  183,  186,  221.  London  Times,  June  25,  1836. 
Thompson,  Recoils.,  66.  Ferry,  Revolutions,  175-206/  23lPowhatan 
Ellis,  July  8,  1839.  76Comte.  gen.  Zacatecas,  Aug.  28.  76Comte.  gen. 
Oaxaca,  Aug.  28.  76Comte.  gen.  Tamaul.,  Aug.  26.  76Comte.  gen. 
Sinaloa,  Oct.  14.  13Bankhead,  nos.  120-2,  Aug.  29.  Taylor,  Broad 
Pennant,  254-5.  Semmes,  Service,  118-9.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones, 
Dec,  1846.  Lerdo  de  Tejada,  Apuntes,  ii,  536.  47Conner,  Aug.  16  (un- 
official), 25,  30;  Sept.  5.  166Conner,  Aug.  17.  76Circular,  Aug.  19. 
Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Dec,  1846.  Indicador,  Aug.  16.  Ramirez, 
Mexico,  134,  137,  139-40.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  777  (S.  Anna).  Busta- 
mante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii,  86-7.  76S.  Anna,  Sept.  7.  Diario,  Aug.  27-8. 
162Conner  to  wife,  Aug.  19.     52Campbell,  Nov.  10. 

29.  This  account  is  based  upon  a  study  of  his  career  and  a  wide  range 
of  reading.  A  few  sources  may  be  specified  :  Atlas,  Feb.  1,  1845.  Bank- 
head,  nos.  66,  110,  1844.  Calder6n,  Life,  ii,  121.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  190, 
198,  203,  210,  216.  Mofras,  Exploration,  i,  14.  Negrete,  Mexico,  xiii, 
370.  Le6n,  Historia,  480.  Defensa  de  S.  Anna.  National,  Dec.  22, 
1847.  Arco  Iris,  Dec.  7,  1847.  Monitor  Repub.,  Oct.  12 ;  Dec.  12,  1847. 
166Campbell  to  Conner,  July  9,  1846.  Noticias  Importantes.  73Re- 
ports  of  the  Spanish  legation  (which  give  striking  evidence  of  S.  Anna's 
intellectual  qualities  and  volubility).  Proceso  del  Gral.  S.  Anna.  Biog. 
del  Gral.  S.  Anna. 

30.  No  doubt  Santa  Anna  had  felt  at  an  earlier  period  and  possibly  felt 
even  now  an  occasional  emotion  of  patriotism  inundate  his  soul,  as  a 
Mexican  proclamation  would  have  said.  Few  are  so  utterly  selfish  as 
never  to  bestow  a  kind  wish  upon  their  fellow-creatures,  and  Santa  Anna 
was  bad  in  a  spontaneous,  human  way,  not  in  that  of  cold  villainy.  Prob- 
ably he  was  largely  guided  by  worse  men  than  himself,  who  had  more 
ability  to  think  but  needed  him  to  execute  their  designs. 

31.  The  army  sent  agents  to  question  Santa  Anna  with  reference  to  his 
intentions.  It  may  safely  be  assumed  that  he  reassured  the  military 
chiefs  regarding  his  real  aims. 

32.  The  Boletin  Oficial  of  S.  L.  Potosi  said  on  July  31 :  "And  liberty  ! 
Oh  liberty  !  There  also  we  meet  with  fine  phrases.  How  beautiful  are 
phrases !  How  they  fill  the  heart !  Santa  Anna  instead  of  Paredes 
.  .  .,  is  not  this  liberty,  I  ask?  A  prince  from  abroad,  a  dictator  from 
Mexico,  —  is  not  this  also  liberty,  I  ask?" 

33.  47Conner  reported  that  on  August  28  an  American  urged  upon 
Santa  Anna  the  necessity  of  making  peace  with  the  United  States,  and 
that  Santa  Anna  replied  in  substance  as  follows :  I  am  convinced  of  that 
but  will  not  assume  the  responsibility  of  proposing  it ;  I  am  old ;  I  have 
money  enough ;  I  will  not  run  the  risk  of  dying  in  exile ;  I  will  assemble 
Congress  as  soon  as  possible  and  act  as  the  majority  shall  decide ;  mean- 
while I  will  attempt  the  arduous  task  of  repelling  the  invaders.  This 
American  was  Hargous,  a  merchant  of  Vera  Cruz  (see  Bustamante,  Nuevo 
Bernal,  ii,  90;  166Pommares  to  Conner,  Aug.  29).  The  British  minister 
believed  that  Santa  Anna  had  made  an  arrangement  with  the  United 
States  at  Havana,  but  was  prevented  by  the  unpopularity  of  his  return 
from  carrying  out  the  agreement  (Bankhead,  no.  128,  Sept.  7). 

34.  A  striking  glimpse  into  the  situation  is  given  by  the  fact  that  for 
some  time  the  government  could  not  communicate  confidentially  with 


488  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X,   PAGES  221-224 

Santa  Anna  because  there  was  nobody  it  dared  trust  with  such  a  mission, 
and  no  person  of  importance  dared  absent  himself  from  the  centre  of 
intrigue  (Ramirez,  Mexico,  145). 

35.  A  series  of  acts  concluded  on  October  23  restored  fully  the  externals 
of  the  federal  system  (Ramirez,  Memorias,  33-4).  This  change  meta- 
morphosed departments  into  states. 

36.  The  constitution  of  1824  was  revived  so  far  as  it  did  not  conflict 
With  the  revolution  of  Aug.  4.  Salas  was  a  weak  man  and  longed  to  es- 
cape from  his  difficult  and  trying  situation  (Bankhead,  no.  140,  Sept.  29 ; 
Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii,  101;   Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  577). 

37.  Other  war  measures  were :  (Aug.  28)  free  importation  of  arms ; 
(Aug.  31)  severe  penalties  for  civil  and  military  officers  refusing  to  obey 
orders  during  the  war;  (Sept.  3)  the  free  manufacture  and  sale  of  gun- 
powder ;  (Sept.  4)  a  commission  to  provide  lands  for  American  deserters ; 
(Sept.  10)  naturalization  to  be  gained  by  entering  the  army  or  navy; 
(Sept.  10)  re  establishment  of  the  Military  Normal  School  at  Chapultepec 
under  the  name  Military  College;  (Sept.  11)  regulations  for  the  National 
Guard.  The  purpose  of  offering  a  pardon  to  deserters  from  the  regular 
army  was  probably  to  transfer  men  from  it  to  the  National  Guards  (Bank- 
head,  no.  126,  Sept.  7). 

38.  The  attitude  of  the  best  citizens  was  probably  stated  by  the  Monitor 
Republicano  of  Aug.  25  :  "  We  will  say  to  Santa  Anna  :  ...  if  you  recog- 
nize your  errors,  promote  the  welfare  of  the  country,  pursue  a  course 
entirely  different  from  your  former  policy,  and  prove  by  acts  —  not  words 
—  that  your  misdeeds  were  not  crimes  but  errors,  then  Mexico  will  forget 
the  past  and  reward  liberally  the  citizen  conferring  upon  her  so  marked  a 
benefit." 

39.  Thirteen  municipalities  of  Oaxaca  contributed  a  total  of  75  pesos. 

40.  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  a  suburb  on  the  northern  side  of  Mexico,  con- 
tained a  deeply  venerated  shrine  of  the  Virgin. 

41.  The  situation  and  Santa  Anna's  course.  47Conner,  July  28 ;  Aug.  12, 
16  (unofficial),  25 ;  Sept.  5,  13,  22 ;  Oct.  4.  73Bermudez  de  Castro,  no. 
316,  res.,  Aug.  28;  nos.  345-6,  Sept.  28.  Ramirez,  Mexico,  131-5,  137 
145,  149.  52Black,  Aug.  22,  27 ;  Sept.  12,  22,  28 ;  Oct.  8.  Mora,  Papeles 
Ined.,  60.  162Conner  to  wife,  Aug.  29.  Heller,  Reisen,  195-6.  Sierra, 
Evolution,  i,  215.  Tributo  a  la  Verdad.  70Degrees,  Aug.  22,  28.  76Salas, 
proclams.,  Aug.  [28 ;  decrees,B  Sept.  10,  27.  lSGutierrez  de  Estrada  to 
Palmerston,  Mar.  1,  1847.  76Circular,  Aug.  28  ("infamous"  reports  that 
the  govt,  aims  to  destroy  the  army).  13Bankhead,  nos.  Ill,  120-2,  126, 
128,  136,  140,  142,  1846.  Rivera,  Jalapa,  iii,  787-9.  166Campbell  to 
Conner,  July  9,  13.  166Pommares  to  Conner,  Aug.  29;  Sept.  23.  Amer. 
Sentinel,  June  15,  1836.  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Aug.  1,  1847,  p.  404. 
Mexico  a  travel,  iv,  577-9,  590,  628.  Diario,  Aug.  27-Sept.  6,  9,  11-20, 
23,  25-30.  47Black  to  Conner,  Sept.  24.  Eco  de.  Tampico,  Nov.  4  (If 
S.  Anna  beats  the  enemy  he  will  be  the  idol  of  the  Mexicans) .  76Circulars, 
Aug.  17,  22,  28,  31 ;  Sept.  3,  15,  17,  20,  25,  28.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra, 
Dec.  Garcia,  Revol.  de  Ayutla,  15.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec. 
77Circular,  Sept.  10;  Nov.  27.  Dublan,  Legislacion,  v,  155-61.  Re- 
publicano, Sept.  15,  29;  Nov.  5.  76To  Almonte,  Aug.  28.  76S.  Anna, 
Sept.  7,  13,  14,  21,  24,  25,  26.  Apuntes,  67,  115.  Tributo  a  la  Verdad. 
Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii,  94,  96,  101,  111.  76Comte.  gen.  Puebla, 
Sept.  6.  Diario,  supplem.  to  no.  39.  70Almonte  to  comte.  gen.  Mex., 
Sept.  15.     76Comte.  gen.  V.  Cr.,  procl.,  Oct.  1.     Monitor  Repub.,  Aug.  25 ; 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XI,  PAGES  225-227  489 

Sept.  14-15,  18,  25.     Ruxton,  Advent.  (1847),  47,  49.     Impartial,  June  18, 
1906.     76Comte.  gen.  QuerStaro,  prod,  Sept.  29.     S.  Anna,  Apelaci6n, 
20.     London  Times,  Oct.  7 ;  Nov.  6.     (380)  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  1046  (Scott). 
42.  (Bulls)  12lHandbill. 

XI.   TAYLOR  SETS  OUT  FOR  SALTILLO 

1.  76Arista,  May  25,  29.  76To  Mejia,  May  27.  (Monterey)  169Tay- 
lor  to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9.  Apuntes,  50-3.  76Mejfa,  June  9,  19 ;  July  2. 
ISld.,  proclam.,  July  6.  The  number  of  officers,  each  of  whom  required 
baggage  and  servants,  was  excessive.  Arista  eliminated  more  than  half 
of  them.  The  cavalry  were  afoot,  and  he  took  steps  to  remount  them. 
Contracts  were  made  for  mules  to  draw  the  cannon,  and  the  work  of  putting 
the  artillery  in  order  began.  Owing  to  Mejia's  illness,  Requena  assumed 
the  actual  command  in  June  (Carrefio,  Jefes,  ccii). 

2.  Apuntes,  51,  53.  285Letter  to  Paredes,  July  13.  285Segura  to 
Escudero,  June  4.  Balbontfn,  Invasion,  26.  76Arista,  Apr.  24.  76Mejia, 
June  9,  19,  20 ;  July  19,  29 ;  Aug.  19,  21.  76/d.  to  Baz,  July  29.  76Am- 
pudia,  Aug.  28.  76Mejia  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31.  69Spy  to  Taylor,  Apr.  5. 
In  addition  to  their  lack  of  patriotism,  the  people  had  no  arms  (76gov. 
N.  Le6n,  May  24). 

3.  69Vinton  to  Worth,  Aug.  19.  285Mejia  to  Paredes,  July  20.  And 
from  76  the  following.  Mejia,  June  14  ("The  loss  of  the  immense  terri- 
tory divided  by  the  Sierra  is  inevitable");  July  9,  19;  Aug.  10,  17,  21. 
Id.  to  Canales,  Aug.  10.  Gargollo  to  second  alcalde  of  S.  Fernando, 
June  5.  S.  Fernando  ayunt.  to  gov.  of  Tamaulipas,  June  8.  Canales, 
June  18.  Id.  to  Mejia,  June  14;  June  14,  personal.  Gov.  of  N.  Le6n, 
June  24. 

Mejia  reported  that  the  officers  at  Monterey  agreed  to  make  no  pro- 
nunciamiento  and  to  obey  the  established  authorities,  whoever  they  might 
be ;  but  a  spy  reported  "utter  confusion"  in  the  public  mind  there  (Vinton, 
supra)  in  consequence  of  the  revolution  of  August  4,  and  Worth  heard 
that  a  state  of  things  existed  which  might  have  been  taken  advantage  of 
by  Taylor  (69to  Bliss,  Aug.  27). 

4.  (Intended)  June  24  Taylor  wrote :  "If  the  gov.  think  proper  to  en- 
trust me  with  this  command  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  the  war  into  the 
enemies  country  I  do  not  feel  authorized  to  decline  the  same"  (Letters 
(Bixby),  18).  The  context  shows  that  Taylor  then  knew  (p.  17)  that  he 
was  to  have  the  command.  The  orders  to  that  effect  had  been  issued 
June  8.  In  fact  the  orders  of  Jan.  13  directed  Taylor  to  assume  the 
offensive,  should  Mexico  begin  hostilities,  and  his  report  of  Apr.  26  recom- 
mended operating  beyond  the  Rio  Grande  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  91,  141). 
All  that  he  did  and  failed  to  do  must  therefore  be  viewed  in  the  light  of 
the  fact  that  he  knew,  or  should  have  known,  that  he  ought  to  wage  a  vig- 
orous and  aggressive  campaign.  (Smuggling)  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  19. 
The  smuggling  on  this  border  was  a  familiar  theme  in  the  Mexican  press. 
76Arleji  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31  (some  Mexicans  are  led  by  self-interest  to 
serve  the  Americans  more  faithfully  than  they  would  serve  their  own 
country).  76Mejia  (July  19)  classed  the  people  of  the  border  generally 
as  enemies.  Taylor  seems  to  have  neglected  persistently  the  duty  of 
obtaining  information  (Niles,  Sept.  12,  p.  22 ;  So.  Qtrly.  Rev.,  Nov.,  1850, 
p.  457).  Apparently  he  tried  interrogating  Mexicans  here  and  there, 
and  was  disgusted  to  find  their  statements  disagreed.     What  he   should 


490  NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  XI,   PAGES  225-227 

have  had  was,  as  Scott  recommended  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  327)  many  care- 
fully selected  agents  (spies),  whose  accounts  could  have  been  sifted  by 
comparison.  No  evidence  can  be  found  that  he  even  attempted  to  follow 
this  advice,  though  Worth  realized  the  value  of  information,  and  did 
something  of  real  utility.  Taylor's  lack  of  data  will  appear  later.  Meade, 
who  was  in  a  position  to  be  well-informed,  wrote  on  Sept.  17  near  Marin 
that  the  Americans  knew  no  more  of  the  numbers  or  defences  at  Monterey 
than  when  they  were  at  Matamoros  (Letters,  i,  130).  Ripley  (War  with 
Mexico,  i,  156-60)  endeavors  to  show  that  Scott  interfered  unwarrantably 
and  caused  confusion  by  giving  Taylor  instructions  on  June  12  that  were 
at  variance  with  those  given  by  Marcy  on  June  8  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  323, 
325).  But  (1)  Marcy  knew  of  and  endorsed  Scott's  "interference"  (ibid., 
p.  328) ;  and  (2)  there  was  no  practical  variance.  Marcy  and  Scott  agreed 
that  Taylor  was  to  advance.  Scott  said  Taylor  would  make  the  high 
road  toward  the  capital  one  of  his  lines,  which  was  (as  Scott  said)  a  matter 
"of  course."  Marcy  said  it  had  not  been  decided  whether  he  should 
advance  to  the  capital. 

5.  Polk,  Diary,  Sept.  5,  1846;  Mar.  20,  1847.  Sen.  1;  30,  1,  p.  545 
(Jesup).  76Gov.  Tamaulipas,  Aug.  5  (Taylor  obtained  1000  mules  through 
the  alcalde  of  Reynosa).  Upton,  Military  Policy,  215  (not  known  at 
Washington  that  wagons  could  be  used).  Taylor,  Letter  to  Gaines. 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  559,  565-6  (Jesup).  Smith,  Remins.,  13-15.  Taylor, 
Letters  (Bixby),  177-8.  61  Worth  to  alcalde,  Aug.  24.  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  164.  N.  Y.  Commerc.  Advertiser,  Mar.  29,  1847.  May  21 
Taylor  wrote  that  the  means  of  transportation  might  be  pack-mules 
"chiefly"  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  300).  (Taylor's  plans  not  known)  Sen.  1; 
30,  1,  546  (Jesup).  (Complained)  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Sept.  1; 
61to  adj.  gen.,  Sept.  10;  Letter  to  Gaines;  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  557. 

Wagons  (drawn  usually  by  eight  mules)  were  more  convenient,  where 
they  could  be  used,  than  pack-mules ;  but  Santa  Anna  showed,  six  months 
later,  that  with  no  such  wagons  24-pound  cannon  and  an  army  three  times 
as  large  as  Taylor  proposed  to  take  could  be  moved  about  twice  the  dis- 
tance from  Camargo  to  Monterey  by  a  route  that  passed  through,  not  a 
populated  region  like  that  where  Taylor  was,  but  a  virtual  desert.  Taylor 
not  only  knew  that  Arista  had  depended  upon  mules,  but  captured  that 
general's  entire  outfit.  It  was  easy  to  obtain  large  numbers  of  mules 
through  the  alcaldes.  Experience  proved  that  unbroken  mules  could 
be  made  fit  for  the  work  in  three  days  (Smith,  Remins.,  18).  The  first 
call  for  wagons  (May  18)  proceeded  from  a  quartermaster  at  Pt.  Isabel, 
who  called  for  seventy.  There  is  no  evidence  that  Taylor  prompted  this 
requisition,  and  it  was  wholly  inadequate  for  his  professed  needs.  His 
indifference  about  such  matters  was  illustrated  by  Col.  Cross,  at  the  time 
his  chief  quartermaster,  who  said,  "With  respect  to  the  means  of  trans- 
portation to  be  provided,  or  other  preparations  in  my  branch  of  the  service, 
I  have  never  received  a  line  of  instructions  or  any  order  whatever  from 
Gen.  Taylor"  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  650).  It  was  his  duty  to  call  seasonably 
for  the  desired  number  of  wagons,  and  he  did  not  do  it. 

When  the  department  found  that  wagons  were  wanted,  it  displayed 
much  energy  in  having  them  purchased  or  built  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  546- 
764).  In  fact,  on  an  intimation  from  Scott  (May  15),  it  ordered  200  to 
be  constructed  at  Philadelphia  as  soon  as  they  could  be  thoroughly  made, 
and  eleven  days  later  sent  an  agent  to  Cincinnati  for  300  more.  Later 
the  field  of  operations  extended  as  far  as  Boston.     But  much  time  was 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XI,   PAGES  227-228  491 

required  to  find  suitable  lumber  and  skilled  workmen,  build  the  wagons 
properly,  and  transport  them  to  Mexico.  None  reached  the  front  in  time 
for  the  fall  campaign;  and  indeed,  after  they  arrived,  pack-mules  con- 
tinued to  be  used  (Whiting:  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  688).  Taylor  complained 
particularly  (Bixby  collection,  185)  because  100-150  wagons  intended  for 
him  went  to  Wool,  whose  expedition  will  be  described  in  chap,  xiii ;  but 
Wool  was  under  Taylor's  orders,  and  the  latter  neglected  to  regulate  the 
matter,  while  the  former  was  alert  and  active.  Taylor  complained  also 
of  lacking  mules,  harness,  pack-saddles,  horseshoe  nails,  etc. ;  but,  as  in 
the  cases  of  boats  and  wagons,  the  fault  seems  chargeable  to  the  head  of 
the  army.  He  conceived  the  absurd  idea  that  the  government  was  en- 
deavoring to  ruin  him  by  crippling  his  operations,  as  if  success  had  not 
been  fully  as  important  for  the  government  as  for  him.  Worth  privately 
said  that  any  lack  of  transportation  was  chargeable  to  Taylor,  and  de- 
scribed the  General's  complaints  as  intended  to  ward  off  responsibility 
in  case  of  failure  and  augment  glory  in  case  of  success  (364to  Capt.  S.f 
Sept.  5) ;  and  on  the  maturest  consideration  this  judgment  appears  to 
be  substantially  correct.  For  a  statement  of  the  chief  clerk,  quarter- 
master's office,  Washington,  see  chap,  x,  note  13.  The  practical  con- 
clusion is  that  Taylor,  with  nearly  300  wagons  and  numberless  mules  at 
command,  was  able  to  move  with  reasonable  promptness.  Jesup,  after 
reaching  the  scene,  contracted  for  2000  mules  in  one  day,  and  said  that 
Taylor  might  have  collected  10,000  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  567). 

One  must  be  extremely  cautious  about  asserting  what  a  general  might 
have  done ;  but  it  seems  quite  clear  that  Taylor  could  and  should  have 
organized  a  systematic  spy  service  that  would  have  given  him  adequate 
information  regarding  the  Mexican  army  and  the  defences  of  Monterey  ; 
have  advanced  his  regulars,  about  1000  at  least  of  his  best  volunteers,  a 
large  supply  of  provisions,  at  least  six  18-pounders,  entrenching  tools,  etc. 
to  Camargo  in  June;  have  had  at  least  3000  mules  collected  there  by 
August  1 ;  have  placed,  say,  2000  regulars  and  1000  volunteers  at  Ce- 
rralvo  by  Aug.  15,  and  gathered  the  large  stocks  of  subsistence  available 
in  that  district;  and  have  reached  Monterey  with  9000  men,  heavy 
guns  and  ample  supplies  by  Sept.  15.  Or  Taylor  might  have  gone  to 
Saltillo  via  'Monclova.  The  distance  would  have  been  considerably 
greater,  but  the  Mexicans  would  have  had  to  abandon  Monterey  and 
Rinconada  Pass,  and  Taylor  and  Wool  would  have  been  able  to  cooperate. 
Both  Santa  Anna  and  Mejia  feared  he  would  adopt  this  plan.  In  reply 
to  all  this  it  may  be  said  that  on  pp.  198-9  the  author  mentioned  with- 
out disapproval  Scott's  plan  to  begin  the  campaign  about  Sept.  25.  But 
the  two  cases  were  not  parallel.  Taylor  was  already  in  the  "hot  mud" 
and  needed  to  bestir  himself;  and  he  planned  but  a  small  movement, 
whereas  Scott,  not  yet  in  touch  with  the  conditions,  planned  a  large 
and  decisive  one,  which  probably  would  not  have  advanced  via  Monterey. 
6.  (Knew)  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  46,  51,  177;  N.  Y.  Herald,  July  25; 
Niles,  July  18,  p.  309 ;  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  391-2 ;  Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  app., 
125  (Ingersoll).  A  resolution  was  introduced  in  Congress  asking  the 
reason  for  the  inactivity  of  the  army  (Niles,  July  18,  p.  309).  One  news- 
paper called  Taylor  "Gen.  Delay."  (Sustain)  Taylor,  Letter  to  Gaines. 
(Consequences)  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  46.  (Suspected)  Taylor,  ibid., 
13,  20.  (Resistance)  Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Sept.  1  ("I  hope  to  be  in 
possession  of  Monterey  and  Saltillo,. as  soon  as  our  legs  can  carry  us  there  ")  ; 
Bliss,  Aug.  14,  in  Ho.  60;    30,  1,  p.  411  (Taylor  "anticipates  no  serious 


492  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XI,   PAGES  228-229 

difficulty  in  reaching  and  occupying  Saltillo");  l35Taylor  to  Butler, 
Aug.  26;  Hist.  Mag.,  x,  207-8  (Backus);  ISOPillow  to  wife,  Aug.  16 
(Taylor  says  he  does  not  think  we  shall  have  to  fire  another  gun  in  all 
northern  Mexico).     Robertson,  Remins.,  125. 

It  has  been  said  that  Taylor  knew  of  Polk's  negotiations  with  Santa 
Anna,  and  therefore  had  good  reason  to  expect  no  resistance.  But  this 
was  a  matter  for  his  government  to  act  upon,  and  the  government  had 
said  nothing  of  that  kind  to  him.  As  we  shall  see,  Scott,  although  ne- 
gotiating himself  later  with  Santa  Anna,  did  not  relax  his  military  activity 
in  the  least.  This  was  the  only  proper  course  for  a  general  in  the  field 
under  orders  to  press  the  war.  185 Aug.  5  Worth  ordered  Duncan  to 
make  a  thorough  examination  of  the  routes.  Aug.  8  Duncan  reported 
that  the  Mexicans  were  said  to  be  fortifying  Monterey.  Sept.  3  Taylor 
wrote  (Bixby  coll.,  51):  "The  country  .  .  .  shall  not  be  disappointed; 
even  if  it  should  turn  out  to  be  a  disaster."  One  does  not  readily  see  how 
Taylor  could  have  supposed  that  the  government  wished  to  be,  or  was 
likely  to  be,  supported  by  an  admittedly  inadequate  expedition. 

7.  6lOrdnance  bureau,  memo.,  June  15.  See  pp.  148,  164,  177.  Benet, 
Ordnance  Reports,  1880,  ii,  158.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  329,  417  (Taylor). 
For  S.  Anna's  task  see  note  5  and  chap.  xix.  66Sanders  to  Taylor,  Feb.  15. 
6lRidgely  to  adj.  gen.,  Aug.  2.     (Bayonet)  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  178. 

8.  Robertson,  Remins.,  118.  69Vinton  to  Worth,  Aug.  19.  69Wolf 
to  Bliss,  Aug.  10.  69Duncan  to  Worth,  Aug.  8.  65Taylor,  gen.  orders 
98-9,  105,  108,  110.  76Canales  to  Mejia,  Aug.  20.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp. 
411-2,  417  (Taylor),  534  (spec,  orders  119).  76Aldrete  to  Mejia,  Aug.  30. 
Picayune,  Aug.  25.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  123.  Niles,  Sept.  5,  p.  2.  69P.  F. 
Smith,  memoir,  Oct.  14.  Rowles,  Allen,  93.  U.  S.  Military  maps  (War 
College,  Washington).     Duncan  and  also  Hays  explored  the  routes. 

The  army  was  organized  as  follows  :  Regulars  (mostly).  A  battery  of 
two  24-pound  howitzers  and  a  10-inch  mortar  (100  men)  from  the  First 
Artillery.  First  Division  (Brig.  Gen.  Twiggs).  Cavalry:  Second  Dra- 
goons. Ridgely's  battery.  Third  Brigade  (Lieut.  Col.  Garland) :  Bragg's 
battery,  Third  and  Fourth  Infantry,  Capt.  Shiver's  volunteer  company. 
Fourth  Brigade  (Lieut.  Col.  Wilson) :  First  Infantry,  Washington  and 
Baltimore  battalion.  Second  Division  (Brevet  Brig.  Gen.  Worth).  First 
Brigade  (Lieut.  Col.  Staniford) :  Duncan's  battery,  Artillery  Battalion, 
Eighth  Infantry.  Second  Brigade  (*Brig.  Gen.  P.  F.  Smith) :  Taylor's 
(Mackall's)  battery,  Fifth  and  Seventh  Infantry,  Blanchard's  Louisiana 
volunteer  company.  Volunteers.  Field  Division  (Maj.  Gen.  Butler). 
First  Brigade  (Brig.  Gen.  Hamer) :  First  Kentucky  and  First  Ohio  regi- 
ments. Second  Brigade  (Brig.  Gen.  Quitman) :  First  Tennessee  and 
First  Mississippi  regiments  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  417).  Each  of  these  four 
regiments  was  reduced  to  a  strength  of  about  500  privates  by  leaving  behind 
the  physically  unfit.  Sept.  20,  the  numbers  were  respectively  (aside  from 
43  sick)  482,  524,  459,  452;  also  37  artillery.  Texas  Division  (Maj.  Gen. 
Henderson)  First  and  Second  regiments  of  mounted  volunteers.  These 
and  the  First  Mississippi  were  riflemen.  About  Aug.  13  a  regiment  of 
Texas  riflemen  commanded  by  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  decided  (except 
some  who  formed  a  company  under  Shiver)  to  go  home.  Johnston  was 
soon  attached  to  Butler's  staff  as  acting  inspector  general  (Ho.  60;    30, 

*  Smith  was  colonel  of  the  Mounted  Rifles;  but,  as  he  had  been  brigadier  general  of 
Lou  f  iana  volunteers  and  now  commanded  a  brigade,  he  was  commonly  given  the  higher 
itle.     In  August,  1847,  he  was  a  regular  brevet  brigadier  general. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XI,   PAGES  229-230  493 

1,  p.  536).  " Field  Division"  simply  meant  those  volunteers  (except 
Texans)  selected  to  make  the  present  campaign.  It  was  a  temporary  and 
local  organization.  Sept.  11  Meade  (Letters,  i,  126)  analyzed  the  army 
as  follows  :  8  regiments  of  regular  infantry  (2500) ;  4  regiments  of  volun- 
teer infantry  (2000) ;  4  light  batteries,  each  of  4  6-pounders  (280) ;  one 
heavy  battery  (100) ;  2  squadrons  of  regular  cavalry  (200) ;  one  squadron 
of  volunteer  cavalry  (150) ;  2  regiments  of  volunteer  cavalry  (1000) ; 
total,  6230  men  and  4-500  teamsters,  hospital  attendants,  etc.,  mostly 
armed.  Aug.  15  a  man  from  Monterey  said  Taylor  should  not  move 
against  the  city  without  12,000  well  disciplined  men.  For  the  assignment 
of  wagons  and  pack-mules  to  the  various  corps  see  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  501. 
A  pack-mule  (mula  de  cargo)  was  expected  to  carry  300  pounds.  Not  a 
little  skill  was  required  to  load  the  animal  quickly  in  such  a  manner  that 
its  burden  would  be  secure  and  would  not  chafe ;  but  the  Mexican  mule- 
driver  was  a  master  of  the  art.  The  subject  is  rather  interesting.  One 
may  consult  Inman,  Old  S.  Fe  Trail  (1897),  56-8;  Robertson,  Remins., 
269 ;  Picayune,  Mar.  6,  1847  (Hughes) ;  Robertson,  Visit,  i,  274 ;  Clai- 
borne, Quitman,  i,  279  (Holt) ;  Henshaw  narrative.  The  troops  not 
taken  to  Monterey  were  probably  distributed  about  as  follows :  at  Ca- 
margo,  2100  under  Brig.  Gens.  Pillow  and  Marshall;  at  Matamoros, 
1100  under  Col.  Clarke;  below  that  city  on  the  Rio  Grande,  4500;  at 
Pt.  Isabel,  120  under  Maj.  Gardner;  in  hospitals,  1400.  Maj.  Gen. 
Patterson  commanded  all  these  forces. 

9.  Henshaw  narrative.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  ii,  306  (Taylor).  Taylor, 
Letters  (Bixby),  56.  Robertson,  Remins.,  119-22.  69P.  F.  Smith  to 
Bliss,  Aug.  26.  69 Worth  to  Bliss,  Aug.  25.  14  Chamberlain,  recoils. 
Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  679  (Whiting).  Giddings,  Sketches,  108.  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  161-77. 

10.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  54,  56.  Robertson,  Remins.,  122.  Velasco, 
Geograffa,  iv,  121.  69Duncan  to  Worth,  Aug.  8.  69Worth  to  Bliss, 
Aug.  25.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  419  (Worth),  421  (Taylor).  Wilhelm,  Eighth 
Inf.,  ii,  281.  76Arleji  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches, 
154,  177-9.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  107.  Picayune,  Sept.  22 ;  Oct.  6.  Meade, 
Letters,  i,  124.     Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  85.     Metrop.  Mag.,  Dec,  1907,  p.  316. 

Worth  wrote  on  Sept.  3  that  he  could  have  bought  5000  bushels  of  corn 
here  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  420).  Taylor  stated  that  he  found  beef,  goats, 
sheep  and  corn  in  abundance  at  Cerralvo  (180Pillow  to  wife,  Sept.  20). 
These  facts  bear  upon  Taylor's  complaint  that  the  government's  failure 
to  send  wagons  caused  a  shortage  of  provisions  and  therefore  of  men,  es- 
pecially since  the  wagons  used  for  the  transportation  of  water  as  far  as 
Cerralvo  were  no  longer  required  for  that  service  (65gen.  orders.  115). 
On  learning  of  the  corn  Taylor  might,  so  far  as  concerned  subsistence, 
have  brought  on  another  volunteer  brigade.  One  cannot  see  why  he 
did  not  push  some  troops  on  to  Cerralvo  instead  of  letting  them  die  at 
Camargo.  One  soldier  wrote  in  his  diary  that  there  were  unwholesome 
swamps  at  Cerralvo,  but  the  statement  appears  doubtful.  Worth's  com- 
mand remained  at  this  point  nearly  three  weeks  and  was  still  in  excellent 
health.  If  there  were  swamps,  the  camps  could  no  doubt  have  been 
pitched  on  ground  above  them,  for  a  fine  stream  came  from  a  gorge  in 
the  mountain. 

11.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  10-24.  Apuntes,  54.  Negrete,  Invasi6n, 
ii,  304-5.  93Memoranda.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Dec,  1846.  And 
from  76  the  following.     To  Ramirez,   Aug.  17.     Comte.  gen.  S.   L.   P., 


494  NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XI,   PAGES  230-231 

Aug.  15,  28;  Sept.  2,  16.  Ramirez,  Aug.  17.  Galindo,  Aug.  24.  Mejia, 
Aug.  17,  19.  Romero,  Aug.  24.  To  Ampudia,  Aug.  17.  Ampudia, 
Aug.  26 ;  Sept.  2,  3,  9.  Ponce  de  Le6n,  Sept.  19,  22.  Id.  to  Ampudia, 
Sept.  15.  Mejia  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31.  Returns,  Sept.  10,  11.  Pacheco, 
Aug.  25.  Ampudia  reported  that  the  First  Brigade  made  about  forty- 
eight  miles  one  day.  This  statement,  were  it  not  supported  by  similar 
facts,  would  not  be  believed.  The  Fourth  Brigade  marched  for  Monterey, 
but  did  not  arrive.  It  was  very  poorly  equipped.  It  reached  S.  L.  Potosi 
Aug.  29,  was  halted  there  to  maintain  order,  and  did  not  leave  until  Sept.  22. 

Ampudia  organized  his  infantry  as  four  brigades  under  Gen.  Ramirez, 
Gen.  Mejia,  Col.  Uraga,  and  Col.  Mendoza,  and  his  cavalry  as  two  bri- 
gades under  Gens.  Torre j6n  and  Romero,  the  former  commanding  by 
right  of  seniority  all  the  mounted  troops.  The  name  of  the  sefiorita  might 
excite  suspicion,  but  there  were  others  who  bore  it. 

The  Mexican  archives  give  very  few  complete,  properly  attested  re- 
turns, but  we  have  one  here,  and  it  seems  worth  while  to  summarize  it 
in  order  to  show  the  fragmentary  character  of  the  Mexican  armies.  The 
attached  numbers  are  the  rank  and  file.  Staff ;  a  section  of  engineers ; 
do.  of  Plana  Mayor;  do.  of  surgeons,  10;  sappers,  118;  artillery,  211. 
Infantry:  Second  Ligero  regt.,  220;  Third  do.,  512;  Fourth  do.,  397; 
First  Line  regt.,  186 ;  Third  do.,  345 ;  Fourth  do.,  187 ;  detachments  of 
Sixth  and  Eighth  do.,  89;  Seventh  do.,  129;  Activo  Battalion  (First)  of 
Mexico,  136 ;  Do.  of  Morelia,  77 ;  Do.  of  S.  L.  Potosi,  340 ;  Do.  of  Quere- 
taro,  340 ;  Do.  of  Aguascalientes,  383 ;  Auxiliary  battalion  of  Monterey, 
349.  Cavalry :  Ligero,  80 ;  First  Line,  93 ;  Third  do.,  140 ;  Eighth  do., 
99 ;  Jalisco  Lancers,  146 ;  Activo  of  Guanajuato,  132 ;  Do.  of  S.  L.  Po- 
tosi, 123;  Auxiliary  Squadron  of  Bejar,  68;  First  Permanent  Co.  of 
Tamaulipas,  41 ;  Second  do.,  9 ;  Permanent  Co.  of  Lampazos,  23 ;  Do. 
of  B6jar,  22 ;  Do.  of  La  Bahfa,  1 ;  First  Activo  Co.  of  N.  Le6n,  56 ;  De- 
fensors [militia]  of  N.  Le6n,  625.  Total,  5836.  This  was  duly  signed  by 
Ampudia  and  J.  G.  Conde.  A  party  of  deserters  (mostly  Irish)  from  the 
American  army,  which  served  at  Monterey,  was  presumably  included  in 
the  above  return.     They  became  the  nucleus  of  the  "San  Patricio"  corps. 

12.  From  76  the  following.  To  Ampudia,  Aug.  20,  23,  .24,  28  (four 
despatches),  31.  Comte.  gen.  N.  Le6n,  Aug.  26.  S.  Anna,  Sept.  29. 
Aug.  24  Ampudia  was  told  to  have  Mejia  suspend  his  retreat,  unless 
Taylor  had  advanced  in  full  force.  Aug.  28  he  was  ordered  to  destroy 
the  fortifications  and  retire,  leaving  a  strong  body  of  cavalry  to  screen 
Monterey  and  observe  the  Americans  until  the  latter  should  arrive  within 
a  few  leagues  of  the  town.  Aug.  31  Ampudia' s  decision  to  hold  the  city 
was  endorsed.  Evidently  the  minister  of  war  did  not  agree  with  Santa 
Anna,  and  on  finding  an  excuse  disregarded  the  latter's  advice.  The 
comandante  general  was  especially  anxious  to  have  the  Americans  attacked 
during  their  march.     He  described  the  garrison  as  enthusiastic. 

13.  From  76. Mejia  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31.  Comte.  gen.  N.  Le6n, 
Aug.  26.  Ampudia  to  Mejia,  Aug.  24,  26.  Ampudia,  Aug.  26 ;  Sept.  9. 
To  Ampudia,  Aug.  31. 

Ampudia's  reasons  were:  1.  It  would  take  a  month  to  demolish  the 
fortifications,  and  during  that  time  the  enemy  could  attack  on  advan- 
tageous terms;  2.  The  materiel  could  not  be  saved;  3.  The  abandon- 
ment of  Monterey  would  lead  the  people  to  declare  their  independence 
and  unite  with  Taylor,  enabling  him  to  hold  the  mountains  so  strongly 
that  50,000  men  could  not  dislodge  him ;   4.  Public  opinion  would  blame 


NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  XI,   PAGES  231-236  495 

Ampudia  and  the  government;  5.  The  effect  on  the  morale  of  all  the 
troops  concerned  in  the  affair  would  be  fatal.  His  plan  was  to  attack 
the  Americans  in  detail  on  their  march ;  and  then,  should  he  find  them  too 
strong  for  him,  retreat  with  his  artillery  and  infantry,  leaving  the  cavalry 
to  fight  rear-guard  actions. 

14.  Apuntes,  54.  From  76  the  following.  To  Mejia,  May  27.  Mejia, 
June  19  (two  despatches);  July  25.  Comte.  gen.  N.  Le6n,  Aug  12' 
Ampudia,  Sept.  9.     Mejia  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31. 

15.  307Roberts,  diary,  Nov.  27.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  133,  136.  Rich- 
mond Enquirer,  Oct.  20.  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9.  Henshaw 
narrative.  Apuntes,  53-4;  176Davis  to  Brown,  Sept.  20.  Balbontfn, 
Invasi6n,  24.  92 Map  and  plan  of  defence.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  327 
(Ampudia).  Picayune,  Nov.  4.  Eyewitness,  Complete  History,'  45. 
Numerous  maps,  published  and  in  MS. 

16.  Apuntes,  53-4.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  138  (evidently  in  error  about 
the  citadel  garrison).  Picayune,  Oct.  21.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Nov.  20. 
Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  216.  Henshaw  narrative.  Robertson,  Remins., 
126-8.  69Mansfield,  report.  GGld.  to  Totten,  June  30,  1847.  147Cham- 
berlain,  diary.  Balbontfn,  Invasi6n,  43.  76Comte.  gen.  N.  Le6n,  Sept. 
20.  76Ampudia,  Sept.  9.  The  Americans  often  spoke  of  the  citadel  as 
the  "Black  Fort"  or  the  "Old  Colored  Gentleman."  Its  Mexican  name 
was  Fort  Independencia,  but  it  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  redoubt 
on  Independence  Hill.  It  stood  about  1000  yards  from  the  densely-built 
part  of  the  city. 

17.  69Mansfield,  report.     Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  27,  38,  42.     76Mejia  to 

Ampudia,  Aug.  31.     Ho.  60;   30,  1,  p.  424  (Taylor).     364Worth  to , 

Oct.  2.  Sen.  1;  29,  2,  p.  46  (Marcy,  report).  22lHill,  diary.  Henrvl 
Camp.  Sketches,  217. 

18.  From  76.  S.  Anna  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  13.  Ampudia  to  Gov.  Ta- 
maulipas,  Aug.  23.  Relaciones  (to  Guerra),  Sept.  23.  Ampudia,  Aug.  28. 
To  Ampudia,  Sept.  4.     Mejia  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31. 

19.  Diario,  July  4;  Sept.  21.  Monitor  Repub.,  Sept.  25.  Reid,  Scout- 
ing Expeds.,  120.  Picayune,  Sept.  22.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  326.  N. 
Orl.  Commerc.  Bulletin,  Sept.  22.  76Ampudia,  proc,  Aug.  31.  76Proc. 
in  English,  Sept.  15.     76Circular,  Sept.  15. 

20.  Monitor  Repub.,  Sept.  18 ;  Oct.  29  (Jauregui).  13Bankhead,  no.  155, 
1846.  Apuntes,  54,  57.  Balbontin,  Invasion,  26.  76Nevia  to  Ampudia, 
Aug.  26. 

21.  Tampico  Eco,  Sept.  24.  Gov.  of  Tamaulipas,  Aug.  20.  Rose, 
McCulloch,  73.  Mejia  to  Paredes,  July  20.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  26. 
Apuntes,  55-8.  Ho.  60 ;  30, 1,  p.  526  (spec,  orders  129).  And  from  76  the 
following.  Ampudia,  Aug.  31 ;  Sept.  2,  res.,  15,  res.  Id.  to  Torrej6n, 
Sept.  1.  Mejia  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31.  Canales,  Aug.  30.  Id.  to  Ampudia, 
Aug.  30-1.     Mejia  to  comte.  gen.  S.  L.  P.,  Aug.  17. 

Canales  said  in  substance :  The  spare  horses  of  the  enemy  cannot  be 
taken,  for  they  are  not  turned  loose ;  the  roads  cannot  be  broken  up,  for 
they  run  across  stony  plains;  the  woods  cannot  be  fired,  for  no  great 
fields  of  dry  grass  are  near  them;  the  watering  places  cannot  be  made 
useless,  for  they  are  streams  coming  from  the  mountains;  the  wagons 
and  pack-mules  cannot  be  captured,  for  my  horses  are  unserviceable. 

22.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  129.  147Chamberlain,  diary.  Giddings, 
Sketches,  97.  139W.  B.  to  D.  Campbell,  Aug.  28.  Nebel  and  Kendall, 
5.     Mayer,  Mex.  War,  159-61.     Picayune,  Nov.  13.     65Gen.  orders  115. 


496  NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  XI,   PAGES  236-238 

Smith,  Chile  con  Carne,  94,  note.     Accounts  of  the  costumes  naturally- 
varied. 

23.  Picayune,  Oct.  6.  Greensborough  Morn.  Post,  Apr.  5,  1903. 
349Patridge  to  Miss  W.,  July  21,  1847.  Metrop.  Mag.,  Dec,  1907,  316-7. 
Spirit  of  the  Times,  Oct.  14.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  183-6,  244. 
364Worth  to  S.,  Sept.  16.  McCall,  Letters,  470.  Reid,  Scouting  Expeds., 
128.  190Ewing,  diary,  Nov.  18.  Robertson,  Remins.,  123-4.  Taylor, 
Letters  (Bixby),  57.  69Duncan  to  Worth,  Aug.  8.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p. 
421-2  (Taylor). 

One  small  mountain  in  this  region  had  a  bare  side  composed  of  crystal- 
lized sulphate  of  lime.  Here,  as  generally,  the  author  draws  upon  his 
own  observations  of  Mexican  scenery.  There  were  a  number  of  defiles 
between  Cerralvo  and  Monterey  and  a  great  deal  of  rough,  bushy  country, 
where  the  Mexicans  could  have  made  Taylor  no  little  trouble.  In  all 
probability  he  could  have  been  delayed  five  to  seven  days.  See  Monitor 
Repub.,  Oct.  20,  remitido. 

24.  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9.  Id.,  Letters  (Bixby),  57,  59. 
Henshaw  narrative.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  277.  Robertson,  Remins., 
125-6.  65Taylor,  gen.  orders  119-20.  Apuntes,  54,  58.  Wilhelm, 
Eighth  Inf.,  ii?  288.  76Comte.  gen.  N.  Le6n,  Sept.  20.  Reid,  Scouting 
Expeds.,  142.  Picayune,  Oct.  6.  Rose,  McCulloch,  100.  Niles,  Oct.  17, 
p.  103.     244Chandler  to  Lakin,  Nov.  23.     Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  189-91. 

Wilhelm,  who  wrote  the  history  of  Worth's  old  regt.  and  had  the  use  of 
Worth's  papers,  states  that,  after  arriving  at  Marin,  Taylor  was  "firm" 
in  the  opinion  that  he  would  meet  with  no  serious  resistance  at  Monterey. 
Certainly  he  then  estimated  Ampudia's  regulars  at  only  about  3000  (Ho. 
60;   30,  1,  p.  422). 

25.  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Sept.  15,  1847.  Id.,  Letter  to  Gaines. 
Id.,  Letters  (Bixby),  178.  Thorpe,  Our  Army  at  Monterey,  46.  Robert- 
son, Remins.,  124.  Henshaw  narrative.  French,  Two  Wars,  67.  Apun- 
tes, 58.  Chavez,  July  29,  1848.  76Ampudia,  Sept.  19.  Monitor  Repub., 
Oct.  20.     Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  190-2. 

Taylor's  61field  return,  Sept.  21  (the  first  of  two  numbers  represents 
officers) :  Hdqtrs.  and  staff,  22;  23.  Webster's  battery  (24-lb.  howitzers), 
3;  24.  1st  Div.  Hdqtrs.  and  staff,  3;  10.  Ridgely's  batt.,  3;  75. 
2  Drags.  (4  Cos.),  10;  228.  Braggs'  batt.,  2;  64.  3  Inf.  (6  Cos.),  18; 
284.  4  Inf.  (6  Cos.),  16;  287.  Shiver's  Co.,  3;  55.  1  Inf.  (4  Cos.), 
12;  179.  Bait,  and  Wash.  Battal.  (6  Cos.),  20;  314.  2d  Div.  (see  be- 
low), 93;  1558.  Field  Div.  (see  below),  148;  1781.  Tex.  Div.  Hdqtrs. 
and  staff,  5  offs.  1st  Regt.  (10  Cos.),  32;  376.  2d  Regt.  (10  Cos.),  35; 
527.  Surgeons,  5.  Sick,  3;  143.  2d  Div.  (Sept.  17).  Staffs,  5.  1st 
brig.:  Duncan's  batt.,  68;  Artill.  Battal.,  532;  8  Inf.,  331.  2d  brig.: 
Mackall's  batt.,  70 ;  5  Inf.,  280;  7  Inf.,  282;  Blanchard's  Co.,  83.  (These 
figures  include  88  com.  offs.)  Sick,  7;  45.  5  Inf.,  7  Inf.  and  8  Inf.  had  6 
Cos.  each.  Art.  Battal.  had  9  Cos.  Field  Div.  (Sept.  20).  Staff,  12. 
Artill.,  37.  Ky.  (10  Cos.),  482;  Ohio  (10  Cos.),  524;  Miss.  (8  Cos.), 
452;  Tenn.  (10  Cos.),  459.  (These  figures  include  139  com.  offs.)  Sick, 
1 ;  42.     Grand  totals  (Sept.  21),  425;  5795  =  6220. 

Taylor's  formal  report  counted  the  officers  twice.  Ripley  made  the 
same  mistake  (War  with  Mexico,  i,  199).  The  24-lb.  howitzers  appear 
to  have  been  classed  as  heavy  field  guns  (69memo.,  ordnance  office, 
June  15). 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XII,   PAGES  239-242         497 


XII.    MONTEREY 

1.  66Mansfield  to  Totten,  Feb.  1,  1847.  Ho.  4 ;  29,  2,  pp.  76,  83  (Tay- 
lor). Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  ii,  289.  76Comte.  gen.  N.  Leon,  Sept.  20. 
Stevens,  Campaigns,  22.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  192.  Nebel  and 
Kendall,  5,  6.     Apuntes,  58. 

2.  Apuntes,  59.  Monitor  Repub.,  Oct.  31  (Berra).  Nebel  and  Kendall,  6. 
Nat.  Intelligencer,  Nov.  20.  J.  Davis  in  Cong.  Globe,  31,  1,  app.,  1034-41. 
Picayune,  Oct.  4;  Nov.  13.  221Hill,  diary.  Smith,  To  Mexico,  73-4. 
69 Worth  to  Bliss,  Sept.  21,  8 :  15  a.m.  147Chamberlain,  diary.  Bal- 
bontm,  Invasion,  25,  36.     Ho.  4;   29,  2,  p.  102  (Worth). 

The  Federation  9-pdrs.  were  classed  by  the  Mexicans  as  8-pdrs.  The 
half-moon  battery  was  designed  to  come  into  play  after  the  capture  of 
the  city,  annoying  the  captors  and  defending  the  line  of  retreat  to  Saltillo. 

3.  76Comte.  gen.  N.  Le6n,  Sept.  20.  69Worth  to  Bliss,  Aug.  28.  76Am- 
pudia,  Sept.  19,  res. 

4.  221  Hill,  diary.  277Staniford  to  Pemberton,  Sept.  26.  Robertson, 
Remins.,  130.  Nebel  and  Kendall,  6.  Chamberlain,  diary.  Ho.  4 
29,  2,  pp.  83  (Taylor),  102  (Worth).  76Comte.  gen.  N.  Le6n,  Sept.  20 
Picayune,  Nov.  13.  245Hays  to  Henderson,  undated.  Pennsylvanian 
Nov.  2.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  133.  Metropol.  Mag.,  Dec,  1907  (Hamilton) 
Spirit  of  the  Times,  Nov.  7.  (Worth)  Robertson,  Remins.,  Sept.  20 
185J.  Van  Buren,  oration;  Chase,  Polk  Admin.,  156;  185W.  to  Duncan 
Apr.  15;  Jacksonville  (Ala.)  Republican,  Nov.  25;  Grone,  Briefe,  83 
Semmes,  Service,  282 ;    327Sutherland  to  father,  Aug.  — . 

A  part  of  Hays's  four  hundred  did  not  march  until  a  little  later.  It 
seems  clear,  although  neither  Taylor  nor  Worth  mentions  the  fact,  that  a 
party  of  dragoons  accompanied  the  expedition  (Chamberlain,  diary; 
Haskin,  First  Artillery,  307).  It  will  be  recalled  that  most  of  our  "ar- 
tillery" served  as  infantry.  Blanchard's  company  was  made  up  of  men 
who  did  not  wish  to  leave  when  most  of  the  Louisiana  infantry  was  ordered 
home  (p.  205). 

Worth's  movement  was  in  principle  extremely  hazardous  (Halleck, 
Mil.  Art,  414).  Napoleon  (Maxims,  p.  24)  :  "Nothing  is  more  rash  or 
more  opposed  to  the  principles  of  war,  than  a  flank  march  in  the  presence 
of  an  army  in  position,  especially  when  that  army  occupies  heights  at  the 
foot  of  which  you  must  defile."  This  maxim  seems  to  fit  the  case  pre- 
cisely. Stevens  (Campaigns,  28)  defended  the  movement  on  the  ground 
that  Taylor  knew  what  could  be  expected  of  Worth's  command  and  of 
the  Mexicans ;  but  as  Ampudia  had  shown  no  conspicuous  want  of 
ability  and  courage  on  May  8  and  9,  Taylor  had  no  reason  to  suppose  he 
would  act  here  as  badly  as  he  did.  Indeed  the  struggle  at  Monterey 
showed  that  if  Taylor  assumed  the  Mexicans  would  not  fight,  he  erred. 
It  was  doubtless  realized  by  Taylor  and  Worth  that  the  small  American 
army,  without  siege  artillery  or  adequate  supplies,  could  escape  ruin 
only  through  extreme  boldness.  Apparently  the  plan  originated  with 
Worth,  for  he  knew  more  about  the  terrain  than  Taylor  did.  Wilhelm 
so  states,  and  the  N.  Y.  Sun  also,  the  editor  of  which  was  close  to  Worth, 
gave  him  that  credit  (Aug.  14,  1847).  Bragg  (210to  Hammond,  May  4, 
1848)  ascribed'  the  plan  to  Taylor ;  but,  as  Taylor  was  the  commander- 
in-chief,  this  was  the  natural  presumption. 

5.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  133.  Ho.  4;  29,  2,  p.  83  (Taylor).  Picayune, 
Nov.  13.  Monitor  Repub.,  Oct.  29  (Jauregui),  31  (Berra).  245Hays  to 
vol.  i  —  2  k 


498         NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XII,   PAGES  242-246 

Henderson,  undated.  Reid,  Scouting  Expeds.,  152.  218Henshaw  narra- 
tive. Ampudia,  Manifiesto.  Robertson,  Remins.,  130-1.  69Worth  to 
Bliss,  Sept.  20,  9  :  30  p.m. 

6.  Ho.  4 ;  29,  2,  pp.  83  (Taylor),  102  (Worth).  Monitor  Repub.,  Oct.  29. 
76V£zquez,  Sept.  23.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  27.  69Worth  to  Bliss,  Sept. 
20,  9 :  30  p.m.     Meade,  Letters,  i,  133.     Robertson,  Remins.,  131-2. 

7.  Ho.  4;  29,  2,  pp.  83  (Taylor),  102  (Worth).  185Duncan  to  Worth, 
Sept.  28.  Henshaw  narrative.  Chamberlain,  diary.  Apuntes,  59. 
Gonzalez,  Aguascalientes,  152.  185Worth  to  Marcy,  July  14,  1847. 
69 Worth  to  Bliss,  Sept.  21,  8 :  15  a.m.  ;  3  :  40  p.m.  Picayune,  Nov.  13, 
1846;  Feb.  17,  1847.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  133.  Wash.  Union,  Nov.  20. 
252Mackall  to  father,  Sept.  27.  N.  Y.  Sun,  Oct.  14.  Monitor  Repub., 
Oct.  17,  31 ;  Nov.  15.  245Hays  to  Henderson,  undated.  Haskin,  First 
Artillery,  309.  180C.  F.  Smith  to  Pemberton,  Sept.  30.  277Staniford 
to  Pemberton,  Sept.  26.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  201.  Prieto,  Me- 
morias,  205.     Reid,  Scouting  Expeds.,  157-9. 

McCulloch,  being  in  advance,  did  not  receive  the  order  to  take  post 
behind  the  fence,  and  hence  fought  in  the  road. 

8.  The  operations  on  Federation  Ridge.  69 Worth  to  Bliss,  Sept.  21, 
3:40  p.m.  Ho.  4;  29,  2,  p.  102  (Worth).  245Hays  to  Henderson,  un- 
dated. 180C.  F.  Smith  to  Pemberton,  Sept.  30.  277P.  F.  Smith  to  Id., 
Sept.  27.  Monitor  Repub.,  Oct.  31  (Berra).  252Mackall  to  father, 
Sept.  27.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  201-3.  Nebel  and  Kendall,  6-7. 
Hist.  Mag.,  Mar.,  1874,  p.  138.  Wash.  Union,  Nov.  12,  20.  Chamber- 
lain, diary  and  recoils.  278Niehenke,  statement.  Meade,  Letters,  i, 
134.  Picayune,  Oct.  4;  Nov.  13.  Henshaw  narrative.  Reid,  Scouting 
Expeds.,  162-6.     Hill,  diary. 

Meade  (Letters,  i,  88)  wrote:  Worth  "has  the  great  misfortune  of 
being  most  rash  and  impetuous,  and  of  constantly  doing  things  which 
cooler  reflection  causes  him  to  repent.  This  infirmity,  in  my  opinion, 
renders  him  unfit  to  command,  but  on  the  field  of  battle,  under  another, 
his  gallantry  and  bravery  are  well  known  and  most  conspicuous."  U.  S. 
Grant  (Mems.,  i,  123)  said :  Worth  "was  nervous,  impatient  and  rest- 
less on  the  march,  or  when  important  or  responsible  duty  confronted 
him." 

Miles  set  out  about  forty-five  minutes  later  than  C.  F.  Smith.  On 
reaching  the  ridge  he  sent  off  detachments  in  order  to  divert  attention 
from  Smith.  Still  restless,  Worth  sent  Col.  Hays  and  more  Texans  to 
the  ridge,  but  these  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  do  anything  of  consequence. 
Gen.  Smith's  attack  upon  El  Soldado,  made  on  his  own  responsibility, 
had  a  very  important  bearing  upon  the  movement  against  Independence 
Hill  and  the  Bishop's  Palace.  Hitchcock  said  Gen.  Smith  not  only  aided 
Worth  materially  but  saved  his  reputation  (Sen.  65;  30,  1,  p.  528).  The 
summit  and  El  Soldado  continued  to  be  held  by  the  Americans.  Scott 
and  Blanchard  (who  was  under  Scott's  orders)  were  recalled  from  No.  3 
to  El  Soldado  the  next  morning  to  cooperate  in  the  attack  on  the  Palace. 
According  to  some  Americans  three  guns  were  captured.  This  mistake 
probably  arose  because  one  piece  was  used  by  the  Americans  at  the  sum- 
mit and  then  moved  to  El  Soldado.  According  to  the  Mexicans  there 
seem  to  have  been  only  175  of  them  on  the  ridge.  On  both  sides  the 
loss  of  men  on  Federation  Ridge  was  insignificant.  Worth  had  15  or  20 
killed  and  wounded.  Some  thought  the  summit  of  Federation  Ridge  not 
less  than^800tfeet^high.     As  the  Monterey  plans  are  unavoidably  based  to 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XII,   PAGES  246-259         499 

a  large  extent  upon  sketches  and  estimates,  it  has  not  been  thought  best 
to  give  a  scale  of  miles. 

9.  The  capture  of  Independence  Hill.  Ho.  4;  29,  2,  p.  102  (Worth). 
Ampudia,  Manifiesto.  69 Worth  to  Bliss,  Sept.  22,  8 :  30  a.m.,  5  p.m. 
French,  Two  Wars,  64-5.  147Chamberlain,  diary.  148/d.,  recoils. 
Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  38-9.  Apuntes,  61-2.  190Ewing,  diary.  218Hen- 
shaw  narrative;  221Hill,  diary.  Picayune,  Nov.  13.  252Mackall  to 
father,  Sept.  27.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  135-6.  Wash.  Union,  Nov.  20. 
Diario,  Sept.  30.  Monitor  Repub.,  Oct.  31  (Berra).  245Hays  to  Hender- 
son, undated.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  205.  Nebel  and  Kendall,  6. 
185Duncan  to  Worth,  Sept.  28.  Reid,  Scouting  Expeds.,  183-5.  Am- 
pudia to  the  People.  Some  officers  thought  the  hill  nearly  600  feet  high. 
Ampudia  tardily  ordered  reinforcements  to  the  hill,  but  they  did  not 
arrive.     Worth's  loss,  Sept.  22,  was  only  about  a  dozen  killed  and  wounded. 

10.  Taylor's  and  Ampudia' 's  operations,  Sept.  20-3;  Worth's,  Sept.  23. 
Ho.  4;  29,  2,  pp.  76-109  (reports  of  Taylor  and  officers).  Ho.  17;  30,  1 
(reports  of  officers).  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9,  1846 ;  Jan.  26,  1847. 
190Ewing,  diary.  218Henshaw  narrative.  Coleman,  Crittenden,  i,  309. 
Claiborne,  Quitman,  ii,  303-7.  22lHill,  diary.  Numerous  reports  and 
letters  in  174  and  176.  Smith,  Chile  con  Carne,  82-97.  Thorpe,  Our 
Army  at  Monterey,  55,  59.  Ampudia,  Manifiesto.  Id.  to  Fellow-citizens. 
Robertson,  Reminiscences,  136-50.  6lGraham  to  Polk,  April  — ,  [1847]. 
6lQuitman  to  Hamer,  Sept.  28.  69Capt.  Vinton  to  Worth,  Aug.  19. 
Taylor,  gen.  orders  115.  69 Worth  to  Bliss,  Sept.  23,  11  p.m.  69Trow- 
bridge  to  Stewart,  Feb.  8,  1848.  French,  Two  Wars,  62,  64-6.  66Mans- 
field  to  Totten,  Feb.  1,  1847.  69Backus  to  Brady,  Sept.  22,  1848. 
147Chamberlain,  diary.  148  Jd.,  recoils.  Balbontin,  Invasion,  24,  27- 
35,  40-3.  Roa  Barcena,  Recuerdos,  72.  Apuntes,  53,  60-4.  Ho.  60; 
30,  1,  pp.  419  (Worth),  424  (Taylor).  Roberts,  diary.  Hist.  Mag.,  Jan., 
1874,  pp.  8-9.  Picayune,  Oct.  23 ;  Nov.  4,  13.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  134-5, 
137-8,  163-5.  185Duncan  to  Worth,  Sept.  28.  242Kingsbury  to  mother, 
Oct.  14.  Lawton,  Artill.  Officer,  29,  30.  Stevens,  Camps.,  23-9.  73Ber- 
mudez  de  Castro,  no.  371,  res.,  1846.  Hist.  Mag.,  x,  207-13,  255-7.  John- 
ston, A.  S.  Johnston,  136-40.  J.  Davis :  note  2.  Pennsylvanian,  Nov.  2 
(Peyton).  Wash.  Union,  Nov.  20,  1846;  Mar.  2,  1847.  Bait.  Sun, 
Nov.  6.  Monitor  Repub.,  Nov.  15.  Spirit  of  the  Times,  Nov.  7,  28,  1846 ; 
Jan.  9,  1847.  245Wood  to  Henderson,  Sept.  24.  245Hays  to  Id.,  un- 
dated. Niles,  Nov.  28,  p.  201.  244Chandler  to  Lakin,  Nov.  23.  175Rus- 
sell  to  Davis,  Sept.  26 ;  Oct.  18.  175Cooper  to  Davis,  Sept.  — .  Wilcox, 
Mex.  War,  119.  Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  77,  107-27,  etc.  139 W.  B.  to  D.  Camp- 
bell, Sept.  28;  Nov.  2,  9,  1846;  Feb.  19,  1847.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches, 
193-201,  203-4,  206-12,  221.  130Brichta,  Letter.  Nebel  and  Kendall, 
7-10.  139Campbell  to  Quitman,  Sept.  27 ;  to  wife,  Oct.  1.  150Cheatham 
to  son,  Oct.  6  ;  to  sister,  Oct.  16.  277P.  F.  Smith  to  Pemberton,  Sept.  27. 
Reid,  Scouting  Expeds.,  108,  152,  170,  173,  190.  76Ampudia,  Sept.  22, 
25.  76ld.  to  comte.  gen.  S.  L.  P.,  Sept.  28.  76Head  of  Ampudia's  medical 
service,  Sept.  24.     The  author  of  the  verse  was  C.  F.  Hoffman. 

Remarks.  Taylor's  lack  of  interest  in  studying  the  topography  and 
fortifications  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Butler,  second  in  command, 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  shown  the  map  drawn  by  Meade  from  in- 
formation obtained  by  Worth,  though  Taylor  certainly  saw  it  (Wilhelm, 
Eighth  Infantry,  ii,  283).  Butler  stated  officially  that  when  he  attacked 
the  city  he  knew  nothing  about  the  locality.     Capt.  Henry  said  Garland's 


500         NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XII,  PAGES  248-259 

charge  was  made  in  "utter  ignorance"  regarding  it  (Camp.  Sketches, 
194).  It  has  been  said  that  Taylor  lacked  entrenching  tools;  but  he 
had  tools  for  building  roads,  planting  the  mortar  and  howitzers,  and 
erecting  new  defences  at  the  Teneria  redoubt.  Stevens  (Campaigns,  29) 
undertook  to  defend  Taylor's  operations  on  Sept.  21  by  saying  that  the 
ardor  of  Garland's  men  brought  them  into  action  before  Mansfield's 
reconnaissance  had  been  completed;  but  (1)  Garland  was  virtually  in- 
structed to  follow  Mansfield's  directions  and  did  so,  and  (2)  Oct.  24  Tay- 
lor said  he  would  have  pursued  the  same  course,  had  he  known  all  that 
he  learned  later  about  the  situation  —  i.e.  Garland  executed  Taylor's 
ideas  and  wishes  (6lGraham  to  Polk,  Apr.  — ,  [1847]).  Waiting  for  a 
fuller  reconnaissance,  therefore,  would  have  consumed  time  without 
giving  any  advantage.  It  follows,  too,  from  this  statement  of  Taylor's 
that  he  would  not  have  excused  Mansfield,  had  Mansfield  instructed 
Garland  not  to  charge.  Taylor  did  not  recommend  a  brevet  for  Garland. 
This  was  an  implied  censure.  Capt.  G.  M.  Graham  of  Garland's  com- 
mand therefore  addressed  a  letter  to  Polk,  giving  a  full  account  of  Gar- 
land's proceedings.  This  letter  was  presented  to  Polk  by  Gen.  George 
Gibson,  who  gave  the  writer  "a  high  character."  It  may  be  added,  that 
it  was  impossible  for  Mansfield  to  make  a  complete  reconnaissance  under 
the  circumstances.     He  would  not  have  lived  to  finish  it. 

The  Fourth  Infantry,  having  been  detached  to  cover  the  battery,  was 
not  in  Garland's  charge.  The  mortar  does  not  seem  to  have  been  effective 
on  Sept.  21  (Giddings,  Sketches,  202) ;  had  it  been  so,  it  would  not  have 
been  put  out  of  commission  for  a  considerable  time  by  being  sent  to  Worth, 
who  does  not  seem  to  have  asked  for  it.  It  appears  to  have  been  used  by 
Taylor  only  twenty  minutes,  which  suggests  that  its  inefficiency  was 
speedily  discovered.  Had  the  cause  been  merely  the  lack  of  a  platform 
(Ripley,  War  with  Mexico,  i,  206),  it  could  have  been  removed.  There 
was  timber  enough  at  Walnut  Grove.  The  statements  regarding  the 
number  of  guns  in  Teneria  redoubt  cannot  be  wholly  reconciled.  This 
may  arise  from  the  fact  that  not  all  the  pieces  could  be  used.  The  state- 
ment in  the  text  seems  to  be  safe. 

The  author  feels  some  scepticism  about  the  doings  of  Backus.  No 
unanimity  prevailed  then  about  him.  He  is  rather  too  precise  in  his 
own  statement.  He  says  {Historical  Magazine,  x,  255)  that  the  distance 
from  the  building  he  occupied  to  the  tannery  was  found  to  be  117|  yards. 
One  can  hardly  understand  how  so  exact  a  measurement  can  have  been 
made  in  such  a  locality.  The  distance  from  his  position  to  Teneria  re- 
doubt was  considerably  more  than  this.  Henry  estimated  it  at  130  yards 
(Campaign  Sketches,  195).  Muskets  were  not  reliable  at  this  distance. 
His  claims  were  not  accepted  by  all  at  the  time.  Still,  many  believed 
that  he  contributed  materially  to  the  capture  of  the  redoubt.  After  the 
capture  of  this  redoubt  Col.  Davis  undertook  to  storm  El  Diablo,  but 
was  recalled.  There  was  a  sharp  clash  between  Taylor  and  Butler  in  the 
course  of  the  operations,  Sept.  21.  Taylor  should,  of  course,  have  kept 
out  of  the  street  fighting  (Griepenkerl,  Applied  Tactics,  187).  There 
was  sufficient  demand  for  head  work  at  that  time  to  absorb  his  full  atten- 
tion. It  was  stated  that  after  the  repulse  of  the  Americans,  Sept.  21, 
Mejia  asked  to  have  both  infantry  and  cavalry  charge  them.  Had  this 
been  done  the  results  might  have  been  very  serious. 

The  American  artillery  when  in  the  town  was  handled  as  cautiously  as 
possible.     For  example,  a  gun  would  be  loaded  and  leveled  behind  a 


NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XII,   PAGES  259-260         501 

corner,  drawn  out  by  ropes,  fired,  and  drawn  back  by  the  ropes  (French, 
Two  Wars,  66) .  Yet  even  in  a  case  of  this  kind  four  out  of  the  five  gunners  < 
were  killed.  Taylor  does  not  mention  the  presence  of  the  Fourth  In- 
fantry, Sept.  23,  but  U.  S.  Grant  does  (Mems.,  i,  115-6) ;  and  as  he  be- 
longed to  that  corps,  it  seems  hardly  possible  that  he  was  mistaken.  It 
had  been  so  much  reduced  the  day  before,  that  perhaps  Taylor  did  not 
think  it  worth  mention.  According  to  Taylor's  report  the  reason  for 
withdrawing  his  men  from  the  city  on  the  afternoon  of  Sept.  23  was  to 
prepare  for  a  general  assault.  But  considerable  time  would  have  been 
necessary  to  do  this  in  concert  with  Worth,  and  it  is  hard  to  see  why 
they  were  withdrawn  under  fire  when  they  were  doing  good  work  in  safety, 
and  night  was  not  far  distant.  Apparently  the  best  way  to  arrange  for 
such  concerted  operations  would  have  been  to  leave  these  troops  where 
they  were,  and  open  a  line  of  communication  through  the  northern  part 
of  the  city  (Ripley,  op.  cit.,  i,  264).  The  rumors  that  Mexican  forces 
were  approaching  by  the  Saltillo  road  were  correct,  but  Ampudia  sent 
them  an  order  to  retire.  They  were  not  strong  enough  to  accomplish 
anything. 

When  Worth  attacked  the  city,  Sept.  23,  his  right-hand  column,  headed 
by  Texan  riflemen,  dismounted,  under  Col.  Hays,  took  the  Calle  de  Mon- 
terey ;  the  left-hand  column,  headed  by  similar  troops  under  Lieut.  Col. 
Walker,  took  the  Calle  de  Iturbide.  Besides  the  Texans  and  the  field 
batteries,  the  Seventh  and  Eighth  Infantry  and  the  Artillery  Battalion 
joined  in  the  attack.  The  detachment  that  had  been  sent  up  the  Saltillo 
road  was  recalled  and  acted  as  a  reserve.  The  American  shells  thrown 
during  the  night  of  Sept.  23  seem  to  have  injured  nothing  except  Am- 
pudia's  courage.     Purisima  Bridge  was  about  2300  feet  from  the  cathedral. 

It  is  probably  true  that  Taylor's  operations  at  the  eastern  end  of  the 
town  and  the  disregard  of  life  exhibited  by  his  troops  tended  to  dismay 
Ampudia.  But  Taylor  had  no  reason  to  suppose  that  operations  so  badly 
planned,  so  ineffective  and  so  costly  would  have  that  effect ;  they  were 
wasteful;  and  they  demoralized  his  own  men.  The  Mexicans  fought  in 
most  cases  with  a  courage  and  tenacity  deserving  of  high  praise  (Henry, 
Camp.  Sketches,  209).  So  far  as  one  can  see,  nothing  saved  Taylor  from 
a  disaster  that  would  have  meant  the  ruin  of  his  army  but  the  poltroonery 
of  one  man,  Ampudia;  and  as  we  have  remarked,  he  had  no  reason  to 
expect  that.  The  head  of  Ampudia's  medical  service  reported,  Sept.  24, 
that  only  sixty  privates  had  been  seriously  wounded. 

11.  Ho.  4;  29,  2,  p.  78  (Taylor).  364Worth  to  S„  Oct.  2.  Garcia, 
Revolucion,  16.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  262-9.  Ampudia,  Manifiesto. 
Apuntes,  64.  13Pakenham,  no.  122,  1846.  Balbontfn,  Invasi6n,  50-2. 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  348  (Ampudia),  348  (Taylor),  349  (terms).  76Ampudia, 
Sept.  29.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Oct.  26;  Nov.  7.  Wash.  Union,  Jan.  18 
(Ampudia) ;  Feb.  18,  1847.  Niles,  Nov.  28,  p.  197.  Epoca,  Feb.  9,  1847 
(Ampudia).  .Observador  Zacatecano,  Dec.  27,  1846,  supplement  (Requena). 
Diario,  Oct.  2  (Ampudia).     Republicano,  May  28,  1847. 

Worth's  cannon  were  prevented  by  a  fog  from  opening  fire  early  Thurs- 
day morning.  Worth's  364reasons,  as  explained  privately  to  a  friend,  for 
giving  liberal  terms  were :  (1)  Owing  to  the  feelings  of  the  Texans  and 
resentment  occasioned  by  the  American  losses  in  the  battle,  an  assault 
would  have  been  attended  with  the  slaughter  of  many  women ;  (2)  The 
numbers  and  the  position  of  the  Mexicans  rendered  them  formidable; 
(3)  "Neither  myself  nor  many  others  had  the  slightest  confidence  in  the 


502  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XII,   PAGE  260 

intelligence  that  directed"  the  American  operations;  (4)  Our  government 
wanted  peace.  The  Mexicans  were  allowed  twenty-one  rounds  for  their 
battery. 

The  principal  excuses  alleged  by  Ampudia  for  surrendering  were  the 
failure  to  injure  the  Americans  on  their  march,  the  lack  of  the  Fourth 
Brigade,  a  want  of  funds,  provisions  and  artillery  ammunition,  the  in- 
efficiency and  cowardice  of  a  part  of  his  army,  the  hostility  of  the  superior 
officers,  and  their  failure  to  support  him.  According  to  a  Mexican  letter 
from  S.  Luis  Potosi  dated  October  3,  1846,  the  loss  of  the  city  was  attrib- 
uted wholly  to  his  cowardice.  A  number  of  his  chief  officers  appear  to 
have  been  no  more  courageous  than  he,  but  the  decision  did  not  rest  with 
them.  Perhaps  he  thought  it  necessary  to  save  the  one  veteran  army  of 
Mexico,  but  a  successful  or  even  heroic  defence  of  Monterey  would  have 
probably  been  more  beneficial  to  his  cause.  There  were  provisions  enough 
and  a  large  stock  of  ammunition ;  but  we  are  not  sure  that  his  supply  of 
artillery  ammunition  was  adequate.  The  commission  consisted  of  Worth, 
Henderson,  J.  Davis,  Requena,  Ortega,  Llano.  The  Mexicans  actually 
carried  away  three  12-pounders  and  three  8-pounders  (Requena).  The 
British  minister  at  Washington  reported:  The  armistice  seems  to  be  "in 
direct  opposition  to  the  rule  laid  down  in  Mr.  Buchanan's  letter  to  Commo- 
dore Conner  of  the  27th  July"  [Sen.  107;  29,  2,  p.  3],  by  which  it  was 
determined  that  no  armistice  should  be  agreed  to  until  a  treaty  of  peace 
should  have  been  actually  concluded  (13Pakenham,  no.  122,  Oct.  16, 
1846).  San  Fernando  de  Presas  was  east  of  Linares  near  the  Gulf.  See 
note  12. 

12.  Polk,  Diary,  Oct.  11,  12.  Ho.  4 ;  29,  2,  pp.  79  (Taylor),  106  (Worth). 
(Instructions)  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  323,  333,  355  (Marcy).  Henshaw  narra- 
tive. Nunelee,  diary.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  62.  364Worth  to  S., 
Oct.  2.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  138.  Taylor,  Letter  to  Gaines.  Pennsyl- 
vanian,  Nov.  2  (Peyton).  139W.  B.  to  D.  Campbell,  Nov.  2.  Robert- 
son, Remins.,  157.  13Pakenham,  no.  127,  1846  (Taylor's  ammunition 
would  not  have  lasted  many  hours  longer).  Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  p.  316 
(Clayton). 

Worth:  Twiggs's  division  and  the  volunteers  "were  taken  into  action 
without  order,  direction,  support,  or  command;  in  fact  murdered"  (364to 
S.,  Oct.  2).  Col.  Campbell:  Taylor  showed  little  generalship  in  the 
handling  of  my  regiment ;  took  too  great  a  risk  in  coming  to  Monterey 
without  more  transportation  (139to  D.  Campbell,  Sept.  28;  Nov.  9). 
Capt.  Cheatham  (Campbell's  regiment):  "I  consider,  that  old  Taylor 
committed  one  of  the  greatest  blunders  that  ever  a  General  was  guilty 
of,  in  coming  here  to  attack  one  of  the  strongest  fortified  towns  in  Mexico, 
with  nothing  in  the  world  but  small  Artillery,  for  open  field  fighting  "  (  50to 
son,  Oct.  6).  Id. :  "We  were  rushed  headlong  into  the  fight  and  our 
Generals  did  not  know  where  we  were  going"  (150to  sister,  Oct.  16). 
Capt.  Henry  (Garland's  brigade) :  "I  look  upon  the  exposure  of  the  field 
artillery  in  the  streets  as  perfectly  useless"  (Spirit  of  the  Times,  Nov.  7). 
Capt.  Backus  (Garland's  brigade)  :  The  Third  and  Fourth  Infantry  were 
"entirely  inadequate  to  the  duty  required"  of  them;  "this  hazardous 
and  useless  enterprize"  (Hist.  Mag.,  x,  212).  Baltimore  Captain  :  Sept.  21 
I  was  under  first  one  general  and  then  another  till  I  and  my  men  "became 
completely  worn  out"  (Picayune,  Nov.  7).  Engineer  Stevens  :  The  eastern 
attack  was  marked  by  rash  and  headlong  movements  ;  the  mortar,  instead 
of  being  sent  to  Worth,  should  have  been  placed  in  Teneria  redoubt ; 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XII,   PAGE  260  503 

Taylor  should  not  have  withdrawn  his  troops  on  Wednesday,  etc.  (Cam- 
paigns, 27).  Officer  :  Garland's  charge  a  fatal  mistake  (Bait.  Sun,  Nov.  6). 
Officer:  The  eastern  attack  very  injudicious  (Nat.  Intelligencer,  Nov.  20). 
Lieut.  Hamilton  (West  Pointer)  :  The  officers  who  fell  at  the  east  end 
were  "a  sacrifice  to  the  blind  folly  and  ignorance  of  our  general-in-chief  " 
(Metrop.  Mag.,  Dec,  1907,  p.  321).  C.  M.  Wilcox,  who  arrived  at  Mon- 
terey not  long  after  the  battle:  "Harsh  and  unfavorable  criticism"  of 
the  operations  at  the  east  end  was  " universal"  there  (Mex.  War,  120). 
Robertson  :  The  lack  of  a  siege  train  was  due  to  Taylor's  misunderstanding 
the  intentions  of  the  enemy;  the  cannon  could  easily  have  been  trans- 
ported (Remins.,  129,  160).  Smith:  Only  Ampudia's  personal  unfitness 
saved  Taylor  from  deserved  ruin  (Remins.,  18).  Monterey  letter,  Oct.  11 : 
6-pounders  were  sent  to  batter  down  fortifications  that  24-pounders  would 
not  have  affected.  Gen.  Requena,  probably  the  best  Mexican  officer: 
Worth  made  the  real  attack;  Taylor  blundered  (Observador  Zacatecano, 
Dec.  27,  supplem.).  G.  Ferry:  Prudence  forbade  Taylor,  in  view  of  the 
too  evident  discouragement  of  his  army,  to  press  his  advantage ;  by 
negotiating  he  changed  almost  certain  defeat  into  victory  (Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  Aug.  1,  1847,  410).  An  editorial  in  Niles'  Register  of  July  18, 
1846,  is  curiously  interesting:  "Owing  to  an  error  in  estimating  the  ca- 
pacities of  the  enemy"  Taylor  "made  a  narrow  escape  from  almost  utter 
annihilation"  in  May.  "One  lesson  of  this  kind,  we  venture  to  predict, 
will  be  a  sufficient  admonition  to"  Taylor.  .  .  .  "He  will  be  cautious  to 
keep  his  troops  within  reach  of  supplies,  and  to  have  at  hand  the  means 
of  transportation."     The  editor  proved  to  be  mistaken  in  every  point. 

One  of  Taylor's  excuses  for  the  terms  was  consideration  for  the  non- 
combatants  (169to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9),  and  it  may.  have  counted  for  some- 
thing ;  but  he  had  just  refused  these  non-combatants  permission  to  leave 
the  town  (Ho.  4;  29,  2,  p.  78).  Another  (ibid.)  was  the  propinquity  of 
the  citadel,  and  the  impossibility  of  taking  it  without  a  siege  of  twenty 
or  thirty  days  or  else  a  large  expenditure  of  life ;  but  the  citadel  had  not 
been  able  to  injure  the  Americans  materially  while  they  were  fighting  in 
the  town,  and  could  not  injure  them  at  all  in  Walnut  Grove ;  and,  as 
Taylor  admitted  that  he  would  hardly  be  able  to  advance  for  six  weeks 
(Bixby  coll.,  62),  there  was  no  lack  of  time.  In  point  of  fact,  as  could 
easily  have  been  surmised,  the  citadel  had  neither  water  nor  provisions 
enough  to  stand  a  siege  (Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  46). 

The  gallant  defence  of  the  city  was  another  excuse  (Ho.  4 ;  29,  2,  p.  79 ; 
Bixby  coll.,  61) ;  but  while  that  is  a  just  reason  for  doing  honor  to  a 
garrison,  it  is  none  for  relinquishing  the  substantial  fruits  of  a  dearly 
bought  victory.  It  would  have  cost  the  lives  of  fifty  or  one  hundred 
soldiers,  besides  the  wounded,  to  take  the  city  by  storm,  said  Taylor 
(169to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9).  But  this  would  have  been  a  low  price  for 
the  elimination  of  an  army  that  he  said  was  rated  at  7200  besides  2000 
irregulars  (Bixby  coll.,  61)  —  the  only  army  possessed  by  Mexico  — 
with  its  arms,  accoutrements,  artillery  and  horses.  The  moral  effect 
of  such  a  victory  would  probably,  in  the  unanimous  opinion  of  Polk  and 
his  Cabinet  (Polk,  Diary,  Oct.  12),  have  ended  the  war ;  and  the  desperate 
fury  displayed  by  Santa  Anna  when  he  supposed  that  such  had  been  the 
outcome  (52Black,  Sept.  26 ;  76S.  Anna,  Sept.  29)  tends  to  support  this 
view.  The  Mexicans  could  have  escaped,  "done  what  we  might,"  Taylor 
urged  (cf.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  359).  But  if  he  could  have  captured  the  city  so 
easily,  entrenched  as  the  garrison  were  in  the  strong  buildings  near  the 


504  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XII,   PAGE  260 

main  plaza,  he  could  certainly  have  scattered  them  and  captured  a  large 
number,  had  they  attempted  to  flee  with  artillery,  ammunition  and 
provisions  through  those  narrow  streets  commanded  by  low,  flat  houses ; 
and  indeed  no  road  available  for  artillery  crossed  the  mountains  except 
the  one  (held  by  Worth)  through  Rinconada  Pass.  Ampudia  wrote  to 
his  government  that  even  if  he  could  have  cut  his  way  out,  his  forces 
would  have  been  dispersed  and  his  military  material  captured  (Sept.  25). 
(Taylor  seems  to  have  taken  no  steps  to  prevent  the  Mexicans  from  es- 
caping during  the  night  of  the  twenty-fourth,  though  their  protracting  the 
negotiations  until  late  in  the  day  might  have  suggested  a  design  to  do  this.) 

But,  suggested  Taylor,  magnanimous  terms  were  favorable  to  peace 
(Bixby  coll.,  61).  On  the  other  hand  the  United  States  had  used  in 
vain  with  Mexico  every  method  except  hostilities ;  our  national  authori- 
ties had  now  instructed  him  to  try  vigorous  warfare  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  324) ; 
and  it  was  for  them  to  say  whether  this  deliberately  adopted  policy  should 
—  on  a  political  ground  —  be  abandoned.  To  meet  this  obvious  view 
the  General  said  that  a  change  of  regime  had  occurred  at  Mexico  since 
the  date  of  his  orders.  That  was  true ;  but  it  would  be  singular  indeed 
if  a  political  change  in  the  enemy's  country  —  of  which  nothing  definite 
was  heard  except  from  an  enemy  notorious  for  subterfuges  —  could  au- 
thorize a  general  in  the  field  to  violate  his  instructions.  Taylor  himself 
stated  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  360)  that  his  " grand  motive"  in  advancing 
from  the  Rio  Grande  was  "to  increase  the  inducements  of  the  Mexican 
government  to  negotiate  for  peace"  — i.e.  by  showing  that  otherwise  it 
would  suffer  the  rigors  of  war;  how  then  could  he  believe  that  acting 
gently  and  indulgently  would  have  the  desired  effect? 

Finally,  and  upon  this  aspect  of  the  matter  Taylor  laid  great  stress 
(Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  360),  Ampudia  stated  that  his  government  was  now 
favorable  to  peace.  But  Ampudia  transmitted  no  official  proposition, 
could  present  no  evidence ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  a  shrewd 
American  like  Taylor  can  have  taken  this  argument  seriously.  Taylor 
seems  to  have  had  no  respect  for  the  Mexicans,  and  therefore  had  no  con- 
fidence in  them  ;  and  what  he  must  have  heard  about  Ampudia  was  calcu- 
lated to  make  him  distrust  that  man  peculiarly.  Besides,  Scott's  letters 
of  June  12  and  15  had  intimated  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  326,  328)  that  he 
was  not  to  grant  even  a  short  armistice  unless  met  with  a  definite  formal 
offer  of  the  Mexicans  to  treat ;  and  on  July  27  Marcy  instructed  Taylor 
to  pursue,  under  similar  circumstances,  the  course  recommended  at  that 
time  to  Conner  (Sen.  107 ;  29,  2,  p.  3)  —  i.e.  not  to  grant  an  armistice 
even  should  the  Mexican  government  consent  to  negotiate  (256to  Taylor, 
confid.).  If  a  knowledge  of  Mackenzie's  negotiations  with  Santa  Anna 
was  enough  to  justify  Taylor  for  violating  such  instructions,  he  should 
not  have  attacked  Monterey.  Moreover,  he  did  not  consider  the  govern- 
ment of  Mexico  stable  enough  to  treat  with  (169to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9). 
Taylor  defended  the  armistice  on  the  ground  also  that  he  needed  time  to 
bring  up  cannon,  ammunition  and  provisions  (169to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9) ; 
but  had  he  captured  or  dispersed  the  Mexican  army  he  would  have  had 
time,  cannon,  ammunition  and  provisions  enough.  Col.  Davis  and 
Taylor  also  argued  that  the  explosion  of  the  cathedral  by  an  American 
shell  would  have  caused  great  loss  of  life  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  359) ;  but  if 
Taylor  knew  the  cathedral  was  liable  to  explode,  this  was  a  reason  for 
pressing  unconditional  surrender  upon  Ampudia,  since  the  Mexicans 
would  have  been  the  principal  sufferers. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XII,   PAGE  260  505 

All  the  arguments  put  forth  in  Taylor's  despatches  to  the  government 
were  formally  pronounced  unsatisfactory  by  Polk  and  the  Cabinet  (Polk, 
Diary,  Oct.  12),  since  the  terms  made  it  possible  for  a  Mexican  army, 
which  Taylor  said  he  could  have  beaten  completely  without  severe  loss, 
to  reorganize  and  make  another  stand.  The  simple  facts  were  that,  in 
order  to  escape  from  the  blame  due  to  his  inefficiency,  Taylor  advanced 
from  Camargo  with  an  inadequate  expedition,  and,  when  the  result  con- 
victed him  of  bad  judgment,  endeavored  to  excuse  himself  without  letting 
the  truth  be  known. 

A  particularly  imprudent  point  in  the  terms  was  that  they  did  not 
require  the  Mexicans  to  retire  well  beyond  Rinconada  Pass.  It  was  left 
possible  for  them  to  fortify  the  pass,  which  was  supposed  to  be  impregnable 
or  almost  so,  and  thus  make  an  advance  from  Monterey  to  Saltillo  costly, 
if  not  impracticable.  Taylor's  course  in  this  matter  was  not  due  to  an 
expectation  that  Wool's  column  (chap,  xiii)  would  render  Rinconada  Pass 
untenable,  for  he  wrote  on  Oct.  15  that  it  formed  "no  element"  in  his 
calculations  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  351).  There  was  another  singular  over- 
sight. Taylor  argued  in  favor  of  the  armistice  that  it  bound  the  hands 
of  the  Mexicans  during  the  time  needed  by  him  for  preparations  to  ad- 
vance (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  359)  ;  but  in  fact,  since  either  government  could 
disallow  the  armistice  and  the  Mexican  authorities  were  within  easy  reach, 
its  terms  bound  him  for  six  weeks  but  bound  them  for  only,  say,  a  fort- 
night or,  as  he  admitted  (Bixby  coll.,  62),  twenty  days.  Scott  said 
privately  —  and  one  can  easily  believe  him  —  that  only  Taylor's  popu- 
larity saved  him  from  removal  at  this  time  (169to  Crittenden,  Oct.  19). 

When  Monterey  yielded,  according  to  Taylor,  his  provisions  were  suffi- 
cient for  "not  more"  than  ten  days;  but  Worth  had  written  privately 
on  Sept.  16  (four  days  after  the  advance  from  Cerralvo  began)  that  the 
army  had  provisions  then  for  only  about  ten  days  (364to  81).  According 
to  the  Washington  correspondent  of  the  Boston  Atlas  (Feb.  8,  1847) 
Clayton  stated  in  the  Senate,  February  3,  1847,  that  Taylor  had  provi- 
sions for  but  three  days  when  Monterey  fell.  A  letter,  probably  from 
Gen.  P.  F.  Smith,  said  that  the  provisions  would  have  lasted  only  through 
Sept.  26,  and  that  during  the  engagement  Taylor  had  to  send  to  Cerralvo 
for  supplies,  of  which  a  sufficient  quantity  could  scarcely  have  arrived  in 
time  (LitteWs  Living  Age,  no.  141,  p.  191).  Col.  Davis  stated  later  that 
the  hope  of  supplies,  when  Monterey  yielded,  rested  on  the  return  of  the 
mule-teams  already  despatched  north  for  this  purpose  (  73Address). 
Col.  Campbell  wrote  privately  that  on  the  morning  of  Sept.  21  Taylor's 
supply  of  ammunition  was  very  limited  and  the  supply  of  provisions  still 
more  so  (139to  D.  C,  Nov.  2). 

The  loss  of  men  that  Taylor  admitted  was  488  killed  and  wounded  (later 
487  :  Ho.  24 ;  31, 1),  but  it  must  have  been  considerably  more.  Lieut.  Hill 
said  in  his  diary  that  the  losses  would  never  be  revealed ;  but  the  inaccuracy 
of  the  official  statement  is  evident.  A  writer  quoted  in  Niles,  Nov.  7,  1846, 
p.  148,  said  it  was  "generally  supposed"  at  Washington  that  Taylor  might 
have  lost  more  than  1000.  A  South  Carolina  officer,  who  must  have  had 
many  opportunities  to  talk  with  men  who  had  been  at  Monterey,  gave  the 
loss  as  about  950  (Cowan,  Cond.  Hist.,  7).  Kendall,  editor  of  the  New 
Orleans  Picayune,  who  was  on  the  ground,  wrote  that  about  300  (including 
wounded  men  finished  by  the  Mexicans)  were  killed  or  mortally  wounded. 
Haile,  a  trustworthy  correspondent  of  the  same  paper,  expressed  the  same 
opinion.     A  letter  in  Niles,  Oct.  17,  1846,  p.  104  gives  nearly  the  same 


506         NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XII,   PAGES  260-262 

figures.  A  Tennessee  captain  reported  the  number  of  killed  as  200.  To 
look  at  the  matter  more  in  detail,  Meade  (Letters,  i,  165)  wrote  that  Gar- 
land lost  some  265  killed  and  wounded.  Butler  admitted  his  own  division 
lost  about  250.  A.  S.  Johnston  (Johnston,  Johnston,  138)  wrote  that  its 
loss  was  " perhaps  many  more"  than  that.  Bliss  admitted  that  it  lost  225, 
killed,  wounded  and  missing,  on  Sept.  21  alone  (McCall,  Letters,  461). 
Worth's  loss  seems  to  have  been  about  70.  The  Texas  division  lost  not 
less  than  27  (Ho.  24;  31,  1).  Here  we  get  at  least  612.  But  Garland 
did  not  have  the  Fourth  Infantry  (303  officers  and  men),  which  Bliss 
stated  was  "almost  destroyed"  (McCall,  Letters,  461).  This  must  mean 
a  loss  (killed  and  wounded)  of  at  least  one  half;  yet  the  official  return 
was  36  (Ho.  24;   31,  1). 

Taylor  began  the  fighting  with  nearly  250  sick,  and  after  three  such 
days  of  excitement,  fatigue  and  hardship,  this  number  was  probably 
quite  400.  The  guard  at  the  camp  —  one  company  from  each  infantry 
regiment  —  probably  amounted  to  at  least  300,  and,  as  some  Mexican 
cavalry  were  looking  for  a  chance  to  strike  there,  could  not  safely  be  re- 
duced. A  considerable  number  of  men  were  needed  to  hold  the  captured 
forts,  escort  supplies  of  provisions  and  ammunition  and  perform  other 
special  services.  If  we  call  Taylor's  loss  800,  deduct  350  for  the  sick 
and  allow  400  for  guards  and  others  detached  on  duty,  we  have  about 
4650  tired  and  considerably  demoralized  men  (many  of  them  horse  and 
many  without  bayonets)  as  perhaps  available  for  an  assault. 

The  simple  fact  that  Taylor  himself  believed  he  could  not,  in  less  than 
about  six  weeks  (Bixby  coll.,  62),  be  in  a  condition  to  resume  his  advance, 
indicated  what  his  situation  now  was.  Finally,  it  should  be  mentioned, 
he  entertained  still  the  false  idea  of  strategy  shown  at  Matamoros.  He 
only  cared  to  get  Monterey,  he  said,  for  he  could  beat  the  Mexicans  at 
any  time  (Coleman,  Crittenden,  309).  The  fact  that  it  would  cost  the 
lives  of  soldiers  to  beat  the  Mexicans  did  not  appear  to  signify. 

13.  147Chamberlain,  diary.  Ho.  4 ;  29,  2,  pp.  82  (Taylor),  106  (Worth). 
169Scott  to  Crittenden,  Oct.  19,  Delta,  Feb.  14,  1847.  169Peyton  to 
Crittenden,  Oct.  2.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  117-8.  Welles  papers.  Griffis, 
Perry,  218.  Smith,  Chile  con  Carne,  97.  Lane,  Adventures,  42.  Spirit 
of  the  Times,  Nov.  7.     (Hardly)  Ripley,  War,  268-9.     76Ampudia,  Sept.  28. 

As  Welles  remarked,  the  people  took  delight  in  thinking  and  talking 
about  the  details  of  the  fight.  The  capture  of  Monterey  had  no  strategic 
bearing  on  the  aim  of  the  war  (Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  412).  The  demonstration 
of  our  fighting  ability  (which,  however,  had  already  been  proved)  had  a 
moral  value ;  but  one  may  well  question  whether  this  was  not  fully  offset 
by  the  blundering  of  Taylor  and  other  officers,  our  losses  and  the  terms 
granted  to  Ampudia.  Many  of  superior  intelligence  in  the  United  States 
criticised  Taylor  sharply. 

XIII.   SALTILLO,   PARRAS,   TAMPICO 

1.  Probably  he  did  not  include  Wool's  troops.  A  Mexican  reported 
that  on  Oct.  14  Taylor  had  not  over  4000  in  camp  near  Monterey,  600 
regulars  in  that  city  and  1080  men  in  the  hospitals  there,  and  that  600 
volunteers,  who  had  arrived  Oct.  15,  marched  with  400  from  the  camp  to 
other  points.  According  to  Gen.  Patterson,  commanding,  there  were 
in  the  Camargo  region,  Oct.  8,  about  7000  effectives,  but  by  Oct.  31  these 
numbered  only  5700,  viz.,  Second  Dragoons,  150 ;    Second  Infantry  and 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XIII,   PAGES  262-264         507 

Mounted  Rifles,  500 ;  Kentucky  horse,  450 ;  Tennessee  horse,  450 ; 
Second  Kentucky,  400 ;  Second  Ohio,  500 ;  First  Indiana,  550 ;  Second 
Indiana,  600 ;  Third  Indiana,  650 ;  Second  Tennessee,  350 ;  Alabama, 
400;  Third  Illinois,  370;  Fourth  Illinois,  330.  The  Mounted  Rifles 
were  classed  as  cavalry,  but  had  no  horses.  Nov.  10  the  sick  at  Camargo 
numbered  1400  or  1500,  said  a  letter.  Below  Camargo  there  were  troops 
now  at  Reynosa,  Matamoros,  Camp  Belknap,  mouth  of  the  river,  Point 
Isabel  and  Brazos  Island.  Nov.  2  Capt.  W.  S.  Henry,  a  very  good 
regular  officer,  doubted  whether  Taylor  had  more  than  10,000  effectives 
(Camp.  Sketches,  239).     The  returns  showed  only  13,000,   he  said. 

2.  It  was  stated,  Dec.  1,  that  fully  120  had  deserted.  (Priests)  Henry, 
Camp.  Sketches,  240;  Roberts,  diary,  Nov.  27.  The  Mexican  govern- 
ment went  so  far  as  to  pay  the  expense  of  sending  a  British  subject  named 
Sinnott  to  the  north  for  the  express  purpose  of  seducing  Taylor's  Irish 
(Roman  Catholic)  soldiers  (76Sinnott,  Oct.  12 ;  76Guerra  to  Santa  Anna, 
Dec.  5;   76to  Hacienda,  Dec.  2;   76S.  Anna,  Jan.  1,  1847). 

3.  61July  21,  1846,  Patterson  wrote  to  the  war  department  that  he 
was  born  in  Ireland  and  entered  the  army  as  a  first  lieutenant  in  1813. 
He  was  then  hardly  more  than  a  boy.  Apparently  he  did  not  see  much 
service.     Later  he  became  rather  active  in  the  Philadelphia  militia. 

4.  Taylor  protested  twice,  and  demanded  that  his  subordinates  should 
be  compelled  "to  keep  in  their  proper  places."  Due  retribution  soon 
followed.  He  sent  an  order  to  Col.  Baker,  one  of  Patterson's  officers, 
upon  which  that  general  demanded  sharply  that  correspondence  with 
his  subordinates  should  go  by  the  usual  channel  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  381, 
384).  Nov.  5  Taylor  wrote  a  long  and  studied  letter  to  Gen.  Gaines, 
defending  himself  and  attacking  the  administration,  and  this  was  pub- 
lished in  the  N.  Y.  Herald,  Jan.  24,  1847.  Evidently  it  was  not  a  mere 
bit  of  friendly  correspondence.  To  many  it  seemed  to  be  the  opening 
gun  of  a  Presidential  campaign,  and  certainly  it  was  improper,  for  the 
writer  presented  information  and  opinions  about  the  American  military 
operations,  and  said  that  success  would  be  worth  little  to  the  United 
States  —  a  view  evidently  calculated  to  discourage  the  Americans  and 
stimulate  the  enemy.  Taylor  was  neatly  punished  for  this  imprudence 
by  a  public  revival  of  paragraph  650  of  the  army  regulations  of  March  1, 
1825,  which  forbade  private  letters  or  reports  from  officers  regarding 
military  operations.  Doubtless  Polk  was  to  a  large  extent  right  in  be- 
lieving that  Taylor  was  now  in  the  hands  of  political  tutors,  and  he  re- 
garded him  as  "a  vindictive  and  ignorant  political  partisan."  See  Marcy 
to  Taylor,  Jan.  27,  1847,  and  reply  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  391,  809) ;  108Marcy 
to  Bancroft,  April  28;  256/d.  to  Wetmore,  Apr.  25;  adj.  gen.,  gen.  orders 
3,  1847 ;  Polk,  Diary,  Jan.  25-7  ;  Phila.  Pub.  Ledger,  Jan.  26-7 ;  Ho.  37 ; 
30,  1. 

5.  A  pleasanter  outcome  of  the  correspondence  was  the  release  of  seven 
American  and  a  number  of  Mexican  prisoners. 

6.  Preliminary  incidents.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  424  (Wool);  341,  344, 
355,  367,  369,  391  (Marcy);  472-3  (Jones);  635  (Jesup) ;  325,  1270 
(Scott) ;  682  (Whiting) ;  386,  439,  442  (S.  Anna) ;  350-1,  358,  361,  381, 
424,  437-40,  444,  526,  809  (Taylor);  384  (Patterson).  69Patterson  to 
Marcy,  Oct.  8 ;  to  Bliss,  Oct.  8,  31 ;  Nov.  23.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  145-6, 
152.  Morning  News,  New  London,  Conn.,  Dec.  10.  Henry,  Camp. 
Sketches,  240.  307Roberts,  diary,  Nov.  27.  69Wool  to  Bliss,  Nov.  2. 
69Riley  to  Bliss,  Dec.  14,  1846.     Niles,  Jan.  9,  1847,  p.  290.     65Patterson, 


508        NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XIII,   PAGES  264-267 

orders  1,  6,  Sept.  5,  29.  169Scott  to  Taylor,  Sept.  26.  169Taylor  to 
Crittenden,  Jan.  26,  1847.  Sen.  32;  31,  1  (Hughes).  Wash.  Union, 
Sept.  26.     Polk,  Diary,  May  14;    Sept.  19-22,  24,  26;    Oct.  12,  13,  20; 

Nov.  21.     69Patterson  to  Marcy,  Oct.  8.     234A.  Johnson  to ,  Dec.  2. 

Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  273-4.  Marcy,  report  in  Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  45. 
Eyewitness,  Complete  Hist.,  48.  205Graham,  mem.  book.  Diario, 
Nov.  14,  29 ;  Dec.  15.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  178.  65/d.,  gen.  orders, 
no.  139,  Nov.  8.  69Gonzalez,  Sept.  — .  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  346,  354, 
356.  Also  the  following  from  76  :  Comte.  gen.  Oaxaca,  Dec.  3.  Circular, 
Nov.  28.  S.  Anna  to  Taylor,  Dec.  17.  S.  Anna,  Nov.  28;  Dec.  12. 
Sinnott,  Oct.  12.  Ord6fiez  to  Worth,  Nov.  12 ;  to  P.  F.  Smith,  Nov.  20, 
Worth  to  Ord6fiez,  Nov.  12.  Smith  to  O.,  Nov.  20.  Ampudia,  Oct.  4. 
J.  F.  Rada,  Oct.  17.  Parrodi,  Sept.  16.  Worth  to  alcalde,  Nov.  5.  On 
the  origin  of  the  proposed  Tamaulipas  expedition  see  chap,  xxvii,  note  4. 

7.  Lieut.  Mackall's  battery,  the  Seventh  Infantry,  and  one  company  of 
the  Artillery  Battalion  were  left  at  Monterey  under  P.  F.  Smith. 

8.  The  maguey  (agave  Americana)  is  the  century  plant,  and  produces 
the  liquid  known  as  pulque  which,  after  it  ferments,  is  about  as  intoxicat- 
ing as  beer,  and  is  consumed  liberally  by  the  common  people  of  Mexico. 
The  stiff,  thick,  wide-spreading  leaves  are  protected  with  thorns. 

9.  The  governor  expected  a  reply,  and  on  finding  that  none  was  to  be 
made  he  retired  to  Parras. 

10.  The  occupation  of  Saltillo.  65Gen.  orders  139.  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
pp.  361,  374,  377,  436,  543,  545  (Taylor) ;  362-3  (Marcy) ;  378  (Aguirre). 
Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  45.  364Worth  to  S.,  Nov.  20.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby), 
71.  267Memo.  (probably  from  Major  Smith).  Meade,  Letters,  i,  144, 
152,  155,  157-8.  Wilhelm,  8th  Inf.,  ii,  295-9.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  24. 
Apuntes,  65.  Sen.  32;  31,  1,  p.  59.  Calendario  de  Ontiveros,  1847. 
69 Worth  to  Arnold  and  Deas,  Nov.  19.  Smith,  Chile  con  Came,  175, 
192,  195.  Henry,  Campaign  Sketches,  245.  Smith,  To  Mexico,  77. 
Eyewitness,  Complete  History,  48.  299Posey  to  Gordon,  Feb.  19,  1847. 
The  following  are  from  76.  S.  Anna  to  Ampudia,  Sept.  30.  S.  Anna, 
Sept.  29;  Oct.  3;  Nov.  21.  Gonzalez,  Nov.  19.  Id.  to  R.  Vazquez, 
Saltillo,  Nov.  16 ;  to  S.  Anna,  Nov.  21 ;  to  Mejia,  May  27.  Mejia,  June  9. 
Id.  to  Ampudia,  Aug.  31.  Worth  to  alcalde,  Nov.  17.  Memo.,  dated 
Nov.  22,  of  a  conference  with  Taylor.  Wool's  advance  may  have  helped 
to  cause  Ampudia's  abandonment  of  Rinconada  Pass.  The  distance  from 
Monterey  to  Saltillo  by  the  railroad  is  about  68  miles,  and  that  by  road 
must  be  about  the  same.     (Marcy,  Oct.  22)  see  p.  350. 

11.  The  celebrated  military  writer,  Clausewitz,  on  whose  work  our 
present  views  of  strategy  are  principally  founded,  recognized  two  distinct 
kinds  of  war:  that  aiming  to  overthrow  the  enemy's  forces,  and  that 
aiming  to  make  conquests  on  the  frontier,  either  to  be  held  permanently 
or  to  be  used  in  exchanges  on  the  settlement  of  peace  (Clausewitz,  Vom 
Kriege,  nachricht,  par.  1;  Donat,  Strat.  Science,  112).  Polk  aimed  to 
accomplish  both  ends  by  having  the  main  army  bring  Mexico  to  terms, 
and  at  the  same  time  taking  possession  of  territory ;  but  he  did  not  apply 
the  principle  understandingly.  He  overrated  the  influence  that  the 
occupation  of  the  northern  provinces  would  have  on  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment ;  he  thought  peace  was  near  at  hand,  and  was  figuring  on  the  terms 
of  a  treaty  when  he  should  have  been  taking  steps  to  bring  Mexico  speedily 
to  the  point  of  making  a  treaty ;  and  he  ordered  this  expedition  without 
knowing  the  conditions  under  which  it  would  have  to  be  conducted  in 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XIII,   PAGES  267-274        509 

Mexico,  and  without  asking  proper  expert  advice.  The  occupation  of 
the  frontier  provinces  would  have  been  sagacious  had  it  been  part  of  a 
strong  coercive  military  policy.  Quotation  at  the  end  of  the  second 
paragraph  :   Meade,  Letters,  i,  152. 

12.  La  Vaca,  now  Port  Lavaca,  is  on  Matagorda  Bay. 

13.  In  view  of  the  Mexican  charge  that  the  Americans  incited  the 
Indians  to  ravage  the  southern  side  of  the  border,  it  should  be  mentioned 
that  not  only  Taylor,  but  Wool,  exerted  himself  to  prevent  such  raids 
(Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  425). 

14.  Harney  committed  a  further  impropriety  by  raising  a  company  of 
Indians  for  the  U.  S.  service.  It  was  not  our  policy  to  employ  Indian 
troops. 

15.  The  author's  description  of  Wool  is  based  largely  on  the  147diary 
and  148recollections  of  Gen.  S.  E.  Chamberlain,  who  served  as  his  orderly 
for  a  time  in  the  Mexican  War ;  also  on  257Hughes  to  Markoe,  Dec.  13, 
1847;  Niles,  May  8,  1847,  p.  156;  BlHorton,  Dec.  3;  Sen.  32;  31,  1 
(Hughes) ;  37lMitchell,  statement ;  316Bragg  to  Sherman,  March  1, 
1848.  Wool  was  a  spare  man  of  medium  height,  light  complexion  and 
brown  hair.     His  manner  was  reserved  and  gentlemanly. 

16.  Buhoup  says  this  section  set  out  with  1244  effectives.  Wool  soon 
joined  it  with  144  men.  At  the  Rio  Grande,  Oct.  12,  eight  companies 
(aggregate,  574)  of  the  First  Illinois  came  up.  The  second  section  (not 
over  1200)  did  not  leave  San  Antonio  until  Oct.  14,  and  some  of  the  men 
were  detained  there  still  longer.  The  whole  force  consisted  of  Washing- 
ton's six-gun  battery,  to  which  were  attached  two  small  guns  taken  by 
the  Texans  from  the  Mexicans  years  before  and  destined  to  be  lost  at 
Buena  Vista  and  recovered  at  Contreras ;  a  squadron  of  the  First  Dra- 
goons, a  squadron  of  the  Second  Dragoons,  a  regiment  of  Arkansas 
horse,  three  companies  of  the  Sixth  Infantry,  one  company  of  Kentucky 
foot  and  the  First  and  Second  Illinois  regiments.  The  aggregate  was 
given  by  Capt.  Hughes  of  the  Topog.  Engineers  as  3400,  of  whom  about 
600  were  regulars.  Wool's  route  to  Monclova  was  in  general  that  of  the 
So.  Pacific  and  Mexican  International  railroads. 

17.  Shields,  Irish  by  birth,  practised  law  in  Illinois,  became  a  judge  of 
the  state  supreme  court  and  was  then  appointed  commissioner  of  the 
General  Land  Office,  Washington.  He  became  discontented  under  Wool's 
command,  and  sent  Davis,  his  aide,  to  Washington  in  the  hope  of  obtain- 
ing command  of  the  Illinois  regiments  or  possibly  of  displacing  Wool. 

18.  Frequently  not  all  of  the  troops  arrived  at  a  place  on  the  same  date. 

19.  Possibly  news  of  the  restoration  of  the  constitution  had  reached 
Monclova  but  not  Santa  Rosa. 

20.  The  authorities  of  Monclova  stated  that  Wool  kept  every  pledge, 
and  they  complained  only  that  the  Americans  ate  up  provisions  needed 
for  the  people.  The  officers  who  criticised  Wool  most  appear  to  have 
been  Shields,  who  —  besides  being  notably  egotistical  (111.  State  Hist. 
Soc.  Trans.,  ix,  pp.  36-8)  —  had  been  appointed  by  Polk  on  a  confidential 
basis  (Davis,  Autobiog.,  96)  and  therefore  felt  entitled  to  be  ambitious; 
Harney,  whose  characteristics  have  been  explained ;  Bonneville,  who ' 
proved  himself  later  incompetent  or  worse;  and  Yell,  whose  men  were 
soon  to  disgrace  themselves  at  Buena  Vista  in  consequence  of  lacking 
discipline.  Nov.  10  Taylor  issued  orders  detaching  Shields  and  Harney 
from  Wool's  command  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  542).  This  change  doubtless 
tended  to   promote   harmony.     In   December  Harney  brought  charges 


510         NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XIII,  PAGES  267-276 

against  Wool,  asserting  that  his  "extreme  imbecility  and  manifest  in- 
capacity" ruined  the  expedition.  The  judge  advocate  general  advised 
that  the  charges  should  be  ignored  (6lHorton,  Dec.  3). 

21.  Just  after  leaving  Parras  Wool  learned  that  2700  Mexicans  with 
four  guns  had  moved  from  Zacatecas  against  him.  One  fault  of  the 
expedition  was  that  it  could  neither  support  nor  be  supported  by  Taylor's 
army  (see  Halleck,  Mil.  Art,  410  and  chap,  xi,  note  5,  of  this  history). 
One  asks  why  Ampudia  was  not  ordered  to  attack  Wool.  With  Blanco's 
irregulars  he  would  have  been  formidable.  The  explanation  probably  is 
that  Santa  Anna  wished  to  build  up  at  S.  L.  Potosf  as  large  an  army  as 
possible  under  his  own  command.     Besides,  he  expected  Wool  to  turn  west. 

22.  Wool  received  on  Nov.  14  Taylor's  instructions  to  give  up  the 
expedition,  and  on  Nov.  26  his  instructions  to  go  to  Parras  and  await 
orders  (61  Wool,  Jan.  17,  1847).  He  moved,  however,  in  anticipation  of 
the  latter  instructions  (6IW00I,  Dec.  7).  Nov.  16  he  reported  that  he 
expected  three  mounted  and  two  infantry  companies  as  escorts  to  the 
last  wagons,  and  after  their  arrival  would  have  about  2750  in  all.  60Marcy 
to  Taylor,  May  6,  1847 :  It  is  not  important  to  hold  Chihuahua,  for  you 
are  in  advance  of  it.  Ripley  (War  with  Mexico,  i,  337),  probably  to  have 
a  fling  at  Wool,  says  Wool  "only"  wished  to  give  up  the  expedition  in 
order  to  go  toward  Durango  and  Zacatecas  in  pursuit  of  glory;  but  the 
document  he  cites  does  not  so  state,  and  Taylor  wrote  that  Wool  proposed 
to  join  him  (Bixby  coll.,  71). 

23.  In  chap.  xix. 

24.  July  2  Taylor  had  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  expedition  might 
prove  very  important  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  329),  but  suggested  that  only 
mounted  men  should  be  employed. 

25.  Marcy  said  that  the  expedition  prevented  a  considerable  part  of 
Mexico  from  sharing  in  the  campaign  against  Scott,  and  to  some  extent 
this  was  doubtless  true. 

26.  Wool's  expedition.  Polk,  Diary,  May  14,  16 ;  Oct.  20.  164Conner 
to  Bancroft,  May  31.  N.  Orl.  Commerc.  Bulletin,  Aug.  17.  Meade, 
Letters,  i,  152.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  323,  363  (Marcy);  325  (Scott);  458 
(Freeman);  328,  454,  466  (Jones);  424,  426  (Wool);  428  (Thomas); 
305,  329,  351,  361,  374,  377,  400,  409,  418,  424,  433  (Taylor) ;  410  (Bliss) ; 
567  (Jesup).  254Mansfield,  report,  Apr.  19.  6IW00I,  July  28;  Aug.  5, 
15 ;  Sept.  2,  15,  28 ;  Oct.  15,  19 ;  Nov.  4 ;  Dec.  16.  256Wool,  July  29. 
Sen.  1;  30,  1,  pp.  45,  545.  Sen.  32;  31,  1  (Hughes  and  others).  65Adj. 
gen.,  gen.  orders  19.  Wash.  Union,  Oct.  19;  Nov.  20,  21,  28,  1846 
Feb.  8;  Mar.  23,  1847.  6lMaynadier,  Aug.  25.  6lHorton,  June  23; 
Aug.  8;  Oct.  20;  Dec.  3.  69Harney-,  Aug.  12.  Reavis,  Harney,  155. 
Sen.  178;  29,  2.  Diario,  Sept.  11.  68P.  F.  Smith,  Oct.  2.  245Duvall 
to  Lamar,  June  27.  Buhoup,  Narrative.  Davis,  Autobiog.,  105-19. 
6lShields,  Aug.  28.  Niles,  Oct.  24,  p.  118 ;  Dec.  26,  p.  263 ;  May  8,  1847, 
p.  156.  6lKingsbury  to  Wool,  Oct.  13.  Sen.  64;  31,  1.  National  In- 
telligencer, Nov.  3,  21.  Carleton,  Buena  Vista,  161-76.  Balbontm,  In- 
vasi6n,  76.  65Wool,  orders  89,  117,  121,  126,  143,  144,  148,  155.  6IW00I 
to  Taylor,  Jan.  17,  1847.  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  Jan.  4,  1849.  180McDowell 
to  Newton,  Sept.  16,  1846.  132Butler,  Dec.  10.  Wool  in  Ceremonies. 
Bishop,  Journal.  69Duncan  to  Worth,  Aug.  8.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby), 
71.  63Marcy  to  Kearny,  Dec.  10.  Picayune,  Mar.  4,  6, 17,  1847.  69Wood 
to  Taylor,  Dec.  7.  66Lee  to  Totten,  Dec.  5.  Donna  van,  Adventures,  41. 
Wallace,  Wallace,  21-9.     69 Wool  to  Taylor,  Dec.  24,  1846 ;  Jan.  20,  1847 


NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XIII,   PAGES  277-279         511 

• 

Baylies,  Wool's  Camp.  Journ.  Milit.  Serv.  Instit.,  xiv,  443.  Wilhelm, 
8th  Inf.,  ii,  301.  82S.  Anna  to  comte.  gen.  Zacatecas,  Dec.  6.  Neville, 
diary.  The  following  are  from  76  :  Gov.  Coahuila,  Sept.  7,  Oct.  8.  Gefe 
Partido  del  Rio  Grande,  Aug.  28;  Oct.  2.  Comte.  gen.  Zacatecas  to 
comte.  gen.  Durango,  Oct.  14;  to  S.  Anna,  Oct.  21.  Gefe  politico,  Mon- 
clova,  to  Wool,  Oct.  24;  reply,  Oct.  26.  Comte.  gen.  Durango,  Dec.  11. 
Heredia  to  comte.  gen.  Durango,  Dec.  10.  Gov.  Coahuila  to  Id.,  Nov.  30. 
R.  Vazquez  to  S.  Anna,  Oct.  1.  Castafieda  to  Vazquez,  Sept.  24.  S. 
Anna,  Sept.  29;  Nov.  4;  Dec.  19,  24.  Wool  to  Arziniega  et  al.,  Oct.  9. 
Aldrete  to  Mejia,  Aug.  30.  Ugarte,  Sept.  26.  Comte.  gen.  Zacatecas, 
Dec.  31.  Lobo  to  R.  Vazquez,  Nov.  2.  Comte.  gen.  Zacatecas  to  S. 
Anna,  Dec.  17.  Gov.  Coahuila  to  Id.,  Nov.  30.  Comte.  gen.  Coahuila, 
Sept.  7.  Gefe  politico,  Parras,  to  S.  Anna,  Dec.  17.  Ampudia,  Aug.  25. 
Rives  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  208)  places  Polk  in  a  rather  absurd  position 
with  reference  to  the  expedition.  He  misunderstands  a  statement  in 
Polk's  Diary,  May  28,  1846.  The  orders  to  Wool  there  mentioned  had 
prime  reference  to  getting  volunteers  in  motion  to  Taylor  {Military  His- 
torian and  Economist,  ii,  32  and  note  on  p.  33). 

27.  The  idea  that  the  occupation  of  Tampico  would  mask  and  aid  the 
expedition  against  Vera  Cruz  came  forward  a  little  later  (Sen.  1 ;  30,  1, 
p.  949). 

28.  This  is  inferred  from  the  fact  that  Marcy's  letter,  which  was  pub- 
lished in  the  Diario  of  Oct.  6,  would  naturally  have  met  Santa  Anna  about 
Oct.  3,  and  from  the  character  of  Santa  Anna's  letter  of  that  date. 

29.  None  of  these  statements  should  be  taken  too  literally.  The 
various  accounts,  which  come  mainly  from  Parrodi  and  Santa  Anna, 
differ  considerably  though  not  essentially,  and  both  men  had  reasons  for 
exaggerating  the  weakness  of  Tampico. 

30.  Parrodi  and  the  court  that  tried  him  declared  that  he  threw  away 
nothing  of  value.  But  many  did  not  believe  this,  and  it  is  hard  to  see 
why  he  should  have  taken  the  trouble,  when  in  such  haste,  to  transport 
a  large  quantity  of  material  to  the  river,  if  it  was  worthless.  The  gov- 
ernment naturally  wished  the  evacuation  to  appear  inexpensive. 

31.  This  sentence  is  inferential.  Writing  to  his  wife,  Nov.  17,  162Con- 
ner  stated  that  he  was  much  surprised  to  find  the  city  evacuated,  and  that, 
had  the  garrison  been  there,  he  would  have  had  hard  work.  Why  Mrs. 
Chase  did  not  give  notice  of  the  evacuation  cannot  be  explained.  No 
doubt  there  was  a  high  state  of  popular  excitement  and,  as  she  had  been 
suspected  of  playing  the  spy,  the  people  perhaps  cut  her  off  more  effectually 
than  the  military  men  had  done.  Later  she  presented  a  claim  to  Congress, 
and  it  was  supported  by  letters  from  some  of  Conner's  officers  but  by  none 
from  himself.  This  fact  may  be  a  hint  that  he  was  not  pleased  with  her 
course.  It  seems  to  have  been  from  her  that  Parrodi  heard  the  imaginary 
tale  of  Conner's  heavy  landing  force,  which  probably  counted  for  a  great 
deal  in  bringing  about  the  evacuation.  Chase  had  sent  a  sketch  of  Tam- 
pico to  Conner  in  June,  and  later  his  wife  forwarded  a  plan  with  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  forts,  the  number  of  guns,  etc.  We  do  not  know,  however,  that 
Conner  received  these  papers.  Taylor  belittled  the  capture  of  Tampico, 
saying  that  Santa  Anna's  order  to  evacuate  the  town  had  been  printed 
in  the  Mexican  papers,  and  that  Conner  must  have  been  aware  of  the 
fact ;  but  Conner  was  on  a  ship  at  some  distance  from  any  town,  and  his 
letter  of  Nov.  17  shows  that  he  was  not  aware  of  it.  The  names  of  the 
captured  gunboats  were  Nonata,  Bonita  and  Reefer. 


512        NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  XIII,   PAGES  277-282 

32.  Signed  by  Tattnall  and  Ingraham;  approved  by  Conner;  ac- 
cepted by  the  deputation  of  the  ayuntamiento.  The  Americans  felt  that 
formal  terms  would  bind  them  yet  could  be  repudiated  by  the  Mexican 
government. 

33.  Two  merchant  vessels  also  were  captured. 

34.  According  to  Apuntes,  pp.  82-6,  Dr.  Francisco  Marchante  of  the 
Mexican  medical  service,  who  had  charge  of  other  public  property,  was 
not  far  away,  but  the  Mexicans  persuaded  Tattnall  that  he  could  not 
be  overtaken.  On  Tattnall's  return  to  the  port,  however,  a  Mexican 
declared  this  could  not  have  been  true,  and  hence  a  second  expedition 
set  out  in  all  haste.  It  was  unavoidably  delayed ;  and  finally,  as  the 
Americans  learned  that  a  Mexican  force  had  been  sent  forward  to  protect 
Marchante,  the  chase  was  abandoned.  A  large  amount  of  ammunition 
was  thrown  into  the  river  at  Panuco  by  Marchante.  The  total  loss  of 
material  was  thus  of  considerable  moment.  Some  of  the  ammunition 
was  saved  by  sending  it  to  Tuxpan. 

35.  Gates  had  two  companies  of  his  own  (Third  Artillery).  The  other 
five  were  Belton's.  A  steamer  carrying  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores 
was  lost. 

36.  Perry  flew  the  pennant  of  a  vice  commodore  (Conner,  Home  Squad- 
ron, 12). 

37.  Brooke  had  at  first  intended  to  send  also  four  companies  of  Mounted 
Rifles ;  and  Taylor,  on  hearing  of  this,  protested  sharply  to  the  govern- 
ment that  "a  large  and  efficient  force  of  cavalry,"  on  which  he  counted, 
had  been  diverted  to  a  place  where  they  were  not  needed  (Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
pp.  382,  388),  overlooking  the  fact  that  this  corps  had  no  horses  (orders 
no.. 149 :  ibid.,  512).  Now  that  Tampico  had  been  captured  by  the  navy, 
Taylor  said  it  was  of  no  consequence  (Letters  (Bixby),  78).  These  points 
are  mentioned  to  show  his  state  of  mind,  which  will  need  to  be  under- 
stood when  we  come  to  Scott's  operations.  The  Alabama  regiment  was 
ordered  to  Tampico  by  Patterson  (Bliss :  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  383). 

38.  Occupation  of  Tampico.  Eco,  June  9 ;  Sept.  12 ;  Oct.  29 ;  Nov.  18, 
19,  25.  303Juanito  del  Bosque,  Jan.  6,  1847.  Apuntes,  78-86.  6lGates 
to  Barnard,  May  4,  1849.  69Prout  to  Patterson,  Oct.  28.  164Chase  to 
Conner,  June  4.  Parrodi,  Memoria  (including  letters  to  and  from  S. 
Anna  and  others).  Ampudia,  To  Fellow-citizens,  July  10.  Commerc. 
Review,  1846,  p.  165.  47Conner,  Oct.  7;  Nov.  5,  21;  Dec.  1.  Polk, 
Diary,  Sept.  19-22.  297Mackenzie  to  Buchanan,  July  7.  Ho.  60;  30, 
1,  pp.  480-1  (Jones) ;  339,  341  (Marcy) ;  378-9,  387  (Taylor) ;  252  (Ma- 
son) ;  270  (Conner) ;  271  (Tattnall  and  Ingraham) ;  271  (Cervantes  el 
al).  162Morris  to  Conner,  Sept.  21.  162Tattnall  to  Conner,  Nov.  20. 
Parker,  Recoils.,  68.  Conner,  Home  Squad,  11  (Conner),  12.  48Ban- 
croft  to  Conner,  Aug.  29.  48Mason  to  Id.,  Sept.  22.  Balbontin,  Estado, 
52.  Diario,  Sept.  22;  Oct.  6;  Nov.  28.  S.  Anna,  Apelaci6n,  29-31. 
99S.  Anna  to  Tampico  ayunt.,  Oct.  27.  2A5Bee  to  Lamar,  Dec.  5.  99Par- 
rodi  to  Tamp,  ayunt.,  Oct.  26.  99Urrea  to  id.,  Oct.  29.  99Gov.  Tamaul. 
to  id.,  Oct.  25.  99Gov.  Tamaul,  circular,  Nov.  17.  Vindicaci6n  del  Gen. 
Parrodi.  69Worth  to  Bliss,  Dec.  4.  Steele,  Amer.  Camps.,  125. 
226Beauregard  to  Totten,  Nov.  27.  69Chase,  Dec.  3,  1845.  313/d.  to 
Saunders,  May  26,  31.  Public  Ledger,  Jan.  7,  1847  (Mrs.  Chase).  52Mrs. 
Chase  to  Conner,  Oct.  20.  316Judd  to  Sherman,  Feb.  26,  1848.  Ballen- 
tine,  Eng.  Sold.,  i,  267.  69Shields  to  Bliss,  Jan.  13,  1847.  60ld.  to  Bar- 
nard,  Apr.  20,   1849.     Meade,  Letters,  i,    159-60.     46Perry  to  Mason, 


NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  XIII,   PAGES  282-283         513 

Nov.  15,  19.  46Declaration,  Nov.  15.  N.  St  Eve.  Post,  Nov.  18,  1847. 
165Conner  letter  book,  Nov.  13-Dec.  4.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  77-8. 
Negrete,  Invasi6n,  iii,  170-3.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  54.  Ho.  1;  30,  2, 
pp.  1171,  1173  (Conner);  1174-5  (Tattnall).  Ho.  4;  29,  2,  p.  381. 
69Perry,  memo.,  [Nov.  16].  6lGardner,  Dec.  2.  6lGates,  Nov.  20. 
6lBrooke,  Nov.  21.  69Gates,  Nov.  26.  163Perry  to  Mason,  Nov.  16. 
6lPatterson  to  Marcy,  Nov.  23.  162Tattnall  to  alcalde,  Nov.  19.  Ben- 
nett, Steam  Navy,  93.  Monitor  Repub.,  Dec.  2.  166Patterson  to  Perry, 
Nov.  22.  166Perry  to  Conner  [about  Nov.  30].  166Tattnall  to  Id., 
Nov.  22.  313Saunders  to  Taylor,  June  5.  6lJones  to  Scott,  Nov.  28, 
30 ;  to  Patterson,  Nov.  29  ;  to  Taylor,  Nov.  30.  313Letters  from  Conner 
to  Saunders,  Nov.  6lGardner  to  Taylor,  Nov.  17.  Smith,  Remins., 
28.  6lShields,  Dec.  23.  Espia  de  la  Frontera,  no.  7.  76Gov.  Tamaul., 
address,  Nov.  27.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  1846  (circular,  Nov.  21). 
Picayune,  Jan.  2,  1847.  112Barnard,  Dec.  20,  notes  on  the  fortifications. 
112/d.  to  Gates,  Dec.  11 ;  to  Shields,  Dec.  28.  112Beauregard  to  Totten, 
Feb.  2,  1847;  to  Gates,  Feb.  24.  6lGates  to  Barnard,  May  4,  1849. 
66Beauregard  to  Totten,  Jan.  9,  1847.  The  following  are  from  76.  Par- 
rodi,  Oct.  17.  S.  Anna  to  Urrea,  Oct.  18.  Prefect  Huejutla,  Nov.  23, 
30.  Mufioz,  Nov.  21,  23,  26;  Dec.  1.  Order,  April  24.  Gov.  Guana- 
juato, Nov.  27.  Gov.  Michoacan,  Nov.  26.  Mufioz  to  Gov.  Tamaul., 
Nov.  14.  Tampico  ayunt.  to  Conner,  Nov.  14.  Parrodi,  proclaim, 
June  9.  To  Parrodi,  June  3 ;  Aug.  28.  Circular,  Nov.  21.  To  Bravo, 
May  14.  Bravo,  May  18.  Mejia,  June  9.  To  comte.  gen.  Queretaro, 
Nov.  21.  Parrodi,  May  20;  June  17;  July  8;  Sept.  2,  5.  Mufioz  to 
Parrodi,  Nov.  14.  S.  Anna  to  Parrodi,  Oct.  12.  To  S.  Anna,  Oct.  15 ; 
Nov.  8.  Ampudia,  Sept.  29.  S.  Anna,  Oct,  3,  10,  12;  Nov.  4,  12,  21. 
Affidavit  of  M.  Dorante,  Deft.  23.  Comte.  Nat.  Gd.,  Tampico,  to  Urrea, 
Nov.  4.  To  Ampudia,  Aug.  28.  When  Perry  reached  Brazos  Id.  the 
weather  was  so  bad  that  he  could  only  leave  an  officer  on  an  anchored 
vessel. 

39.  An  estimate  of  Taylor's  strength  on  Dec.  9  was  14,000  for  the  en- 
tire field  (Picayune,  Dec.  27).  One  of  Wool's  companies  was  still  at  San 
Antonio,  one  on  the  Rio  Grande,  and  four  at  Monclova  on  Dec.  16,  he 
stated;  several  were  left  behind  when  he  marched  from  Parras,  and  he 
probably  had  200  sick.  Dec.  24  he  reported  about  2000  effectives  as 
with  him.  At  Camargo  and  doubtless  elsewhere  in  that  region  there  was 
considerable  sickness.  See  a  letter  (probably  from  P.  F.  Smith)  in  Littell, 
no.  141,  p.  191.  One  may  doubt  whether  Taylor  had  a  fighting  force  of 
over  12,000  at  this  time.  The  lines  are  reckoned  as  from  Point  Isabel  or 
the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  to  Camargo,  Saltillo  and  Parras,  and  from 
Monterey  to  Tampico.  They  were  soon  longer,  because  Taylor  advanced 
beyond  Saltillo.    His  advance  to  Victoria  began  Dec.  13  (chap,  xviii,  p.  357). 

40.  Opinions  as  to  the  number  of  men  under  Santa  Anna  at  this  time 
differed.  Taylor's  report  on  Dec.  4  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  441)  was  20,000 
infantry  and  a  large  cavalry  force ;  Meade,  Nov.  24,  35,000 ;  Meade, 
Dec.  8,  30,000.  69Wool  wrote  on  Dec.  24  that  according  to  spies  sent 
out  from  Parras  Santa  Anna  had  12,000  at  San  Luis  Potosi,  30,000  at 
some  distance  from  there,  and  9000  on  their  way  from  Guadalajara. 
69Butler  wrote  from  Saltillo  on  Dec.  20  that  Santa  Anna  appeared  to 
have  35,000  at  S.  L.  P.  and  9000  at  Tula. 

41.  Taylor's  military  policy.  Taylor,  Letter  to  Gaines,  Nov.  5  (and  in 
Picayune,  Feb.  2,  1847).     169/d.  to  Crittenden,  Oct.  9.     370/d.  to  Davis, 

VOL.    I  —  2  L 


514        NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XIII,   PAGES  283-286 

April  18,  1848.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  351-4,  377,  379-82,  441,  514-5  (Tay- 
lor); 389-91  (Marcy).  256Marcy  to  Wetmore,  Jan.  24;  Mar.  29,  1847. 
Scribner,  Campaign,  55.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  152,  168-9.  Polk,  Diary, 
Jan.  5,  1847.  6IW00I,  Dec.  16.  69/d.  to  Taylor,  Dec.  24.  Journ. 
Milit.  Serv.  Instil.,  xiv,  443.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  71-2.  330ld.  to 
brother,  Dec.  12.  256Scott  to  Marcy,  Dec.  27,  priv.  Morning  News, 
New  London,  Conn.,  Dec.  10.  267Memo.  (probably  from  Maj.  Smith). 
P.  F.  Smith,  Memoir,  Oct.  15. 

There  was  also  the  difficulty  of  supervising  lines  so  extended.  At  this 
very  time  Taylor  was  afraid  things  were  going  badly  in  his  rear  (330to 
brother,  Dec.  12).  It  is  particularly  hard  to  find  any  good  reason  for 
posting  a  (necessarily  large)  force  at  Victoria,  so  very  far  from  support. 
The  pass  between  that  point  and  Tula  was  not  practicable  for  artillery, 
and  was  not  the  only  pass  by  which  infantry  and  cavalry  could  cross  the 
mountains.  Taylor  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  380)  argued  that  from  Victoria 
he  could  threaten  the  Mexican  flank,  should  Santa  Anna  advance.  But 
he  would  have  had  to  force  the  pass,  and  without  artillery  he  could  not 
have  accomplished  much.  In  case  of  Santa  Anna's  advancing  and  suc- 
ceeding, this  flanking  force  would  have  been  in  great  peril,  while  in  case 
of  his  failing  it  would  have  been  useless.  Anyhow  it  would  have  been 
more  useful  with  the  main  army.  Not  only  were  the  Americans  scattered 
at  posts,  but  they  moved  about  in  parties  of  only  200  or  300  with  a  care- 
lessness that  astounded  the  Mexicans  (Camargo  letter :  N.  Y.  Journal  of 
Commerce,  Jan.  8,  1847).  Taylor  could  not  safely  count  upon  cooperation 
between  Wool  and  Worth  in  the  case  of  an  advance  of  the  Mexicans,  for 
it  was  likely  that  Santa  Anna's  first  care  would  be  to  block  the  road,  as 
probably  he  could  have  done. 

$ 

XIV.   SANTA  FE 

1.  Independence  is  ten  miles  east  of  Kansas  City  and  about  thirty-five 
from  Fort  Leavenworth. 

2.  Conditions  in  New  Mexico;  Armijo.  13Bankhead,  no.  148,  1846. 
St.  Louis  Weekly  Reveille,  May  23.  St.  Louis  Republican,  Aug.  25.  Sen. 
7;  30,  1  (Emory).  60Leitensdorfer,  June  7.  Sen.  Misc.  26;  30,  1  (Wisli- 
zenus).  Inman,  Old  S.  Fe  Trail,  27-54,  67-92.  75Armijo,  Jan.  12. 
75Hacienda  to  Relaciones,  Mar.  16.  Monitor  Re-pub.,  Apr.  15.  Me- 
moria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  March,  1845.  Picayune,  March  18.  Dublan, 
Legislaci6n,  v,  10.  Niles,  Sept.  26,  p.  52.  52Alvarez,  Feb.  2,  1842; 
Sept.  4,  1846.  52Jones,  Sept.  20,  1837.  13Ashburnham,  no.  50,  1837. 
Sen.  90;  22,  1,  pp.  30-41.  Captain  of  Vols.,  Conquest.  Pacheco, 
Exposici6n.  Ruxton,  Adventures  (London,  1847),  110,  185-6.  Cooke, 
Conquest,  60.  Kendall,  Narrative,  i,  295,  314-5,  346-60.  Amigo  del 
Pueblo,  Aug.  19,  1845.  Mexico  a  travel,  iv,  403.  Wash.  Globe,  Sept.  2, 
1845.  N.  Orl.  Courier,  July  5,  1845.  Houston  Telegraph,  Jan.  24,  1844. 
77Arrang6iz,  no.  63,  res.,  1843.  77Almonte,  no.  4,  1844.  Amer.  Anti- 
quarian Soc.  Proceeds.,  new  series,  viii,  324-41.  And  the  following 
from  76.  Assembly  of  N.  Mex.,  Feb.,  1846  (petition  for  comte.  gen.). 
Re-extracto  on  N.  Mex.  (Sambrano).  Ayunt.,  Hermosillo,  Son.,  proclam. 
Comte.  gen.  N.  Mex.,  May  17,  1845.  Tornel,  Mar.  10, 1846.  To  Hacienda, 
Mar.  6.  Trial  of  Magoffin  (testimony).  A  merchant's  estimate  of  Santa 
Fe  caravan  business  for  1846  was  that  the  first  cost  of  the  goods  amounted 
to'$937,500  (Captain  of  Vols.,  Conquest,  11). 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XIV,  PAGES  286-289         515 

3.  The  text  includes  two  companies  of  dragoons  that  joined  Kearny 
on  the  march.  On  account  of  the  scarcity  of  grass  at  Santa  Fe  and  be- 
cause he  considered  infantry  the  chief  reliance,  Kearny  did  not  wish  so 
large  a  proportion  of  mounted  men.  Fischer's  company  enlisted  to  serve 
as  horse.  The  artillery  had  twelve  brass  6-pounders  and  four  12-pound 
howitzers.  Kearny's  army,  being  near  states  abounding  in  resources, 
was  more  readily  set  in  motion  than  Taylor's  or  Wool's,  but  on  account 
of  its  long  march  459  horses,  3658  mules,  14,904  oxen,  1556  wagons,  and 
516  pack  mules  were  required  to  transport  it,  its  reinforcements,  and  its 
supplies.  (This  account  is  not  complete,  but  on  the  other  hand  it  refers 
not  only  to  Kearny's  expedition  but  to  troops  that  followed  him.  Rives's 
account  in  U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  214-5,  is  therefore  misleading,  and  makes 
the  short  rations  endured  on  the  march  seem  incredible.)  The  Indians 
drove  off  many  of  the  cattle,  robbed  trains  and  killed  not  a  few  drivers 
(Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  545). 

4.  S.  Fe  expedition  ordered  and  organized.  S.  Louis  Weekly  Reveille, 
May  11,  23.  Polk,  Diary,  May  13,  14,  16,  30.  69Jones  to  Kearny,  May 
13.  63Marcy  to  Kearny,  May  27.  240Kennerly,  Narrative.  Sen.  7; 
30,  1  (Emory).  69Kearny,  orders,  June  19;  July  31.  Richardson,  Jour- 
nal, 3-6.  6lKearny  to  gov.  Mo.,  June  16;  to  Cummins,  June  20. 
60Marcy  to  gov.  Mo.,  May  13.  Wash.  Union,  Sept.  24.  Nat.  Intelli- 
gencer, Oct.  2.  Monitor  Repub.,  Mar.  27,  1847.  Scharf,  St.  Louis,  i, 
369,  372-3.  St.  Louis  Republican,  May  13,  22,  30;  June  26.  Sen.  1; 
30,  1,  p.  545.  Niles,  July  4,  1846,  p.  281 ;  July  3,  1847,  p.  279.  Ho.  60; 
30,  1,  p.  326.  Elliott,  Notes,  217,  221.  Ruxton,  Adventures  (1849), 
312-3.  St.  Louis  New  Era,  Aug.  20.  Mo.  Hist.  Soc.  Colls.,  ii,  no.  4. 
212Hastings,  diary.  256Penn,  Jr.,  [May  23].  Bancroft,  Pac.  States, 
xii,  410,  note  (names  of  officers).  Hughes,  Doniphan's  Expedition,  24-7. 
Cooke,  Conquest,  2. 

5.  The  route  taken  by  Kearny  was  not  the  shortest  but  it  seemed  the 
best  for  his  purpose  (Cooke,  Conquest,  13).  Distances  from  Fort  Leaven- 
worth :  to  Council  Grove,  126  miles ;  to  the  Arkansas  River,  393 ;  to 
Bent's  Fort,  564;  to  S.  Fe,  873  (Ho.  1 ;  30,  2,  p.  236). 

6.  To  and  at  Bent's  Fort.  Mexico  in  1842,  128.  Sen.  7;  30,  1. 
63Marcy  to  Howard,  May  13,  1846.  Ho.  41 ;  30,  1.  6lKearny,  June  5; 
Aug.  1.  6lKearny,  orders,  June  27;  July  31.  6lCapt.  Johnston,  diary. 
20lGibson,  diary.  Prince,  Concise  Hist.,  164-74,  178.  Niles,  Aug.  1, 
1846,  p.  343.  Cooke,  Conquest,  3-4.  Elliott,  Notes,  222-3.  58Cooke, 
Map  of  S.  Fe  Trace.  Captain  of  Vols.,  Conquest.  Ho.  45;  31,  1.  Sen. 
23;  30,  1.  Mo.  Hist.  Soc.  Colls.,  ii,  no.  4.  Richardson,  Journal.  Sen. 
Misc.  26;  30,  1,  pp.  5-13.  Connelley,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  179-81. 
212Hastings,  diary.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  151,  168.  Ruxton,  Far  West, 
189.  69Kearny,  July  17.  Hughes,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  30-59.  76Kearny 
to  Armijo,  Aug.  1.  76Heredia  to  S.  Anna,  Dec.  31,  1846.  Bent's  Fort 
lay  about  fifteen  miles  above  the  mouth  of  Las  Animas  River  (Cooke, 
Conquest,  12). 

7.  Armijo7 s  motives  and  preparations.  Sen.  7;  30,  1  (Emory).  Gib- 
son, diary,  Sept.  5.  Republicano,  Jan.  13 ;  Feb.  5, 1847  (Armijo).  Twitch- 
ell,  Milit.  Occup.,  60.  Read,  Guerra,  219.  Prince,  Concise  Hist.,  179. 
52Alvarez,  Sept.  4,  1846.  From  76  the  following.  M.  E.  to  F.  Pino.  N. 
to  F.  Pino.  J.  F.  to  J.  E.  Ortiz.  J.  F.  Ortiz  to  P.  Armendaris.  M. 
Ramirez  to  Senora  Casanoba.  N.  Quintanar  to  L.  Tellez.  D.  Vigil  to 
J.  F.  Zubia.     Decision  of  the  mesa.     Testimony  given  at  the  trial  of 


516         NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XIV,   PAGES  290-294 

Magoffin.  S.  Anna,  Dec.  8,  1846.  Summary  of  four  packets  of  letters, 
and  conclusion  of  the  mesa.  Armijo,  Sept.  8,  1846;  Jan.  20;  Mar.  30, 
1847.  Tornel,  Mar.  10,  1846.  Id.  to  Ugarte,  Mar.  10 ;  June  25 ;  July  25. 
Segundo  cabo,  Chihuahua,  July  10.  Armijo  to  Ugarte,  July  1.  To 
Armijo,  July  25.  Comte.  gen.  Durango,  July  16.  Ugarte,  July  17 ; 
Aug.  23.     Letter  from  El  Paso,  Aug.  9. 

8.  The  regiment  under  Price  numbered  at  first  about  1000,  and  the 
battalion,  commanded  by  Lieut.  Col.  Willock,  about  300.  In  July  a 
third  force  (infantry)  was  ordered  to  take  the  same  route  but  it  was  found 
unnecessary,  and  the  plans  were  given  up  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  162). 

The  second  (Price's;  Mormons)  and  third  (abortive)  expeditions.  Polk, 
Diary,  May  30 ;  June  2,  3,  5 ;  July  18,  1846 ;  Apr.  28,  1847.  62Marcy 
to  gov.  Mo.,  May  11,  1847.  62Jones  to  Price,  May  18,  22,  1847.  63Marcy 
to  gov.  Mo.,  Apr.  28;  May  6,  11,  1847.  69Jones  to  Scott,  Apr.  20,  1847. 
6lDoniphan  to  Marcy,  Oct.  20,  1846.  6lShields,  Aug.  9,  1846.  62Marcy 
to  gov.  Mo.,  July  18,  1846.  Wash.  Union,  Sept.  24,  1846.  Scharf,  St. 
Louis,  i,  375-6.  Niles,  July  18,  1846,  p.  312.  2Allred,  recoils.  Sen.  439  ; 
29,  1,  p.  2.  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  p.  49.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  171.  Bancroft,  Pac. 
States,  xii,  410,  note  (names  of  officers).  Cooke,  Conquest,  2.  Hughes, 
Doniphan's  Exped.,  134,  137-8. 

9.  Kearny's  letter  to  Armijo,  found  in  the  Mexican  archives,  is  stated 
to  have  been  translated  by  the  American  consul  from  a -certified  copy  of  the 
original.  A  little  later  an  American  trader,  who  had  married  a  Santa  Fe 
woman,  was  despatched  to  distribute  the  proclamation  and  sound  the 
people  at  Taos.  A  scouting  party  under  Bent  went  forward  to  examine 
the  route. 

10.  Kearny  was  criticised  for  undertaking  to  release  the  people  from 
their  allegiance  to  Mexico ;  but  since,  as  our  Supreme  Court  decided 
in  the  Castine  case,  the  inhabitants  of  conquered  territories  pass  under  at 
least  a  temporary  allegiance  to  the  conquering  power,  they  must  neces- 
sarily be  absolved  from  their  former  obligations.  See  Washington  Union, 
August  21,  1847. 

11.  Kearny  returned  a  conciliatory  message  by  the  bearer  of  Armijo's 
letter.     See  note  13. 

12.  Estimates  of  the  number  of  the  people  in  arms  vary  from  about 
1800  (76 Armijo)  to  4-5000  (Cooke).  Armijo's  reports  minified  all  his 
means  of  defence.  Apparently  there  were  about  3000.  So  Magoffin 
stated  on  his  76trial,  and  this  was  the  conclusion  of  the  war  department 
at  Mexico.  Probably  Armijo  felt  surprised  and  embarrassed  by  the  re- 
sponse of  the  people. 

13.  It  was  charged  by  Mexicans  that  Armijo  was  bought  by  American 
agents.  But  Kearny  had  no  money  to  use  in  this  way,  and  in  the  absence 
of  substantial  evidence  there  seems  to  be  no  good  ground  to  suppose  that 
the  merchants  had  a  sufficient  reason  for  buying  him.  Armijo  sent  Dr. 
Henry  Connelly  back  with  Cooke  to  treat  in  his  behalf  with  Kearny 
(Cooke,  Conquest,  31,  33),  but  nothing  seems  to  have  been  accomplished. 
Kearny  probably  desired  (76Connelly  to  Armijo,  Aug.  19)  that  Armijo 
should  surrender  with  his  troops,  and  presumably  Armijo  asked  for  im- 
possible concessions.  Magoffin  went  on  to  Chihuahua,  was  arrested, 
tried,  and  imprisoned  until  the  end  of  the  war,  and  later  was  paid  $30,000 
by  the  U.  S.  government  for  his  services  and  losses  (Benton,  View,  ii, 
683).  There  is  little  reason  to  suppose  that  his  services  were  of  much 
Value. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XIV,   PAGES  290-298         517 

14.  The  Mexican  archives  contain  many  letters  from  New  Mexico  bear- 
ing upon  Armijo's  conduct  and  motives.  Most  of  the  writers  called  him 
a  traitor ;  and  a  war  department  board  (mesa) ,  after  reviewing  the  evi- 
dence, decided  that  he  ought  to  be  tried.  But  of  course  this  was  the 
opportunity  for  his  enemies  to  turn  upon  him.  The  popular  party  natu- 
rally insisted  that  the  people  wanted  to  fight,  and  were  betrayed  by  him. 
But  he  denied  this,  demanding  why,  in  that  case,  they  did  not  select  some 
other  chief,  and  hold  their  ground.  Armijo  hovered  about  for  a  time, 
pretending  to  cooperate  with  Ugarte ;  but,  not  being  permitted  to  remain 
in  Chihuahua,  he  went  south  with  a  train  of  wagons  filled  with  American 
merchandise  and  guarded  by  Missourians,  and  finally,  making  his  way  to 
the  capital  under  an  order  to  come  and  answer  for  his  conduct,  he  re- 
peatedly demanded  to  be  put  on  trial. 

15.  The  population  of  Santa  Fe  was  about  3000. 

16.  Events  from  Aug.  1  to  18  inclusive.  Mexico  in  1842,  p.  128.  Sen.  7  ; 
30,  1.  Polk,  Diary,  June  15,  17,  1846.  Sen.  Misc.  26;  30,  1,  pp.  17-20. 
Sen.  18;  31,  1,  p.  237.  6lKearny,  Aug.  1.  6lCapt.  Johnston,  diary. 
62Marcy  to  Kearny,  June  18.  20lGibson,  diary.  Republicano,  Sept.  10, 
1846 ;  Jan.  13 ;  Feb.  5,  1847.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii,  104.  Con- 
nelley,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  181,  184.  Anzeiger  des  Westens,  Aug.  6; 
Sept.  5,  7,  24,  1846.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  168-70.  Wash.  Union,  Sept.  14; 
Oct.  2,  27,  1846;  July  12,  1847.  Diario,  Sept.  9,  10;  Oct.  5.  Read, 
Guerra,  220.  Prince,  Concise  Hist.,  179-80.  Niles,  Oct.  10,  pp.  90-2. 
Robinson,  Sketches,  20-1.  Elliott,  Notes,  225,  231,  234-5,  237,  241. 
52Alvarez,  Sept.  4.  Sen.  23;  30,  1.  Ruxton,  Adventures  (London, 
1847),  110.  Benton,  View,  ii,  683.  Mo.  Hist.  Soc.  Colls.,  ii,  no.  4. 
212Hastings,  diary.  268Kearny,  letter  book.  337Capt.  Turner,  diary. 
Cutts,  Conquest,  44.  Cooke,  Conquest,  5-43.  Richardson,  Journal. 
Hughes,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  59-87.  From  76  the  following.  Letters 
from  N.  Mex.  (undated  letters  in  note  7).  Testimony  at  trial  of  Magoffin. 
S.  Anna,  Dec.  8.  Summary  of  four  packets  of  letters  and  conclusion  of 
the  mesa.  Armijo,  Sept.  8.  Armijo  to  Kearny,  Aug.  12.  Connelly  to 
Armijo,  Aug.  19.  Armijo,  Jan.  20;  Mar.  30,  1847.  Re-extracto  from 
statement  of  Sambrano.  Reyes,  Aug.  25,  1846.  Ugarte,  Aug.  23  ;  Sept.  5. 
Kearny  to  Armijo,  Aug.  1.  Estados  of  troops  in  Zac,  Dur.,  Chih.,  and 
N.  Mex. 

17.  Events  from  Aug.  19  to  Sept.  25  inclusive.  6lWooster,  Sept.  25. 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  169-74  (Kearny).  Sen.  7;  30,  1.  Sen.  Misc.  26; 
30,  1,  pp.  55,  etc.  6lKearny,  Aug.  30;  Sept.  24.  69Kearny,  orders, 
Aug.  27;  Sept.  12.  20lGibson,  diary.  Anzeiger  des  Westens,  Sept.  26; 
Nov.  16.  243Kribben,  home  letter,  Aug.  28.  Wash.  Union,  Oct.  27. 
Prince,  Concise  Hist.,  180,  182.  Niles,  Oct.  10,  p.  90.  Hastings,  diary. 
Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  169-70.  Hughes,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  100-19.  76Vigil, 
reply  to  Kearny,  Aug.  19.  76Letter  from  El  Paso,  Aug.  9.  76Heredia, 
Oct.  17.  Some  of  the  force  did  not  set  out  until  Sept.  26  (Cooke,  Conquest, 
71). 

XV.   CHIHUAHUA 

1.  Willock's  battalion  was  under  Price's  command.  The  Mormons 
were  intended  for  California.  Kearny's  order  to  Doniphan  anticipated 
a  suggestion  made  independently  by  Scott  and  by  Benton  in  November, 
and  forwarded,  with  Polk's  approval,  to  Kearny  on  December  10  by  Marcy. 


518         NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XV,   PAGES  298-302 

Doniphan  was  anxious  to  be  ordered  to  Wool,  and  his  men,  reacting  from 
the  atrocious  conditions  prevailing  at  Santa  Fe  —  of  which  quite  enough 
will  be  heard  in  chapter  xxxi  —  were  eager  to  be  off. 

2.  Arriving  at  Santa  Fe  without  provisions,  the  soldiers  soon  ate  up 
what  supplies  could  be  obtained  there,  and  as  the  people  were  declared  to 
be  American  citizens,  nothing  could  be  taken  without  the  consent  of  the 
owners.  Besides,  Kearny  had  no  adequate  funds.  By  a  surprising 
blunder  the  contracts  for  the  supplies  that  followed  him  called  for  delivery, 
not  at  Santa  Fe,  but  at  Bent's  Fort.  Doniphan's  setting  out  for  the 
south  was  delayed  by  a  lack-  of  provisions.  The  description  of  his  men 
is  based  upon  a  large  number  of  documents  (particularly  the  diaries  of 
Gibson  and  Hastings  and  Ruxton's  Adventures)  which  will  be  cited  when 
the  occupation  of  New  Mexico  comes  to  be  considered  (chap.  xxxi). 

3.  Ruxton  speaks  of  tents,  but  perhaps  he  was  thinking  of  Clark's  men. 
•Doniphan  stated  that  they  marched  across  the  Jornada  without  tents 

(St.  Louis  Republican,  July  3,  1847). 

4.  December  19  Heredia  reported  to  Santa  Anna  that  there  were  108 
infantry  and  320  cavalry  at  El  Paso.  There  is  no  reason  to  suspect  the 
honesty  of  this  report,  and  none  of  the  other  troops  in  the  state  had  time 
to  reach  that  town  before  Christmas.  Some  ex-soldiers,  however,  are 
said  in  Apuntes,  141,  to  have  joined  the  colors,  making  some  1200  in  all, 
including  militia. 

5.  It  is  impossible  to  state  positively  how  many  men  Ponce  de  Le6n 
had.  The  American  accounts  run  as  high  as  1300  (Hughes),  but  evidently 
they  were  not  based  on  reliable  information,  and  very  likely  the  writers 
assumed  that  all  of  Vidal's  troops  were  under  Ponce.  From  the  Mexican 
accounts  it  would  appear  that  such  was  not  the  case.  Vidal  would  natu- 
rally keep  men  back  to  act  as  a  reserve,  hold  what  he  called  his  "line  of 
defence,"  and  guard  his  person;  and  this  probability  is  strengthened  by 
the  fact  that  three  of  his  four  guns  were  not  used  in  the  fight.  The  figures 
of  several  Mexican  accounts  are  about  500.  The  reports  of  the  details  of 
the  skirmish  are  equally  irreconcilable.  El  Brazito  (The  Little  Arm)  was 
the  smaller  (eastern)  of  the  two  channels  into  which  the  river  was  here 
divided  by  an  island. 

6.  Doniphan's  operations  to  Dec.  25  inclusive;  Mex.  preparations  at  the 
Chihuahua  frontier.  6lWooster,  Sept.  25.  268Portrait  of  Doniphan. 
240Kennerly,  narrative.  6lKearny,  special  orders  11.  Sen.  7;  30,  1. 
Richardson,  Journal.  Sen.  Misc.  26;  30,  1,  p.  61.  6lKearny,  orders, 
Sept.  23.  6lDoniphan,  Oct.  20.  6lPrice,  Feb.  26,  1847.  6lScott, 
Nov.  24  and  Marcy's  endorsement,  Dec.  9.  Cooke,  Conquest,  51. 
20lGibson,  diary.  Republicano,  Jan.  26;  Apr.  10,  1847.  Picayune, 
Mar.  6,  18,  1847.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii,  105.  Anzeiger  des 
Westens,  Apr.  11,  14;  May  17,  18,  1847.  243Kribben,  letters,  Oct.  20, 
etc.,  1846.  Wash.  Union,  Mar.  18,  21,  1847.  St.  Louis  Republican, 
July  3,  1847.  Niles,  Mar.  6,  1847,  p.  7 ;  Apr.  3,  p.  71 ;  July  3,  p.  279. 
Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  pp.  496-7  (Don.).  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  171,  1128.  Apuntes, 
141-3.  Elliott,  Notes,  227,  229.  Sen.  23;  30,  1,  pp.  90-6.  Sen.  439; 
29,  1,  p.  2.  (Loss)  Ho.  24;  31,  1.  Ruxton,  Adventures  (London,  1847), 
171-2,  176,  178,  183.  Statement  re  Doniphan  from  Hon.  Champ  Clark, 
Jan.  27,  1906.  Benton,  View,  ii,  686-8.  Mo.  Hist.  Soc.  Colls.,  ii,  no.  4. 
212Hastings,  diary.  Cooke,  Conquest,  39.  Hughes,  Doniphan's  Exped., 
256-67.  Connelley,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  589.  From  76  the  following. 
Trias,  proclaim,  Nov.  19,  1846.     Id.,  Nov.  23;   Dec.  18.     Balmiidez,  El 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XV,   PAGES  303-308         519 

Paso,  Oct.  28.     Vidal,  proclam.,  Dec.  21.     Id.,  Dec.  26.     Heredia,  Dec.  25. 
Ponce  to  Vidal,  Dec.  26.     Gov.  Chih.  to  prefect  El  Paso,  Sept.  19. 

7.  October  22  Marcy,  learning  from  Kearny  that  surplus  troops  might 
be  ordered  to  report  to  Wool  at  Chihuahua,  directed  Taylor  to  notify 
and  instruct  any  such  detachment  in  case  he  (Taylor)  should  decide  to 
have  Wool  join  him  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  365).  It  was  probably  possible 
to  have  a  Mexican  spy  go  from  Parras  to  Chihuahua  and  thence  north 
to  meet  Doniphan,  but  so  far  as  we  are  aware  no  attempt  to  do  this  was 
made. 

8.  The  insurrection  will  be  described  in  chap.  xxxi. 

9.  During  the  stay  at  El  Paso  some  of  the  traders  stole  away,  went  to 
Chihuahua,  and  sold  ammunition  to  the  enemy. 

10.  Lieut.  Col.  Mitchell  had  been  ordered  south  by  Price  in  December 
to  open  communication  with  Wool,  who  was  believed  to  be  approaching 
Chihuahua,  and  Mitchell  had  organized  the  Rangers  as  an  escort.  Chris- 
tian Kribben,  who  commanded  one  of  the  two  companies,  wrote  (Nov.  30) 
that  Mitchell  selected  the  best  men  then  at  S.  Fe.  The  commander  was 
named  Hudson.  (See  also  Richardson,  Journal.)  Mitchell  nearly  reached 
El  Paso  while  Doniphan  was  engaged  with  the  Indians ;  but,  alarmed  by 
reports  of  Mexican  troops,  he  returned  and  joined  Doniphan.  There 
was  no  engineer  in  Doniphan's  command. 

11.  Events  from  Dec.  26  to  Feb.  27  inclusive.  Sen.  Misc.  26  ;  30,  1,  p.  61. 
6lPrice,  Feb.  26,  1847.  6lWooster,  Mar.  7.  Gibson,  diary.  Picayune, 
Mar.  18.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii,  105.  Wash.  Union,  Mar.  18. 
Richardson,  Journal.  228Hughes  to  Miller,  Jan.  26.  Id.  to  war  dept., 
Jan.  25.  Sen.  1;  30,  1,  pp.  498-9  (Don.),  503  (Gilpin).  Apuntes,  143. 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  365,  1128.  Elliott,  Notes,  245.  Ruxton,  Adventures 
(London,  1847),  156,  158,  168.  Kendall,  Narrative,  ii,  35.  Mo.  Hist. 
Soc.  Colls.,  ii,  no.  4.  Hastings,  diary.  Hughes,  Doniphan's  Exped..  256, 
269,  271-4,  280,  286,  289-95,  301-2.  From  76  the  following.  Garcia 
Conde,  Apr.  5.  Comte.  gen.  Chih.,  Oct.  10,  1846.  Heredia,  Jan.  9,  1847. 
Id.  to  S.  Anna,  Dec.  31,  1846;  Jan.  5,  1847.  Gov.  Sonora  to  Busta- 
mante, Feb.  28,  1847.  Trias,  Feb.  7.  The  artillery  arrived  on  Feb.  1, 
but  the  baggage  and  provision  train  not  until  Feb.  5. 

12.  After  the  battle  the  Mexicans  represented  their  forces  as  small ; 
but,  as  Trias  himself  wrote  on  February  20  that  he  would  set  out  the 
next  day  from  Chihuahua  City  with  2000  troops  (it  is  not  probable  that 
he  looked  upon  the  rancheros  as  troops),  and  Garcia  Conde  was  then 
north  of  the  Sacramento  with  about  800  cavalry,  it  seems  impossible  to 
reduce  the  total  given  in  the  text. 

13.  Mexican  preparations  to  defend  Chihuahua;  the  ground  and  the  forti- 
fications. Sen.  Misc.  26;  30,  1,  p.  53.  Gibson,  diary.  Republicano, 
Mar.  25 ;  Apr.  10 ;  June  8.  Anzeiger  des  Westens,  May  17,  18.  Diario, 
Nov.  5,  1846.  Edwards,  Campaign,  127.  Sen.  1;  30,  1,  pp.  498-513. 
Apuntes,  143-6.  Ruxton,  Adventures  (London,  1847),  159.  47Conner, 
May  31,  1846.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Mar.,  1845,  p.  28.  Kendall, 
Narrative,  ii,  63.  Hastings,  diary.  Hughes,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  303-5. 
From  76  the  following.  Garcia  Conde,  Apr.  5,  1847.  Martinez,  Oct.  10, 
1846.  Reyes,  Oct.  9,  1846.  J.  M.  Conde,  Feb.  24;  Mar.  15,  1847.  S. 
Anna,  Oct.  12;  Nov.  11 ;  Dec.  24,  1846;  Jan.  4,  1847.  Tornel,  June  25, 
1846.  Gov.  Durango,  July  27 ;  Sept.  3,  1846.  Re-extracto  of  Sambrano 
letter.  Boletin  no.  8,  Chih.  Reyes  to  Trias,  Oct.  7,  1846.  Comte.  gen. 
Durango,  Aug.  22 ;  Sept.  3  ;  Oct.  30,  1846.     To  Reyes,  Aug.  31 ;  Sept.  9, 


520         NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  XV,   PAGES  308-313 

18,  25,  1846.  Reyes,  Aug.  25;  Sept.  14;  Oct.  2,  6,  1846.  Memo.,  Sept  9. 
To  director  gen.  of  artill.,  Sept.  18.  Patriotic  junta,  plan,  July  27,  1846 
(reported  upon  by  generals,  Sept.  4).  Comte.  gen.  Chih.,  [Sept.]  15,  1846. 
Trias,  Sept.  19;  Dec.  26,  1846;  Feb.  20;  Oct.  26,  1847.  Gov.  Chih., 
July  23,  1846.  Comte.  gen.  Zacatecas,  July  31.  Segundo  cabo,  Chih., 
July  18,  res.,  21,  25;  Aug.  17.  Estados  of  troops  in  Zac,  Dur.,  Chih. 
and  N.  Mex.  Heredia  to  S.  Anna,  Dec.  31,  1846 ;  Jan.  5  ;  Feb.  13,  20,  1847. 
To  Heredia,  Mar.  13,  1847.  Memo,  on  defence  of  Chih.  Heredia,  Oct.  10 ; 
Nov.  2;  Dec.  7,  1846;  Jan.  19,  26,  30;  Feb.  20;  Mar.  2,  22,  1847.  Es- 
tado  of  Dur.  troops  sent  to  Chih.,  dated  Feb.  20,  1847.  To  comte.  gen. 
Dur.,  Sept.  9,  1846.     And  many  others. 

14.  A  letter  of  May  18,  1847,  from  Chihuahua  said  that  in  the  opinion 
of  sensible  persons  commercial  interest  in  the  caravan  had  much  to  do 
with  Doniphan's  victories,  and  that  certain  extraordinary  events  could 
be  explained  in  no  other  way  (Republicano,  June  8).  76Heredia  sus- 
pected that  Chihuahua  merchants  were  secretly  working  to  bring  about 
the  arrival  of  the  caravan. 

15.  Doniphan  might  have  crossed  the  cordillera  bounding  the  eastern 
side  of  the  valley  and  turned  the  Mexican  position  entirely,  wrote  76Garcia 
Conde ;  but  he  did  not  say  that  the  wagons  could  have  gone  that  way. 
If  they  could  not,  the  plan  was  impracticable. 

16.  Doniphan  said  later:  "There  was  no  particular  generalship  at  the 
battle.  You  were  marched  within  the  proper  distance,  when  you  were 
turned  loose.  The  enemy  first  recoiled,  then  gave  way,  then  fled."  To 
a  great  extent  this  was  true.  Doniphan  knew  that  he  was  not  a  general, 
and  did  not  try  to  play  the  part.  For  a  time  at  least  he  merely  watched 
and  whittled  (Edwards,  Campaign,  112).  Affairs  were  mostly  in  the 
hands  of  his  subordinates.  But  he  gave  some  directions.  Lieut.  Wooster 
of  the  Fourth  Artillery,  who  had  arrived  at  Santa  Fe  on  August  28,  was 
on  the  ground,  and  according  to  his  own  report  was  mainly  responsible 
for  the  conduct  of  the  battle. 

17.  Events  of  Feb.  28.  Sen.  1 ;  30, 1,  pp.  498  (Doniphan),  502  (Mitchell), 
503  (Gilpin),  508  (Clark).  (Loss)  Ho.  24;  31,  1.  20lGibson,  diary. 
212Hastings,  diary.  American  Eagle,  V.  Cruz,  May  26.  Richardson, 
Journal,  61-4.  Polk,  Diary,  May  4.  188Edwards,  diary.  Sen.  Misc. 
26;  30,  1,  p.  53.  6lWooster,  Mar.  7.  Republicano,  Mar.  25;  Apr.  10. 
Mexico  &  traves,  iv,  644.  Anzeiger  des  Westens,  May  18  (Kribben). 
Wash.  Union,  July  12.  Diario,  Mar.  17 ;  Apr.  8.  Edwards,  Campaign, 
111-2,  117.  Niles,  July  3,  1847,  p.  279.  Robinson,  Sketches,  57-8. 
Apuntes,  146-9.  Elliott,  Notes,  245.  13Bankhead,  no.  29,  1847.  Cap- 
tain of  Vols.,  Conquest,  38.  Ruxton,  Adventures  (1847),  159.  Mo. 
Hist.  Soc.  Colls.,  ii,  no.  4.  Benton,  View,  ii,  686.  Cooke,  Conquest,  89. 
240Kennerly,  narrative.  Hughes,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  306-13.  Con- 
nelley,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  418,  590.  From  76  the  following.  Garcia 
Conde,  Apr.  5.  J.  M.  Conde,  Mar.  15.  Yanez,  Mar.  23.  To  Heredia, 
Mar.  2,  13.  Heredia,  Mar.  2;  Apr.  1.  Ugarte,  Mar.  10.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  point  out  that  howitzers  and  cavalry  should  not  ordinarily 
be  used  in  storming  entrenched  positions.  Ibarra's  list  of  officers  killed 
during  the  war  (p.  8)  mentions  but  one  as  falling  here.  This  fact  seems  to 
suggest  the  true  character  of  the  battle.  Drawing  the  fire  of  the  Mexican 
fortifications  by  sweeping  to  the  left  prepared  the  way  for  our  decisive  charge. 

18.  Trias  made  active  efforts  but  in  vain.  Heredia  had  only  200  men 
on  April  10 ;  and  Ugarte  on  April  15  merely  expected  to  have  two  small 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XV,   PAGES  313-314  521 

parties  afoot  before  long.  Arlegui,  comandante  general  of  Durango,  was 
anxious  to  protect  his  own  state  by  recovering  Chihuahua,  but  the  governor 
showed  no  interest  in  that  project. 

19.  Sen.  Misc.  26;  30,  1,  pp.  61-2.  Frost,  Taylor,  304,  6lWooster, 
Mar.  7.  Gibson,  diary.  Republicano,  Apr.  10;  June  8.  Wash.  Union, 
July  12.  Sen:  1;  30,  1,  pp.  501  (Doniphan);  503  (Mitchell).  Apuntes, 
149.  Robinson,  Sketches,  62.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  1088  (Mora);  1128 
(Doniphan).  Ronde,  Voyage,  136.  Hastings,  diary.  Hughes,  Doni- 
phan's Exped.,  316,  327,  335.  Richardson,  Journal.  From  76  the  follow- 
ing. Ugarte,  Mar.  15;  Apr.  8,  15.  To  comtes.  gen.  in  Jalisco,  Zacat., 
Guanaj.  and  Dur.,  Mar.  13.  To  Filisola,  Apr.  1,  30.  Gov.  Dur.  to 
comte.  gen.,  Mar.  7;  Apr.  3.  Arlegui,  Mar.  31.  Id.,  proclam.,  Apr.  11. 
Heredia,  Mar.  2,  18;  Apr.  8.  Trias,  May  26.  Olivares  and  Maceyra 
to  Doniphan,  Mar.  5.  Gov.  Zacatecas,  Mar.  18.  The  news  that  Mexican 
forces  were  coming  was  not  without  foundation.  Gen.  Filisola,  a  veteran 
officer,  had  now  been  given  Heredia's  place,  the  comandantes  general  of 
three  states  had  been  ordered  to  the  north,  and  the  governor  of  Durango 
was  expecting  1000  men. 

20.  About  sixty-five  Comanches  had  raided  Parras  just  before  the 
Americans  arrived  there,  killing  eight  or  ten  persons.  As  the  people  of 
the  town  had  been  friendly  to  Wool,  Captain  Reid  with  about  thirty- 
five  men  pursued  the  Indians,  and  without  losing  a  life  killed  seventeen, 
wounded  at  least  twenty-five,  and  recaptured  nineteen  boys  and  girls 
besides  hundreds  of  horses  and  mules.  Doniphan's  men  were  reviewed 
by  Wool  at  Buena  Vista. 

21.  The  return  home.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  1127,  1131,  1136,  1143,  1170 
(Taylor);  1128  (Doniphan);  1144  (Reid).  Richardson,  Journal. 
Hughes,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  339-51,  359,  363-5,  etc.  Sen.  Misc.  26; 
30,  1,  pp.  62-82.  6lWooster,  Mar.  7.  65  Wool,  gen.  orders  293.  Cutts, 
Conquest,  89.  Republicano,  June  8.  Richardson,  Journal.  Independ- 
iente,  May  29.  Wash.  Union,  July  12.  Scharf,  St.  Louis,  i,  379.  Con- 
nelley,  Doniphan's  Exped.,  591.  Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  502.  Captain  of  Vols., 
Conquest,  37,  39.  Cooke,  Conquest,  90,  note.  148Chamberlain,  recoils. 
65Taylor,  gen.  orders  59.  S.  Anna,  Apelaci6n,  app.,  15-7.  Connelley, 
Doniphan's  Exped.,  596.  Mo.  Hist.  Soc.  Colls.,  ii,  no.  4.  Hastings, 
diary.  Niles,  July  3,  1847,  p.  279;  July  17,  p.  316;  Aug.  14,  p.  372. 
Robinson,  Sketches,  64-71.  76Ugarte,  May  3.  76Relaciones,  May  20. 
76Arlegui,  May  7,  14.  76Aguirre,  May  14.  76  Jefe  politico,  Mapimi, 
May  10.  The  distance  from  Chihuahua  to  Saltillo  was  called  675 
miles.  Doniphan  resumed  the  practice  of  law,  managed  his  fine  farm, 
and  served  in  the  Missouri  senate.  When  the  Civil  War  broke  out,  he 
supported  the  Union;  but  apparently  he  felt  too  much  tenderness  for 
his  neighbors  to  take  up  arms. 

XVI.   THE   CALIFORNIA  QUESTION 

1.  In  1845  there  entered  at  Monterey,  the  only  port  of  entry,  twenty- 
seven  American  vessels  (9435  tons),  eighteen  Mexican  (2620),  four  British 
(966),  three  French  (756)  and  three  German  (525). 

2.  Mexico  tried  to  keep  the  emigrants  out  with  proclamations  and 
orders  to  the  California  authorities,  but  the  Americans  appealed  success- 
fully to  the  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  and  (it  may  be  presumed)  to 
the  self-interest  of  local  authorities. 


522         NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XVI,   PAGES  315-319 

3.  The  Mexican  government  was  urged  to  buy  New  Helvetia,  and 
negotiations  began ;  but  it  was  said  that  the  Americans  in  the  valley 
declared  they  would  not  permit  Sutter  to  sell,  and  it  seemed  doubtful 
whether  Mexico  could  hold  the  place  even  if  she  purchased  it. 

4.  California  and  its  population.  13Pakenham,  nos.  66,  78,  1840;  1, 
1842.  13Capt.  Jones  to  Pakenham,  Nov.  30,  1841.  Revue  de  Paris, 
Jan.,  1849.  13Forbes,  no.  2,  1846.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Apr.  26,  1842; 
Nov.  5,  1844.  Madisonian,  Dec.  24,  1842.  77To  gov.  Calif.,  June  1, 
1842.  77 Almonte,  no.  84,  1844.  13Barron,  May  5,  1837 ;  Jan.  20,  1844. 
Id.  to  Seymour,  Jan.  28,  1845.  12Blake  to  Seymour,  July  5,  1846.  52 Ves- 
sels entering  at  Monterey,  1845.  Forbes,  Calif.,  155,  225,  276.  Bulletin 
de  la  Soc.  de  Geog.,  no.  77,  May,  1844,  99-102.  Dana,  Two  Years,  83-8, 
90-3,  200.  Colton,  Three  Years,  19-22,  37-8,  45,  68,  111,  118,  155,  158, 
172-3,  231.  Whittier,  "The  Crisis."  61R.  B.  Mason,  Sept.  18,  1847. 
Sherman  Letters,  43.  Duflot  de  Mofras,  Explor.,  i,  319,  402;  ii,  24. 
Wise,  Gringos,  42,  49.  Ho.  70;  30,  1,  pp.  7-8.  6lKearny,  Mar.  15; 
Apr.  28,  1847.  77Covarrubias,  Apr.  5,  1846.  247March  to  Larkin. 
247Sutter  to  Larkin,  Oct.  3,  1845.  Bidwell,  Calif.,  157,  161.  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  Dec.  15,  1845,  p.  1039.  Sherman,  Sloat,  xv,  xxxix.  St. 
Amant,  Voyages,  513.  Richman,  Calif.,  265,  267,  276.  13Forbes  to 
Barron,  Jan.  27,  1845.  13Elliott,  July  3,  1845.  Royce,  Bidwell.  Boston 
Post,  Nov.  27,  1845.  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corres.,  946.  247Sutter  to 
Larkin,  Oct.  3,  1845.  372Hyde,  statement,  6.  Farnham,  Life,  358-60. 
Diario,  Mar.  21,  1846.  Soule,  Annals,  168,  201.  Sherman,  Home  Letters, 
114%  Niles,  June  6,  1846,  p.  211.  Schafer,  Pac.  Slope,  231.  Simpson, 
Narrative,  i,  287,  297.  Sen.  33;  30,  1,  p.  97.  Revere,  Tour,  70.  Sen. 
Rep.  75;  30,  1,  p.  50.  Sherman,  Mems.,  i,  20.  Bryant,  What  I  Saw, 
447.  Royce,  Calif.,  31-2,  38-9,  41.  123Bidwell,  statement.  Sen.  7; 
30,  1  (Emory).  Larkin,  Calif,  prior  to  1846  (52Cons.  letters,  Monterey, 
i,  1).  Letter  from  S.  Fe,  July  29,  1841;  Mex.  in  1842,  p.  128.  London 
Times,  June  18,  1841.  Phila.  No.  American,  Oct.  31,  1843.  52Larkin, 
nos.  7,  June  20;  9,  Aug.  18,  1844;  12,  Mar.  22;  22,  June  6;  26,  Sept.  29, 
1845. 

5.  Startled  by  this  affair,  the  Mexican  government  now  proposed  to 
send  1200  men  to  California  with  the  idea  of  establishing  them  as  military 
colonists ;  and  in  May,  1845,  Ignacio  Iniestra,  a  Mexican  educated  at 
Paris  and  regarded  as  a  competent  officer,  was  appointed  to  the  chief 
command.  No  such  number  of  troops  was,  however,  provided ;  Iniestra 
refused  to  set  out  until  sure  his  men  would  be  paid  and  fed;  and  the 
requisite  money  was  not  supplied.  In  August  U.  S.  Consul  Parrott  and 
the  Amigo  del  Pueblo  of  Mexico  stated  that  a  commissioner  had  come 
from  California  to  inform  the  government  that  the  troops  would  not  be 
admitted.  About  this  time  the  lack  of  funds  caused  a  mutiny ;  but  that 
was  suppressed,  and  the  dwindling  forces  lingered  on  until,  at  the  end  of 
the  year,  a  large  part  of  them  were  swept  by  Paredes  into  the  vortex  of 
his  revolution.  For  nearly  two  months  they  were  cantoned  near  Mexico ; 
but  finally  another  sham  effort  was  put  forth.  Though  Iniestra  died,  the 
men  proceeded  under  various  embarrassments  —  receiving  accessions  en 
route  from  the  prisons  of  Guadalajara  —  to  the  port  of  Mazatlan,  and  the 
arms,  munitions  and  provisions  made  their  way  under  equal  difficulties 
to  Acapulco,  where  seven  small  vessels  were  gathered  to  receive  them. 
But  the  restless  Juan  Alvarez,  called  "The  Tiger  of  the  South,"  seized 
the  effects  of  the  expedition,  giving  his  brigandage  a  color  of  respectability 


NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XVI,   PAGES  319-323         523 

by  pronouncing,  as  we  have  seen,  against  Paredes,  and  three  weeks  later 
the  troops  at  Mazatlan,  commanded  now  by  Col.  Rafael  Tellez,  took  a 
similar  step  —  being  determined  on  the  one  hand  not  to  go  to  California, 
and  quite  willing  on  the  other  to  live  riotously  on  the  funds  of  the  expedi- 
tion and  the  ample  revenues  of  the  customhouse.  They  pronounced  for 
Santa  Anna;  and  soon  after  the  revolution  of  the  citadel  took  place, 
August  4,  1846,  the  government,  promising  to  make  up  his  command  to 
1000,  ordered  Tellez  to  sail,  but  the  necessary  reinforcements  were  not 
provided.  Tellez  advised  giving  up  the  expedition,  and  on  Sept.  7  the 
government  expressed  its  concurrence  in  this  recommendation.  Thus 
ended  even  the  pretence  of  taking  the  California  situation  in  hand.  Tellez 
stated  that  according  to  documents  in  his  possession  Paredes  never  in- 
tended to  have  the  expedition  sail ;  and  it  is  certain  that  secret  instruc- 
tions were  given  to  Iniestra,  which  the  government  was  extremely  anxious 
to  keep  from  the  knowledge  of  the  public.  In  all  probability  the  real 
purpose  of  proposing  the  expedition  was  merely  to  make  people  feel  that 
something  was  to  be  done.  (13Bankhead,  nos.  13, 1845 ;  74, 1846.  Diario, 
May  4,  1846.     London  Times,  Jan.  8,  1846.     47Wood  to  Bancroft,  June  4, 

1846.  Comunicaci6n  Circular  que  .  .  .  Pefia.  Amigo  del  Pueblo,  Aug.  14, 
1845.  Of  the  author's  very  numerous  76documents  relating  to  the  expedi- 
tion the  following  are  enough  to  cite.     Bustamante  to  Moreno,  Mar.  26, 

1847.  Tornel  to  gov.  Calif.,  May  13,  1846.  N.  Flores,  Mar.  8,  1846. 
Yafiez,  Mar.  10,  23,  1846.  Alvarez,  Mar.  17;  Apr.  7,  1846.  M.  Gu- 
tierrez, May  19 ;  June  16,  1846.  To  J.  I.  Gutierrez,  May  13,  1846.  Tellez 
to  prest.  of  consejo  de  gob.,  July  25,  1846 ;  reply,  Aug.  18.  J.  I.  Gutierrez, 
May  9,  1846.  To  Iniestra,  Mar.  31 ;  May  9,  1845.  Iniestra,  July  31 ; 
Aug.  24,  29;  Sept.  23;  Dec.  2,  24,  1845;  Jan.  5,  18,  24;  Feb.  28,  1846. 
Castanares,  Oct.  27,  1845.  To  Monterde,  Apr.  10,  1846.  T.  Moreno, 
Mar.  3,  1846.  Baneneli  to  Tellez,  May  7,  1846.  Moreno  to  Gutierrez, 
Apr.  16,  24,  1846.  Tellez,  Feb.  9,  27;  Mar.  2;  Apr.  11;  Aug.  24,  26; 
Sept.  2,  1846.     To  Tellez,  Sept.  7,  1846.     See  also  chap,  xxx,  note  27.) 

6.  Mexico  fully  warned.  London  Times,  June  18,  1841 ;  Aug.  6 ;  Oct.  6, 
1845.  77Almonte,  no.  84,  P.,  July  16;  153,  P.,  Dec.  12,  1844.  13Paken- 
ham,  no.  2,  Jan.  6,  1842.  13Bankhead,  nos.  31,  Mar.  31,  1845;  42,  1846. 
77Arrang6iz,  Sept.  17,  1842 ;  nos.  64,  res.,  June  28,  1844 ;  41,  res.,  Feb.  28  ; 
70,  res.,  May  7;  101,  res.,  July  8,  1845.  London  Chronicle,  Aug.  13,  1845. 
Castanares,  Documentos.  75Sanchez,  Apr.  2,  1846.  Bancroft,  Pac. 
States,  xvii,  32.  76Mora  y  Villamil,  Nov.  15,  1845.  76Bustamante, 
Nov.  13,  1845.  76Mil.  comte.,  Acapulco,  July  22,  1845.  76J.  Castro  to 
Castanares,  Oct.  6,  1845.  76/d.,  May  30,  1845.  76Bustamante  to 
Moreno,  Mar.  26,  1847.  In  November,  1845,  the  Mexican  minister  of 
relations  told  Bankhead  that  Castro  could  not  be  punished  for  revolting 
(13Bankhead,  no.  113). 

7.  If  anyone  doubts  this,  let  him  look  at  the  present  populous,  rich,  happy 
state  of  California,  think  how  much  it  contributes  to  the  world,  and  con- 
sider what  it  would  now  be,  had  it  remained  a  part  of  Mexico,  and  suffered 
from  the  anarchy,  devastations  and  massacres  of  recent  years. 

8.  France  had  at  one  time  cast  longing  glances  at  California.  In  the 
early  forties  Duflot  de  Mofras  made  a  Visit  there,  and  according  to  the 
British  vice  consul  in  California  a  formal  offer  of  protection  was  made  by 
him,  Admiral  Du  Petit  Thouars  and  Capt.  Laplace  in  the  name  of  their 
government  (13Forbes  to  Barron,  Sept.  5,  1844) ;  but  the  time  for  such  a 
move  was  not  then  ripe,  and  France,  aside  from  maintaining  a  consular 


524         NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XVI,   PAGES  319-323 

representative  on  the  ground,  became  inactive.  England  was  even  less 
responsive.  While  many  British  subjects,  particularly  the  correspondent 
of  the  London  Times  at  Mexico  (e.g.  Times,  Sept.  9,  1845),  felt  that  Eng- 
land should  take  California,  the  British  government,  though  doubtless 
extremely  anxious  that  the  territory  should  not  fall  into  the  possession  of 
the  United  States,  refused  to  move  or  countenance  any  move  in  that 
direction.  December  31,  1844,  the  Foreign  Office  wrote  to  Consul  Barron 
at  Tepic,  Mexico,  who  had  charge  of  Vice  Consul  Forbes  at  San  Francisco, 
that  in  the  California  agitation  the  British  agents  were  to  be  entirely 
passive,  and  that  the  idea  of  a  British  protectorate  could  not  be  coun- 
tenanced, adding  that  the  authorities  of  California  "  should  be  clearly 
made  to  understand  that  Great  Britain  would  view  with  much  dissatis- 
faction the  establishment  of  a  protectoral  power  over  California  by  any 
other  foreign  State."  Other  documents  bearing  on  the  subject  are  the 
following.  13Forbes  to  Barron,  Sept.  5,  1844.  Kennedy  in  London 
Times,  June  18,  1841.  13Pakenham,  nos.  91,  Aug.  30,  1841 ;  61,  July  21, 
1842.  13To  Id.,  Dec.  15,  1841.  Bankhead,  nos.  74,  July  30,  1845; 
73,  May  30,  1846.  13To  Bankhead  (exactly  in  line  with  the  despatch 
addressed  to  Barron  on  the  same  day),  nos.  53,  Dec.  31,  1844 ;  18,  May  31, 
1845 ;    16,  June  1 ;    4,  Aug.  15,  1846.     108Ashburton  to  Sturgis,  Apr.  2, 

1845  ("we  certainly  do  not  want  colonies,  and  least  of  all  such  as  would 
be  unmanageable  from  this  distance,  and  only  serve  to  embroil  us  with 
our  neighbours").  13Mora  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  15,  1847.  London 
Times,  Oct.  6,  1845.  12For.  Off.  to  Admty.,  June  19,  1846.  Webster, 
Writings,  xviii.,  192.  12Seymour  to  Admty.,  Apr.  27,  1846.  Monitor 
Repub.,  Apr.  16,  1846.  52Everett,  Mar.  28,  1845.  Gordon,  Aberdeen, 
183.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  155,  230,  417.  Mackintosh,  Brit,  consul 
at  Mex.,  proposed  to  place  500,000  European  colonists  in  California  in 
twenty  years  (13to  Bankhead,  July  26,  1845)  with  a  view  to  turning  over 
to  England  the  control  of  the  province  (13Bankhead,  no.  73,  May  30,  1846). 
Paredes  promised  to  give  " every  possible  facility"  for  the  execution  of 
this  plan  (13Bankhead,  no.  73),  but  the  British  government  would  not 
take  it  up. 

9.  Mexican  rule  to  the  end  of  1845.  13Forbes,  nos.  1,  Oct.  19,  1843; 
2,  Jan.  26,  1846.  Boston  Advertiser,  Sept.  26,  1842.  Nat.  Intelligencer, 
May  11,  1844.  London  Times,  Aug.  6;  Oct.  6;  Nov.  11,  1845;  Mar.  13, 
1846.  Revue  de  Paris,  Jan.,  1849.  77Almonte,  nos.  84,  P.,  July  16; 
153,  P.,  Dec.  12,  1844.  13Barron,  May  5,  1837 ;  Feb.  18,  1845.  lZld. 
to  Seymour,  Jan.  28,  1845.  13Pakenham,  nos.  13,  1837;  66,  1840;  91, 
1841;  2,  1842.  13Doyle,  no.  79,  1843.  13Bankhead,  nos.  108,  1844; 
31,  52,  113,  1845;  73,  1846.     Paredes,  address  on  opening  Cong.,  June  6, 

1846  (Diario).  Mobile  Commercial  Register,  June  13,  1843.  Diario, 
Mar.  27;  June  3 ;  Aug.  21,  1845.  Wash.  Globe,  May  29;  Oct.  21,  1845. 
Amigo  del  Pueblo,  Aug.  14,  1845.  St.  Louis  New  Era,  Aug.  20,  1845. 
Memphis  Eagle,  Oct.  1 ;  Nov.  5,  1845.  52Black,  Sept.  2, 1845.  Britannia, 
May  15,  1847.  52Virmond  to  Jones,  Feb.  4,  1837.  52Larkin,  nos.  9, 
Aug.  18;  11,  Oct.  30;  12,  Dec.  9,  1844 ;  16,  Jan.  1 ;  1,  Mar.  22;  2,  Mar.  22; 
20,  Mar.  24;  25,  July  10;  26,  Sept.  29,  1845.  247Stearns  to  Larkin, 
May  14,  1846.  52Parrott,  Aug.*26,  1845.  12Blake  to  Seymour,  July  5, 
1846.  12Seymour,  June  13.  Otero,  Cuesti6n  Social,  117.  Gimenez, 
Memorias,  90.  Mexico  a  travel,  iv,  404.  52Burroughs  to  Ellis,  Jan.  10, 
1837.  77Castillo,  no.  119,  1835.  (Simpson)  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  xiv,  pp. 
88-9.     Memoria   de  .  .  .  Relaciones,    Mar.,    1845.     Royce,    Calif.,    202. 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVI,   PAGES  323-326         525 

Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra,  Jan.,  1844;  Mar.,  1845.  Mateos,  Hist.  Pari., 
v,  98.  Bandini,  Calif.,  138.  13Jones  to  Pakenham,  Nov.  30,  1841. 
Lowenstern,  Le  Mexique,  84.  13Diaz  to  Barron,  Sept.  29,  1845.  Lon- 
don Chronicle,  Aug.  13,  1845.  47Wood  to  Bancroft,  June  4,  1846.  St. 
Louis  Reveille  (weekly),  May  18,  1846.  77Arrang6iz,  Jan.  9;  Sept.  17, 
1842;  nos.  64,  res.,  1844;  70,  res.,  76,  res.,  101,  res.,  1845.  Gordon, 
Aberdeen,  183.  Forbes,  Calif.,  146-52.  Bulletin  de  la  Soc.  de  Geog., 
no.  77,  p.  186.  Castanares,  Documentos.  Colton,  Three  Years,  20,  22, 
32.  Argonaut,  Feb.  2,  1878  (Sutter's  diary).  Sherman  Letters,  43-4. 
13Forbes  to  Barron,  Aug.  9;  Sept.  5,  1844;  Jan.  27;  Mar.  10,  1845. 
Ho.  70;  30,  1,  pp.  7-8,  42.  75P.  Pico,  July  1,  1845;  Feb.  13,  1846. 
7$Covarrubias,  Apr.  5,  1846.  75Sanchez,  Apr.  2,  1846.  75Calif.  Com- 
mission, Aug.  10,  1846.  Reforma,  Feb.  10,  1846.  122Bidwell,  Calif., 
119,  123.  SAlvarado,  Calif.,  v,  129.  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Dec.  15, 
1845,  p.  1037.  Richman,  Calif.,  273-9.  334Torres,  Peripecias,  49. 
Blackmar,  Span.  Instits.,  10-12.  Walpole,  Four  Years,  ii,  205.  N.  Y. 
Journ.  Commerce,  Dec.  30,  1846.  llCyprey  to  Guizot,  no.  58,  1841. 
Wilkes,  Narrative,  v,  171.  13Aberdeen  to  Bankhead,  no.  53,  1844. 
Sen.  7;  30,  1.  52Larkin,  Calif,  prior  to  1846  (Cons,  letters,  Monterey, 
i,  1).  Dana,  Two  Years,  90-1,  200.  (Prussia)  52Everett,  no.  284,  con- 
fid.,  Mar.  28,  1845.  And  from  76  the  following.  To  gov.  Calif.,  Apr.  1, 
1845;  May  9,  1846.  Tellez,  Mar.  23,  1846.  Alvarez,  Mar.  17,  1846. 
Guerra,  circular,  Apr.  1,  1845.  Comte.  gen.  Igaala,  Mar.  13,  1846.  Mora 
y  Villamil,  Nov.  15,  1845.  Bustamante,  Nov.  13,  1845.  J.  Castro, 
memo.,  undated.  Id.,  Oct.  6,  1845.  Castanares,  Jan.  27,  1846.  Estado, 
Monterey,  June  15,  1845.  Castro  and  Alvarado,  May  30,  1845.  Sutter 
to  Mex.  commr.,  Nov.  19,  1845.  Castafieda  to  P.  Pico,  Feb.  10,  1846. 
Carrera,  Apr.  8,  1846. 

10.  Interest  of  the  American  -people  in  California.  13Pakenham,  no.  63, 
1841.  N.  Orl.  Commercial  Bulletin,  Feb.  19,  1840 ;  May  21 ;  Oct.  12,  1841. 
London  Times,  June  18,  1841 ;  Aug.  1,  1845.  N.  Y.  Journ.  Commerce, 
Oct.  9,  1841 ;  Feb.  23,  1842.  St.  Louis  Reveille,  Sept.  17,  1845.  Wash. 
Globe,  Feb. -27;  Aug.  23;  Oct.  21;  Nov.  4,  1845.  Nashville  Union, 
Mar.  13,  1845.  Memphis  Eagle,  May  2  ;  Nov.  5,  1845.  N.  Orl.  Picayune, 
Apr.  21,  1842 ;  Apr.  5,  1844 ;  Nov.  25,  1845 ;  Mar.  31,  1846.  13Bank- 
head,  no.  113,  1845.  Savannah  Republican,  Apr.  25,  1845.  N.  Orl. 
Courier,  Feb.  17,  1840;  Apr.  26;  July  10,  1845.  American  Review, 
Jan.,  1846,  82-99.  Diario,  Nov.  3,  1845.  Charleston  Courier,  July  11, 
1845.  Journal  des  Debats,  June  1,  1846.  Richmond  Enquirer,  Sept.  12, 
1845.  Bait.  Clipper,  Mar.  2,  1840.  N.  Y.  Herald,  Feb.  22,  1845.  (Regu- 
lations) 52Larkin,  no.  8,  June  24,  1844.     Charleston  Mercury,  Feb.  24, 

1845.  N.  Orl.  Bee,  Apr.  19,  1842.  Phila.  North  American,  Nov.  1,  1845. 
N.  Y.  Tribune,  Apr.  5,  1845.  Forbes,  Calif.,  147-8.  Dana,  Two  Years, 
200.  Southwestern  Hist.  Qtrly.,  xviii,  nos.  1-3  (R.  G.  Cleland).  .(Whalers) 
Hunt's  Merchants'  Mag.,  Jan.,  1845.  Cong.  Globe,  29,  1,  p.  197  (Allen) ; 
app.,  Hunter,  Jan.  10,  1846.  Sen.  33 ;  30,  1,  p.  98.  77Almonte,  no.  84, 
P.,  July  16,  1844.     77Arrang6iz,  71,  res.,  May  12,  1845. 

11.  Views  and  policy  of  U.  S.  government.  Ho.  42 ;  25,  1,  p.  18  (Forsyth, 
Aug.  6,  1835).     52Ellis,  Sept.  24,  1836.     108Hooper  to  Bancroft,  June  25, 

1846.  52Slidell,  no.  3,  Dec.  17,  1845.  13Pakenham,  nos.  43,  1833;  63, 
91,  1841.  13Forbes,  no.  2,  Jan.  26,  1846.  London  Times,  June  18,  1841 ; 
Aug.  6 ;  Sept.  9 ;  Oct.  6  ;  Nov.  19,  1845  ;  Apr.  11,  1846.  77Mex.  commrs., 
Feb.  16,  1842.     52Larkin  to  Stearns  et  al.,  Apr.  17,  1846.     Journal  des 


526  NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XVI,   PAGES  326-330 

Dtbats,  July  10,  1843;  Jan.  12;  June  1,  1846.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  399. 
Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  27,  1845.  52Everett,  no.  284,  confid.,  Mar.  28,  1845. 
52Shannon,  Jan.  9,  1845.  Gilmer  in  U.  S.  Ho.  Repres.,  Jan.  28,  1843. 
N.  Y.  Courier  and  Enquirer,  Nov.  17,  1845.  77Almonte,  no.  4,  res.,  Jan.  10, 
1843 ;  84,  P.,  July  16,  1844.  52Thompson,  nos.  1,  Apr.  29 ;  4  July  30, 1842. 
56W.  S.  Parrott,  May  13 ;  Sept.  2,  1845.  Constitutionnel,  Oct.  13,  1844 ; 
Mar.  29,  1845;  July  9,  1846.  National,  Sept.  4,  1845.  52Wickliffe  to 
Buchanan,  private,  [June]  3,  1845.  N.  Y.  Journ.  Commerce,  Feb.  23,  1842. 
Harvey,  Webster,  203-4.  52Buchanan  to  Slidell,  no.  1,  Nov.  10,  1845. 
Adams,  Mems.,  xi,  346,  355.  Curtis,  Webster,  ii,  250.  Forbes  to  Barron, 
Mar.  10,  1845.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Apr.  19.  Buchanan  to  Larkin,  Oct.  17, 
1845.     Charleston  Mercury,  July  12,  1845.     Charleston  Courier,  Nov.  12, 

1845.  Forbes,  Calif.,  149.  Mofras,  Exploration,  i,  517.  Smith,  Annex, 
of  Texas,  109.     Polk,  Diary,  Oct.  24,  1845.     St.  Louis  Reveille,  Apr.  29, 

1846.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  i,  45.  247Hastings  to  Larkin,  Mar.  3, 
1846.  247Allerton  to  Larkin,  Mar.  4,  1846.  247Sutter  to  Larkin,  Oct.  3, 
1845.  1  Allen  in  U.  S.  Sen.,  Aug.  6,  1846.  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes, 
Dec.  15,  1845,  pp.  1037,  1043.  Vallejo,  Documentos.  Van  Tyne,  Letters 
of  Webster,  269.  Texas  Review,  Jan.,  1917,  p.  217  (Barker).  Schafer, 
Pac.  Slope,  229.  Reeves,  Amer.  Diplomacy,  280-1.  52Flower  to  Van 
Buren,  Feb.  8,  1840.  52Kelley  to  Webster,  Jan.  2,  1842.  Kelsey,  Con- 
sulate, 7,  35,  etc.  52Larkin,  nos.  8,  June  24 ;  9,  Aug.  18,  1844 ;  Mar.  22 ; 
25,  July  10;  26,  Sept.  29;  29,  Dec.  31,  1845;  37,  Mar.  9;  42,  Apr.  17; 
44,  June  1,  1846.  Webster,  Writings,  xviii,  203-4.  N.  Orl.  Picayune, 
Nov.  25,  1845.  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corres.,  978.  35lThompson  to  Web- 
ster, Jan.  30,  1843.  Monitor  Repub.,  Apr.  16,  1846.  Royce,  Calif.,  38-9. 
122Bidwell,  Calif.,  138.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv,  398,  539-40.  Rich- 
mond Enquirer,  Sept.  12,  1845.  77Arrang6iz,  no.  41,  res.,  Feb.  28,  1845. 
13Crampton  to  Palmerston,  no.  63,  1848.  London  Chronicle,  Aug.  13, 
1845.  Democratic  Review,  July,  1845,  p.  9.  48Bancroft  to  Sloat,  Mar.  21, 
secret  and  confid.,  Oct.  17,  1845.  Southwestern  Hist.  Qtrly.,  xviii,  nos.  1-3 
(R.  G.  Cleland).     Meade,  Letters,  i,  65. 

12.  For  the  facts  merely  alluded  to  here  see  pp.  127-8,  130-4.  (Vir- 
tually forbid)  chap,  iv,  note  24.  Polk's  announcement  that  he  should 
endeavor  to  obtain  California  (Schouler,  United  States,  iv,  498)  is  suffi- 
ciently explained  by  his  attempts  to  purchase  it.  When  he  determined 
to  lay  our  grievances  before  Congress,  it  is  not  certain  that  he  expected 
war  to  result.  He  seems  to  have  felt  that  a  determined  stand  on  our  part 
might  bring  Mexico  to  terms.  And  his  promptly  taking  advantage  of 
the  rights  conferred  by  the  state  of  war  to  occupy  the  territory  and  bar 
out  foreign  interference  counts  for  nothing  as  proof  that  he  brought  on 
the  war  for  the  alleged  purpose.     See  e.g.  Von  Hoist,  U.  S.,  iii,  266. 

13.  Bancroft's  history  of  California,  which  at  times  is  rather  free  in  its 
conclusions,  denies  that  such  a  meeting  was  held  (Pacific  States,  xvii, 
61-2).  His  principal  reasons  are  lack  of  corroborative  evidence,  the 
silence  of  Larkin,  and  the  inconsistencies  in  the  accounts  of  it.  But 
(1)  we  have  corroborative  evidence  from  several  persons ;  (2)  Larkin 
may  not  have  wished  to  mention  a  confidential  talk  held  under  his  own 
roof  —  especially  as  it  accomplished  nothing ;  and  (3)  inconsistencies 
are  found  in  the  accounts  of  many  events.  On  the  other  hand  some 
accounts  of  the  meeting  have  no  doubt  been  exaggerated  and  embellished. 

14.  Bancroft  (Pacific  States,  xvii,  200)  says  there  is  no  evidence  that 
Gillespie  had  official  relations  with  Sloat ;  but  Sloat's  47report,  February 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVT,   PAGES  326-330  527 

25,  1846,  said  that  in  accordance  with  "the  verbal  orders  he  delivered  me," 
Gillespie  was  immediately  sent  forward. 

15.  Although  no  formal  meeting  took  place  at  Santa  Barbara,  Capt. 
Blake,  of  the  British  warship  Juno,  who  went  there,  was  appealed  to  for 
protection  on  the  ground  that  Mexico  and  England  were  allied  nations 
(12Seymour  to  Admiralty,  Aug.  27,  1846).  Some  proposed,  should  Eng- 
land refuse  it,  to  address  France.  About  this  time  an  Irish  priest  named 
McNamara  arrived  in  a  British  vessel  with  a  grand  scheme  of  colonization, 
and  obtained  an  immense  grant  of  land.  The  scheme  was  much  talked 
about,  but  signified  nothing.  The  grant  was  illegally  made.  Mexico, 
though  she  treated  McNamara  pleasantly  did  not  endorse  the  plan,  and 
in  all  probability  would  not  have  confirmed  such  a  grant,  had  California 
remained  under  her  jurisdiction,  for  she  was  extremely  suspicious  of  Eng- 
land, and  could  see  that  10,000  British  colonists  would  be  a  dangerous 
element.  Indeed,  McNamara  was  suspected  at  Mexico  of  acting  in  the 
interest  of  England.  A  few  of  the  documents  bearing  on  this  subject  are  : 
Ramirez,  Mex.,  246;  Ho.  17;  31,  1  (Halleck,  Cuevas,  Castillo  y  Lan- 
zas); Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xvii,  215-23;  Sen.  Report  75;  30,  1  (testi- 
mony of  Fremont  and  others ;  the  McNamara  papers) ;  Royce,  California, 
166;  52Larkin,  no.  56,  Aug.  22,  1846;  335McNamara,  proposition, 
May  17,  1845. 

16.  Politics  in  California,  Jan-June,  1846.  13 Jones  to  Pakenham, 
Nov.  30,  1841.  108Hooper  to  Bancroft,  June  25,  1846.  13Forbes,  no.  2, 
Jan.  26,  1846.  Boston  Advertiser,  May  27,  1843.  13Forbes  to  Barron, 
Sept.  5,  1844;  Jan.  27;  Mar.  10,  1845.  13To  Barron,  Dec.  31,  1844. 
Diario,  Aug.  21,  1845.  52J.  Castro  to  P.  Pico,  June  8,  1846.  12Blake 
to  Seymour,  July  5,  1846.  52Larkin  to  Stearns  et  al.,  Apr.  17,  1846. 
13To  Bankhead,  no.  53,  1844.  47Sloat  to  Bancroft,  Feb.  25,  1846. 
47Wood  to  Bancroft,  June  4,  1846.  12Seymour  to  admty.,  Aug.  27,  1846. 
Colton,  Three  Years,  429.  247Stearns  to  Larkin,  May  14,  1846.  13Forbes 
to  Calif,  govt.,  Jan.  28,  1846.  13Seymour  to  Bankhead,  June  13,  1846. 
13Pico  to  Forbes,  June  29,  1846.  13Barron,  Aug.  12,  1846.  52Military 
junta,  Monterey,  Apr.  11,  1846.  52Larkin  to  Gillespie,  Apr.  23,  1846. 
52Larkin,  circular  (in  Spanish).  Sherman  Letters,  43.  13 J.  A.  to  A. 
Forbes,  July  9,  1846.  Sen.  18;  31,  1,  p.  574  (Stevenson).  75P.  Pico  to 
Relaciones,  Feb.  13,  1846.  75Covarrubias  to  Relaciones,  Apr.  5,  1846. 
75S;£nchez  to  Relac,  Apr.  2,  1846.  Bancroft,  Pacific  States,  xvii,  41-75, 
215-22.  247Allerton  to  Larkin,  Mar.  4,  1846.  247Larkin  to  Bennett, 
May  26,  1846 ;  to  Stearns,  May  24,  1846.  247Stearns  to  Larkin,  June  12, 
1846.  Revere,  Tour,  24.  Buchanan  to  Larkin,  Oct.  17,  1845.  122Bid- 
well,  Calif.,  138,  147,  151.  Alvarado,  Calif.,  v,  129-43,  222,  241.  126Bo- 
tello,  Anales,  133,  136.  Phelps,  Fore  and  Aft,  284.  Amer.  Hist.  Rev., 
xiv,  88-9.  Richman,  Calif.,  316,  474.  Ramirez,  Mexico,  246.  Lancey, 
Cruise.  343Vallejo,  Documentos.  334Torres,  Peripecias,  48-9.  Wal- 
pole,  Four  Years,  ii,  208.  Ho.  17;  31,  1,  p.  121.  Hall,  S.  Jose,  143. 
Sen.  33;  30,  1,  p.  377.  McGroarty,  Calif.,  190-1.  Sen.  Report,  75;  30, 
1,  pp.  12,  16  (Fremont),  19,  31,  33  (Gillespie),  37  (Hensley),  44  (Minor), 
46  (Childs).  Sherman,  Sloat,  56,  xv.  263Mervine  to  Sloat,  July  1,  1846. 
Swasey,  Early  Days,  57,  81.  Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  pp.  604-7  (Benton). 
Willey,  Transition  Period,  19.  Kelsey,  Consulate,  45,  51.  Royce,  Calif., 
36,  166.  123Bidwell,  statement.  52Larkin,  Calif,  prior  to  1846  (Consular 
letters,  Monterey,  i,  1).  52ld.,  nos.  4,  Apr.  16;  9,  Aug.  18,  1844;  20, 
Mar.  24;   26,  Sept.  29,  1845;   39,  Apr.  2;   42,  Apr.  17;   44,  June  1;   48, 


528         NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  331-332 

June  18 ;  54,  July  20 ;  56,  Aug.  22,  1846 ;  63,  Jan.  14,  1847.  13Crampton 
to  Palmerston,  nos.  35,  63,  1848.  76P.  Pico  to  Relac,  June  29,  1846. 
76M,  proclams.,  May  [13];  June  23,  1846.  76Vallejo,  Nov.  24,  1845. 
76Pico,  May  25,  1846.  76J.  Castro,  Mar.  5;  Apr.  1,  2;  May  30,  1846. 
76Castro  and  Alvarado,  May  30,  1845. 

XVII.   THE  CONQUEST  OF   CALIFORNIA 

1.  Fremont's  clash  with  Castro.     13Forbes  to  Barron,  Jan.  26.     Sen.  1 ; 

29,  2,  pp.  50-1.     Benton,  View,  ii,  580,  688.     67Abert  to  Fr6mont,  Feb.  12, 

1845.  13Pakenham,  no.  130,  1846.  13Forbes  to  Calif,  govt.,  Feb.  28. 
62 Adj.  gen.  to  Benton,  Nov.  2,  1847.     75 J.  Castro  to  P.  Pico,  Jan.  30, 

1846.  75Fremont  to  J.  Castro,  Jan.  29.  247Larkin's  memoranda  and 
correspondence  with  Fremont  and  others  on  the  subject.  52ld.,  nos.  36, 
38,  Mar.  5,  27 ;  41,  Apr.  17,  1846 ;  63,  Jan.  14,  1847.  3Alvarado,  Hist, 
de  Calif.,  239.  Phelps,  Fore  and  Aft,  279.  Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xvii, 
4-23.  Fremont,  Mems.,  i,  454-70.  Id.,  Geog.  Memoir.  Niles,  Nov.  21, 
1846,  pp.  188-9.  Diario,  Apr.  24.  Sen.  33 ;  30,  1,  pp.  372-4  (Fremont 
here  states  that  he  was  given  permission  to  explore  south  of  the  Colorado, 
and  was  on  his  way  to  do  so  when  stopped  by  Castro.  This  permission 
does  not  appear  in  the  documents  of  March,  1846.  It  may  have  been 
given  very  incidentally,  and  this  may  have  been  the  cause  of  the  trouble) . 
Bandini,  Calif.,  139.  Sen.  Report  75;  30,  1,  pp.  12,  16.  Richman, 
Calif.,    308.     Tuthill,    Calif.,    163.     Sherman,    Sloat,    xv.     Cong.    Globe, 

30,  1,  pp.  604-5.  Kelsey,  Consulate,  96.  76Castro,  Mar.  6;  Apr.  1. 
76Larkin  to  alcalde,  Mar.  10.     Journ.  Mil.  Serv.  Instit.,  xxxi   711. 

Rives  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  172-3)  decides  roundly  against  Fremont, 
and  cites  for  support  a  letter  from  the  prefect  to  Larkin  demanding  the 
reason  for  Fremont's  movements ;  but  it  was  perfectly  in  accord  with 
Mexican  methods  that  such  a  letter  should  have  been  written  purely  to 
satisfy  the  authorities  at  Mexico. 

2.  Gillespie's  mission.  Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  p.  605.  247Gillespie  to 
Larkin,  May  24.  13J.  A.  to  A.  Forbes,  July  9.  Polk,  Diary,  Oct.  30, 
1845.  247Leidesdorff  to  Larkin,  Apr.  25,  1846.  Buchanan  to  Larkin, 
Oct.  17,  1845.  Atlantic  Monthly,  Oct.,  1890,  pp.  548,  etc.  Sen.  33 ;  30, 
1,  373.  Ho.  Report  817;  30,  1.  Sen.  Report  75;  30,  1,  pp.  12,  30. 
Fremont,  Mems.,  i,  489.  Century  Mag.,  N.  S.,  xix,  923.  Calif.  Hist. 
Soc.  Papers,  i,  pt.  1  (1887),  pp.  69-72.  52Larkin,  no.  44,  June  1.  52ld. 
to  Stearns  el  al.,  Apr.  17.  Benton,  View,  ii,  689.  Cooke,  Conquest,  203-4. 
Royce,  Bidwell. 

Gillespie  took  to  Fremont  a  letter  of  introduction  from  Buchanan  and 
letters  from  Fremont's  father-in-law,  Senator  Benton.  The  former  was 
entirely  non-committal;  and  the  latter,  while  very  likely  they  contained 
veiled  allusions  to  conversations  in  which  the  desire  of  the  administration 
to  acquire  California  had  been  mentioned,  must  have  been  like  it  in  that 
respect,  else  Gillespie  would  not  have  dared  to  carry  them  through  Mexico. 

3.  The  evidence  on  this  point,  including  Fremont's  positive  statements 
made  not  long  after  the  event,  is  conclusive  (Polk,  Diary,  March  21,  1848 ; 
Senate  Report  75;  30,  1,  pp.  13,  32;  132Benton,  Feb.  18,  1848;  Ho. 
Report  817 ;  30,  1,  p.  4 ;  52Larkin  to  P.  Pico,  July  5,  1846.  Speaking  in 
the  Senate,  April  10,  1848  (Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  p.  604),  Benton,  though 
feeling  extremely  bitter  toward  Polk  and  no  doubt  fully  informed  by  his 
son-in-law  and  client  regarding  all  the  facts,  did  not  intimate  that  any 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  332-333         529 

instructions  inconsistent  with  the  instructions  of  Larkin  were  sent  to 
Fremont.  Indeed  he  stated  the  contrary.  See  also  his  Thirty  Years 
View,  ii,  689. 

4.  Fremont  stated  before  a  committee  of  the  Senate  that  he  had  learned 
from  Bancroft  that  Polk's  plan,  in  case  of  war,  contemplated  the  occupa- 
tion of  California ;  but  Fremont  wrote  to  Capt.  Montgomery  of  the  Ports- 
mouth, June  16,  1846,  that  even  in  the  case  of  war  he  was  not  expected  to 
prosecute  "active  hostilities."  In  1886  Bancroft  stated  that  Gillespie 
was  to  inform  Fremont  of  the  President's  intentions. 

5.  First,  many  of  the  settlers  had  ample  reasons  to  feel  alarmed :  the 
illegality  of  their  presence ;  Castro's  sudden  and  cruel  seizure  of  Americans 
in  1840;  his  attack  upon  Fremont  in  violation  (the  Americans  believed) 
of  a  promise ;  official  notices,  issued  about  May  1,  to  the  effect  that  the 
majority  of  the  Americans  were  liable  to  be  expelled  at  the  convenience 
of  the  authorities ;  Castro's  warlike  preparations ;  his  talk  of  moving 
against  the  immigrants  with  armed  forces  (52Larkin,  no.  42,  April  17) ; 
and  reports,  more  or  less  authentic  and  reliable,  from  various  persons 
regarding  what  he  said  or  intended.  Secondly,  the  contemporary  testi- 
mony of  Fremont,  Gillespie  and  other  Americans  —  some  of  it  given 
under  oath  —  that  alarm  was  actually  felt  is  too  strong  to  be  rejected 
(see  note  6).  Much  has  been  made  of  Bidwell,  a  clerk  of  Sutter's,  who 
tells  us  that  alarm  was  not  felt.  But  (1)  his  123Statement  was  made 
thirty  years  after  the  events ;  (2)  he  admits  that  he  was  not  on  good  terms 
with  Fremont,  and  the  Statement  aims  to  show  that  Fremont  invented 
the  story  of  alarm  as  an  excuse  for  his  conduct ;  (3)  his  Statement  is  in 
other  respects  clearly  inaccurate;  (4)  it  assumes  that  he  knew  the  senti- 
ments of  all  the  persons  on  the  Sacramento,  yet  proves  that  an  important 
fact  may  have  been  known  to  but  few;  (5)  it  shows  that  at  the  critical 
time  he  was  absent  in  the  mountains;  (6)  it  says,  " Calif ornians  were 
always  talking  of  expelling  Americans"  [and  therefore  were  talking  of  it 
in  April,  1846] ;  (7)  his  book  mentions  that  in  1845  an  attack  upon  New 
Helvetia  was  so  confidently  expected  that  he  rode  day  and  night  to  warn 
Sutter;  (8)  he  undertakes  to  disprove  positive  testimony  with  negative. 
The  legitimate  settlers  had  no  direct  occasion  to  feel  alarmed;  but,  as 
Bidwell  himself  points  out,  they  could  not  have  held  aloof,  had  an  attempt 
been  made  to  expel  their  fellow-countrymen.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to 
suppose  that  the  Americans  who  joined  Fremont  in  these  operations  were 
actuated  solely  by  patriotism  and  the  idea  of  self-defence. 

6.  The  Bear  movement.  (Starred  citations  refer,  among  other  facts,  to 
the  alarm  felt  by  Americans.)  *12Blake  of  Juno  to  Seymour,  July  5. 
Benton,  View,  ii,  691.  12Seymour  to  admty.,  Aug.  27,  1846.  75M. 
Castro  to  Calif,  govt.,  Jan.  29.  Niles,  Nov.  21,  1846,  p.  191 ;  Oct.  16, 
1847,  p.  110.  Colton,  Three  Years,  175.  Cooke,  Conquest,  204-11. 
13J.  A.  to  A.  Forbes,  July  9,  14.     13P.  Pico  to  J.  A.  Forbes,  June  29. 

52M.  Castro  to ,  [Apr.  30].     52Larkin  to  M.  Castro,  June  14.     *52lde, 

proclams.,  June  15,  18.  52J.  Castro,  proclams.,  June  17.  52P.  Pico, 
proclam.,  June  23.  52/d.  to  Larkin,  June  29.  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  pp.  51-2. 
Buchanan  to  Larkin,  Oct.  17,  1845.  52J.  Castro  to  Larkin,  undated. 
247Larkin  to  Stearns,  Apr.  17.  52Larkin  to  Pico,  July  5.  48Bancroft 
to  Sloat,  June  24;  Oct.  17,  1845.  123Bidwell,  statement.  Royce,  Bid- 
well.  Willey,  Thirty  Years,  10.  256Marcy  to  Wetmore,  Dec.  5,  12. 
McGroarty,  Calif.,  192.  Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xvii,  39-48,  101-86,  199. 
Apuntes,  353-4.     247Gillespie  to  Larkin,  May  24;    June  7.     247Larkin 

vol.  i  —  2  fcl 


530       NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  333-334 

to  Mott,  Talbot  &  Co.,  June  18.  Peters,  Kit  Carson,  269.  247Leides- 
dorff  to  Larkin,  Mar.  19;  June  19.  247Montgomery  to  Larkin,  July  2. 
247Vallejo  to  Larkin,  Sept.  15  ;  to  J.  Castro,  July  23.  122Bidwell,  Calif., 
*141-2,  161,  etc.  *3Alvarado,  Calif.,  184.  *Phelps,  Fore  and  Aft,  279, 
284,  291.  Oakland  (Cal.)  Tribune,  June  30,  1914.  *Richman,  Cali- 
fornia, 308-14.  249Leese,  Bear  Flag  Papers,  9.  105Baldridge,  Days  of 
1846.  Diario,  Dec.  27,  1846.  *Colton,  Deck  and  Port,  389.  247Guerrero 
to  Leidesdorff,  Apr.  30.  314Sawyer  papers.  Polk,  Diary,  Sept.  1.  Niles, 
Nov.  14,  1846,  p.  174;  Nov.  21,  p.  191  (Fremont  to  Benton,  July  "25") ; 
Oct.  16,  1847,  p.  110  (Fremont's  declaration  of  June  6).  *Upham,  Fre- 
mont, 228.  Century  Mag.,  N.  S.,  xix,  1917  (Mrs.  F.),  780  (Royce),  782. 
Schafer,  Pacific  Slope,  258.  263Mervine  to  Sloat,  July  1.  Cong.  Globe, 
30,  1,  p.  606  (Benton).  52Larkin,  Calif,  prior  to  1846.  *Sen.  33;  30,  1, 
p.  374.  Ho.  Report,  817,  30,  1,  p.  4.  Bandini,  Calif.,  142.  Revere, 
Tour,  64.  *Sen.  Report,  75;  30,  1,  pp.  12,  13,  25-9,  32-4,  38-40.  *Sher- 
man,  Sloat,  xv  (Gillespie's  note).  *Swasey,  Early  Days,  49.  Nat.  In- 
telligencer, Nov.  11.  *Willey,  Transition  Period,  39,  42.  Kelsey,  Consu- 
late, 15,  72.  Royce,  Calif.,  132.  Atlantic  Monthly,  Oct.,  1890,  pp.  548-57. 
52Larkin,  nos.  *41,  Apr.  17;  *48,  June  18;  53,  July  18;  54,  July  20,  1846; 
63,  Jan.  14,  1847.  *Californian,  i,  nos.  3-5.  76Pico  to  Relac,  June  29. 
76Pico,  procl.,  June  23.  76M.  Castro  to  Pico,  June  19.  76Alvarado, 
June  28.     76Narvaez  (undated).     *  Journ.  Mil.  Serv.  Instit.,  xxxi,  715. 

7.  As  Sloat  was  in  personal  intercourse  with  Gillespie  about  Feb.  20-22, 
he  probably  learned  from  him  something  more  about  the  intentions  of 
our  government. 

8.  480ct.  17,  1845,  Bancroft  wrote  to  Sloat,  "In  the  event  of  actual 
hostilities  between  the  Mexican  Government  and  our  own,"  you  will 
carry  out  "the  instructions  [of  June  24]  forwarded  to  you  from  the  Dept. 
in  view  of  such  a  contingency."  Rives  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  168)  draws 
a  sharp  distinction  between  the  "actual  hostilities"  of  this  order  and  the 
"declaration  of  war"  of  June  24.  But  (1)  Bancroft  said,  Oct.  17,  "actual 
hostilities"  [not  between  forces  in  the  field  but]  between  the  two  govern- 
ments ;  and  (2)  in  his  last  quoted  words  above  he  indicated  that  the  two 
orders  contemplated  precisely  the  same  [not,  as  Rives  holds,  a  different] 
contingency.  As,  therefore,  the  order  of  June  24  was  the  formal  and 
fundamental  one,  Sloat  had  a  technical  ground  for  falling  back  upon  it, 
whereas  an  officer  of  broad,  clear  views,  decided  character  and  unselfish 
loyalty  would  have  acted  more  promptly,  even  at  a  slight  personal  risk. 
To  do  him  justice,  the  reader  should  recall  that  many  Senators  refused  to 
believe  that  the  border  hostilities  were  hostilities  between  the  two  govern- 
ments (p.  182) ;  and  also  that  Sloat  was  old  and  not  robust,  and  that  he 
had  the  case  of  T.  A.  C.  Jones  before  his  eyes. 

9.  We  find  both  July  1  and  2  given  as  the  date  of  his  arrival.  The 
log  book  of  his  vessel  says  that  she  anchored  at  Monterey  July  1,  and 
that  Larkin  came  aboard  July  2.  As  he  would  have  gone  aboard  as  soon 
as  possible,  it  seems  probable  that  the  vessel  arrived  July  1  at  night. 

10.  Capt.  Mervine  wrote,  July  6,  to  Capt.  Montgomery  that  Larkin 
believed  Castro,  Pico  and  others  would  meet  the  following  day  to  de- 
liberate about  declaring  independence  and  hoisting  the  American  flag. 

11.  Sloat  stated  later  that  he  acted  on  his  own  responsibility  in  taking 
possession  of  California ;  and  in  fact  the  orders  of  May  13  did  not  reach 
their  destination  until  about  August  28  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  229). 

12.  It  has  been  said  (Bancroft,  Pacific  States,  xvii,  250)  that  Sloat 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  334-336        531 

merely  pretended  to  have  based  his  action  on  Fremont's  operations,  so 
as  to  have  a  way  of  escape  should  he  be  blamed;  but  (I)  we  should  not 
without  evidence  accuse  him  of  lying,  (2)  he  showed  strong  feeling  when 
he  learned  that  Fremont  had  acted  without  authority  {e.g.  Baldridge, 
Days  of  1846 ;  Sen.  33 ;  30,  1,  p.  178),  and  (3)  as  a  rational  man  he  could 
not  fail  to  be  influenced  greatly.  Bancroft  says  (ibid.,  227)  that  Sloat 
learned  from  Larkin  that  Fremont's  cooperation  with  the  insurgents 
was  not  certain ;  but  he  admits  (ibid.,  228-9)  that  on  July  5  a  launch 
from  the  Portsmouth,  then  lying  at  San  Francisco,  brought  proof  that 
Fremont  was  so  doing;  and  the  next  day  Sloat  and  Larkin,  according 
to  the  log  book  of  the  Savannah,  were  busy  preparing  the  proclamation, 
etc.  Royce  (California,  158)  places  against  Fremont's  testimony  (that 
Sloat  said  his  action  had  resulted  from  Fremont's)  the  fact  that  Larkin 
did  not  so  state ;  but  silence  is  not  equal  in  strength  to  assertion,  and 
Fremont  is  supported  by  Gillespie  (Sen.  Report  75;  30,  1,  p.  32),  by  Wil- 
son of  the  Savannah  (ibid.,  41),  by  Sloat's  private  secretary  (Baldridge, 
Days  of  1846),  by  Sloat's  anxiety  to  obtain  Fremont's  cooperation,  and 
by  the  resentment  that  he  exhibited  on  finding  that  Fremont  had  acted 
without  authority  (Sen.  33;  30,  1,  p.  178).  See  also  Benton,  Abr.  Deb., 
xvi,  17. 

13.  August  27,  1846,  12Seymour  wrote  to  the  Admiralty:  "My  prin- 
cipal object  has  been,  for  many  months,  to  be  at  hand  to  prevent  or  re- 
tard it  [the  American  occupation  of  California],  if  I  should  be  directed  to 
take  any  proceedings  for  these  purposes."  It  was  presumably  to  wait 
for  orders  that  he  placed  himself  at  San  Bias.  What  led  him  to  sail  for 
Monterey,  however,  as  he  did  on  June  14,  was  not  Sloat's  leaving  Maza- 
tlan, but  news  that  the  Santa  Barbara  convention  was  likely  to  declare 
for  independence  (13Seymour  to  Bankhead,  June  13).  Had  that  been 
done,  he  would  have  felt  that  he  had  a  ground  on  which  to  oppose  Amer- 
ican occupation,  though  he  thought  that  a  large  body  of  reliable  colonists 
would  be  necessary  to  establish  British  ascendancy  (12ld.,  Aug.  27). 
When  he  arrived  at  Monterey  he  was  aware  that  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  were  at  war,  and  this  was  in  his  opinion  an  additional  reason  for 
inaction  (12ld.,  Aug.  27) ;  but  he  wrote  to  Pico  that  American  occupation 
should  be  regarded  as  merely  provisional  (12to  Pico,  July  23) .  Sir  Thomas 
Johnson,  commanding  a  British  sloop-of-war  off  Mazatlan,  showed  his 
sympathies  by  constantly  giving  the  Mexicans  information  about  our 
vessels  (76Gutierrez,  Apr.  8,  1846,  res.). 

14.  Sloat  also  guaranteed  land  titles.  This  was  impracticable.  In 
annexing  California  he  exceeded  his  authority. 

15.  Sloat's  operations,  etc.  47Sloat,  Nov.  19 ;  Dec.  3,  1845 ;  Feb.  25 ; 
Mar.  17;  Apr.  8,  30;  May  31;  June  6,  1846.  47/d.  to  Howison,  Apr.  1, 
1846;  to  Montgomery,  Apr.  1.  47Wood  to  Bancroft,  June  4.  Benton, 
View,  ii,  692.  Bulletin  de  la  Soc.  de  Geog.,  no.  77.  12Seymour  to  admty., 
no.  47,  Aug.  27,  1846 ;  to  Pico,  July  23.  Dana,  Two  Years,  78-9,  90. 
Sherman,  Address.  Wise,  Gringos,  47.  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  258-64. 
247Sloat  to  Larkin,  May  18.  247Larkin  to  Stearns,  Aug.  — .  N.  Y. 
Herald,  Mar.  4,  1880.  Davis,  Sixty  Years,  196.  Hist.  Soc.  of  So.  Calif., 
viii,  77  (Barrows).  47Conner,  Oct.  9,  1846.  13Seymour  to  Bankhead, 
June  13.  13A.  Forbes  to  Bankhead,  Aug.  1.  13J.  A.  Forbes  to  A.  Forbes, 
July  14.  52J.  Parrott,  June  4.  13Letter  from  Mazatlan,  Aug.  4.  13Sey- 
mour  to  J.  A.  Forbes,  July  22.  52Larkin  to  J.  Castro,  July  8;  reply 
July  9.     52ld.  to  Alvarado,  July  8 ;    reply,  July  9.      142Carson,  recoils. 


532        NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  336-337 

52Sloat,  gen.  orders,  July  14.  47Conner,  Aug.  26.  48-9Bancroft  to  Sloat, 
June  24;  Oct.  17,  1845;  May  13,  15;  June  8;  July  12;  Aug.  13  (two), 
1846.  108J.  Parrott  to  Buchanan,  private,  July  23,  1846.  Duflot  de 
Mofras,  Explor.,  i,  400-6.  Sen.  1;  29,  2,  pp.  378-9.  Bancroft,  Pac. 
States,  xvii,  204,  etc.  247Larkin  to  Ten  Eyck,  Sept.  19.  247Frazer  to 
Larkin,  Aug.  27.  4Amador,  mems.,  169.  247Atherton  to  Larkin,  Dec.  3. 
3Alvarado,  Hist.,  214-9.  Proceeds.  U.  S.  Naval  Institute,  1888,  pp.  539- 
40.  Bennett,  Steam  Navy,  91.  N.  Orl.  Picayune,  Oct.  23,  1848.  Sher- 
man, Sloat,  passim.  120Fauntleroy  to  Biddle,  Mar.  12,  1847.  Phelps, 
Fore  and  Aft,  291.  Richman,  Calif.,  315.  Mexico  a  traves,  iv,  643-4. 
Diario,  Aug.  16;  Oct.  16,  1846.  i06Lancey,  cruise  (logbook  of  Savannah). 
105Baldridge,  Days  of  1846.  Walpole,  Four  Years,  ii,  204.  Wash.  Union, 
Sept.  24;  Oct.  3,  26.  Ho.  1;  30,  2,  pp.  1013-4,  1019-20.  Dunbar, 
Romance,  38.  Sherman,  Home  Letters,  85.  Niles,  Oct.  10,  1846,  p.  87. 
Sen.  Report  75;  30,  1,  pp.  13,  32,  40,  44,  70-4.  Century  Mag.,  N.  S., 
xviii,  794.  N.  Y.  Nation,  xlviii,  141,  Hittell,  Calif.,  ii,  466.  295Pinto, 
Apuntaciones,  104.  Sen.  33 ;  30,  1,  pp.  374,  377.  Ho.  Rep.  817 ;  30, 
1,  pp.  4-5.  Ho.  4 ;  29,  2,  pp.  649-67.  Revere,  Tour,  55,  77.  Fremont, 
Mems.,  534,  539.  172Cyane  log  book.  263Mervine,  letter  book.  Swasey, 
Early  Days,  60.  Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  pp.  606-7.  Royce,  Calif.,  157-61. 
S^Larkin,  nos.  1  (descript.  of  Calif.) ;  52,  July  10 ;  53,  July  18 ;  54  and 
55,  July  20.  76Gutierrez,  no.  42,  res.,  Apr.  8.  76To  Castro,  May  9; 
July  25.  76To  comte.  gen.  Sonora,  July  25.  76To  min.  of  eccles.  affrs., 
July  25.     76Monterey  estado,  Apr.  1.     76S.  Anna,  Oct.  30. 

16.  Stockton  sailed  from  Norfolk  on  the  Congress  in  October,  1845. 
Some  mystery  has  been  attached  to  his  sealed  orders  (Bancroft,  Pacific 
States,  xvii,  251) ;  but  they  were  merely  to  sail  via  the  Sandwich  Islands 
fpr  Monterey,  deliver  the  original  of  the  despatch  of  October  17  to  Larkin, 
and  then  join  Sloat's  squadron.  For  his  character  see  e.g.  Royce,  Cali- 
fornia, 179;  330Taylor  to  brother,  January  19,  1848;  108Appleton  to 
Bancroft,  April  27,  1847 ;  Porter,  Kearny,  6,  7 ;  Sherman,  Home  Letters, 
1Q8 ;   Quincy,  Figures,  230-40. 

17.  One  aim  of  the  proclamation  was  doubtless  to  provide  a  way  of 
escape  for  the  United  States  and  its  agents  in  case  there  should  be  no  war, 
but  even  from  this  point  of  view  it  was  ridiculous.  Sloat  repudiated  the 
reasons  for  his  action  that  were  ascribed  to  him  by  Stockton. 

.  18.  Castro  and  the  Californians  generally  did  not  believe  that  war  had 
been  declared,  and  of  course  Larkin's  letter  to  Stearns  tended  to  confirm 
their  opinion.  Had  it  proved  correct,  Stockton  would  soon  have  been 
making  apologies  like  T.  A.  C.  Jones.  This  may  help  to  explain  Castro's 
firm  attitude.  The  Life  of  Stockton  attempts  to  explain  Ins  haughty 
and  menacing  language  as  due  to  Castro's  military  preponderance  and 
the  necessity  of  intimidating  him.  Stockton  himself  said  later  that,  as 
Castro  had  no  authority  from  the  central  government  to  make  terms,  it 
would  have  been  useless  to  treat  with  him ;  but  Castro  could  have  laid 
down  his  arms,  and  that  was  the  vital  point  just  then.  Stockton's  other 
reasons  (Ho.  1;  30,  2,  pp.  1041-2)  are  equally  unsatisfactory.  Bancroft 
(Pacific  States,  xvii,  269)  expresses  the  belief  that  Stockton  did  not  wish 
to  make  terms  with  Castro  and  the  other  officials,  but  to  eliminate  them. 
This  is  quite  possible.  Probably  temperament  and  thirst  for  glory  counted. 
Stockton's  pretence  (in  his  reply  to  Castro)  that  since  the  two  countries 
were  at  war,  he  could  not  suspend  hostilities  until  Castro  should  raise 
the  American  flag,  was  absurd.     Truces  have  often  been  made  during 


NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  336-339         533 

war,  and  never  during  peace.  This  was  enough  —  especially  as  it  came 
after  Larkin's  overture  —  to  show  Castro  he  could  expect  nothing  from 
Stockton. 

19.  76Later  Castro  complained  bitterly  that  after  forsaking  all  for 
Mexico  he  had  to  beg  for  bread. 

20.  Stockton's  regime  to  Sept.  30.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Relaciones,  Dec, 
1846.  Colton,  Three  Years,  16,  25,  28-9,  32,  56,  175,  180.  Cooke, 
Conquest,  213-6.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  265-8.  247Larkin  to  Stearns, 
Aug.  — ,  1846.  61R.  B.  Mason,  Sept.  23,  1847.  Sec.  navy  to  Stockton, 
Aug.  18,  1846.  13J.  A.  to  A.  Forbes,  July  14 ;  Sept.  22,  1846.  13Sey- 
mour  to  Bankhead,  July  22,  1846.  Californian,  i,  no.  1.  47Stockton, 
proclam.,  Aug.  22.  47/d.  to  Fremont,  July  23 ;  Aug.  24,  1846.  47Flores 
to  Stockton,  Aug.  7.  47Stockton  to  Bancroft,  July  25 ;  Aug.  22 ;  Sept.  19 ; 
Oct.  1 ;  Nov.  23.  Id.  to  Mervine,  Sept.  19.  Bancroft  to  Sloat,  Aug.  13. 
Mason  to  Stockton,  Nov.  5,  1846;  Jan.  11,  1847.  Bancroft  to  Stock- 
ton, Oct.  17,  1845.  108Appleton  to  Bancroft,  Apr.  27,  1847.  Wise, 
Gringos,  50,  70.  Royce,  Bidwell.  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  pp.  52,  379.  Sen.  31;; 
30,  2,  pp.  1-3.  Bancroft,  Pacific  States,  xvii,  143.  4Amador,  mems., 
169.  115Belden,  statement,  48.  3Alvarado,  Calif.,  v,  239-41.  16lJour- 
nal  of  the  Congress,  1846.  17lJournal  of  the  Cyane,  1846.  Cutts,  Con- 
quest, 125.  Phelps,  Fore  and  Aft,  299,  300.  Richman,  Calif.,  318'. 
109Bandini,  documentos.  Walpole,  Four  Years,  ii,  215.  Sen.  31 ;  30, 
2,  pp.  9-14.  Wash.  Union,  Oct.  26;  Dec.  4,  1846.  295Pinto,  Apun- 
taciones,  104.  Diario,  Oct.  16.  Statement  to  the  author  by  Asst.  Sec. 
of  the  navy  Roosevelt.  Sherman,  Home  Letters,  108.  Du  Pont,  Official 
Despatches,  1.  Quincy,  Figures,  230,  etc.  Proceeds,  of  U.  S.  Naval 
InstiL,  xxiv.,  pt.  1,  270  (Neeser).  Sen.  33;  30,  1,  pp.  10,  83,  109-10, 
118-9,  175,  178-83,  374,  377.     Ho.  70;   30,  1,  pp.  36-41,  43-5.     Ho.  i; 

29,  2,  pp.  657-8.  Ho.  1;  30,  2,  pp.  1034-42.  Ho.  19;  29,  2,  p.  104. 
McGroarty,  Calif.,  199.  Bandini,  Calif.,  143.  Revere, l  Tour,  55,  77-80. 
Sen.  Report  75;  30,  1,  pp.  17,  47,  51.  Ho.  Report  817;  30,  1,  p.  9. 
263Mervine  to  Stockton,  Sept.  16.  Swasey,  Early  Days,  73.  Porter, 
Kearny,  6-7.  Life  of  Stockton,  120-3,  157-8.  Bryant,  What  I  Saw1, 
330,  366.  Royce,  Calif.,  177-84.  123Bidwell,  statement.  52Larkiri, 
nos.  54,  55,  58,  1846.  And  the  following  from  76.  J.  Castro,  July  13; 
Sept.  9,  1846;  June  5,  1847.  To  comte.  gen.  Calif.,  May  9;  July  25. 
To  comte.  gen.  Sonora,  July  25.  Stockton  to  Castro,  Aug.  7.  Castr6 
to  Stockton,  Aug.  7.  Id.,  procls.,  Aug.  9,  10.  Id.  to  consuls,  Aug.  9. 
Moreno  to  Bustamante,  Mar.  20,  1847.  Castafieda  to  Pico,  Feb.  10,  1846. 
Bustamante  to  Castro,  June  23,  1847. 

21.  In  a  proclamation  of  October  1  Flores  charged  that  the  Americans 
were  dictating  "arbitrary  and  despotic  laws"  and  crushing  the  people 
with  exactions  intended  to  ruin  them.  His  aim  was  announced  as  the 
expulsion  of  the  Americans.  All  Mexicans  and  Calif ornians  15-60  years 
old,  not  joining  the  insurgents,  were  declared  to  be  traitors  and  under 
penalty  of  death.  All  Americans  acting  directly  or  indirectly  against  the 
insurgents  were  to  lose  their  property  and  be  sent  into  Mexico  as  prisoners. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  many  Californians,  especially  in  the  north,  had 
been  deprived  of  their  property  —  particularly  horses  and  saddles  —  by 
Fremont's  men  in  the  name  of  the  United  States,  and  that  many  had 
suffered  personal  abuse  (Sen.  33 ;  30,  1 ;  pp.  97,  etc. ;   Ho.  Report,  817 ; 

30,  1;  Sen.  Report  75;  30,  1;  Colton,  Three  Years,  155).  Colton  esti- 
mated that  in  all  1200  Californians  were  in  arms  at  one  time. 


534        NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  338-342 

22.  Flores  charged  that  Gillespie  violated  the  terms  and  Gillespie 
denied  this  vigorously.  Gillespie  seems  to  have  interpreted  the  terms, 
which  were  loosely  drawn,  with  a  view  to  the  advantage  of  his  side,  and 
Flores  to  have  judged  largely,  if  not  entirely,  from  what  he  supposed  to 
be  Gillespie's  intentions.  We  have  not  sufficient  data  to  say  more.  A 
misunderstanding  was  very  natural,  and  possibly  Gillespie,  since  he  was 
dealing  with  perjured  men,  thought  it  right  to  take  every  advantage  he 
could.  Flores  sent  parties  to  San  Diego  and  Santa  Barbara,  and  captured 
those  places.  Capt.  Merritt  of  the  California  Battalion,  commanding 
at  the  former  place,  took  refuge  on  a  whale-ship.  Lieut.  Talbot,  com- 
manding at  Santa  Barbara,  refused  to  surrender,  and  with  his  eight  or  ten 
men  made  an  extremely  brave  escape  through  the  mountains. 

23.  At  this  point  Mervine's  log  book  was  extremely  bitter  with  reference 
to  Stockton,  whom  it  described  as  vain,  selfish,  cowardly,  false  and  ignorant 
of  naval  life  and  duties.  The  Captain  was  doubtless  smarting  under  his 
repulse,  due  (he  asserted)  to  Stockton's  selfishness  in  retaining  all  his  field 
pieces.  Stockton  explained  his  going  to  San  Diego  by  saying  that  San 
Pedro  was  not  a  good  base,  and  there  was  force  in  this  view ;  but  it  was 
much  nearer  to  Los  Angeles,  and  certainly  he  should  have  decided  whether 
it  was  a  good  base  before  attempting  to  use  it  as  such.  San  Diego  had 
been  recovered  by  Merritt  and  others  (Proceeds.  U.  S.  Naval  InstiL,  1888, 
p.  544).     Lieut.  Minor  of  the  navy  now  commanded  there. 

24.  Kearny's  march;  battle  of  S.  Pascual.  Colton,  Three  Years,  153, 
180.  Cooke,  Conquest,  84-6.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  153,  242.  Hist.  Soc. 
So.  Calif.,  iii,  pt.  2,  pp.  55-66.  337Turner,  diary.  6lKearny  to  adj. 
gen.,  Oct.  3,  11.  62Marcy  to  gov.  Mo.,  June  3.  Ho.  41 ;  30,  1,  pp.  551- 
63,  567-614.  47Stockton,  Feb.  4,  1847.  Polk,  Diary,  May  25,30; 
June  2,  1846.  6lEmory  to  adj.  gen.,  Feb.  2,  1847.  Hughes,  Doniphan's 
Exped.,  204-30.  6lWooster  to  adj.  gen.,  Sept.  25,  1846.  Apuntes, 
359-60.  Bidwell,  Calif.,  200.  126Botello,  Anales,  154-6.  Phelps,  Fore 
and  Aft,  315.  177Davis,  statement.  290Pico,  documentos,  105,  115. 
Nat.  Intelligencer,  Apr.  23,  1847.  Journal  U.  S.  Artillery,  July,  1892, 
p.  294;  Oct.,  1892,  p.  413.  Sen.  1;  30,  1,  pp.  513-6.  Sen.  33;  30,  1, 
pp.  31,  41,  46,  64-5,  129-33,  161,  186-9,  204,  272,  331.  McGroarty, 
Calif.,  261.  Sen.  7;  30,  1  (Emory).  Ho.  1;  30,  2,  pp.  236,  1049-50. 
Sen.  31;  30,  2,  pp.  24-7.  (Losses)  Ho.  24;  31,  1.  Peters,  Kit  Carson, 
281.  Porter,  Kearny,  14-23.  Life  of  Stockton,  134-6.  76Flores,  Dec.  11, 
1846 ;   Mar.  31,  1847.     207Griffin,  journal. 

Including  servants  and  quartermaster's  men,  Kearny  probably  had  at 
least  150 ;  but  precisely  how  many  took  part  in  the  fighting  one  cannot 
say  —  perhaps  not  more  than  80.  Some  of  the  men  had  to  guard  the 
baggage  and  manage  the  howitzers,  and  probably  others  did  not  reach 
the  front  in  time.  The  howitzers  were  tied  up  with  rawhide  ;  when  made 
ready  they  could  not  fire  at  first  because  the  two  parties  were  mixed  in  a 
hand-to-hand  struggle ;  and  when  they  were  preparing  to  do  so  later, 
one  was  carried  away  by  frightened  mules  and  captured  by  the  enemy. 
Botello,  who  talked  with  Pico  after  the  fight,  says  that  Pico  was  afraid 
forces  from  San  Diego  would  attack  him,  should  he  continue  to  operate 
against  Kearny,  and  also  that  Pico's  horses  were  now  too  much  exhausted 
to  be  serviceable.  207Griffin  thought  the  Californians  drew  off  to  make 
sure  of  keeping  the  howitzer.  It  seems  clear  that  Pico  did  not  retire  from 
fear  of  Kearny  —  unless  possibly  from  fear  of  his  guns.  Dec.  7  Kearny 
advanced  a  short  distance,  drove  some  Californians  from  a  rocky  hill  near 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  338-345         535 

San  Bernardo,  and  occupied  it.  In  the  night  of  Dec.  10-11  Lieut.  Gray 
and  about  215  men  from  San  Diego  reinforced  him.  Lieut.  Beale  of  the 
navy  and  the  scout  Christopher  ("Kit")  Carson  made  their  way  past  the 
enemy  with  remarkable  courage  and  endurance,  to  inform  Stockton  of 
Kearny's  desperate  situation,  and  arrived  just  as  Gray  was  setting 
out. 

25.  The  troops  were  all  on  foot  except  Gillespie's  men.  Stockton 
had  two  9-pounders  and  four  smaller  pieces. 

26.  Only  six  shells  were  captured  with  the  howitzer  at  San  Pascual, 
and  owing  to  its  construction  the  gun  could  use  no  other  ammunition. 
Flores  reported  that  he  had  also  a  6-pounder,  a  3-pounder,  and  a  2-pounder 
(76Mar.  31). 

27.  The  insurrection  in  the  south.  330Taylor  to  brother,  Jan.  19,  1848. 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  266-8.  Hist.  Soc.  So.  Calif.,  iii,  pt.  1,  pp.  47-54; 
ix,  p.  19.  237Kearny  to  Stockton,  [Jan.  13,  1847].  47Flores,  procl., 
Oct.,  1846.  47/d.  to  Stockton,  Jan.  1,  1847.  47Stockton  to  Bancroft, 
Nov.  23,  1845;  Jan.  11,  15;  Feb.  4,  5,  1846.  5lQueen  to  Henderson, 
Apr.  30,  1848.  6lR.  B.  Mason,  Oct.  7,  1847.  6lEmory,  Feb.  2,  1847. 
373Evans,  narrative.  376Nicholson,  recoils.  Kell,  Recoils.,  29,  80. 
12Admty.  records,  class  1,  5577,  enclosure  in  Y  93.  Apuntes,  355-61. 
247Gillespie  to  Larkin,  Nov.  29,  1846.  247Larkin  to  wife,  Dec.  14,  1846. 
llSBelden,  statement.  3Alvarado,  Calif.,  v,  220,  240,  267-8.  126Bo- 
tello,  Anales,  140,  158-61.  Colton,  Three  Years,  64,  74,  78,  82,  95,  98, 
123,  131,  169-70,  201.  Proceeds.  U.  S.  Naval  Instit.,  1888,  pp.  139,  539- 
49.  Phelps,  Fore  and  Aft,  311,  316-19.  Parker,  Recoils.,  50.  Richman, 
Calif.,  317.  334Torres,  Peripecias,  49.  103Avila,  notas.  258Marshall, 
recoils.  Upham,  Fremont,  258.  Morrell,  Four  Voyages,  201.  171  Jour- 
nal of  the  Cyane.  Wash.  Union,  Apr.  23  ;  May  7  ;  July  24,  1847.  N.  Y. 
Journ.  Commerce,  Apr.  2,  1847.  Diario,  Dec.  1,  1846 ;  Jan.  24,  1847. 
Sherman,  Home  Letters,  100.  Schafer,  Pacific  Slope,  266.  Sen.  33 ;  30, 
1,  pp.  47-323.  Ho.  70;  30,  1,  p.  45.  Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  pp.  516-7.  Ho.  1 ; 
30,  2,  pp.  1045-54,  1065-70.  McGroarty,  Calif.,  246-52.  Bandini, 
Calif.,  143,  146.  Revere,  Tour,  164-6.  Sen.  7;  30,  1  (Emory).  Sen. 
Report  75 ;  30,  1,  pp.  49-52.  Sen.  31 ;  30,  2,  pp.  15-20,  22-4,  30-6 
(Stockton).  207Griffin,  diary.  (Losses)  Ho.  24;  31,  1.  172Cyane  log 
book.  263Mervine  to  Stockton,  Oct.  25  (2).  Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  p.  608 
(Benton).  Porter,  Kearny,  7-9,  25-9.  Life  of  Stockton,  129-48  and 
appendices.  Cutts,  Conquest,  156,  197,  203,  207.  Bryant,  What  I 
Saw,   330.     Royce,   Calif.,   185-94.     47Stockton  to    Bancroft,   July  25, 

1846.  52Larkin,  no.  63,  Jan.  14,  1847.  And  from  76  the  following. 
Flores,  Sept.  30;  Oct.  7,  9,  24,  25,  1846;  undated;  Jan.  2;  Mar.  31  (2), 

1847.  Carrillo,  Oct.  8,  1846.  Gillespie  to  Flores,  Oct.  2  (2),  3  (2),  4.. 
Flores  to  Gillespie,  Oct.  4  (2).  Flores-Gillespie,  terms  of  capitulation, 
Sept.  29.  Carrillo  to  Flores,  Oct.  9.  To  Flores,  Feb.  6,  1847.  Busta- 
mante,  Mar.  8,  13,  1847.  Moreno  to  Bust.,  Mar.  20,  1847.  Stockton, 
procl.,  Jan.  5,  1847.  Flores  to  Stockton,  Jan.  1,  1847.  And  others  of 
minor  importance.     Jan.  9  some  Mexicans  charged  our  front. 

28.  Fremont's  methods  were  unscrupulous.  He  promised  the  men 
large  pay,  and  took  horses,  saddles,  etc.,  where  he  could  get  them  (Sen. 
Report  75;  30,  1,  particularly  Wilson,  p.  42).  Probably  he  intended  to 
pacify  the  owners  later  by  paying  liberally.  Apparently  one  must  accept 
the  explanation  of  his  policy  proposed  in  the  text,  or  ascribe  to  him  a 
tenderness  not  suggested  by  his  choice  of  a  profession  and  his  conduct  in 


536        NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVII,   PAGES  345-347 

June,  or  accuse  him  —  as  did  many  at  the  time  —  of  a  cowardice  that 
would  explain,  after  all,  only  a  part  of  the  facts. 

29.  It  is  particularly  singular  that  Fremont  did  not  use  the  Savannah 
to  communicate  with  Stockton. 

30.  The  reports  of  Flores  show  that  Fremont's  approach  embarrassed 
the  insurgents.  Fremont  now  had  six  guns.  January  10  Kearny  wrote 
a  note  to  Fremont  stating  that  the  Americans  were  entering  Los  Angeles. 

31.  For  later  events  see  chap.  xxxi.  Disturbances,  resulting  partly 
from  the  insurrection  in  the  south  and  partly  from  depredations  com- 
mitted by  Americans,  occurred  in  the  north.  Monterey  was  threatened, 
and  some  fighting  occurred  near  San  Francisco  Bay ;  but  those  who  had 
taken  up  arms  to  protect  their  property  gladly  laid  them  down  (about  the 
time  Stockton  entered  Los  Angeles)  when  satisfied  there  would  be  no  more 
plundering,  and  the  treaty  of  Cahuenga  quieted  those  still  acting  in  sym- 
pathy with  Flores.  (See  particularly  Colton,  Three  Years,  73-6,  86,  152, 
155,  158,  170;  Bancroft,  Pacific  States,  xvii,  378-383;  lOAram,  state- 
ment; 4Amador,  memorias,  175;  Aldrich,  Marine  Corps,  95.)  During 
these  troubles  Larkin  was  made  a  prisoner,  and  but  for  the  fear  of  reprisals 
might  have  suffered  severely  for  what  the  Calif ornians  regarded  as  double- 
dealing.  Just  before  leaving  California  Flores  released  him.  (See  par- 
ticularly 52Larkin,  no.  63,  January  14,  1847 ;  Bryant,  What  I  Saw,  361 ; 
263Mervine  to  Fremont,  Nov.  21.) 

32.  Fremont's  operations.  316Fulsom  to  Sherman,  Jan.  9,  1848. 
47Stockton  to  Bancroft,  Nov.  23,  1846;  Jan.  11,  15,  1847.  Colton, 
Three  Years,  98.  47Fremont,  orders,  Jan.  12,  1847.  122Bidwell,  Calif., 
203.  258Marshall,  recoils.  Bryant,  What  I  Saw,  365-94.  Sen.  33 ;  30, 
1,  pp.  6,  73-7,  119-21,  131,  184,  194,  260,  377-9,  405.  Ho.  1 ;  30,  2,  pp. 
1045,  1052,  1067-9.  Revere,  Tour,  78.  Sen.  Report  75 ;  30,  1,  pp.  40-2 
(Wilson),  50  (Russell).  Sen.  31;  30,  2,  pp.  18,  21-2.  Tuthill,  Calif., 
222.  Porter,  Kearny,  29.  Life  of  Stockton,  148-9.  Royce,  Calif.,  194. 
Sen.  7;  30,  1  (Emory).  76Flores,  Mar.  31,  1847  (2).  76Moreno  to 
Bustamante,  Mar.  20,  1847.  Cutts,  Conquest,  156-64.  Sherman,  Home 
Letters,  113. 

XVIII.   THE  GENESIS   OF  TWO   CAMPAIGNS 

1.  As  early  as  August  16  Pillow  wrote  to  his  wife  that  Taylor  thought 
it  would  be  necessary  to  attack  the  city  of  Mexico  by  way  of  Vera 
Cruz. 

2.  The  fortress  of  San  Juan  de  Ulua  stood  on  a  reef  about  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  from  the  strong  fort  which  guarded  the  north  end  of  Vera  Cruz 
at  the  water  line.  U.  S.  Consul  Campbell  of  Havana  informed  Conner 
before  June  10,  1846,  that  the  defences  of  Ulua  on  the  side  facing  the 
city  were  partially  undermined  and  poorly  armed,  and  that,  as  all  the 
Mexican  preparations  had  been  founded  on  the  belief  that  future  assail- 
ants would  adopt  the  French  plan  of  attack,  he  could  place  his  vessels  on 
that  side  at  night  with  little  or  no  injury,  and  easily  take  the  fortress  by 
escalade ;  but  Conner  does  not  appear  to  have  endorsed  this  opinion.  An 
American  named  Jobson,  who  resided  at  Vera  Cruz,  wrote  to  the  war 
department,  Feb.  14,  1847,  that  nobody  except  the  Americans  was  afraid 
of  Ulua ;  that  in  September,  1846,  it  had  been  garrisoned  by  only  180 
men,  who,  being  neither  paid  nor  fed,  ran  up  the  American  flag  on  the 
night  of  Sept.  17 ;    and  that  Conner  might  have  passed  in  by  the  south 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  347-351        537 

channel,  put  500  men  ashore,  and  captured  the  fortress  in  half  an  hour. 
See  chap,  xxx,  note  20. 

3.  These  regiments  were  to  come  from  Mass.,  New  York,  Penn.,  Va., 
No.  and  So.  Carolina,  Miss.,  La.  and  Texas  (mounted  men)  —  one  from 
each;  and  in  December  a  second  regiment  was  invited  from  Penn. 
There  was  considerable  hesitation  about  calling  on  Massachusetts,  but 
it  was  concluded  that  should  she  fail  to  supply  her  quota,  the  country 
would  take  note  of  her  attitude.  Marcy  issued  the  calls  on  Nov.  16 
(Nov.  27  Florida  was  asked  for  a  company),  and  the  abruptness  of  the 
change  wrought  by  Benton  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  only  five  days  earlier 
Marcy  had  stated  that  the  volunteers  then  in  service  were  "deemed 
sufficient  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war"  (Wash.  Union,  May  28,  1847). 
The  field  and  staff  officers  were  to  be  a  colonel,  a  lieutenant  colonel,  a 
major,  an  adjutant  (a  lieutenant  from  one  of  the  companies),  a  sergeant 
major,  a  quartermaster  sergeant  and  two  principal  musicians.  Each  of 
the  ten  companies  of  a  regiment  was  to  have  a  captain,  a  lieutenant,  two 
second  lieutenants,  four  sergeants,  four  corporals,  two  musicians  and 
eighty  privates,  but  a  company  including  sixty-four  effective  privates 
was  to  be  accepted.  These  privates  were  to  be  in  physical  vigor  and 
apparently  18-45  (inclusive)  years  of  age.  The  field  and  company  officers 
were  to  be  men  appointed  and  commissioned  under  the  laws  of  their  state. 
The  rendezvous  of  the  infantry  were  to  be  Boston,  New  York,  Pittsburgh, 
Guiandotte  (Va.),  Wilmington,  Charleston,  Vicksburg,  New  Orleans. 
Most  of  the  regiments  were  made  up  rather  slowly,  and  there  was  so 
much  difficulty  in  Virginia  that  her  recruiting  officers  went  into  Maryland. 
This  difficulty  appears  to  have  been  due  to  a  lack  of  enthusiasm  for  the 
war  (first  part  of  chap,  xxxiv).  The  supposedly  brilliant  victory  at 
Monterey  had  exercised  a  favorable  influence,  but  the  obligation  to  serve 
the  war  out  had  a  contrary  effect,  and  the  terms  of  the  law,  which  required 
the  independent  action  of  the  state  governments,  caused  delay  in  some 
instances.  The  First  Pennsylvania  reached  New  Orleans  Dec.  29  and  30, 
and  at  that  time  the  Mississippi  regiment  was  expected  to  arrive  there  by 
Jan.  10.     The  South  Carolina  regiment  was  ready  on  Dec.  22. 

Special  efforts  were  made  at  the  same  time  to  bring  the  regular  army 
up  to  15,000  men.  The  authorized  maximum  was  at  this  time  16,998 
(including  780  commissioned  officers),  but  in  spite  of  energetic  recruiting 
only  10,381  were  actually  serving  in  the  two  regiments  of  dragoons,  one 
of  Mounted  Riflemen,  four  of  "artillery,"  eight  of  infantry,  and  a  co.  of 
engineer  soldiers  (Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  pp.  62-3).  Nov.  3  the  recruiting  officers 
were  authorized  to  pay  a  citizen,  non-commissioned  officer,  or  soldier 
$2.00  for  each  accepted  man  brought  to  the  rendezvous  (65gen.  orders  48). 
The  minimum  height  was  reduced  to  five  feet  and  three  inches  (65gen. 
orders  51).  Men  desiring  to  enlist  had  probably  felt  more  drawn  to  the 
briefer  volunteer  service,  and  had  waited  for  a  second  call.  Besides,  the 
widows  and  orphans  of  volunteers  (but  not  of  regulars)  were  to  be  pen- 
sioned, and  the  prevailing  high  wages  for  labor  deterred  many  from  wish- 
ing to  enlist.  The  lack  of  officers  in  the  regular  army  still  continued 
serious.  On  July  30,  1846,  less  than  one  third  of  the  regimental  field 
officers  were  available.  The  regiments  in  Mexico  did  not  average  one 
field  officer  apiece. 

According  to  the  report  of  the  adjutant  general  dated  Dec.  5,  1846, 
Taylor  had  (including  the  garrison  at  Tampico  and  troops  en  route,  but 
subject  to  some  deductions)  7406  regulars  and  10,926  volunteers,  besides 


538       NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  347-351 

621  and  2039  respectively  under  Wool.  Adding  to  these  446  and  3546 
respectively  under  Kearny,  and  the  New  York  regiment  en  route  to  Cali- 
fornia, one  finds  that  the  land  forces  amounted  to  25,750  men  before  the 
November  calls  were  issued ;  but  subtractions  of  an  unknown  magnitude 
needed  to  be  made  from  these  figures  so  far  as  availability  was  concerned. 
These  and  further  details  may  be  found  in  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2.  See  also  the 
following.  62Marcy  to  govs.,  Nov.  16.  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  p.  46  (Marcy, 
report).  6lBowman  to  Jones,  Dec.  4;  to  Polk,  Dec.  29.  6lBrooke  to 
Jones,  Dec.  29.  Wash.  Union,  Nov.  30,  1846 ;  May  28,  1847.  6lJones 
to  Scott,  Dec.  17.  Polk,  Diary,  Nov.  7,  10,  14-16.  62Marcy  to  gov. 
Fla.,  Dec.  27.  63Marcy  to  gov.  Mass.,  Nov.  16;  to  gov.  Tex.,  Nov.  20; 
to  gov.  Iowa,  Nov.  25.  Niles,  Nov.  21,  1846,  p.  179;  Jan.  16,  1847, 
p.  308.  29Brown  to  Marcy,  Oct.  6.  Sen.  1 ;  29,  2,  p.  62.  13Pakenham, 
no.  132,  Nov.  23.  Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  p.  428  (Cabell).  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
pp.  478  (Freeman),  873  (Marcy).  West  Va.  dept.  arch,  and  hist.,  report, 
1910,  p.  186. 

4.  Genesis  of  the  Vera  Cruz  expedition.  Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  45  (Marcy, 
report).  52Black,  Oct.  29.  Benton,  Abr.  Deb.,  xvi,  63.  13Pakenham, 
nos.  119,  130,  132,  140,  150.  228G.  Flagg  to  A.  Flagg,  Dec.  17.  Picayune, 
Apr.  30;  Oct.  5;  Dec.  11,  1846;  Feb.  2,  1847  (Taylor  to  Gaines).  (Cal- 
houn) Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  app.,  323.  Polk,  Diary,  July  2 ;  Aug.  29 ;  Oct. 
10,  17-22;  Nov.  7-17;  Dec.  1,  2,  1846;  Jan.  2,  1847.  Meigs,  Benton, 
361.  108Bancroft  to  Polk,  Dec.  3.  Benton,  View,  ii,  693-4.  108Bu- 
chanan  to  Bancroft,  priv.,  Dec.  29.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  273.  335Let- 
ter  from  P.  F.  Smith  (with  Trist's  letter  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  28,  1847, 
private).  Wash.  Union,  Sept.  29;  Oct.  2.  Niles,  Mar.  13,  1847,  p.  20. 
206James  Graham  to  Gov.  Graham,  Jan.  10,  1847.  256Marcy  to  Wet- 
more,  Nov.  1.  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  404.  Johnston,  A.  S.  Johnston,  134. 
Hft.  60 ;  30, 1,  pp.  333,  355,  363, 1231  (Marcy) ;  1268-1270, 1273-4  (Scott) ; 
351  (Taylor).  297Benton,  memo.,  July  4.  297Mackenzie  to  Buchanan, 
July  7.  47Conner,  June  11;  July  22;  Oct.  4.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  148. 
52Campbell,  June  9.  Schouler,  Hist.  Briefs,  155.  58Jobson,  Feb.  14, 
1847.  Sen.  52 ;  30,  1,  p.  170.  Bancroft  to  Conner,  May  30.  Conner, 
Castle  of  Ulloa.  256Totten  to  Marcy,  Nov.  23,  1847.  180Pillow  to 
wife,  Aug.  16.  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Sept.  1.  13Doyle,  no.  79,  1843. 
69P.  F.  Smith,  memoir,  Oct.  14.  354Welles  papers.  152Mason  to  Con- 
ner, Nov.  29,  priv.  and  confid.  Journal  des  Debats,  Nov.  4.  Boston 
Atlas,  Dec.  17.  Buchanan,  Works,  viii,  365.  Diccionario  Universal 
(Ulua).     Cong.  Globe,  29,  2,  app.,  191.     (UMa)  See  chaps,  xxii,  p.  21,  xxx. 

5.  It  is  believed  that  the  preceding  text  and  notes  afford  ample  support 
for  this  sentence.  Note  27  contains  additional  references  ;  and  see  Ripley, 
War  with  Mexico,  i,  361-2.  Taylor  seems  never  to  have  perceived  that 
Polk  could  have  superseded  him  with  a  Democrat  by  merely  sending 
Jesup  or  Wool  to  the  army  with  reinforcements  before  brevetting  him 
major  general  and  ordering  him  to  serve  with  his  brevet  rank.  Nov.  10 
Polk  asserted  in  his  diary  that  he  had  known  no  politics  with  reference 
to  Taylor.  The  diary  shows  that  he  was  aware  how  Taylor  felt  about 
him.  This  was  not  at  all  surprising.  Pillow's  letters  indicate  plainly 
that  he  understood  the  matter  and  he  was  in  confidential  correspondence 
with  the  President.  Pillow  wrote  to  his  wife  that  Taylor  systematically 
proscribed  Polk's  friends,  and  this  may  offset  some  of  Taylor's  assertions 
that  he  himself  was  persecuted  by  the  administration. 

6.  Dec.  10  (Bixby)  Taylor  wrote  to  his  son-in-law  that  he  would  not 


NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  351-355       539 

say  he  would  refuse  to  serve,  if  elected  President.  This  meant  of  course 
month    W^  a  Candldate-     His  formal  announcement  came  the  following 

ii^'J*  is  Probable  that  the  administration  knew  how  Taylor  felt  about 
the  Vera  Cruz  expedition,  for  he  was  outspoken,  and  Polk  had  more  than 
one  correspondent  m  his  camp. 

8.  Scott,  like  nearly  all  the  Whigs,  disapproved  of  a  war  made  by  a 
Democratic  administration  for  (as  the  Whigs  generally  alleged)  party 
reasons  but  was  ready  to  do  his  duty  as  a  soldier  (ISPakenham,  separate 
and  confidential,  Sept.  28).  p«"«*ws 

9.  The  selection  of  the  commander.     Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  363,  367  369  373 
Marcy);  372   1268-70  (Scott) ;   383  (Bliss)';   384  (Patterson)     ' K 

to  iaylor,  Sept.  26  ("I  never,  for  a  moment,  ceased  to  watch  over  your 
fame  and  interests  with  the  liveliest  solicitude").  Polk,  Diary  Sent  5 
15;   Oct  22;  Nov    10>  i4,  17_19j  2l>  1846;   May  6    lg4?     Ja£      Pjtf 

Scott,  Mems,  n,  386,  399.  London  Times,  June  30,  1847.  132Slidell 
to  Buchanan,  Nov.  5.  169Scott  to  Crittenden,  Sept.  17.  169Taylor 
to  Crittenden  Jan.  26;  Mar.  25,  1847.  354Welles  papers.  Note  par- 
ticularly Taylor  s  political  exchanges  with.  169Crittenden  and  Wood 
(tfixby  coll.)  during  the  summer  and  autumn.  ISOPillow  to  wife  Oct  27  ■ 
Dec.  8  SSOTaylor  to  brother,  Dec.  12,  1846 ;  Jan.  19,  1848.  Id,  Letters 
(Bixby),  June  3;  Aug.  23;  Nov.  26;  Dec.  10,  13,  1846;  Jan.  26;  Feb  9- 

cZ  !i  AUg9^9'/847-  .345Blair  t0  Van  Buren>  J^  7-  Coleman; 
Crittenden,  i  243-4.  169Scott  to  Marcy,  Sept.  12.  62Marcy  to  Scott 
Sept.  14  256/d.  to  Wetmore,  June  28.  Watson,  In  Memoriam,  115 
Grant,  Mems.,  i,  120.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  175.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Aug  29* 
Garrison,  Extension,  242.  Bancroft,  Pacific  States,  viii,  375.  Mao  of 
Amer  Hist,  xiv,  564.  Slidell  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  5,  1846,  private :  "The 
fate  of  the  Administration  depends  on  the  successful  conduct  of  the  war" 
(Curtis,  Buchanan,  i,  601). 

10.  Scott's  figures  were  slightly  below  the  adjutant  general's.  Possibly 
the  latter  used  returns  of  later  dates.  Taylor  did  not  have  so  many  avail- 
able troops,  and  accused  Scott  of  stating  what  he  knew  or  should  have 
known  to  be  false  (Bixby  coll.,  181) ;  but  if  the  adjutant  general  was  in- 
correctly informed  as  to  the  strength  of  the  forces,  the  fault  was  Taylor's 
See  note  3.  J 

11.  Scott  was  severely  criticised  by  Marcy  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  1239)  and 
others  for  ordering  so  many  boats,  guns  and  shells,  and  it  was  triumphantly 
proclaimed  that,  as  the  result  proved,  he  did  not  need  so  large  an  outfit 
But  this  argument  was  not  sound.  He  had  to  reckon  on  a  failure  to  pro- 
duce and  deliver  at  the  point  of  shipment  in  season  all  that  he  specified 
on  a  heavy  loss  through  wreckage  and  other  accidents,  on  the  probability 
that  his  landing  would  be  opposed,  and  on  the  expected  necessity  of  re- 
ducing Ulua;  nor  did  he  know  that  naval  guns  (to  which  he  actually  was 
compelled  to  have  recourse)  would  be  available.  It  has  been  said,  too, 
that  the  army  could  have  landed  in  the  boats  of  the  blockading  squadron, 
but  fecott  found  on  inquiry  that  only  about  500  could  go  ashore  in  them 
at  a  single  trip  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  1274).  Scott  on  the  other  hand  was 
unreasonably  bitter  in  charging  the  war  department  with  negligence 
More  could  have  been  done  by  the  government,  and  errors  were  com- 
mitted, but  shortcomings  and  mistakes  were  inevitable.  Marcy's  reply 
to  Scott's  charges  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  1218,  1227)  needs  to  be  scrutinized 
carefully.     Ripley  (War  with  Mexico,  ii,  14)  ridicules  Scott  (for  asking 


540       NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  355-356 

for  a  pontoon  train)  on  the  ground  that  every  stream  between  Vera  Cruz 
and  Mexico  was  fordable.  But  (1)  Scott  could  not  be  sure  his  operations 
would  be  confined  to  that  line ;  (2)  he  operated  in  fact  on  the  lower  Al- 
varado  River,  where  it  was  not  fordable;  (3)  had  the  national  bridge 
been  blown  up,  pontoons  might  have  been  useful  there  forj  wagons  and 
heavy  guns.  Rio  del  Plan  was  a  small  stream,  but  the  enemy  caused 
the  Americans  much  trouble  by  destroying  the  bridge  at  Plan  del  Rio. 
See  Ripley,  op.  cit.,  ii,  165. 

12.  The  proof  that  Scott  and  the  administration  intended  that  Taylor 
should  not  be  placed  in  jeopardy  is  superabundant:  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp. 
357,  366,  389  (Marcy) ;  844,  1272,  1276  (Scott).  Scott  even  intended 
to  give  Taylor  his  personal  aid,  should  the  Mexicans  attack  him  in  force  ; 
and  this  was  one  of  his  reasons  for  going  to  Camargo  (ibid.,  844;  6lScott 
to  Brooke,  Dec.  28). 

13.  As  late  as  Jan.  2,  1847,  every  member  of  the  Cabinet  except  Clifford 
was  opposed  to  Scott's  marching  against  the  city  of  Mexico,  though  Polk 
favored  taking  that  step  should  it  be  necessary  in  order  to  obtain  peace 
(Polk,  Diary). 

14.  Taylor  alleged  bitterly  (Bixby,  182)  that  discourtesy  and  injury 
were  done  him  by  the  failure  to  notify  him  promptly  of  the  expedition, 
but  Polk's  precaution  was  wise.  Some  despatches  were  intercepted  or 
lost,  and  soon  a  most  important  letter  from  Scott  to  Taylor,  marked 
"confidential"  both  outside  and  within,  was  opened  by  a  subordinate  at 
Monterey  and  publicly  discussed  (Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  402).     See  note  15. 

15.  Nov.  25  Marcy  wrote  guardedly  to  Taylor  with  reference  to  the 
new  expedition,  but  the  despatch  went  astray  (62adj.  gen.  to  Taylor, 
May  5,  1847).  It  is  surprising  that  cipher  was  not  used.  It  seems  as  if 
a  ciphered  letter  giving  the  necessary  explanations  and  ordering  Taylor 
to  place  the  required  forces  at  specified  points  by  specified  dates  should 
have  been  sent  to  Taylor  in  triplicate  by  trusty  messengers  not  later  than 
Nov.  30. 

16.  Scott's  operations,  etc.,  up  to  Dec.  27.  Ho.  60  ;  30,  1,  pp.  373,  838-41, 
1218,  1268,  1270,  1273-5  (Scott);  369,  372,  873,  1231  (Marcy);  1253 
(Jesup);  1100  (Taylor).  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  95,  181.  Senex, 
Myth.  Wise,  Seven  Decades,  235.  Polk,  Diary,  Nov.  10,  20,  1846; 
Jan.  2,  1847.     Jameson,  Calhoun  Corres.,  727-8.     Journ.  of  Milit.  Serv. 

Instit.,  xiv,  442.     234A.  Johnson  to  ,  Dec.  2.     19lFairfield  to  wife, 

Dec.  13.  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  402.  256/d.  to  Marcy,  Dec.  27,  private. 
61H.  L.  Scott,  Nov.  24.  61W.  Scott,  memo.,  Nov.  29.  62Jones  to  Tay- 
lor, May  5,  1847.  164Scott  to  Conner,  Dec.  26  (P.  S.  Dec.  27).  Picayune, 
Dec.  24.  "The  Brazos"  signified  loosely  a  region  comprising  Brazos  Id., 
Pt.  Isabel,  and  sometimes  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande. 

Scott  blamed  Marcy  for  permitting  him  to  spend  only  four  days  at 
Washington  in  preparatory  work  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  1218).  Marcy  re- 
plied that  Scott  passed  twenty-six  days  in  going  from  the  capital  to  New 
Orleans  via  New  York  when  he  might  have  reached  that  place  in  seven 
(ibid.,  1228).  The  reply  looks  effective  but  does  not  cover  the  ground. 
Marcy  said  Scott  was  not  needed  at  the  war  department,  where  the  initial 
work  had  to  be  done ;  and  hence  the  General  did  well  to  fortify  himself 
for  the  campaign  and  gain  time  for  reflection  by  choosing  the  sea  route. 
The  voyage  took  nineteen  days  instead  of  twelve  on  account  of  head 
winds. 

While  he  was  at  New  Orleans  a  newspaper  published  there  stated  that 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  356-359        541 

the  expedition  (which  Scott  intimated  was  bound  for  San  Luis  Potosi) 
would  strike  at  Vera  Cruz,  and  Polk  showed  what  he  meant  in  promising 
Scott  his  full  confidence  by  charging  that  he  had  betrayed  the  secret 
(Diary,  Jan.  14;  Feb.  27).  The  secret  was  out  at  New  Orleans  in  reality 
about  two  weeks  before  Scott  arrived  there,  and  the  newspaper  stated 
later  that  its  information  did  not  come  from  any  person  connected  with 
the  army  (Niles,  Feb.  13,  1847,  p.  370).  (See  256Scott  to  Marcy,  Jan.  27, 
priv.)  Polk  also  complained  —  another  mark  of  confidence  —  that 
Scott's  vanity  was  causing  him  to  make  "extravagant  preparations,"  as 
if  Taylor  had  not  shown  at  Monterey  the  consequences  of  failing  to  prepare 
adequately.  In  fact  Scott,  instead  of  insisting  upon  extravagant  prepara- 
tions, wrote  Dec.  23  that  he  would  move  against  Vera  Cruz  if  he  could 
land  even  5000  men  there  early  in  February  (374to  Conner). 

17.  The  new  First  Division  included  Harney's  (Third)  Brigade,  now 
consisting  of  Co.  C  (Bragg's  light  battery)  of  the  Third  Artillery,  com- 
panies B,  C,  D  and  E  of  the  Second  Dragoons,  the  Second  Infantry  and 
the  Third  Infantry ;  and  P.  F.  Smith's  (Fourth)  Brigade,  now  consisting 
of  Co.  E  (Sherman's  light  battery)  of  the  Third  Artillery,  two  companies 
of  the  Mounted  Riflemen  (without  horses),  the  First  and  the  Seventh 
Infantry.  The  rest  of  the  Second  Dragoons  were  to  be  assigned  when- 
ever they  should  join.  Five  companies  of  the  Second  Infantry  had  been 
for  some  weeks  at  Montemorelos ;  the  rest,  like  the  Second  Tennessee, 
marched  to  that  point  from  Camargo.  The  Fourth  Infantry  and  two 
companies  of  the  First  Artillery  were  to  occupy  the  citadel.  The  Wash- 
ington and  Baltimore  battalion,  which  had  belonged  to  the  First  Division, 
was  now  attached  to  Quitman's  brigade.  It  will  be  noted  that  Taylor, 
who  was  incorrectly  said  to  have  been  exposed  with  inadequate  forces  to 
Mexican  attack,  now  treated  Worth  in  precisely  that  way,  exposing  also 
Saltillo,  which  he  himself  called  "our  most  important  point"  in  that 
region  (Ho.  60  ;  30, 1,  p.  381).  Taylor  overtook  Quitman  Dec.  16.  Nearly 
2000  wagons  were  now  under  Taylor's  orders,  yet  pack-mules  were  used 
mainly  for  the  train.  By  the  railroad  Victoria  is  284  kilometers  from 
Monterey. 

18.  As  the  Americans  had  no  positive  information  regarding  Santa 
Anna's  intentions  and  movements,  Worth  was  blamed  for  giving  a  false 
alarm.  Rives  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  304)  says  S.  Anna  was  unable  to 
leave  S.  L.  Potosi.  Worth  really  did  expect  the  Mexicans  to  reaeh  him 
considerably  sooner  than  they  could  have  done.  Major  Gaines  with 
three  companies  of  Kentucky  cavalry,  previously  ordered  to  Saltillo, 
seems  to  have  arrived  there  on  Dec.  17.  Butler  was  now  ordered  to  take 
command  at  that  point. 

19.  In  one  letter  Taylor  stated  that  he  received  Scott's  note  when  two 
days  from  Monterey,  but  this  must  mean  "second  day."  Dec.  20  Scott 
had  written  to  him  from  New  Orleans,  explaining  his  plans  more  fully, 
but  this  letter  did  not  reach  him  until  January  16  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  1101). 

20.  From  Montemorelos  Taylor  sent  a  topographical  engineer,  escorted 
by  a  squadron  of  dragoons  under  May,  to  examine  Santa  Rosa  Pass  and 
rejoin  the  command  at  Linares.  Ten  men  of  May's  rear  guard  and  the 
baggage  were  cut  off  in  the  pass  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  387-8,  1095.  Maury, 
Recoils.,  31.     Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  284). 

21.  "Norther"  was  the  name  given  to  an  extremely  violent  wind  which 
blew  at  frequent  intervals  from  October  to  April,  lasting  usually  about 
three   days.     During   Scott's   operations   one   lasted   seventy-six   hours. 


542       NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  359-360 

It  grew  more  violent  as  one  went  south  toward  Vera  Cruz,  probably  be- 
cause the  cordillera  approached  the  coast  and  produced  somewhat  the 
effect  of  a  funnel.     Its  merit  was  that  it  prevented  yellow  fever. 

22.  The  real  Mexican  cavalry  numbered  about  1000  under  Gen.  Romero, 
who  was  sent  by  Valencia,  now  commanding  at  Tula,  because  the  governor 
of  Tamaulipas  had  asked  for  1000  infantry.  The  cavalry  arrived  at  Vic- 
toria on  Dec.  24.  Only  200  were  regulars.  The  rest  were  badly  armed 
and  munitioned,  and  cavalry  were  not  suitable  for  a  region  covered  with 
woods  and  intersected  with  rivers.  The  people,  however,  prepared  to 
cooperate  with  them;  but  arms  were  lacking,  and  the  revenues  of  the 
state  had  mostly  been  cut  off  by  the  occupation  of  Matamoros  and  Tam- 
pico  (Gaceta  de  C.  Victoria,  July  23,  1846).  Valencia  was  very  anxious 
to  attack  the  Americans,  but  Santa  Anna  would  not  permit  this  —  prob- 
ably because  he  did  not  wish  Valencia  either  to  be  defeated  or  to  win 
6clat  by  succeeding.  December  26  Romero  received  positive  orders  not 
to  risk  an  action,  and  two  days  later  he  retired  (82gov.  Tamaul.  to 
gov.  Puebla,  Jan.  6,  1847.  Hid.  to  Relaciones,  Apr.  23).  Taylor 
strongly  desired  to  capture  Valencia  (Roberts,  diary). 

23.  Taylor's  march  to  Victoria  {including  Worth's  alarm).  Ho.  60;  30, 
1,  pp.  513  (orders  156) ;  361,  379,  381,  385,  387-8,  848,  1100  (Taylor) ; 
839,  851,  1156  (Scott).  Meade,  Letters,  i,  170,  172.  Autograph,  July- 
Aug.,  Nov.-Dec,  1912  (Taylor).  Diccionario  Universal  (Itinerario). 
307Roberts,  diary.  Sen.  32;  31,  1,  p.  8,  note.  Henshaw  narrative. 
Velasco,  Geog.,  iv,  150.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  277  (Holt's  journal). 
Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  262-287.  Robertson,  Remins.,  185-198.  Ve- 
dette, ii,  no.  9  (Townes).  193Foster  to  father,  Dec.  10.  139W.  B.  Camp- 
bell to  D.  C,  Jan.  2,  1847.  69Worth  to  Bliss,  Dec.  16 ;  to  Butler,  Dec.  18. 
69Butler  to  Bliss,  Dec.  20.  69Wool  to  Worth,  Dec.  24.  69Riley  to  Bliss, 
Dec.  10.  69Quitman  to  Bliss,  Dec.  30.  69 Worth  to  Bliss,  Dec.  4.  65Tay- 
lor,  gen.  orders  160,  Dec.  22.  169/d.  to  Crittenden,  Jan.  26,  1847.  Id., 
Letters  (Bixby),  180.  Wilhelm,  Eighth  Inf.,  ii,  300-1.  6lClarke  to 
McCall,  Dec.  27.  Apuntes,  86-7.  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  402.  69Wool  to 
Butler,  Dec.  25.  Delta,  Jan.  24 ;  Feb.  13,  1847.  52Black,  Oct.  8.  299Po- 
sey  to  Gordon,  Feb.  19,  1847.  N.  Y.  Herald,  Feb.  6,  1847.  Scott  wrote 
privately  (2 56 Jan.  16)  that  "friend  Taylor  .  .  .  turned  his  back  upon  the 
appointment  I  gave  him  .  .  .  saying  he  would  be  back,  at  Monterey,  in 
36  days,  the  1st  of  February!!"  Taylor  actually  wrote  that  he  might 
return  "early  in  Feb."  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  848).  Also  the  following  from 
76.  S.  Anna,  Dec.  22,  muy  priv.  Id.,  Pec.  24;  Jan.  1.  Gov.  Tamaul., 
Oct.  22;  Dec.  3.  E.  Gonzalez,  Dec.  29.  Comte.  Nat.  Gd.,  Catorce, 
Dec.  30.  Instead  of  admitting  that  his  journey  to  Victoria  delayed  the 
receipt  of  Scout's  letter  of  Jan.  3  to  him,  Taylor  complained  in  his  character- 
istic fashion  that  it  should  have  been  sent  by  a  special  messenger  (Ho.  60 ; 
30,  1,  p.  1101). 

24.  One  naturally  inquires  why  Taylor  concentrated  more  than  5000 
men  at  Victoria.  He  stated  that  he  went  in  that  direction  to  examine 
the  passes  and  establish  one  or  more  posts,  and  that  he  sent  Patterson's 
command  there  because  Mexican  parties  were  going  from  Tula  to  that 
point ;  but  he  had  been  ordered,  Oct.  22,  to  have  4000  men  ready  to  em- 
bark for  Vera  Cruz,  if  he  could  spare  them  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  366),  and 
presumably  had  this  in  mind.     But  see  his  letter,  Bixby  coll.,  72. 

25.  Such  was  the  regular  Mexican  measure.  In  this  as  in  some  other 
cases  the  American  estimates  were  higher. 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  360-362        543 

26.  Patterson's  march  to  Victoria.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  358  (Marcy) ; 
379,  387-8  (Taylor);  383  (Bliss);  383-4  (Patterson);  569,  571  (Jesup). 
60Patterson,  Dec.  8.  292Pillow  to  wife,  Dec.  15.  Amer.  Flag,  Mata- 
moros,  Dec.  26.  332Tennery,  diary.  254McClellan,  diary.  322Smith, 
diary.  Diccionario  Universal  (Itinerario).  Ho.  13;  31,  2  (G.  W.  Smith). 
Engineer  School,  U.  S.  A.,  Occasional  Papers,  no.  16  (G.  W.  Smith). 
60Belknap,  memo,  (with  Patterson,  Nov.  1).  193Heiman  to  Mrs.  Foster, 
Feb.  28.  Lawton,  Artillery  Officer,  16.  Furber,  Twelve  Months  Vol., 
275-318.  335Trist,  draft  of  address.  Welles  papers  (Pol.  Hist,  of  U.  S.). 
139Campbell  to  D.  C.,  Nov.  2,  1846;  Jan.  2;  Feb.  19,  1847.  Scott, 
Mems.,  ii,  423.  159Collins,  diary.  Hist.  Teacher's  Mag.,  Apr.,  1912, 
p.  75.  Smith,  Annex,  of  Texas,  250-1.  N.  Y.  Herald,  Nov.  3,  1857 
(Scott).  146Caswell,  diary.  275Nelson  to  Coe,  Oct.  14,  1846  ("The 
General  in  making  a  speech  to  us  a  day  or  two  ago  said  that  we  should 
go  on,  or  if  it  so  happened  that  we  had  to  stay  that  he  (Pillow)  would 
remain  with  us.  This  would  make  our  situation  deplorable  indeed.  Our 
Brigadier  General  I  am  sorry  to  say  is  universally  unpopular").  Two 
soldiers  wrote  :  "We  do  not  charge  Gen.  Pillow  with  that  wholesale  abuse 
that  has  been  heaped  upon  him  by  many.  It  is  his  misfortune  to  be  cursed 
with  unalloyed  selfishness"  (McLean  County  Hist.  Soc.  Trans.,  i,  24). 
280Nunelee,  diary.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  277  (Holt's  journal).  180Pil- 
low  to  wife,  Oct.  27.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  180.  Trans.  Ills.  State 
Hist.  Soc,  1906,  177-8.  McCall,  Letters,  474.  273Mullan,  diary. 
Bishop,  Journal. 

27.  Scott's  operations,  Dec.  27-Jan.  7,  including  the  division  of  the  troops. 
61H.  L.  Scott,  Dec.  28.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  842,  844,  848,  851,  853,  875, 
1156  (Scott);  858-9  (Butler);  860-1  (Worth).  6lButler,  Jan.  8,  1847. 
Wash.  Union,  Jan.  13,  1847.  (Suggested)  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  353  ;  Taylor, 
Letter  to  Gaines.  (Ordered)  Polk,  Diary,  Nov.  17-19.  (Appointed) 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  372  (Marcy).  (Authority)  Polk,  Diary,  Mar.  21,  1847; 
Cong.  Globe,  30,  1,  p.  502  (Douglas).  (Condition)  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  390, 
1276.  (Admitted)  Ibid.,  1102.  (Manner)  Ibid.,  373,  839,  848,  851.  (Pur- 
pose) Ibid.,  373,  839 ;  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  403.  (Reach)  Ho.  60  ;  30, 1,  pp.  848, 
852.  (Required)  Ibid.,  864 ;  Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  47.  (Recognized)  169Tay- 
lor  to  Crittenden,  Jan.  26,  1847.  ("Wormed ")  Ibid. ;  370Taylor  to  Davis, 
Apr.  18,  1848.  (Kill)  330Taylor  to  brother,  May  29,  1847.  ("Con- 
temptible") Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  180.  (Suggestion)  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
pp.  337,  375  (Taylor).  ("Intrigue")  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  84.  (Out- 
raged) Ibid.,  180.  (Degraded)  Ibid.,  181.  ("Discourteous")  Ibid.,  179. 
(Ruin)  Ibid.,  90,  95.  (Expecting)  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Jan.  26,  1847 ; 
Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  890,  1109-10,  1113.  ("Sacrificed")  Ibid.,  863;  Bixby 
coll.,  114.  The  New  Orleans  Comm.  Bulletin  said  a  fearful  responsibility 
rested  on  the  government  for  exposing  Taylor.  See  also  330Taylor  to 
brother,  -Feb.  8 ;  Apr.  5,  22  ;  May  29,  1847  ;  Jan.  19,  1848. 

For  a  particular  reason  both  Scott  and  Taylor  (169to  Crittenden,  Jan.  26) 
felt  sure  that  Santa  Anna  would  go  to  Vera  Cruz  promptly.  This  reason 
was  the  capture  of  Scott's  original  letter  of  Jan.  3  to  Taylor,  borne  by 
Lieut.  Richey  (French,  Two  Wars,  71;  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  876,  890; 
Meade,  Letters,  i,  182;  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  82).  It  was  believed 
that  the  letter  was  in  Santa  Anna's  hands  by  about  Jan.  15.  For  this 
reason  and  the  tardiness  of  the  new  volunteer  regiments  Scott  felt  that  he 
needed  more  and  Taylor  fewer  troops  than  he  otherwise  would  have  esti- 
mated (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  893).     Indeed,  Taylor  wrote  to  Scott  on  Jan.  26 


544        NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  363-364 

that  Santa  Anna  had  already  left  the  north  (Ho.  60  ;  30,  1,  p.  890).  Scott 
was  so  confident  that  he  would  meet  serious  opposition  at  Vera  Cruz  that 
he  employed  five  or  six  agents  to  obtain  information  about  the  forces 
assembling  there.  Marcy  entertained  the  same  expectation  (Ho.  60  ;  30, 
1,  p.  369).  Ripley  {op.  cit.,  i,  358)  argues  that  S.  Anna  had  a  better 
chance  of  success  in  attacking  Taylor  than  he  would  have  had  in  attack- 
ing Scott,  and  therefore  Scott  should  not  have  believed  that  S.  Anna 
would  oppose  his  debarkation.  But  Ripley  could  not  have  proved  his 
premise ;  and,  even  were  that  true,  the  additional  advantage  that  would 
have  been  gained  by  guarding  the  route  from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico  City 
looked  like  a  decisive  consideration.  S.  Anna's  moving  against  Taylor 
was  largely  due  to  political  considerations  not  understood  by  either  Scott 
or  Ripley. 

Taylor  gradually  settled  down  upon  the  idea  that  the  aim  of  Polk  and 
Scott  was  to  cause  him  to  leave  Mexico  in  disgust  (330to  brother,  Feb.  8 ; 
Apr.  5).  Later  he  changed  "Scott,  Marcy  &  Co."  to  "Scott,  Polk  & 
Co."  (330to  brother,  Jan.  19,  1848),  thus  smiting  at  one  stroke  a  rival  in 
his  own  party  (see  330letter  to  brother,  Apr.  5,  1848)  and  a  supposed  rival 
in  the  other. 

The  number,  of  troops  left  with  Taylor  for  defence  against  an  enemy 
who  was  not  expected  to  advance  was  about  800  regulars  and  6-7000  well 
seasoned  and  respectably  trained  volunteers  (169Taylor  to  Crittenden, 
March  25,  1847)  besides  several  regiments  of  new  volunteers  —  say 
2400-2800  men  —  who  were  expected  to  arrive  soon ;  while  Scott  had 
less  than  13,000  to  face  (with  all  the  disadvantages  of  debarking)  the 
garrisons  of  Vera  Cruz  and  Ulua,  the  army  that  Santa  Anna  was  believed 
to  be  leading  against  him,  and  all  such  reinforcements  as  the  Mexican 
government  could  raise  when  threatened  at  the  vital  point.  Moreover 
Scott's  new  volunteers  were  to  land  with  practically  no  training  whatever, 
and  could  hardly  be  counted  on  for  the  initial  fighting.  Taylor  said 
that  for  a  blow  at  the  capital  25,000  men  (10,000  of  them  regulars)  would 
be  required  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  353).  As  Scott  pointed  out,  Taylor  now 
had  really  nothing  to  do  except  defend  Texas  (Memoirs,  ii,  409)  and, 
should  it  be  practicable,  aid  Scott's  offensive  by  threatening  to  advance. 
Scott  took  Robert  E.  Lee  from  Taylor's  army. 

On  receiving  Scott's  orders  of  Jan.  3  Taylor  replied  in  a  style  correspond- 
ing to' his  state  of  mind  (Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  p.  863).  Scott  answered  :  "There 
are  some  expressions  in  those  letters  [of  Jan.  15]  which,  as  I  shall  wish  to 
forget  them,  I  shall  not  specify  or  recall"  (ibid.,  864) ;  and  to  Marcy  Scott 
wrote  privately:  "However,  he  [Taylor]  is  still  the  same  excellent  man " 
(256Jan.  23).  In  his  correspondence  on  this  subject  Taylor  appeared  to 
regard  the  troops  placed  under  his  command  as  his  personal  property. 
The  battle  of  Buena  Vista  has  commonly  been  cited  as  the  cause  of  Tay- 
lor's election,  but  it  was  the  idea  that  he  had  been  deliberately  exposed  to 
the  Mexicans  which  gave  that  victory  its  remarkable  political  effect 
(210Simms  to  Hammond,  Jan.  15,  1847;  So.  Qtrly.  Review,  Jan.,  1851, 
p.  37).  It  may  be  observed  further  that  for  the  government  to  sacrifice 
him,  his  army  and  all  the  public  property  in  northern  Mexico,  and  give 
Santa  Anna  an  opportunity  to  ravage  Texas  would  have  been  to  commit 
suicide.     The  idea  was  unreasonable. 

28.  Scott,  who  was  a  great  soldier  but  not  a  great  lawyer,  had  the 
imprudence  to  attack  Marcy,  a  master  of  fence,  in  regard  to  the  supply  of 
vessels,  and  he  fared  rather  badly.     Marcy's  defence  was,  however,  by 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XVIII,  PAGES  364-365       545 

no  means  wholly  sound.  He  himself  called  it  privately  a  "special  plea" 
(256to  Wetmore,  Apr.  11,  1848).  For  example,  Dec.  15,  1846,  he  notified 
Scott  (and  also  Jesup,  who  had  gone  to  the  front)  that  he  was  ordering 
ten  transports  in  ballast  to  the  Brazos,  but  later,  on  receiving  a  letter 
dated  Jan.  27  from  Jesup  (then  at  the  Brazos)  which  over-confidently 
stated  that  all  needed  vessels  could  be  chartered  there,  he  countermanded 
the  order ;  and  this  looks  like  a  satisfactory  defence  against  Scott's  com- 
plaint that  none  of  the  ten  transports  specified  by  him  in  his  requisition 
appeared.  But  Marcy  neglected  to  inform  Jesup  or  Scott  that  the  order 
had  besn  countermanded,  and,  as  Jesup's  letter  could  not  have  reached 
Washington  before  about  Jan.  7,  Jesup  naturally  assumed  that  the  ten 
transports  had  got  under  way.  Indeed,  Jan.  23  the  adjutant  general 
wrote  what  Scott  understood  to  mean  that  the  latter  might  soon  expect 
ten  ships  in  ballast  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  897).  Therefore  Jesup  and  Scott 
counted  upon  them  (ibid.,  896),  and  naturally  did  not  exert  themselves 
to  obtain  shipping  (when  disappointed  about  vessels  already  engaged)  as 
otherwise  they  doubtless  would  have  done.  (See  Scott,  Marcy,  Jesup, 
Hetzel  in  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  894,  1218,  1227,  1253.)  Besides,  it  was 
found  necessary  to  send  a  number  of  the  Brazos  vessels  to  Tampico  for 
the  troops  of  Patterson,  Twiggs  and  Quitman.  Jesup  (supra)  charged 
Scott  with  causing  delay  by  changing  the  assignation  of  certain  regi- 
ments; but  Scott  certainly  did  not  desire  to  waste  time,  and  it  is  only 
fair  to  suppose  that  he  made  the  changes  for  adequate  reasons.  Jesup 
complained  that  many  of  his  officers  were  inefficient,  and  Marcy  with 
well  feigned  naivete"  replied  that  their  names  had  been  presented  to  Polk 
[by  politicians]  with  "the  highest  testimonials." 

29.  Harney  soon  disobeyed  Scott's  positive  orders  at  Medellin  bridge 
(chap,  xxii,  note  25),  and  his  biographer  admits  that  he  might  justly  have 
been  shot  (Reavis,  Harney,  186).  Scott,  however,  merely  refrained  from 
reporting  the  affair,  whereupon  Harney  complained  that  he  had  been 
unjustly  ignored.  One  of  the  best  reasons  for  studying  the  Mexican  war 
is  to  observe  how  political  considerations  interfered  with  military  affairs. 
The  Harney  episode  was  enough  to  justify  Scott's  apprehensions  of  a  fire 
from  the  rear,  but  it  was  not  the  only  instance  of  executive  meddling 
(213Hatch  to  sister,  Feb.  11,  1847).  Another  incident  also,  which  occurred 
at  this  time,  illustrates  his  magnanimity  and  good  sense.  Lieut.  Col. 
Ethan  Allen  Hitchcock,  a  man  of  notable  talents  and  attainments  and 
formerly  instructor  in  tactics  at  West  Point,  was  admirably  qualified  to 
act  as  inspector  general,  and  Scott  gave  him  the  post  although  Hitchcock 
had  repeatedly  opposed  him,  and  was  personally  unfriendly  to  him.  Ex- 
perience soon  made  Hitchcock  one  of  Scott's  firmest  admirers  and  partisans 
(Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years,  234-6). 

30.  Scott's  operations,  Jan.  8-Feb.  15.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  844,  855-6, 
866,  875,  880,  882,  890-1,  893,  896,  1218,  1273  (Scott) ;  874,  1227  (Marcy) ; 
568,  571,  1253  (Jesup) ;  884,  894  (Hetzel) ;  868,  870,  887-9,  893,  1164-6 
(H.  L.  Scott) ;  867,  869,  888  (Harney) ;  860-1,  870  (Worth) ;  858-9  (But- 
ler). Niles,  Feb.  13,  p.  369;  Feb.  27,  p.  401.  63Marcy  to  qtrmr.  officer, 
Dec.  11,  15,  1846.  Lawton,  Artillery  Officer,  42-3.  358Williams  to 
father,  Jan.  17.  Ballentine,  English  Soldier,  i,  257.  Picayune,  Feb.  3; 
Mar.  12.  180Pillow  to  wife,  Feb.  14.  65Scott,  gen.  orders.  8, 11.  Polk, 
Diary,  Dec.  14,  1846;  Feb.  20,  1847.  Reavis,  Harney,  186.  Grant, 
Mems.,  i,  123-4.  6iWorth  to  adj.  gen.,  Feb.  17.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  176. 
60Scott  to  Marcy,  April  5,  1847.     256/d.  to  Id.,  Jan.  23,  1847,  private. 

VOL.    I  —  2  N 


546       NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  365-367 

Amer.  Flag,  Matamoros,  Feb.  17.  Oswandel,  Notes,  48.  62Stanton, 
Nov.  29;  Dec.  7,  13,  20,  1846;  Jan.  5;  Feb.  16,  1847;  Sen.  65;  30, 
1,  p.  91  (Hitchcock).  322Smith,  diary.  364Worth  to  S.,  Feb.  17;  to 
wife,  Feb.  18.     Smith,  To  Mexico,  84-103  (Worth's  march  from  Saltillo). 

31.  An  American  estimate  was  130  miles.  This  is  partially  explained 
perhaps  by  the  fact  that  the  pioneers  made  some  " short  cuts"  (mule 
paths)  available.  Meade  (Letters,  i,  159)  even  cut  the  distance  to  about 
100  miles,  but  this  appears  to  have  been  little  more  than  a  guess.  By 
the  railroad  the  distance  is  about  141  miles. 

32.  From  Victoria  to  Tampico.  146Caswell,  diary.  Ho.  60;  30,  1, 
pp.  1097  (Taylor);  879  (Patterson).  Diccionario  Universal  (Itinerario). 
303Orders  3,  Jan.  12.  Robertson,  .Remins.,  199-207.  Taylor,  Letters 
(Bixby),  181.  U.  S.  Engineer  School,  Occasional  Papers,  no.  16  (G.  W. 
Smith).  Ho.  13;  31,  2  (Id.).  Prieto,  Tamaulipas,  229.  332Tennery, 
diary.  273Mullan,  diary.  Lawton,  Artillery  Officer,  27.  322Smith, 
diary.  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Jan.  26.  69Colecci6n  de  Itineraries. 
307Roberts,  diary.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  174-5.  Defensor  de  Tamaul., 
Jan.  18.  76Cos,  Feb.  1.  218Henshaw  narrative.  139W.  B.  Campbell 
to  wife,  Jan.  25.     Furber,  Twelve  Months  Vol.,  342-93. 

33.  The  author's  opinion  of  Pillow  is  based  upon  his  letters  to  his  wife, 
Polk,  Scott,  Duncan  and  others,  the  Trist  papers,  the  Campbell  papers, 
the  records  of  two  courts  of  inquiry  regarding  his  conduct,  and  a  large 
number  of  additional  documents,  most  of  which  will  be  cited  later,  par- 
ticularly in  chaps,  xxvi  and  xxix.  An  army  correspondent  of  W.  T.  (later 
Gen.)  Sherman  described  Pillow,  Feb.  26,  1848,  as  "a  mass  of  vanity, 
conceit,  ignorance,  ambition  and  want  of  truth."  There  was  good  warrant 
for  this  characterization,  but  one  should  add  plausibility,  cunning,  energy  and 
a  genial  disposition.     For  his  personal  appearance :  Semmes,  Service,  165. 

34.  Scott  had  not  yet  heard  from  Washington  regarding  Harney. 

35.  At  Tampico.  332Tennery,  diary.  273Mullan,  diary.  Lawton, 
Artillery  Officer,  10-64.  146Caswell,  diary.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  896? 
899,  900,  1169  (Scott);  901  (Totten) ;  850  (Clarke);  896  (Hetzel). 
Robertson,  Remins.,  207-13.  Bishop,  Journal.  ISOPillow  to  wife,  Dec.  8, 
1846;  Feb.  23,  1847.  lllBeauregard  to  Totten,  Jan.  9,  14;  to  Gates, 
Feb.  24.  Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  241-5.  330J.  T.  Taylor  to  Scott,  Feb.  12. 
280Nunelee,  diary.  Apuntes,  88.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  177,  184-5. 
218Henshaw  narrative,  Feb.  20.  254McClellan,  diary.  303Shields  to 
Quitman,  Mar.  4.  159Collins,  diary,  Feb.  19,  25.  Davis,  Autobiog., 
121-3.  65Scott,  gen.  orders.  21,  Feb.  19.  76Cos,  Feb.  19.  76Anon.  letters 
to  Garay,  Jan.  25,  28,  etc.  139Campbell  to  wife,  Feb.  3,  7,  16.  Mason, 
Lee.  37.  Furber,  Twelve  Months  Vol.,  394-415.  Works  defending  the 
two  land  approaches  to  Tampico  were  now  ready,  and  Col.  Gates  of  the 
Third  Artillery  with  a  company  of  artillery,  the  Md.  and  D.  C.  battalion 
and  the  new  Louisiana  regiment  —  about  1200  men  in  all  —  were  de- 
tached as  a  garrison.  Rumors  came  that  Taylor  was  in  danger,  but  the 
air  was  full  of  rumors  about  the  enemy,  and  Scott  had  ample  ground 
for  disregarding  these,  though  criticised  for  doing  so.  Von  Moltke  said 
(Franco-German  War,  71) :  "It  would  have  been  unjustifiable  to  entirely 
change  the  line  of  march  on  the  ground  of  rumors  that  might,  after  all, 
prove  unfounded."  Feb.  19  Scott  announced  his  staff  appointments. 
The  possession  of  Tampico  was  extremely  useful  to  him.  Fresh  provisions 
abounded  there,  and  the  embarking  of  about  5000  men  en  the  dangerous 
coast  at  the  Brazos  was  avoided. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  367-368        547 

36.  The  Louisiana  men  went  from  Lobos  Islands  to  Tampico.  Col. 
De  Russey  and  the  other  part  of  the  regiment  were  wrecked  about  Feb.  6 
on  the  coast  nearly  opposite  those  islands,  but  after  some  hardships  and 
considerable  danger  of  being  captured  by  Gen.  Cos,  commanding  at  Tux- 
p£n  about  forty  miles  distant,  they  made  their  way  to  Tampico,  meeting 
en  route  an  expedition  sent  to  rescue  them  (Meade,  Letters,  i,  179 ;  Law- 
ton,  Artillery  Officer,  32-5;   270Moore,  diary;    76F.  de  Garay,  Mar.  5). 

37.  To  Lobos  Islands.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  1256  (Hetzel) ;  1259  (Bab- 
bitt); 878  (Conner);  568  (Jesup) ;  840,  841,  846,  880,  891,  896  (Scott). 
65Scott,  gen.  orders  1,  6,  8,  Jan.  15,  30,  30.  Lawton,  Artillery  Officer, 
23,  65.  GlBrooke  to  Munroe,  Jan.  11;  to  Scott,  Jan.  9,  21.  62Stanton 
to  Jesup,  Feb.  16.  Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  413.  298Porter,  diary.  254Mc- 
Clellan,  Feb.  23.  193Foster  to  mother,  Feb.  26.  Ho.  59;  30,  1,  p.  41. 
Smith,  To  Mexico,  105,  108.  164Scott  to  Conner,  Dec.  26,  1846.  Niles, 
Mar.  13,  p.  21 ;  20,  p.  48.  Hartman,  Journal,  6.  Oswandel,  Notes,  54-6. 
Picayune,  Feb.  18.  159Collins,  diary.  146Caswell,  diary.  Ballentine, 
English  Soldier,  i,  266.     Bishop,  Journal. 

38.  Polk  and  Marcy  felt  that  he  was  looking  for  an  issue  (256Marcy  to 
Wetmore,  April  25,  1847),  and  his  course  warrants  that  supposition. 

39.  Taylor's  movements.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  861,  890,  1097(Taylor), 
875  (Scott).  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  72,  85,  87,  180-2.  169/d.  to 
Crittenden,  Jan.  26.  Polk,  Diary,  Oct.  20,  1846;  Jan.  5;  Mar.  21-23; 
Apr.  1,  1847.  256Marcy  to  Wetmore,  Mar.  11.  Journ.  Mil.  Serv.  Instit. 
xiv,  443. 

Jan.  26  Scott  wrote  to  Taylor:  "I  must  ask  you  to  abandon  Saltillo, 
and  to  make  no  detachments,  except  for  reconnaisances  and  immediate 
defence,  much  beyond  Monterey.  I  know  this  to  be  the  wish  of  the 
government,  founded  on  reasons  in  which  I  concur"  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p. 
864).  In  reply  Taylor  wrote  on  Feb.  7  that  he  was  going  to  remain  at  his 
advanced  position  unless  "  positively  ordered  to  fall  back  by  the  govern- 
ment at  Washington"  (ibid.,  1162).  In  addressing  the  government  on 
the  same  day  (ibid.,  1110)  he  referred  to  Scott's  instructions  as  advice. 
But  such  language  from  a  superior  officer  was  clearly  an  order  courteously 
phrased,  and  this  interpretation  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  Scott  deemed 
it  necessary  to  give  Taylor  express  authority  later  to  make  a  diversion 
toward  San  Luis  Potosf  (ibid.,  p.  876).  Polk  (Diary,  April  7,  1847,  and 
elsewhere)  remarked  that  Taylor  had  violated  his  orders  by  taking  his 
advanced  position. 

Taylor's  ostensible  reasons  for  so  doing  as  given  by  himself  (Bixby  coll., 
182)  were  these :  1 .  It  would  be  safest  to  fight,  should  the  Mexicans  ad- 
vance, immediately  on  their  getting  across  the  desert  region  that  lay 
between  San  Luis  Potosi  and  the  advanced  American  position,  rather 
than  let  them  recuperate  and  use  Saltillo  as  a  base.  2.  Had  the  Amer- 
icans fallen  back  to  Monterey,  Santa  Anna  would  have  invested  it,  the 
Mexicans  of  that  section  would  have  risen,  every  animal  at  Monterey 
would  have  starved  or  been  destroyed,  the  troops  —  disheartened  by 
retreating,  and  beyond  succor  —  would  have  surrendered  or  been  cut  to 
pieces,  and  every  American  depot  in  the  rear  would  have  been  abandoned 
or  captured.  3.  Doniphan  would  have  been  ruined.  But  (1),  as  we  have 
seen  (note  27),  Taylor  believed  on  Jan.  26,  Feb.  4,  7,  and  14  (i.e.  both 
before  and  after  taking  the  advanced  position)  that  he  was  in  no  real 
danger  of  being  attacked  by  Santa  Anna,  and  hence  had  not  the  warrant 
of  a  supposed  emergency  for  disregarding  his   instructions.     (2)    This 


548       NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XVIII,   PAGES  368-369 

advanced  position  was  not,  as  his  explanation  assumes,  a  good  place  at 
which  to  meet  the  Mexicans,  and  he  retired  from  it  before  the  battle  of 
Buena  Vista.  (3)  Rinconada  Pass,  on  the  other  hand,  could  probably 
have  been  made  virtually  impregnable  toward  the  south,  and,  if  properly 
defended,  could  at  least  have  held  out  for  a  considerable  time.  (4)  It 
was  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  Santa  Anna,  learning  that  Scott  was 
about  to  strike  at  the  vitals  of  Mexico,  would  undertake  to  carry  the  Pass 
and  besiege  a  city  like  Monterey,  prepared  in  all  ways  —  as  Marcy  had 
instructed  Taylor  on  Oct.  13,22  (Ho.  60;  30, 1,  pp.  356,364)  to  prepare  it 
—  for  a  stubborn  resistance  (Howard,  Taylor,  238) .  (5)  If,  however, 
Santa  Anna  were  going  to  do  so,  as  Taylor's  explanation  assumes,  the 
policy  of  Scott  and  the  administration  was  certainly  the  true  one,  since 
it  would  have  contributed  to  a  triumph  on  the  line  from  Vera  Cruz  to 
the  capital.  (6)  Taylor's  retirement  to  Monterey  and  vicinity  would 
have  entailed  no  loss  of  prestige  or  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  Amer- 
icans, since  it  would  have  formed  one  part  of  a  bold  offensive  plan ;  but 
would  only  have  diminished  somewhat  Taylor's  personal  effulgence. 
(7)  It  was  not  reasonable  to  believe  that  the  men  with  whom  Taylor 
(Bixby  coll.,  86)  was  ready  to  meet  Santa  Anna  in  the  field  could  not 
hold  their  own  against  him  in  strong  works  (Meade,  Letters,  i,  179),  and 
a  success  at  Monterey  would  have  been  not  only  more  certain  but  more 
decisive  and  less  costly  than  at  Buena  Vista  (Scott,  Mems.,  ii,  412)  More- 
over Taylor  would  have  had  the  Monterey  garrison  as  well  as  the  troops 
who  actually  fought  at  Buena  Vista.  (8)  Taylor  represented  that  he 
could  not  transport  siege  guns  from  Camargo  to  Monterey,  and  how 
could  he  have  expected  Santa  Anna  to  bring  them  to  Monterey  from  San 
Luis  Potosi?  (9)  If  Monterey  did  not  contain  ample  forage  for  the  ani- 
mals, the  fault  was  Taylor's ;  and,  if  he  was  to  stand  a  siege,  most  of  the 
animals  could  have  been  sent  to  the  Rio  Grande  (Ripley,  War  with  Mex., 
i,  435).  (10)  Reinforcements  from  the  north  were  en  route,  and  succor 
from  Scott  could  have  reached  Monterey  more  easily  than  a  position 
far  in  advance.  (11)  Doniphan  could  have  retired  from  Chihuahua  by 
the  way  he  had  gone  there  or  (like  a  party  of  only  forty  men :  Hughes, 
Doniphan's  Exped.,  335)  via  Presidio  del  Rio  Grande;  and  before  moving 
toward  Saltillo  it  was  his  duty  to  ascertain,  as  he  actually  did,  whether 
he  could  safely  go  there. 

Another  point  brought  forward  by  Taylor  was  that  had  he  remained 
at  Monterey,  the  Mexicans  could  more  effectually  have  annoyed  •  his 
flanks  and  lines  of  communication  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  1110) ;  but  (1)  evi- 
dently, had  he  remained  at  Monterey,  his  flanks  and  lines  of  communica- 
tion would  have  been  less  extended  and  more  easily  protected  than  when 
he  was  about  eighty-five  miles  farther  on  (Polk,  Diary,  Mar.  23,  1847), 
and  (2)  as  a  matter  of  fact  his  flanks  were  effectually  annoyed  and  his 
communications  entirely  cut  off.  (For  certain  points  in  this  discussion 
the  author  is  indebted  to  Ripley's  "  War  with  Mexico.")  In  short,  the 
only  rational  explanation  of  Taylor's  course  appears  to  be  that  suggested 
in  the  text.  Oct.  15  Taylor  wrote:  Every  day's  march  beyond  Saltillo 
will  weaken  our  position  and  strengthen  the  enemy's  (Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p. 
352).  Nov.  26  he  wrote:  "We  have  advanced  as  far  from  our  base  in 
this  quarter  as  we  ought  to  venture"  (Bixby  coll.,  72). 

The  troops  that  Taylor  now  had  were :  regulars  —  two  squadrons  of 
cavalry,  four  batteries  (16  guns),  and  at  Monterey  one  company  of  ar- 
tillery ;    volunteers  —  two  regiments  of  horse,   eight   regiments  of  foot, 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XIX,   PAGES  370-374        549 

and  two  guns  at  Monterey,  Saltillo  and  beyond  Saltillo;  and  three  regts. 
of  volunteer  foot  holding  the  line  to  Camargo  and  down  the  river  (Ho. 
60;   30,  1,  p.  1098). 

XIX.   SANTA  ANNA  PREPARES  TO  STRIKE 

1.  Butler  returned  to  Monterey  about  the  first  of  February. 

2.  The  statements  regarding  Taylor's  negligence  are  from  Gen.  Ben- 
ham,  who  was  on  the  ground  as  an  engineer  officer.  His  "  Recollections  " 
was  published  in  1871,  and  whether  it  was  based  on  documents  is  not 
known.  But,  being  an  engineer,  he  was  a  man  of  clear  and  trained  in- 
telligence; he  possessed  superior  ability;  and  on  careful  inquiry  the 
author  was  told  by  Major  Lukesh,  director  of  the  engineer  school,  Wash- 
ington Barracks,  that  in  1878  his  faculties  appeared  to  be  entirely  sound. 
Moreover  his  account  shows  internal  evidences  of  credibility.  The 
alleged  negligence  of  Taylor  was  in  accordance  with  his  temperament 
and  previous  record,  and  he  probably  thought  it  would  reassure  the 
troops. 

3.  Taylor  wrote  nothing  and  did  nothing  indicating  an  intention  to 
make  his  stand  at  Carnero  Pass,  and  the  evidence  that  he  intended  to 
fight  at  Agua  Nueva  seems  to  be  decisive.  He  might,  however,  have 
endeavored  to  annoy  the  enemy  at  the  Pass. 

4.  Affairs  with  Taylor  up  to  Feb.  20.  Carleton,  Buena  Vista,  2-8,  50, 
179-80.  190Ewing,  diary.  330Taylor  to  brother,  Feb.  8.  Raleigh 
(N.  C.)  Star,  Aug.  18,  1847.  Taylor,  Letters  (Bixby),  86,  182.  69Wool 
to  Taylor,  Jan.  20,  29.  69Warren  to  Wool,  Feb.  14.  147Chamberlain, 
diary.  148/d.,  recollections.  6lAm.  offs.  to  S.  Anna,  Mar.  24.  6lHeady 
to  Marshall,  Aug.  30,  1848.  6lGaines  to  Scott,  May  3,  1847.  65Wool, 
orders  222.  C.  M.  Clay,  Mems.,  i,  143.  Vedette,  ii,  no.  2  (Oury) ;  no.  8 
(Lee).  61  [Wool]  to  adj.  gen.,  Jan.  17.  Article  on  Taylor  (by  J.  Davis) 
in  Appleton's  Biog.  Diet.  Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  248-9.  185Bragg  to 
Duncan,  Apr.  4.  299Posey  to  friend,  Feb.  19.  Smith,  Chile  con  Carne, 
161.     Smith,    Remins.,    41-5.     Upton,    Mil.    Policy,   209.     Amer.  Flag, 

Matamoros,  Feb.  17.     N.  Y.  Tribune,  Mar.  29.     367Yell  to ,  Jan.  19. 

Ho.  Report  413;  30,  1.  Encarnacion  Prisoners,  35-8,  92-4.  Meade, 
Letters,  i,  169,  182.  300Priekett,  letters.  Bishop,  Journal.  8Anon. 
diary.  245Bee  to  Lamar,  Dec.  5,  1846.  Rapida  Ojeada,  6,  8.  Coleman, 
Critt.,  i,  308-10.  Balbontm,  Invasi6n,  70.  Benham,  Recollections. 
253Harney  to  McLean,  June  13.  349Pattridge  to  Miss  W.,  July  21. 
Spirit  of  the  Times,  May  1  (H.  von  S.).  Hist.  Teacher's  Mag.,  Apr.,  1912., 
p.  75.  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  Jan.  4,  1849.  316Bragg  to  Sherman,  Mar.  4,  1848. 
146Caswell,  diary,  Jan.  12.  139Campbell  to  D.  C,  Nov.  2,  9,  1846. 
Senex,  Myth.  N.  Y.  Sun,  Jan.  28.  (Urrea)  Delta,  Jan.  16.  Picayune, 
Mar.  11;  Apr.  14  (Taylor);  June  25.  Niles,  Mar.  20,  p.  60;.  May  8, 
p.  156.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  441,  1098,  1106-10,  1162  (Taylor);  864,  876 
(Scott);  1108  (Wool);  1111-2,1182  (lists).  Monitor  Repub.,  Jan.  14. 
76S.  Anna,  Jan.  26;  Feb.  27.  76Zambonino,  Jan.  23.  76 Auxil.  inspector 
of  N.  Le6n  to  Canales,  Jan.  20. 

Col.  Campbell  (First  Tenn.  regt.)  :  "Old  Zack's"  manners  are  such  that 
he  excites  no  jealousy ;  "no  one  feels  that  he  [Taylor]  is  his  superior,  but 
his  equal  or  inferior,  and  each  thinks  he  can  control  and  manage  such  a 
mind"  (139to  D.  Campbell,  Apr.  25,  1847).  U.  S.  Grant:  We  thought 
the  battles  on  the  Rio  Grande  pretty  important,  but  had  "only  a  faint 


550         NOTES   ON  CHAPTER  XIX,   PAGES  374-378 

conception  of  their  magnitude  until  they  were  fought  over  in  the  North 
by  the  Press  and  the  reports  came  back  to  us"  (Mems.,  i,  99).  It  will 
be  noted  that  Taylor  pursued  now  the  same  anti-Csesarean,  anti-Napole- 
onic policy  of  teaching  his  troops  to  despise  the  enemy  that  had  been  fol- 
lowed by  him  before  the  battles  of  May,  1846  (chap,  viii,  note  9).  The  dis- 
tance by  rail  from  Saltillo  to  Agua  Nueva  station  is  eighteen  miles.  Rives 
(U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  350)  speaks  of  the  buildings  at  Buena  Vista  as  "laid 
out  in  regular  streets";  but,  as  the  text  states,  Buena  Vista  was  only  a 
poor  farm,  not  a  rich  hacienda.  A  soldier,  there  present,  called  it  an 
"  insignificant,  dirty  little  rancho." 

5.  El  Crepusculo,  May  16,  1835,  said  that  Santa  Anna  triumphed  over 
Zacatecas  "with  the  tranquillity  of  the  tiger,  which,  sated  with  the  flesh 
of  its  prey,  lies  down  on  what  it  does  not  wish  to  devour."  During  De- 
cember, 1846,  very  sharp  76letters  were  exchanged  by  Governor  Gonzalez 
and  Santa  Anna. 

6.  This  estimate  is  based  upon  about  thirty  statements,  none  of  them 
official.  About  the  middle  of  August  Salas  ordered  to  the  north  the  troops 
that  had  been  fighting  in  Jalisco.  About  5500  regulars  preceded  or  ac- 
companied Santa  Anna's  journey  to  the  north,  and  later  he  called  other 
troops  from  the  capital  and  the  states.  Though  accounts  varied,  Ampudia 
seems  to  have  brought  nearly  6000  ;  the  Fourth  Brigade,  which  had  failed 
to  reach  Monterey,  and  the  former  garrison  of  Tampico  were  substantial 
additions ;  Guanajuato  state,  roused  personally  by  Valencia,  contributed 
more  than  5000  ;  the  Jalisco  regiment,  which  arrived  at  the  end  of  October, 
numbered  1345  foot ;  the  state  of  S.  Luis  Potosi  did  well,  and  other  states 
did  more  or  less ;  and  an  artillery  company  was  made  up  from  American 
deserters,  mostly  Irishmen,  under  the  name  of  San  Patricio  (see  chap,  xi, 
note  11) ;  but  desertion  —  due  to  the  inborn  distaste  of  the  masses  for 
war,  to  bad  treatment  and  to  poor  subsistence  —  was  constantly  un- 
raveling the  work  of  accumulation. 

It  seems  to  have  been  a  mistake  to  draw  Ampudia' s  army  to  San  Luis 
at  so  early  a  date.  It  was  in  no  danger  before  the  end  of  the  armistice ; 
it  could  have  encouraged  the  people  near  Saltillo  to  act  as  guerillas ;  and 
it  needed  time  to  regain  its  morale.  Besides,  this  backward  movement 
had  a  bad  effect  on  the  other  troops,  and  so  much  was  said  at  San  Luis 
by  Ampudia's  men  about  the  prowess  of  the  Americans,  that  a  general 
order  forbidding  such  talk  had  to  be  issued.  Ampudia  and  a  number  of 
his  officers  were  put  on  trial ;  but  the  trials  were  suspended,  and  most 
of  the  accused  were  exonerated  in  orders.  Several  thousand  men  (suc- 
cessively under  Urrea,  Valencia  and  Vazquez)  were  kept  at  Tula,  about 
125  miles  northeast  of  San  Luis.  Santa  Anna  knew  the  Americans  could 
not  bring  artillery  via  Tula,  and  did  not  fear  them  without  it ;  but  he 
looked  forward  to  operating  via  Victoria  against  Taylor's  line  of  communica- 
tion. Another  body  was  kept  at  Matehuala.  Smaller  forces  were  eche- 
loned in  the  same  general  direction ;  and  Min6n's  brigade  was  thrown 
still  farther  forward  as  a  screen,  corps  of  observation  and  means  of  annoy- 
ing the  enemy.  In  order  to  prevent  the  Americans  from  learning  about 
his  operations,  Santa  Anna  gave  orders  to  the  cavalry  at  his  front  that 
no  one  should  be  permitted  to  go  to  Saltillo  or  Monterey  without  a  pass 
signed  by  himself. 

7.  Santa  Anna's  arrival,  plans  and  operations  at  S.  L.  P.;  his  financial 
difficulties  there.  Amer.  Eagle,  Apr.  8.  52J.  Parrott,  Feb.  6.  52Black, 
Nov.  17,  1846.     London  Times,  Dec.  18,  1846;    Mar.  11;   Apr.  20,  1847. 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XIX,   PAGES  374-378         551 

Matamoros  Amer.  Flag,  Mar.  13.  Gimenez,  Mems.,  96-7,  264.  Journal 
des  Debats,  Feb.  22.  Constitutionnel,  Dec.  5,  12,  1846;  Jan.  17,  31,  1847. 
69 Worth  to  Bliss,  Nov.  29, 1846.  69Shields  to  Bliss,  Jan.  13,  1847.  58Job- 
son,  Feb.  14.  6lShields  to  adj.  gen.,  Jan.  19.  47Black  to  Conner,  Sept.  24, 
1846.  47Conner,  Oct.  26;  Nov.  5;  Dec.  1.  Memoria  de  .  .  .  Guerra, 
Dec,  1846.  Doblado,  Memoria  que  contiene.  70Canalizo  to  S.  Anna,  Jan.  7. 
Henry,  Camp.  Sketches,  249,  271.  Gamboa,  Impug.,  26.  Negrete,  In- 
vasion, ii,  351;  iii,  app.,  444;  iv,  app.,  177,  417.  Ramirez,  Mexico,  9, 
10,  12.  Mexico  a"  traves,  iv,  579,  591-2.  Don  Simplicio,  Oct.  10,  1846 ; 
Jan.  9,  30;  Feb.  17,  1847.  Observador  Zacat.,  Dec.  27,  1846,  suplem. 
lOOJefe  dept,  of  V.  Cruz  to  ayunt.,  Dec.  21,  1846.  Eco  de  Tampico, 
Oct.  8,  14,  1846.  Escudero,  Mems.,  6.  Durango  congress,  Dec.  11,  1846. 
Repuhlicano,  Oct.  15,  1846 ;  Feb.  2,  1847.     80Mex.  state,  decree,  Nov.  26, 

1846.  Epoca,  Sept.  26;  Oct.  13,  1846;  Jan.  19,  26,  30;  Feb.  16.  77Re- 
laciones,  circulars,  Sept.  30;  Oct.  6,  19,  20,  22,  1846.  75aHacienda, 
circular,  Oct.  14,  1846.  83Gov.  Queretaro  to  other  govs.,  Oct.  16,  1846; 
to  Farias,  Oct,  18  ;  to  S.  Anna,  Nov.  21 ;  Dec.  21.  Rivera,  Gobernantes, 
ii,  309.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  53-4,  58,  61.  Apuntes,  69,  70,  73,  75. 
Defensa  de  .  .  .  Estrada.  Donnavan,  Adventures,  51,  76.  13Bank- 
head,  nos.  140,  144,  151,  173,  178,  1846.  Muro,  Miscelanea,  65,  68,  70. 
Garcia,  Revol.  de  Ayutla,  27.  Sierra,  Evolution,  i,  217.  Crepusculo, 
May  16,  1835.  Puga  y  Acal,  Docs.,  57.  Garcia,  Ju&rez,  65.  Busta- 
mante,  Apuntes  .  .  .  S.  Anna,  289.  S.  Anna,  Apelaci6n,  24-5 ;  app.,'  3, 
14, 18-24,  30,  30-9,  66-7.     80ld.  to  gov.  Mex.  state,  Nov.  26, 1846 ;  Jan.  31, 

1847.  Picayune,  Mar.  10.  Delta,  Jan.  22.  Independiente,  May  22. 
Wash.  Union,  Nov.  16,  30,  1846;  Mar.  17,  1847.  N.  Y.  Journ.  of  Com- 
merce, Jan.  8.  80Gov.  to  legislature,  Feb.  15,  1847.  Diario,  Oct.  1,  2, 
6,  7,  16,  21,  22,  24;  Nov.  2,  14,  19,  27;  Dec.  4,  6,  8,  16,  20,  24,  25,  28, 
1846;  Jan.  30;  Feb.  15,  17,  1847.  Monitor  Repub.,  Oct.  18,  31 ;  Nov.  17, 
18,  20,  21;  Dec.  21,  1846;  Jan.  8,  29;  Feb.  11,  16;  Apr.  22;  Nov.  30, 
1847.  Mora,  Papeles,  64,  66.  162Conner,  Dec.  1,  1846.  166Black  to 
Conner.  Sept.  24,  1846.  Niles,  Mar.  27,  p.  57.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  160. 
52J.  Parrott,  June  4,  1846.  73Bermudez  de  Castro,  nos.  343,  346,  1846. 
75Gov.  Michoacan  to  Relaciones :  circ.  no.  252  of  Relac.  Parrodi,  Me- 
moria (S.  Anna,  Oct.  18).  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  776,  no.  4.  366Letters  from 
S.  Anna  to  gov.  S.  L.  P.,  Nov.  1.  And  from  76  the  following.  Carrera, 
Nov.  10.  Plana  mayor,  Dec.  1.  Valencia,  addresses,  Oct.  6,  30.  Gov. 
to  cong.  Durango,  Nov.  8.  M.  Escand6n,  July  21.  Salas,  proclams., 
Aug.  28 ;  Nov.  11.  Pifia  to  Carrera,  Dec.  10.  Decrees,  Sept.  27 ;  Dec.  2. 
Memo,  of  artill.  sent  to  S.  L.  P.  Circular,  Aug.  4.  Report  on  artillery, 
Nov.  13.  Comte.  gen.  Chiapas,  Oct.  3.  Comisario  gen.  to  S.  Anna, 
Nov.  30;  Dec.  5.  Juan  Morales,  Nov.  2.  Comte.  gen.  Durango,  ad- 
dress, Oct.  16.     Guerra,  circulars,  Oct.  1,  2,  3,  4,  5;    Nov.  30;    Dec.  2, 

1846.  S.  Anna,  Sept.  29;  Oct.  3,  4,  10,  14,  17,  19,  22,  22,  res.,  25,  res., 
28,  30,  31 ;  Nov.  2,  4,  5,  7,  9,  16,  18,  19,  28,  30;  Dec.  3,  4,  7,  9,  11,  14,  19, 
22,  28,  30,  1846;  Jan.  1,  4,  7,  15,  19,  20;  Feb.  27,  1847.     Mora,  Apr.  22, 

1847.  Comte.  gen.  Guanajuato,  Oct.  30;  Nov.  13;  Dec.  28,  1846.  S. 
L.  P.  assembly,  decree,  June  17,  1846.  Ampudia  to  S.  Anna,  Oct.  18. 
Relaciones,  Jan.  11.  J.  G.  P.  Garay,  June  8,  1846.  Valencia,  proclam., 
Dec,  1844.  Yafiez,  Oct.  9;  Nov.  6,  1846.  Ampudia,  Oct.  1,  1846. 
Valencia,  Nov.  8.  To  S.  Anna,  Oct.  17.  S.  Anna  to  gov.  Zacatecas, 
Dec.  17. 

8.  Copies  of  the  Herald  containing  this  letter  arrived  at  Vera  Cruz,  but 


552         NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XIX,   PAGES  378-380 

were  seized.     Later  Santa  Anna  denied  flatly  that  he  had  had  any  deal- 
ings with  the  United  States  (Apelaci6n,  16). 

9.  As  Santa  Anna's  movement  rested  essentially  upon  non-military 
reasons,  Scott's  forecast  of  his  operations  naturally  proved  incorrect. 
The  American  attack  upon  Vera  Cruz,  though  known  to  be  planned,  was 
not  yet  known  certainly  to  be  coming.  Santa  Anna  defended  himself 
later  for  not  going  to  Vera  Cruz  by  saying  that  he  was  merely  commander 
of  the  northern  army,  but  in  fact  he  did  not  so  regard  himself.  The  truth 
is  that  he  urged  and  expected  the  government  to  provide  for  Vera  Cruz, 
that  the  government  assured  him  it  had  been  provided  for,  and  that,  had 
it  been  tenaciously  defended,  it  could  have  held  out  until  he  could  have 
arrived  in  that  vicinity  (76S.  Anna,  Oct.  14,  20,  1846 ;  Jan.  14,  18,  1847. 
Id.,  Apelaci6n,  33.  76To  S.  Anna,  Jan.  30,  1847).  Taylor's  moving 
away  from  Scott  caused  the  intercepting  of  Scott's  letter  of  January  3, 
which  revealed  Taylor's  weakness,  and  thus  may  have  been  the  cause 
of  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista. 

10.  Why  Santa  Anna  marched  north  (complaints  of  his  conduct) .  52Black, 
Aug.  27;  Oct.  8;  Nov.  17,  1846;  Jan.  28,  1847.  Sierra,  Evolution,  218. 
Soldado  de  la  Patria,  no.  13.  London  Times,  Jan.  28.  Memoria  de  .  .  . 
Relaciones,  Dec,  1846.  Courrier  des  Etats  JJnis,  June  20;  July  9,  1846. 
335Mackenzie  to  Trist,  Nov.  25,  1846.  Gamboa,  Impug.,  15-19,  21-2. 
Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  390.  Ramirez,  Mexico,  173,  192.  Don  Simplicio, 
Jan.  9,  20,  27;  Feb.  3.  82MS.  apparently  written  in  Jan.,  1847.  77Re- 
laciones,  circular,  Nov.  27,  1846.  Republicano,  Jan.  21,  31.  13Paken- 
ham,  no.  127,  1846.  83Gov.  Queretaro  to  S.  Anna,  Nov.  21,  1846.  Biog. 
del  Gen.  S.  Anna,  1847.  13Pakenham  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  29,  1846. 
Negrete,  Invasi6n,  iii,  app.,  483  (Otero);  iv,  app.,  177.  Balbontin, 
Invasi6n,  59.  Apuntes,  77.  Pacheco,  Exposici6n.  13Bankhead,  nos. 
121,  140,  141,  157,  169,  1846;  5,  1847.  Garcia,  Juarez,  65.  Tribute 
a  la  Verdad,  27.  S.  Anna,  Manifiesto,  Mex.,  1847,  6.  Id.,  Apelaci6n, 
16,  23.  Picayune,  Mar.  9,  10.  Acta,  Mazatlan,  Jan.  18.  80Olaguibel 
to  S.  Anna,  Jan.  — ,  1847.  Wash.  Union,  Oct.  10,  1846  (from  La  Patria) ; 
Mar.  17,  1847.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Sept.  5,  1846.  Richmond  Times, 
Sept.  2,  1846.  Diario,  Nov.  24;  Dec.  6,  8,  1846  ;  Jan.  30,  1847.  Monitor 
Repub.,  Oct.  22;  Nov.  20,  29;  Dec.  28,  1846;  Jan.  4,  6,  8,  14,  19,  22  (call- 
ing attention  to  the  scattered  state  of  Taylor's  forces) ,  26, 29, 1847.  Mora, 
Papeles,  70.  Niles,  Mar.  27,  p.  57.  73Bermudez  de  Castro,  nos.  343,  res., 
410,  1846.  Bustamante,  Nuevo  Bernal,  ii,  90,  76Relaciones,  Jan.  11. 
76S.  Anna,  Feb.  27.     76/d.,  Manifiesto,  Jan.  26. 

Rives  (U.  S.  and  Mexico,  ii,  341)  doubts  whether  S.  Anna  had  learned 
from  Richey's  despatches  (chap,  xviii,  note  27)  that  Taylor's  forces  had 
been  depleted,  and  cites  in  evidence  S.  Anna's  declaration  in  defence  of 
himself  for  going  against  Taylor  when  Scott  was  about  to  attack  Vera 
Cruz  (Apelaci6n,  32).  But  (1)  S.  Anna  was  not  a  person  to  admit  un- 
necessarily the  strongest  point  of  an  accusation  against  him,  and  in  fact 
the  other  point  of  his  defence,  cited  by  Rives,  was  not  honest ;  (2)  S.  Anna 
here  representing  that  he  feared  Scott  was  coming  from  Tampico  to  S. 
Luis  Potosi  shows  again  the  disingenuousness  of  his  defence,  for  he  must 
have  known  that  such  a  movement  was  impracticable;  (3)  it  is  hardly 
conceivable  that  Scott's  intercepted  letter  of  Jan.  3  did  not,  like  Marcy's 
of  Sept.  2,  find  its  way  to  headquarters. 

11.  The  forces  taking  part  in  the  campaign  seem  to  have  been  9500 
infantry  from  San  Luis,  4000  (under  Mejia)  stationed  at  Matehuala,  and 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XIX,   PAGES  380-381         553 

1000  (under  Parrodi)  from  Tula,  6000  cavalry  in  four  brigades  (Torrej6n 
at  Las  Bocas  near  S.  L.  P.,  Juvera  at  Venado,  Andrade  at  Cedral,  and 
Miri6n  at  La  Encarnaci6n),  and  900  engineers,  artillery  and  sappers  —  a 
total  of  21,400  including  officers.  These  numbers  are  taken  from  Rapida 
Ojeada  and  from  a  San  Luis  letter  (the  figures  of  which  were  stated  posi- 
tively to  have  come  from  a  member  of  Santa  Anna's  staff)  printed  in  El 
Republican*)  of  February  12,  which  substantially  agree.  Santa  Anna's 
figures  were  smaller  but  perhaps  did  not  include  Mifi6n's  and  Parrodi's 
troops.  Those  of  the  Spanish  minister  were  somewhat  larger.  There 
seem  to  have  been  seventeen  guns  (three  24-pounders  and  three  16's,  all 
of  which  were  siege  or  fortress  guns,  and  for  field  pieces  five  12's,  five  8's 
and  a  7-inch  howitzer)  which,  as  well  as  most  of  the  ammunition,  appear 
to  have  gone  forward  January  27.  Urrea  was  at  the  same  time  to  pass 
from  Tula  into  Tamaulipas,  strike  at  Taylor's  communications  and 
threaten  Monterey.  Probably  there  were  bodies  of  irregulars  at  points 
not  named  above. 

It  occurs  to  the  author  at  this  point  to  remark  that  consistency  in  the 
use  of  the  article  in  geographical  names  is  hardly  practicable.  Even 
Mexican  maps  have  not  been  consistent ;  and  for  us  it  would  (e.g.)  be 
an  affectation  to  use  the  article  with  such  well-known  names  as  Puebla 
and  Saltillo. 

12.  At  certain  points  in  the  desert  there  were  large  wells ;  and  in 
each  of  these  a  wide  wheel,  carrying  buckets,  was  turned  by  mule 
power. 

13.  The  main  part  of  the  army  arrived  Feb.  17-19  (Apuntes,  96). 
Taylor  thought  he  could  not  move  more  than  about  6000  men  some  125 
miles  (supposed  to  be  about  140)  from  a  well-stocked  base,  Camargo, 
through  a  region  supplied  with  water,  subsistence  and  forage,  and  could 
not  transport  18-pounders  (chap,  xi,  note  5).  After  Miii6n  advanced  to 
Potosf,  Andrade  occupied  La  Encarnaci6n  (night  of  Feb.  11).  The  wheel 
pumps  were  then  set  in  operation,  but  by  Feb.  19  they  were  worn  out. 
The  only  ample  supply  of  water  was  then  seven  or  eight  miles  away,  but 
it  had  to  be  used  for  the  animals.  The  distance  from  S.  L.  Potosi  to  Agua 
Nueva  by  rail  is  about  223  miles. 

14.  Feb.  19  two  brigades  of  cavalry  had  not  arrived.  The  figures  may 
or  may  not  have  included  these  and  Mifi6n's  force.  Probably  they  did 
include  many  whose  duties  kept  them  from  the  firing  line  (Republicano, 
May  3,  1847).  The  original  reports  of  the  officers  regarding  numbers 
and  operations  have  disappeared  from  76. 

15.  To  and  at  La  Encarnacion.  Carleton,  Buena  Vista,  23,  229.  Le6n, 
Mex.,  474.  Garcia,  Ju&rez,  67.  London  Times,  May  10.  Journal 
Milit.  Serv.  Instit.,  xiv,  443.  Gimenez,  Mems.,  98.  Sierra,  Evolution, 
219.  Le  Clercq,  Voyage,  31-49.  Calendario  de  Ontiveros,  1847.  Sen. 
32;  31,  1,  p.  8,  note.  Rapida  Ojeada,  4,  7-9,  etc.  Ord6fiez,  Refutaci6n, 
5,  8,  etc.  6lLamar  to  Bliss,  Apr.  21.  Rodriguez,  Breve  Resefia,  1848,  57. 
Republicano,  Feb.  12;  Mar.  24;  May  3.  80S.  Anna  to  gov.  Mexico 
state,  Jan.  27.  Epoca,  Jan.  19,  26;  Feb.  25.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  389. 
Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  60-9,  78.  Apuntes,  88,  91-7.  S.  Anna,  Manifiesto, 
Mar.,  1848.  Id.,  Apelacion,  24-7,  32;  app.,  67.  Muro,  Miscelanea, 
73-5.  Sen.  1;  30,  1,  pp.  153-8.  De  Peyster,  Kearny,  127.  Diario, 
June  13.  Monitor  Repub.,  Nov.  30.  Journal  of  U.  S.  Artillery,  July, 
1892,  p.  294  Rapida  Ojeada,  ii,  4,  6,  7.  Niles,  Mar.  27,  p.  62.  73Ber- 
mudez  de  Castro,  no.   445,   1846.     Encarnacion  Prisoners,  43.     Steele, 


554        NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XIX,  PAGES  381-383 

Amer.  Campaigns,  i,  125.     76S.  Anna,  Jan.  19,  26;    Feb.  2,  11,  17,  27. 
The  author  has  been  over  the  greater  part  of  the  route. 

16.  One  cannot  be  sure  enough  now  regarding  the  truth  of  the  various 
allegations  regarding  the  lateral  routes  to  say  what  Santa  Anna  might 
have  done.  If  he  had  reason  (as  he  seems  to  have  had)  to  believe  that 
he  could  surprise  Agua  Nueva,  it  would  have  been  unwise  to  choose  a 
circuitous  route  of  doubtful  practicability.  No  Mexican  came  to  give 
him  information  about  the  ground  (76Mora,  April  23,  1847). 

17.  From  La  Encarnacion  to  Corner o  Pass.  Carleton,  Buena  Vista, 
232.  Semmes,  Service,  121.  Gamboa,  Impug.,  23.  Epoca,  Feb.  25. 
Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  69,  70,  79.  Apuntes,  97.  S.  Anna,  Apelaci6n,  25. 
Ord6fiez,  Refutacion.  Republicano,  Mar.  24.  Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  pp.  156-8. 
Diario,  June  13  (Ordonez).  Diccionario  Universal  (Itinerarios).  76Mora, 
Feb.  25.     76S.  Anna,  Feb.  27. 

18.  McCulloch  had  made  a  previous  expedition  to  La  Encarnaci6n 
and  found  cavalry  there. 

19.  Santa  Anna  attributed  to  a  deserter  named  Valdez  the  failure  of 
his  plan  to  surprise  Taylor  (Apelaci6n,  26),  but  the  story  of  Valdez  in 
itself  probably  would  not  have  had  much  effect  on  Taylor.  At  La  He- 
dionda  May  sent  Lieut.  Sturgis  on  a  scouting  expedition.  Firing  was 
heard  later,  and  Sturgis,  being  captured,  did  not  return.  This  La 
Hedionda  was  often  called  La  Hedionda  Grande. 

20.  Chamberlain's  147diary  states  in  detail,  quoting  the  remarks  made, 
how  Wool,  supported  by  the  officers,  forced  the  withdrawal  from  Agua 
Nueva  by  threatening  to  lead  the  troops  back  himself  rather  than  see 
them  sacrificed.  This  is  startling,  but  cannot  easily  be  rejected.  Of  all 
the  military  men  known  to  the  author  Chamberlain  was  the  most  sternly 
soldierlike.  He  rose  from  the  ranks  to  a  brevet  brigadier-generalship, 
and  he  vouched  for  the  correctness  of  his  diary,  which  had  been  kept 
strictly  for  himself.  When  not  acting  as  Wool's  orderly  he  served  as  one 
of  May's  dragoons,  who  were  commonly  used  by  Taylor  as  a  sort  of  body- 
guard. The  reason  given  by  Taylor  for  retreating  (Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  132) 
was  that  his  position  could  be  turned  on  either  side ;  but  he  knew  that 
long  before,  or  should  have  known  it. 

As  the  route  via  La  Hedionda  debouched  in  the  rear  of  Buena  Vista, 
one  asks  why  the  reason  which  seems  mainly  to  have  caused  the  retreat 
did  not  veto  the  stand  actually  taken.  Wool  must  have  seen  this  point; 
and  one  suspects  that  he  used  the  alarm  produced  by  the  reports  of  the 
scouts  to  bring  about  a  withdrawal  to  the  position  he  had  long  preferred, 
reckoning  also  that,  should  it  prove  necessary  to  retire  farther,  this  could 
much  more  easily  be  done  from  Buena  Vista  than  from  Agua  Nueva. 
Evidently  the  sudden  retreat  fatigued  the  troops  as  well  as  discouraged 
them ;  and  not  having  become  acquainted  with  the  peculiar  ground  on 
which  they  were  to  fight,  they  were  repeatedly  taken  by  surprise  during 
the  battle  that  followed.  By  retreating  Taylor  gave  up  the  advantage, 
on  which  he  had  insisted,  of  forcing  S.  Anna  to  fight  at  the  very  edge  of  a 
desert  (chap,  xviii,  note  39). 

21.  At  night  wagons  were  sent  to  Agua  Nueva  for  the  stores,  but  the 
Gentlemen- Volunteers  under  Yell  refused  to  load  them.  Hence  the  First 
Dragoons  (regulars),  who  had  slept  only  some  three  hours  in  as  many 
days,  were  sent  up  to  do  the  work  (Chamberlain,  diary).  Marshall's 
Kentucky  horse  reinforced  Yell.  The  haste  of  the  Americans  was  such 
that  corn  and  beans,  instead  of  being  loaded  into  waiting  wagons  or  de- 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  383-388         555 

stroyed,  were  thrown  into  a  spring,  where  the  Mexicans  found  them 
(officer's  diary  in  Republicano,  May  3,  1847).  Yell's  instructions  were 
to  retire  before  midnight,  taking  the  Second  Kentucky  with  him  from 
La  Encantada. 

22.  Taylor's  operations  Feb.  20-21  {including  night  of  Feb.  21).  299Posey 
to  friend,  Feb.  19.  69Woolto  Bliss,  Feb.  7.  147Chamberlain,  diary.  148/d., 
recollections.  Madison  Record,  1850  (Prickett).  300Prickett,  letters. 
Semmes,  Service,  121-2.  Tampico  Sentinel,  Mar.  27.  Scribner,  Camp., 
59.  Smith,  Remins.,  37,  42.  Picayune,  Apr.  14  (Taylor).  Sen.  1;  30, 
1,  pp.  97,  99,  132  (Taylor) ;  144  (Wool).  J.  Davis  in  Cong.  Globe,  31,  1, 
app.,  1034-41.  mid.,  Address.  Benham,  Recoils.  J ourn.  U .S.  Artillery, 
July,  1892,  p.  294.  Davis,  J.  Davis,  i,  336.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  1168, 
1176  (Taylor).  Carleton,  Buena  Vista,  4,  12-21,  24-6,  45.  J  ourn. 
Milit.  Serv.  Instit.,  xiv,  199  (No  one  can  tell  why  Taylor  did  not  fortify 
Saltillo  before  the  battle),  443.  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  Jan.  4,  1849.  76Mora, 
Feb.  25. 

The  reason  that  led  Taylor  to  neglect  preparing  Saltillo  was  no  doubt 
the  same  that  had  led  him  previously  to  neglect  preparations  when  the 
circumstances  called  for  them. 

XX.   BUENA  VISTA 

1.  Many  of  the  Mexicans  marched  nearly  forty-five  miles  in  less  than 
twenty-four  hours.     See  Stevens,  Camps.,  18. 

2.  The  statements  regarding  the  time  of  day  differ,  but  the  account  of 
the  text  appears  to  rest  upon  the  most  reliable  evidence.  See  Wallace, 
Wallace,  40.  Taylor's  verbal  reply  to  the  summons  of  Santa  Anna  is 
said  to  have  been  more  forcible  than  elegant,  but  a  courteous  answer  in 
writing  was  sent  by  Bliss. 

3.  Several  officers  seem  to  have  noted  the  advantages  of  this  battle- 
field, but  Wool  recommended  it  near  the  end  of  December  and  is  entitled 
to  the  credit  of  the  choice.  The  author  visited  the  ground  twice,  and 
found  that  a  good  route  for  infantry  and  cavalry  ran  from  La  Encantada 
behind  the  hills  west  of  Buena  Vista  valley,  and  entered  this  valley  north 
of  La  Angostura.  Apparently  it  could  have  been  made  practicable  for 
cannon  easily,  and  could  have  been  used  effectively  by  either  general  for 
a  feint  at  least.  Engineer  Mansfield  had  a  picket  guard  it  during  the 
afternoon  and  night  of  February  22. 

4.  This  space  was  to  be  closed,  if  necessary,  with  two  wagons  loaded 
with  stone.  The  parapet  was  occupied  by  two  companies  of  the  First 
Illinois  under  Lieut.  Col.  Weatherford.  The  main  American  position  was 
over-manned.  S.  Anna  could  not  have  carried  it  against  Washington's 
guns  and  infantry  flanking  fire  from  the  edge  of  the  plateau,  and  men 
were  urgently  needed  for  the  American  left. 

5.  330The  American  forces  in  action  at  Buena  Vista  were  as  follows: 
Dragoons  under  Bvt.  Lieut.  Col.  May  (First,  133;  Second,  76),  209; 
Third  Artillery  (Co.  C  under  Capt.  Bragg,  three  guns  —  the  fourth  being 
at  Saltillo  ;  Co.  E  under  Capt.  Sherman,  four  guns),  150 ;  Fourth  Artillery, 
Capt.  Washington,  eight  guns,  117;  Arkansas  horse,  Col.  Yell,  479;  First 
Kentucky  (two  squadrons  of  cavalry  and  a  battalion  of  mounted  riflemen), 
Col.  Marshall,  330 ;  Second  Kentucky,  Col.  McKee,  571 ;  First  Mississippi, 
Col.  Davis,  368;  Indiana  Brigade  (Second  regt.  under  Col.  Bowles  and 
Third  under  Col.  Lane),  Gen.  Lane,  1253,  including  a  rifle  battalion  of 


556         NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  383-388 

four  companies  under  Major  Gorman;  First  Illinois,  Col.  Hardin,  580; 
Second  Illinois,  Col.  Bissell,  573 ;  Texas  volunteer  company  (attached  to 
Second  Illinois),  Capt.  Conner,  61;  Major  McCulloch's  Texan  scouts, 
27.  The  figures  include  officers  and  men.  The  general  staff  numbered 
forty-one.  Three  hundred  and  sixty-four  of  the  men  were  on  the  sick 
list.  A  company  of  the  First  Artillery,  a  few  men  of  the  Third  Artillery, 
two  Mississippi  companies  and  four  Illinois  companies  were  at  Saltillo. 
All  except  the  dragoons  and  artillery  were  volunteers.  Only  the  artillery, 
dragoons,  Mississippi  regiment,  and  Conner's  company  had  been  under 
fire,  and  some  of  these  men  were  raw  recruits ;  but  Col.  Davis  and  all 
the  field  officers  of  the  Second  Kentucky  were  West  Pointers.  Mostly 
Wool's  men  had  been  well  trained.  McCulloch's  company  probably 
served  under  May.  All  the  corps  not  otherwise  described  were  infantry. 
In  the  volunteer  horse  certain  companies  appear  to  have  been  regarded 
as  true  cavalry  and  certain  others  as  only  mounted  infantry.  A  similar 
fact  was  noted  in  connection  with  the  battle  of  Sacramento  (p.  309). 

6.  Miii6n  issued  from  the  Palomas  de  Adentro  pass. 

7.  No  satisfactory  explanation  of  Taylor's  trips  to  Saltillo  was  made. 
The  city  had  been  in  greater  danger  of  attack  from  Min6n  while  the  Amer- 
icans were  eighteen  miles  away  at  Agua  Nueva  than  after  they  retired. 
Taylor  should  have  ascertained  seasonably  that  Palomas  Pass  was  prac- 
ticable for  cavalry,  and  have  done  whatever  was  necessary.  Wool  appears 
to  have  barricaded  the  streets  of  Saltillo  before  going  to  Agua  Nueva 
(N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  Jan.  4,  1849),  and  Butler  began  a  redoubt,  which  seems 
to  have  been  the  only  external  defence.  Taylor's  escort  were  not  needed 
as  laborers.  Major  Warren,  the  governor  of  Saltillo,  Capt.  Webster  of 
the  First  Artillery,  who  had  charge  of  the  redoubt,  and  First  Lieut.  Shover, 
of  the  Third  Artillery,  stationed  not  far  away  in  the  old  camp,  were  compe- 
tent officers ;  and  the  first  two  made  no  allusion  in  their  reports  to  Taylor's 
visits,  while  the  third  only  said  that  the  General  ordered  him  to  watch 
Mifi6n,  and,  if  attacked,  defend  his  post  to  the  last  extremity  —  which 
were  his  obvious  duties.  There  seems  to  have  been  no  particular  reason 
to  anticipate  a  night  attack.  Taylor  did  not  suggest  this  as  a  reason  for 
going  to  the  city.  Especially  is  it  surprising  that  he  left  his  work  at  Sal- 
tillo, whatever  it  was,  so  incomplete  on  the  morning  of  February  22  that 
he  had  to  return  in  the  evening.  Santa  Anna,  after  the  exhausting  march 
just  made,  could  not  be  expected  to  strike  decisively  that  day,  whereas 
such  an  attack  was  almost  certain  to  be  made  the  next  morning,  and  it 
was  Taylor's  duty  to  be  on  the  ground  at  that  time. 

8.  Events  of  Feb.  22;  the  battlefield.  Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  pp.  97-9  (Taylor) ; 
98  (S.  Anna) ;  144  (Wool) ;  163  (Marshall) ;  169  (Fry) ;  171  (Roane) ; 
174  (Weatherford) ;  175  (Bissell) ;  181  (Gen.  Lane) ;  186  (Col.  Lane) ; 
189  (Gorman) ;  197  (May) ;  203  (Sherman) ;  205  (Warren) ;  206  (Web- 
ster);  207  (Shover).  Carleton,  B.  Vista,  5-9,  27-49,  177-86.  Gonzalez, 
Aguascalientes,  158.  French,  Two  Wars,  77-8.  Journ.  Milit.  Serv. 
Instit.,  xiv,  443.  190Ewing,  diary.  Raleigh  Star,  Aug.  18.  276Neville 
diary.  Delta,  Mar.  14,  1848.  69Wool  to  Taylor,  Jan.  20.  147Chamber- 
lain,  diary.  148/d.,  recoils.  HOBarbour,  diary.  Vedette,  iv,  no.  8 
(Lee).  8Anon.  diary.  61  [Wool]  to  Jones,  Jan.  17.  300Prickett,  letters. 
Rapida  Ojeada.  Diario,  Apr.  17.  Matamoros  Amer.  Flag,  Mar.  20. 
Republicano,  May  3.  80Ampudia  to  gov.  Mex.  state,  Oct.  10.  Balbontm, 
lnvasi6n,  71-3.  Apuntes,  98-100.  Taylor  and  his  Generals,  166.  S. 
Anna,    Apelaci6n,    25-7.      Eyewitness,    Complete   Hist.,    55.      Scribner, 


NOTES   ON   CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  388-396  557 

Camp.,  62,  note.  Smith,  Chile  con  Carne,  214-5.  Smith,  Remins., 
37,  48.  Picayune,  Apr.  14  (Taylor);  May  21 ;  Sept.  7;  Oct.  19;  Dec.  3. 
Delta,  July  11.  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Aug.  1,  413-4.  Benham,  Recoils. 
Nat.  Intelligencer,  Apr.  7.  Spirit  of  the  Times,  May  1.  Napoleon,  Maxims, 
p.  26.  Wallace,  Wallace,  40.  Davis,  J.  Davis,  i,  340.  Profess.  Memoirs 
corps  of  engineers,  no.  31,  p.  110.  Stevens,  I.  I.  Stevens,  i,  145.  Carrefio, 
Jefes,  ccxxxii.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  1168  (Taylor).  Stevens,  Camps.,  18. 
Encarnacion  Prisoners,  34,  38-9.  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  Jan.  4,  1849.  Littell 
no.  155.  Romero,  Geog.  and  Stat.  Notes.  76Reports  of  S.  Anna,  Uraga, 
Memontesdeoca,  Zamara,  Mig.  Andrade,  Guzman,  Trejo,  Juvera,  Mora. 

9.  The  data  relating  to  the  Mexican  batteries,  when  collated,  cannot 
be  fully  harmonized.  E.g.  Carleton  puts  the  24-pounders  on  the  American 
left  near  the  mountain,  but  from  Mexican  sources  it  seems  clear  that  they 
remained  near  the  road,  and  Wallace  (Wallace,  50)  says  the  same.  Wash- 
ington states  that  he  was  most  of  the  time  under  the  fire  of  heavy  guns. 
Of  course  the  Mexican  left  had  to  be  protected,  and  it  would  have  been 
very  hard  to  move  these  clumsy  iron  pieces  on  the  rough  ground.  Gen. 
Perez  stated  after  the  battle  that  from  lack  of  forage  the  draught  animals 
had  been  too  weak  to  draw  the  artillery  up  the  hills. 

10.  Bowles  was  personally  brave,  but  had  been  away  much  of  the  time 
and  did  not  understand  his  work  (65orders  281).  His  men  keenly  real- 
ized this  (Perry,  Indiana,  292),  and  hence  went  into  the  battle  shaky. 
Lane  knew  how  they  felt  (Scribner,  Camp.,  62) ;  and  apparently  he  should 
not  have  placed  them  far  in  advance  and  alone  to  meet  overwhelming 
numbers.  It  should  be  added,  however,  that  (1)  he  intended  to  give  his 
personal  attention  to  the  regiment  (Scribner,  Camp.,  62),  and  (2)  the 
Mississippi  Rifles  (to  whom  a  position  had  been  assigned  the  previous 
evening)  were  expected  to  join  the  Second  Indiana  at  an  early  hour  (Bar- 
bour, diary).  Had  they  not  been  absent  with  Taylor,  one  may  fairly 
say,  Bowles  would  not  have  given  his  fatal  order,  and  the  American  flank 
would  in  all  probability  not  have  been  turned;  or,  had  the  order  been 
given,  the  Second  Indiana  would  almost  certainly  have  rallied  upon  the 
Mississippians,  and  the  virtual  loss  of  Marshall's  troops  would  have  been 
avoided.  The  gap  created  by  the  absence  of  the  Mississippi  regiment 
should  have  been  filled  by  recalling  McKee  and  Bragg  from  the  west  side 
as  soon  as  the  formation  of  Santa  Anna's  columns  indicated  where  he 
intended  to  strike  and  by  ordering  the  reserved  artillery  to  the  plateau. 
The  cause  of  Bowles's  order  is  not  certain ;  but  O'Brien's  horses,  when 
attached  to  the  guns  for  the  purpose  of  advancing,  faced  of  course  to  the 
rear,  and  it  seems  probable  that  Bowles  misunderstood  this  as  a  sign  of 
withdrawal.  The  worst  feature  of  his  order  was  that  he  specified  no  place 
to  stop. 

Lieut.  Col.  Haddon  of  the  Second  Indiana  stated  in  1848  that  the  regi- 
ment was  rallied  on  the  south  edge  of  a  ravine,  but  was  ordered  by  Taylor 
himself,  who  had  then  arrived,  to  cross  to  the  other  side  of  it,  and,  as  a 
body  of  Mexicans  charged  it  just  then,  it  broke  and  ran  (Perry,  Indiana, 
292).  Certainly  Taylor  exhibited  a  peculiar  resentment  toward  the 
regiment,  opposed  having  the  affair  investigated  (ibid.,  163,  313)  and 
endeavored  to  hush  it  up  (ibid.,  276).  Other  officers  were  doubtless  as 
censurable  as  Bowles,  but  he  was  the  most  conspicuous  delinquent  and 
became  the  scapegoat. 

11.  The  failure  of  this  attack  on  Buena  Vista  was  said  by  a  Mexican 
officer  to  have  been  due  to  Gen.  Andrade,  who  failed  to  cooperate,  and 


558  NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  388-396 

prevented  a  large  force  of  infantry  from  doing  so  (Republicano,  May  3, 
1847).  Yell  was  a  gallant  but  negligent  officer.  He  did  not  know  how 
to  manoeuvre  his  men,  and  only  a  portion  of  them  fought  here  (Niles, 
May  8,  1847,  p.  157 ;  Spirit  of  the  Times,  May  1).  He  was  far  in  advance 
of  them  when  he  fell  (Carleton,  B.  Vista,  93).  American  guns  came  up 
and  also  some  dragoons,  and  helped  complete  the  repulse  of  the  enemy. 
The  skirmish  lasted  only  a  few  minutes. 

What  the  Arkansas  men  lacked  was  not  courage,  but  the  discipline 
(and  the  resulting  skill  and  confidence)  against  which  they  had  protested 
while  on  the  Chihuahua  expedition  (p.  274).  Benham  states  that  Mar- 
shall would  not  go  back  to  the  field  though  urged  by  Taylor  personally 
to  do  so  (Recoils.).  All  this  resulted  from  a  mistake  of  Wool's.  He 
understood  that  the  bench  was  an  extremely  valuable  position,  and  should 
therefore  have  occupied  it  in  advance,  and  thrown  up  a  breastwork  there, 
dismounting  the  volunteer  cavalry,  and  placing  them  behind  this  and 
other  works  (Chamberlain).  One  part  of  the  lancers  ("cuirassiers") 
retreated ;  the  other  part  crossed  to  the  opposite  side  of  the  valley,  and 
returned  behind  the  hills  (see  note  3)  to  Santa  Anna's  position.  On  re- 
appearing they  were  taken  for  Americans  and  caused  great  alarm  (Bal- 
bontm,  Invasi6n,  87).  This  suggests  what  the  effect  might  have  been 
had  either  Santa  Anna  or  Taylor  used  this  route  for  a  feint  or  attack. 

12.  A  bitterly  contested  question  was  whether  Wool  advised  retreat 
during  the  battle.  The  truth  appears  to  be  that,  as  Benham  fully  ex- 
plains, he  advised  preparing  to  retire,  that  Taylor  gave  an  order  accord- 
ingly to  Washington,  and  that  a  zealous  subaltern  began  to  move;  but 
that  Taylor,  almost  instantly  reflecting  on  the  moral  effect  that  a  sign  of 
retreat  would  have  on  the  volunteers,  countermanded  the  order.  Wool 
would  not  have  advised  retreating  from  what  he  considered  the  best 
position,  except  in  the  case  of  absolute  necessity. 

13.  Bragg  now  had  three  guns,  for  the  one  that  had  been  under  Lieut. 
Kilburn  had  rejoined  him.  It  is  worth  mention  that  Bragg  gives  his 
ammunition  expenditure,  Feb.  23,  as  about  250  rounds  per  gun  (Sen.  1 ; 
30,  1,  p.  202),  an  unparalleled  record  for  muzzle-loading  cannon. 

14.  The  Americans  looked  upon  this  as  a  ruse  of  Santa  Anna,  designed 
to  save  the  men  in  the  recess  of  the  mountain ;  but  the  Mexicans  give 
the  view  of  the  text  (e.g.  Apuntes,  102),  and  a  field  officer  (probably  Col. 
Bissell) ,  who  went  with  Hardin  and  McKee  to  meet  the  Mexican  officers, 
stated  that  they  had  no  white  flag  (Littell,  no.  155,  p.  234).  The  fact 
that  so  much  consideration  was  paid  to  their  absurd  question  suggests 
that  Taylor  was  not  averse  to  a  parley.  Many  of  the  Mexicans  in  the 
recess  endeavored  to  escape  by  scaling  the  mountain  (Carleton,  B.  Vista, 
105). 

15.  As  the  Mexican  artillery  could  not  cross  the  longravine,  the  Mexicans 
in  the  north  field  were  almost  predestined  to  fail,  but  had  Santa  Anna 
attacked  the  centre  vigorously  at  this  time  with  all  his  remaining  forces, 
the  American  artillery  would  have  had  to  stay  on  the  plateau,  and  hence 
in  that  respect  the  two  sides  would  have  been  equal  in  the  north  field. 
Santa  Anna's  critics  charged  that  he  simply  threw  his  troops  into  the 
battle,  and  left  them  without  guidance  or  support.  Not  knowing  how 
much  he  was  hampered  by  misconduct  on  the  part  of  subordinates  one 
must  be  cautious,  but  the  criticism  seems  mainly  just.  He  should  have 
concentrated  on  the  American  left  and  centre,  sending  merely  a  small 
force  to  amuse  Washington,  and  making  feints  on  the  west  side  of  the 


NOTES  ON   CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  388-396         559 

road  and  from  behind  the  western  hills.  Again,  as  we  see  from  the  Mexican 
reports,  he  gave  too  much  attention  to  the  details  of  the  operations,  and 
he  was  unable  to  adapt  his  plans  to  the  quick  manoeuvring  of  the  Amer- 
ican artillery.  He  attributed  his  defeat  to  Min6n's  failing  to  attack 
Taylor's  rear  (Negrete,  Invasi6n,  ii,  378) ;  but  Minon  had  not  force 
enough  to  do  this  effectively,  and  such  a  duty  had  not  been  assigned  to 
him  (Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  71).  Gimenez  (Memorias)  charged  it  to  the 
want  of  subordination,  precision  and  morale  on  the  part  of  the  officers, 
and  the  effect  of  their  criticisms  of  Santa  Anna  upon  the  soldiers. 

16.  Benham  (Recollections,  24)  states  that  (as  he  learned  from  Mans- 
field) Chilton,  Taylor's  aide,  told  Mansfield  that  he  carried  this  order, 
and  was  cautioned  by  Mansfield  not  to  mention  the  fact.  Wallace  (Wal- 
lace, 47)  says  Chilton  carried  the  order,  and  gives  his  language.  Wool 
states  that  this  final  affair  occurred  under  Taylor's  eye  and  direction 
(Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  p.  149).  W.  A.  Richardson,  a  captain  in  one  of  these  regi- 
ments, and  also  Col.  Bissell  stated  that  the  order  emanated  from  Taylor 
(Charleston  Courier,  Jan.  20,  1854).  Weatherford,  who  succeeded  Hardin, 
gives  the  language  of  the  order  in  his  report.  Lombardini,  general-in-chief 
of  the  Mexican  infantry,  had  been  wounded,  and  hence  Perez,  second  in  that 
command,  took  his  place.  It  has  been  said  that  Santa  Anna  should  have 
led  the  charge,  but  he  stated  that  his  old  wound  had  reopened  (76Feb.  23). 

17.  The  redoubt  at  Saltillo  commanded  most  of  the  approaches.  It 
was  held  by  Capt.  Webster  with  two  24-pound  howitzers,  a  company  of 
the  First  Artillery,  and  an  Illinois  company.  At  the  train  and  head- 
quarters camp  on  the  right  of  the  redoubt  Lieut.  Shover  had  one  of  Bragg's 
6-pounders  and  two  Mississippi  companies.  The  three  remaining  Illinois 
companies  (two  having  been  detached  from  each  of  the  regiments)  re- 
mained in  the  city.  Mifi6n  found  that  on  account  of  the  broken  ground 
he  could  do  nothing  (Mifi6n  in  Delta,  June  16,  1847),  and  soon  retired. 
Shover  pursued  him  for  some  distance  with  his  gun,  the  Mississippians 
and  a  yelling  crowd  of  stragglers  and  teamsters,  followed  by  Lieut.  Donald- 
son of  Webster's  company  with  one  of  the  howitzers.  It  was  believed 
that  Min6n  lost  fifty  or  sixty  men.  Many  Mexican  irregulars  gathered 
near  Saltillo  but  they  accomplished  nothing. 

18.  Once,  it  was  said,  Col.  McKee  sent  his  adjutant  to  inform  the 
General  that  he  was  surrounded,  and  to  ask  what  should  be  done.  With 
convincing  energy  Taylor  replied,  "Go  and  tell  your  Colonel  that  he  has 
got  them  just  where  he  wants  them,  and  now  is  the  time  to  give  them 
Jesse"  ;  upon  which  the  adjutant,  whose  face  had  been  a  picture  of  despair, 
clapped  spurs  to  his  horse,  rushed  back  and  delivered  the  message  at  the 
top  of  his  voice  with  a  spirit  that  every  soldier  caught  instantly.  Whether 
the  story  is  literally  true  or  not,  it  doubtless  represents  the  most  important 
part  played  by  Taylor,  and  this  was  invaluable.  If  Taylor  made  the 
remark,  however,  he  doubtless  used  a  stronger  Biblical  word  than  "Jesse." 
According  to  Gen.  Chamberlain,  instead  of  saying,  "Give  them  a  little 
more  grape,  Mr.  Bragg,"  he  exclaimed,  "Double-shot  your  guns  and  give 
'em  hell !"  Rev.  Theodore  Parker  said  (Sermon)  that  the  following  anec- 
dote appeared  to  be  "very  well  authenticated."  Seeing  McKee's  regi- 
ment stagger,  Taylor  cried  as  if  the  men  could  hear  him,  "By  God,  this 
will  not  do;  this  is  not  the  way  for  Kentuckians  to  behave."  Then 
they  rallied,  and  rising  in  his  stirrups  he  shouted,  "Hurrah  for  Old  Ken- 
tuck  !  That's  the  way  to  do  it.  Give  'em  hell,  damn  'era!"  There  is 
ample  reason  to  believe  that  such  Taylor  could  be  on  the  battlefield. 


560         NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  388-396 

19.  The  battle  of  Feb.  23.  The  reports  of  Taylor  and  his  officers  in 
Sen.  1;  30,  1,  pp.  97-209.  267Reports  of  Miss,  captains.  Perry,  In- 
diana, contains  numerous  letters.  Carleton,  Buena  Vista,  passim.  Cal- 
der6n,  Rectif.  Ceballos,  Capitulos,  122-3.  Gonzalez,  Aguascalientes, 
159-60.  Puga  y  Acal,  Doc,  59.  Rapida  Ojeada,  Segunda  Parte,  9. 
Zarco,  Historia,  i,  259.  French,  Two  Wars,  78-83.  Journ.  Milit. 
Serv.  Instit.,  xiv,  443-4;  xvii  (Van  Deusen).  Neville,  diary.  Sierra, 
Evolution,  i,  219.  Delta,  Mar.  14.  Claiborne,  Quitman,  i,  291.  Tay- 
lor, Letters  (Bixby),  182.  69 Wool  to  Taylor,  Mar.  30.  147Chamberlain, 
diary.  148/d.,  recoils.  69Bragg  to  [Bliss],  Mar.  5.  190Ewing,  diary. 
Davis,  Recoils.,  212-3.  Dix,  Speeches,  i,  210.  330Taylor  to  brother, 
Mar.  27 ;  Apr.  25 ;  Sept.  — .  Raleigh  Star,  Apr.  28 ;  July  21 ;  Aug.  18. 
Charleston  Mercury,  Apr.  8.  Rowland,  Register,  407,  410^-12.  Ills. 
State  Hist.  Soc.  Trans.,  1904,  pp.  49-50,  53-6  ;  1905,  p.  209.  6lGorman, 
report,  Mar.  2.  6lO'Brien  court  of  inquiry.  6lGen.  Lane,  statement, 
May  19,  1849.  65Gen.  Lane  court  of  inquiry.  65Bowles  court  of  in- 
quiry. Eyewitness,  Complete  Hist.,  63.  HOBarbour,  diary.  Greens- 
borough  (N.  C.)  Morn.  Post,  Apr.  5,  1903  (O.  R  Smith).  8Anon.  diary. 
61[Wool]  to  Jones,  Jan.  17.  Madison  Record,  1850  (Prickett).  300Prick- 
ett,  letters.  Sen.  32;  31,  1  (Hughes).  Zirckel,  Tagebuch,  9.  Appleton's 
Biog.  Diet.  (Taylor  by  J.  Davis).  Johnson,  Thomas,  24.  McCormack, 
Koerner,  i,  499,  504-5.  Parker,  Sermon.  256Gen.  Lane  to  Wool,  May  20. 
256 Wool  to  Marcy,  June  12.  277Taylor  to  Coombs,  May  23.  Wallace, 
Wallace,  44-51.  Nebel  and  Kendall,  The  War  Illustrated,  11-16. 
Semmes,  Service,  120-2.  Rapida  Ojeada,  i.  5Anaya,  memoria,  [Nov., 
1847].  S.  Anna,  Mi  Historia,  60-5.  Id.,  Apelaci6n,  28.  Gamboa, 
Impug.,  24-5.  185Bragg  to  Duncan,  Apr.  4,  1847 ;  Jan.  13,  1848.  Kenly, 
Md.  Vol.,  264.  Tampico  Sentinel,  Mar.  27.  Diario,  Apr.  16.  Republi- 
cano,  Mar.  24;  Apr.  17;  May  3;  June  20.  80Ampudia  to  gov.  Mex., 
Oct.  10.  208Herran  to  Acal,  Mar.  6.  Noticia  hist,  de  todos  los  Cuerpos. 
212Hastings,  diary.  Negrete,  Invasi6n,  iii,  app.,  33-5.  Balbontin,  In- 
vasi6n,  80-8.  Apuntes,  100-4.  Taylor  and  his  Generals,  166.  Scrib- 
ner,  Campaign,  21,  59-71.  .  Ord6flez,  Refutaci6n,  i,  ii.  Hitchcock, 
Fifty  Years,  349.  Grant,  Memoirs,  i,  138.  Muro,  Miscelanea,  75. 
Smith,  Chile  con  Carne,  215-49.  Smith,  Reminiscences,  6,  50,  112. 
N.  Orl.  Picayune,  Mar.  27;  Apr.  14,  22;  May  21 ;  June  24.  Delta, 
Apr.  4;  May  30;  June  6,  16;  July  11.  Tropic,  Mar.  31.  Upton,  Milit. 
Policy,  209-10.  Boletin  de  la  Democracia,  no.  11.  Buhoup,  Narrative, 
120,  123.  210Bragg  to  Hammond,  May  4;  Dec.  20.  349Pattridge  to 
Miss  W.,  Aug.  25.  Piatt,  Thomas,  69.  Quisenberry,  Taylor,  34-5. 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Aug.  1,  pp.  413-7.  Benham,  Recoils.  Wash. 
jffinion,  Apr.  6,  7 ;  June  16 ;  Aug.  25.  Nat .  Intelligencer,  Apr.  7,  23 ; 
May  7,  21,  1847;  Mar.  23,  1848.  N.  Y.  Journ.  of  Commerce,  Apr.  16. 
Monitor  Repub.,  May  67  16;  Nov.  30.  Spirit  of  the  Times  (H.  von  S.), 
May  1.  Journ.  of  U.  S.  Artillery,  July,  1892,  p.  296 ;  Oct.,  1892,  pp.  415-8. 
Halleck,  Milit.  Art,  i,  p.  415.  Dodd,  Davis,  87.  Charleston  Courier, 
Apr.  20,  1847 ;  Jan.  20,  1854.  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  Jan.  4,  1849.  Ceremonies. 
367Moore  to  Moore,  Apr.  15.  Davis,  J.  Davis,  i,  341-50.  Stevens, 
I.  I.  Stevens,  i,  145.  Carrefio,  Jefes,  cexxxiv-v.  Niles,  Apr.  3,  p.  80 ; 
Apr.  10,  pp.  83-4;  Apr.  24,  p.  117;  May  8,  p.  156.  92Accusaci6n  del 
Gral.  S.  Anna.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  pp.  1115,  1169,  1181.  Dix,  Dix,  i,  210-3. 
Madigan,  cat.  no.  2,  1914  (Bragg).  210Alvord  to  Hammond,  Feb.  24, 
1848.     Griepenkerl,  Applied  Tactics,  187.     Ills.  State  Hist.  Soc.  Trans. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  396-398  561 

ix,  50.  South.  Qtrly.  Rev.,  Jan.,  1851,  169-89.  Littell,  no.  155,  pp.  233-5. 
25lLowry,  narrative.  Albert  Pike,  poem.  76S.  Anna,  Feb.  23.  76/d. 
to  Adame,  Feb.  26.     76Mora,  Mar.  31,  res. 

A  German  ex-officer  under  Taylor  said  the  battle  was  won,  in  spite  of 
an  unexampled  ignorance  of  all  tactical  rules  on  the  part  of  field  officers, 
by  the  lion-like  courage  of  the  soldiers  of  certain  regiments  assisted  by 
other  fortunate  circumstances  (Zirckel,  Tagebuch,  9).  W.  H.  L.  Wallace, 
adjutant  of  First  Illinois,  wrote:  "I've  no  doubt  —  inter  nos —  had  it 
been  just  as  convenient  for  us,  as  for  Santa  Anna,  to  vamos  [i.e.  retreat] 
we  would  have  been  off  for  Monterey"  ;  but  we  knew  Miri6n  was  in  our 
rear,  and  believed  that  larger  Mexican  forces  had  been  sent  toward  Mon- 
terey, and  that  the  mountains  were  full  of  irregulars  (Wallace,  Wallace, 
51;  see  also  Balbontin,  Invasion,  84). 

20.  Killed,  265;  wounded,  408  (Ho.  24;  31,  1).  Missing,  6.  The 
Mississippi  regiment  lost  more  heavily  than  any  other  —  one  out  of  3.75 
men  (Carleton,  B.  Vista,  212). 

21.  Aside  from  pluck  and  patriotism  Taylor  had  a  good  reason  for  not 
giving  up.  Had  he  been  defeated,  he  would  probably  have  been  punished 
for  disobeying  orders  in  advancing  so  far  (see  Polk,  Diary,  March  23, 1847). 
(Querying)  173 J.  Davis,  Address. 

22.  The  greater  part  of  the  deserters  appear  to  have  gone  to  Agua 
Nueva  (Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  83),  where  they  hoped  to  find  provisions  and 
water.  Santa  Anna  should  have  had  a  guard  on  the  road  to  check  and 
reorganize  these  men.  His  policy  of  holding  out  expectations  of  booty 
reacted  now,  for  many  men  left  the  ranks  to  rob  the  dead  and  wounded 
(Uraga  in  Monitor  Repub.,  Nov.  30,  1847). 

23.  Balbontin  (Invasion,  89)  said  that  the  troops  felt  confident  of 
triumphing  the  next  day,  and  therefore  would  not  have  deserted;  but 
while  this  may  have  been  true  of  the  artillery  (always  a  superior  body) 
to  which  he  belonged  J  it  cannot  have  been  true  of  the  army  in  general. 
Thousands  had  deserted  already. 

24.  The  night  of  Feb.  23.  Semmes,  Service,  122.  Ceballos,  Capitulos, 
122.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  1115  (Taylor).  69Wool  to  Taylor,  Mar.  30. 
Chamberlain,  diary.  Id.,  recoils.  Barbour,  diary.  Prickett,  letters. 
Sen.  1 ;  30,  1,  pp.  99,  137  (Taylor) ;  144  (Wool)  Delta,  June  16 ;  July  11. 
Benham,  Recoils.  Rapida  Ojeada,  i,  ii.  Ord6nez,  Refutaci6n,  i,  ii.  5An- 
aya,  Memoria.  185Bragg  to  Duncan,  Apr.  4.  Republicano,  Mar.  24; 
May  3.  Carleton,  B.  Vista,  125-31,  191.  French,  Two  Wars,  81-2. 
Journ.  Milit.  Serv.  Instit.,  xiv,  443-4.  Ewing,  diary.  Dix,  Speeches,  i, 
213.  330Memo.  in  Taylor's  letters  to  his  brother.  330Taylor  to  b*ro\her, 
Mar.  27.  Nebel  and  Kendall,  13.  267Bradford  to  J.  Davis,  Mar.  2 
Perry,  Indiana,  178,  etc.  Polk,  Diary,  Mar.  23.  Sierra,  Evolution,  etc., 
i,  219.  Independiente,  Apr.  10.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  83,  89,  90-1,  93, 
100-1.  Apuntes,  104-7.  118Berhndier,  journal.  S.  Anna,  Apelaci6n,  29, 
32,  etc.  Gamboa,  Impug.,  23-5.  Scribner,  Camp.,  66.  52Black,  Mar.  6. 
Picayune,  Mar.  24  (Sold,  de  la  Patria) ;  Apr.  11.  Monitor  Repub.,  May  6 ; 
Nov.  30.  Niles,  Apr.  10,  p.  83.  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  Jan.  4, 1849.  Ills. 
State  Hist.  Soc.  Trans.,  ix,  50.  316Bragg  to  Sherman,  Mar.  1,  1848. 
76S.  Anna,  Feb.  23,  26,  27.  76ld.  to  Adame,  Feb.  26.  76 J.  M.  Aguirre, 
Jan.  27,  1848.     Wallace,  Wallace,  40. 

The  Kentucky  horse  and  the  guns  (First  Artillery)  should  have  been 
ordered  up  from  Rinconada  Pass  as  soon  as  Taylor  found  there  was  to  be 
a  battle  (Ripley,  War  with  Mex.,  i,  437-8).     They  could  have  guarded  La 
vol.  i  —  2  o 


562         NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  398-400 

Angostura,  and  Washington's  field  pieces  would  have  been  invaluable  on 
the  plateau. 

25.  The  Mexicans  were  not  driven  away  by  hunger.  Statements  from 
persons  knowing  the  facts  regarding  the  provisions  available  at  Agua 
Nueva  differ  so  radically  that  we  can  reach  no  precise  conclusion  on  that 
point ;  but  certainly  there  were  enough  to  support  the  army  more  than 
two  days,  and  then  enable  it  to  move.  Whatever  provisions  were  at  that 
place  could  have  been  brought  to  the  battlefield  (Balbontin,  Invasi6n, 
89).  It  seems  as  if  there  must  also  have  been  supplies  at  Patos  and  La 
Vaquerfa ;  and  Mifion  asserted  later  that,  as  he  sent  word  to  Santa  Anna, 
he  had  plenty  of  provisions  for  the  army  (Delta,  June  16) .  The  question 
of  water  is  more  difficult;  but  there  were  many  wagons,  and  enough 
could  have  been  transported  for  say  6000  picked  men.  Apparently  some 
water  must  have  been  brought  up  on  Feb.  22  and  23.  In  short,  had 
Santa  Anna  felt  any  assurance  of  being  able  to  rout  the  Americans  on 
Feb.  24,  he  would  have  tried  to  do  so,  knowing  that  abundant  supplies 
lay  at  Saltillo.  Possibly  he  might  have  remained  in  the  vicinity  and 
prepared  for  another  battle,  even  if  he  could  not  fight  again  the  next  day ; 
but  probably  he  remembered  Scott,  and  he  had  not  counted  upon  remain- 
ing long  at  the  north. 

26.  Taylor  doubtless  expected  to  obtain  the  men  captured  at  La  En- 
carnaci6n,  but  they  had  gone  south  (see  Encarnacion  Prisoners).  Santa 
Anna  had  very  few  to  give  up,  for  almost  all  Americans  who  had  been  or 
might  have  been  captured  were  killed  by  his  excited  troops  (Rapida  Ojeada ; 
Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  81;  Republicano,  March  24,  1847). 

27.  The  Mexican  sequel.  Rapida  Ojeada,  i,  ii.  Gamboa,  Impug.,  23-5, 
27-9.  Otero,  Comunicaci6n,  11.  Republicano,  Mar.  24 ;  May  3.  Epoca, 
Mar.  2,  11.  208Herran  to  Acal,  Mar.  6,  13.  Balbontin,  Invasi6n,  95- 
100.  Apuntes,  108-15.  S.  Anna,  Apelacion,  app.,  39-55,  67.  Ord6fiez, 
Refutaci6n,  i,  ii.  Muro,  Miscelanea,  77-8.  52Black,  Mar.  6.  Picayune, 
Mar.  24  (Sold,  de  la  Patria).  Independiente,  Apr.  10.  Boletin  de  la 
Democracia,  no.  21.  Sen.  1;  30,  1,  p.  99  (Taylor).  Diario,  Mar.  31 
(S.  Anna);  June  13.  Monitor  Repub.,  Mar.  31;  May  6;  Nov.  30.  Ca- 
rrefio,  Jefes,  ccxlii.  Ho.  60;  30,  1,  p.  1115  (Taylor);  1125  (S.  Anna). 
Dublan,  Legislaci6n,  v,  267.  82Gil  to  Ruano,  Mar.  6.  76S.  Anna,  Feb.  26, 
27.  76ld.  to  Adame,  Feb.  26.  76Comte.  gen.  Puebla,  Mar.  3.  76Comte. 
gen.  Tabasco,  proclaim,  Mar.  11.  76Mora,  Mar.  31,  res.  76Comte. 
gen.  S.  L.  Potosi,  Mar.  6.  76A.  Bustamante,  Mar.  9.  76Comte.  gen. 
V.  Cruz,  Mar.  4.     76Guerra,  circular,  Mar.  1. 

28.  The  fortifications  of  Monterey  had  already  been  greatly  improved. 
Col.  Morgan,  Lieut.  Col.  Irwin  and  Major  Wall  of  the  Second  Ohio 
occupied  respectively  Cerralvo,  Marin  and  Punta  Aguda  (Ho.  60;  30, 
1,  p.  1123).  Morgan  distinguished  himself  by  a  march  executed  in  the 
face  of  great  odds,  and  Irwin  went  to  his  aid  (ibid.).  Urrea  attacked  at 
least  one  other  train  (Mar.  6),  and  did  a  large  amount  of  damage.  So 
great  became  the  alarm  of  the  Americans  that  Col.  Curtis,  now  in  charge 
at  Camargo,  sent  an  officer  to  Washington  with  a  requisition  for  50,000 
volunteers  (Nat.  Intelligencer,  Mar.  23). 

29.  The  American  sequel.  330J.  T.  Taylor  to  Scott,  Feb.  12.  330Tay- 
lor  to  brother,  Mar.  27.  Perry,  Indiana,  127-8,  137,  149.  Taylor,  Letters 
(Bixby),  95.  Polk,  Diary,  Jan.  5;  Mar.  21-3;  Apr.  1,  7.  69Mesa  to 
Trist,  Mar.  3.  169Taylor  to  Crittenden,  Mar.  25 ;  May  15.  25lLowry, 
narrative.     Amer.    Pioneer,    Mar.    8.     272Memoir    of    Morgan.     Henry, 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XX,   PAGES  398-400         563 

Camp.  Sketches,  327-9.  Rapida  Ojeada,  9.  139Campbell  to  D.  C, 
Mar.  20.  Meade,  Letters,  i,  143,  182.  69Wool  to  Taylor,  Mar.  7. 
60Marcy  to  Brooke,  Mar.  22.  Picayune,  Feb.  18 ;  Mar.  13,  28 ;  Apr.  8. 
Kenly,  Md.  Vol.,  263-4.  Tampico  Sentinel,  Mar.  27.  Carleton,  B. 
Vista,  153-4.  60Marcy,  Mar.  22,  to  Pierce;  to  Brooke;  to  Scott;  to 
govs.  Grant,  Mems.,  i,  123.  Smith,  Chile  con  Carne,  151-71.  Delta, 
Jan.  19.  Matamoros  Amer.  Flag,  Feb.  13,  17.  Ho.  60 ;  30,  1,  pp.  1118-9. 
1123-5,  1131  (Taylor).  Wash.  Union,  Mar.  23.  N.  Y.  Journ.  of  Conv- 
merce,  Jan.  8.  Nat.  Intelligencer,  Mar.  23.  Niles,  Mar.  27,  p.  59;  May  1, 
p.  131;  May  8,  pp.  151-2.  185Thomas  to  Duncan,  Mar.  18.  Sen.  32; 
31,  1  (Hughes).  Parrodi,  Memoria.  Benham,  Recoils.  76S.  Anna, 
Feb.  27.  76Carbajal  to  Urrea,  Mar.  8.  76Mora  to  S.  Anna,  Mar.  17. 
Sen.  1;  30,  1,  pp.  49,  99,  210-5.  245Curtis  to  Lamar,  Mar.  1.  108Bu- 
chanan  to  Bancroft,  June  14. 


APPENDIX —  THE  SOURCES 

A.  MANUSCRIPT  AND  PERSONAL  SOURCES 

As  a  number  of  the  owners  or  holders  of  MSS.  (whose  names  are  pre- 
ceded below  by  colons)  did  not  desire  to  receive  applications  for  the  use 
of  their  papers,  it  has  been  thought  best  to  omit  all  addresses. 

Some  documents  belonging  to  large  collections  are,  for  convenience  of 
citation,  listed  separately.  A  few  verbal  statements  (so  described)  are 
included.  The  numbers  preceding  collections,  etc.,  correspond  to  num- 
bers preceding  citations  of  MS.  documents  in  the  notes. 

The  complete  Appendix  follows  the  Notes  of  volume  ii. 

Allen,  William.     lPapers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Allred,  R.  N.     2Recollections  :  R.  R.  Allred,  Esq. 

Alvarado,  J.  B.     3Hist.  de  California  :  Bancroft  Coll.,  Univ.  of  California. 

Amador,  J.  M.     4Memorias  sobre  la  Hist,  de  California  :  Bancroft  Coll. 

Anaya,  P.  M.     5Memoria  :  Sen.  Lie.  D.  Genaro  Garcia. 

Anderson,  Robert.     6Papers  :  Mrs.  James  M.  Lawton. 

Anderson,  W.  E.     7Document. 

Anonymous.     8Soldier's  Diary  sent  anonymously  to  the  author. 

Antrim,  Jay.     9Sketches  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Aram,  Joseph.     lONarrative  :  Mrs.  Grace  Aram. 

Archives  of  France.     llDept.  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  Paris. 

Archives  of  Great  Britain.  12 Admiralty  Papers  ;  13Foreign  Office  Papers  : 
Public  Record  Office,  London. 

Archives  of  States.  14Alabama,  ISArkansas,  16Connecticut,  17Delaware, 
18Georgia,  19Florida,  20Illinois,  21Indiana,  22Iowa,  23Kentucky, 
24Louisiana,  25Maine,  26Maryland,  27Massachusetts,  28Michigan, 
29Mississippi,  30Missouri,  3lNew  Hampshire,  32New  Jersey,  33New 
York,  34North  Carolina,  350hio,  36Pennsylvania,  37Rhode  Island, 
38South  Carolina,  39Tennessee,  40Texas,  41Vermont,  42Virginia, 
43Wisconsin. 

Archives  of  the  44U.  S.  Embassy  at  Mexico. 

Archives  of  the  45U.  S.  Legation  in  Texas  :  State  Dept.,  Washington. 

Archives  of  U.  S.  Navy  Dept.  46Captain's  Letters  ;  47Squadron  Letters' ; 
48Confidential  Letter  Books;  490rders  ;  SOExecutive  Letters; 
51Marine  Corps. 

Archives  of  U.  S.  State  Dept.  52Correspondence  (and  enclosures)  with 
diplomatic  and  consular  agents  in  Mexico,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Spain,  Prussia  and  Texas  ;  53Notes  to  and  from  the  legations  of  those 
countries  ;  54Report  Books  ;  55Confidential  Report  Books  ;  56Special 

565 


566  APPENDIX 

Missions    and  Correspondence  with  confidential  agents  in  Mexico, 

Texas  and  California  ;  57Domestic  Letter  Books  ;  58Miscellaneous 

Letters  and  Replies  ;  59Circulars  issued  to  diplomatic  and  consular 

agents.     See  also  Claims  Commission. 
Archives  of  U.  S.  War  Dept.     60Secretary  of  War's  files  ;     61Adjutant 

General's  files  ;    62Quartermaster  General's  files  ;     63Military  Book  ; 

64Adjutant   General,  Miscellany  ;     650rders  ;    66Engineer's   office  ; 

67Bureau  of  Topog.  Engineers  ;    68Judge  Advocate  General's  office, 
'courts  martial,  courts  of  inquiry  ;  69Discontinued  Commands,  etc. 
Archivo  69cdel  Distrito  Federal,  Mexico. 

Archivo  70General  y  Publico  (particularly  "Guerra"),  Mexico. 
Archivo  71Historico-Nacional,  Madrid. 
Archivo  72Nacional  de  Cuba. 

Archivo  73Particular  del  Ministerio  de  Estado,  Madrid. 
Archivos  (National)  de  74Fomento  (Maps)  ;     75Gobernacion  (formerly 

called    "Relaciones    Interiores")  ;      75aHacienda  ;       76Guerra    y 

Marina  ;    77Relaciones  (i.e.,  Exteriores).     At  Mexico  City. 
Archivos  (State)   de  78Coahuila,   79Jalisco,   80Mexico,   81Nuevo  Leon, 

82P'uebla,83   Queretaro,  84San  Luis  Potosi,    85Tamaulipas,   86Vera 

Cruz,  87Zacatecas.     At  the  state  capitals. 
Archivos  (Municipal)  de  88C6rdoba,  89Guadalajara,  90Jalapa,  9lMata- 

moros,  92Mexico,  93Monterey,  940rizaba,    95Puebla,  96Queretaro, 

97Saltillo,  98San  Luis  Potosi,  99Tampico,  lOOVera  Cruz,  lOlVictoria, 

102Zacatecas. 
Avila,  Juan.     103Notas  Californianas  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Ayer  104Collection  :  Newberry  Library,  Chicago. 
Baldridge,  William.     105The  Days  of  1846  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Bancroft  106Collection  :  Univ.  of  California. 
Bancroft  107Papers  :  New  York  City  Public  Library. 
Bancroft,  George.     108Papers  :  Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc. 
Bandini,  Juan.     109Documentos  para  la  Hist,  de   California  :  Bancroft 

Coll. 
Barbour,  H.  H.     HODiary  :  Mrs.  Barbour. 
Beauregard,  P.  G.  T.     lllPapers  :  C.  S.  Hook,  Esq. 
Beauregard,  P.  G.  T.     112Papers  :  Justin  H.  Smith. 
Beauregard,  P.  G.  T.     113Reminiscences  (done  by  him  from  diary  and 

notes)  :  Claiborne  papers,  Mississippi  Dept.  of  Hist. 
Beeler,  Louis  F.     114Recollections. 
Belden,  Josiah.     115Statement  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Bell,  A.  N.     116Document. 
Benjamin,  W.  R.     117Collection. 
Berlandier,  Luis.     118Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Bevan,  William.     119Statement. 
Biddle,  James.     120Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Biddle,  Charles  J.     121Papers  :  Charles  Biddle,  Esq. 
Bidwell,  John.     122California,  1841-8  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Bidwell,  John.     123Statement  :  Harvard  Univ.  Library. 
Blocklenger,  Benjamin.     124Letter. 


APPENDIX  567 

Bonham,  Milledge  L.     125Letters  :  Dr.  Milledge  Lake  Bonham,  I  IT. 

Botello,  Narciso.     126Anales  del  Sur  de  la  California  :  Bancroft  Coll. 

Boyle,  John.     127Letter  :  Miss  Esmeralda  Boyle. 

Brackett,  A.  G.     128Diary  :  Mrs.  Brackett. 

Breckenridge,  Robert  J.     129Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Brichta,  A.  C.     130Letter  :  belonging  to  the  family. 

Brindle,  William.     131Statement  :  J.  D.  Parrish,  Esq. 

Buchanan,  James.     132Papers  :  Pennsylvania  Hist.  Soc. 

Buck,  Dr.  Solon  J.     133Collection. 

Burton,  C.  M.     134Collection,  Public  Library,  Detroit. 

Butler,  Anthony.     135Papers  :  Univ.  of-  Texas. 

Butterfield,  James.     136Recollections. 

Calhoun,  John  C.     137Papers  :  Clemson  Coll. 

Calhoun,  John  C.     137aPapers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Campbell,  William  B.     138Letters  :  John  DeWitt,  Esq. 

Campbell,  William  B.  (and  David).     139Papers  :  Lemuel  R.  Campbell, 

Esq. ;    Mrs.  James  S.  Pilcher. 
Cantwell,  John  L.  P.     140Letter  :  Miss  Jessica  R.  Smith. 
Carson,  J.  C.     14lStatement  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Carson,  J.  H.     142Gold  Mines  of  1848  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Cary,  T.  G.     143California  Papers  :  Boston  Public  Library. 
Cassidy,  P.  A.     144Recollections. 
Castro,  Manuel.     145Documentos  para  la  Hist,  de  California  :  Bancroft 

Coll. 
Caswell,  William  R.     146Diary  and  Letters  :  Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc. 
Chamberlain,  S.  E.     147Diary  :  loaned  by  the  writer. 
Chamberlain,  S.  E.     148Recollections  (verbal). 
Chase,  Salmon  P.     149Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Cheatham,  B.  F.     150Diary  and  Papers  :  Mrs.  Telfair  Hodgson. 
Claiborne,  J.  F.  H.     151Papers  :  State  of  Mississippi,  Dept.  of  Hist. 
Claiborne,  Thomas.     152Memoirs  :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Claims  Commission  of  1849.     153Book  of  Awards  ;    154Book  of  Opinions  ; 

155Journal  :  U.  S.  State  Dept. 
Clay,  Henry.     156Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Cobb,  Howell.     157Papers   (printed  later  by  the  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.)  : 

Dr.  U.  B.  Phillips. 
Cobb,  Howell.     158Papers  :  Dr.  R.  P.  Brooks. 
Collins,  Francis.     159Papers  (published  later  in  the  Qtrly.  Publication  of 

the  Hist,  and  Philos.  Soc.  of  Ohio,  1915,  Nos.  2-3). 
Columbus.     160Record  of  Punishments,  1846-7  :  U.  S.  Naval  Academy 

Library. 
Congress. .   161Journal  of  a  Cruise,  1846  :  U.  S.  Naval  Academy  Library. 
Conner,  David.     162Papers  :  Hon.  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt. 
Conner,  David.     163Papers  :  P.  F.  Madigan,  Esq. 
Conner,  David.     164Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Conner,  David.     165Papers  :  Navy  Dept.  Library. 
Conner,  David.     166Papers  :  New  York  City  Library. 
Coutts.     167Diary  of  a  March  to  California  :  Bancroft  Coll. 


568  APPENDIX 

Cralle,  R.  K.     168Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Crittenden,  J.  J.     169Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Crcoker  Family   (of  South  Carolina).     170Papers  :  Dr.  E.  M.  Shealy. 

Cyane.     171Journal  of  a  Cruise  ;     Abstract  of  Journal  :     U.  S.  Naval 

Academy  Library. 
Cyane.     172Log  Book  :  Library,  U.  S.  Navy  Dept. 

Davis,  Jefferson.     173Address  :  Library  of  Congress  (reading-room  desk). 
Davis,  Jefferson.     174Papers  :  Confederate  Memorial,  New  Orleans. 
Davis,  Jefferson.     176Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Davis,  Jefferson.     176Papers  :  State  of  Mississippi,  Dept.  of  Hist. 
Davis,  John  W.     177Statement  of  the  Battle  of  San  Pascual  :    Bancroft 

Coll. 
Davis,  T.  F.     178Diary  :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Diario  179Esactisimo  de  lo  o'currido  en  Mexico,  etc.  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Dreer  180Collection  :  Pennsylvania  Hist.  Soc. 
Donelson,  A.  J.     18lPapers  :  Mrs.  Wm.  A.  Donelson  (now  in  the  Library 

of  Congress). 
Dormitzer,  Walter.     182Collection. 
Drum,  R.  C.     183Recollections  (verbal). 
Duke,  Moses  S.     184Letters  :  Miss  Winnie  V.  Lynch. 
Duncan,  James.     185Papers  :  U.  S.  Military  Academy. 
Duncan,  W.  L.     186Notes  on  Bishop's  Journal  :  McLean  County  (111.) 

Hist.  Soc. 
Eddy  187Manu scripts  :  Charles  Carroll,  Esq. 
Edwards,  Marcellus  B.     188Diary  :  Missouri  Hist.  Soc. 
Evans,  Mrs.  Lucy.     189Letter  :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Ewing,  J.  C.     190Diary  :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Fairfield,  John.     19lPapers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Ford  192Collection  :  New  York  City  Public  Library. 
Foster,  R.  C.     193Letters  :  Mrs.  Edward  W.  Foster. 
Fourth  (Mexican)  Infantry.     194Book  of  Accounts  :  New  York  Hist.  Soc. 
Fowler,  W.  P.     195Collection. 

Fremont,  John  C.     196Statement  :  Library  of  Harvard  Univ. 
Gaines,  E.  P.     197Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Gallatin,  Albert.     198Papers  :  New  York  Hist.  Soc. 
Garcia,  Sen.  Lie.  D.  Genaro.     199Collection. 
Gibbes,  W.  H.     200Collection. 
Gibson,  George  R.     20lDiary  :  Missouri  Hist.  Soc. 
Gimenez,  M.  M.     202Papers  :  Sen.  Lie.  D.  Genaro  Garcia. 
Gleason,  James.     203Letter. 

Gouverneur,  S.  L.     204Diary  :  Mrs.  Rose  Gouverneur  Hoes. 
Graham,  L.  P.     205Memorandum  Book  :  E.  W.  McGlenen,  Esq. 
Graham,  W.  A.     206Papers  :  A.  W.  Graham,  Esq. 
Griffin,  John  S.     207Journal  of  1846  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Guadalajara  (Public  Library)  208Collection. 
Guitar,  Aldon.     209Letter. 

Hammond,  J.  H.     210Diary  and  Papers  :  library  of  Congress, 
Hardie,  James  A.     21lPapers  :  Library  of  Congress.5] 


APPENDIX  569 

Hastings,  D.  H.     212Diary  :  loaned  by  the  writer. 

Hatch,  John  P.     213Letters  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Hays,  John  C,  and  Caperton,  John.  214Life  and  Adventures  of  John  C. 
Hays  :  Bancroft  Coll. 

Heald,  Nathan.     215Papers  :  Univ.  of  Wisconsin  Library. 

Heiman,  A.  216Services  of  the  First  Regt.  of  Tennessee  :  Tennessee  Hist. 
Soc. 

Henshaw,  J.  C.     217Papers  :  Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc. 

Henshaw,  J.  C.  218Narrative,  prepared  by  Mrs.  Henshaw  from  his 
papers  :  Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc. 

Heraldica  219del  Ejercito  Mex.,  etc. :  Biblioteca  Nacional. 

Higgins,  H.  H.     220Plans  and  letters  :  Mrs.  T.  M.  Coxe. 

Hill,  D.  H.     221Diary  :  Pres.  D.  H.  Hill. 

Hiney,  E.  F.     222Diary. 

Hirschorn,  Jacob.     223Recollections  :  Justin  H.  Smith. 

Hitchcock,  E.  A.  224Diary  and  Papers  :  Mrs.  E.  A.  Hitchcock  (now  in 
the  Library  of  Congress). 

Holt,  Joseph.     225Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Hook,  C.  S.     226Collection. 

Hoyle,  E.  D.     227Recollections. 

Illinois  University.     228Collection. 

Indiana  State  Library  229Collection. 

Ittirbide,  Agustin  de.     230Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Jackson,  Andrew.     231Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Jameson,  J.  Franklin.     232Collection. 

Janssens,  Agustin.  233Documentos  para  la  Hist,  de  California  :  Ban- 
croft Coll. 

Johnson,  Andrew.     234Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Jones,  Roger.     235Papers  :  W.  R.  Benjamin,  Esq. 

Judah,  H.  M.     236Diary  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Kearny,  S.  W.     237Letter  Book  :  Missouri  Hist.  Soc. 

Keating,  E.  H.     238Map  of  Monterey,  Mex.  :  Monterey  City  Govt. 

Kemper,  Jackson.     239Papers  :  Univ.  of  Wisconsin  Library. 

Kennerly,  W.  C.     240Narrative. 

Kent,  James.     24lPapers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Kingsbury,  D.  M.     242Letters  to  his  Mother. 

Kribben,  Christian.     243Home  Letters  :  B.  D.  Kribben,  Esq. 

Lakin,  George  W.     244Papers  :  Univ.  of  Wisconsin  Library. 

Lamar,  M.  B.     245Papers  :  Texas  State  Library. 

Lane,  Joseph.     246Autobiography  :  Bancroft  Coll. 

Larkin,  T.  O.     247Papers  :  Bancroft  Coll. 

Lasselle,  Stanislaus.     248Papers  :  Indiana  State  Library. 

Leese,  Jacob  P.     249Bear  Flag  Papers  :  Bancroft  Coll. 

Lieber,  Francis.     250Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Lowry,  Robert.     251Narrative. 

Mackall,  W.  W.     252Letters  :  belonging  to  the  family. 

McLean,  John.     253Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

McClellan,  Geo.  B.     254Diary  and  Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 


570  APPENDIX 

Mangum,  W.  P.     255Papers  :  A.  W.  Graham,  Esq 

Marcy,  W.  L.     256Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Markoe  and  Maxcy.     257Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Marshall,  Henry.     258  Recollections  :  Bancroft  Coll. 

Maryland  Hist.  Soc.  259Collection. 

Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc.  260Collection. 

Memoires.  2611,  Apparently  prepared  by  the  French  agent  in  Mexico  ; 
261a  II,  Sur  les  Revolutions  du  Mexique  :  Dept.  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres,  Paris. 

Memorias.  262Reports  issued  under  this  title  by  Depts.  of  the  Mexican 
government  (see  also  "Memorias"  under  the  head  of  Books  and 
Pamphlets.  A  number  of  the  Memorias  were  not  published  —  un- 
less in  newspapers  —  but  exist  in  MS.  in  the  library  of  the  Sria.  de 
Relaciones) . 

Mervine,  William.     263Letter  Books  and  Papers  :  Navy  Dept.  Library. 

Mexican  Hist.  264Documents  :  Museo  Nacional,  Mexico. 

Miller,  N.  C.     265Letter. 

Miller,  W.  D.     266Papers  :  belonging  to  the  family. 

Mississippi  Dept.  of  Hist.  267Collections  (Dr.  Dunbar  Rowland,  Director). 

Missouri  Hist.  Soc.  268Collection. 

Molina,  Sen.  D.  Ignacio.     269Recollections  (verbal). 

Moore,  H.  Judge.     270Diary. 

Morales,  J.  B.     271Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Morgan,  George.     272Memoir  of  :  Col.  J.  M.  Morgan. 

Mullan,  James.     273Diary  :  belonging  to  the  family. 

Neeld,  Peter  C.     274Letter. 

Nelson,  T.  B.,  Jr.     275Letter  :  Mrs.  Annie  J.  Holland. 

Neville,  Harvey.     276Diary  :  Chicago  Hist.  Soc. 

New  York  Hist.  Soc.  277Collection. 

Niehenke,  R.     278Stateraent. 

Notes.  279Sur  les  Possessions  Espagnoles  en  Amerique  :  Dept.  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres,  Paris. 

Nunelee,  S.  F.     280Diary  :  James  Howell  Nunelee,  Esq. 

O'Keefe,  Michael.     28lStatement :  Justin  H.  Smith. 

Olivera,  Agustin.  282Documentos  para  la  Hist,  de  California  :  Bancroft 
Coll. 

Orders  (General  and  Special).  283 Army  of  the  North  under  Mejia, 
Ampudia  and  Arista  :  New  York  Hist.  Soc. 

Otero,  M.  284Comunicacion  que  sobre  las  Negoc.  Diplom.,  etc.  :  Yale 
Univ.  Library. 

Paredes  y  Arrillaga,  Mariano.     285Papers  :  Sen.  Lie.  D.  Genaro  Garcia. 

Parker,  James.     286Statement. 

Parrish,  P.  C.     287Diary. 

Pennsylvania  Hist.  Soc.  288Collection. 

Perez  de  Acal.     289Papers  :  Guadalajara  Public  Library. 

Pico,  Pio  (Familia  Pico).  290Documentos  para  la  Hist,  de  California  : 
Bancroft  Coll. 

Pierce,  Franklin.     291Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 


APPENDIX  571 

Pillow,  Gideon  J.     292Letters  :  W.  R.  Benjamin  Collection. 

Pillow,  Gideon  J.     293Letters  :  Library  of  Congress. 

Pillow,  Gideon  J.     294Letters  :  Pennsylvania  Hist.  Soc. 

Pinto,  Rafael.     295Apuntaciones  para  la  Hist,  de  California  :  Bancroft 

Coll. 
Poinsett,  Joel  R.     296Papers  :  Pennsylvania  6ist.  Soc. 
Polk,  James  K.     297Papers  :  Library  of   Congress  (including  the  Polk 

papers  examined  by  the  author  at  the  Chicago  Hist.  Soc). 
Porter,  Andrew.     298Papers  :  Major  John  Biddle  Porter. 
Posey,  Carnot.     299Letters  :  Dr.  Walter  L.  Fleming. 
Pricket,  John  A.     300Letters. 
Primer  Battn.  Activo  de  Oaxaca.     301Libro  de  Servicios  :     Rhode  Island 

Hist.  Soc. 
Puryear,  J.  F.     302Document. 

Quitman,  John  A.     303Papers  :  in  possession  of  the  family. 
Quitman,  John  A.     304Papers  in  the  Claiborne  Papers. 
Richardson,  C.  T.     305Recollections  :  Justin  H.  Smith. 
Riser,  J.  J.     306Recollections  (Mormon  Battalion). 
Roberts,  B.  S.     307Diary  and  letters  :  Brigadier  General  B.  K.  Roberts. 
Roberts,  Charles.     308Autograph  Collection  :  Haverford  Coll. 
Roessler,  Edward.     309Diary  :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Roque,  J.  K.     310Document. 

Santa  Anna,  A.  L.  de.     311Papers  :  Sen.  Lie.  D.  Genaro  Garcia. 
Santa  Anna,  A.  L.  de.     312Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Saunders,  J.  L.     313Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Sawyer,  Charles  H.     314Documents  for  the  Hist,  of  the  Conquest  of 

California  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Schouler,  William.     315Papers  :  Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc. 
Sherman,  W.  T.     316Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Sibley,  H.  H.     317Papers  :  Minnesota  Hist.  Soc. 
Smith,  C.  B.     318Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Smith,  George.     319Diary  :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Smith,  Persifor  F.     320Papers  :  State  Normal  School,  West  Chester,  Pa. 
Smith,  T.  F.     32lDiary  :  belonging  to  the  writer. 
Smith,  W.  B.     322Diary  :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Stevenson,  J.  D.     323Letter  Book  ;     324General  Order  Book ;    325Regi- 

mental  Order  Book  :  New  York  Hist.  Soc. 
Sumner,  Charles.     326Papers  :  Harvard  Univ.  Library. 
Sutherland,  D.  H.     327Letters  :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Sweet,  G.  N.     328Statement. 

Taliaferro,  William  B.     329Papers  :  Miss  L.  S.  Taliaferro. 
Taylor,  Zachary.     330Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Taylor,  Zachary.     331Papers  :  Henkels  catalogue. 
Tennery,  Thomas  D.     332Diary  :  Rev.  John  S.  Cook,  D.D. 
Tlacotalpam,  Mex.     333Judicial  Archives. 

Torres,  Manuel.     334Peripecias  de  la  Vida  California  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Trist,  Nicholas  P.     336Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Turner,  C.  B.     336Letter  :  belonging  to  the  family. 


572  APPENDIX 

Turner,  H.  S.     337Diary  :  Missouri  Hist.  Soc. 

U.  S.  House  of  Representatives.     338Files  :  Capitol,  Washington. 

U.  S.  House  of  Representatives.     339Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 

U.  S.  Military  Academy  (West  Point).     340Collection. 

U.  S.  Senate.     341Files  :  Capitol,  Washington. 

University  of  Illinois.     342Collection. 

Vallejo,  M.  G.     343Documentos  para  la  Hist,  de  California  :  Bancroft 

Coll. 
Vallejo,  M.  G.     344Recuerdos  Hist,  y  Personales  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Van  Buren,  Martin.     345Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Wade,  W.  P.     346Document :  belonging  to  the  family. 
Washburne,  Elihu  B.     347Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Watterston,  George.     348Notes  on  U.  S.  History  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Watterston,  George.     349Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Weber,  Juan  L.     350Recollections  (verbal). 
Webster,  Daniel.     351Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Weeks,  J.  W.     352Reminiscences  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Welles,  Edgar  T.     353Collection  :  Connecticut  Hist.  Soc. 
Welles,  Gideon.     354Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Wheaton,  Henry.     355Papers  :  Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc. 
Whitcomb,  T.  M.     356Diary  :  T.  J.  Whitcomb,  Esq. 
Wilcox,  C.  M.     357Diary  (portions  copied  by  him)  :  Claiborne  papers, 

Mississippi  Dept.  of  History. 
Williams,  Thomas.     358Letters  :  Rt.  Rev.  G.  Mott  Williams. 
Winthrop-Clifford.     369Correspondence  :  Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc. 
Winthrop-Kennedy.     360Correspondence  :  Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc. 
Woods,  William.     361Recollections. 
Worth,  G.  A.     362Papers  :  Library  of  Congress. 
Worth,  W.  J.     363Papers  :  W.  R.  Benjamin  Collection. 
Worth,  W.  J.     364Papers  :  Mrs.  K.  S.  Hubbell. 
Wyse,  F.  O.     365Papers  :  Miss  Mary  Wyse. 
Yale  University.     366Collection  (University  Library). 
Yell,  Archibald.     367Papers  :  Mrs.  R.  H.  Fitzgerald. 
Map  Division,  Library  of  Congress.     369Map  of  Palo  Alto. 
Taylor,  Zachary.     370Papers  :  Mrs.  W.  R.  StaufFer. 
Mitchell,  W.  I.     37lStatement. 

Hyde,  George.     372Statement  of  Hist.  Facts  on  California  :  Bancroft  Coll. 
Evans,  Joseph.     373Narrative  :  Justin  H.  Smith. 
Conner,  David.     374Letters  :  Henkels  catalogue. 
Madigan,  P.  F.     375Collection. 
Nicholson,  A.  S.     376Recollections (verbal). 

Willing,  Wildurr.     377Paper  on  Scott's  operations  (published  later). 
Winthrop,  R.  C.     378The  Mexican  War  Bill  (Massachusetts  Hist.  Soc.) 
De  Witt,  John.     379Collection  (see  also  No.  138). 


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